The American Socialist

New York Elections:

Battle of the Silver Spoons

In France:

Government by Blackmail

by Claude Bourdet



What's Wrong in Detroit?

Social Class and Mental Illness

OCTOBER 1958 *35 CENTS*

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

German Socialist

Thank you very much for the copies of the *American Socialist*. . . . I am a typesetter by profession, but when I came home in 1947 I couldn't get a job in my trade, and in order to support my old parents as well as my own family, I had to accept a job with the Federal Railways. There I earn 70 marks a week—about $17.50—which covers just food, after monthly expenses, as we must pay rent, 58 marks a month, gas and electric, 20 to 25 marks, insurance, 16 marks, radio, 2 marks. Clothing and shoes always need a special head-wracking, and so does the storage of coals for the winter. But we are used to living in a modest way in the country of the "Economic Miracle," profiting a few.

When Hitler came to power I was 13 years old. My father was a Social Democrat and free thinker. He was not much active under Hitler, but he was brought before a tribunal in the war for sabotaging the Nazi war effort. However, he lived through it, but his health is down since then. My father-in-law was thrown into the Moorlager concentration camp in 1934, and he lived through it too, but is a cripple. I was in North Africa from 1942, was captured in 1943, and shipped to the United States where I was in prisoner-of-war camps in Oklahoma and Massachusetts.

Today, with friends, we work to educate people to true socialism. Therefore, we appeal to you for help, for back copies of the *American Socialist,* for books like Harvey O'Connor's *Empire of Oil,* and so on, which we would like to use as tools to work over here. Of course, we learned soon that we need patience to educate workers, and so we intend to use your material to build a small, but effective, working library serving our community.

This community, Hagen, has a population of 186,000. It borders on the Ruhr empire of Krupp, and has steel and iron works. As to politics, there is apathy among the mass of the workers, unfortunately! Their main concern is to work overtime, and even extra hours on some other job, if time allows, to buy ice-boxes, television sets, and so on. They play in football pools and the races every week; money is their god today, they don't think of tomorrow, let alone politics, for Adenauer or Ollenhauer will think for them, so they say. Let's live today, who knows whether we live to see tomorrow, so they argue. Those voting for Adenauer listen to the priests who "advise" their flocks how to vote, how to defeat the Reds (every Social Democrat is a bloody Red to the Adenauer CDU).

So you won't wonder that concentration camp SS doctors continue to practice. Hitler officers are in commanding posts of the new Wehrmacht, even in NATO. Unfortunately, the Social Democratic Party has not done enough to fight the comeback of the SS men and Nazis. Thus you need not wonder that there are influential people who demand the return of lost territories; want to again establish Germany as the strongest military power in Europe; make alliances with the big German industrialists, Krupp, Thyssen, and others; play one NATO power against the other and reap the benefit, and so forth.

Apathy of the masses is bad! A shrewd politician can turn such a mass into a "hang them" crowd overnight. But we live in a revolutionary time, don't we? Even peoples in Asia and Africa turn revolutionary and soon their countries will have new faces. In Germany, already workers are on short-time work, and they grumble, for they have to live modestly again, and they don't like it. Today there are a few of them, but tomorrow?

So what is one to do? We can only work among the masses, enlighten them, educate them to the truth. And here the written word can do much if used properly. We ask your assistance, for we can't give up the work, despite apathy, despite opportunism and corruption.

F. J. *West Germany*

Information on Bellamy

I am gathering information for a book about the influence of Edward Bellamy, the famous author of *Looking Backward* and *Equality,* and am seeking answers to the following questions:

1) How did you first become acquainted with the books of Bellamy?

2) Do you remember anything about the use of his books—or excerpts from them such as "The Parable of the Water Tank"—by labor groups? If so, please name the labor union or labor reform group which used them for study material or propaganda.

3) Do you know anything about the use of his books by the different socialist groups —Marxian and non-Marxian—and about what use was made of them?

4) Were you ever a member of a Bellamy Club? If so, where and when? What type of program did it sponsor? What was the objective of the club?

5) Do you know of any religious groups which were influenced by or which used Bellamy's books?

6) Can you name any prominent American—lawyer, author, political leader, economist, etc.—who was a follower of Bellamy or who was influenced by his ideas?

7) Can you name any books which mention Bellamy or which were written under his influence?

8) Do you know of any colonies or communities which were formed under the influence of his ideas?

Any information that you may possess which is not covered by one of these questions will also be welcomed. Information which you possess may help fill an important gap in the book tentatively titled *Edward Bellamy at Home and Abroad: A Study of Influence.*

By way of identification, I might add that I am the author of *The Year 2000: A Critical Biography of Edward Bellamy* (New York: Bookman-Twayne, 1958); of "Bellamy's Missing Chapter" (March, 1958), *New England Quarterly;* and of sundry other articles and reviews.

Dr. Sylvia E. Bowman
714 Union Street
Fort Wayne 2, Indiana

Thank you for sending me copies of the June and July-August issues. Meanwhile, I found that a copy of the latter issue had arrived but had been mislaid; so I am enclosing $1 for the extra copy. It is a very fine issue and worth more than a dollar for Bert Cochran's article ["American Labor in Midpassage"] alone.

J. R. *Honolulu*

The American Socialist
October 1958 Vol. 5, No. 10

Published monthly, except July and August, when bi-monthly, by American Socialist Publications, Room 306, 857 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y. Telephone: WAtkins 9-7739, Subscription rates: $3.00 for one year; $5.50 for two years. By first-class mail: $5.00 for one year. Foreign $3.50 for one year; $6.50 for two years. Single copy; 35 cents. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

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The American Socialist

October 1958 Vol. 5, No. 10

New York Elections:

The Battle of the Silver Spoons

IN a nation precariously poised at recurrent brinks, and increasingly uneasy about its foreign policy, the coming elections present a curious picture. While serious issues demand new solutions, there is little sign of a crystallization of opinion or platforms. The Republicans and Democrats, considered as political parties with clear and significantly differing outlooks for this country, continue to be more shibboleth than reality. National policy, while formally the province of this best educated electorate in the world and its chosen representatives, is dictated, with little challenge, by a small and active coterie, while the bulk of the population drifts apathetically, hardly aware of the alternatives before it. Politics shares the stigma of the cheap, the shoddy, the trivial, and the vacant, that has come to mark so much of American life under the corporation raj.

Were it not so grim a joke, the elections in New York State would be worth little but laughter. The Democrats have renominated Averell Harriman of the railroad billions to run for the governorship, while the Republicans have chosen Nelson Rockefeller of the oil billions. The scale in which these two are balanced will have to be mighty sensitive to detect differences, and we foresee many a perplexed banker, broker, and corporation lawyer on Election Day. Good friends in personal life, both came to politics by the same route: Their wealth and position in the capitalist hierarchy gave them the right of appointment to high position and the exercise of power befitting distinguished scions of top families in the power elite. Their views on national and international problems appear to be sufficiently alike that they are virtually interchangeable parts in the machinery of government, and such differences as they may painfully manufacture before Election Day will also be the product of their common interest in running some kind of campaign. Both entertain Presidential ambitions which would have been thought ludicrous, if not dangerous, a generation ago.

Mauldin in the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*

"Battle of the Silver Spoons"

The *New York Times,* in commenting editorially on the state nominating conventions, smugly assessed the choice of candidates:

> *But, though we are not surprised today that a Harriman is running against a Rockefeller, voters of another day would have been. It is, perhaps, a sign of a healthier society that members of families holding great fortunes in trust feel a responsibility to serve their fellow citizens in public office and that the people, in turn, see nothing incongruous in being so served. It may be safely surmised that the average man in New York State will feel that his interests can be entrusted to a Harriman or a Rockefeller as benefactors of great wealth with complete confidence in their concern for the people, for the many as against the few.*

The patronizing assumption of *noblesse oblige* running through this paragraph may or may not describe the individuals concerned—on that score, closer friends of Rockefeller and Harriman than we find it possible to consult will have to speak. What is all wrong, however, is the claim of a "healthier society" signalized in this trend. For it is plainly a trend, not a freakish accident. Government and big capital are growing ever closer together. The underlying cause is undoubtedly the transformation of government into a vital hub of the business world through a multi-billion dollar permanent semi-war and war economy since 1940. From that time on dates the invasion of thousands of business potentates into the administrative and decision-making offices of the government by appointment of the three Presidents who have held office during this span. The capitalist class, no longer the crude, single-minded animal of its busy days of accumulation, has thrown up large numbers of representatives in whom the intense and greedy self-interest of an earlier age is veneered over with more attractive coatings of general class and "national" interests. As in other and older countries, "public service" is becoming the chief occupation of a stabilized and vastly enriched upper class, not generally out of corrupt motives of personal gain, but simply in the exercise of the prerogatives of rule that all the economic elites of history have claimed as theirs by birthright.

ROCKEFELLER'S entrance into electoral politics is a first-class example of the power wielded by our wealthy. Though a political neophyte, from the first expression of his interest in the nomination it was his as though by feudal due and obligation. Six weeks before the convention, there

were three candidates in the field besides Rockefeller: Leonard W. Hall, Paul W. Williams, and Walter J. Mahoney. Williams resigned on a Wednesday from his U.S. Attorney's job to run for the governorship, bowed out to Rockefeller on Friday, and then there were two. A week before the convention, Leonard Hall was swept aside by falling delegate commitments, and then there was one. Mahoney announced from Buffalo that he would "push forward with increased vigor" for the nomination, but within two days, he withdrew. Rockefeller remained as unanimous choice of a state convention which quickly rechristened him "Rocky," to the great delight of headline writers and *Time* feature scribblers who were soon doing their best to fit him to the image of a rough-and-tumble fighter coming up the hard way. Upon receiving the nomination, "Rocky" threw down the gauntlet to Harriman by saying: "I'll give him a run for his money"—a figure so apt that it ought to be preserved for posterity, when the gift of laughter will perhaps be restored.

Without aspersing Rocky's fighting qualities, it ought to be noted that, in running for nomination, it helps to have New York City's entire financial community behind you. The Republicans have long kept legislative power in the state in the hands of rural minorities upstate, in order to keep a check on liberal and advanced trends in the big city electorate. This has been accomplished by means of archaic "rotten borough" apportionment provisions in the state constitution. So outmoded are the electoral maps, that a candidate in the Third or Twelfth district in Queens can get from five to eight times as many votes as winners in some upstate districts, and still lose the election. But within their own party, they run things differently, making sure that the apportionment of delegates to state conventions is based on the total vote cast in each county, so that the city can keep control. Rockefeller went into the campaign for nomination with much of the New York City Republican strength committed to him, and the rest was easy. The bulldozer of wealth and influence rapidly leveled all before it, moving Leonard Hall to comment admiringly of Rockefeller: "There's magic in that name."

MEANWHILE, in the Democratic Party, a farce of another order was being played out. With the retirement of Irving Ives from the Senate, a place was opened for a new representative from New York. The Democratic trend, as illustrated in the Maine elections and California primaries, seems to give that party a good chance of winning the Senate seat. For this reason, Democratic Party leaders and ideologists, as well as the Liberal Party heads, placed a great deal of importance on the nomination. Although the Democrats have a majority in the Senate, so large a part of it is made up of reactionary Southerners that political liberals are intensely interested in getting a strong contingent from the Northern states, and if New York is not to supply at least one of those, it is doing far less than the expected. The liberals therefore came forward with a pretty strong front around the name of Thomas K. Finletter, former Secretary of the Air Force, with Thomas E. Murray, who used to be on the Atomic Energy Commission, as an acceptable second choice. It is not our purpose here to pass on the merits of these choices, but merely to record what happened.

Seemingly, every prominent figure of the Democratic Party in New York State was behind Finletter. Harriman, Mayor Wagner, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, former Senator Herbert H. Lehman, even state chairman Michael H. Prendergast, all favored him or Murray. Finletter appointed former police commissioner Francis W. H. Adams as his pre-convention manager, and the latter promptly informed the press that "almost all of my own friends are conservative people and I have found a high degree of support among them," thus appearing to make it unanimous. Manhattan's District Attorney Frank S. Hogan was also in the race, but, to the casual observer, only as an also ran. As late as August 22, three days before the convention, the *New York Times* reported:

> *While leaders of that [Democratic] party continued to insist that the race was wide open among the six declared candidates, it appeared that the contest was narrowing rapidly to either Mr. Finletter or Thomas E. Murray. . . . For reasons that were not immediately apparent, the candidacy of District Attorney Frank S. Hogan appeared to be losing ground. He reportedly was the preferred candidate of Carmine G. De Sapio, Tammany leader and the de facto head of the Democratic city organization.*

Various explanations were attempted as to why De Sapio favored Hogan. Some said he wanted to slap down the Liberal Party and liberal Democrats, and thus free his hands for a deal with the Southerners at the next national convention. The more cynical passed around the rumor that he wanted Hogan kicked upstairs to tighten his grip on the New York District Attorney's office. But whatever the explanation advanced, none couched his assessment of De Sapio's motives in any but power terms. For this man is head of a political machine obsequies for which have often been read but which never seems to stay buried. All and sundry recognize how incongruous it is to try to explain the actions of such a machine in terms of political ideologies. "The true character of the machine," D. W. Brogan aptly wrote in his *Politics in America,* "is its political indifferentism." The chief reason why America still abides so scandalous a situation as that of important statesmen being ordered around, or created to order, by politically indifferent power machines, is that political ideas play so small a role in American politics anyway.

