


YOUNG SOCIALIST

REVIEW

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INFORMATION AND
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OF
THE YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE

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EDITORIAL NOTES

WHAT THE YSR IS

The Young Socialist Review is the information and discussion bulletin of the Young Socialist League. The YSR is prepared by the YSL National Office.

The aim of the YSR is to constitute a forum for the expression of all points of view within the YSL. It is, therefore, completely open to any member or group of members who may wish to contribute their views. Contributions from non-members will be accepted, if of sufficiently high interest. (The editor reserves the right to decide on the case of each such article.)

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THIS ISSUE

While this issue cannot be construed as necessarily a pre-plenum YSR considering its proximity of publication to the date the NEC plenum has been called, some of the contents deal with discussion of certain problems of particular political interest to our comrades today.

Absolutely unable to predict when the next YSR will be published, the only encouragement needed is manuscripts from our comrades out of town as well as in N.Y. YSR depends on copy from you!

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The Colonial Revolution: Two Cases

by Mike Harrington

(1) The position of the YSL with regard to the various manifestations of the colonial revolution was determined by the 1955 Convention (International Resolution, YSR, Vol 2 No 4, p. 29ff). That discussion was, however, more political than analytic, i.e. it turned on the question of support or non-support to the Viet Minh. Because of this, it requires supplementing.

(2) The task of the colonial revolution is the creation of an independent national state. In Western Europe, this was accomplished by the bourgeois revolution. However, it has always been necessary to see the bourgeois revolution in its specific context, and this is all the truer today in the case of the colonial revolution when world social relations are dominated by the existence of, and struggle between, two powerful systems.

(3) Even in the classic cases of the bourgeois revolution - the overthrow of feudalism in Western Europe - there were profound differences in the way in which the new national states were created. The earliest of the bourgeois revolutions, the English, took what Marx called "the revolutionary way", it developed through a movement in which petty producers became capitalists and fought against the feudal power. The French Revolution involved a tremendous upheaval from below, was carried out by a truly revolutionary bourgeoisie, and resulted in a thoroughgoing transformation of the ancien regime. The German Revolution, however, was separated from the French by half a century. That meant that it took place in a world in which capitalist powers were already in existence - and in which the challenge of the workingclass to the bourgeois order was becoming apparent. The German bourgeoisie, to use Engels' phrase, saw its shadow; it feared a thoroughgoing destruction of the feudal past because such an event would open the way to the socialist future. As a consequence, German capitalist only challenged the feudal ruling class to the extent that was absolutely necessary. Significant elements of the old feudal order carried over into the new social system.

(4) In Russia, the bourgeois revolution was even more delayed. It took place within the context of a world dominated by capitalism and torn by imperialist war. The Russian bourgeoisie was weak; incapable of fulfilling the minimal tasks of the national revolution; the Russian workingclass was small, but concentrated, its "social weight" was out of proportion to its numbers; the peasantry was determined to take the land. This particular relationship of classes was a function of the peculiarities of Russian development and of the position of Russia in a capitalist world (the interconnection of feudal state and bourgeoisie is an example of the first point; the importance of foreign capital in Russia, of the second). Consequently, even the accomplishment of the immediate tasks of the bourgeois revolution - land reform, workingclass rights, bourgeois civil liberties, etc - was beyond the Russian bourgeoisie, as the Kerensky Government made clear. The peasantry and workingclass made the October Revolution, and power passed to the Soviets; the bourgeois revolution was carried out, could only be carried out, by socialist measures. But, as Comrade Shachtman has pointed out, though Russia was ripe for a socialist revolution, it was not ready for socialism. Once the European Rev-

olution failed and the Soviet power was isolated, the socialist revolution was destroyed and a new social system, bureaucratic collectivism, took its place. By the end of World War II, this social system was a contender for world power.

(5) After World War II, the degeneration of capitalist imperialism and the growing consciousness of the colonial masses led to a tremendous revolutionary burst: to the colonial revolution as we now know it. But this took place within the context of a polarizing world which was the scene of a rivalry between two super-imperialist powers. Because of this, the situation has become tremendously complicated. A new class force has appeared in the colonial world, counterposing itself to both the bourgeoisie and the workingclass. In China, it is this class, the bureaucratic collectivist, which is carrying out the colonial revolution. In those nations where bureaucratic collectivists have not succeeded in taking leadership - India, for example - the forms of development are profoundly modified by the general world context. Only if we place the colonial revolution in a historical perspective can we understand its various manifestations.

I

(6) First, let us turn to China, where bureaucratic collectivism has succeeded in taking over the leadership of the colonial revolution.

(7) In 1932, Trotsky gave a picture of what a revolution in China without workingclass participation would look like: "In the absence of a strong revolutionary party and the organization of the proletarian masses, we can only have the rule of the leaders (of an army based on the peasantry -mh). The Commanders and commissars would then appear as the incontestable masters of the situation and, in entering the cities, they will look down on the workers from on high..." (Ecrits, vol 1, p 315) And, a little later, "In the actual situation, the peasant army by itself, without the immediate direction of the proletarian vanguard can only give power to a new clique of the bourgeoisie." (Ibid, p. 316)

(8) Thus, Trotsky on the kind of a revolution which actually did take place in China: a peasant-based revolution made without the intervention of the workingclass. Trotsky was, of course, right in noting that such a movement could not bring socialism; he was even accurate as to the psychology of the leaders - the Chinese CP told the workers to keep quiet, not to rise up, when they came to the cities. But he was wrong in seeing such a chain of events as simply leading to "a new clique of the bourgeoisie." This is partly a result of the earliness of his remarks (1932), but it also follows from his general failure to recognize the class nature of Stalinism. Let us look at the reality of the "commanders and commissars" of this peasant based revolution.

(9) The Chinese Stalinists who came to power were not simply the leaders of a Party. They were the rulers of a state which had existed, in one form or another, since the Long March of 1927. Here is how one acute analyst describes the class composition of this unique (state within a state)

movement: "During the two decades following 1927, the CP had become a party of de-urbanized intellectuals and peasantx leaders whose main strength lay in the military force which they created and with which they ultimately won power. Apart from its broadly agrarian character and pre-occupation, this party and this military force had no stable or consistent class base through the years...it shifted from one section of the peasantry to another, now seeking the support of the lower strata, now of the upper strata, at times adapting itself without difficulty even to the landlords. It came as a force from the outside, bringing its program with it." (Harold Isaacs, Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, Rev. Ed., p. 312). And, describing Party members, "They were, by and large, declassed masses of men, held together by submission to the authority of the party and of the army, and by acceptance of the Party's program." (Ibid, p. 313)

(10) Thus the CCP's road to power offers us an illuminating insight into the social nature of the regime which it established. The Chinese Stalinists road to power on the backs of the peasantry, but were not of the peasants; they came to the cities to rule, but without the support of the workers. Their base was a state, a party, an army, their alliance with the Russian Stalinists: they came from the outside, as Isaacs puts it. This is hardly a bourgeois clique - as the relationship which they established with the various classes of Chinese society makes clear.

