

# INTERNAL

  

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# Spain, France and Portugal--The Evolution of the Political Debate in the Fourth International

Report to the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, by Mary-Alice Waters, June 23, 1974

[The following report was made to the plenum of the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party on June 23, 1974. A counterreport for the International Majority Tendency was made by Comrades J. Barzman and V. Charles.]

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I would like to take my forty-five minutes today, reporting on behalf of the leadership of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction in the Socialist Workers Party, to deal with the three major political questions around which debate has focused in the four months since the world congress:

First is the evaluation of the armed struggle resolution and report adopted by the majority at the last world congress. Subsequent events have shown that our assessment of the meaning of that line was—unfortunately—all too accurate.

Second is the line adopted by the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire and supported by the United Secretariat majority in the recent presidential elections in France.

And third is the statement adopted by the United Secretariat majority on the recent events in Portugal.

## The 'Armed Struggle' Line

When the Leninist Trotskyist Faction drew up its balance sheet on the Fourth World Congress since Reunification (Tenth World Congress) we stated that the adoption of the resolution on armed struggle was the single most important political development that took place at that gathering.

Five years ago, at the 1969 world congress, comrades who later formed the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency were already pointing out that the line of the majority represented an adaptation to Castroism, to guerrillaism. We said that unless this adaptation were reversed, it could only lead to a revision of our program. In our opinion, that is exactly what the armed struggle resolution and report adopted by the most recent world congress represent.

In his report to the New York Caucus of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on March 12, 1974, Joe Hansen put this very clearly. He stated: "The adoption of this line means that a new stage in the history of the Fourth International has been opened. A key point of program—

the position of the Fourth International opposing 'minority violence' in both theory and practice—has been revised." (Internal Information Bulletin, No. 4 in 1974, p. 6)

Comrade Roman, who was the reporter for the IEC Majority on this point at the world congress, agreed that a question of program was involved. In his report [see Appendix Two], Comrade Roman spoke several times of the "programmatically insufficient" of the Fourth International in relation to the question of "armed struggle."

In particular, when discussing the balance sheet of the Fourth International in Latin America since the 1969 world congress, he spoke of "a general programmatic weakness of the International in a very important domain, that of choosing the forms of armed struggle and integrating them into our revolutionary strategy."

His report, which was adopted, argued strongly in favor of "minority violence," that is, violent actions initiated and carried out by small groups operating on their own outside the mass movement.

Delegates and observers supporting the positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction insisted that the Marxist program on which the Fourth International stands, far from being "insufficient" on the question of armed struggle, is extremely rich. Our program on this question is set down with great clarity in "The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International." It is fully explained in writings such as the *History of the Russian Revolution*, by Trotsky. There is no need to revise it.

We argued that a revision of program on this question could not be limited to one continent, as the majority pretends to do by entitling its resolution "On the Question of Armed Struggle in Latin America."

As evidence, we pointed to the position taken by the LCR/ETA-VI, the Spanish sympathizing organization, whose central leaders support the positions of the International Majority Tendency, following the assassination of Carrero Blanco. The LCR/ETA-VI Political Bureau statement proclaiming "total support" for the terrorist action was an alarming indication that the IEC Majority's "programmatically insufficient" was already beginning to be applied in practice in at least one European country.

At the conclusion of the counterreport on armed struggle given at the world congress [See Appendix III], Joe Hansen stated the following:

"If adopted, [the armed struggle resolution] would place the Fourth International in a rather ignominious posi-

tion—standing on the sidelines hailing the 'minority violence' committed by others. Could this position be maintained for long? I don't think so. The pressure would mount to go 'still further in departing from the programmatic position of Trotskyism on this question. I hope that the comrades will draw back from this road before it is too late. If they do not, our movement will face the most disastrous consequences. To turn resolutely away from this fatal perspective, the resolution on armed struggle must be defeated."

### LCR/ETA-VI Commandos?

Unfortunately, there are already some indications that our assessment of the resolution and our warnings concerning its application were accurate. Comrades have read the two articles from the Spanish bourgeois press, reporting an action allegedly carried out by the first military commando of the ETA-VI/LCR. [See Appendix I.]

According to the articles, three individuals involved in this alleged action escaped. One was not so lucky. He was interrogated with the police methods that are particularly notorious in Spain.

It is, of course, possible that the Commando Fleming was not connected to the LCR/ETA-VI. We have no knowledge of this and would be the last to assert any connection to the Fourth International. What is of concern to us is the question of *political line* for Spain. We anxiously await a statement from the leadership of the LCR/ETA-VI, or from the majority leadership of the Fourth International, clarifying that such actions are not in consonance with the political perspectives for revolutionary Marxists in Spain today. In the absence of such a statement, it will surely be assumed by all left political currents in Spain, and elsewhere, that such actions *are* in harmony with the majority's line today—not only on the Latin American continent, but in Spain, which happens to be on another continent.

I should add that we don't really expect such a statement to be forthcoming. Actions of the Commando Fleming type are the logical extension of an evolution that has been taking place for some time. This is an evolution that the Liga Comunista has called attention to many times. From the firebombing of a tractor warehouse (an act of solidarity with the Pamplona general strike a year ago) to molotov cocktails through the windows of a French bank (a protest against the banning of the Ligue Communiste) to the Commando Fifi, as it is more commonly known in Spain—the evolution is clear and logical.

But we have obviously reached a new stage in this evolution, and the responsibility for it can be laid squarely on the IEC majority resolution on armed struggle adopted by the world congress.

### Pamplona—the Test of Two Lines

The May Day demonstration in Pamplona this year provided another example of the line of the LCR/ETA-VI in action. The ETA-VI/LCR contingent intervened in this demonstration with hoods on, presumably to avoid being recognized by the police. The rest of the demonstrators, however, assumed they must be police agents

if they were afraid to show their faces, so the arrival of the hooded ETA-VI/LCR forces signaled the end of the demonstration. Everyone else scattered. In a standard diversionary move to hold off the cops as the participants dispersed, the ETA-VI/LCR contingent threw some molotov cocktails. One exploded in front of an apartment house, setting on fire and seriously burning a worker who had been watching the action. A large number of demonstrators and bystanders were arrested as the cops moved in and took full advantage of the confusion and disorientation.

The least that can be said is that such actions are not designed to win a mass following. They hardly inspire confidence in the capacity of the LCR/ETA-VI to lead the masses in action. But they reflect a deliberate political choice—an orientation away from organizing and mobilizing the masses, an orientation toward isolated, spectacular, publicity-conscious "initiatives in action" by the real, "revolutionary" forces.

The difference between the ETA-VI/LCR orientation and the line of the Liga Comunista, whose central leaders support the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, can be illustrated by the LC's intervention in the recent May 9 nationwide student mobilizations against the new education law that the Francoist dictatorship is trying to impose. It is a law that would further restrict access to secondary school and higher education.

There were basically three different lines for what to do on May 9—the Liga Comunista's, the Communist Party's, and the ultralefts.

The Liga Comunista proposed that May 9 should be a day of mass mobilizations in the streets, prepared by mass student assemblies in every faculty and high school and democratically elected organizing committees. They proposed that the students should take the initiative in going to the factories to ask the Workers Commissions to lead these mobilizations, explaining that the new education law was first and foremost directed against the working class, that it was not simply a "student" issue.

The Communist Party opposed mass street actions because they would scare off the priests and school administrators. They wanted faculty assemblies with black arm-bands and urged everyone to write their liberal priest. (There aren't any liberal congressmen in Spain so the CP says write your liberal priest!) They didn't want mass planning meetings and democratically elected coordinating committees to organize the actions. Instead they wanted decisions to be made by committees they set up in which the liberal priests and administrators would exercise veto power. They didn't want the Workers Commissions involved in something that was overtly a political action.

The ultraleft groups were in favor of demonstrations, but "active" ones, not mass demonstrations. They argued it was "irresponsible" to take thousands of students into the streets, especially young high school students, who were too inexperienced to know what they were getting into.

In every major city, in every high school and faculty, there was a clash between these three lines. In some cities, like Valencia, the CP was strong enough to destroy the mobilization planning committees and prevent them from functioning at all. In others, like Madrid and Barcelona, the relationship of forces was more equal. The CP could

not destroy the mobilization committees (for example the Liga Comunista's line carried in more than a dozen high schools in Barcelona) but we were still not strong enough to organize massive street actions against the CP's opposition. It was a standoff.

But in Pamplona the relationship of forces was such that the Liga Comunista was able to implement their line completely. The result was a demonstration of 1,300 to 1,500 students on May 9. This had been preceded by faculty assemblies of three, four and five hundred, and the students' appeal to the Workers Commissions to join them was read to workers assemblies in at least two factories.

Faced with the obviously massive opposition, the Francoist dictatorship has decided to postpone the imposition of the new education law until sometime next year.

The size and character of the Pamplona demonstration offer a clear example of the potential that exists today in Spain — if the correct leadership is provided.

As a sad but ironic footnote to history, May 9 was also the day the Commando Fleming chose not to go into the streets with the masses of students, but to try their first payroll heist.

As a result of their intervention in the student movement and elsewhere, the Liga Comunista has been growing in the recent period. One of the most important developments has been the evolution toward the Fourth International of another entire wing of the ETA forces, the group known in Spain as ETA (Mino). The bulk of ETA (Mino) is today working very closely with the Liga Comunista, and the comrades are quite confident they will be able to win them. The decisive element in convincing the ETA (Mino) of the correctness of the line of the LC as opposed to the ETA-VI/LCR has been the test of the two lines in practice in the last few months. When the leadership of ETA (Mino) approached the leadership of the LC for organized discussions, they said they considered themselves to be Trotskyists, but were not sure what the differences between the two sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International were, or which one had the correct line for Spain today. After watching the two groups in action in the May Day demonstration in Pamplona, the May 9 Commando Fleming operation, and the May 9 student demonstrations, the ETA (Mino) comrades said the differences were quite clear — and so was their choice.

## Repression in Spain

There has been a qualitative escalation in the repression in Spain since the Carrero Blanco assassination. The comrades of the LCR/ETA-VI have been hit very hard by this. The Liga Comunista has taken some blows also, but they have not been so severe as those struck against the LCR/ETA-VI.

According to the reports in the Spanish press, the police claim to have arrested several cells of the ETA-VI/LCR in the Basque Country in recent weeks. In another important city, the entire LCR/ETA-VI organization has reportedly fallen and those not arrested have had to go completely underground or leave the country. Elsewhere more than 40 alleged members are in jail.

It is difficult to organize the kind of defense effort that

such repression necessitates, either inside or outside Spain. To admit membership in a clandestine political organization means that the prosecution will almost automatically ask for an eight, 10 or 20 year prison term, even if one has been arrested for a very minor offense. So it is standard defense policy to deny membership. But this makes it more difficult to organize a campaign, because you can never say who a person is, what they have done, what their political affiliations are, or provide other information that is necessary to sustain a defense campaign.

The comrades of the LCR/ETA-VI are going to try to draw together a dossier of information that can be used, and this will be very helpful. Given the tremendous increase in interest in what's happening on the Iberian peninsula, primarily as a result of the events in Portugal, it should be possible to utilize such information in a real defense effort. This is extremely important.

The comrades of the LCR/ETA-VI are dedicated and courageous revolutionists. And that is precisely why we all get a kind of sickening feeling as we watch the evolution of the majority line in Spain. Haven't we just been through this in Argentina? How many more cadres and political parties are going to be unnecessarily destroyed because of the adventurous, ultraleft political line of the IEC majority?

Between the 1969 world congress and the most recent one, we witnessed the test of two lines in Argentina. Between the 1974 world congress and the next one, we seem to be repeating the test in Spain.

## The Presidential Elections in France

The French presidential elections have already elicited a very lively debate in the Fourth International, especially in the European sections.

Fundamentally, this is a continuation and a broadening of the debate that began around the 1973 legislative elections. The contributions by the Political Bureau of the Liga Comunista, the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, and the LTF Political Resolution have provided the starting point for the critical evaluation of the line adopted by the leadership of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire. [See articles by Pierre Frank, Daniel Bensaid, Pierre Rousset, and others, *Intercontinental Press*, April 22-June 17, 1974.]