DE SAPIO came to the convention with the entire New York delegation in his pocket; this alone, aside from the Buffalo support he worked up by a deal with the politicians from that fair city, was enough to give him the choice of the man who may be our next Senator from New York. By some quirk of character or ego, Carmine De Sapio is not content to rule the Democratic Party through Tammany, and feels he has to make noises like a national statesman as well. Getting a firm grip on the microphone, he filled in some of the hours before a choice could decently be made by assailing "the clogged and gutted dross of Republican indolence," called Sherman Adams "the President's principal prophet of political purity plunged

down from his pedestal," lashed out at "the helpless, hopeless, hapless confusion" of Republican foreign policy, and otherwise caused the assembled throng to chortle. He then named Hogan for elevation to the United States Senate. The entire hierarchy of Democratic political figures was furious—but powerless.



This presented the third of New York's parties with a dilemma. The 250,000 to 400,000 votes which a Democrat may receive on the Liberal Party line have generally been essential to win past statewide elections. But the Liberals had thrown their whole weight against Hogan, and had sworn to nominate Finletter on their own if Hogan was the Democratic choice. Apart from the general desire to see a more distinguished candidate in the field, a strong antipathy to Hogan on the part of union leaders in the New York area was behind this Liberal stand, as the New York District Attorney has made many more enemies than friends among union officials by his investigations and activities. Finletter was duly nominated, but, like a good politician, played the big-party game by refusing to run on a rump ticket. In this he was seconded by his former supporters. Herbert Lehman wired from Europe that although he was shocked by the convention action, the Liberals ought to back Hogan.

The Liberals' solution to their dilemma was not particularly novel. They applauded speeches like the one which said: "We don't have to spit in our own faces by endorsing Hogan. We are not a rubber stamp. We are a Liberal party composed of Liberals or we are nothing. If this party is to continue to exist we must put up our own independent candidate." And then they voted, three to one, to nominate Hogan.

Thus concluded a typical display of mid-century pre-election maneuvering by the major parties on the American scene. The two sides were now prepared to go to the electorate, secure in the knowledge that the voting results would be of little consequence to anyone save the candidates themselves, and that the democratic process had been effectively emasculated in advance. Whatever happens at the polls in November will not change the situation of the average citizen of the state for weal or for woe, the course of the government being effectively decided in quite other arenas.

ON the left, a slate of candidates has been nominated for the top state offices on a United Independent-Socialist ticket, as a result of the activities of former American Labor Party leaders and of the weekly *National Guardian,* supported by some socialist groups and individuals. With Corliss Lamont and John T. McManus heading the ticket for Senator and Governor respectively, an effort is being made to get on this year's ballot by way of nominating petitions, and then to stay there in succeeding elections by polling the minimum of 50,000 votes for Governor required to ensure ballot status.

The *American Socialist* has, from its inception, favored an independent radical electoral effort as an alternative to the hopeless Democratic-Republican twinship. Some years ago, before the debacle of American radicalism became clear in its full dimensions, we hailed efforts to launch independent campaigns somewhat more optimistically than we can at present. As a movement among the American people, socialism does not exist. As a radical current in American life, the ensemble of existing organizations has lost what credit and influence it once possessed. What remains of the left-wing movement is badly splintered among a number of groupings, none of which can claim with candor that it has discovered a fresh and effective approach of the kind that is so plainly required. In the existing situation, it is dubious how much of an impact can be made by election slogans and broadside appeals, although it has been shown that reasoned, from-the-ground-up educational efforts can make headway in rebuilding an audience for socialism.

What we are saying, to speak candidly as is our habit in these pages, is that there is little sign of even the beginnings of the sort of mood among the American people that would give a bit of buoyancy to such a campaign, and even less sign that the existing radical groups are in shape to launch it effectively. Our reservations about the effort are increased by the composition of the platform and slate, both of which indicate a continuation of some of the defects of the American Labor Party which assisted at its isolation. In particular, the inability of the new group to get its throat cleared for a cogent statement about Russia and the Soviet bloc cannot but be a defect in any try at renewed socialist campaigning in the United States.

What we have said here, in the interest of realism, about the drawbacks and difficulties of the United Independent-Socialist campaign does not mean that we have changed our minds in the slightest about the major parties. In particular, we remain unmoved by appeals to vote Democratic to "keep the Republicans out" or to assist the liberal elements in the Democratic Party. This reasoning sounds particularly hollow after Carmine De Sapio's last state convention. Those who argue that political progress may well come about in the form of upheavals in the Democratic Party may have a point. But we will not be able to do much good in any prospective realignments by tying radicalism to the coat-tails of the existing Democratic Party.

That means that radicals, socialists, even conscientious liberals, face the same problem of an acceptable alternative to old-party politics this coming election day as they have faced for some years gone by. A protest vote for all socialist candidates on the ballot (not including, of course, candidates of the Stalinized Communist Party) appears to us to be much better than no vote at all, and infinitely better than a vote which cuts across all lines of conscience, belief, and principle on the Democratic line. We are sure that our readers will register such a protest, not only in New York State, but wherever such an alternative is available.

De Gaulle gained power by posing as the only alternative to civil war, and uses the same threat to force a new monstrous political structure on the French people.

In France:

Government by Blackmail

by Claude Bourdet

GENERAL de Gaulle's current experiment cannot be judged solely from the constitutional point of view, nor solely from the point of view of the policy followed during his first three months, nor from these two points of view together; one must examine the close relationship between the institutional plans and the going policies.

As Pierre Mendès-France observed to a press conference, de Gaulle has never been and probably never will be as strong as he was during the first weeks of his new ascent to power. The Fourth Republic melted before military blackmail; de Gaulle had collaborated extensively with this blackmail in encouraging the men of Algeria, as he admitted in reply to a question that I posed to him during his press conference of May 19; without him, the military could only have gotten under way a vague adventure without perspective, like the Kapp putsch in Germany, and, as in that attempt, would have been at the mercy of a general strike. That remained true after the May 30 seizure of power: He could then have imposed his wishes upon the military if he had wanted. He could have done it with all the greater facility, as it was easy for him at that time to rally the people around him. The suicide of the Fourth Republic, more than its past weakness, had discouraged the Left. The Gaullist section of the French Left had succeeded, if not in persuading the rest of the Left that de Gaulle had liberal intentions, at least in keeping the question open. De Gaulle, had he immediately set straight the men he had used in order to achieve power, would have been in line with the great monarchistic Machiavellian tradition. That would not have displeased the people of France, since he would have been on the side of the people.

One can ask why he didn't do it; is he therefore completely the man of the Algerian "ultras," of the extreme Right and the military? Did he fool the liberals who visited him in 1956-1957? That is hardly possible; according to the formulation of one of his former collaborators, he is still more Louis XIV than Louis Napoleon. He is truly, as he says, a man belonging to no one, because as he ingeniously lets it be understood so often—and one should not fail to take this literally—he *is* in his own eyes *la France* and *l'Etat*. But in order to accomplish this gigantic act of historical retrogression, he must have powerful means of coercion. He therefore introduced a new method of government: *government by blackmail.* He could never have come to power without the events in Algeria. That is why his closest friends, such as Chaban-Dalmas and Soustelle, prepared the upheaval; although at the beginning it wasn't completely under their control. That is why, while simultaneously strategist and umpire, he encouraged the rebellion at the same time as he proposed to the French that he could save them; that is why, at the last moment, he menaced Pflimlin, Vincent Auriol and finally all of the citizenry, with his threat to abandon them to the parachutists and a civil war, and "to lock himself up at home for the rest of his life" if he were not called. This strategy, having been successful, was employed again several days later to extract from the National Assembly the right to write a new constitution and to submit it to the country without even consulting its elected representatives. It is still the same blackmail of *"au retour a Colombey-les-deux-Eglises"* that he employs to persuade the hesitant masses to give his constitution a favorable vote in the plebiscite. The specter of a civil war "if de Gaulle quits" is used as an agitational technique by all of his friends, who know very well that the Frenchman's desire for peace and tranquillity gives this technique an extraordinary degree of effectiveness.

THUS one can clearly understand why de Gaulle hardly made any efforts to set the military straight, and why he acceded to their wishes by decorating and promoting the officers and civilians convicted of having plotted against the Republic; and why at their demand he seized newspapers and gave the key job of Minister of Information to Mr. Jacques Soustelle, who immediately proceeded to line up the radio and television services in the fascist manner. In order to keep the frightful image of a civil war before the French people, it is indispensable that the menace of the colonels and of the "ultras" does not appear to diminish; and the activists of Algeria who understand to what degree de Gaulle needs them as scarecrows are not at all reluctant to profit from the consequences.

Will it be different tomorrow if the *"oui"* triumphs in the referendum? That is the continued pretense of the liberal Gaullists—who are a feeble percentage of the Gaullist mass, where one finds on the other hand pretty near all of the French Right. These liberal Gaullists, who maintain that de Gaulle "was not strong enough" to impose his will upon the men of Algeria and "that he will be strong enough and no longer will have need of them" after the referendum, think that then we will see the reappearance of a republican and liberal de Gaulle, in the image that they insist upon retaining. That is an honorable hope and a pious avowal; but one cannot construct a policy with this type of divination. In reality, de Gaulle will have less strength to move in the direction of liberty

Claude Bourdet is the well-known editor of France-Observateur, *which has in a decade of existence become the most influential left-wing weekly of Europe.*

and peace than he had yesterday. He will have less for institutional reasons: He will have to rely upon an Assembly whose election is being prepared with a system of voting designed to eliminate the Left. Even if his constitution gives little power to that Assembly, this power will weigh in the most reactionary direction. He will also be less able for psychological reasons; because the deception of the people, who expect that he is at least preparing the conditions for peace in Algeria, will be transformed more and more into an opposition that he will seek to vanquish or suffocate, but will do nothing to *convince.*

AND above all—as Mendès-France also recalled—blackmail begets more blackmail; it is very doubtful that de Gaulle will abandon this new and useful instrument of government. Everything demonstrates that he wants an Assembly which is most docile, that is to say, the most reactionary possible. It would be a good bet that the blackmail of a civil war will again be utilized during the November elections. For later in the game, in order to impose laws and to prevent popular reaction by a people that is bridled, canalized, and hemmed in on every side by new institutions, it will be immeasurably more useful for him to keep fresh the menace of the parachutists. If you consider that during the course of the same week when he announced to the workers a wage freeze, his Minister of Finance, Pinay, announced to the capitalists the pardon of those convicted of fraud, you can understand that keeping the machinery of military blackmail in good shape will not be a useless precaution for him.

Now, all of the factors that we are considering are also being considered by the military of Algeria. Though some shortsighted "ultras" proclaim a more rightist view on the independence that he has granted Africans—in order to harvest in Africa the *"oui"* that no French administrative apparatus is any longer able to fabricate by trickery, as they did in 1951—the Algerian colonels (and the whole network of military activists of which they are only the visible section) consider their pressure methods better. They know that Algeria will sooner or later be independent anyway. What is important to them is simply that the war lasts long enough to permit them to transform the French regime into a fascist regime; by no means do they fear a showdown with de Gaulle, because his earlier capitulations give them the feeling, which in my opinion is correct, that he depends much more upon them than they upon him.

This dependence is, again, increased by the monstrous nature of the institutional structure that is being submitted for referendum. Its characteristics have been extensively described by the best experts, who all insist that it places a barrier in the path of the normal functioning of universal suffrage. Let us here simply enumerate:

1) The election of the President of the Republic by 70,000 *notables* of whom more than half will be the men of influence in the villages, that is to say the most reactionary group in the country; which assures, not only the election and the re-election of General de Gaulle without any possible contest, but worse yet, the perennial election of this type of man to that office.

2) The gigantic powers accorded to the President of the Republic, far greater than those of the President of the United States; in particular, in Articles 11 and 12, the President, after having consulted only State bodies whose opinions he is not obliged to follow, can short-circuit the Assembly by presenting, over its head, new laws for referendum; he can dissolve the Assembly when he so desires; according to Article 16 he can assume all of the legislative power if he considers that "the institutions of State are menaced." This last article has a fraternal resemblance to Article 14 of the Royal Charter of Louis XVIII "granted" by the monarch—the article which permitted Charles X to promulgate the Ordinances of 1830—naturally eliminated after the revolution of 1830 by the Assembly when it revised the Charter. It is, by the way, comical to observe that by an irony of history that article originally carried the number 14, but when *France-Observateur* and *Le Monde* both noted the coincidence, Article 14 became Article 16. . . .

APART from these provisions and many others that make this constitution the least democratic that France has known since that of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, the conditions under which it is being proposed to the French people are absolutely frightful. To demand that the people reply yes or no to a complicated juridical text, containing more than 80 articles, and not previously discussed by any body chosen by universal suffrage; to demand this response with no counter-proposal simultaneously offered for consideration; to aggravate the difficulties of the electorate by compelling it to respond at the same time and in the same manner on the ultra-reactionary text on internal State institutions and also on the text for the links with overseas France—which by contrast is formulated to seduce the African population and gain the *"oui"* —that exceeds all limits of dishonesty, and makes this referendum a pure Bonapartist plebiscite. But the commentary with which the General and his friends accompanied the presentation of the project, repeating once more that if Frenchmen do not accept this *diktat* the General will abandon them to their fate, that is to say the menace of fascism from Algeria, and thus to a civil war, gives this plebiscite the virtual character of a caricature.

But what is perhaps most important for the future is

precisely the extreme mistrust of the people and the will to impose the system upon them at any price by blackmail and fear, and to prevent them from ever getting their bearings—which is demonstrated both by the text of the constitution and the methods employed. Here we have a fundamental characteristic of Gaullist thinking, and one finds it in diverse works of the General. According to the best paternalistic tenets, the General thinks he acts *for* the people, but wants to have nothing done *by* the people except to mock them and to take advantage of them, in the invariable manner of modern authoritarian regimes where popular suffrage provides a facade for arbitrariness.