(11) Immediately after the Chinese Stalinists took power, there was talk that the CCP would go slow on collectivization, that it would work through voluntary co-operatives, etc. In 1955, this analysis was totally frustrated. The CCP announced a vigorous program for the total collectivization of agriculture with a target date of 1959-60 for the complete accomplishment of its program. In his speech of December 27, 1955, Mao claimed that millions had "joined" the collectives in a period of four months. Thus in agriculture, the Stalinists did not simply destroy feudalism (indeed, Chinese agrarian relations were much less foudal than the Russian of 1917) and create an independent class of peasant proprietors. They replaced the feudal-bourgeois relations with those of bureaucratic collectivism, i.e. state control of agriculture through enforced collectivization.

(12) After their victory, the Chinese Stalinists also put forward an economic plan calling for a "national capitalist" sector of the economy. This has continued to this day, but it is a transitional situation with the bourgeoisie under the rigorous control of the state apparatus and with an offer of managerial posts for businessmen who go along once the economy is completely statified. By 1953, the CCP claimed that 80% of heavy industry, 40% of light industry, 90% of export-import trade, had been nationalized. Investment was, of course, controlled by the bureaucracy.

(13) Crucial, from a socialist point of view, is the relation which the CCP has established with the workingclass. As noted before, there was practically no workingclass participation in the revolution itself. Today, every vestige of workingclass independence has been destroyed. The "All

China Federation of Trade Unions" is a typical Stalinist labor front. Its Constitution, proposed by the "union" itself, states the following purpose: "to ensure and consolidate labor discipline, correctly organize labor, fully and rationally use working hours, raise labor productivity and turn out quality products." In other words, the Chinese Stalinists maintain a tight control over the workingclass so that they can impose the speed-up and increased production.

(14) Finally, Chinese Stalinism is an integral part of the world Stalinist camp. This is not to say that it is simply a satellite, or to deny that it has its own variations on the Moscow line. As a nation in which Stalinism came to power through a national Stalinist revolution, i.e. on the momentum of the native Stalinists rather than through the intervention of the Red Army, China occupies a position of a certain autonomy within the Stalinist camp. But nevertheless, it has remained firmly in that camp - it is part and parcel of world Stalinist imperialism.

(15) Thus Chinese Stalinism: a bureaucratic collectivist social system in political alliance with the world camp of Stalinist imperialism. As such, it plays a profoundly reactionary role in the world today - it solves problems, to be sure, it industrializes, it cleans out the flies (a fact which looms large in the imagination of British Stalinoids), but it does so in a reaction, anti-workingclass, imperialist fashion. When Comrade Wang saw a progressive aspect to this reactionary social system (NI, March April, 1951, p. 107), he did so on the basis of a description of it more applicable to its road to power and its very first days of victory than to what has followed. At that time, the CCP did indeed turn, now to the bourgeoisie, now to the peasantry, now to the workingclass. But since then, it has consolidated its bureaucratic rule over all classes in Chinese society; it has emerged as a new class engaged in the creation of bureaucratic collectivism.

II

(16) When we turn to India, we find certain similarities with the situation in China, but in terms of social system there is a basic difference: India is state capitalist, not bureaucratic collectivist.

(17) The situation in which India found itself at the time of its independence is exactly what one would expect in a country whose economy had been developed under imperialism. This is how the Indian Government described it: "Till recently, the major emphasis in industrial development in India was on the consumer goods industries; thus the development of basic capital goods industries lagged behind...In the case of capital goods industries and industries manufacturing intermediate products, the available capacity is inadequate even for the present requirements, while the production of iron and steel represents hardly 50% of the country's present demands." (From India, Reference Annual, 1955; Ministry of Information, Delhi; cited as Ind. hereafter; p. 253)

(19) As a result of this imperialist pattern of economic development, independent India is primarily an agricultural nation. Here is how its working force is distributed (1951-52; Ind.)

	in 00,000's	%age of total
Agriculture	1,063	72.4
Mining	7	.5
Factory	29	2.1
Small shops	115	8.0
Communications	1	.1
Railways	11	.8
Banking	1	.1
Transport	95	6.7
Other	132	9.3
	1,432	

(20) Once independent, India proceeded to develop its economy. The main forces are the native bourgeoisie, foreign capital, and the state. According to the law of April 7, 1948, three sectors were marked out: (a) the armaments industry, atomic energy, railroads, and other industries, to be under complete government control; (b) the coal, iron, steel, aircraft, etc. industries, to be a mixed area of state and private investment; (c) a private sector in other industries, to be under state regulation.

(21) The reason for this pattern is clear enough. The areas marked out for state intervention are industries in which the bourgeoisie is either unable (because of the magnitude of capital required) or unwilling (because there are more profitable sections) to take over. This is recognized by the Congress Party. Thus, H.V.K. Tongak, Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, noted: "The volume of investment required for the industrial programs in view is so large that these programs could not possibly be accomplished only by the private sector. Government must come in, not merely in certain basic fields, but also in other cases where the private sector is unwilling to risk capital either because a venture is likely to be unprofitable or not profitable for a fairly long period."

(22) This situation is, of course, a particular consequence of the period in which India's national revolution took place. The plant investment which must be made is not of the type which the 19th century European bourgeoisie provided; rather it must be on a level with hugely developed and concentrated industrial nations like the U.S. and Russia. Here again, the historical context is of crucial importance in determining the characteristics of the national revolution, but in this case, the solution is not bur-

ocratic collectivism, as in China, but state capitalism, the most advanced of capitalist forms.

(23) The First Five Year Plan (1951-56) must be seen in this perspective. It was largely a holding action, particularly because of a severe agricultural crisis which gripped the nation at that time. As a result, investment in heavy industry was not given priority. 17.5% of the funds went to agriculture; 8.1% to irrigation; 12.9% of power; 24% to transport; 8.4% to industry; 16.4% to social services; 4.1% to rehabilitation (the DP problem); and 2.5% to miscellaneous. The goals of this plan were not, in general, met.

