

Xs. 1344, 5111A, 5111, 6111 ✓

Rouge, September 10, 1976

Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese Revolution -- by D.R.

The agony of the Chinese empire, submitted to the rapacity of the imperialists, the impotence of the bourgeois revolution of 1911 to carry out the agrarian reform and liberate the country, the chaos engendered by the warlords, such was the ~~background~~ setting for the ~~youth~~ childhood and youth of Mao Tse-tung, born in 1893 in Hunan into a family of poor peasants. It would take too long to recount here his clashes with his father, who soon became wealthy, ~~the~~ or the peripatations of his school life as a poor student. Put simply, Mao very ~~soon~~ ^{early} became interested in the destiny of China, and participated in the reformist and modernist intellectual ferment created by the "importation" of Western ideas into China.

"At that time," he would tell Snow, "my ^{mind} outlook was a curious blend of liberalism, of democratic reformism, and of utopian socialism.... I was ~~frankly~~ antimilitarist and

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anti-imperialist." ^{1/} In 1917, he founded the ^{from Peking} "Society for the Study of the New World"; in 1919, he ~~participated~~ in Peking where he

was an assistant librarian, he participated in the student movement of May 4, 1919, against the Versailles Treaty, which transferred to Japan the German concessions in China. He began his initiation in Marxism, which was brought to China by the salvos of October. In 1920, he founded a Marxist study society, while beginning to carry out the job of organizing the working class. In 1921, he participated in the founding congress of the Chinese Communist Party.

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With the Kuomintang

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This tiny group (57 members in 1921!) lost no time in implanting itself solidly in the working class, which Mao organized ⁱⁿ from Shanghai ^{and} to Hunan. But the ~~CCP~~ young and inexperienced ^{CCP} was ^{confronted} constrained to submit to the directives of the Stalinist Third International, and in 1923 concluded an

unprincipled alliance with the Kuomintang, the bourgeois nationalist party. This led to the defeat of the Chinese revolution of 1926-27.

During this period, Mao showed himself to be a fervent partisan of collaboration with the Kuomintang, in which he held responsible posts from 1923. If Schram is to be believed, Mao was one of the last to break from the KMT. But he would have the opportunity to go through his first campaign in the working class, and to discover, in 1925 and in 1927, the revolutionary potential represented by the peasantry. Despite his enthusiasm for the peasant movement of Hunan, he submitted to the Comintern's directives, which had as their primary objective, up to the last minute, not to upset their bourgeois ally.

note 2

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From the defeat of 1927 to the Kiangsi Republic:

"A single spark can start a prairie fire"

line #

In August 1927, the working class had been massacred

by Chiang Kai-shek and the CCP decimated. Nevertheless, the Comintern launched a policy of uprisings in the cities, as criminal as the preceding policy, which culminated in December ⁱⁿ with the crushing of the Canton Commune. Mao, for his part, was entrusted with the leadership of the "Autumn Harvest uprising." Beaten, ~~excluded~~ ^b from the CCP Politburo for his disagreements, he retreated with ^a the remnants of his army into the Chingkan mountains, where he tried to protect what remained of the CCP and of his army. Meanwhile, the Comintern continued to ^{advocate} pursue a disastrous policy in the cities which led in 1930-31 to the complete elimination of the working class as a revolutionary force.

It was in the defeat of 1927 that Maoism was born. If Mao was not capable of producing ~~an overall analysis~~ ^{an overall analysis} of Stalinism and of its repercussions in China, if he remained loyal to the theory of the revolution by stages, he drew a certain number of lessons from 1927 which he never forgot. He understood the necessity of ^u distrust^{ing} the treacherous Kuomintang, the

necessity of preserving the political and organizational autonomy of the Communist Party, and the need to construct a political and military relationship of forces that would assure ^{of} for the CCP the leadership of the revolutionary process. He also understood that he must oppose the Comintern's directives whenever these were in contradiction with the interests of the Chinese revolution.

Through his campaigns he created an army out of nothing, ^{and} he built a base of support from which to launch the conquest of China from the Nationalists. And he refused ^{in practice if not very explicitly} to give support to the policy of the CCP in the cities (to prepare ~~the~~ insurrections),

~~In fact~~
~~in practice~~ by refusing to attack Changsha with his army, after a preliminary setback ^{if not in} ~~very explicitly.~~

In 1931, the Kiangsi Soviet Republic was founded, of which he was the chairman and which ^{saw itself as} was a "workers' and peasants' government." The Communists ^{based their support on} won support through a radical agrarian reform, later moderated when the Nationalist

encirclement prevented them from indulging in the "luxury" of alienating the middle and rich peasantry.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that Mao in 1927 deliberately opted for the peasantry out of contempt for the working class. It was the defeat of the Autumn Harvest uprising and his disagreements with the party in the cities which ~~constrained~~ ^{compelled} him to stay where he was as a strategic withdrawal.