I want to take up only three of the questions currently being discussed: (a) the proposed Piaget "far-left" candidacy that was put forward by the FCR leadership as their preference for the first round of the elections; (b) the character, axis and orientation of a revolutionary-Marxist campaign in France today; and (c) the character of the Union of the Left.

There have been numerous articles in *Intercontinental Press*, *Inprecor* and elsewhere dealing with the general social context in which the elections took place and analyzing the significance of such developments as the crumbling of the Gaullist coalition, the high degree of class polarization around the electoral alternatives, the size of the vote for the two Trotskyist candidates on the first round, etc.

I won't review such points. I want to take what time is available to focus on the main points of disagreement.

## A United 'Far-Left' Candidate?

Comrades will recall that as soon as the elections were announced, *Rouge, Revolution!*, the Pabloites, some left-PSUers, and a few others all indicated their support for running a "common candidate of the far-left." The proposal was to unite behind Charles Piaget, the central leader of the LIP strike and a member of the PSU. This common candidate never materialized because the PSU leadership voted to support Union of the Left candidate Mitterrand on the first round of the elections, and Piaget declined to break with his party's discipline on this question.

Whether or not the Piaget proposal was correct to begin with has become the focal point of one of the debates taking place. For example, Lutte Ouvrière opposed the idea from the very start and immediately announced they would put up their own candidate, regardless of who else ran.

Although it may seem that the debate over the Piaget proposal is somewhat irrelevant because it never came to fruition anyway, in my opinion that is not the case. The FCR's approach to the Piaget candidacy is similar to their approach on the first round of the legislative elections in 1973. If comrades go back and reread the letters written a year ago, you will notice that one of our criticisms of the Ligue Communiste's line was the fact that they considered armed struggle rather than class struggle to be the essential dividing line in the elections and called for a first round vote for any candidate who met a single programmatic criterion—rejection of the peaceful road to socialism.

In the presidential elections in France, an attempt to forge a united campaign around a clear class-struggle program in opposition to the class collaborationist program and campaign of the Union of the Left could have been a very powerful maneuver with broad appeal. It was that kernel of an idea that gave the proposed Piaget candidacy an attractive power far beyond the organized members and sympathizers of the various Trotskyist, Maoist, spontanéist and centrist currents. The PST's use of the workers pole, and their attempt to convince Tosco to run on a clear class-struggle platform, was a model for such a broadly based campaign. But the example offered by the PST was the polar opposite of the Piaget maneuver.

A clear programmatic basis for the Piaget proposal was absent from the beginning. *Rouge, Revolution!*, the Pabloites, the left-PSUers, Piaget, and others who were in on the ground floor of the maneuver didn't sit down—either together or separately—and try to hammer out a clear, even if brief, class-struggle program that sharply drew the class line on the electoral plane. They could not have done so, because of the deep political differences amongst these groups on the decisive questions.

To give just one example: *Rouge* believes that the Union of the Left is an alliance of reformist workers parties, whereas *Revolution!* says that the Socialist Party is a bourgeois party, and still calls for a vote for Mitterrand on the second round!

There is absolutely no way that such politically disparate forces could have reached a principled political agreement on a class-struggle program to draw the class

line on the electoral arena as well as in the factories and in the day-to-day struggles. And that was the flaw of the Piaget candidacy from the beginning. In an election campaign, which always poses the question of power, of which class will rule, it is not enough to simply "exemplify the combativity of the workers" or "symbolize the new workers vanguard." The question of program becomes decisive, and there is no way to cheat. It's fine to try and maneuver with the PSU, to deepen the divisions within its ranks, to remove it as an obstacle in the revolutionary path—but not at the expense of uncompromising programmatic clarity, which is what *Rouge* slid into.

## The 'Far-Left'

It was a "far-left" campaign proposal.

I want to say a word about the "far-left" question. I have noticed that we sometimes slip into using the designation "far-left" ourselves. Of course, it permeates the press of the European sections and the language of the IEC Majority. But there are problems with that term and I think we should be careful in our use of it.

Sometimes it is used simply as a descriptive phrase. For example *Le Monde* uses it all the time to refer to left-wing political groups critical of the reformist policies of the CP and SP. But when the IEC Majority uses the term it is usually not simply a descriptive abbreviation. It has come to embody a political line. It is a synonym for "new mass vanguard" and it has the same political connotations as "new mass vanguard." It implies that all the heterogeneous groupings traveling under the label of "far left" are part of a *political vanguard*.

What is the "far left"? Is far left better than left? Are the Maoists, spontanéists and anarchists more correct politically than the CP and SP? What do Trotskyists have in common with them? What is the dividing line between the left and the far left, or the left and the non-left?

When *Le Monde* refers to the "left," they of course include bourgeois forces such as the Left Radicals. The CP does the same.

When Trotskyists speak of the left in Europe, they usually mean the reformist workers parties with a mass base. But even that doesn't always hold. In some countries, like Belgium, you'll find that the comrades often include the CP in the "far left"!

One of the biggest problems is that "far left" is never defined. The closest thing to a definition I've ever heard was the one offered by the Ligue Communiste in the 1973 legislative elections, when they said vote "far left" on the first round of the elections, vote for any candidate who rejects a peaceful transition to socialism. But as we explained at the time, we do not consider that one point adequate to define a revolutionary program. You can be for armed struggle, for the "revolutionary road," and still be an unreconstructed class collaborationist, popular frontist—like the anarchists in Spain, or the Maoists.

It was the Cubans who introduced the gun as the dividing line between revolutionists and nonrevolutionists. But that is not our dividing line. Our dividing line is class struggle versus class collaboration, class independence versus coalitionism.

Our alternative to the left is not the "far left." Our alternative is a class-struggle program and perspective that cuts across both the "left" and the "far left."

The error of seeing the "far left" as a political vanguard of which we are but one component, the error of seeing armed struggle as the key political question before the French workers, led to a mistaken orientation in the first round of the 1973 legislative elections and in the 1974 presidential elections. Both times the French Trotskyists said, in effect, vote revolution on the first round, vote popular front on the second.

### The Krivine Campaign

This brings us to the question of the Krivine campaign, the character of the campaign organized by the FCR.

Comrades can tell by reading the articles in *The Militant* and *Intercontinental Press* that the FCR's presidential campaign was an impressive effort. On short notice, a very ambitious campaign was organized. For example, they brought out a daily paper, five days a week for a month.

On some levels the 1974 presidential campaign was a step forward from the 1969 or the 1973 elections. There was more of an attempt to raise concrete demands and perspectives for struggle. They paid more attention to problems like unemployment and inflation and talked about the need to fight for a sliding scale of hours and wages. They integrated the demands raised by the immigrant workers in France and invited the candidate representing the immigrant workers to speak on their platform. They campaigned for abortion rights and championed the struggle for women's liberation. They cooperated closely and very effectively with the comrades of the Groupe Révolution Socialiste, the Antilles section of the Fourth International, and coordinated their campaigns. All these things represented a significant improvement over previous campaign efforts.

Yet, in my opinion, the axis of the FCR's electoral propaganda was a vision of imminent social revolution just around the corner—if Mitterrand were elected. This axis gave the campaign an ultraleft thrust and character.

The FCR called for a vote for Union of the Left candidate Mitterrand on the second round. I think this was an opportunist error. It stemmed in part from the overwhelming pressure created by the hopes and illusions of the masses of French workers who rallied behind the Mitterrand candidacy. But the FCR did not call for a vote for Mitterrand because they believed it offered a solution. On the contrary, they warned the French workers that Mitterrand could solve none of the basic problems. The thrust of the FCR campaign was to vote Mitterrand into office and prepare for the revolution; elect Mitterrand and prepare for the civil war; elect Mitterrand and arm the workers; elect Mitterrand and form militias. This was the axis of the campaign.

This was most clearly reflected in two of the central themes of the campaign—the lessons of Chile and the question of the army.

Chile was discussed at every meeting. Over and over it was said, "We must understand what happened in Chile. We can learn from the lessons of Chile. The tragedy must not be repeated in France. It does not need to be repeated here."

But what was the main lesson to be learned from the Chilean experience, according to the FCR? The main lesson was that the workers did not have arms, that a

few thousand armed workers would have changed the course of history in Chile.

The emphasis was not on explaining how the deadly policy of coalitionism, of popular frontism, had led the workers into the bloody deathtrap, disarming them *politically* and, of course, militarily. The FCR leadership did not explain that lesson of Chile, because they did not think that this was the lesson to be drawn. They do not believe that Allende's regime was a class collaborationist coalition from the very beginning. In fact, it is not even clear whether they considered it a *bourgeois* government. Some of the things they have written seem to leave open the question of the class character of the Allende government, up to the time when the military entered the cabinet.

So the FCR did not explain the lesson of coalitionism in Chile and how the French CP and SP are today politically disarming the French workers just as they did the Chilean workers by teaching them to accept a bloc with bourgeois forces. The FCR jumped over that problem and went on to the next one—what to do after the workers have been politically disoriented and disarmed, after the revolutionary tide has been turned back, after the reaction has gained mass support because there was no revolutionary party to show the way out. Their lesson was elect Mitterrand and pick up a gun, organize workers militias.

From reading the letters to the editor of the *Daily Rouge* you can see that this aspect of the campaign seemed a little off base even amongst some supporters of the FCR.

The second thing that clearly showed the ultraleft axis of the campaign was the way the question of the army was treated.

There is a significant radicalization affecting the armed forces in France today, which are still based on a compulsory draft for every male. There are very real openings for political work within the army, but conditions for such work are much more difficult than in the United States since there is no tradition of political rights for soldiers. Draftees are frequently arrested for participating in meetings or preparing a mimeographed leaflet.

The most spectacular publicity-winning "coup" of the Krivine campaign was one of his television appearances in which he talked about the struggle for democratic rights within the army and ended by calling on soldiers "to prepare to block any move by their reactionary officers," and "to give yourselves the means to block any forceful coup" in the event that Mitterrand is elected.

The next day, when Galley, the minister of the army, accused Krivine of inciting mutiny and insubordination, the *Daily Rouge* replied by saying, in essence, "We did not say it. Galley did. But, yes, that is our tradition and we're proud of it."

I guess it didn't sound "revolutionary" enough to simply talk about the fight for democratic rights and freedom of political activity for draftees. It's not enough to say that soldiers should have the right to assemble, to discuss their orders, to publish their own papers, and elect their own officers. Someone might think you are nothing more than a civil libertarian, not a "real revolutionary." It would seem that not much consideration was given to how certain aspects of Krivine's publicity stunt might hurt not help draftees trying to fight for their rights within the army.

The Chile question and the army question exemplify the tone and political line that dominated the FCR campaign. They were used to put across the whole "minority violence" perspective.

No one disputes the fact that if Mitterrand had been elected this would have created a new situation in France, changed the framework in which the class struggle unfolds, and opened broad new opportunities for building a mass revolutionary Marxist party. But even the FCR leadership had to note in retrospect, when the campaign was over, that there had been a few ultraleft notes in their propaganda.

As Pierre Rousset admitted in his article written for *Imprecor* (No. 1), "Our modes of expression were sometimes a bit complex. We did not adequately explain the necessity of a revolutionary vote on the first round. The analysis of the political situation could have sometimes appeared premature and somewhat 'catastrophic.'"

### The Character of the Union of the Left

I want to deal now with the call for a vote for Union of the Left candidate Mitterrand on the second round of the elections.

The political position of the French leadership and the IEC Majority as a whole has evolved since we and the Liga Comunista comrades wrote our letters a year ago. On the analysis of the Union of the Left, they have corrected a number of very serious errors that were being made at the time of the 1973 legislative elections.

For example, the French comrades are no longer silent on the class character of the Socialist Party. The majority of the leadership of the FCR now says that the Socialist Party is a workers party even if bourgeoisified, that it is a current *within* the working class movement. That is an extremely important advance.