IN the face of this masquerade, I can hardly understand how a republican can answer *"oui,"* and it seems that many of them that do it, do it with death in their souls and because "they see no other way." To this uneasiness, however, the *Union de la Gauche Socialiste,* the minority of the Socialist Party, and Mendès-France, have already replied by proposing that immediately after a victory of the *"non,"* a Constituent Assembly be called with the responsibility of drawing up a constitution not less but more democratic than that of the Fourth Republic. This problem is not difficult to resolve, and there is no need for all of the dictatorial guarantees invented by de Gaulle to assure a longer duration to the cabinet and to avoid the traditional pitfalls of French politics. It is sufficient that the government, while getting all of its powers from the Assembly, establish with it a sort of legislative contract which obliges the Assembly to go back to the electorate in case of a grave crisis—for example, at the conclusion of two cabinet crises. A bit more flexible than the English system, this formula would stabilize French politics perfectly. It is characteristic that the Communists, after having hesitated for a long time and having leaned towards the idea of a pure and simple return to the Constitution of 1946, now understand that such a solution would by no means be popular, and have also rallied to the idea of a Constituent Assembly.

Finally, everything may depend more on the volume of the *"non"* than on whether or not the constitution is adopted by the electorate. Even if the *"non"* were in a majority in metropolitan France, the stuffing of the ballot boxes, the organized intimidation of the voters in Algeria in the manner of 1951, would almost certainly reverse the balance. And the majority of *"oui"* that is certain in Black Africa—where the people see in the constitution and in the concessions that de Gaulle made to them a first step in the direction of complete independence—will, in effect, have the nearly certain result of giving a clear overall victory to the *"oui."* But if the *"non"* in metropolitan France is sufficiently large, it will be evident that the blackmail of civil war was ineffective, that Frenchmen are not afraid of the parachutists and other mutinous elements, and that they refuse to permit themselves to be cornered. The small, aggressive contingent of militarists will lose face, the clamorous, if resourceful and influential, Europeans of Algeria will suddenly become more reasonable, and it will still be possible to save French democracy. At the moment that I write these lines, the question is still open.

How Did de Gaulle Come to Power So Easily?

The following is from an interview with Claude Bourdet, by Francis Flavius, in the British Tribune *for July 18th:*

"HOW did de Gaulle come to power so easily?" Claude Bourdet, editor of *France-Observateur* and leader of the Left Socialist Union of France, repeated my question thoughtfully.

"First," he said, "you must never forget that the people didn't want de Gaulle. The last-minute rally of a quarter of a million Parisians was proof of that. But you know, people are the same the world over. They'll only resist when they are given strong, clear leadership and a fighting chance of success.

"That's what was lacking. The Left parties wavered and hesitated. Faced with the threat from Algiers, they were led astray and divided by the notion of de Gaulle as the lesser evil."

I put the much-discussed question: "Is this fascism?" Bourdet replied: "It seems to me that people in England are too prone to lay down that any system must be either fascism or democracy. We're living in the shadows between the two, and probably shall be for quite a while.

"De Gaulle lacks a mass fascist movement like the Nazi Party. He relies on a party of a peculiar kind—the Army. I mean, of course, the colonels; I don't know why we talk about an army as if it had no soldiers. The props of this regime are the military clique and big business. So we get an authoritarian system that reminds us of Napoleon III's Empire more than anything else."

Here he added a warning. "It may get a lot tougher if de Gaulle wins his plebiscite in October and is confirmed with powers to overrule Parliament. Don't forget that Mussolini ruled through a coalition and did nothing drastic for a considerable time after his march on Rome.

"Six months after that event, Amendola, an Italian Socialist who later died in a fascist jail, was calling on his followers to back Mussolini as the only bulwark against the wild men and extremists."

"Don't you think that things are getting tougher already?" was my next question.

"Very much so," Bourdet agreed. "Soustelle's appointment is a danger signal. During the critical last days of May, de Gaulle gave one promise to Mollet and Auriol—that Soustelle would be kept out of the Government. You can judge from that how fatal it is to trust de Gaulle."

I WENT back to the key subject of disunity on the Left. "The Socialist Party," Bourdet explained, "has fatally compromised itself and demoralized its supporters by leading the jingo crusade in Algeria. The Communists, too, have thrown away their position in the van of the working-class by their intolerance and rigidity. Yet the scattered following of both parties has got to be united and mobilized again. We in the Left Socialist Union see that as our main job."

"You think that alliance with the Communists is a necessity?"

"Absolutely," Bourdet said. "And we're not frightened of it. It's part of the Gaullist blackmail to argue that a People's Front automatically means a Communist coup. We're not afraid of working with the Communists because we preserve our independence, hit out at them when it's necessary over something like the murder of Nagy, and keep our followers loyal to democratic, militant socialism."

Longer, lower, wider, ever more cheaply betinselled and costly to buy and operate, the famous product of Detroit is running into more and more consumer resistance.

What's Wrong in Detroit?

by Frank Bellamy

CREEPING paralysis is laying low the largest single manufacturing industry in the world—the United States automobile industry. For the third successive year, sales of new automobiles are down to barely half the number produced during the peak year of 1955. Forecasters are predicting that this fall's crop of cars, most of which will be hitting the showrooms October and November, will fare little better.

Reasons for the buyers' strike are not difficult to find. First is the irrationality of the industry itself. Automobile executives, like most business executives, are loath to admit that shrinking job opportunities, continued unemployment, and declining family income have anything to do with slump in sales. They do not concede a shortage of consumer purchasing power. Instead, like Edward T. Ragsdale, general manager of General Motors' Buick division, they blame "needless hoarding" of money. Consumer confidence, Ragsdale says, has simply been sapped by all the talk about the recession. The raggedness of Ragsdale's hypothesis was demonstrated this spring by the dismal showing of the "You Auto Buy Now" campaign which, through elephant rallies and newspaper hoopla, sought to impress upon all patriotic citizens that failure to buy a new car was little short of treason. In some cities the campaign fell flat on its face; in others the slight upturn in sales barely paid for the crash advertising. The (May 6) *New York Times* reported: "The consensus was that most of the public, as well as many of the dealers, was unimpressed by or uninterested in the tactics to spur depressed automobile sales here."

The auto plants have the capacity to turn out twice as many cars as the public can afford to buy. The industry's inability to recognize, or unwillingness to admit, this elementary fact of overproduction and underconsumption only compounds its troubles. As an indepedent auto maker puts it, GM, Ford, and Chrysler are "muscle-bound"; their very hugeness, let alone their obstinacy, hinders them from rolling with the recession punch. With a new approach the auto builders might have fared better this year. But Detroit's approach was simply a repeat on its once-magic formula—making the "low-priced" cars bigger and more powerful, and hoisting price tags all along the line for the fourth year in a row.

THE public is becoming increasingly wary of phony come-ons, price-packing, high interest and insurance rates, costly repairs, lemons—and more concerned with economical, safe operation in less flashy, less pseudo-Freudian-inspired machines whose styles don't change for change-sake alone.

Phony Come-Ons: Not a few errant auto dealers lure the public to their showrooms with bait advertisements of non-existent cars or cars the dealer has no intention of selling or—another favorite gimmick—with misleading prices. These sharp practices have helped to keep many disillusioned car buyers at home.

Price-Packing: Nearly all American cars now have what is known as a "pad" built into their price. The pad, which may range from $300 to $1,000, is for the sole purpose of allowing the dealer to make what would seem to be an outlandish trade. The May 12 *Time* says: "There is so much razzle-dazzle and price-packing in the auto salesman's spiel that list price is a joke. Ford, Plymouth and Chevrolet, for example, all post about the same factory list price on their cars. But by the time all the extras have been tacked on, the actual delivered price is much more." The May 2 *U. S. News & World Report* quotes a San Francisco dealer: "Car shoppers . . . are confused to the point where they're afraid they're getting gypped and won't buy at all."

Installment Debt: Interest charges on installment loans have always been high and remain high. Recession-hit families already sweating out monthly payments for refrigerators, washing machines and TV sets, have hesitated to take on the added burden of new car payments. Since 60 to 80 percent of new cars are bought on the installment plan, this debt-shyness is significant.

Insurance Rates: Auto liability insurance rates in a great many states have risen this year by anywhere from a few percentage points to as much as 25 or 30 percent. Collision insurance has also gotten an upward, if more modest, bump in price. Comprehensive coverage now costs some motorists in the neighborhood of $300 a year. The reason, the January 25 *Business Week* reports, is that "auto accidents in 1957 hit the highest figure in highway history . . . basic cost elements have soared in the last year or two—hospital and medical fees, compensation for lost earnings, and charges for repairing late-model automobiles, which are loaded with expensive, easy-to-damage parts."

Costly Upkeep: Auto repairmen and auto parts dealers are enjoying good business this year despite the lag in new car sales. The August 10 *New York Times* reports that an "important factor is that the modern automobile has many more parts than those of a decade ago. Some of these parts must be replaced more frequently because of the punishment they take from today's high compression

Frank Bellamy is the pen name of a New Jersey newspaperman.

engines." Such mechanical geegaws as the eight-barrel carburetor, quadruple headlights (twice as difficult to adjust), six-muffler exhaust system, power brakes, power steering and push-button windows multiply repair and replacement costs.

Lemons: "Thousands of potential automobile customers refuse to buy at today's high prices because of the increasingly poor workmanship of the domestic automotive product," says the August *Mechanix Illustrated*. *Time* reports in its May 12 issue: "As for workmanship, the tales of the lemons are legion. Cars arrive from the factory with unwelded cross braces, drill bits broken off in screw holes, leaky windows, poor body fitting, the wrong parts—or missing parts. When customers complain, they get little sympathy. The stock answer to every automotive woe from leaky trunks to loose air vents is, as one Milwaukee owner sadly reports, 'Can't fix it; they all do that.'"

The Stretch-Out: In the last ten years cars in the eight most popular lines have grown an average of 18.2 inches longer and 6.2 inches wider: Too long and too wide for the garage of many a homeowner who would rather stick with his old klunk than pay for alterations. Stretched-out autos discourage people who street-park in car-infested cities. Each time the manufacturers add six inches to overall length, they add 50 miles of sheet metal (in a normal year's production) to the traffic load. The composite 1959 car will be even larger.

Gas-Gulpers: Potential buyers have also kept in mind that big-horsepowered cars guzzle gas, and premium "hi-test" gas at that.

Unsafe: High horsepower enables many new cars to go over 100 miles an hour (on level roads) without the accelerator hitting the floor. A driver can cruise 80 or 90 on a good road with deceptive smoothness without realization of the dangers. All too often the car goes "out of control." Too much speed to handle. Industry big-wigs rightly point out that most car buyers care less about safety details than appearance. Yet some potential buyers must have been scared away by the "shocking number of projections and sharp edges inside 1958 cars by which, in a panic stop even at low speed, occupants may be injured" (*Consumer Reports,* April)—and by dangerously unsupported, pillarless hardtops, vision-distorting windshields, and light-gauge, easily crumpled sheet metal.

Anti-Flashiness: The American auto industry pioneered in such engineering achievements as the hydraulic brake and the automatic transmission. The research continues. GM, for example, has developed a V-8 aluminum engine that weighs about 30 percent less than the present cast iron V-8s. Nevertheless, GM and its competitors seem more concerned with putting new faces on their wares than in improving their innards. For the most part the industry has stuck to its precept that "$10 worth of chrome does more for sales than $100 worth of engineering." But does it? There is increasing evidence—such as the remarkable success of small, sparsely chromed European cars in the American market, that customers are beginning to rebel against longer, lower, wider, flatter, splashier, chromier, finnier, more luxury-loaded machines.

Snobbery Is Slipping: Originally there were many kinds of cars, covering a wide range of tastes and prices and functions. But they have grown more and more alike. E. B. White puts it very well in the April 5 *New Yorker*: "Big cars have grown smaller, small cars have grown bigger, all cars have grown lower, all cars have gone up in price." And again: "The cars pass in an endless parade, and there



is a terrible sameness to them—a litter of lively pigs from the brood sow in Detroit. Some are slightly upswept, some are slightly downcast (like the industry itself). But almost all of them seem to have been poured from the same mold. . . ." The effect of blurring distinctions between brands has been to reduce the snob appeal of the higher-priced cars.

Anti-Motivationalism: There is increasing evidence that reason is reasserting itself among the car-buying public. This augurs ill for the motivation researchers who have convinced many a Detroit executive that people don't buy automobiles for transportation, but to satisfy dreams of sex, speed, power and wealth. E. B. White again: "In motordom architects and engineers are not permitted to work undisturbed; their elbow is constantly being jiggled by tipsters, pollsters, motivationalists, and dream-mongers. . . . The method used in Detroit is to turn some engineers loose in one room and some stylists in another room, while the motivational pixies scamper back and forth whispering secrets in everybody's ear, and after months of such fooling and plotting and compromising and adjusting, then out comes the new automobile, and no wonder it carries the telltale marks of monstrosity on its poor tortured body. In many cases it looks as though the final licks had been given it by a group of emotionally disturbed children." John Keats, author of "The Insolent Chariots," said in the August issue of *Playboy* that Detroit was in the habit of building "deliberate sexual symbols" to represent "the shape of the customers' sexual shortcomings. This is the reason the manufacturers stick penial shapes on the hoods of their cars. This explains why Cadillac's stylists candidly talk of the breast on their bumpers; why Buick came up with its famous ring pierced by a flying phallus; why knowing Detroiters complimented the Edsel people for achieving 'the vaginal look'; why so many Detroit stylists lavish so much attention on the rear ends of automobiles." Such appeals to neurosis are proving decreasingly effective.

