

Jack, Joe, M-A, Doug, (ms)
B/c

Attn. : Comrades Jack, Barry, Gus etc.

JUN 27 1978

17 June 1978

To: U Sec Bureau

Dear Comrades,

After reading Comrade Roman's report to the U Sec Bureau dated May 10, we feel the need to write this report to you for your reference in the discussions of related problems.

First, we would like to express our sincere joy that since August last year, we have heard that responsible comrades of the FI have successfully dissolved the LTF and the INT, eliminated the opposition from these two factions, and strengthened solidarity in the FI. That is exactly what we strongly aspired to in the conclusion of the document (entitled 'Our opinion on the issue over Latin America') that we sent to you on the eve of the 10th W.C. We have also heard the joyous news of the successful fusion of organizations in several countries. They are good examples for, and impetus to, fraternal organizations which are still striving for fusion. Fusion and solidarity of this kind are extremely significant to the development of the entire movement.

Attempts of comrades of the FI at fusions have been realized after the comrades have conquered certain tendencies of division, after they have clarified political divergencies and resumed agreement, and with their insistence on the fusion being based on common political and organizational principles. We appreciate your conscious efforts; we completely support your present efforts of helping the divided organizations in other countries to achieve fusion. And because of this, Fong has expressed to Comrade Roman that we hope this effort will be extended to other Trotskyist organizations which have still not yet recognized the leadership of the U Sec Bureau. For example, if we can win over the French Lambert faction to be fused with the French section, a mass party will rise in France which can lead struggles with greater strength and serve as a greater impetus to the convergence or fusion of forces in other countries.

A The problem of fusion with RML

In converging^{the} forces here and striving for fusion with RML, we work with^{the} above attitude and wish. We react to your call in your letters, agree to work towards fusion with the RML, and go through a series of practical steps: we have made a report of this to you in our letter dated 25 Nov 1976.

(1) Actual moves to advance the fusion

This wish and attitude of ours are expressed in many facts. As early as when cde Wu suddenly announced his withdrawal from the RCP and the FI to set up another organization, despite its rejection to us, we still tried our best to approach it and cooperate with it; despite its refusal to join with us in holding mass rallies, we still supported it^{in action}, joined its rallies, and assisted it financially. Only because it did not regard itself as Trotskyist, there was no question of fusion of the two organizations. Still, we recognized two persons in that organization -- Wu and Heung -- as Trotskyists. Later, with the assistance of cde Sakai, we, they, and cde Lau of IWP, together formed a co-ordinating committee. The chief responsibility for the failure of this committee to play an active role lay, we think, not on us.

Despite the fact that cde Wu, being leader of RML, has never answered us on why he previously withdrew from the RCP and the FI (we have made a report on this matter to you at the time), and despite the fact that he stated in internal articles that RCP had degenerated to 'a reactionary position of betrayal of the revolution' and taunted cde S.T. Peng^{open} in publications, we still do not ask for his clarification of these questions as a precondition for the fusion discussions (rationally speaking, a responsible revolutionary should, of his own accord, first settle these questions clearly. And, on the position of the RCP, we should first obtain a reasonable explanation.) This shows that we are extremely tolerant in order to achieve fusion, and that we sincerely work to overcome obstacles.

The first actual step both sides took towards fusion was to assign us to draft a draft 'Joint Statement'; within the draft, there was the suggestion to 'cease any open criticisms of the other organization'. The draft was sent to the RML for their study with a view to adopt it jointly. But a month later, RML published on Combat Bulletin (6th issue) the article 'Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution' under the name of Mao Lan Yau (Wu's penname). The article greatly whitewashed Mao Tsetung and the CCP, condemned the 'mistakes of the traditional Chinese Trotskyists' five times each time with several words, attacked S.T. Peng by name, and even announced that from the next issue onwards, Combat Bulletin would discuss 'the mistakes committed by the traditional Chinese Trotskyists in the Third Revolution'. Apart from the above as answer to the draft 'Joint Statement' that we proposed, they have given us no other answers.