~~It would not be until~~ ^{was only} after 1931 that he ~~would see~~ ^{could} no other alternative in China except a revolution ~~from which~~ ^{without} the proletariat ~~was absent~~.

But the proletarian position would always be preserved.

In 1935, the Communists were compelled to evacuate Kaingsi, after having four times repelled the Nationalist troops. This would be the Long March which would lead them to north Shensi, a

military defeat transformed into a political victory,
during which Mao took over the party leadership.

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From the anti-Japanese united front
to the People's Republic of China

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Since 1931, Japan had been engaged in a policy of annexing China. The CCP was hardly established in north Shensi when in order to confront the invader it made a sharp turn from the line of the Kiangsi period and proposed the largest possible united front (excluding only pro-Japanese elements). According to Mao, who wrote his famous essay "On Contradiction" in 1937, the primary contradiction was ~~not~~ ^{no longer} between the proletariat, the peasantry, and the possessing classes, but between the Chinese "people" and Japan.

An accord ~~was concluded, not without difficulty,~~
with the Kuomintang was concluded, not without difficulty, based on reciprocal concessions. The CCP for

its part renounced the agrarian reform (this was ~~abolished~~ replaced by

~~a reduction in~~ crop shares paid by tenant farmers and ~~of ground~~ land rent), and the formal ^{its} subordination of Mao's government and army to the government and army of Chiang Kai-shek.

Was this unbridled opportunism? It is not for us to justify the rightist excesses of this period, Mao's return to the necessity of a bourgeois-democratic stage, in retreat from the Kiangsi Republic (On New Democracy, 1940), which pushed the socialist revolution off into the indeterminate future. But it is necessary to keep in mind the national and international context in which the CCP operated, and also a certain number of facts. The accord with Chiang Kai-shek himself, and not only with the national bourgeoisie, was imposed by the USSR following the Sian incident in 1936. (Chiang, made prisoner by two of his generals, was freed under pressure from ^CMoscow instead of being executed.) Mao had to struggle, if one is to believe the documents, against a wing of the party that advocated the policy of the "closed door," against the

accord with the Kuomintang (~~and then, their~~ positions are little known), but he was also opposed to a pure and simple subordination to the central government.

The concessions had their limits! That is why China was not Spain, why the CCP was able to win an unprecedented audience (on a nationalist base) (~~against the base of the Nationalists~~), and return to the civil war in 1947, after a period of confused negotiations with the Kuomintang, with a relationship of forces that permitted the ~~installation~~ ^{establishment} of the People's Republic of China in 1949. This took place against Stalin's will and in violation of the Yalta accords which, following the victory in 1945, divided the world into "spheres of influence."

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Mao and the circuitous course
of the Chinese revolution

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This is not the place to make an exhaustive analysis of Mao's ~~revolutionary conception~~ ^{conception}, of his relationship with

Marxism, etc. But it is necessary to indicate in a summary

way that he ~~was~~

led the Chinese revolution against Stalin, and

that, from 1927. This, ~~it is true,~~ did not involve a clear

and clean political break, but rather a revolutionary practice

on the fringes of Stalinism and against it. On the fringes,

because Mao did not renounce Stalin's fundamental theses.

Against it because Mao placed the interests of China ahead of

those of the USSR, and because ~~he~~

in fact he bent the Stalinist

"theory" of the revolution by stages ~~into the meaning~~ of a

sort of debased Leninism. If you will, in practicing a policy

of class alliance without ~~subordination~~ to the national bourgeoisie,

Mao returned to the policy defined by Lenin in 1920 for

use in the colonial countries, not to the "Menshevism" of

Stalin. But it was a debased Leninism because ~~he~~ Mao did not

~~eliminate~~ the opportunist "excesses" (in theory and practice)

already mentioned.