(24) The Second Five Year Plan was announced as having the "goal of a socialistic pattern of societ..." It placed a much heavier emphasis upon the industrialization of the nation. The total projected investment was fixed at Rs. 48,000 million (\$10,800 million) to be divided: industries, transport and communication, 48%; irrigation and power, 18%; agriculture, 12%; social services, 20%. During the same period, private investment was estimated at Rs. 23,000 million (\$4,830 million): \$1,050 million to industry and mining. Thus, in the second Five Year Plan, the importance of the state sector increased.

(25) In terms of social relationships, the picture which this development gives is complex. This is especially true since various reforms are being carried out on a local (state) level, and vary from place to place.

(26) In agriculture, the British imperialists set up a landlord (Zamindar) system as their method of control over the economy. And, of course, they completely disrupted the village industries: "The general deterioration in the agrarian economy resulted from the gradual elimination of cottage industries in the face of growing competition from British manufactured goods and quickened the pace of the impoverishment of the Indian peasantry" (Ind. p. 187). Since independence, there have been various reforms aimed at abolishing the zamindar system and rationalizing agriculture into larger units of production, but they have proceeded on the basis of compensation, in some cases even continuing various feudal rights and claims in effect, and have failed to meet the problems. (It is interesting to note that the Stalinists see some possibility of total reform through this gradual reform. Cf. V. B. Singh, Land Tenure in an Indian State, Science and Society, Fall, 1955.)

(27) In all of this, the basic problem is to make a system of intensive, large-scale farming. In some Indian states, laws have been passed which prohibit the alienation of land in units of less than 5 acres. In others, voluntary cooperative schemes have been encouraged, and in still other cases, compulsory cooperative farms have been introduced. The rock bottom of the problem is the fact that the great mass of the Indian peasantry is classified as "ruined" (holdings of less than 2 acres) or "poor" (holdings of less than 5 acres. In addition, 55% of the peasant population is, for all intents and purposes, landless (cf. Mehta, Dissent, Spring 1955, p. 216). The Bhave movement (voluntary land redistribution) has only operated on the margin of the problem. Agriculture remains the most serious situation in the entire Indian economy.

(28) Foreign capital continues to play an important role in the Indian economy. Various Indian firms have "technical agreements" with companies like Chrysler, American Cyanamid, Imperial Chemical Industries and the Nuffield Group (the last two are British), etc. The recent Indian Companies Act, however, aimed at a certain limitation of the rights of foreign capital in the economy, especially with regard to the "managing agent" system. As one would imagine, the political and social policies of the Congress have not stimulated too much investment from abroad since independence: between 1948 and 1953, foreign private investment increased by only a quarter of a billion dollars, and a considerable proportion of this was re-invested profit. Nevertheless, Congress continues to appeal to foreign investors and gives some guarantees that the rights of their capital will be respected.

(29) The Indian workingclass is, of course, small in relation to the rest of the country. It is, however, fairly well organized - in 1953, the Government reported about two million workers in various unions, and this on the basis of incomplete figures. The social weight of the workingclass is considerable in certain urban centers, but in the country as a whole the workers do not play a leading role. The rural proletariat of landless farm workers is huge and it has provided a certain base for both the socialists and Stalinists. In the province of Uttar Pradesh, the total agricultural population is 12 million. 55.8% of these are "ruined peasants" (holdings of less than two acres), 25.4% are "poor peasants" (between 2 and 5 acres), 12.7% are "middle peasants" (between 5 and 10 acres), and only 6.1% hold over 10 acres! Here is another manifestation of the basic Indian agricultural problem, this time as it casts light upon the class stratification of the nation. The possibility of an alliance between the ruined and poor peasantry and the workingclass is, of course, a central point for socialists in such a situation.

(30) In all of this, the actual achievements of the Indian economy since independence have been considerable if they are taken absolutely (with 1946 equal to 100, industrial production in 1953 stood at 135.2, and this despite the severe agricultural crisis of the late forties and early fifties. But relative to the dimensions of the problem, India is still in a period of the most turbulent transition. This is how G.L. Mehta, Ambassador to America, summarized the situation in October, 1955: "We have no more than completed the task of reconstructing the economy from the effects of war and partition... The per capita income of the Indian people, although it has increased from \$53 to \$58 is still woefully low. There is continuous pressure of population on land since factory undertakings account for a little over 3 per cent of the total number of workers employed. There is considerable unemployment and underemployment in both the villages and towns. Further, there is an annual increase of between 1.5 and 2 million people to the work-force seeking opportunities for employment."

(31) In this sense, India must be viewed as a nation which is in crisis. It follows the path of state capitalist, but it has yet to modernize (in the sense of capitalizing) agriculture. Its industry is weak, its problem of employment and unemployment is great. And all of this is a typical consequence of the years under British imperialism, the situation is not of India's creating, but India must solve it if independence is to be meaningful.

(32) (As this was being written, additional information became available. Hence this lengthy post-script.

(In May, 1956, Nerhu announced a deepening of two of the policies discussed above. He called for an increase in the state sector, adding industries to the category under total state control, and he came out for more controls on foreign capital. This amounts to a continuation of the policy which has been described, and in a direction which was quite predictable.

(The additional information on China also confirms much of what has been said, but it is of much greater significance. It is taken from an article by Leon Triviere which appeared in Saturne, the monthly of the International Commission Against the Concentration Camp Regime - David Rousset's group. The bulk of Triviere's piece is taken up with long quotations from Stalinist sources. What follows in this paper is a summary of his findings.

(When the Chinese Stalinists came to power, they announced a three stage agricultural line: (1) land reform; (2) cooperatives; (3) "socialization of the land." In 1951, there were indications of a crisis in the relation between Party and peasantry. Po I-po, a member of the CCP Central Committee reported: "Certainly the peasants were the principle force behind the revolutionary movement in China, but the victory of the revolution was a turn toward the workingclass represented by the Communist Party. But a certain number of Party members of peasant extraction haven't understood this..." (my emphasis) The formulation, "toward the workingclass represented by the Communist Party" is a fascinating one. What Po I-Po is describing, of course, is the conflict between the bureaucracy and the peasantry.

(By 1952, the Chinese Stalinist press was speaking of a "blind, massive exodus" of peasants from countryside to city, especially in Manchuria, Setchouan, Chansi, and Kiangsou. This was part of a growing peasant resistance to the regime's agrarian line. On May 15, 1953, the Government had to report that a combination of natural and political factors had resulted in a famine. During 1954, this crisis continued. The official Stalinist press reported on March 15, 1954 that "In certain regions, the phenomenon of a blind exodus of peasants to the cities continues without diminution..."