In the letter the RCP PNC sent to the RML Standing Committee and to all RML comrades dated 30 October 1976, we asked them about their ^{previous} extremely severe criticisms of RCP, and we restated our request of the termination of open criticism of the other party, we asked that our letter be issued to all RML comrades for discussion, and ^{that we} be told ~~them~~ the results of their discussions (we have translated this ^{into English} letter ~~at~~ that time and sent to you). But after that, we have never received a reply, except at a meeting, we heard Wu express orally that: their open criticism of us was only a kind of historical study which ~~was~~ was permissible. (Of course, we do not agree that this is the proper method in studying a historical question, which will achieve any good effects, and not result in the ~~damage~~ ^{the image of} of the Trotskyists) ~~image~~ Despite all these, later we still decided to appoint 3 comrades who, together with another 3 comrades from the RML, formed a co-ordinating committee which, on the one hand, discusses and promotes the fusion process, and on the other hand carries out daily work that both sides can cooperate in.

(2) Differences in the fusion process

We believe that in order to achieve a fusion based on common political and organizational principles, we must first carry out political discussions on our programmatic positions on China to find out the areas where both sides are common or different. When the programmatic principles have been confirmed to be common and the differences that exist are only of secondary importance, then ~~can~~ the fusion has a firm base on principles.

We do not agree to some other ways, such as before discussions have been carried out, people prophetically proclaim that the two sides do not have differences in programmatic principles; or, people think though there exist many differences, the fusion should first be realized and after that, discussions will be carried out within the same organization. The former way neglects the importance of political and organizational principles. If there were no serious differences, then, past divisions and setting up of another organization in opposition to the original organization was a mistake of unprincipled split. The many years of division show that there inevitably exists various differences. If we do not first clarify and solve the differences, but instead, bring the ~~possible~~ serious differences that may exist into the fused organization to be then argued, the new organization will bog down into disturbances and disputes; it will not be able to carry out ordinary work and play its role, but very probably, it will have opposing sides and ~~may~~ even a new split.

This probable development does more harm than good to the entire movement. We are very unwilling to see this. Therefore, the differences that exist while we work towards fusion ^{mainly} are ~~are~~ differences in the actual process and methods. These differences ~~cannot~~ must not be viewed as evidences of agreement or opposition to the fusion.

The process and method that we propose are basically similar

to the method used by FI leading comrades in strengthening FI solidarity this time: they first clarify past issues of political arguments, overcome actual differences, affirm the common positions of the two sides, and then dissolve the factions to ~~join~~ fuse them as one. Why is it that the FI method that has proved effective should not be applied here? Why is it that ~~this~~ ^{this} suggestion of ours should be considered defeatism that hinders fusion?

(3) Political differences that have been discovered

On November 26 last year, all members of the leadership of both organizations held a joint meeting and decided to have the six problems listed in the ~~above mentioned~~ Discussion Program which ~~our organization~~ we proposed as ~~problems~~ of programmatic principles for the fusion. If there can be ~~unanimity~~ ^{unanimity} ~~on these six problems~~ on these six ~~problems~~, that will constitute the basis for fusion. At the same time, the meeting decided that the leadership of both organizations would each prepare a written document on the six ~~problems~~ to facilitate discussions.

Later, we produced our written opinion on the ~~six~~ six questions (except part of the 6th question about the Constitution), and The RML produced ^{the} documents on questions 1, 2, and 5, and suggested some corrections to our document on ~~the~~ question 6. The RML did not write ~~anything~~ about questions 3 and 4, but they indicated that basically, they agreed with the related documents produced by us.

As for the documents the RML produced on questions 1 and 2, we immediately pointed out that they were too concise and relatively ~~too~~ of generalized theory and not concrete enough, thus evaded or concealed possible differences concerning real ~~pr~~ questions on China. RML, on the other hand, proposed to be theoretical as far as possible and to be concrete only when the program was being drafted. As for concrete problems, RML indicated that they did not agree with our criticism of the CCP's foreign policy of co-existence we mentioned in our document on question 1, and they said this should not be considered as a question of programmatic position. As for ^{one item in} question 5 about agricultural communes, a question which posed the most obvious differences, after several discussions, RML has corrected quite a lot of their opinion, but ~~they still insisted~~ ^{concerning joining of} ~~the~~ rural production organizations, they still insisted not to include the ^{principle} ~~idea~~ of respect for peasants' own will; but this was what we expressly proposed ~~and adopted~~ in the program adopted in the Conference of April last year.