The Maoist conception of the revolution was born in the

defeat of 1927, and ~~was shaped by~~ the specific context ~~in~~

which it ~~was~~ created. The necessity to rely from then on solely on ^{their} his own forces, added to Mao's complete lack of theoretical internationalism, ~~he~~ explains "the circuitous course of the revolution." It also explains the fact that his revolutionary theory is not exportable as such, except to provoke catastrophes ~~in~~ (Indonesia).

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"How Yukong moved the mountains"

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^{first} "We are poor and 'blank.'" ^{second} "Poor," ^{By} ~~because we don't have~~ ^{I mean that we have not}
~~very~~ much industry and ^{our} ~~because~~ agriculture ^{is not so} ~~also isn't very~~
^{advanced either. By 'blank' I mean that we are like a sheet of blank}
~~developed. 'Blank' is a clean sheet of paper, because our~~
cultural and scientific level is not high. ^{Those who are poor want} ~~But the 'poor'~~
^{change only they want to have a revolution, want to burst their}
~~aspire to make the revolution, to become stronger. A white~~
^{board and seek to become strong. A blank}
~~sheet of paper is just the thing on which to write."~~ ^{good for writing on.} (April
1956, ⁱⁿ "The Ten Great Relations.") ^{MS}

It is really not possible in the framework of this
article to follow all the stages in ^{Mao's} ~~the~~ career of ~~Mao~~ after
the taking of power. We can only ~~elaborate an~~ ^{analysis} of the

"struggle between two lines" which has been exacerbated in the party at each critical period and which is still obscure.

It would appear more interesting to attempt to grasp the Maoist problematique of the transition to socialism, which ^{claims} ~~pretends~~ to avoid the worst "errors" of the Soviet experience.

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To walk on two legs,

to put politics in command

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By his own admission, Mao was not an economist. This certainly explains his ^{"contempt" for} ~~"misapprehension"~~ of objective conditions and the extraordinary voluntarism that marks his attempt to construct socialism "faster, better, and more economically."

Since 1956, in the wake of the Twentieth Congress of the Russian CP, Mao ^{delivered} ~~pursued~~ a partial but virulent critical

analysis of the Soviet model. The principal axes of this analysis were developed in the ~~texts~~ ^{of 1958-60}, collected by

Hu Chi-Shi.³ For him (and this concern appears as early as 1955), it was a question of avoiding as much as possible

distortions between the development of agriculture, of light industry, and of heavy industry, and of not sacrificing everything for ~~this last~~. He was also concerned not to become exclusively devoted to economic advancement but to ^{make} ~~place in tandem~~ the rise of the productive forces and the overthrow of social relations, ^(keep pace by) ~~by~~ creating the necessary structures (the people's communes), and ^{by basic means} ~~in seeking support~~ through an intensive mobilization of the masses.

The Great Leap Forward, launched in 1958, was the first attempt to put this policy into practice. It ^{failed} ~~came to grief~~, for reasons that would take too long to develop here, and provoked the first grave crisis in the party. This was settled by the expulsion of P'eng Te-huai (who had in 1959 undertaken a virulent criticism of the Great Leap), but also by a relative "imprisonment" of Mao in the party, to the ^{advantage} ~~profit~~ of the "moderate" line of Liu Shao-ch'i. Mao did not succeed even with an unprecedented mobilization of the population in overcoming the ^{inherent} ~~inherent~~ contradictions ^{involved in} ~~of~~ China's backwardness, especially after ^d the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960.

In order to counterbalance the social and political effects of the "moderate" lines, as much as to "regain power" in the party and the state, Mao continually launched political campaigns ~~of various amplitude~~, before and after the riskiest of these attempts to reimpose his political line, the Cultural Revolution. (The social effects of the "moderate" line included social differentiation ~~between city and countryside~~, and within the working class; the constitution of a "bureaucracy" of the "Stalinist" type, completely cut off from the masses, etc.)

line =

Mao, the party, the bureaucracy, and the masses

line =

In order to ~~better~~ carry out his effort to break with the Soviet "model," Mao has always claimed to practice "the mass line." It is not our concern to portray China, as the smug Maoists do, as a model of proletarian democracy. But Mao's concern to not cut himself off from the masses was real and was based on several ~~reasons~~:

One thing is clear about the history of the Chinese

revolution: the ~~bureaucracy~~

Chinese bureaucracy did not arise like the Stalinist bureaucracy, as a parasite on the social conquests of a victorious ^{out} revolution. The Chinese ~~the~~ Communists made the revolution; ^{in order to lose} they had to carry out a profound mobilization of the ~~the~~ peasant masses, and then to "lend a receptive ear" up to a certain point.