Secondly, they no longer say that the class character of the Union of the Left is determined by the dominant role of the CP within it. That is how they got around the question of the SP a year ago. They said the class character of the SP did not matter because the CP dominated the Union of the Left and that determined its class character. They have now decided that such a position was wrong and dangerous.

Thirdly, the French leadership now believes they were wrong to have called for a vote for the Union of the Left *per se* on the second round of the 1973 legislative elections. They believe they should have called for a vote for the candidates of the CP and SP only—as we proposed.

Fourthly, a year ago the French comrades held the position that the Union of the Left had a class-against-class dynamic. They have changed their view on that point also, and today they say that the Union of the Left has a class-collaborationist dynamic. This is another important shift, a partial rectification of a serious error.

However, these corrections do not eliminate all the differences. Our views on the character of the Union of the Left *today* remain diametrically opposed.

In "The Mote and the Beam" (IIDB, Vol. X, No. 18) Comrade Pierre Frank defines the Union of the Left as "an alliance of the two big reformist workers parties." The French leadership believes that this "united front" could at some time in the future be turned into a popular front

type coalition if the bourgeoisie decides it needs such a formation. But many do not think that is even the most likely variant.

We, on the other hand, believe that it is not necessary to wait and see what the Union of the Left *may* become at some time in the future. In our opinion it is already, today, a class-collaborationist *coalition*. It is a matter of principle that revolutionary Marxists can give it no support.

We are not interested in getting sidetracked into a terminological debate. We don't care whether the label is Millerandism, Kerenskyism, Popular front, popular unity, national front, sacred union, broad front, liberation government, Union of the Left, Pact for Freedom, antimonopoly coalition, or humpty-dumpty. Let's put the term aside for the moment.

If Pierre Frank wants to define popular frontism as a formation that is controlled by Moscow, that includes the presumed aim of fighting fascism, and that includes a major party of the bourgeoisie—that is a secondary debate. I think it is an arbitrarily narrow definition that does not help educate comrades concerning the real nature of popular frontism. And it becomes a cover for a political error.

But the bigger problem is not what distinguishes each one of these formations from the other, what peculiarities marked their formation and evolution. Describing the differences is a task that any good journalist can easily handle. What we need to discuss is the political essence, what it is that makes all of these formations—from the time French Socialist Party leader Millerand entered the "cabinet of republican defense" in 1899, to the Union of the Left—*fundamentally alike*.

They are all class-collaborationist electoral or governmental *blocs*, *coalitions*, involving one or more reformist party and one or more bourgeois political party or its surrogate, however shadowy or numerically small. To participate in or to call for a vote for that kind of *bloc* is to cross class lines in politics. That is the essence of the question under debate. That is what we want to discuss.

### Four Reasons

Coalitionism is not synonymous with class collaborationism or with reformism. All coalitionism is class collaboration. All reformists are class collaborationists, and ultimately coalitionists. But *coalitionism* is a specific form of reformist class collaboration.

And it is an especially pernicious, virulent form. There are four reasons.

First, class collaborationist electoral or governmental blocs are always formed precisely when the class struggle threatens to reach such heat and intensity that the Stalinists' and Social Democrats' business-as-usual methods of class collaboration start to loose their efficacy. They are no longer sufficient to guarantee the derailment of the class struggle. When that starts to happen, both the reformists and the bourgeoisie have to find some new, some refurbished, dressed-up form of class collaboration in order to disorient the working class, demobilize it, demoralize it, and preserve the capitalist system. The current examples of Chile and Portugal could hardly be more instructive on this point.



Second, the reformists *always* defend such interclass coalitions, justify them and sell them to their followers by appealing to the most deeply felt *class* instincts of the workers. They appeal to the class consciousness of the toiling masses, their elementary understanding that only through unity do they have strength, only through unity can they defend their interests, achieve their aspirations, meet their needs. So the reformists tell them that coalitionism *is* class unity—unity to fight fascism, to stop reaction, to open the road to socialism, or whatever.

Third, because coalitionism always arises precisely at the moment when class independence, class mobilization and class unity *are* desperately needed, such false appeals are capable of mobilizing the hopes and illusions of millions and millions of workers and their allies. One of the Union of the Left's campaign slogans was that Mitterrand was the candidate of "hope."

Thus, at the decisive moment, coalitionism has over and over again fatally disoriented the workers and bound them in the shackles of class-collaboration—under the guise of class independence and unity.

Fourth, such coalitions, such blocs, always prepare the conditions for the defeat of the working class, for the victory of the most brutal types of military dictatorships, for the rise of fascism. If there is no revolutionary party to offer an alternative political course of class independence, no party strong enough to show the way out of the death trap, the result can be nothing but the most bloody repression.

A vote for such an interclass *bloc* is not the same thing as a vote for a class-collaborationist reformist party of the working class. The two things stand on opposite sides of the class line. This has nothing to do with their written program. For example, the Common Program of the Union of the Left is fundamentally the same as the program of the CP and the SP. There is no qualitative difference. And we always explain to the workers that we vote for the CP and SP *despite* their class collaborationist programs. But it is within our class principles to vote for them because the CP and SP are workers parties. By doing so we can cast a *class* vote, draw the class line in the electoral arena, demonstratively show that we stand with our class against the enemy class.

But once an interclass bloc has been formed, revolutionists can no longer say that voting for its candidates represents a class vote, even if that bloc happens to be composed 99.9 percent of reformist workers parties. The program of class collaboration has already been implemented, concretized, and to vote for that concretization is to cross class lines.

### Are the Left Radicals Irrelevant?

Our major disagreement with the comrades of the IEC Majority concerns the character of the Union of the Left today. And this is focused in the question of the role of the Left Radicals.

Comrades of the IEC Majority argue that the Left Radicals represent no significant sector of the bourgeoisie and therefore they are irrelevant. Their participation in no way affects the character of the Union of the Left. We of course agree that they are not numerically, socially or economically a significant sector of the bourgeoisie.

But does that mean they play the same role as bourgeois liberals who call for a vote for the Labour Party in Britain? We say no. The Left Radicals are not simply a group of liberals *supporting* a candidate of a workers party. They are one of the three component parts of a *coalition* that has already been established between two workers parties and a bourgeois formation.

Are the Left Radicals present in the Union of the Left because the CP wants them there "purely for purposes of electoral propaganda," as Comrade Michaloux asserts in an article in *Inprecor* (No. 1)?

I think the Spanish comrades dealt with this question very well in their letter to the Political Bureau of the Ligue Communiste a year ago. They quote Comrade Henri Weber, who wrote in *Rouge*, "Why would the Big bourgeoisie have itself represented by the relics of the Radical Party? Out of masochism?"

And the Spanish comrades continue: "We ask: Why does the Union of the Left put them up as candidates? To fight the bosses? No. To broaden the number of votes? Also no. Well then, what is the role of the Left Radicals in the Union of the Left? Simply, *they are the guarantee offered Big Capital that the bloc formed on the basis of the Common Program of Government is ready to respect the bourgeois order.* At the same time they are the *bridge toward other sectors of the French bourgeoisie in order to be able to establish a pact* with them, a coalition government alternative capable of safeguarding the capitalist system from the rise of the proletariat and the popular masses. It is in this sense that we have classified it as an embryo of a Popular Front."

There is another very important reason the Left Radicals are part of the Union of the Left today. By their presence they educate the workers to accept a bloc with sectors of the bourgeoisie. In this sense their role in the Union of the Left is *decisive*. Through their participation, the Stalinists and the Social Democrats are teaching the French working class that it is correct to make programmatic electoral and governmental blocs with the bourgeoisie.

From that point of view, the fact that the Left Radicals are not a significant sector of the bourgeoisie is even helpful to the CP. Class collaborationist blocs don't appear over night. It takes time to prepare them. The workers must be educated to accept them, taught they are correct, convinced that they really represent class independence and unity, or at least a step in that direction. A small, "insignificant" bourgeois force is easier to swallow—just as a small dose of poison is easier to disguise.

### The Need For an Exemplary Initiative

That is why we say "No!"—from the very first day that the CP and SP start organizing one of these blocs, from the very first day they set up the apparatus, from the very first day it comes into existence. For us that is the decisive turning point. That is the qualitative leap. Right then and there we say, "No! No support under any conditions." We don't wait for it to emerge as a full-blown, mature bloc with a "significant" party of the bourgeoisie. We don't wait for the generals to enter the cabinet. From the very inception we say, "No political support whatsoever."

The comrades of the IEC Majority wax eloquent on the

need to prepare the workers today, in practice, through our own exemplary actions, to throw a molotov cocktail straight or load a gun. But when it comes to the need to inoculate the working class against the deadly virus of coalitionism, they think it is not necessary to even start the immunization program until the disease reaches epidemic proportions. They don't even have enough exemplary audacity to say, "No, we won't cast a vote for Union of the Left candidate Mitterrand on the second round of this election." Yet that is exactly the kind of exemplary "initiative in action" that is called for.

These and many other questions raised by the French presidential elections and the line of the IEC Majority deserve a thorough discussion within the ranks of the international. In addition to translating several contributions already made by the French and German comrades, we hope to collaborate with other comrades in the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on drafting some written material to help advance the discussion in the world movement.

### The Fourth International's Line for Portugal

I want to conclude by saying a few words about the line of the International in relationship to the recent events in Portugal. We have already discussed Portugal at length under the report given by Comrade Foley the first day of the plenum. I simply want to summarize what I said then about the statement recently adopted by a majority of the United Secretariat.

This statement, "The Fall of the Dictatorship and the Revolutionary Upsurge in Portugal," appears in the June 24, 1974 issue of *Intercontinental Press*.

Many of the things contained in the statement are correct, or at least unobjectionable. However, after several hours of discussion, United Secretariat members who are also members of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction voted against the statement. I would like to explain why.

The first difference was over the way in which a small revolutionary organization should respond to the new coalition government's refusal to withdraw all troops from Africa and announce immediate independence for all colonial territories.

The United Secretariat statement describes at length the importance of the war question, how the contradictions created by the prolonged colonial war were central to bringing down the Salazarist dictatorship, and why the war remains the central problem facing the junta and its CP-SP backers today. The statement raises the correct demands in relationship to the war question: immediate, total, unconditional independence for the colonies; not one ship, not one soldier, not one penny, not one drop of blood for continuing the dirty colonial war; immediate withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Africa.

The differences, however, arose when we proposed that a section be added calling for the building of a mass movement against the war. We thought this should be stressed in Portugal itself, and also throughout the NATO countries which have so long provided the weapons and material resources to enable the Portuguese ruling class to continue the colonial war. We proposed that this should be incorporated as one of the central tasks facing a small revolutionary Marxist organization in Portugal today.

This proposed addition to the statement was rejected. The differences were not over the importance of the

war question, but on how revolutionists in Portugal should react—whether they should attempt to build mass mobilizations against the war. We said, yes. The comrades of the United Secretariat majority said, no. They counterposed an orientation toward building "vanguard" actions together with the Maoists, spontanéists, and other ultra-left groups. This line is clearly spelled out in the new issue of *Quatrième Internationale*, (No. 15, June 1974) the organ of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, in an article by Carlos Rossi. He calls for "the construction of a powerful anticolonialist movement encompassing the broad vanguard and even significant sectors of the masses" (p. 8).

In other words, mobilize the new mass vanguard first, and the masses may even come along. As we know from our own experience in building the anti-Vietnam-war movement in a number of countries, there is no way to combine new-mass-vanguard "victory to the NLF" mobilizations with an orientation toward building mass actions against the war. The two lines are mutually exclusive. For the majority leadership of the Fourth International to adopt a "vanguardist" orientation means that they *default* in their revolutionary obligation to help the Portuguese comrades organize and mobilize the massive opposition to the Portuguese ruling class's continued war effort. This is especially grave in view of the CP and SP's line.

### The Role of the CP and SP

Which brings us to the second major disagreement that arose out of the discussion—the evaluation of the role played by the SP and CP in Portugal, especially the CP. The differences were illustrated in two points.

The first is the characterization of the role of the CP and SP. The line of the United Secretariat statement is seen most clearly in the paragraph that talks of the "partial and timid reforms" and "the shilly-shallying and vacillations of the CP and SP leaderships."