(By 1955, the Stalinists were faced with a fundamental choice: whether to go slow in the face of the peasant resistance, or to push it through by force. In July of that year, Mao announced the decision: force. In his speech on agrarian policy that month, he told the Party that it didn't know its own strength. This was the background of the announcement later in the year of a policy of total collectivization. It is a clear indication of the

struggle which is going on between Party and peasantry.

(Finally, in an article published by the Second International, an Indian socialist G.S. Bhargava, has some interesting things to say on the whole issue of state property. Those comrades who are impressed by the nationalized sector in China, please note: "The assumption of State control of industry is an orthodox method of forcing the pace of development, of which Japan had made use with advantage in the past. 'In the initial period of development, especially in the 1870's and 1880's, the State dominated the scene in providing capital for public works and industrial expansion. Revenues were channelled directly into investment.

("In the inter-war years, long before the Soviet shadow fell on them, Latvia and Poland, and Turkey today, provided examples of the State dominating in the national economy. Before World War II, in no country in Eastern Europe did the public sector comprise less than 30%. Among our Asian neighbors - in Burma, Indonesia and Thailand - the State plays an important role in investment activity.

("Formosa which, in the eyes of us all, has a very unpopular and reactionary regime, has today a proportionately more State-dominated economy than any other country in the world with the exception of the USSR. The State has a practising monopoly in the aluminum, cement, coal, fertiliser, gold and copper mining, ship-building, petroleum, electric power, paper, steel, machine-manufacturing, sugar and chemical industries. As many as 186 sugar-cane plantations, covering half the total acreage growing sugar cane and employing 200,000 workers, are also run by the State. Does this make the economic set-up there socialist or socialistic?...")

III

(33) How do we assess these two cases of the colonial revolution? What theoretical conclusions must we draw?

(34) The first point is obvious: in every manifestation of the colonial revolution, the state will play a role of tremendous significance. This is inevitable given the period and the problem of these nations - it is a function of combined and uneven development.

(35) But whose class interest will the state express? The bourgeoisie cannot develop these new economies by itself. It needs the assistance of the state. Thus, it is possible to have the state be state capitalist - as in India. This means that once the revolution has reached its initial political

ain - freedom from the rule of the imperialist oppressor -, the bourgeoisie cannot undertake the social and economic steps which then become necessary. They cannot build up the heavy industry of the economy; they cannot solve the agrarian crisis (if it is soluble at all on a bourgeois basis). But their political strength may guarantee them an important place in the society, e.g. the Congress Party. And yet, the general movement of the society is toward an increase of the state, and a decrease of the private, sector. Such regimes are transitional, and the historical perspective of the bourgeoisie cannot be optimistic.

(36) China gives us the picture of another type of state power, that of a bureaucratic collectivist class. This class has already made it clear that it is the implacable enemy of the workers and peasants - it exploits the workers through labor fronts; it exploits the peasantry through collectivization; it uses the national capitalist for a time, promising them managerial status when their liquidation is called for. This situation is qualitatively different from the one obtaining in India.

(37) But what of the workingclass? The workingclass has, since World War II, played a relatively minor role in the colonial revolution in India and China. In the case of China, this was encouraged by the Stalinhists themselves. Moreover, in that country, one must still contend with the terrible Stalinist betrayal of the 1920's. In India, the workingclass is divided into four union federations and its social power has been subordinated to the "socialistic" national leadership of Nerhu. But obviously, one cannot predict that this will always be the case. In the past, the workingclass of colonial countries has demonstrated exceptional qualities (China in the Twenties, Indochina in the Thirties, for example) and a resurgence of this militancy cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, at this particular time, admittedly one of transition in all countries of the colonial revolution, the workingclass does not play a decisive role.

(38) In all countries of the colonial revolution, the masses of the peasantry are, of course, tremendously important. Yet, nothing that has happened in recent years alters Trotsky's thesis that the peasants cannot establish their own social power, and are forced to choose among the urban parties. This is most obvious in the case of Chinese Stalinism where a Party which came to power on the backs of the peasantry has already become the chief antagonist of the peasantry. In India, where limited democracy is still in force, the landless peasant proletariat is an important political factor, and progressive developments can only come when it is allied with the workingclass in the cities.

(39) This brings us to a crucial and summary point: the ques-

tion of socialism and the colonial revolution. Even though the colonial revolution occurs in backward, unindustrialized nations, socialism, and the organization of mass socialist parties, becomes an immediate necessity. The state will dominate; the only problem left up in the air is whose state? In India, it is a bourgeois state, but with the state sector gaining more and more power; in China, it is a bureaucratic collectivist state. The only alternative in this historical period is a socialist state.

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A MARXIST UNDERSTANDING of STALINISM

- A Review of "Stalinist Russia:
A Marxist Analysis" by Tony Cliff

Today with the new Kremlin line, with the tremendous unrest in Russia and the satellites (Polish workers are being slaughtered in the streets as I write) and with the confusion and disorientation in the ranks of the world Communist movement and its camp followers, the Russian question more than any time in the past becomes the basic question facing the radical movement.

It is not enough simply to develop our present "line" on Russia and attempt to politically embarrass and destroy the stalinist movement. We must keep our minds alert and alive. We must not only follow the Russian events with the utmost scrutiny; we must also read, think, and discuss. We have to continue our own theoretical development at an ever increasing rate as the importance of our movement and of the role of independent socialists throughout the world becomes ever clearer with the beginning of the disintegration of the stalinist movement that we are witnessing today!

For the above reasons the appearance of Tony Cliff's Stalinist Russia: A Marxist Analysis is especially a propos. Here we have a book with a veritable wealth of information on the nature of the stalinist regime. Not only that; here we have a book written from the same political point of view as the independent socialist movement in this country but from a significantly different theoretical point of view.

The book raises many questions for socialists to think about and regardless of whether one agrees with its formulations it can perform the extremely important function of stimulating theoretical thinking within our movement on this all-important question.

SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SHACHTMAN'S AND CLIFF'S ANALYSIS

It is significant that both Cliff and Shachtman come from the same socialist tradition, the trotskyist movement. This is no mere coincidence, for Trotsky and his supporters performed the extremely important role of keeping revolutionary marxism alive in the thirties and formulating the fundamental analysis of the reasons for the failure of the Bolshevik revolution and for the rise of counter-revolutionary stalinism.