• There is also, and this is striking in the documents of 1956, the specter of the Hungarian insurrection. Mao analyzed this as a counterrevolutionary insurrection, but he understood the danger ^{he was} of cutting himself off too much from the masses ^{by} ~~while~~ exercising ~~over them~~ too strong a pressure ^{an economic pressure on them} for the ^{salve} need of accumulation and heavy industrial construction, ^{and} ~~while~~ multiplying the material privileges of the bureaucracy.

• There ^{is} ~~was~~ ~~the~~ necessity, ^{mentioned above to mobilize} ~~already raised in mobilizing~~ to the maximum the labor force, ^{to give} ~~of giving to~~ the workers a minimum of rights in ^{administration} ~~the direction of~~ the factory or of the commune. ^{This was done} ~~This was also implied~~ by carrying out a politicalization

(albeit highly contradictory) of the masses rather than putting the accent on material incentives.

bullet
There was, finally, the Maoist manner of using his prestige with the masses to get them to intervene into the internal affairs of the party.

From all this, it does not flow that Chairman Mao was a great bureaucrat slayer; there are too many facts that attest to the contrary. But he tried by the most diverse means (flexible and ~~was~~ decentralized planning, relative autonomy of the provinces, and up to a certain point, the drawing together of production, politicalization of the masses, and minimal "proletarian democracy") to ~~evade the consolidation~~ *avoid establishing* of a bureaucracy of the classic type, ~~founded~~ *u* on the ~~backwardness,~~ *masses* the isolation, ~~the~~ *e* lack of culture ~~of the masses,~~ *and* the "imperatives" of economic development.

But the permanent mobilization of the masses for economic or political objectives is not the exercise of workers' democracy in the structures of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

And the Maoist ^{at's} project is full of explosive contradictions.

It represents a different method of political domination by the bureaucracy rather than a consistent antibureaucratism.

line #

From the hundred flowers

to the anti-Teng campaign

line #

In 1956, Mao launched the slogan, "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." He was concerned with rallying the intellectuals and the democratic parties to the party, and trying to cut back on an excessive bureaucratization. This was ~~to be~~ a general outcry against the party, which led also to a wave of workers' strikes. The disorders should not be feared, Mao said, and in 1957 ^{he} wrote his essay on "The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." But the hundred flowers ^q quickly faded under the repressive blow of the "rectification movement" of 1957.

What else could a party do that wanted to get rid of excess baggage without tolerating genuine organs of proletarian

democracy? In a very different context, the Cultural Revolution ^{was} stopped short ^{by} before the same insoluble contradiction.

Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to reassure his position in the party by using the oblique shortcut of a mass campaign, which soon went far beyond its initial objectives.

The working class surged into the breach to win its own economic and political ^a demands. And in 1967 the bureaucracy closed ranks. Mao declared that ^a 90 percent of the cadres were good or relatively good and tried his utmost to restrict the targets of the movement. Revolutionary Committees were instituted. These were a compromise between the two factions, who contended for power under the arbitration of the army. It took two long years to "reestablish order."

It would be wrong to reduce the Cultural Revolution solely to the struggle for power inside the party. But what concerns us here is that ² these events showed the difference between Mao and Stalin (one cannot imagine Stalin taking the risk of calling on the students and the working class to intervene on the political scene -- even though these forces largely

arrogated that right to themselves), as well as what separates Mao from a revolutionary Marxist conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Mao took care to win^{over} the army before launching the Cultural Revolution. He ~~would later tell~~^{had} Snow that he had been for a massive dose of the "cult of personality" in this period, which is a strange way to allow the masses to take charge of their own affairs. Thus, he substituted the Revolutionary Committees for the election of delegates "according to the principles of the Paris Commune."

~~Mao, then, avoided~~ ^(then, Mao) after the Cultural Revolution, avoided taking the risk of a general antibureaucratic outbreak by the masses (this can be seen in the antibourgeois[^] rightist campaign of 1975 or the campaign against Teng Hsiao-p'ing in 1976).

line #

In conclusion

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This quick survey of Mao's trajectory does not ~~permit~~ ^{claim to be} an overall assessment of Maoism. Only a few points can be

made: Mao made the first important break in the Stalinist hegemony over the international workers' movement. After taking power, he tried in his own way to ~~square~~ square the circle, to resolve the contradiction of claiming to construct socialism in a backward and isolated country without counting on the development of the world revolution. ^{Constructing} To construct socialism on the basis of national self-sufficiency ^{unavoidably involves as a} has as its ineluctable ^{consequence} corollary ~~the subordination~~ of the interests of the world revolution to the interests of the Chinese state. ~~It will suffice~~ Even a casual glance at China's foreign policy should suffice to convince one of this. This is all the more true in that Mao never ceased to think in ~~terms~~ ^{terms} specifically "Chinese," ^{for}.