Timid? Shilly-shallying? Vacillating? Such words have little relation to the reality of Portugal today. Has the CP been "timid" and "shilly-shallying" in the way they have mobilized to smash the postal workers strike, calling the postal workers "fascists"? Far from timid and weak-kneed, we would say *counterrevolutionary* through and through. Their role is to smash the mass movement and preserve capitalism in Portugal, to hand the working class over to the junta on a silver platter of a modernized economy and higher profits.

And the SP? What about the role of Foreign Minister Soares, who is negotiating for the interests of imperialism and Portuguese capitalism, working to find a neocolonialist solution to imperialism's difficulties in Africa. Is that vacillating and timid?

The second disagreement concerning the SP and CP had to do with the demand that they break with the junta and leave the government coalition. This demand was not contained in the draft of the statement brought to the United Secretariat for discussion. After extensive debate, it was added as a final amendment when several LTF members on the United Secretariat indicated that the failure to incorporate that demand was one of the reasons they would vote against the statement.

In other words, the majority of the United Secretariat

members did not seem to ascribe much importance to the demand—in or out, they were prepared to vote for the statement either way. We think that calling on the CP and SP to break with the junta, to break with the bourgeois ministers in the coalition cabinet, and to leave the government is one of the touchstones of a revolutionary line for Marxists in Portugal today.

We also disagree with the way in which this particular demand is finally formulated. The statement calls for the election of a Constituent Assembly and then goes on to say, "Revolutionary Marxists call on the CP and SP ministers to leave the government of 'national union' and to struggle to replace the junta with what comes out of this Constituent Assembly."

In other words, the call for the CP and SP to break with the bourgeois parties and the junta is tied to the call for a government based on the Constituent Assembly. It is entirely correct to call for the election of a Constituent Assembly. That also must be one of the corner stones of our line in Portugal today. But it is an entirely different matter to accept in advance any kind of government that might come out of that Constituent Assembly. It could be a bourgeois government officially committed to "upholding democracy" while actually committed to paving the way for a new totalitarian regime.

We call on the CP and SP to leave the coalition and to fight for a workers and farmers government. We explain this demand to the masses by placing it in the perspective of the fight for *class* independence on all levels, including independent class political action.

A third major difference arose over the paragraph dealing with the demands revolutionary Marxists should raise in relation to the massive discontent in the Portuguese army today. We argued against the ultraleft bravado reflected in the statement, "the time has come for a revolutionary effort aimed at accelerating the disintegration of the bourgeois military apparatus." We pointed out that in a statement of this kind it is sufficient to emphasize the fight for democratic rights in the army, the right for soldiers to form their own councils and debate their perspectives. It is not necessary to give the Portuguese ruling class a weapon with which to victimize comrades and others inside the army.

Our arguments on this question may have had some effect because there is a discrepancy between the final French and English versions of the United Secretariat statement. The English version includes the sentence we objected to. The French does not.

Finally, we objected to the loose way in which the term fascism is used in the statement. It was our view that it is more accurate to refer to the Salazar regime as a military-police dictatorship with strong fascist traits. Since there is so much political confusion on the left about fascism, and a tendency to label many regimes fascist simply as an epithet, it is important for us to use the term only in a rigorously scientific fashion.

For all these reasons the United Secretariat members who are also LTF members voted against the draft of the United Secretariat statement on Portugal. Perhaps with the evolution of events, and further discussion, some of these differences will narrow or even disappear. We hope so. Others, though, like the disagreement on how to respond to the war question, reflect the basic differences that led us to vote against the majority's European resolu-

tion at the last world congress.

On the question of Stalinism, it remains to be seen whether the formulations in the United Secretariat statement stem from "sloppiness" and "carelessness," or if they reflect the real political line, or if there are differences within the majority on this issue. Frankly, I'm not sure, because I have noticed, for example, that *Rouge's* editorials on Portugal have been qualitatively superior to the United Secretariat statement. The differences on the role of the CP in Portugal must be thoroughly explored to determine their scope. Only time and further discussion will tell.

## SUMMARY

I don't intend in the summary to deal with the evolution of the situation in the Fourth International since the world congress. Comrades have all read the statements of the majority tendency and the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on the outcome of the world congress. To refresh your memory you can check those statements. They are printed in the International Internal Discussion Bulletin along with the world congress minutes. You have also read the exchange of correspondence between Comrades Ernest Mandel and Joe Hansen, discussing the publication of world congress documents and the IMT's factional abuse of their majority since the world congress. [See Appendix V.]

I simply want to restate the view of the LTF on the sequence of events since the world congress, the sequence of events that began almost the moment the nine-point agreement was adopted by the world congress.

We have witnessed a line of action on the part of the IEC Majority that negates the nine points in both spirit and letter. The result has been abrogation of what was for us not a "rotten compromise" that stood in the way of building the Fourth International—as many of the comrades in the IMT thought—but a correct compromise that was in the best interests of the International. Implementing the "Agreement on Measures to Maintain Unity of the Fourth International" was the only possible way to block the trend toward an unnecessary and unwarranted split.

We think that this process in which the nine points have been abrogated has taken place because of the unwillingness or the incapacity—it doesn't make much difference which—of the older and more experienced leaders of the IEC Majority to hold back the split wing of their faction. This is rooted in the deadly logic of the forces that have been set in motion by the deepening of the political errors that were first codified at the 1969 world congress on the question of guerrilla warfare and similar "initiatives" by tiny groups of revolutionists who are trying to substitute themselves for the organization and mobilization of the masses.

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On the question of Portugal, I want to make it clear that we are not criticizing the Portuguese comrades for failing to mobilize the masses of Portuguese workers. Whether we could or could not organize and lead such actions depends on many factors, most of which are beyond the control of our tiny forces. Our criticism is

directed to the *line* of the United Secretariat majority, to their line of mobilizing the new mass vanguard "on the basis of its concerns," rather than a line based on the needs of the masses. Comrade Charles told us that he is entirely in favor of a mass orientation. That is very good. I'm just rather dubious because when we proposed such an orientation be incorporated into the statement of the United Secretariat on Portugal our suggestion was rejected by the United Secretariat.

\* \* \*

On the French elections: First of all, Comrade Barzman accused us of "attacking" the French comrades in *The Militant* because we published a signed article by Comrade Caroline Lund that argued that to vote for Mitterrand on the second round of the elections was wrong—for essentially the reasons we have discussed here today. We reject Comrade Barzman's accusation.

The article in *The Militant* was not an attack on the comrades of the FCR. It presented a different line from theirs, that is true. But it deliberately did not mention the FCR and avoided any polemic with them. We consider that it is entirely in order, entirely correct, and within the framework of an international movement based on democratic centralism, that comrades in one part of the world, in one country, can have an opinion about something that is going on in another country. They can say what their opinion is, even if it differs from the views of the comrades in the other section or sections concerned. We do not think that is a violation of the norms of our movement.

And I should point out that this is not a new concept we suddenly dreamed up in the heat of a factional struggle in order to attack the French comrades. There are articles in the press of the sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International all the time analyzing what is going on in the United States, for example. Some of them are absolutely horrendous. If I had time I could cite a recent unsigned article in the *Daily Rouge* discussing the meaning of Watergate. It is so far off base that you might double up laughing when you read it. Do we interpret that as a malicious, factional attack on the SWP? No, of course not.

We think it is correct for the French comrades to write about what is happening in American politics. Indeed, they would be derelict in their duty to their own members if they did not. We might advise them to assign someone who knows something about American politics to write such articles, and suggest that they read *The Militant* first. (Perhaps the French comrades would return similar advice to us.) But if they have a different opinion about what is happening in the United States, we think they have every right to say what they think in the pages of their paper.

Important events were taking place in France. Some 25,000 *Militant* readers were wondering what we thought about them. We stated our opinion, just as we have done on Vietnam, the Mideast, Portugal, Ethiopia, Chile and elsewhere.

### Voting for Mitterrand

On the question of voting for Mitterrand on the second

round of the elections, I think there are a number of aspects that have to be considered. It all depends on the *real* character of the Mitterrand campaign.

My first reaction was that if Mitterrand was genuinely running as the candidate of the Socialist Party, if he was in reality *breaking* from the Union of the Left to run as a candidate of the SP, then it would have been correct to call for a vote for Mitterrand as the SP candidate on the second round. And that is what I told the French comrades when we discussed it in April, when the campaign had just begun. That is the discussion Comrade Charles referred to. But I also said I was extremely dubious that Mitterrand was running as an SP candidate in order to differentiate himself from the Union of the Left, and I doubted that it was correct to vote for Mitterrand. I wanted to study the question more carefully, and I did. I went to France and spent ten days going to campaign activities, watching the candidates on TV, listening to them on radio, reading the papers, and discussing with comrades.

No one in France today (except *maybe* the Lambertists) claims that Mitterrand is anything but the candidate of the Union of the Left. The FCR and *Daily Rouge* certainly did not claim he was something other than the "common candidate of the Left." They are not fools. On the contrary they are usually rather astute. To have pretended that Mitterrand was not the Union of the Left candidate would have made them the laughing stock of the French left. Everyone agrees that the fact Mitterrand was formally the candidate of the SP was only that—a formality.

The French comrades did not argue in their press, "Vote for Mitterrand because he is the candidate of the Socialist Party." (The only time they really use that argument is when they discuss with us.) Not at all. They said, "Vote for Mitterrand because that will create better conditions for the class struggle." Their real line, as Barry so aptly pointed out, was vote for Mitterrand because then the bang-bang will start sooner, like in Chile.

So our basic disagreement is not over whose ticket Mitterrand was running on. He was the candidate of the Union of the Left. We disagree on the character of the Union of the Left.

They say the Union of the Left is a *united front* of reformist workers parties supported by virtually every workers organization in the country. We say it is a *class-collaborationist bloc* between reformist workers parties and a bourgeois political formation, supported by virtually every workers organization in the country. That is the heart of the difference.

In the legislative elections a year ago we advocated voting for the candidates of the CP and SP and said this should be counterposed to voting for the Union of the Left. A number of comrades have asked, "Couldn't the same tactic have applied in the presidential elections? Couldn't we have called for a vote for Mitterrand as the candidate of the SP and counterposed that to voting for him as the candidate of the Union of the Left?"

I don't think so. In the legislative elections we were calling for a vote for a slate of candidates not as individuals, but on the basis that a vote for that *party* represented a class vote. The SP's slate, of course, even included Mitterrand, and that did not make it incorrect to call for a vote for the SP. But in a presidential election, there *is* a difference. You are not calling for a vote for a party slate but for a single individual who will determine

governmental policy. That individual, Mitterrand, was running as the candidate of the Union of the Left and pledged to setting up a government composed one-third of ministers from the SP, one-third from the CP, and one-third from the Left Radicals and similar bourgeois forces who were in, or could be brought into, the Union of the Left coalition government.

In that situation, it is impossible to counterpose Mitterrand, the single candidate of the SP, a working-class party, to Mitterrand, the single candidate of the Union of the Left, a class-collaborationist bloc, and say vote for one and not the other. To attempt to do so could only cut across clarifying the character of the Union of the Left, make it more difficult. It is totally different from saying vote SP-CP not Union of the Left in the legislative elections, where you would be able to use such a distinction to counterpose mass working-class parties to a class-collaborationist bloc. It is pretty hard to cut a single individual in two and counterpose one-half of him to the other.

In some aspects the argument to vote for Mitterrand as the candidate of the SP is similar to the argument advanced by the Stalinists in this country in the 1930s when significant numbers of workers wouldn't vote for Roosevelt on the Democratic Party line because they had been educated not to vote for capitalist party candidates. So the CP created the American Labor Party and nominated Roosevelt as the ALP candidate and told the workers they were casting a class vote because they were pulling the lever for a working-class party, not a capitalist party. The analogy is far from exact. There are many differences between the two situations—Mitterrand is not Roosevelt; the Union of the Left is not the Democratic Party; the Socialist Party is not the ALP—but there is an element that is similar and worth calling attention to.