During the political discussions, we asked them: were there any changes in their opinion expressed in the programmatic document the RML put forward on 4 May 1976 (entitled 'The crisis of CCP's bureaucratic rule, and prospects for the political revolution' and published in the 5th issue of Combat Bulletin)? Their answer was no. But we have always considered that this document contains the following main, serious mistakes: Firstly, it asserts that "the Maoists' main social basis has always been on the strata

of the highest political consciousness among the proletariat and the poor lower middle peasants; basically, their convergence basis is political ideology."As for the Chow and Tang faction, they are the rightists whose social basis has been on administrative personnel in science and technology, the intellectuals, bureaucratic cadres of the state organ, and the relatively well-off peasants; their convergence basis is political, economic and social privileges.

Secondly, it asserts that "the Maoists represent the tradition of the CCP as mass movement", that "the success" of the cooperative movement and the commune movement "has been accomplished by the form of mass movement". "These basic positions of the Maoists determine their centrist position". (In our opinion, the communalization policy has not succeeded and has not been a 'mass movement'. Instead, it has been carried out by order from above, a bureaucratic order similar to Stalin's promotion of collective farms in the U.S.S.R. starting from 1929.)

Thirdly, it thinks that the Maoists hope "bureaucratic policies & mass will can be entirely concordant, and orders will become the subjective demands of the masses", that "the Maoists fully allow 'horizontal democracy' to exist, ie, when the workers and peasants are carrying out orders from above, under the basic condition that they do not object to the policies, they can collectively decide^{on} how to carry out the policies and the details of the distribution of work." Such arguments^{as above} which contradict the facts and gild the Maoists should "support the Maoists^{oppose} and the rightists", and 'have no reason to insist the line of political revolution against the Maoists' (remarks of cde Wang on that programmatic document). But the line of political revolution is the most significant, central question in a program on China, and there must not be allowed a contradictory, ambiguous and evasive attitude.

Above mentioned are some of the more obvious differences that have been discovered concerning the two organizations' view on the programmatic question on China. This has been clearly pointed out by cde Lee See at the joint meeting which cde Roman participated. Besides that, there are some actual differences between the two organizations in their views on Taiwan (see Joint Internal Bulletin, Issue 1, 'Foundations of fusion for the Chinese Trotskyist movement', and our opinions on that document), in the agitation slogans we should now forward in Hong Kong and Macau (we propose the slogan of generally elected, fully empowered people's congress; RML proposes the slogan of Soviets), and in the advocacy of the RML in its 'Outline of Political Program' that the RML "should prepare and carry out armed struggle ~~in Hong Kong~~ if class struggle in Hong Kong develops to a certain level or under special circumstances," etc. (As to questions such as the appraisal and arguments on China's past history, the appraisal of the past mistakes of the Chinese Trotskyists, there will be quite a number of differences; but both sides have agreed to talk about them in detail in the future and will not take them as questions of programmatic principles which

must first be solved in the present fusion.)

In January this year, when we were discussing the first three questions and when the last three questions were not yet discussed on paper, RML gave us a letter and put forward 8 concrete suggestions (it is said this letter has been sent to you). Our opinion was that discussion should be completed according to the original plan, but the time limit for the completion of the discussions, for the ^{documents such as} drafting of the programs, for each to call its party congress to decide on the fusion, etc, should be definitely set.

When the discussions of ~~both~~ the leadership of both sides ended in early March, they jointly set up a document drafting committee. We were responsible for drafting the program on China, and that document we have given to the RML for study on June 4. We are still waiting for their opinion.

The ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ many differences ^{mentioned above} ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ are difficult to discover if both sides have not exchanged their views and discussed the questions. ^{But even after the differences have been discovered,} ~~the differences existing between the two sides~~ will be quite considerate and quite significant if the RML does not seriously consider and alter their obviously incorrect opinion, does not clarify some questions ~~that~~ pending clarification, and make concrete ^{the} questions they previously theorized as far as possible. The truth is always concrete, and the programs must also be concrete and clear. Without a concrete and clear political program, we will not be able to base on it in outside propaganda and agitation, and win the masses to our movement, and educate comrades internally.

All the above facts ^{we are serious and responsible in} prove that: ~~our~~ attitude to fusion, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ that we attach great significance to the political and organizational principles and positions as basis for fusion, ^{and} the methods and steps we have taken are necessary.

(4) Work in Hong Kong and cooperation between the two parties

Before and after the two organizations carried on the above mentioned discussions, we have made an effort to seek cooperation and joint action in outside work (such as holding open mass rallies, issuing statements, protesting and demonstrating).