With this similar theoretical background they both have split from Trotsky on the Russian question. The Appendix of the book under discussion makes the same general analysis of Trotsky's theory of the degenerate workers' state as Shachtman does in The Struggle for the New Course.

As important as their basic grounding in Trotskyist theory is their understanding that Russia - far from being a workers' state - is a class society with a new ruling class, the bureaucracy. For this is the foundation upon which any marxist understanding of stalinism must base itself. From this flows the recognition of the existence of the class struggle in Stalinist Russia and the looking to the working class rather than the bureaucracy for basic progressive changes in the society.

Following also from this is a realization of the necessity of a social, not simply a political, revolution to bring the working class back into power in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Another interesting similarity between Shachtman's and Cliff's theories is the recognition of the fusion of economics and politics under Stalinism. Cliff puts it this way: "... in Russia today, the double function of the state, as the guardian of the ruling class and as organizer of social production, leads to a total fusion of economics and politics."

Lastly it must be pointed out that both Shachtman and Cliff take a fresh approach toward Russia. Neither assumes that nothing has changed or that there is some magical phrase in Marx that will take care of everything. They both realize that Russian society is unique, though as we will see, Cliff holds that it is essentially a variation of capitalism while Shachtman holds it is an entirely new form of social system. They both emphasise the all-important point that one must study and think about the Russian question.

Thus we see that on many theoretical points and on all basic political points, Cliff and Shachtman are in agreement.

BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLIFF AND SHACHTMAN

One of the weaknesses of Cliff's book from our point of view is that he does not really deal with Shachtman's theory. He only mentions Shachtman twice and in these places only briefly and inadequately.

And yet it is not too difficult to discover where the two diverge and exactly what is behind Cliff's rejection of Bureaucratic Collectivism. Let me say at the outset that this difference is more than a terminological one. If the only question were whether to call Stalinism "Bureaucratic Collectivism" or "Bureaucratic State Capitalism" I would be for stopping the whole discussion and devoting our time to finding a new term; for they are both extremely clumsy terms.

The following quote from Cliff will serve, I think, to point up

his differences both with Shachtman and those who attempt to simply apply the pre-1928 Marxist state capitalist notions to Russia today:

"To say that a bureaucratic class rules in Russia and stop at that (here in my opinion he is describing Shachtmanism - TW), is to circumvent the cardinal issue -- the capitalist relations of production prevailing in Russia. To say that Russia is state capitalist is perfectly correct, but not sufficient; it is also necessary to point out the differences in juridical relations between the ruling class in Russia and that in a state capitalism which evolved gradually from monopoly capitalism. The most precise name for the Russian society is therefore Bureaucratic State Capitalism."

Cliff's criticism of Shachtman is essentially not that what he says is wrong but that he does not say enough. To say that Russia has a "collectivist" economy is to say little. All it means is that the state owns the means of production. It does not, therefore, distinguish the economy from a socialist one. It could lead one to the point of view that all that is necessary to bring about socialism in Russia is replace the ruling bureaucracy with workers' power and the workers will not have to touch the whole economic and social structure of the society. That shachtmanites haven't (to my knowledge) adopted this point of view shows that they are willing to sacrifice theoretical consistency for political correctness. This ability is of course Shachtman's saving grace.

Thus we see that Bureaucratic Collectivism is in a sense an open door through which almost any kind of creature can enter. The shachtmanites say that Russia is a new class society but fail to relate it to the only other major class society in the world, capitalism. Much of the richest parts of Marxist analysis are devoted to an analysis of capitalism. To what extent are the various laws of capitalist development applicable to Stalinism? This is the major question that Cliff asks but which Shachtman ignores.

To call Russia Bureaucratic Collectivist tells us nothing about the relations of production in Russia and raises more questions than it answers.

It is obvious from the passage above quoted from Cliff that he recognizes that there is a difference between the state capitalism of Russia and what Marx, Engels, Trotsky, Bukharin, and others meant by state capitalism. Their major difference lies in their historical origin: one is the logical development from monopoly capitalism and the other flows from the failure of the Russian revolution. Under one the ruling class lives off of state bonds; under the other the bureaucracy consumes its share of the surplus product through exorbitant salaries.

The following statement from Illya Ehrenburg during an interview with Morris Rubin throws some light on this point: "We have nothing resembling your bourgeoisie," he argued. "For classes to be created, in the Western sense, there needs to be accumulation of capital over two or three generations. In the United States you can make more dollars out of the dollars you have. Here this is impossible. One can only spend. That is the fundamental difference.

In a sense he is pointing to a basic difference between Russian

state capitalism and monopoly capitalism or state capitalis, growing out of monopoly capitclism. In Russia only the state "can make more dollars out of dollars" and it does it in such the same way that an American corporation accumulates capital.

Thus we have no simplistic state capitalist theory here a la Forrest, Johnson, Shane, Kautsky, et al. (In this regard it is interesting to note that while Shane rests his whole theory on the existence of free labor in Russia, Cliff denies its existance there as well as to a certain extent its existence under the Nazis.)

Now that we have seen Cliff's criticisms of shachtmanism and of simplistic state capitalism we still have to treat the question, "How does he defend his characterising the stalinist system as 'essentially capitalist' ".

To answer this we must first raise the difficult question of what is "essentially capitalist"? When one compares the capitalism of Adam Smith to the monopoly capitalism of today with its permanent war economy we find this a difficult question to answer/. One way of getting some idea of the differences and similarities between capitalism in all its forms is to compare fascism under Hitler (Especially in its last days) with early capitalism. We will find far greater differences between these two forms of capitalism than we will between Bureaucratic State Capitalism in Russia and monopoly capitalism in Fascist Germany. Hilferding wrote, "In Germany... the State, striving to maintain and strengthen its power determines the character of production and accumulation. Prices lose their regulating function and become merely means of distribution. The economy and with it the exponents of economic activity, are more or less subjected to the State, becoming its subordinates."

Another way to approach this question is to consider what Marx thought to be the essential role of the capitalist class in history and see whether the stalinist bureaucracy in performing this role in Russia.

Marx wrote, "Except as personified capital, the capitalist has no historical value, and no right to that historical existance... but, so far as he is personified in capital, it is not values in use and the enjoyment of them but the exchange value and its augmentation, that spur him into action. Fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he ruthlessly forces the human race to produce for production's sake... Therefore save, save, save, i.e. reconvert the greatest possible portion of surplus value, or surplus product into capital. Accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake..."