Obsolescence Is Becoming Obsolete: Planned obsolescence means deliberately bringing out a product aimed at making last year's model appear out of date. Many autoists still trade in last year's car to keep up with this year's style. But many others no longer fall for glitter and gingerbread palmed off in lieu of good design. Walter Dorwin Teague, founder of one of the oldest and largest industrial design firms, says: "One of the causes of the recession is

the refusal of our people to be seduced any longer by planned obsolescence. The design sensibilities of the public have been offended (and) they have no desire to spend their money on a lot of nothingness." The Big Three, however, remain wedded to an annual change of models and have spent an estimated $1.5 billion on the "new, all new" 1959 models. In contrast, no faceliftings are in store for the 1959 foreign cars. Annual changes, say Europe's auto makers, drive prices too high. With plants working at near capacity and customers waiting, the Europeans ask: "Why change a winner?" The 1959 Volkswagen, for example, will look pretty much like the first Volkswagen produced in 1940.

GM, Ford and Chrysler feel obliged to maintain the price line even when sales are in low gear. The official index of consumer prices rose 20 percent in the 1948-58 decade but today's car, in the equivalent price bracket, is up 57 percent. In 10 years the list price of a two-door Buick Super sedan has jumped from $1,800 to $4,000. No price reductions are in the offing. "Most factory list prices of the 1959 models will be unchanged from 1958," says the July 11 *U. S. News & World Report*. The motor moguls blame rising material, labor, depreciation and other costs, but the United Automobile Workers Union has effectively documented its case that price increases came before, and far outstripped, the rises in wage rates. Even the *Wall Street Journal* (December 10, 1957) acknowledged that "wage increases can hardly explain away all the 1958 price rises. . . . If wages rose 18.6 cents an hour in the past year, as Ford Vice President Benson Ford asserted recently, this would have boosted costs less than $25 on the car. . . . This estimate ignores productivity rises which offset at least part of the higher wages." The *Journal* made its own estimate that corporate profit on a sample car had risen by $55 since 1953—to $255. The fabulous profits earned by the industry in the last 10 years—approximately $10 billion net, have been less fabulous this year. GM's profit for the first half was 30.6 percent under the comparable 1957 figure, Ford's profit was down 96 percent, Chrysler finished $25 million in the red. Why then haven't auto prices been reduced in an attempt to bolster sagging sales and earnings? The answer seems to be that the auto industry, among the most concentrated in the country, has a gentlemen's agreement to sustain prices even where it makes a revival of production more difficult.

This much seems certain: The break-even production point has been declining. The more efficient companies, GM in particular, can operate with a profit at well below full capacity. GM can make substantial net profits ($333.5 million in the first six months of this year) at low levels of operation, and its profit potential at high rates of operation is tremendous. The industry today has more unused capacity than at any time since the 1930s. Despite this, investment is still high and is adding to capacity all the time.

Since the American auto industry made a shaky start in 1893, it has narrowed from more than 2,700 different automobiles to 16. Requiem was sung in the '58 model year over four famous cars—the Hudson, Nash, Packard and Continental. The death rate may rise even higher. The March 31 *Time* predicts that "in the future, many of the overlapping models produced by the big five may also disappear." GM cars, though down in volume, have captured another 6 percent of the market, accounting in the first eight months of this year for 53 percent of the domestically produced total. George Romney, president of American Motors (Rambler), long ago proposed that GM and Ford be broken up. Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., although he once remarked that the Big Three's saturation of the market "constituted a monopoly," "investigated" Romney's proposal for five years without translating his own criticism into an anti-trust suit. GM's pre-eminence is damaging not only to its competitors but also to its suppliers and dealers, who constantly complain of unfair squeezes. The Dealers Association predicts that 3,500 new car dealers will go out of business this year. Already there have been over 150 bankruptcies, twice last year's.

AUTOMATION has increased the proportion of indirect as against direct labor. In the ten-year period, 1947 to 1956, the number of automotive employees engaged in the processing of information increased 24.3 percent, while the number of production workers declined 3.5 percent. Automation has also accentuated the tendency of automobile production to outstrip demand. In good times automation drives displaced manpower into other, and often lower-paying fields of employment; in bad times such as these, into the street. Then, too, automation has accentuated the tendency of production to gravitate increasingly under the control of fewer and larger firms. Inability to automate as fast and as extensively as the Big Three hastened the death or merger of several independent producers.

One factor behind higher prices is that costs in the factory are a declining fraction of the costs borne by the new car buyer, who pays increasingly more for yearly model change-overs, hidden and open taxes, transportation from factory to showroom, and advertising. An industry-wide survey which appeared in *Advertising Age* indicated that from 1950 to 1956 advertising expenditures per car tripled in most instances, and multiplied almost six-fold in others. Advertising per Chrysler, for example, jumped from $18.62 to $103.04; on Continentals to a tidy $709.09.

The glut in autos is more acute than the glut of total goods and services in the entire economy. But when autos are in trouble, it's a serious matter for all segments of the interdependent industrial society. The car is really the nation's No. 1 consumer item; when it languishes, everything languishes. The auto industry, directly or indirectly, normally accounts for one job out of seven in the country. It uses 17.8 percent of the nation's steel, 64.8 percent of its rubber, 70 percent of its plate glass, 33 percent of its radios, 42.4 percent of its lead, 28.2 percent of its zinc. So important are auto sales that some analysts have speculated that their decline last fall pulled down the entire economy. The May 25 *New York Times* said: "It is significant that car production actually turned down last year well before the recession became apparent. Thereafter steel went down, automotive equipment and, eventually, just about everything else. Is it a case of the tail, autos, wagging the body of the economy? Could be."

An important new insight into the nation's Number One health problem has been gleaned by an exhaustive community study, upsetting many common current notions.

Social Class and Mental Illness

by Harry Braverman

TUNE in on the conversation of any group of educated and knowledgeable people, and you are pretty sure to find the talk, from time to time, veering over into mental illness, psychosis, neurosis, Freud, civilization and its discontents. You would not have to monitor many such conversations before you discovered a prevailing notion of high popularity and wide acceptance. We know now—you would hear—that the old thinkers were wrong in postulating man's economic problems as central to his life structure. Moral and psychological troubles have taken over from the social and economic. As we grow well-to-do, boredom with a leisured and tasteless life, a life without values or standards other than the material, sets in. This shapes up as the major problem of the future—you would hear from your assorted conversationalists.

Implied in this theory, and sometimes flatly stated, is the assumption that an increase of mental troubles goes hand in hand with the betterment of standards of living. Just what support this assumption has in actual fact has never been clear. Very few comparative statistics of mental illness are available. Rates of alcoholism, suicide, and homicide are claimed to be higher in some of the wealthy Western countries than in poorer nations, but these claims are not very conclusive,* and even if they were, it is a long leap from there to the conclusion, unsupported by facts, that the better-off within the industrial nations are the chief sufferers from mental illness.

Perhaps the notion gets more support from intangibles than hard statistics. The novels of D. H. Lawrence and the many who have followed him stress the Freudian theme of repressions in polite upper- and middle-class society as the chief cause of unhappiness and neurotic behavior, while among the "free" and "untrammeled" lower classes, who take sex where and as they find it, mental balance reigns supreme. A play mentioned by Freud, typically, depicts the landlord's daughter as developing hysteria from feelings of guilt and conflict over a purely platonic love affair, while, by contrast, the janitor's daughter is lustily engaged in a variety of sexual pursuits without remorse. As against the complex and neurotic rich, the image of the worker is painted, rejoicing in animal-like health, saved from inner conflict by his freedom from convention and his lack of mental and emotional subtlety.

FICTION, pseudo-learned journalism, fleeting impressions, extrapolations from a plausible theory, middle-class and academic moods, all these appear to have gone into the making of this now-dominant idea. Just as reading too much Agatha Christie and Rex Stout can convince the unwary that crime is an exclusively leisure-class occupation, so too many New Yorker cartoons, hot-air seminars, egocentric observations, and hard-shelled isolation from the bulk of humanity can and have convinced many that psychiatric trouble is a refined and delicate prerogative of the upper layers of society.

Nothing, as a brilliant and courageous community study that has recently been completed conclusively demonstrates, could be further from the truth. *Social Class and Mental Illness* (John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1958, $7.50) is one of the most successful academic performances of recent years. One of its authors, August B. Hollingshead, Professor of Sociology at the Graduate School, Yale University, is noted for the soundness and thoroughness of his exploration of class differences in American society. The other, Fredrick C. Redlich, is chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at Yale. They headed a team of social scientists and psychiatrists which, over a ten-year period, made an exhaustive investigation into the New Haven community, approximately 240,000 in population, in an attempt to determine whether there is any relationship between social class and mental illness. To say that their findings are staggering is an understatement; they overturn every popular notion and glib assumption described above.

IT seems to me the authors deserve high commendation on two grounds besides the intrinsic merits of the work. First, is the courage and forthrightness it displays. Both social class and mental illness, as the authors point out, are topics that Americans would rather avoid. How much more unpleasant, how much more against the grain of current moods, to deal with the two in tandem! Despite the scholarliness, an undercurrent of strong feeling occasionally breaks through which will give many comfortable citizens, and especially psychiatrists, some uneasy hours. Early in the book the scene is set in the following grim paragraph:

> *Both social class and mental illness may be compared to an iceberg;* 90 *percent of it is concealed below the surface. The submerged portion, though unseen, is the dangerous part. This may be illustrated by recalling what happened when an "unsinkable" trans-Atlantic luxury liner, the* Titanic, *rammed an iceberg on her maiden*

* "The suicide rate varies widely from country to country. In France, Belgium, and Denmark it is three times as high as in Norway, Spain, and Italy. Contrary to widespread opinion, there is no close correlation between the number of suicides and industrial progress or urbanization. The number of suicides rises in some countries and declines in others, following divergent and little-known trends." (W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production,* New York, 1953.)

voyage in 1912. *In that crisis, a passenger's class status played a part in the determination of whether he survived or was drowned. The official casualty lists showed that only* 4 *first class female passengers* (3 *voluntarily chose to stay on the ship*) *of a total of* 143 *were lost. Among the second class passengers,* 15 *of* 93 *females drowned; and among the third class,* 81 *of* 179 *female passengers went down with the ship. The third class passengers were ordered to remain below deck, some kept there at the point of a gun.*

The second special virtue of the book is that it adds substantially to our knowledge. In this day and age of academic boondoggling, of research grant studies which gleefully come up with the news that tall men weigh more than short men, or that rich men own more automobiles than poor, in the present academic atmosphere that stresses the trite, the obvious, or the inconsequential and miniscule in order to avoid the important, a study of this kind stands out as impressive by its rarity alone. As to the importance of the subject, little need be said. The approximately three-quarters of a million persons currently hospitalized in United States mental institutions, occupying 55 percent of all hospital beds, the 980,000 discharges and 865,000 rejections by the armed forces in World War II on psychiatric grounds, the estimates of seven to eight million Americans who could benefit from psychiatric care if available, all speak eloquently of what has come to be our foremost health problem.

NOW to get at some of the results: The study began with a full-scale class stratification of the community, based upon a careful five-percent sample, which was cross checked against the 1950 census results. Hollingshead's famous Index of Social Position, which uses area of residence, occupation, and education as the basic factors in classification, was applied to the sample, distributing the population into five classes:

Class I, consisting mainly of executive and professional men, "major office holders, such as on the boards of trustees, presidents, vice presidents, secretaries, and treasurers in the larger industries, construction and transportation companies, stores, banks, brokerage houses, and utilities," makes up 3.4 percent of the community.

Class II, including chiefly managerial and professional personnel below the decision-making level, and proprietors of middle-range businesses, includes 9 percent of the population.

Class III, salaried administrative, clerical, supervisory, and technical people, plus the owners of small businesses and bottom-rung semi-professionals, takes in 21.4 percent of the population.

Class IV, made up of skilled and semi-skilled workers, and clerical and sales workers, is by far the largest, embracing almost half—48.5 percent—of the population.

Class V, the lower ranges of semi-skilled, unskilled, and unemployed workers. perhaps best identified in the self-description of the bitter realists in the group who call themselves "lower-class slum dwellers," makes up the final 17.7 percent.

These figures agree with national occupational statistics in placing about two-thirds of the population in the working-class category. If an attempt is made to demarcate a "ruling" or "capitalist" class on the basis of these classifications, the results are somewhat more vague, as the concept is harder to pin down. Certainly all of New Haven's power elite is encompassed by classes I and II, although some part of class II is probably better described as middle class. At any rate, the authors' survey of the class structure of the New Haven community is a model of its kind, not limited to bare statistical bones, but including

Two Case Histories

THE case histories of two compulsively promiscuous adolescent females will be drawn upon to illustrate the differential impact of class status. . . . Both girls came to the attention of the police at about the same time but under very different circumstances. One came from a core group class I family, the other from a class V family broken by the desertion of the father. The class I girl, after one of her frequent drinking and sexual escapades on a weekend away from an exclusive boarding school, became involved in an automobile accident while drunk. Her family immediately arranged for bail through the influence of a member of an outstanding law firm; a powerful friend telephoned a newspaper contact, and the report of the accident was not published. Within twenty-four hours, the girl was returned to school. In a few weeks the school authorities realized that the girl was pregnant and notified her parents. A psychiatrist was called in for consultation by the parents with the expectation, expressed frankly, that he was to recommend a therapeutic interruption of the pregnancy. He did not see fit to do this and, instead, recommended hospitalization in a psychiatric institution to initiate psychotherapy. . . . In due course, the girl delivered a healthy baby who was placed for adoption. Throughout her stay in the hospital she received intensive psychotherapy and after being discharged continued in treatment with a highly regarded psychoanalyst.