In these few years, political ~~and working~~ situation here has indeed been much more favourable than before. The chief reason is that, the CCP's factional struggles and mistakes have been shockingly revealed and that ~~severely~~ has dealt a severe blow to the CCP's prestige, increased the discontent of the ~~xxxxxx~~ masses, and ~~raised~~ ~~the~~ ~~understanding~~ helped them to a better understanding.

But, the subsequent glory of the CCP's leadership in the successful Chinese revolution is still remnant. The CCP is still a strong party with over 35 million members and ruling a country of 900 million people. It still has a great influence and deception in Hong Kong, and the

side, so that both sides could concentrate in winning over leftists outside our movement. At the time they indicated that they accepted this suggestion. But at the forum, they suddenly distributed a special collection of articles in which ~~XXXX~~ was the article we mentioned above -- Mao Lan Yau's 'Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution'; there was even a footnote for the articles saying that these articles fundamentally reflected RML's opinion. At the same time, cde Lau, formerly of IWP and now of RML, distributed a pamphlet in the name of himself and ~~another~~ ^{Wang} comrade. Within this pamphlet, there was an article entitled "Lessons must be drawn from the defeats of the Chinese Trotskyists -- a discussion program proposed to the 10th World Conference". The content of the above two articles did not have direct relation with the immediate problems set for discussion at the time, and so ~~xxxxxxxx~~ there was no need for their being distributed. Such an act in fact partly diverted the attention of the participants from the immediate questions of struggles for socialist democracy and against bureaucracy in China to opposition to the past 'mistakes' of the Chinese Trotskyists. The result would be causing ^{perplexion of} people outside our movement ~~xxxxxxperplexxx~~, increasing their misunderstanding and bad impression of the Trotskyists, and diminishing their aspirations for the FI movement.

From the above facts, we can see that cde Roman has exaggerated when he said "our political place in now have control in far left milieus".

Cde Roman of course derived the above from reports made by some comrades here. In the past, we find there have been exaggerated reports of this kind. For example, on May 3 last year, The Rouge reported: on May Day in Hong Kong, 1000 people marched to the police station to demand the release of two arrested RML members. But the fact is: on the day, the RML sent two members wearing protest boards to demonstrate in the streets and they were followed by a crowd; though there were some sympathizers among the crowd, many were passers-by who looked on with curiosity. This exaggerated report was made use of by pro-Maoist publications in Hong Kong as an excuse to deal a blow on the Trotskyists and ~~this~~ cause damage to the prestige of our movement.

questionns such as
Concerning/the lines, methods and styles of work in Hong Kong, there have been obvious differences between the two organizations ~~ix~~ a few years ago. We think there was a tendency to adventurism displayed by the time from S.L. to RML. In these years, such a tendency ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{has} seldom been found. But some flamboyancy ^{still} seems to exist.

During political discussions, Yip Ning suggested to include the lines of work in H.K. as one of the questions that the two organizations should discuss. This reflects that he or other young comrades think that on this question, the two sides may have differences. Though the leadership of the two organizations have agreed to include this in the agenda, this question is not considered as a programmatic question necessary for the fusion. But, until now, this question has not yet been discussed.

(YL)

B Disputes over party-youthleague/relationship, and the crisis that incurs

Lately, disputes within the RCP have developed to the verge of split. A detailed report should be ~~given~~ made on this serious organizational problem and we hope you will give us your opinion and help to solve this crisis.

The focus of disputes is on the relationship between the party and the youthLeague. The event that directly caused this is when some comrades who were both party andRCY members (headed by Cheung Kwai and Yip Ning) themselves announced the dissolution of the original Revolutionary Communist Youth (RCY) and themselves 'merged' into the YSG, and YSG was not to be 'the continuation of RCY'.

(1) The main developments of the disputes

In order to understand the content and significance of today's disputes, a concise description need to be given on the development of disputes inside the party for the past years. (Since there are many documents from every side , we cannot translate them into English and so we simply enclose the original documents.)

In Nov 1974, the PNC 'called on and decided on the re-establishment of S.Y.'. To help the party to develop youth work, an S.Y. /^(Socialist Youth) Provisional committee was formed by two old comrades and five comrades of the youth cell who had newly joined the party. Their duties were to develop the membership^{and} do preparatory work for the future conference of the Y.L. about to be called. The resolution actually stated that the party-Y.L. relationship was to be: "S.Y. members should be preparatory members for the party; S.Y. should be the ~~party's~~ preparatory school for the party; S.Y. is to accept the party's political leadership, but remain independent organizationally."