If this isn't an exact definition of the role of the stalinist bureaucracy I'd like to know what is. For as Marx points out in the above quotation "it is not values in use and the enjoyment of them" that is fundamental here. Thus if the Soviet state somewhat limits the individual bureaucrats' ability to personally accumulate it is only to enhance the ability of the bureaucracy as a class to "accumulate for accumulation's sake", which is carried under stalinism to a point unheard of under normal capitalism. This is the driving force of the entire stalinist society, it is its essence. The rule

of the bureaucracy is based on the power this accumulated wealth gives it; the ruthless exploitation of the Russian worker and peasant has made this accumulation of surplus value possible in much the same way as the exploitation of the workers has done this under monopoly capitalism.

From this basic point flows an understanding of the society as a whole. In every aspect of stalinist society scrutinized by Cliff we find the domination of capital over the workers and peasants, of property rights over human rights. For instance personal crimes are punished lightly in Russia, but crimes against property, which cause injury to state property, are dealt with ruthlessly.

This point of view enables one to get important insights into the present loosening up in Russia. The following brilliant quote, from Cliff's book, was written before the present change in soviet tactics but clearly presents one of the basic delimitations of the Russian rulers that has led them to attempt some sort of concessions to the masses.

"The historical task of the bureaucracy is to raise the productivity of labour. In doing this the bureaucracy enters into deep contradictions. In order to raise the productivity of labour above a certain point, the standard of living of the masses must rise, as workers who are undernourished, badly housed and uneducated, are not capable of modern production. The bureaucracy approaches the problem of the standard of living of the masses in much the same way as a peasant approached the feeding of his horses: 'How much shall I give in order to get more work done?' But workers, besides having hands have heads. The raising of the standard of living and culture of the masses means raising their self-confidence, increasing their appetite their impatience at the lack of democratic rights and personal security, and their impatience of the bureaucracy which preserves these burdens. On the other hand, not to raise the standard of living of the masses means to perpetuate the present low productivity of labour which would be fatal for the bureaucracy in the present international situation, and would tend to drive the masses sooner or later to revolts of despair."

Another quote, this time from Cliff's excellent pamphlet "Russia from Stalin to Khrushchev", makes a similar point on Russia's policy towards slave labor camps.

"Again, slave labour, once welcomed and encouraged by the bureaucracy as a method of breaking bottlenecks in the economy and of using the abundant unskilled labour force as 'shock troops' for capital accumulation, is becoming too expensive. Slave labour is not productive, and when labour becomes short, as in Russia today (because of the expanding industrial economy and the stagnation of agriculture which still keeps two-thirds of the population in the country side) it becomes uneconomical. Thus it is most unlikely that in future there will be mass arrests for filling the camps; repeated amnesties will continue depleting many of the existing ones. The camps in Russia would then fulfil the same function as Hitler's or Mussolini's, which served as weapons of political terror and not as a means of economic activity (except during the war years).

Another area into which Cliff's theory throws much light is

Russian imperialism. In this connection Mike Harrington's discussion in YSR last year on Bureaucratic Collectivism and imperialism are very interesting. Harrington claimed that Russia is not "imperialist" because its domination of others does not flow from anything basic in its social system. He therefore called it "expansionist". Oponants pointed out that this distinction logically lead to a position of defense of the USSR as Harrington dropped it. What his critics did not point out was that it also flowed logically from Bureaucratic collectivist theory. Again logical contradictions are entered into in order to make political sense out of Shachtmanism!

Cliff's chapter on imperialism, contrary to the above speculation contains a pointed and thorough analysis of soviet imperialism and its relationship to the bureaucratic state capitalist system. "The privileges of the Russian bureaucracy", Cliff states, "as those of the bourgeoisie, are conditioned by the unceasing advance of accumulation." It is thus necessary for Russia to seek other areas of the world to dominate and exploit. "Stalinist Russia looted the countries of Eastern Europe and Manchuria. She did so by transferring factories to Russia, and, as Nazi Germany did, by concluding barter agreements with her vassals which were ruinous to them". This point Cliff goes on to document in considerable detail. Another motive behind Russian imperialism is the need of a relatively backward country with a scarcity of capital for labor power. "The addition of 100 million people from the countries of Eastern Europe is therefore an important motive for the expansion of Russian imperialism, corresponding to the export of capital to the countries of advanced capitalism, he concludes.

A final but extremely important motive is of course strategical considerations. This however must be considered in conjunction with the others and not as the whole story.

It is interesting at this point to consider national resistance to stalinist imperialism in the satellite countries. For here as under monopoly capitalist imperialism we have two basic conflicting classes leading the national struggle, in this case the bureaucracy and the workers. Titoism is an example of the former. Here we find all the vacillating and inability to clearly and completely achieve national independence (it is significant to note Tito's recent moves to re-enter the stalinist fold) that is characteristic according to Trotsky's brilliant analysis of the capitalist class in colonial struggles. The other tremendous force is the working class which as we can see most clearly in the recent Polish events is fighting not only a class struggle but a national struggle (we must never forget the dual nature of the struggle) and has completely seized the leadership of the national independence movement in that country at the present time.

An interesting insight into the antiimperialist aspect of the revolt is given by a newspaper woman who witnessed the outburst. As reported in the Times, "She said she had seen demonstrators tearing up Soviet flags and pictures. She said they cried, 'Give us the goods that are being exported to the Soviet Union!'" There is an interesting possibility that the Soviets may attempt to placate the masses at home in the coming period with its imperialism abroad as western

capitalists have done. Witness in this respect the fantastic outburst of Great Russian chauvinism during the last war. We may see this again.

There are many other extremely interesting questions in relation to the nature of Russian imperialism that deserve careful study and thought.

Another interesting and important area of investigation which Cliff indicates in this book is the functioning of the law of value and the possibility of an economic crisis occurring within Russia. This is an extremely important and difficult topic and I will not attempt to discuss it here except to suggest to the reader that he read and seriously consider what Cliff has written on this subject in the concluding chapters of the book.