When we say vote labor, vote CP, or vote SP, we say vote for those parties *despite* their program, because they are parties of the working class. We use that vote to educate the working class on the need for independent political action, for class independence in the electoral arena as in all others. And that is how we explain it. We don't say vote CP or vote labor because that will create better conditions for the class struggle, or worse conditions, or anything else. We explain our vote to the workers by saying that we do this in order to help draw a class line in the elections, in order to pose the need for class struggle as opposed to class collaboration, in order to demonstrate our line of class against class.

Charles brought up the question of the legislative elections in Germany in 1972. It's a good example to help clarify some of the differences involved.

In that election, the majority of the German leadership took the position that we should not call for a vote for the SPD, the German Social Democratic Party. The majority of the United Secretariat agreed with that position—although I don't believe a formal vote was ever taken. One of the reasons advanced by United Secretariat members for refusing to call for a vote for the SPD was that the SPD leadership had already announced that even if they won a majority of the seats in the legislature they would still form a coalition cabinet with the Free Democrats, a bourgeois party.

The same comrades who advanced this argument for refusing to vote SPD are today arguing that it was correct

to vote for Mitterrand. The least you can say is that they are not being consistent.

What was our position? We argued that it was correct to vote for the SPD despite the pledge to form a coalition cabinet. What was the difference with the recent elections in France? In my opinion the difference is that the German elections were legislative not presidential. The call to vote SPD was a call to vote for a *party* of the working class despite its program, to vote SPD while also demanding a break with the Free Democrats. It was not a call to vote for Willy Brandt. The correct parallel is not with the 1974 presidential elections in France, and a call to vote Mitterrand, but with the 1973 legislative elections, where we called for a vote for the CP and SP despite the fact they too were committed to forming a class-collaborationist coalition government if elected.

The question is not one of program. The programs of the CP, SP and Union of the Left are virtually the same. The difference is that we can vote for a party of our class, but we cannot vote for a class-collaborationist bloc even if the two formations have the identical program. There is no way you can vote for the bloc—or the single presidential candidate of that bloc—and use it to educate the workers on a line of class against class.

Many of the arguments advanced by the IEC Majority in favor of voting for Mitterrand might be correct arguments if Mitterrand were not the candidate of the Union of the Left. For example, we agree that the masses of workers will not shed their illusions in the mass reformist parties simply by listening to our explanations and seeing the light. They will learn only by going through certain experiences in the class struggle under the leadership of the CP or SP. That is one of the considerations we have in mind when we say vote Labour, or vote CP. Let's have a Labour government, let's have a CP-SP government, because they will be exposed, the working class will begin to learn that these parties are not interested in defending their interests but are instead defenders of the bourgeois order.

But you cannot use the same arguments to say vote Union of the Left, because voting is an act of political support. It may be support in the way that the rope supports a hanging man, as Lenin said, but it still means you want that party or bloc to form the government. To vote for a class collaborationist bloc is to cross class lines in politics.

That act may not have any dire repercussions right away. I want to make it clear: we are not impugning the motives or intentions of the French comrades. We do not believe they are class-collaborationists, betrayers of the working class. Their intentions were good. They wanted to bring the revolution a bit closer. But it's not your intentions that educate people; it's your acts. The danger is that you begin to fundamentally miseducate your own cadres, members and sympathizers on very basic questions of principle. Archeo-Trotskyist "holy principles" if you like. But principles without which no revolutionary party can be built because at the decisive moment, when the real test comes, if your cadres have been miseducated on these principles, the results will be disastrous.

I think the differences on this question can best be summed up by referring to the statement adopted by the May meeting of the United Secretariat, supporting the policy followed by the FCR during the elections. [See

Appendix IV.]

Point four of that resolution states that the foundation of revolutionary Marxist policy in electoral questions is "the necessity for the masses to go through a practical experience of reformism 'in power' if they are to shed their bourgeois democratic illusions."

We say, no, that is not the fundamental guideline. What guides us in electoral questions, as in everything else we

do, is the need to educate the working class to fight for class independence, to follow a line of class struggle not class collaboration in every field.

That goes to the heart of our differences on the French elections with the IMT and the majority of the United Secretariat.

June 23, 1974

## APPENDIX I: TWO ARTICLES FROM THE BOURGEOIS PRESS IN SPAIN

### Break-up of First Military Commando Group of ETA VI Assembly

[The following article appeared in the May 14, 1974, Barcelona newspaper *Noticiero Universal*.]

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Bilbao, 14. The first military commando group of the ETA VI Revolutionary Assembly has been broken up by the Civil Guard as the result of an investigation carried out following an attempted hold-up of the Bolueta Foundry, Inc., May 9.

The commando group was made up of two of the perpetrators of the attempted hold-up, Gregorio Martínez García and María Josefa Ana Leceartua Goni, both of whom were arrested by the Civil Guard the same day. Later the woman succeeded in fleeing while she was being interrogated. Two other participants in the attempted hold-up fled successfully, when they realized their compañeros had been detained.

Gregorio Martínez García, alias Daniel, a 27-year-old native of Baracaldo—near Bilbao—is a machinist and has been married approximately a year to María Josefa Leceartua, alias Fifi, a 21-year-old native of Bilbao and a student. Both were members of the military commando group of the ETA VI Assembly/Liga Comunista Revolucionaria and had been recruited by ETA in 1971 by Julián Abad Rodríguez, who has fled to France.

Later, after their recruitment, they remained "in limbo" until they formed the commando group. The first operation of this group was not carried off, since the robbers were arrested by the Civil Guard. To plan the hold-up

they had held a meeting with another military commando group fifteen days ago, where they were told that they would have to carry out an action. They were given a Colt 48 revolver and a Firebird pistol. One day earlier they received concrete instructions for the hold-up.

First thing on the morning of May 9 they went to the Bolueta Foundry, Inc. with two other individuals, and as reported earlier the Civil Guard succeeded in discovering the projected hold-up and in arresting two of those who were going to participate in it.

The two were taken to the offices of the Civil Guard. María Josefa Ana Leceartua, in spite of being handcuffed, managed to escape when she was being interrogated in the information service. When she was alone for a minute in the headquarters, she opened the window and jumped from a height of ten feet to the outside. The guard there could not shoot for fear of injuring some children who were playing nearby and the girl succeeded in escaping. Up to the moment she has not been located.

Through the investigations begun by this service of the Civil Guard, two other arrests have been carried out of presumed members of ETA and it has been learned that in Guipúzcoa and Bilbao two other military commando groups of ETA VI/Liga Comunista Revolucionaria are functioning. Their mission is to carry out robberies of businesses and banks to get money with which to buy arms.

The military commando group in Bilbao has been broken up and at this time attempts are being made to find the Guipúzcoa group. — Cifra.

### Report from Bilbao: New Basque Clandestine Group

[The following article appeared in the May 25 issue of the Spanish weekly *Mundo*.]

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A new armed-action political group has come on the scene in the Basque country. It is the so-called ETA VI Asamblea/LCR (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna VI/Liga Comunista Revolucionaria—Basque Nation and Freedom/Revolutionary Communist League).

Its public armed debut was a failure; nonetheless, it still exists menacingly. On Thursday, May 9, a married couple, Gregorio Martínez, "Daniel," 27, and María Josefa Ana Lecertua Goni, "Fifi," 21, attempted to hold up the Bolueta Foundry, located on the outskirts of Bilbao.

The newly born violent version of the ETA VI/LCR needed money to pay for arms and hideouts and went into action. Its objective: the 5 million pesetas of the Bol-

ueta Foundry payroll.

But "Daniel" and "Fifi" did not manage to even get into the factory. Almost at the door, they were discovered by the Civil Guard and their plans were spoiled. There was a struggle. Shots were fired. Though no one was wounded, it was enough to convince Daniel and Fifi to give up.

By 10:30 a.m. Thursday, May 9, the two were entering the general headquarters of the Civil Guard in La Salve (Bilbao), arrested and demoralized by the failure.

The two, along with another youth who was not arrested, formed the Fleming commando group, the first military commando group of the ETA VI/LCR.

#### *Free Within Four Hours*

But it did not take Fifi even four hours to get out of the La Salve headquarters. She did not go out the way she came in to be sure. Her exit was more risky, fantastic, and eventful. Fifi escaped jumping through a window while

her hands were handcuffed. It seems unlikely, but that is the reality of the situation.

Carelessness and the tremendous audacity of the young wife did it all. The girl was in an office undergoing interrogation. When she was left alone for a minute, she climbed up to a window — which was not barred — and jumped from the ten-foot sill to an interior patio. Afterwards, though she was hand-cuffed, she began to run across an open area.

How did she manage, in spite of all that, to escape the pursuit of the police? Who released her from the handcuffs once she reached the street? It is not known. . . .

Result: Fifi, mother of a four-month-old child, a resident of Bilbao, a revolutionist, and student of philosophy and letters, leader of the first military commando group of the ETA VI, managed to win her freedom, while her husband, a machinist from Baracaldo, remained a prisoner.

#### *What is ETA VI/LCR?*

As with all things, we must begin at the beginning.

Since its founding fourteen years ago, state its statutes, the ETA's highest controlling body has been the Blitzar Nagusia or General Assembly. All decisions and political positions are worked out by this body.

In all general meetings up to the time they held their VI Assembly, they had been zig-zagging from one position to another. However, they always came out ahead, apparently, at least, without too many problems.

Then came the VI Assembly (in September 1970) in the pretty French tourist fishing spot, San Juan de Luz. All the tensions, differences, and struggles, which were more or less dormant or slowed down, were raised in a chaotic manner.

And the VI Assembly marked the splitting of the organization into many groups. One of them, of course, was the ETA VI.

On the other hand, immediately after the fracturing of the organization produced by the assembly at San Juan de Luz, the so-called ETA V came to the forefront as the true representative of the ideological line hammered out at the preceding Blitzar Nagusia.

During recent years, for all practical purposes, ETA VI has been silent, or reduced to propaganda and proselytizing work.

On the other hand, ETA V has been the protagonist

of almost all the activism which developed between 1972 and the present and which reached its peak with the death of Admiral Carero Blanco.

In reality, ETA V members had pushed ETA VI into the background. Nonetheless, the latter is now coming onto the scene hand in hand with the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria, and, in addition, via a struggle with military commando groups.

#### *A Team with the LCR*

It was March 14, 1973, when the remains of the ETA VI Assembly and the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria signed the agreement on "joint work," based on the line of the Fourth International.

Are the ETA VI members "important" guests within the LCR? They do not seem to be. They are just ordinary types on "probation" in the lobby.

In the Basque country, the LCR at first brought two tendencies into play: the "encrucijada" (crossroads) — for all practical purposes dismantled and in the ditch, and the "en marcha" (on the move) or "marchanges" (the marchers) — who continue to be active and collaborate closely with ETA VI.

The initials ETA VI/LCR appeared on the walls in southwestern France for the first time at the end of 1973, in relation to trial No. 1,001. In Spain, their propagandistic debut took place in spring 1974 in Durango, Bilbao, and San Sebastián.

This new political group has a clearly Trotskyist line, which has thus accentuated still more its ideological differences with the official ETA, which came out for socialism at the Fifth Assembly.

#### *A Weak Movement*

It would clearly be premature to predict the future of this new armed political group, which has gone into action. However, what we can say is that even before picking up the gun, the group developed an intensive work of subversive propaganda and that it is thought that the group is very small.

In spite of all that, we cannot take lightly the obvious fact that there are new armed commando groups in the Basque country, which are willing to take their activism along the road of hold-ups, violent actions, and kidnappings. — Jose Maria Portell.



## APPENDIX II: REPORT ON ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA, by Roman, adopted by the Fourth World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress), February 1974

The aim of this report is not to repeat what is contained in the resolution we will be voting on but to indicate the place the discussion now occupies in the Fourth International. The context can be outlined both in terms of the political questions that arise from a critical reassessment of our previous analyses and in terms of our current need to present our program on this point in a better way.