Later, S.Y. changed its name to RCY and all theRCY members joined the YSG which is a mass youth organization formed by us and active openly. Its aim is "anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and or socialism."The political level and ^{composition} ~~composition~~ of its members varies; in these years, its membership numbers at most to 20 or so. Its nuclei and leadership are our comrades.

In July 1975, the PNC invited cde Yip Ning to join work in the PNC and to be a PNC member. The PNC maintained his living so that he could devote all effort to youth work,

After some time, in the PNC / started to occur differences / on the YSG question. Yip Ning changed his past view and thought YSG should be developed to an organization similar to the RCY, which meant to combine these two organizations into one. Other PNC members held the opinion that: YSG had its role in its existence; it could take in young people of different political level (particularly those of very low level) and the organization could serve as ^{our} peripheral political organization in society and carry out

activities. And we could, within the organization, educate them and raise their political level.

Later, the PNC proposed that YSG members with sufficient conditions be promoted to Y members, but this met with ~~an~~ objection from Yip Ning. He proposed that the alternative was to wait for the combination of the party with the entire YSG in the future. If now some of the members were promoted, those being promoted would have ill feelings. But, in the end, the majority of PNC members decided that the PNC members would talk directly to some of the YSG members, and subsequently, half a dozen members were recruited into the RCY and it was proved that they did not have any ill feelings.

In the party conference in April 1977, Yip Ning proposed that the party should help RCY to develop and dissolve YSG. Since this opinion was not proposed as a motion, it was not discussed and adopted.

A month or so later, ie, in May 1977, Yip Ning suddenly proposed to dissolve RCY. The CC called an RCY plenary meeting to discuss this suggestion, and the result was that the proposal was voted down by the majority of the RCY. In order to reflect the opinion of the whole party, we called a CC enlarged meeting to discuss this question and the result was that Yip Ning's proposal was voted down by an overwhelming majority.

In early 1977, RCY Standing Committee drafted the draft RCY constitution in which was set the relationship between the RCY and the RCP, which was basically similar to the ~~xxxxxxx~~ above mentioned PNC decision of Nov 1974. The draft was adopted by 4 votes (Cheung Kwai, Ah Lap, Chi Ming -- the 3 young comrades-- and cde Hong Kai) to 1, and it is to be put forward ^{for discussion at} the RCY congress then under preparation. (Yip Ning cast an opposing vote on the reason that he did not agree to the item of "politically under the leadership of the RCP".)

In Nov 1977, the majority of the reorganized RCY Standing Committee (cdes Cheung Kwai, Yip Ning, Mak Ka) adopted the Draft Position of the YSG which is to be put forward for discussion and adoption at the YSG Congress. Its Chapter 4 "YSG's nature and its relation with other organizations" does not define the special fraternal relationship between YSG and RCP, as RCY and RCP did in the past, but views RCP and RML with equality and adopts the same attitude; on the other hand, RCY is to be dissolved in practice.

On 28 Jan this year, ~~xxxxxxx~~ on behalf of the YSG Standing Committee, Yip Ning wrote a letter to the RML Youth Organization Committee suggesting that the two organizations be fused immediately and ~~xxxxx~~ "an independent Trotskyist youth group" be set up jointly. The actual significance of this suggestion is: Yip and the others ignored the fusion plan that the leadership of the two organizations were at the time carrying on, and ^{tried to} themselves/first of all 'fuse' some of the young comrades of RCP and RML. It is said that this suggestion was made to Yip and Kwai etc a few months

ago by cde J.P. (the RCP CC only came to know of cde J.P.'s suggestion from Wu ~~xxxxxxx~~ a while ago.) This action of Yip and the others had not been put to discussion or adoption beforehand with the leadership of RCP and RCY. On February 8, the RCP called a CC enlarged meeting (besides the CC members, alternate CC members and RCY standing committee members, there was a delegate from each cell and from Yip's tendency; the RML also sent an observer) in which one of the items was to discuss the above question suggested by Yip Ning and the others. The result was that the suggestion was voted down by 10 votes to 4. At the same time, the RML Youth Organization Committee replied to officially reject the suggestion.

On February 16, after two ~~xxxx~~ days of long discussion and argument, the CC at last reached a unanimous resolution (ie, what Cheung Kwai said to be the 'Mutual Agreement'), and on the spot wrote it down for Yip Ning to base on it to rewrite the draft resolution of YSG's organization. The main content was to alter the ambiguous position of the majority of Y standing committee on the above draft and to set down that "YSG is the continuation of RCY".