The class V girl was arrested by the police after she was observed having intercourse with four or five sailors from a nearby naval base. At the end of a brief and perfunctory trial, the girl was sentenced to a reform school. After two years there she was paroled as an unpaid domestic. While on parole, she became involved in promiscuous activity, was caught by the police, and sent to the state reformatory for women. She accepted her sentence as deserved "punishment" but created enough disturbance in the reformatory to attract the attention of a guidance officer. . . . The psychiatrist who saw her was impressed by her crudeness and inability to communicate with him on most subjects. He was alienated by the fact that she thought masturbation was "bad," whereas intercourse with many men whom she hardly knew was "O.K." The psychiatrist's recommendation was to return the girl to her regular routine because she was not "able to profit from psychotherapy." *Social Class and Mental Illness.*

historical, cultural, residential, educational, religious, ethnic, and status descriptions which adequately convey the flavor of life and social position at each level.

THE next major step in the study was to conduct an exhaustive psychiatric census, with the aim of uncovering every patient in mental treatment in the community, including patients of private doctors, public and private hospitals, and clinics. Nearly 1900 patients were found, and their case histories and social position analyzed and classified according to uniform standards. The authors were then in a position to proceed with statistical correlations, with the object of answering two major questions: "Is mental illness related to social class? Does a mentally ill patient's position in the status system affect how he is treated for his illness?"

Before going ahead, we should note and emphasize that this study covered only patients actually undergoing some kind of treatment at the time of the study. Insofar as there are numbers of mentally ill persons, probably large numbers, who are not receiving treatment, this study is not complete; it is hard to see how a census of all mentally ill, including those not under medical care, could be made. But the likelihood, reinforced by many details of this study, is that the proportion of untreated mentally ill among the poorer classes is much higher than that among the wealthy. Thus, if there is any bias to the results, it is in the direction of the topmost classes.

The basic finding is presented in a table (p. 199) on "Class Status and the Distribution of Patients and Nonpatients in the Population":

Class	Population, percent	
	Patients	Nonpatients
I	1.0	3.0
II	7.0	8.4
III	13.7	20.4
IV	40.1	49.8
V	38.2	18.4

As this table shows, class I individuals are under-represented in the patient population, having only a third as many patients as might be expected in an even distribution. Class II, III, and IV are also under-represented, but not anywhere near to the same degree as class I. Class V, however, has more than double the percentage of patients as it has in the general population. When these results are tested by controlling such variables as age, sex, religion, race, and marital status—which the authors do with exemplary thoroughness—nothing in them is significantly altered. As a matter of fact, adjusted for age and sex, the following rates per 100,000 of population of treated mental illness are arrived at: class I and II—553; class III—528; class IV—665; class V—1668. With a small dip for class III, the results show an unmistakable correlation to the detriment of the poorer classes, a correlation which grows extraordinarily strong for class V.

But this is only the beginning of the story. More of it emerges when the study moves on to break the figures down between neuroses and psychoses. The authors do not undertake the thankless task of trying to define the vague boundaries between these two classifications of mental ill-



ness. But the reader can get an idea of the general difference by noting that, while almost 90 percent of all neurotics in the present study are treated on an ambulatory basis, over 90 percent of the psychotics have to be hospitalized. Now, in classes I and II, some two-thirds of the patients are neurotics by diagnosis, while in class V, nine-tenths of the patients are psychotics, and the classes in between fall into place on the scale in perfect order. Just what these vast differences mean is not clear—whether the seriousness of illness increases as one moves down the class scale, or whether far larger numbers of neurotics in classes IV and V never get into treatment, or a combination of both—but whatever the explanation, the effect of these results is to enormously reinforce the finding that mental illness strikes more heavily as one moves down the scale from capitalist and middle class through working class and slum dweller.

AMONG the psychotic disorders, the rates of prevalence are sharply related to class: class I and II—188 per 100,000 population; class III—291; class IV—518; class V—1505. With the rate in class IV almost triple that in the two highest classes, and with the rate in class V fully eight times that in the two highest classes, there is little doubt about the correlation. And, with typical thoroughness, the authors close a loophole to those who might try to claim that psychotic patients have "drifted down" in the class structure as a result of their illnesses, by drawing on their voluminous materials to show that this is not the case.

The next major portion of the study is devoted to discovering how class position affects the kind of treatment patients receive. Since classical Freudian psychoanalysis and other kinds of analytic psychotherapy are slow, subtle, delicate, and most of all, expensive, it will not surprise us to learn that hardly any of the class IV and class V patients get that kind of treatment, while large percentages of class I and II patients receive the benefits of these techniques. On the other hand, the rougher treatments with more limited aims, like shock, drugs, operations, and the hopeless "custodial care" category (which simply means "put away," often under frightful conditions) are heavily concentrated in the two lower groups. Those who do not believe we have a definite class structure in this country should ruminate upon the facts in this book, which show that if you are schizophrenic (the largest single class of psychotics) and you belong to classes I or II, the chances are you will get psychotherapy; if you belong to classes III or IV, you are most likely to be treated by one of the organic therapies; and if you are in class V your fate will

probably be custodial care in a public hospital where "the visitor sees scores of aging men and women sitting idly in the long dark hallways, pushing mops purposelessly, or trailing, like a flock of hungry chickens, behind the doctor when he walks through the wards."

Social inequalities in treatment are seen most clearly among schizophrenic patients. The class IV or V schizophrenic, once cast off by his family and community, may receive one or two series of organic treatments in a public hospital. If these treatments do not succeed, the patient drifts to the back wards where in stultifying isolation he regresses even more into a world of his own. Rarely, however, do we see in the class I or II schizophrenic patients in private hospitals, who may get the benefit of psychotherapy and environmental treatment, deterioration comparable to what we see regularly in the chronic wards of the state hospitals. Indeed, in wealthy families who can afford to provide show farms and boat yards as occupational therapy for their schizophrenic scions we have observed over a period of years unmistakable schizophrenic symptomatology, but little deterioration. We have, in view of our clinical observations and of newer experiences on "isolating" individuals, every reason to believe that to expose schizophrenics to a "back ward atmosphere" is the worst thing we can do to them. These differences add up to deep social fissures in psychiatric treatment, such as we do not encounter in the rest of medicine with the possible exception of peacetime cosmetic surgery.

When the authors approach the public clinics, they discover some surprising things. Even though payment for treatment at a public clinic is either absent or nominal, based on ability to pay, the same bias in the direction of upper-class patients continued. Patients from the two or three classes at the top of the ladder got more psychotherapy, and in general more hours of care and attention than patients from classes IV and V, by quite a wide margin. The result is that the largest amount of care, and hence the largest expense, is lavished on patients from the better-off classes, so that the clinics are functioning in a precisely opposite way from their ostensible purpose. In probing why this is so, the authors make some very sharp observations about the psychiatric profession:

The significant association of class with the type of therapy psychiatrists give within the clinic is of particular interest, because the treatment prescribed is not connected with the economic factor as it is in private practice. The patients are treated free, or for nominal fees determined by administrative personnel who have no direct connection with the patient's therapy. We may infer, therefore, that the type of therapy given to a clinic patient is related more to social factors than to economic costs. The doctor-patient relationship and communication between the physician and his patient appear to be related, in turn, to the class of the patients and of the doctors.

Hollingshead and Redlich categorized 95 percent of the psychiatrists living in the New Haven community as class I, and 5 percent as class II. While they are careful to point out that most psychiatrists can honestly disclaim conscious bias, a number of important factors operate to make a biased selection of patients for the more favored types of treatment. Conscious that he is dispensing a scarce commodity, the psychotherapist looks for "responsive" patients, and tends to find them in people from his own milieu, with his own level of education, and with similar habits of thought and expression. The psychiatrist finds it difficult either to understand or to communicate with workers, and has by and large taken the easy route of skirting the bulk of the population by recommending treatments that require a minimum of analysis and a maximum of organic manipulation, and by restricting analytical methods to his own social class or those above him in the scale. The economic factor of ability to pay is, of course, the largest single pressure influencing this trend, but, as the example of the clinics shows, social bias plays a big part as well.

THIS study by Hollingshead and Redlich is the first volume; a second will be required to complete the presentation. The next book, by two other investigators on the team, will bear down intensively on a small number of cases out of the large number incorporated in the present study, in an attempt to discover why mental illness is so significantly related to social class. But the first has already established that the relationship is exactly opposite to what has been lightmindedly assumed by so many in the past.

The elimination of poverty is a primary tool in the battle against mental illness as well as against so many other human ills; a society in which material benefits are spread to all ought to be a society with a better record in the field of mental health. Given the stubbornness with which prejudices hold on, we can hardly expect this new finding to be accepted right away, but we can hope that sooner or later it will sink in.

Status and Sentences

WHAT actually happens to a sexual deviant may be determined more by his class status than by what is defined by the law or by the most enlightened theory of social scientists or "progressive" dynamically oriented psychiatrists. . . . While this research was in progress, a class I married man, whose wife was pregnant, was arrested for exposing himself to a little girl. He was referred to a psychiatrist to avoid a possible prison sentence. The accused man retained a shrewd lawyer, well acquainted with persons in high political circles and also with the judge, a political appointee, who tried the case. The lawyer's primary expectation of the psychiatrist was to make a statement in court that would, in his words, "get his client off the hook." The accused was found guilty of breach of the peace and "sentenced" to two years of psychotherapy. From a psychiatric viewpoint, this is not a miscarriage of justice, but an enlightened sentence. The point is that such "sentences" are given rarely to the class IV and V sexual deviates, alcoholics, and drug addicts who face higher and lower courts but usually land in prison, not on a psychoanalyst couch.

Social Class and Mental Illness.

Notebook of an Old-Timer

by George H. Shoaf

Colloquy in a Union Hall

IN this country before attempts to organize the workers were made, and until the labor movement grew strong enough to make demands on the employers, with power sufficient to enforce those demands through strikes, and threats of strikes, the workers, as individuals, as far as their social and economic status was concerned, vegetated more like serfs than as free men. True, they could join the church of their own choosing, and on election day they had free access to the ballot box. But in the matter of fixing wages, hours of work, and conditions under which they worked, they had no choice. As individuals, they accepted the wages, working hours, and working conditions prescribed by the boss, or they didn't go to work. It was as simple as that.

Common labor at the beginning of the century, that is, in construction work other than in agriculture, received on the average one dollar a day, with the working day stretching to ten and, sometimes, twelve hours. What was called skilled labor, such as involved carpenters, mechanics in heavy industry, railway employes, and so forth, on the average was compensated at the rate of one dollar and fifty cents per ten-hour day. Agricultural workers, particularly in the Southern states, were given five dollars a month and "found," with the working day beginning at sunup and ending at sundown.

"Finish" carpenters in California, those endowed with extra skill, today, when they work, get $3.37 an hour. That appears to be a high wage; but when it is realized they are idle as much as half the year, and taking current high costs of living into account, they have no cash surplus in the bank to brag about. Each year they are back about where they started twelve months previously, financially defunct, and obligated to hunt a job.

The "right to work" law, if passed and enforced, according to leaders and members of the Carpenters Union, means a return to substandard living conditions for the American working class. In a colloquy with union men at a union headquarters at Sacramento, California, recently, the conversation, in substance, went as follows:

"This right to work law, if adopted and enforced, will operate like this," said a union man. "Since my union protection is gone, as an individual, I will have to hold my own as best I can. Suppose I am working on a job with wages fixed at $3.37 an hour. There are plenty of jobless carpenters in California anxious to get my job. Some of them will offer to do my work for $2.50 an hour. I'm fired and replaced by the cheaper man. After I and my family have gone hungry for a month or so, I go back and offer to work for $2 an hour. I'm hired, and the man who replaced me is laid off. This will become a continuous process, not only among carpenters, but among all industrial workers, until we get back to conditions that obtained before the workers organized—the ten and twelve hour day with wages averaging a dollar a day."

"BUT," I interjected, "under the new conditions inaugurated by the enactment of the right to work law, you will become a free man in a free land. No labor boss will be able to order you around and tell you what to do and what not to do. As in the old days, you will enjoy the uninhibited right to breathe the air of freedom, to work when, where, and for whom you wish to work, with wages and conditions mutually agreed on between yourself, a free citizen, and your potential employer, who also is a free citizen. Isn't that personal liberty, that freedom of citizenship, your right to exercise choice of action, of more value to you, as you stand supreme beneath Freedom's Flag, than all the emoluments and perquisites you hitherto possessed as a member of the American labor movement?"

"Like thunder!" exclaimed the union man. "How much freedom would I have working twelve hours a day for a dollar a day? On such wages, how could I buy and pay for a home? How much time would I have for recreation, for reading and study, for mental improvement? I would just degenerate into a wage slave when I had a job, and a penniless vagrant when out of work. Under conditions following the liquidation of organized labor, conditions brought on by the right to work law, here would be my probable course of action.

"With nothing to back me but my labor power and willingness to work, driven to get a job because of my hungry family, I apply at office headquarters of some factory or plant with a request to see the boss. After some palavering with a guard, I am finally admitted into his august presence. Before a mahogany desk I stand, a suppliant, hat in hand, while the boss takes my measure respecting my physical strength, my age, and mental adaptability. In theory, we two, applicant and boss, are Americans with an equality before the law in the matter of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We are about to bargain as free Americans anent wages, hours, and conditions of toil. He is either an owner of the factory or plant, or an authorized agent of the owners. But hold, there is something more to the equation than this.

"As owner, or agent, he represents a corporation with an investment of

fifty or a hundred million dollars. I have nothing behind me except my individual status as job seeker. Back of him are not only millions of money, but the local, state and national governments, with their courts and police and military equipment pledged and dedicated to the protection of private property, particularly corporation property, against any and every foe, especially a robbed and outraged working class demanding a square deal.