(To put his views briefly and therefore inadequately, Cliff feels that the law of value and commodity production exists to a limited extent in the Soviet Union when its economy is viewed in isolation from the world economy. Such limitations are similar to the limitations on the law of value found in monopoly areas of our economy and found to a far greater extent in the economy of Nazi Germany. However, "law of value is thus seen to be the arbiter of the Russian economic structure as soon as it is seen in the concrete historical situation of today - the anarchic world market" (underling added TW). As far as the possibility of an economic crisis in the USSR, Cliff feels that as long as Russia trails the West in production (and this will not be for long) it is relatively safe from this particular malady, but once "the production of machinery succeeds in bringing the economy up to the level of the rest of the world, will this state capitalist system be faced with overproduction? There can be only one reply to this question ... that the economy will be practically stagnant. Of course the war economy may offset this development. In this respect he states, "Given the world situation today, it appears that the war-economy solution is the only expedient for the Russian bureaucracy until such time as either socialism or barbarism will render a 'solution' to the contradictions inherent in capitalism - orthodox or state - superfluous." It may be that soon Russia will have as much to lose by disarmament as the West has now.)

In my opinion Cliff has only initiated the discussion on this point. Much more needs to be done, but I do feel that the direction Cliff points out is the most fruitful one possible.

One last remark about shachtmanism. It would seem to me that consistent with Bureaucratic Collectivism is the view that Burnham and others have held, that we are entering into a new epoch, the epoch of the bureaucratic class and of the bureaucratic society. Otherwise, if stalinism is simply a mutation - not a basically new and different society with an historic role - then it must be a variation of capitalism playing the same historic role and having the same historic fate. Again Shachtman makes a correct political judgment at the expense of logic and refuses to consider stalinism as a viable social form with a historic future.

The entire Russian question is a very complex one. In many places in the course of this review I have just barely touched on

many important questions which need thorough and thoughtful investigation. It is, in my opinion, the duty of every YSLer to begin to think about these questions, to reject the foolhardy notion that we have in any way "a finished program" as our sectarian SWP friends claim. You may disagree with much that Cliff has to say, but for those grounded in bureaucratic collectivist theory he offers a great challenge to accepted theory.

Let me conclude with another question growing out of the happenings over the last week in Poland. Poland today is faced by a serious unemployment problem. "Some young men told reporters they had been out of work for years," comments the Times. This is, of course, a very embarrassing problem for the stalinists. Since they consider unemployment impossible under socialism there is no unemployment insurance in Poland.

But while we are laughing at the stalinists we must also ask ourselves the same question they do: Why the unemployment? Nothing in bureaucratic collectivist theory would lead us to an explanation of this. Maybe the stalinist regimes are afflicted with many more "peculiarly" capitalist ills than many of us suppose. It is interesting to think about in any case.

-- Tim Wohlforth

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ISREAL AND THE ARAB REVOLUTION
A discussion of the Anvil Editorial on the Middle East

by Shane Mage

The current issue of Anvil devotes a full page editorial to the Israel-Arab crisis. The importance of this problem needs no demonstration, and it is heightened for us by the fact that a large portion of our campus arena is composed of young people of Jewish origin, who are deeply concerned with the survival of Israel. It is therefore all the more regrettable that this editorial is so pitifully inadequate.

An editorial on the Middle East in a socialist magazine should attempt to do three things:

1. To clearly delineate the social and national forces in conflict and to evaluate the revolutionary role and potential of each.
2. To analyze the relationship to the situation of the world inter-imperialist rivalries, showing the political aims and policies of each great power.
3. To set forth a socialist approach to a solution of the crisis.

Of course this could not have been done really adequately in the small space of a page in Anvil. But a schematic outline could have made the important points, in a clear and organized fashion.

Instead, the editorial makes a number of sketchily related points, with no attempt at programmatic or analytical clarity. Worse, on a number of important issues it seems to have a mistaken political line.

The editorial begins with an appraisal of the balance of military forces which is, to say the least, extremely questionable. "If nothing else is sure one thing is--the 'victory' of Israel in 1948 will not and cannot be repeated in 1956. The Arab states, led by Egypt, are stronger today than ever before." Of course it is true that the Arabs are better armed than in '48. But so is Israel. Even assuming that the Arab states have improved their armies more than Israel, there is no evidence that this improvement has overcome the enormous imbalance that existed (in favor of Israel) in 1948.

The persistence of this imbalance is indicated by the fact that in the border fighting between Israel and Syria-Egypt, large scale military actions have been resorted to only by Israel and with enormous tactical success. Syria and Egypt were unable (or unwilling) to retaliate in kind--they have been restricted to guerilla tactics.

Add to these considerations the staggering logistic problem of the Arab states who have to fight across a desert against an enemy possessing the shortest supply lines conceivable and the falsity of the statement "For Israel the question of war is a question of its very survival" becomes apparent.

The source of this error is probably confusion over the proposition that in the long run Israel cannot survive as a ghetto in an Arab Middle East. This is true, and basic, but it is wrong to deduce from it that Israel cannot survive a war at the present time.

This mistaken view of the military situation is important in itself, since one's picture of the military balance is a basic factor in a political analysis. At the same time, the view that Israel cannot survive a war has symptomatic

significance; it reveals a failure to reckon with the role the U.S. and Great Britain would be likely to play in such a war.

It is highly improbable that a war would remain confined to Israel, and the Arab states. The western imperialists have too much to gain by entering it: the British could reestablish their lost supremacy over Egypt and Jordan, the U.S. could, as its "saviour", force Israel into a position of abject dependence, and for both there would be plentiful bases. This sort of intervention would be politically easy, since it would take place under the "idealistic" slogan, "Defense of Israel". Despite this, we would have here a classic imperialist adventure, against which a defense of the Arab peoples would be the responsibility of every socialist.

Failure to even pose the problem of Western intervention is not the least weakness of the editorial.

Its worst mistakes come from a failure to understand the reality of the Arab revolution. True, there is the abstract phrase "The Arab masses are in motion". But this does not prevent the editorial from lumping all the Arab states together as "corrupt" and "reactionary", from passing over in silence the actual mass struggles in the Arab world and the reaction to them of Israel and other states, and from assuming that only the Israeli working class can take the initiative in the transformation of the Middle East.

The idea which pervades the editorial that the rulers of the Middle-Eastern Arab states form a reactionary mass is both false and harmful. Not only are these states split by power-political antagonisms (like the fierce disputes over the Baghdad pact), but they differ widely in their level of development and internal regimes.

There are countries still mired in the blackest feudalism and imperialist domination (like Saudi Arabia) but there are also countries (like Jordan, Syria and Egypt) which have made enormous progress toward, or actually achieved, their national independence.

Failure to make this elementary distinction does not merely render impossible any understanding of the real revolutionary processes in the Arab world--it leads directly to the grossest factual and political errors.

An example of the first is the reference to the "reactionary rulers of the Arab nations for whom war would be a solution of the 'Jewish question'". The error involved here is at least twofold, and both points should be apparent even from a cursory acquaintance with the facts of Arab policy.