On the field of internal politics, he sought a more harmonious development of the ^{on} economy, which brought him into conflict with ~~insurmountable~~ ^{insurmountable} difficulties ^{substance} (the need to struggle constantly against the supporters of the "right" wing, but also to compromise with them).

Finally, he was moved by an undeniable desire to halt the "natural" development of the bureaucracy, but because he never envisaged the development of organs of a genuine proletarian democracy his efforts fell short and were reduced to a permanent concern for mobilizing the masses for the reasons enumerated above, without ever giving them the means to take the ^{administration} ~~direction~~ of the Chinese state into their own hands.

In wanting to rely in a voluntarist manner on the "poorness" and "blankness" of China, Mao came up against contradictions that the international ^o context, China's isolation, and his own ^f relationship with revolutionary Marxism made it impossible for him to surmount.

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NOTES:

- Snow, Edgar Garden City, 1939 p. 132*
1. Red Star Over China? ~~Snow, p. 126.~~
 2. Mao Tse-tung, ~~Collection of~~ *Stuart Schram* ~~Stuart Schram~~ *Schram & Schuster 1967.*
 3. Mao et la construction du socialisme (Editions de Seuil)

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Rouge, September 10, 1976

Mao Is Dead -- by Ernest Mandel

embodies

Mao above all ~~represented~~ the victory of the third Chinese
 revolution, the ^{overthrow} ~~breaking~~ of the power of the bourgeoisie and
 of the landed proprietors in the most populous country in the
 world, the breaking of the imperialist encirclement of ^{the} USSR,
 the fundamental modification of the relationship of forces
 on a world scale. Whatever may be our opposition to the
 bureaucratic regime which rules today ⁱⁿ the People's Republic
 of China, we must judge the role of Mao in the history of
 the twentieth century firstly by his relations with the
 fundamental classes of the contemporary world.

The victory of the third revolution, of which he was
^{the} ~~the~~ principal architect, ^{is} was the most important event of
 the twentieth century ^{since} ~~after~~ the socialist October revolution
 in Russia. China is not just any country. ^{It is} ~~This was~~ a country
^{was once} ~~had once been~~ the most advanced and the richest in
 the world, where the penetration of foreign capitalism in

the nineteenth century had blocked the transition toward the formation of an autonomous imperialist power such as the Japanese ruling classes had finally succeeded in creating.

Tens of millions of peasants and impoverished artisans were ~~submitted to~~ ^{subjected for} decades to a more and more unbearable regime of misery, oppression, and humiliation. They ~~underwent~~ ^{ear} successive waves of revolt, from the Taiping rebellion to the Boxers, to the ~~revolutions of 1911 and of 1925-27~~ revolutions of 1911 and of 1925-27. These uprisings had ~~no~~ ^{for} chance of political success until the appearance of a proletariat sufficiently powerful to put forward its own candidacy for the ~~leadership~~ political and organizational leadership of the agrarian revolution. To break the grip of imperialism, ~~to modernize the country, to free the peasantry from the yoke of the landed proprietors and usurers -- this would not be possible except through the conquest of power~~ ^{only} ^{proletariat winning} ~~proletarian~~ hegemony within the Chinese revolution, through the ~~transcendence~~

planned DE

of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the socialist revolution, through ^{*Establishment*} ~~the establishment~~ of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The second Chinese revolution came to a tragic defeat in 1927 because Stalin imposed on the young Communist Party political subordination to the bourgeois Kuomintang of Chiang Kai-shek.

The ~~2nd~~ third Chinese revolution was able to triumph because, despite some erroneous texts such as "On New Democracy," Mao in practice refused to subordinate the People's Liberation Army born of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war to the army of Chiang Kai-shek. He refused to sacrifice the peasant uprisings on the altar of a coalition government with the bourgeoisie. The third Chinese revolution resulted in the creation of the People's Republic of China, a workers' state thanks to which ~~China~~ the Chinese people became a great independent nation in the world, torn free of stagnation and famine. No later event can take from Mao the historic credit for the key role he played in the victory of the socialist revolution

in China.