"So we, the boss and I, free Americans, proceed to bargain. After I have stated my qualifications for the job, he, not I, sets the wages, hours and working conditions. Praise be! I am not a slave such as Russian workers are said to be, and I can either accept or reject his terms. Then I rapidly think. At home is my family pleading with me to take the job regardless. Shall I take the job and so be able to earn a living for my family, or shall I exercise my godgiven rights as a free and independent American, refuse, leave the office and begin the weary grind of looking for another boss?

"Brother, despite the Declaration of Independence, the Sermon on the Mount, the Golden Rule, and the rantings of Westbrook Pegler, where is my guarantee of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness when as an unprotected applicant, I stand before the boss and ask him for a job? The question answers itself!"

AT this point, if it is permissible, I would like to cite a personal experience that highlights and illustrates worker conditions prior to and following the induction of the workers into the organized labor movement.

I happened to be in Chicago at the turn of the century without a job. My ordination as a Christian minister was valueless for the reason I had repudiated my religious belief. So I applied to the management of the Chicago City Railway Company for a job as street car conductor. Despite the fact that three hundred applicants for the same job were on the waiting list, I was hired, and here is why. Robert McCulloch, general manager, was born and reared in the South, and had been a Captain in the Confederate army in the Civil War. When I was admitted into his presence, and informed him I was a Texan, that my father was a police official in San Antonio, and I had just arrived in Chicago, he sat up and took notice. After some questioning, he assigned me to duty in the Wentworth Avenue barn where, on the extra list, I went to work at 11 cents an hour. Top wages for motormen and conductors were 17 cents an hour.

Later, I learned why I was hired in preference to the hundreds of Chicago young men whose names were listed for the job. Captain McCulloch thought that I, being from the South, knew nothing of the labor movement, was not interested in organized labor, and that in the event of a strike, I would uphold my independent Americanism and stress my patriotism by scabbing on my fellow workers. Never was the Captain more surprised and disillusioned when, later, he called me in, denounced me as an agitator, and fired me for attempting to organize the street and elevated railway working men and women. The attempt succeeded, however, and the organization became an influential factor in the city's industrial life.

A strike was required to effect the following improvements respecting wages and working conditions. From beginning wages at 11 cents an hour, today the top wages for Chicago transportation employes, according to last figures received, average $1.80 an hour.

The abominable swing runs, which obligated the workers to be on duty eighteen out of the twenty-four hours to get in ten hours of actual pay work, have been abolished, an insurance system has been provided, and numerous other improvements have been made. This question:

Had the workers remained unorganized, would they have emerged from the contemptuous slavery they were forced to tolerate, and gotten their wages raised to where today they can live in some comfort? Aside from the low wages they received, what aroused my resentment most was the condition of servitude into which they had sunk. They reminded me of the Negro slaves on my grandfather's plantation in South Texas, where fear was the chief obsession. Each worker was afraid to talk organization with another worker for fear he might be talking to a labor spy. He was sour on the job, a pest to his wife at home, at loggerheads with his fellow workers, angry with the world. During organization days, every worker observed conversing with me was dismissed until over a hundred workers lost their jobs. With the setting up of three Divisions—260, 241, and 308—conditions changed. Today, the street and elevated railway workers in Chicago walk erect. They are proud to be Americans, proud of their jobs, and they are patriotic for the country in which they live. This is a far cry from the old conditions which cursed them with intolerable wage slavery. What brought about the change? Benevolent concessions by a humanitarian management that wanted well paid and satisfied workers on the job? Not according to the record. It was the union they organized, and the fight they waged, that changed the conditions.

NOW there is a concerted effort by industrial and business management, functioning through venal politicians and a subsidized reptile press, to discredit the labor movement by picturing its leaders as conscienceless scoundrels bent on establishing a labor monopoly, the objective being dictatorial control of the American way of life. A number have been revealed, on investigation, as having personally profited at the expense of gullible followers. But what group or movement in this country—political or religious, business, industrial, or labor—is entirely free from rascality and crime? There is no disposition here to defend crooked labor leaders. They should be punished as traitors when caught; but how about the long line of political scalawags, financial crooks, business and indus-

San Francisco Plan: California Unions Fight "Right to Work"

ONE of the principal issues in the recent primary and in the coming election in California, if not the only one, is the fight over the "right-to-work" measure. Senator William Knowland, the Republican candidate for governor of California, has placed "right-to-work" as the first point in his program. The Democratic and many Republican candidates oppose it.

This is the second time that Californians are being asked to vote on a measure which would ban the union shop and weaken collective bargaining. In 1944 such an initiative was defeated by a million votes. Numerous attempts to jam such a law through the state legislature have so far failed. To the union busters California again offers what to them are favorable opportunities. California is now one of the more advanced industrial and unionized states. There is a large influx of people from the Deep South and rural areas who have little or no union background. With full employment until recently, the workers have been apathetic. In addition, California is a large agricultural state and much of the rural population has been traditionally to the right in politics.

Taking a cue from the McClellan Committee revelations on union corruption, Knowland calls for a labor "bill of rights." His inference is that the right-to-work measure, by destroying the power of "labor bosses," will restore union democracy, do away with "compulsory" unionism—and the working man will be grateful. His propaganda is especially directed to white-collar workers who are little organized, the professional groups, the conservative elements in the rural population, and minority groups who have felt union discrimination.

The AFL-CIO unions, especially here in San Francisco, are meeting the "right-to-work" threat head on. Although they do not officially belong to the national Committee on Political Education (COPE), the San Francisco unions have set up an independent apparatus going down to the precinct level. The form is that of a Legislative Policy Committee with representatives from each local union. Each area is divided into Assembly Districts (corresponding to the districts for the state legislature). Assembly District Committees set up one or more headquarters in their district. The local unions designate precinct leaders to work with the Assembly District Committees. The District Committees then organize precinct and neighborhood committees. In addition a women's department has been set up to do work among wives of union men.

ALL of this organizational activity was in the formative stage before the primary, but it is now going ahead. In the pre-primary stages the unions carried on an intensive vote registration drive, using volunteer registrars, aimed especially at their own members. Plans now call for a campaign fund of $100,000. This is to be used for radio and TV time, newspaper advertising, and for the expenses of setting up the precinct organization. The unions are collecting at least a $1 donation per worker. Up to the present the financial response has been slow. But the numerous rallies called against right-to-work have been well attended. Community and religious leaders have been enlisted. The various union papers have devoted columns of education on right-to-work.

The union leaders are running scared but they are not crusading. The union membership is appealed to but its response has been mild to date. Of course what is involved is a new experience for an American worker. It takes considerable individual initiative to go out and do precinct work. The local leaders have not as yet created avenues to reach the members. A crying need now is for a special newspaper designed to serve the ends of this campaign, which would bring in other elements in the community as contributors, so as to appeal to the entire public.

The San Francisco Plan is up against an additional obstacle: The labor leadership is divided on the wisdom and necessity of a precinct organization. Those opposed to it haven't openly blocked it, since they want to oppose the right-to-work proposition. The plan was voted for by all. But some unions refused to turn over membership lists. The appeal made directly to unions for ten members for each local union to work with the assembly district organizations was not fully carried out. When response didn't come from the ranks nothing more was done to sustain and popularize the appeal. But, regardless of shortcomings, there is no doubt that labor, at least in San Francisco, will register the vast majority of its membership.

LABOR can also bank for aid by the split in Republican ranks. Governor Knight has consistently opposed right-to-work measures. No doubt this was one reason for the Knowland-Nixon pressure move to bludgeon Knight out of running for re-election as governor. Instead Knowland ran for governor and Knight for Senator. Knight is running independently of Knowland and still opposes right-to-work. Most of the other Republican candidates either oppose right-to-work or declare neutrality. The split forced the California Republican Party to declare the right-to-work proposition a "non-partisan" issue.

In the primary, Attorney General Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, the Democratic nominee, polled a total vote over 600,000 larger than that of Knowland. Similar margins were obtained by other Democratic candidates. This vote continues a national trend against the Republicans. But the special factor in this case was labor's energetic registration activities.

The primary vote, thought it indicates a probable Democratic victory in November for the first time since 1938, does not guarantee defeat of the right-to-work initiative. Unknown factors are the attitude of white collar and Negro workers. Although Negro ministers and the NAACP oppose right-to-work, the *San Francisco Chronicle* for June 14, 1958, quotes Franklin H. Williams, regional secretary-counsel of the NAACP: "There is danger that some Negroes will misinterpret the right-to-work proposal and be misled into believing that it will eliminate discrimination where it exists among unions." George W. John, Secretary of the San Francisco Labor Council, is quoted by the official organ, *San Francisco Labor,* of July 25, 1958, as saying ". . . the best estimates agree that the vote against right to work could run as much as 10 percent behind the Democratic vote."

> *He [Johns] pointed out that, since Attorney General Pat Brown in his primary election victory garnered only* 56.5 *percent of the total vote, that* 10 *percent lag could spell victory for the anti-union proponents of Proposition* 18.
>
> *He noted, too, that polls in Southern California give the proposition a lead in that section—and that imposes a special responsibility on Northern California to turn in an even bigger majority against the measure.*

If these polls are accurate, then the labor movement has a big job to do in a short time.

PHILIP SAMEN

trial freebooters whose activities have brought them wealth and power at the expense of the health and welfare of the American people?

The fact of the matter is that this country is torn into segments by a class struggle—workers and employers, exploited and exploiters, sellers and buyers, with each trying to benefit at the expense of the other. Under the present economic system of private ownership for profit, misnamed the free enterprise system, internecine strife is its outstanding characteristic. There is neither certainty, stability nor responsibility involved in the economy. It is an endless round of boom, bust, depression and war. Individuals and private corporations may plan for individual greed, but those in charge of the economy repudiate planning for the common good. In such an economy, trite as it is to state it, it is every man for self with the devil taking the hindmost. Except for feeble attempts by splinter political parties, the only saving grace in the situation is the presence and activities of the organized labor movement. That movement abolished, this nation would quickly degenerate into a feudal mass of disinherited slaves ruled by a master class of merciless tyrants.

PROPAGANDA calculated to deceive working men and women and constrain them to believe that by not identifying themselves with the organized labor movement they will not only incur the approval of the employing class, but as rugged individualists they will more quickly and surely get ahead in winning wealth and renown, is daily being put across in this country by publicity agents in the employ of employer groups. As *The Carpenter,* official organ of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, states:

> *On the one hand, the workers may be rugged individualists who think they can make better progress by going it alone—an illusion the boss is fond of fostering through judicious and secretive hints of better things to come; "We have our eyes on you," "The man who stands out doesn't need a union," etc. And, on the other hand, the workers may be convinced that the NAM has something when it says the good old days of employer exploitation are gone. Unions may have been necessary at the turn of the century when employers were rapacious and unenlightened, but in this day and age when business is simply dripping with sweetness and light, a union is needless. Besides, most unions are only devices "labor bosses" maintain to fatten their own pockets. So goes big business propaganda.*

The actual experience of wage workers in business and industry today so effectually belies this propaganda that it requires no answer. Between the haves and have-nots, wage workers and the boss class, competition is so keen for a share of the products of industry and agriculture that it amounts to war, and nothing less. And this war will continue as long as the instruments and agencies of production and distribution are privately owned, though socially operated. And here is the lesson wage workers, as a whole, must learn. Since it is axiomatic that ownership involves rulership, if the workers wish to be really independent and free, directors of their lives and masters of their destiny, of necessity, they must own the tools with which they work. They must organize for the next stage in the social process, which is the socialization and joint operation of the means of life.

Individualism and private initiative, with rare exceptions, disappeared with the discontinuance of hand tools of production and the organization of big industry and big business. Regimented labor has displaced individual effort. These are the facts of modern life, and labor must realize these facts and face them. Moreover, it is up to labor to solve the problems a changed situation has introduced. The only solution that will genuinely and fundamentally solve the problem is the collective ownership and democratic operation and management of the instruments and agencies of production and distribution within the framework of a regime dedicated to the common good of all mankind. That regime is socialism, and nothing else but; and that is the challenge that confronts organized labor.

BOOK REVIEW

Militant Atheist

WHY I AM NOT A CHRISTIAN and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, by Bertrand Russell. Edited, with an Appendix on the "Bertrand Russell Case" by Paul Edwards. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1957, $3.50.

BERTRAND RUSSELL, the well-known English mathematician and philosopher, has a flair for succinctly pinpointing the crux of an involved argument in a few effortless, urbane sentences. When he strips an opponent's reasoning of its frills, and paraphrases its weak logical essence, the procedure is devastating; formal refutation is usually unnecessary, for there is nothing left to refute. In this precise, logical exposition lies the chief merit of Professor Russell's essays.

Not all of the fifteen articles which comprise this collection are of equal importance. The principal argument is contained in the first four essays, supplemented by the twelfth (Our Sexual Ethics) and the fourteenth (Can Religion Cure Our Troubles?). The remaining pieces are more entertaining than argumentative. The essay "The New Generation" (1930) even has overtones of "Brave New World" (childbearing is to become a "well-paid profession"), and is probably not meant to be taken too seriously.

Professor Russell inquires: Is the Christian religion true? and is it useful?; recognizing these two queries as logically separate. Much of his commentary, however, applies to religion in general. Religion is here employed in the more narrow sense, as belief in a personal God, rather than in the looser sense, as any set of supra-personal ideals.