But in the YSG congress, the resolution put forward by Yip Ning and adopted had altered the basic position which the CC had unanimously adopted. Instead, it was abstractly written that "RCY also considers YSG as the basis for its continuous establishment of a revolutionary youth organization, which in fact merges into the YSG." (though, it has adopted some other suggestions put forward by the CC, and has added a narrative of the past special and close relationship between the RCP and the RCY, and added lines such as "we should make an effort to seek the strengthening and consolidation of cooperation with the RCP in various aspects.")

At the time, a young party member (and also YSG member) who supports the CC majority suggested that the YSG adopt: YSG is the continuation of RCY, independent organizationally, & ^{the leadership of the} accept RCP politically. But this motion was ~~xxxxxxx~~ vetoed by 8 party members headed by Yip and Cheung, and one non-RCP YSG member. Other non-RCP members cast votes of abstention.

On February 26, the CC adopted a resolution on the YSG question by 5 votes for, one vote against (Cheung Kwai), and one vote was absent. One of the main points of the resolution was to "continue in winning over YSG ~~xxxxxx~~ to become a youth league of the FI Chinese Section", and to instruct "party members who are in the YSG executive committee to at once arrange for discussions within the YSG on the question of the relationship between the party and the Y.L. ."

(2) Key-points and nature of the present arguments

On March 5, Cheung Kwai drafted a 'Draft resolution on the relationship between the party and the Y.L.' which was later adopted by the YSG executive committee and is to be discussed and adopted at the YSG congress. Its main differences are: "if the Y.L. states clearly that it

Before Yip Ning put forward the resolution, it had been glanced over by comrades Lee See, Cheung Kwai and Hong Kai.

~~follows~~ accepts the political leadership of the party (political not only includes principles, positions and programs but also actual political questions and policies and lines etc), it will mean that on every question, the Y.L. inevitably accepts the party's views"; "at present, we should adopt such phrases as politically unanimous or politically supporting"; "at present there are two parties in China.....If deep political differences cause the effort to seek fusion of the two parties to fail, then the revolutionary youth organization will have to judge which party is the real revolutionary party by the position and performance of the two parties", etc.

On April 17, the RCP CC adopted a resolution entitled 'Opinion and attitude on the questions of Y. L.-building work and the relationship between the party and the Y.L.' by 6 votes for, 1 vote against (also, one for and one against consultative vote from the alternate CC members). This resolution reiterates the party's traditional opinion and position: the Y. L. is the party's young assistant and training school; it is organizationally independent but it has a fraternal, inseparable association with the party; it accepts the leadership of the party politically. After the RCY has 'merged' into the YSG and the YSG has been elevated to a Trotskyist youth organization, the YSG should expressly define its relation with the RCP, ie, the relation between the party and the Y.L. as defined above. Besides, party members working in the YSG should carry out the party's official decisions in the YSG ^{and} vote according to the party's instructions; they should not violate the instructions and vote only according to their own (or the party minority's) views.

Cde Cheung Kwai and the others stated that they objected to the above views of the CC majority, and they were going to vote according to their own views and not the party's majority's decisions when the YSG voted on the question of relationship between the party and the Y.L. This means they will once again violate discipline in action, oppose the party in the open, and therefore may lead to an actual split in the party. Faced with this threat of split, the CC decided on May 4 that: there will be 2½ months' pre-conference discussion; in early August an extraordinary convention will be convoked and all party comrades will discuss and decide on this serious question of dispute over the party-Y.L. relationship, and also on the fusion question with the RNL.

We can see from the above development of arguments that what Yip Ning, Cheung Kwai etc are after is another organization separated from the RCP and the RCY, and even to be politically independent. It is developed under the name of the revolutionary youth organization, YSG. In order to defend their violation of the traditional views and the organizational principle of democratic centralism (~~xxxxxxx~~ also ^{the} violation of the ~~proposition~~ position that they had agreed to or proposed not long ago), they have created a number of ~~xxxxxx~~ spurious excuses. But no excuse can

U Sec Bureau should ~~also~~ also bear the chief responsibilities. Of course such an argument is not valid. But the action of withdrawal itself is related to the attitude of a revolutionary to a party (a national or an international one) and to the organizational principles and methods of a party. This is not a casual one like going in or out of a club or hotel. We do not know whether or not the U Sec Bureau has carried out discussions and drawn a conclusion when it received the reports from us and (if there is one) from Wu.