### Ninth World Congress Resolution on Latin America

The resolution adopted at the Ninth World Congress stressed that armed struggle was a reality in Latin America. That contention was based on both an assessment of the depth of the social struggles and an analysis of the relationship of socioeconomic forces established between the classes (the relative social weight of the proletariat, the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, etc.). Two main consequences flowed from this reality.

● Any significant upsurge in the class struggle that is not quickly brought to a halt by the bourgeoisie and drained of its momentum poses the political question of violent confrontation. From then on the activity of the masses is dominated by the fact that repression looms over the horizon.

● The revolutionary vanguard is thus very quickly confronted with the need to define its own political and organizational tasks in this context—though its forms may vary—for a long period of time.

This thesis has been confirmed by history over the course of the last five years in Latin America, including in countries where the most significant "democratic openings" occurred (Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, etc.). The evolution of the present situation in Argentina indicates that it too will not escape this process. The reality of armed struggle remains a question determining the options open to revolutionary Marxists. This is what is emphasized in points 1 and 2 of the resolution presented to this congress.

The Ninth World Congress also urged the sections to intervene in the revolutionary current that emerged after the victory of the Cuban revolution in order to reshape it politically through common action and win over a section of it to our program and movement.

The PRT (Combatente) [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers party] posed a special problem. Although it was a section of the Fourth International, it had yet to be fully won over to Trotskyism (see the Argentine resolution on this). Does the overall failure to integrate the PRT (C) into our movement and the split that ratified this failure call for a general condemnation of the entire proposal to establish contact with

the new revolutionary generation in Latin America? No—but it does enable us to define more accurately *the way it should be applied*.

An example, even though it is from Europe, will help shed some light on the question—the fusion of the Basque organization ETA-VI [Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna—Basque Nation and Freedom] with the LCR [Liga Comunista Revolucionaria—Revolutionary Communist League], a Spanish sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. ETA was initially a nationalist formation that was much further from Trotskyism than the Castroist current or the Argentine PRT (C). The evolution of the ETA militants began with an understanding of the limits their original orientation imposed on their development. The Trotskyist current emerged through contact with the Spanish LCR and the French Ligue Communiste [Communist League], and, through these organizations, with the Fourth International. Its emergence culminated a process of political clarification that was already under way in the ETA and resulted in a leap forward in the formation of a Trotskyist organization in the Spanish state. *The example of the LCR/ETA-VI provides a useful illustration of the validity of our general plan for building the Fourth International.* Furthermore, this example is far from unique (note the recent affiliation of the GRS [Groupe Révolution Socialiste—Socialist Revolution Group], the new Antilles section of the Fourth International). *At the same time, however, it enables us to illustrate the two conditions necessary for carrying out this plan:* the capacity of the Trotskyist organization and militants to *organize a programmatic debate* with the centrist currents that have begun to evolve, and their capacity to carry out joint actions with these currents. *The failure to measure up to these two conditions in Argentina is what prevented us from definitively winning over a significant current of the PRT (C) to our movement.* The existence, in spite of our weakness, of groups that have emerged from the PRT (C) and have resolved to continue building an Argentine organization of the Fourth International testifies to what it would have been theoretically possible to accomplish.

*The task today is to draw up a critical balance sheet of our previous orientation in order to point up why these conditions were not met.* The aim is not to call into question the overall political basis on which the Ninth World Congress worked out its orientation for Latin America. But this critical review of the past is important for a full understanding of the present resolution.

The weaknesses, ambiguities, and errors of the Ninth World Congress resolution on Latin America stem mainly from three sets of problems:

a. *Organizational weaknesses that were not overcome.* The Ninth World Congress set our movement, more firm-

ly than in the past, on a course toward political action corresponding to the new international situation. In Latin America, this was characterized by an unprecedented effort to respond to the concrete problems posed for both the vanguard and the masses by the sharp and violent character of the confrontation with the bourgeoisie.

But this effort to "transform" our movement politically implied a deepgoing modification of the way it functioned as an organization—both on the level of the sections and the international center. *We did not succeed in changing our methods of functioning as quickly as the new political tasks we had assigned ourselves demanded.* Consequently, our Latin American sections and the United Secretariat were unable either to initiate the political debate in time or work closely enough with the PRT (C). For this reason, the United Secretariat and each section of the International must now put special emphasis on this organizational transformation.

b. *The Ninth World Congress orientation for Latin America was marked by a number of weaknesses and errors of political analysis.*

The main ones concerned the analysis of the Castroist current, the evolution of the Cuban state, and the emergence of a new equilibrium in continental class struggles marked by a greater significance of the urban sectors. These errors resulted in an undeniable overestimation of our perspectives (closely linked to the hope that the Castroist current and Cuba would play a much more significant role than it actually did), and in an extreme centralization of these perspectives around rural guerrilla warfare.

*These weaknesses and errors of analysis were serious because they concerned some of the central problems under debate with the Latin American vanguard, including the PRT (C).*

This is why the Tenth World Congress is opening a discussion on the evolution of the Cuban state.

c. *A general programmatic weakness of the International in a very important domain, that of choosing the forms of armed struggle and integrating them into our revolutionary strategy.*

Marxist thought in this and other areas has to a great extent been rendered sterile by Stalinism, which has broken the continuity linking us with Bolshevik traditions. In addition, the weakness of our forces prevented us from taking up the development of this question with the same success we have had in other domains. It was no accident that we returned to this fundamental question in the context of the Ninth World Congress and the need to determine an orientation for Latin America. This flowed from a political turn toward intervention in a continent where the class struggle concretely posed the questions of armed struggle to the vanguard and the masses.

This relative lack of a living theoretical tradition of armed struggle and the narrowness of our political experience (though there was some in Europe—the resistance—and in Latin America) made the Ninth World Congress resolution on Latin America very abstract and dangerously hasty. That was the source of "elliptical formulations" that tended to "telescope" the different stages of struggle—formulations that we have criticized in the discussion.

*The aim of the present resolution is to return to these questions, beginning with an effort to systematize and develop our orientation with regard to the place and the forms of armed struggle in our strategy for Latin America.*

## What Is Under Discussion in the Present Debate?

We attach great significance to this question. For us, the point is not merely to take stock of our previous orientation, *for the problem remains a burning question.* The Latin American far left contains two broad currents representing two symmetrical deviations on the role of armed struggle in the revolutionary strategy for seizing power—a "militarist" current and a so-called "massist" or spontanéist one. We have to present and explain our own positions and distinguish our revolutionary Marxist current from the other currents, including our position on armed struggle.

To understand the function of the present resolution we should go back once again to the context of the current discussion. The majority tendency has no intention of promoting either a "focoist" strategy or a terrorist orientation, as the minority would have one believe. On the contrary, as the resolution presented to this congress illustrates, our entire orientation reflects and clarifies *the need to subordinate the party's decisions on the question of armed struggle to its transitional strategy for seizing power.* Moreover, this is not a debate about one preferred form of armed struggle (i.e., rural guerrilla warfare). On the contrary, our orientation brings out *the variety of forms armed struggle can take—and the different ways of arming the proletariat—depending upon the various possible political situations; in contrast with the Ninth World Congress resolution it calls attention to the role of the revolutionary crisis in the arming of the masses.*

This is not a debate over the "techniques" of armed struggle. *It is an eminently political debate over the vanguard's particular responsibilities in solving the problem of arming the proletariat and the popular masses in order to seize power.*

In this report I am not going to take up questions that have already been dealt with at some length in the discussion (the Bolivian experience, etc.). In order to illustrate the *general applicability of the debate* I will take only one example—Chile and the circumstances surrounding the resistance to the military coup. It is clear to everyone that this was a case in which there was no question of a "focoist" orientation (i.e., the organization of rural guerrilla nuclei), "terrorism" (i.e., assassinations of UP [Unidad Popular—Popular Unity] governmental figures), or of a generally "militarist" perspective.

As far as all Trotskyist militants are concerned, there was a clear necessity to organize an urban and regional insurrectional uprising in the face of the danger or first sign of the coup. *Despite this very general area of agreement, important differences remain regarding the analysis of what the role of the vanguard was in this situation.* Behind the specific debates one can readily see what is really at issue in the discussion—a discussion that this World Congress must bring to a conclusion.

What then were the tasks of revolutionary militants in anticipation of the coup?

The first priority was obviously to defend and broaden the proletariat's political and organizational autonomy, and on this basis strengthen its alliance with the working peasantry (from which flows support to the slogans of nationalization under workers' control, expropriation of the large landholders, spread and national centralization of the embryonic organs of dual power then in the process

of emerging, etc.). The point, therefore, was to hasten the working class's *political* break with the reformist leadership and to put forward an alternative *political* leadership on a national scale.

But was that enough? We do not think so. A comparison will help demonstrate this, a comparison with Spain in July 1936.

The revolution did not win in July 1936 in Spain. But the situation was quite different from that of Chile in September 1973: for one thing the fascist coup had been defeated in the greater part of the Spanish territory. If that had been the case in Chile (for instance, in the regions of Valparaiso and Santiago), the national and continental situation would have been profoundly different from the one that emerged from the general success of the coup. That does not mean, however, that the struggle would have been over. The example of Spain brings that point home. But the struggle would have taken place on an infinitely more favorable basis than it does today, and not only for the Chilean workers.

The question of why Chile suffered such a heavy defeat is therefore of great importance. What lessons are to be drawn regarding the role of revolutionary militants? Those who feel it is enough to reply that since the revolutionary party had not been built, revolution was not on the agenda, are sidestepping the question. For it cannot be said that the Spanish far left (CNT, POUM) [Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores—National Confederation of Workers; Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista—United Marxist Workers party] was qualitatively more developed than the far left in Chile. And it certainly cannot be said that general conditions were less favorable in Chile: The objective weight of the Chilean working class was relatively strong, and the workers had benefited from three years of the Popular Unity government, during which a very large number of workers' committees had been established (the *cordones*, etc.). The peasant movement too had accumulated a number of experiences in struggle. A process of political differentiation was taking place among the masses. And in the beginning, at least, the ruling classes were equally divided.

Likewise, if one compares, in the Spain of July 1936, the areas where the coup succeeded and those where it failed, it can be seen that the intervention of general factors does not provide a sufficient explanation: The workers strongholds fell almost without a fight.

*What proved to be decisive was the intervention of the vanguard.* Everywhere in both Spain and Chile, the masses reacted spontaneously to news of the putsch. But they also reacted everywhere in an essentially defensive fashion, occupying "their" factory, "their" neighborhood. In both cases the masses had been disarmed by a reformist government. In Spain, wherever the coup was defeated, this occurred on account of the intervention by revolutionary militants who, with whatever arms they had in their possession, knew how to put forward objectives to the mobilized masses (the armories, encirclement of the barracks, etc.). *It was the intervention of the vanguard that enabled the masses to break away from passive reaction and go over to the counteroffensive.* And this occurred even in regions where the reformist leadership remained at the head of the workers movement. The MIR [Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left] (the main organization

of the Chilean far left) was unable to carry out what the militants of the CNT and POUM accomplished in many areas of Spain. This is probably the product of a difference in the history and class struggles of the two countries. An insurrectional tradition—and thus cadres who had already been tested, and masses who had already accumulated experiences of struggle—already existed in Spain.

The lesson to be drawn from the comparison of Chile in 1973 with Spain in 1936 is clear. The bourgeoisie does not wait until the masses have finished breaking with the reformist leadership before it reacts. *Once it reacts, everything takes place in a few days at best; more likely in a few hours. The revolutionary vanguard must know how to sweep over the reformist leadership in order to present objectives to the masses. And it must know how to present objectives that are not only political but are also related to the military tasks of the insurrection.*

For the Latin America of today the lesson is even clearer that the bourgeoisie and its army have learned a great deal and have made careful preparations. The Chilean coup is a model of the type. The degree of preparation required of the masses and the vanguard is therefore greatly increased.

What then are the tasks of revolutionary Marxists in a situation similar to that of Chile before September 1973, specifically in reference to the question of arming the proletariat (and taking into account the whole range of other political tasks)?