Arguments for the existence of God can be grouped under three headings: metaphysical, scientific and emotional. In the United States edition of this book, the so-called metaphysical proof of existence of God (that God is an entity the instrinsic nature of which includes existence, i.e. God is such that he cannot not exist; the argument is a little bit more involved than this, but not very much) is hardly touched upon at all. The British edition includes the transcript of a fascinating debate between Professor Russell and Father F. C. Copleston, S. J., in which the metaphysical argument is discussed at considerable length.

Metaphysical arguments (in the classical

sense of the word, i.e. arguments in which logical deductions about the real world are drawn from "self-evident" first principles) used to be very popular among philosophers. Despite some efforts by R. M. Hutchins and M. J. Adler to revive this discipline outside the Catholic hierarchy, we have become rather impatient with this type of reasoning, now that we understand that there are no self-evident first principles, only assumptions, the best of which (those which explain most) are not at all self-evident. Professor Russell ends the metaphysical argument by asserting that the very concepts used by Father Copleston are meaningless to him: "What do you say—shall we pass on to some other issue?" (It is interesting, though irrelevant for this review, that in matters of education the philosophical followers of Russell and those of Hutchins usually form a united front in favor of strict academic standards, against the "life-adjustment-no-content" attitude of the latter-day followers of James and Dewey.)

By "scientific argument for the existence of God" is meant the assumption of the concept of God in order to explain observed phenomena, i.e., our sensations about an external world, in which there is some order, which is livable, and which was set in motion ("wound up," on which more below). This kind of argument is not too popular with some theologians, for it concedes that the existence of God, like the truth of any scientific hypothesis advanced to explain what is observed, is a matter of probability, not certainty. By the same token, Professor Russell has more sympathy for this line of reasoning; patiently and good humoredly he points out implausibilities in the various arguments. These do not constitute formal refutation, which is impossible of any consistent hypothesis. The author even concedes that those with the proper state of mind may find the existence of God a reasonable explanation—but he does not.

PROFESSOR Russell believes that the true reasons for believing in God are emotional, largely fear (of death and of a totally impersonal and purposeless universe), as well as indoctrination in childhood. Such reasons likewise cannot be refuted, but, recognized and identified, are likely to lose their effectiveness.

Among the arguments against the existence of God, Professor Russell concentrates on the logical impossibility for God to be at once all good, omniscient, and omnipotent. The dreadful state of the affairs of the world, the incalculable suffering and injustice which prevails, further augmented by the prediction of roasting in hell for persons who, after all, did not ask to be created in the first place, would make Creation an inexcusable misdeed. Arguing against belief in the immortality of the soul, Professor Russell emphasizes the established connection between brain structure and mental life. "I believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will survive." Belief in immortality arises from fear of death, but it is unworthy of intelligent beings to rely on imaginary crutches to overcome this fear.

In the essay "What I Believe," and elsewhere, the author expounds his positive philosophy of life. Moral rules should be rational guides to a desired end. As to the ends, "we are ourselves the ultimate and irrefutable arbiters of value." This does not mean that all ends are equally valid. "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge." To those who doubt human strength to abide by such a code in the absence of the fear of God, Professor Russell would grant that "among semi-civilized communities . . . such considerations may have helped to promote socially desirable conduct. But in the present day such good as may be done by imputing a theological origin to morals is inextricably bound up with such grave evils that the good becomes insignificant in comparison."

That, incidentally, is the only place in the entire book where any appreciation for the positive social aspects of religion is shown, if one excludes the joke about the organization of the calendar as theology's major contribution to society. Elsewhere, the author displays the bitterness of the European militant atheist. Now, what Professor Russell says of the churches is true: They have become institutionalized, tied to the status quo. Their day-to-day preachings have little in common with the revolutionary and humane teachings of Jesus Christ or Buddha. They have opposed the development of science and the diffusion of knowledge at every turn (Galileo, birth control, etc.) and thereby caused untold suffering, to which they have preached submission, resignation and hope for something better in the next world.

Here, however, we see the weakness of Professor Russell's purely logical, unhistorical approach. It would, no doubt, be much better if the Montgomery Improvement Association, instead of opening its meetings with the Lord's prayer, began with a reading from Russell's *Principles of Mathematics;* or if welfare agencies and boy-scout clubs were organized by local branches of the Rationalist Ethical Society, as they probably will be some day. But this is not the choice before us. One can vigorously oppose the theological dogma of churches—on this point Professor Russell is superb—but when evaluating the churches as social institutions, one must look at both sides of the coin. Quite apart from the radical and prophetic clergy, it is a curious fact that despite their tie-in with the status quot, and perhaps because of it, the churches have provided a vehicle for a large section of the population to begin thinking in social, ethical and supra-personal terms, to find strength in union, and to take concerted action towards limited goals, where other means were lacking or could not be effective. (These comments should not be misconstrued as an appeal to blur fundamental philosophical differences or to infiltrate churches in order to organize Baptists-for-Peace, in the tradition of a well-known organization. Sociological evaluation is one thing, political action another.)

CHRISTIANITY as such, rather than religion in general, is discussed with reference to two principal topics. The first is the personality of Jesus Christ, to whom the author grants considerable wisdom as a teacher ("Turn the other cheek," "Sell that which thou hast, and give to the poor," maxims which few professed Christians follow), but whom he reproaches for his vituperative intolerance of unbelievers ("Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell," etc.). Professor Russell considers Buddha and Socrates as morally greater figures than Jesus.

The second topic is the Christian emphasis on personal holiness rather than on good deeds which help mankind. "What has human happiness to do with morals? The object of morals is not to make people happy," is the author's summary of the Christian position. He attributes this detachment of morals from social virtue to the origins of Christianity in a time in which persons of noble inspiration could not entertain any hope of affecting the course of human events. "Holiness had to be achieved by people who were impotent in action. . . . . This defect is inherited from the Gospels. Christ tells us to become as little children, but little children cannot understand the differential calculus. . . . The church no longer contends that knowledge is in itself sinful . . . but the acquisition of knowledge . . . is dangerous since it may lead to pride of intellect, and hence to a questioning of the Christian dogma."

On the matter of sexual ethics, I am inclined to agree with the author's evaluation that the role of the churches, and of Christian churches in particular, has been entirely negative, based on irrational taboos rather than dedicated to personal happiness. Professor Russell holds the churches responsible for the attitude that "sex is in itself indecent and ridiculous." This is not to say that he advocates general promiscuity, as his detractors have freely accused him, since promiscuity would, in the long run, make for less happiness rather than more. He recognizes that sexual relations contribute to happiness only if accompanied by lasting affection. This is best accomplished in marriage, with children. There is no reason, however, to exclude stable, though not necessarily permanent, childless associations ("trial marriages"), to precede the more permanent form. The author asserts that, in the absence of procreation, sexual relations between unmarried people are strictly a private affair, of which society should not take cognizance. The possibility of such childless relations depends on the efficacy of methods of birth control. The morality of an act depends on its probable consequences, and thus may depend on the state of science.

Professor Russell attacks the entire concept of wickedness and sin, and would substitute for it that of disease and treatment.

"A man who is suffering from plague has to be imprisoned until he is cured, although nobody thinks him wicked. The same thing should be done with a man who suffers from a propensity to commit forgery; but there should be no more idea of guilt in one case than in the other. . . . No man treats a motorcar as foolishly as he treats another human being. When the car will not go, he does not attribute its annoying behavior to sin. . . . He attempts to find out what is wrong and to set it right. . . . Of two methods which are equally effective in preventing murder, the one involving the least harm to the murderer is to be preferred. . . . Suffering to the criminal can never be justified by the notion of vindictive punishment." (I might add here my own view that persons imprisoned for having the plague, or, more frequently, committed for mental disease, should have the same legal safeguards as those suffering from a propensity to forgery.)

ON the nature of the physical universe, Professor Russell's views are those of a metaphysical (here in the Marxist sense of the word, i.e. reducing to schematics, as opposed to dialectical) materialist, although he rejects the latter term. Thus he believes that "The (physical) laws . . . can apparently be summed up in a small number of very general principles . . . physical science is approaching the stage when it will be complete, and therefore uninteresting." He seems to take seriously the concept of a Laplace calculator, i.e. one who, knowing the exact state of the universe at present, could accurately predict the future. I have elsewhere [Philosophy of Science *23*, 97 (1956); *24*, 25 (1957)] criticized this view, and shall only record my opposition here.

It is very strange that Professor Russell should believe in "thermodynamic death" of the universe, i.e. in a universe due to "run out," like a watch, in a few billion years; for unless one assumes that there are natural processes (perhaps operating cataclysmally) counteracting the running down process, one is faced with the question how the universe was wound up to begin with, to which "God did it" is a very convenient answer. Several plausible "winding up" mechanisms have been suggested. It is thus odd that Professor Russell should take "thermodynamic death" more to heart than many theist physicists.

On the question of causality in physics, the author is more optimistic, and sides with Einstein in believing acausality in quantum physics to be a passing phase.

In a lengthy appendix, the editor of the collection recalls how an assortment of religious bigots and "patriotic" zealots prevented Bertrand Russell from serving his appointment as visiting professor of philosophy at the College of the City of New York, to which he had been appointed for the academic year 1941-42. Three points are especially noteworthy:

(a) While the lunatic fringe was as vocal as could be expected, much of the opposition to the appointment emanated from "respectable" sources (a bishop of the Episcopal Church, the Catholic weekly *America*, etc.).

(b) The extreme improbability of another such case shows what immense progress we have made in less than two decades. Even at the height of the post-war inquisition, comparatively few dared suggest that the advocacy of any consistent intellectual position should be barred from a college faculty. It was, in fact, to circumvent the entrenched position of academic freedom that the concept of "conspiracy" was thrown into the picture.

(c) To someone reared in the worship of the New Deal, the disgraceful role of the late Mayor LaGuardia during the Russell controversy was a sad revelation.

HANS FREISTADT

Bucko Skipper

SS SILVERSPRAY by John Langdon. MacMillan, New York, 1958, $3.95.

JOHN Langdon, in his new novel, *SS Silverspray,* tells the story of a struggle aboard a modern American cargo vessel between the crew and a power-hungry skipper who eventually runs amok, murdering one of the crew members. This tale is authentic on several different levels.

In the first place, similar incidents have actually occurred on American ships during recent years. Further, such incidents occur because they are generated out of fundamental social relationships prevailing at sea. It is one of the merits of Langdon's work that he is obviously aware of the broader implications in the particular events he is recounting.

Class lines aboard ship are drawn with unmistakable clarity. The codes that govern conduct go back in unbroken chain of descent to the earliest days of commercial capitalism. The skipper is the plenipotentiary of the owners. He is guardian of their property: the vessel and its cargo. The better that he may carry out this function, he has likewise been anointed as the representative of state power. A ship on a long voyage—particularly in the early days—might be separated for months or years from the institutions of home life; and to the skipper fell the various rods and mantles of the courts, police, the army and the church.

The crew, however, had (until recently) few rights, and no powers except such as they could claim for themselves. They were appendages, "hands," which moved the private property of the owners from one place to another. That the state would, as a matter of course, delegate its authority to the spokesman for the owners, to the guardian of property—rather than to some representative of the human beings who manned the ship—seems always to have been accepted without question. Social organization at sea thus became a scale model, a kind of caricature, of the structure of society as a whole. In the merchant ship, the capitalist state appears in microcosm.

There were however, certain special—and highly important—effects which resulted from the compressing of social relationships. Few individuals in shoreside life have ever exercised such unchecked power as the captain of a ship at sea. By the axiom that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," we might assume that some at least of these captains would be tainted by the power they wield; and such has certainly been the case. The bucko skipper, the man insatiable for power, has become a familiar figure in maritime history—and in the literature of the sea. We meet him in early English chronicles like the records of Captain Bligh's voyage aboard the *Bounty*. He is described with clinical accuracy by Richard Henry Dana in *Two Years Before the Mast*. More recently we find him again in writings of Jack London, Conrad, and other sea story authors.

LANGDON here is dealing with a classic theme. And just as his freighter, the *Silverspray*, carries within its fo'csles and cabins a scale model of the "system" at home, so one of the crucial problems from home inevitably comes to dominate the thoughts and actions of those aboard ship. It is upon the position to be occupied by Negroes among them that the contest between the crew and the skipper finally centers. The skipper's dementia is that of the society he comes from; when he is placed under stress, it lies waiting for him like an open pit. Unerringly, he selects one of the Negro crew members as his victim.

Here certainly is a striking concept for a novel; and the author's treatment of the theme is satisfactory in almost every respect. The creation of shipboard life is fully convincing; one does not need the publisher's note on the jacket to be sure that Mr. Langdon has spent time at sea. He is a writer of skill and sensitivity; under his guidance the reader quickly becomes acquainted with a dozen or more of the crew and officers, shares with them the incidents of daily life—the rotation of watches, the friendships and frictions, the monotony, the marvelous beauty of the sea. He senses the brief welding together of the ship's company in a battle to save the life of a man fallen overboard, and then to save the ship itself in a typhoon. Meanwhile, taking form out of these incidents, the central drama of the novel is shaping to its climax.

The crew of the *Silverspray* are fortunate to have in their hands one weapon that was lacking to the men aboard the old windjammer on which Richard Dana served his apprenticeship. This weapon is their union, and it turns out to be decisive. The manner in which the men use it, altering the balance of power in the age-old struggle of crew vs. bucko skipper, is I suppose, the heart of Langdon's novel.

He handles the union scenes objectively and well.