The 'second major break' may be referring to cde Johnny's departure. We admit that the leadership at that time should bear a much greater responsibility for this than for Wu's withdrawal, because some of the leadership's actions (such as agreeing to the requests of newly joined young comrade not to inform comrades outside the PNC of the new comrade) increased Johnny's dissatisfaction. But at the same time, Johnny had joined work with S.L. and was together with Wu and the others, and not long later, he also left S.L. Some time ago when he came back to H.K., he told us that his discordance with the old comrades was not the only reason for his departure; he did not want to be involved in the opposition of the two sides here, and he would not join either side before the fusion (this ^{may} imply he has opinion on both sides), and his departure was basically an evasion.

It is of course a fact that there exist discords and disputes between the older and younger generations, and the former should particularly take heed of this and should try to overcome them with greater patience. But discords and disputes among the young generation also occur incessantly. For example, ^{in the past} between Wu and Johnny, Wu and Yip Ning, within RML (we often heard there were withdrawals of its members, and the number and frequency was several times more than the above two in our case), between Yip Ning and Cheung Kwai (such as last summer, because Yip Ning openly 'broke party discipline' while he was with the masses, Cheung Kwai had violently proposed that Yip be expelled, but this was dissuaded by us; today, while discussing this report, Cheung Kwai says that at the time, she was only proposing that Yip be dismissed from his post of secretary in the RCY and he be expelled only when he continued to behave in that way), and lately between YSG and RML (Wu had severely reprimanded YSG on the joint meeting which cde Roman participated), and among RCP young comrades who support or oppose the CC majority.....

The main facts and basic principles must be based on in the judgment and expression of attitude on all differences or disputes, and age must not be used as the chief criterion to determine right or wrong. When the young generation join our movement, we of course very much welcome them and should ~~try to do our best to unify them~~ try our best to unify them. Their merits (such as courage and enthusiasm) are an example for the old comrades. But, many of them are often inconsistent in their position, capricious in their opinion, and they have not been put under a long trial. As for the

old comrades, though some of them are not too active, and their occupation and age etc make it difficult for them to join ~~us~~ in open struggles, they have withstood extremely strong pressure from all sides for several decades in the difficult and adverse political environment (^{all other} FI sections of countries where communist parties are in power have been unable to maintain their organizations, not even outside their national boundaries -- from this can be seen the power of the pressure). Up to today, they have shown themselves still loyal to their consistent belief and our movement. Generally they have been under trial and they upkeep the movement's tradition and principles. Some, in recent years, have worked hard (especially in writing and publishing) and have made great contributions in overcoming financial difficulties..... It will only do harm to the movement if someone adopts an attitude of discrimination ~~indignation: xxxxxxjacticoxxogathossxxofxkxxxxrightxxxxxxx~~ against these comrades (even if that is objectively so), or if someone intends not to recognize them because they (or the majority of them) may not fit in with some persons' time schedule for fusion (recently we have heard of such sayings of an almost ultimatum kind).

On cde Roman's report, he said that: one of the RCP CC members "said that all previous splits occurred as a direct result of FI division and clearly implied that members of the center encourage them." We have not heard of such words or implications. Perhaps this has resulted from estrangement in language communication. On the joint meeting, what we heard a CC member say were: "divisions here are related to the FI" (records of the time are the same). The indications that he meant were: firstly, the opposition ^{between} the majority and the minority in the FI increased the opposition between the RCP and the RML; secondly, cde J.P. suggested Yip Ning to set up an immature tendency, and suggested young comrades to fuse with the RML themselves.

We have made such a lengthy report in order to provide most information and facts and to point out the actual situation, so that you can have a better understanding of our situation here. We particularly hope you will refer to the reports given by cde Roman and us and to materials provided by other comrades, study them in detail, carry out discussions and then to make decisions (if necessary, discuss and decide this on FI ex-co meetings), so that you can help us here to solve these difficult questions in a reasonable way.

With Trotskyist salutes,

Lee See

for Standing Committee of C.C., RCP.

P.S. This report has been adopted by the S.C. with 4 votes for, 1 vote against. Cheung Kwai cast an opposing vote chiefly because she thought this report was not comprehensive enough. During discussions, other comrades had suggested that she made another report. She had no response to this.

C C: Comrades Sakai, Barry, Jim P., Peng;