At least four can be cited:

1. Carrying out *beforehand* a systematic campaign of political education around the themes of arming the proletariat (from self-defense to militias), against legalist illusions, and against the bourgeois army. Here, just as around other transitional themes, the Marxist vanguard must play an *active* role in formulating slogans, publicizing them, and generalizing *concrete experiences* (for in the end, it is through this analysis that the masses become educated). *This is what makes the question of arming the masses one of the key questions in the revolutionary party's political activity once a tumultuous mass upsurge is under way.*

2. *On the basis of this work*, consistent propaganda and organizational activity must be carried out inside the bourgeois army. The example of Chile reconfirms that this work can only be carried out on the basis of a relationship of forces grounded in the effective capability of the masses to confront the bourgeois army. Work in the army should begin as soon as possible. It can succeed only on the basis of well-established work outside the army that is not limited to peacefully organizing the masses; militias and workers committees must already be in existence if the rank and file of the army is to come over to the proletarian camp. Opposition to the coup existed in the army, and it even seems to have been rather broad. It was physically crushed without resistance.

3. The revolutionary party must be capable of carrying out *its own intervention* and it must have its armed detachments. It should not only be able to assure the protection of itself and its militants, but should also be capable of facilitating the masses's *concrete experiences*, maximizing their effect, and deepening them, as well as carrying out significant political actions at the chosen

time to speed up the process. In addition, it must be capable of enrolling the masses when decisive confrontations begin.

4. In a general way, the question of timing becomes a key factor. In no case is it possible to count on the bourgeoisie being paralyzed for a length of time sufficient to enable the masses to undergo "naturally" the full experience of the bankruptcy of reformism, if only because the bourgeoisie has the benefit of international support. From this flows the decisive role of revolutionary militants in the whole period of preparation for the insurrection. At the decisive moment, this question becomes even more important. There is no longer time to hesitate. All the circumstances and conditions involved in sweeping over the reformist leaderships and in carrying out the political and military tasks of the uprising must have already been anticipated and thought out. "Insurrection is an art," Trotsky used to be fond of saying. That is something we should not forget.

Stressing these tasks of the revolutionary vanguard is not, we repeat, aimed at sidestepping the debate on the other forms of struggle. It is aimed at throwing some light on the fundamental point under debate. *Because the orientation thus defined is different from both militarist orientations and tail-endist, spontanist orientations.*

It differs from militarist orientations—which the PRT(C) of Santucho is the most sophisticated example of—by concretely illustrating the central role of organs of dual power in arming the masses, the importance of the moment of revolutionary crisis, and the link between carrying out the tasks of arming the proletariat and the revolutionary Marxist program as a whole.

It is profoundly different from the perspectives proposed by the international minority (and in particular by the Argentine PST), which are very close to those of the spontanist current on the question of the insurrection.

For the minority, the arming of the proletariat is the "natural" product of revolutionists' general political activity and requires no prolonged and specific intervention on the part of the party. "Minority violence" is in principle contradictory to "mass violence" and thus should be denounced. The only violence permitted is violence coming from the mass movement, carried out in its name, and by its organizations. The term "minority violence," which they say must be denounced in principle, is also attached to actions that scarcely merit the term "violence" (such as breaking the windows of a U.S. Embassy in the name of a revolutionary political organization in the course of a movement against the imperialist war in Indochina. . .). The revolutionary militant must march with the masses, *at the same pace as the masses*—masses who, "when the time comes," will know how to find ways to arm themselves.

The minority refers to the lessons of the guerrilla defeats in Latin America. We will draw them. But they themselves forget to draw the lessons from *guerrilla warfare that helped bring about victories* (from China to Cuba, including Vietnam); nor do they draw the lessons of the defeats of the "insurrections" in Bolivia, Chile, etc., over the last few years. They show signs of the most insipid tail-endism toward the mass movement—and in point of fact toward its reformist leaders—and of total spontanism in regard to arming the proletariat. We believe

in the spontaneity of the masses—otherwise we would have no hope for the socialist revolution. But we do not believe in being unprepared for insurrection and revolution.

As for the third tendency, it seems to adopt the minority's tail-endist way of approaching this question. They differ only in offering an amendment calling for the existence of an "armed (but *inactive*) wing" of the party until the day when "the masses themselves" arm themselves. The importance of the inactive "armed wing" is reduced to furnishing, when the time comes, well-trained (how?) "revolutionary officers" for the proletariat. For the third tendency, the politics of the PST are simply "not very clear" because the PST is silent about the existence of this "armed wing." The silence will have lasted until the end of the debate, and it is not by accident: It is the product of legalistic politics.

## The Tenth World Congress Resolution

The resolution presented to the Tenth World Congress does not try to present an overall continental strategy based on a precise evaluation of the evolution of the class struggles in Latin America. Its aim is more modest; its purpose is different from that of the Ninth World Congress resolution.

Its aim is to begin, on the basis of a critical balance sheet of our past orientation, the work of conceptualizing and formulating the party's tasks in relation to armed struggle. In other words, its purpose is to eliminate the "elliptical" character of the formulations of the previous world congress, to show in a more systematic way the form that armed actions of the party take in relation to the evolution of the political situation, the class struggle, and the party itself. This resolution continues the work of programmatic development begun in this area at the Ninth World Congress. That is what has led us to define more fully the content of the concepts involved and to give a more balanced assessment of the role of rural guerrilla warfare as it was defined five years ago, and to do so in terms of an analysis of the shift in social struggles under way in Latin America.

It is at the very least somewhat strange to assert that the resolution presented to this congress tends to generalize guerrilla warfare to encompass all forms of struggle in Latin America, and tends to extend this orientation to the whole rest of the world. First, because this resolution specifically emphasizes *the limits to actions of the strictly guerrillaist (rural or urban) sort. Second, because it is in point of fact a continental resolution, not a world one.*

## A Continental Resolution

In my remarks I made comparisons with some European examples (ETA-VI and July 1936 in Spain) because it is possible to draw useful lessons from them. But *the resolution on armed struggle in Latin America is perhaps based more on the differences between continents than on their similarities.*

The first difference is stated in point 1 of the resolution. Everywhere in the world the revolution will undoubtedly be violent, and every revolutionary party must therefore set

itself specific military tasks. *But at the moment the violent confrontation between the masses and the bourgeoisie begins, the forms this confrontation takes will differ greatly between the colonial and semicolonial countries on the one hand and the imperialist countries on the other, for the social structure in these countries is vastly different. The social weight of the proletariat is much weaker in the colonial and semicolonial countries, as is the socio-economic base of the bourgeoisie. It is this particular relationship between the classes that explains the rapidity with which any serious upsurge in class struggles provokes a confrontation. The difference between the colonial revolution as a sector of the permanent revolution and the "classical" proletarian revolution is shown here as well. In what Latin American country would the bourgeoisie be able to assimilate and derail a struggle as broad as the one in May 1968 in France, through essentially political means and wage concessions? That is, however, what the French bourgeoisie did; the army (though on alert) remained in the barracks and the police intervened only at the beginning and end of the movement. Three militants were killed, but that time the army was not directly used (although the *threat* of an intervention was employed).*

So, are we talking about a resolution that is valid for the whole of the colonial and semicolonial world? No! Latin America has a social structure and a tradition of class struggle that differ in too many ways from those of the other continents dominated by imperialism to permit the use of an identical approach. A document on armed struggle in Southeast Asia or Black Africa would not be exactly like the one for Latin America.

An example will clarify this point: the comparison with Vietnam enabled us to criticize the conception held by the PRT (C) and the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—People's Revolutionary Army] *by highlighting the differences.* Prolonged revolutionary war on the Sino-Vietnamese model requires the creation and development of liberated zones based on a *resistance economy and an embryonic state apparatus* that can only exist in a country with an economy that is still essentially rural. The socioeconomic base of a liberated zone (not to mention problems of a more specifically military character) does not exist in a shantytown. *Developments in urbanized Argentina cannot be the same as those in rural Vietnam.* In other words, for Argentine revolutionists the emergence of liberated zones can only be conceived within a perspective of continental, or at least subcontinental, struggle. *However, this perspective implies the existence of a continental or subcontinental civil war encompassing significant rural regions.* In other words, this orientation was not applicable in the last few years.

The Vietnamese national liberation army was not based solely on the formation of liberated zones. Its development was also coordinated with the outbreak of revolutionary crises, and partial or general insurrections (August 1945, for example). There is a dual lesson here. Generally speaking, the transition from minority armed action to the arming of the masses occurs in a context of overall socioeconomic crisis, of revolutionary crisis. What is involved is a qualitative leap; *i.e., it is not a case of linear development from an armed wing of the party to a mass revolutionary army.* And the political line of the revolutionary party must lead to locating these

favorable factors. For that matter, the concrete means for forming a revolutionary proletarian army of mass proportions will vary according to the country, the specific situations, and the concrete forms of the class struggle (centralization of workers militias, development of a "national liberation army" of the Vietnamese type, etc.). Here again the party's role in anticipating developments will be decisive.

The comparison could be pursued further to show the importance of *differences* in defining an orientation. There is, however, a *general theme* underlying the differences between the majority and minority, a theme that has nothing to do with "continental" considerations and that expresses itself in our different conceptions of armed struggle. What is this theme? *It involves the relationship that must be established between the revolutionary vanguard and the masses in order to assure the full development of the transitional dynamic of struggles; it also involves the nature of the program and the whole question of transition.* The differences can be expressed as follows: Is it enough to march at the same pace as the masses, merely taking up their slogans and forms of struggle, or should the Marxist vanguard be capable of preparing the masses—through propaganda, agitation, and action—for the tasks they are going to be confronted with in the immediate future? We agree with Lenin that there are times when the party must know how to march a "half step" ahead of the masses, or else risk being unable to play its role. That holds true for armed struggle as well as everything else.

## A Bolshevik Tradition

For the minority, the resolution on armed struggle in Latin America, in the context of the Ninth World Congress, represents an "innovation" in the history of the Trotskyist movement, an innovation whose methodology is contrary to the Marxist tradition. We have already replied to this astonishing argument in the pre-congress debate, taking up (among other examples) the method applied by Lenin at the time of the development of guerrilla actions in Romania in 1906, and the method Trotsky applied to the antifascist struggle and to actions taken by the party itself. Since it is necessary to go back over this, let us take a look at a pamphlet written by Trotsky—"Strategy and Tactics in the Imperialist Epoch," chapter 10, "The Strategy of Civil War." In 1924, a working group centered around the Military Science Society encountered opposition from the anti-Trotskyist faction of the Comintern. In Trotsky's view:

"A more lightminded and criminal step can hardly be imagined. In an epoch of abrupt turns, the rules of the civil war in the sense presented above must be part of the iron inventory of the entire revolutionary cadre, let alone the leaders of the party. These 'statutes' would have to be studied constantly and augmented from the fresh experiences in one's own country. Only such a study can provide a certain guarantee against steps of panic and capitulation at moments when supreme courage and decisiveness are required, as well as against adventurist leaps in periods which require prudence and patience.

"Had such regulations been incorporated in a number of books, the serious study of which is as much the duty of every communist as the knowledge of the basic ideas

of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, we might well have avoided such defeats as were suffered during recent years, and which were by no means inevitable. . . ." (*The Third International After Lenin*, pp. 146-47.)

It can be seen that our concerns are not new.

We do not believe that the solution to all our problems can be found in the texts that are the heritage of the Marxist movement. But we do believe in the application of the method that guided the Bolsheviks' actions during the Russian revolution and the elaboration of the Transitional Program of 1938. All we are doing today is renewing—in a modest fashion—an old tradition of the communist movement, a tradition many of whose threads have been broken by Stalinism.

The resolution presented to this Tenth World Congress puts forward a concept of armed struggle that is sharply distinguished from the militarist or spontanéist deviations of armed struggle, deviations that have been and continue

to be widespread in the Latin American far left.

The resolution enables us to draw a critical balance sheet of our own orientation. Its aim is to clarify and better differentiate the concepts we make use of (armed protection of the party's propaganda work, actions of the party itself, guerrilla warfare in the strict sense of the term, and so forth). It illuminates the correlation that exists between the evolution of developments in the class struggle and the tasks incumbent upon the party.