WHILE the work presents a thoroughly *authentic* picture, there seem to be certain areas in which the author fails (or neglects) to make his material thoroughly *typical.* A striking example is provided by the characterization of the skipper, obviously a focal point. We see the skipper in the end becoming incapable of rational action, even directed towards his own irrational goals. He turns psychotic. While this is convincing and real, and while it is true that the form of his psychosis derives from his background, the problem is that the character of the skipper thus becomes less typical. There are plenty of bucko skippers sailing the seas, and some of them wind up blowing their stacks. But most don't. They would not be useful to their employers if they did. While a novelist has the right to select any character he wishes, one wonders if, in this case, the depth of the skipper's psychosis were not forced upon the author because he felt that he could not otherwise make the crew's final action credible to the reader. But to the extent that Langdon portrays his captain as a madman, he particularizes his view and thus narrows the significance of the whole narrative.

The same difficulty, I think, appears in the handling of the Negro characters—or rather, of the crew's attitude toward them. Perhaps Langdon permits his white crew members to reach too easily the conviction that an injury to one of different color is an injury to all. The labor movement, especially on the West Coast, has established a rather undistinguished record on racial issues. Seamen, despite their militant stance on many other matters, have been deeply infected with prejudice. Most ships sailing out of West Coast ports, if they carry Negro crew members at all, have them jimcrowed into the steward's department. On the *Silverspray,* however, we find Negroes in the deck gang, and one is even elected ship's delegate—again a focal point of the narrative. It is not that such a situation couldn't exist—it can and does; but it is rare. On a more typical freighter, the crew would be divided into several different unions, the Negroes in one department only, and plenty of anti-Negro prejudice emanating more or less officially from union headquarters. On a more typical freighter, in short, the final decision of the crew to act on a principle of interracial solidarity might have been harder for them to come by. But the struggle they went through in the process would have carried the novel more intensely into what is perhaps the key problem facing the American working class today. It would also have made a more difficult novel to write. Here too, the need for a compact, seemingly conclusive ending, may have somewhat forced the author's handling of his material.

Only good books are worth criticizing. The lines spent on the foregoing examination would be unwarranted except for the fact that Mr. Langdon has presented us with an exciting, skillful, and thoroughly readable novel. It contains some of the best (and most objective) portrayals of American working people I have read. And it is indeed a rare bird among the flock of current fiction that aims so purposefully at placing its characters in action, within the social setting of which their lives (and ours) are part.

ALEXANDER SAXTON

Double Standard in Education

WHAT WE WANT OF OUR SCHOOLS by Irving Adler. The John Day Company, New York, 1957, $3.75.

THE usual discussion of education, as Robert M. Hutchins states in the forward to Mr. Adler's book, "is about money, taxes, the size of classes . . ., public relations, athletics, buildings, fraternities, 'radical' teachers, and adjustment to the group." Much of the material concerned with the above topics is frequently dull and often beside the point. In contrast, *What We Want of Our Schools* is a lucid and provocative treatment of such vital topics as the unwarranted use of IQ tests to rank children, the need for academic freedom and the cultivation of critical thinking, the origin, history, virtues, and vices of progressive education, some practical insights into the teaching of the three R's, and finally, the Negro's struggle for more equal educational opportunity.

The first few chapters of Mr. Adler's book are devoted to a brief exposition of his understanding of human nature and social evolution on the sound theory that what transpires inside the classroom is not divorced from society and human nature in general. Man is conceived as being a relatively pliant creature who is gifted with the ability to adapt and change his environment through tool-making and symbolizing. His needs for survival and growth are, for the most part, acquired through a learning process which, as society becomes more industrial, differentiated, and complex, necessitates more intellectual training for larger numbers. There is no physiological basis, contrary to much current school theory and practice, to assume a distinction that some people are innately "mental-minded" and others are innately "manual-minded."

> *The distinction has its roots in the separation of the craft and scholarly traditions. And this, in turn, originated with the division of society into classes in ancient times . . . the distinction is social and cultural, and not physiological in origin. . . .*

The importance of this pseudo-distinction between the "mental" and "manual" minded, along with its consequences in understanding an aspect of our school's ranking of children, will be indicated later.

Social progress and evolution, to continue with Adler's introductory chapters, are related to the accumulation and assimilation of knowledge. The need to maintain free thought and critical thinking as a living part of our social organism arises from this fact, since

> *all human knowledge is approximate and fragmentary, and . . . partly error. . . . All knowledge is subject to verification, modification, and refinement . . . the progress of knowledge is therefore dependent on the* cultivation of critical thinking, *on the refusal to be bound by any unproved assumptions, on a willingness to face facts even if they contradict old ideas.*

The social progress of any society is basically a function of two interacting elements, social institutions and technology, and in the very ultimate sense, technology alone. Social institutions, which may either retard or propel the constructive and continuous use of technology, are dependent upon the social knowledge which is disseminated by our schools. In this manner, the failure of our educational institutions to respond properly to the changing needs of society could be fatal to that society.

FOLLOWING this orientation, Adler correlates the various phases in the development of public education in the United States with the spread of democracy. Our schools grew and changed as society's needs accumulated. Educational opportunities opened and widened to larger cross sections of the populace alongside and as a result of efforts by the common people to achieve a more democratic society. This usually entailed a struggle against vested business interests. But just as the process of perfecting our society is incomplete, so is the process of perfecting our schools, since they tend to reflect the contradictions, paradoxes, and injustices of the social organism. At present, Adler finds three main factors operating to deprive many American children of their educational birthright:

> *The shortage of school buildings and teachers is leading to a general decline in the quality of education. A two-class system of education has emerged in the public schools providing an inferior education for most children; false theories of education . . . are partly responsible for this development,* [*and finally . . .*] *the children of the Negro people and other minority groups are held back by segregation and other discriminatory practices.*

Unlike many current critics of public education, who are either grinding personal axes or advocating an educational philosophy of "elitism," Adler's analysis is aimed at finding solutions to raise the opportunities, standards, and quality of education for *all* students, not only for the select few. For this reason, one of his im-

portant chapters is devoted to exposing the use of IQ tests to rank children.

The use of IQ tests for this purpose assumes that "intelligence is hereditary and constant." Indirectly, it assumes that those with a high IQ (mental age divided by chronological age) are "mental-oriented," and those with a low IQ are "manual-oriented." One practical result of this IQ theory is that it systematically denies and discourages a vast number of students (especially those with working-class backgrounds) from seriously pursuing academic subjects. Middle- and upper-class students who tend to score better on IQ tests, on the other hand, take college preparatory courses. Thus, a two-class system has developed in our schools. Moreover, this double standard has actually led to a watered-down curriculum of the whole school, college preparatory subjects not excluded.

THE assumption that intelligence is innate is the faulty footing for the IQ approach. Many sociological experiments have demonstrated that environment (family and community) are vital in determining general intelligence. Rather than discourage and neglect students with underprivileged backgrounds by permitting them to shuffle along on a "dehydrated" and "devitaminized" school diet, our schools ought to provide intense remedial work and special teaching devices to help many children overcome their initially poor environment.

An IQ policy which assumes that many children are innately incapable of learning much, and therefore dictates that no effort should be exerted to teach them too much, is bound to "prove" that IQ is constant or changes very little in the course of a child's school career. Our schools would do far better to heed Mr. Adler's advice:

> *We must always assume that we have* not *done all we can to improve learning. This suggests a new approach to the ideal of getting each child to work up to the level of his powers*: The only way to develop the abilities of a child up to the limit of his powers is to strive constantly to develop his powers beyond the limits of his present abilities.

Another topic, better known to the public, which Adler aptly evaluates is progressive education, the ideas of which have been lost in the hubbub of current clichés and phrase fragments. For anyone who desires a concise, accurate, and clear summary of the origin, goals, and growth of progressive education, along with a critical evaluation of each of its phases, Adler provides an excellent account. All that it is possible to indicate here is a summary of his conclusions.

THE progressive movement in education began with laudable goals at about the turn of the century. The two main ones were: (1) to meet the needs of a changing society, and (2) to provide teaching methods that were attuned to the emotional and developmental processes of a child. However, the program of progressive education

> *is derived not only from these goals but also from John Dewey's concept of society, his instinct theory of psychology, and his pragmatic theory of knowledge. The interaction of the laudable goal, defective theories, and changing circumstances has led to educational theories and practices that contain good and bad tendencies. The good tendencies include stress on discussion, criticism, and freedom of thought; the use of experience with concrete materials to develop the meaning of abstractions, and provide opportunities to use what is learned; and attention to the emotional development of the child. The bad tendencies include indoctrination for the* status quo, *and the underestimation of the importance of knowledge, systematic instruction, sustained effort, and drill. The bad tendencies have contributed to the neglect of subject matter, the decline in standards, and the retreat from democracy. . . .*

The problem, as Adler sees it, is neither complete rejection nor total acceptance of progressive education. "What the situation calls for today is a program to restore content to education, expand educational opportunity, and re-establish freedom of thought. Those aspects of progressive education that are consistent with this should be preserved. But those of its trends which stand in the way should be swept away." Who shall do the sweeping away and reconstructing is a moot problem, since, in my opinion, there are still very few within and without the school systems who see the issues.

Adler's book deserves to be widely read. It has something for the layman, student, social reformer, and professional educator. That something is an uncompromising and accurate analysis of the most relevant societal as well as strictly school factors that have corroded the foundations of American public education.

R. F.

Refreshingly Old Fashioned

MAKE FREE: THE STORY OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD by William Breyfogle. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, 1958, $4.50.

The earliest histories of the Civil War took the form of recriminations, with the South blaming the conflict on "fanatical abolitionists" and "Black Republicans" while Northern historians insisted the guilt be laid upon the Southern "fire-eaters." The later development of historiography removed the emphasis from personal blame and sought deeper causes, finding them in the clash of economic and social systems. This economic interpretation of the Civil War, most clearly developed by Charles and Mary Beard, did not, however, eschew blame and place the two sides on an equal level. The comparison of the burgeoning industrial society of the North with the retrograde slave system of the South clearly put progress in one camp only. The economic interpretation of the Civil War, in other words, followed the line of thought of William H. Seward in his classic "irrepressible conflict" speech shortly before the war, a speech at once thoughtful and objective about the causes of the clash and bitterly partisan in its Northern loyalty.

During the past two decades, a trend of "revisionism" in American history has affected almost every field of study, not least the Civil War. Historians like Professors J. G. Randall and Avery Craven have, in actuality, revived the "devil theory" of an unnecessary conflict brought on by hotheads, and while they give perfunctory wrist-slaps to the Southerners, the real villains in these new narratives turn out to be Northerners: free-soilers, the Republican Party, radical reformers, and especially the Abolitionists. Professor Craven's book *The Coming of the Civil War* is reported to have been titled in manuscript *The North's Mistake,* which puts the revisionist thesis frankly into three words.

The great virtue of Mr. Breyfogle's book, apart from its many intrinsic merits, is that it is written wholly in disregard of the new revisionism, and continues the uncompromisingly hostile view of slavery characteristic of an earlier and better day in American history writing. The heroes of this volume are Abolitionists, free-soilers, and helpers of fugitive slaves—and it's a hearty relief to read it after these years of we-were-all-a-little-at-fault interpretations which contrive to place on an equal moral level the slaveholder and the slave, while assigning the major share of the blame to the Abolitionist for "provoking" the dealers in human chattel.

There was a great element of spontaneity about the Underground Railroad, which, as an illegal improvisation to help steal slaves out of the South, was not set up by any official agencies but by unknown ordinary people. The story of these people, and of the bold risks they took and the adventures they had in their brave work, is a fascinating one, and Mr. Breyfogle has told it well. The writing is interesting and at times dramatic; footnotes, useless lengthy quotations, and the rest of the academic paraphernalia are happily omitted in the interest of a free-flowing narrative that ranges over all aspects of the slavery question, from plantation conditions to the coming of the Civil War. The thumbnail sketches of people of greater or lesser importance in the period, and the incidents and anecdotes of the flight to freedom, are freely salted down with the author's opinions and reflections. While the book lacks larger distinction of an intellectual or historical kind, it is refreshingly old-fashioned in its tone and viewpoint at a time when the old fashion is much better than the new.

H. B.

Kudos from all sides

WILLIAM Appleman Williams' article in our last issue, "The Large Corporation and American Foreign Policy, 1890-1958," has brought reader kudos from all sides. In particular, a surprising number of readers are paying the article the sincerest form of compliment by sending in for the reference notes we had to omit (as they occupied sixteen double-space pages) in order to dig deeper into the topic. Requests for extra copies and small bundles are running higher than usual. All in all, we feel satisfied that with our July-August labor issue and our September issue featuring the Williams article, our readers got a lot of top quality information and analysis. We hope we can often repeat.

Although summer is long gone, the summer labor issue we put out together with Monthly Review is still attracting attention. Our readers will be interested in this letter from the research director of a medium-size AFL-CIO union:

"Your American Labor Today issue, of July-August 1958, is impressive.

"Your back cover carries a reference to the availability of additional copies of this issue at reduced rates. Will you tell me what this rate is, minimum number of copies to be ordered, any other information needed before placing an order for distribution of this monumental issue."

We should mention here that the labor issue was completely sold out shortly after publication, and we are only able to fill orders now from newsstand returns. These are going fast, so if you want any copies, you should order at once.

WE have received a communication from G. D. H. Cole announcing that the International Society for Socialist Studies is launching an International Socialist Forum "which will enable members in all countries to establish links with one another through the medium of a common program of discussions."

"The first, on the Arab-Israel dispute, is being held during the period September/October, and will be followed in November/December by one on "Socialism and Contemporary Capitalism." Each subject will have its own background paper which it is expected convenors will use as an introduction, and in addition it is hoped that each group will elect a reporter who will send us some notes on the discussion and thus make it possible to ascertain the trends of socialist opinion in different parts of the world."

Socialists who would like to join or convene a forum group are invited to apply to the International Secretary of the ISSS, 22 Nevern Road, London, S. W. 5, England, (enclosing return postage) for fuller details.