1. There is absolutely no evidence for the Hitlerite anti-Semitic motivation imputed to the Arab leaders by the phrase "solution of the 'Jewish Question'". On the contrary, the rulers of Egypt and Syria have consistently denied any anti-Semitism.

2. It is strictly false to imply that the professed Arab aim is to destroy Israel. The Arab governments have repeatedly stated their willingness to make peace on the basis of U.N. resolutions (resolutions which would recognize the right to existence of the state of Israel.)

This factual error is complemented by a staggering political error: "The present reactionary leaders cannot be appeased--it is meaningless to enter into 'agreements' with men whose very political existence in most cases depends on keeping the masses of their countries inflamed against Israel."

This view would be fatal for any Israeli socialist who adopted it. Only one party in Israel has opposed negotiations with the Arabs: the extreme right wing, chauvinist Herut. Even Ben Gurion recognized that peace can be achieved only through negotiations between Israel and the Arab governments. But his offers to negotiate are vitiated by his simultaneous 'activist' policy. The first point of a socialist peace policy in Israel (and in the Arab states too) must be a willingness to negotiate in good faith.

This would be true of an Israeli revolutionary socialist regime (since political exposure of the Arab leaders can only be brought about through negotiations). The need to advocate negotiations is even more crucial for a revolutionary socialist opposition to the Ben Gurion Social-Democratic regime which has been incapable of taking any serious steps toward peace.

The revolutionary movement of the Arab masses is not abstraction: it has broken out into the open constantly in the last year most notable is the epochal struggle of the Algerian people for national liberation. It is not indispensable for an editorial on the Middle East to discuss the Algerian revolution--except for one consideration: that the relative positions of Israel and the Arab states are absolutely inconsistent with the simplistic description of the Arab rulers as "corrupt" and "reactionary". Israel voted with French imperialism in the U.N., while the Arab states, and particularly Egypt, have given significant political and military aid to the North African revolution.

The editorial's condemnation of Zionism, "its deep chauvinism, its disregard of the Arab peoples, and its dependence on the imperialist powers of the world for support" describes very well the political basis for the Israeli position. But what about the Arab states? What about Egypt?

The Egyptian regime is lumped with the other Arab states in one reactionary mass. The only specific reference to the Egyptian regime is to the "dictator Nasser."

Now Nasser is certainly a dictator, but that tells us nothing about the social nature of his regime. History has known many types of dictatorships--revolutionary as well as reactionary, democratic as well as oligarchic. Of what sort is the dictatorship of Nasser?

Like almost all the states so far established by the colonial revolution, the Egyptian regime has sharply apparant contradictions, stemming from the fact that it represents a small elite group attempting to establish itself as a national, state-capitalist ruling class (for a fuller discussion of this point see my Draft International Resolution, and my criticism of the Martin and Harrington documents).

On the one hand, the Egyptian working class has suffered severe repressions, and independent left wing opinion has been almost totally suppressed. But at the same time, Egypt has won its national independence and chased Britain from Suez; the corrupt, feudal Farouk gang has been kicked out of the country; important (though far from complete) measures of land redistribution have been taken; projects indispensable to the development of the country (such as the Aswan dam) have been initiated, and a powerful impetus has been given to national liberation movements through-out Africa, not merely by example and agitation but by concrete material and political aid to the North African independence movements. (Of course, this aid has gone to the right wing of these movements, such as the Algerian FLN, whose national capitalist and authoritarian outlook corresponds closely to that of the Nasser group.)

What forces could impel this regime to a war with Israel? Nasser must recognize all too clearly that an aggressive war, leading to British and American intervention, would mean his own destruction. He realizes too (and has stated

* This was written prior to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, an act which confirms this point 100%.

it frequently) that the arms race is a crushing burden to a country which needs every available resource to lift itself from ages of backwardness.

The vital interests of the Egyptian regime therefore preclude aggressive war against Israel---consequently negotiations can lead to peace.

The editorial's discussion of the role of world imperialism in the Middle East is, at best, superficial. References to "the old game of jockeying for position" tells us nothing about the concrete political reasons for Western and Russian imperialism. ~~For~~ It is not my purpose to analyze them here, except to point out a necessary distinction between the policies of western and Russian imperialism. The U.S. and Britain are already installed in the Mid-East. While the U.S. would like to oust its partner for its own advantage, both are concerned, above all, with preserving what they already have. Their first objective is to prevent the further progress of the Arab revolution. Thus, Dulles, defending arms shipments to Saudi Arabia, explained that the tanks would be sent to a place from where it would be virtually impossible to use them against Israel, and that their sole purpose was to suppress internal "disorders". The U.S. needs the Arab governments as policemen, a fact which gives these governments (even such a vile and servile one as the Arabian) a certain latitude in bargaining with the U.S. But this latitude becomes important only when these governments can rely on another great power against the U.S.

Russia is exploiting this situation by supporting the Arab governments as they break away from the Anglo-American camp. Since it cannot hope to establish its own domination over any area in the Middle East, its policy is aimed at encouraging neutralism and breaking down Western imperialist rule in the region. This policy is reactionary too, but in a very different way from that of the Western powers--it is very wrong to equate them. While the West is simply interested in strangling the Arab revolution and maintaining its own power, the Russians, supporting for their own reasons the national liberation of the Arab states, pursue a policy whose effect is to prop up the present rulers and to restrain the revolutionary surge of the Arab masses--in short, to confine the Arab revolution within national capitalist boundaries.

The final inadequacy of the editorial is that it does not state any socialist program for Middle Eastern peace. It merely enumerates a number of progressive measures that could be taken by Israel---and considers them the basic elements of a solution.

Its essential error is expressed thus: "a solution of the crisis lies in a basic change in the Israel policy. Why Israel? Because in Israel there exists a modern, educated working class which can take the initiative in a progressive policy which would necessarily embrace the whole of the Middle East."

This outlook is wrong both practically and theoretically. Theoretically, because a "modern and educated" working class is not necessarily more revolutionary than a more backward one. And practically, because the revolutionary forces in the Arab world are very strong and operate in a highly unstable situation while there is not sign of a revolutionary situation in Israel.

Therefore, a socialist peace policy must rely on the progressive forces in both camps. Its main points should be: (a) the demand for immediate multi-national negotiations on all disputed points, assisted by the mediation of a neutral figure like Nehru, and (b), the proposal of a Mid-Eastern federation of both Israel and the Arab states, as the only form through which a progressive solution of the enormous problems besetting this area can be reached.