The third Chinese revolution was not a "normal" socialist revolution. It took place after a long, devastating war against China by Japanese imperialism. This war devastated the economy and disintegrated the urban proletariat. This objective fact, added to Mao's conscious orientation of stifling the struggle of the urban proletariat, ^{resulted in} ~~had as a consequence the~~ ~~fact that~~ the working class ^{was} unable to play an autonomous role in the course of the third Chinese revolution. The leadership of the revolutionary process was in the hands of a highly bureaucratized CP, which prevented any development of soviets, ~~or~~ ^{or} workers' councils, in China. The Chinese revolution was a bureaucratized revolution from the beginning.

Mao was neither a Lenin nor a Stalin precisely because he led a revolution ^{and} ~~not~~ a counterrevolution, ^{but} ~~the~~ revolution he led was not in its organizational form an authentic proletarian revolution, although it had that social and historic content. It destroyed the power and the property of the bourgeoisie; ^{it} ~~and~~ destroyed the bourgeois state.

But if Mao was neither a Lenin nor a Stalin, the bureaucratic regime ~~that~~ he erected in the People's Republic of China had traits in common with the Stalinist regime in the USSR. These included the stifling of proletarian democracy, the absence of workers' control over the industrial enterprises, the pragmatic deformation of Marxism, the cult of Mao's personality, and the material privileges of the bureaucracy. To explain these phenomena solely by the backwardness of China, which is clearly one of the roots of the bureaucratization, is to underestimate ^{both} the importance of the subjective factor and the dynamic of the mass movement in the People's Republic of China.

It is here that the truly tragic dimension of the ageing Mao appears. He was uneasy ^{about} ~~with~~ the consequences of the bureaucratization of the party and the country ^{resting} on the depoliticization of the masses, in the image of what had developed in the USSR. Put in a minority in the party leadership after the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," he appealed to the masses over the heads of the party apparatus. This was

the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, which had ~~similar~~
features ^{in common with it} to the youth radicalization in the rest of the world.

It was launched under the sign and the slogan: "In the last analysis, the lessons of history come down to this: rebellion is justified."

But, when the mass mobilizations passed more and more outside the control of the Maoist faction, when they raised the specter of left oppositional tendencies, when they began to draw in the workers and place them on the road of strikes, Mao reversed course and reunited with the majority of the apparatus. The "Red Guards" were disciplined and repressed. The rule now became: "All rebellion is justified, except rebellion against Mao Tsetung Thought."

The domestic right turn led to a still more pronounced right turn in the field of foreign policy. After having reproached the Soviet leaders for their lack of support to revolutionary movements and ^{for} their excessive concessions to imperialism, the Maoist leadership discovered the existence of "social imperialism"

in the USSR, of two "superpowers" placed on the same plane. Then they discovered that the "young" Soviet imperialism was more aggressive and therefore more dangerous.

Let us recall the cynical betrayal of the revolutionary movements in Ceylon, Sudan, and Ethiopia, the support given to the Iranian hangman, the hand extended to the European imperialisms to strengthen their armies against the USSR.

The Sino-Soviet conflict -- for which the Khrushchevist bureaucracy ^{bears} bore the main responsibility ^{for} through having stopped its economic and military aid to the People's Republic of China -- and then the Cultural Revolution exercised a genuine attraction on ~~the new vanguards~~ a part of the new vanguards on a world scale.

Maoism appeared as an alternative, at the same time leftist and Third Worldist, and even libertarian, to the official Communist parties. The end of the Cultural Revolution, the right turn in Chinese foreign policy, ^{and} the transformation of the Maoist organizations ~~into~~ ^{have conspicuously} into neo-Stalinist sects ~~has~~ ^{has singularly}

tarnished this image. Mao is dead at the moment when Maoism ^s had gone into decline ~~in~~ internationally.

Mao leaves a People's Republic of China in deep ferment.

In contrast to the USSR of the 1940s and 1950s, the masses are neither demoralized nor passive. The intrabureaucratic struggle for the succession will not be decided ^{apart from} ~~without~~ intervention by the masses. The crisis of Maoism is here and now begun.

It will lead to the victory of the antibureaucratic political revolution ^{and to} ~~based on~~ the exercise of power by the Chinese

workers and peasants, who will consolidate ~~and render invincible~~

~~the gains of the great Chinese revolution.~~

the gains of the great Chinese revolution.

and render them

invincible.

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