But this resolution remains very abstract. It is no substitute for the capability of each of our groups or sections in Latin America to define its own tasks in terms of the national situation. It does not claim to define a full, complete, *overall* strategic orientation for the entire Latin American continent. But to move ahead in both elaboration and action, we must now bring to a close the debate between tendencies that emerged in the International following the Argentine and Bolivian experiences.

### APPENDIX III: ARMED STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA, Counterreport for the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, by Joseph Hansen, presented to the Fourth World Congress Since Reunification (Tenth World Congress), February 1974

To properly judge the resolution that has been placed before the congress, and in particular the arguments made by Comrade Roman, the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, who went beyond Latin America—citing events elsewhere in the world—to bolster his arguments on the "programmatic clarification" offered by the resolution, it is necessary to consider the document in relation to the position on this question held by the Fourth International since it was founded in 1938.

The fundamental position of the Fourth International on armed struggle proceeds from the view that the socialist revolution, unlike all previous revolutions is a conscious action carried out by the masses—by the masses in their millions and tens of millions—under the leadership of the proletariat. This sounds simple; and it is simple—but it is also very profound. It constitutes the basic frame of revolutionary-Marxist politics, distinguishing us from all other tendencies in the radical movement. We proceed from this view in trying to solve the key problem that faces us as revolutionary Marxists today: how to bring the program of socialism to the masses so that they adopt it as their own program and set out themselves to realize it in life.

This is very clearly shown by the way Trotsky, in his final programmatic statement on the question of armed struggle, handles the subject in the Transitional Program.

He begins with mass actions; in this instance with a wave of sit-down strikes and occupations of factories. That is the proper way to begin from the Marxist point of view. Then he proceeds to the probable response by the bourgeoisie—the use of violence. This in turn impels the workers to act in self-defense.

Measures of self-defense, worked out by the masses and put into effect by the masses, sharpen the class struggle, as Trotsky outlines the likely course of events. The bourgeoisie, as has been seen in many a bitter strike struggle, resorts to the use of armed thugs, to private armies, in addition to the ordinary use of the police and army. As the struggle sharpens, the bourgeoisie inclines more and more toward a fascist takeover. Or, if you wish to look at it in the context of many areas today, including Latin America, the bourgeoisie inclines toward a military coup and the establishment of a repressive military regime.

And so to defend themselves in the most powerful way open to them, the masses mobilize in their millions. Their self-defensive measures—as Trotsky continues the logical sequence—become broader, sharper, and increasingly effective through the organization of armed workers detachments. This involves, as Trotsky stresses, tens of millions of toilers. In dealing with armed struggle, Trotsky always speaks in terms of the masses—of the vast majority of the population. The battle begins in the plants, Trotsky says; in the plants where the workers are. It ends with the masses flooding the streets as the contending class forces confront each other in mounting clashes.

The nuclei in this area of the class struggle consist of strike pickets. That's the point of departure. For the workers, self-defense begins with pickets. These develop at a later stage, as Trotsky visualized the sequence, into a workers militia.

Trotsky emphasizes, moreover, that as the struggle proceeds, the advances always occur on the basis of the experience of the masses themselves. He is simply stating the most elementary proposition of Marxist politics. Our politics is the politics of the mass movement, of mass struggles.

Here is Trotsky's summary on the question of armed struggle:

"Engels defined the state as bodies of 'armed men.' *The arming of the proletariat* is an imperative concomitant element to its struggle for liberation. When the proletariat wills it, it will find the road and the means to arming. In this field, also, the leadership falls naturally to the sections of the Fourth International."

What is the essence of this position, of this revolutionary-Marxist political position? It is the mobilization and organization of tens of millions of people. The concept is one of immense boldness—a perspective of organizing the masses by the millions. Considering the small forces that we start with, what perspective could be bolder than that?

By what strategy is this aim to be achieved? It is through the construction of a mass revolutionary party, an instrument interlocked with the masses and thereby in position to provide them with leadership at each stage of the struggle.

Consider more closely Trotsky's sentence on how the proletariat is to be armed. This is Trotsky speaking: "When the proletariat wills it, it will find the road and the means to arm itself."

Does this mean that Trotsky was a spontaneist? Few today would call Trotsky a spontaneist. In 1938 that position was called having confidence in the initiative of the masses. Initiatives in action, if you please.

Trotsky was not an *advocate* of violence. He said more than once that it would be preferable to avoid violence. He pointed out, however, that the decision on this question rested with the bourgeoisie, and that history teaches us that the bourgeoisie will resort to minority violence if they believe their rule to be seriously endangered. The majority then has no choice but to defend itself against the violence of the small minority hanging on to power against the will of the people.

Trotsky insisted on the importance of the distinction between majority and minority. In the case of the civil war in the United States and again in Spain, it was the reactionary minority that resorted to violence in hope of frustrating the will of the majority. The majority had no choice but to respond in kind.

Trotsky's rejection of a course that would have involved our movement in the use of "minority violence" cannot be ascribed to pacifism, tail-endism or right opportunism on

his part. In the last years of his life, as is well-known, he was greatly concerned about the mounting threat from native fascism in the United States itself. Against that threat, Trotsky counseled his followers in the United States to use their influence to help the trade unions and other mass organizations initiate the organization of workers defense guards.

What Trotsky said on this question in the last years of his life is especially important. He was voicing his considered judgment based on the entire experience of the revolutionary movement, including what he had learned in the Russian revolution and in the struggle against the rise of fascism in Europe. In the Transitional Program he condensed the valid positions of the first four congresses of the Communist International. Besides that, Trotsky left us rich observations on this question in his *History of the Russian Revolution*.

What is the conclusion of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on this point? Briefly, that there is no need for a new resolution on armed struggle. We already have a rounded programmatic position on armed struggle. What we leave open is its tactical application. That has to be determined by the concrete circumstances at a given moment in the class struggle. If any resolution is required it ought to be one reaffirming the Trotskyist position against the challenge offered by the new rise of individual terrorism in many countries.

The resolution of the IEC Majority Tendency does the opposite. It revises the Trotskyist position. It reaffirms the guerrilla orientation adopted at the 1969 congress. At the same time it seeks to make that orientation more palatable. It could be said to mark the completion of the turn adopted by the majority at the last world congress. The resolution reduces guerrilla warfare to but one form of "armed struggle." Or, looked at from another angle, it generalizes guerrilla war. Instead of a particular form we have been presented with the general form.

What is referred to in the resolution, it must be emphasized, is not armed struggle as initiated and carried out by the majority of the population but violent actions initiated and carried out by small groups. Such actions are supposed to serve as examples to the masses. And this is obviously how the term "armed struggle" will be understood by every guerrilla fighter, every practitioner of "minority violence" in the world.

Some of the flaws in the resolution, as it stands, should be noted. In the very first sentence a contradiction appears: "For a series of reasons that were spelled out in the resolution on Latin America at the Ninth World Congress and that are particular to that continent at this stage, any turbulent rise of the mass movement must soon confront a resolute attempt by the army to crush it and to establish a military dictatorship."

According to that, "armed struggle" is confined to the continent of Latin America. Yet the stated conditions hold generally for all continents. They hold even for industrially advanced countries. It can be safely predicted that any turbulent rise of the mass movement anywhere in the world today faces the danger of "a resolute attempt by the army to crush it and to establish a military dictatorship."

That was the experience in Indonesia, which is hardly a part of Latin America. Wasn't a turbulent rise of the mass movement there met with the establishment of a ferocious military dictatorship?

If it is true that the bourgeoisie will grant concessions in face of small mobilizations, as the resolution states elsewhere, but will seek to smash big mobilizations, doesn't that hold for Western Europe and for the United States? Consequently, even though we consider his conclusions to be wrong, it was correct of Comrade Roman to consider the question on a world scale and not merely in reference to Latin America.

In fact it would appear that the references in the resolution to Latin America represent nothing but bits of the shell in which the new orientation on "armed struggle," or guerrilla war, was presented at the last world congress.

There are other flaws. The resolution singles out "armed struggle," as an entity existing in its own right, a phenomenon to be considered by itself. Abstracting the question in this way shows that the authors of the resolution have isolated it from the struggle of the masses.

Further proof, if proof is needed, is the emphasis on the action of miniscule groups. In reality that is all the resolution deals with—the action of miniscule groups isolated from the masses.

Along with this goes unrealistic schematization, an abstract set of rules as to when and where "armed struggle" is to be used, in what forms the miniscule groups should apply it; that is, whether as guerrilla war, as armed detachments of the party, as initial pilot projects, etc.

The fatal flaw in this approach is that the concrete reality is always richer than the best-laid schema. Concrete reality always proves to be richer than it can be imagined in advance. Thus the tactical prescriptions advanced in this resolution can prove to be deadly traps.

Our movement has had some bad experiences in this respect. Wasn't that one of the reasons why the sections of the Fourth International in both Bolivia and Argentina followed courses out of consonance with the reality, thereby suffering serious setbacks?

This is not all. The resolution offers a caricature of the position outlined in the Transitional Program. Then it *combines* this caricature with the Transitional Program.

What this means in practice is shown by what the Bolivian comrades told us happened in Bolivia. They succeeded in getting important union bodies there to vote for the Transitional Program. Then they discovered that this was not enough because later on they still had to confront the problem of "armed struggle." So they "attached" armed struggle to the Transitional Program.

The most important aspect of the Transitional Program, however, is the method it offers—a method to be used by the revolutionary party in advancing the class struggle. This method applies to all aspects of the class struggle, including the periods in which the masses resort to arms in self-defense against the attacks of the bourgeoisie. The point is that revolutionists should master this method so that they can utilize it in concrete situations no matter how unexpected these situations may be in their actual form. To have unions *vote* for the Transitional Program can be meaningless, if not worse.

The Bolivian comrades believed, of course, that they had carried out their duty and had scored a success in getting powerful unions to vote for it. After this success they turned to other tasks. And what happened? They were left defenseless before the pressure of Castroism.

The resolution submitted by the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency follows essentially the same



course. The majority comrades emphasize that they are all for the Transitional Program; but they propose to combine something with it that goes directly against Trotsky's basic concept of armed struggle as arising from within the mass movement itself.

On the theoretical level such an attempt represents an absolute collapse of serious thought.

The orientation on rural guerrilla war adopted at the last world congress reflected the pressure of Castroism on our movement. In some circles of what the majority calls the "new mass vanguard," it is thought that the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban revolutions were touched off by small groups through pedagogical armed actions.

If you believe that this model is valid for the coming revolutions, then the majority resolution follows logically. But it is the logic of Castroism—a quite obsolete logic, it ought to be added. The fact is that this model is far removed from the real course of those revolutions.

On top of that, the revolutionary upsurge developing internationally today is more and more approximating the model of the Russian revolution.

Castroism has been ebbing for some time. How then are we to explain the pressure within the Fourth International for continuing the guerrilla orientation, the pressure for deepening it, for generalizing it, for experimenting with new variants of it? The explanation remains the same as the one offered by the minority at the 1969 congress. The fact is that the memory of the impact of the Russian revolution, of its pattern, of the methods used by its leaders and what a mighty role can be played by a Bolshevik-type party has grown dim. It remains a living concept only among the older generations, along with young comrades who are really willing to study it in depth and to transport themselves in mind to that titanic event.

Many youths have come into the Fourth International under the influence of the Cuban, Chinese, and the Vietnamese revolutions. They have not yet outgrown that influence. At best the Russian revolution is to them one among other revolutions, one model among others; and they have not yet grasped its central political lesson.

And sadly enough, some of the older leaders of the Fourth International, rather than seeking to overcome the ultraleft bias of these new recruits, bent to the pressure. As in the way they handled the non-Trotskyist PRT in Argentina, these leaders drifted. Still worse, they pampered the ultraleft prejudices of these recruits. These are the main sources of the pressures within the Fourth International that have led to the continuation, deepening, and generalization of the "armed struggle," or guerrilla, line as codified in this resolution which is now before us.

We come to another very important point. The resolution on "armed struggle" opens the way to all kinds of deviations of the most dangerous kind. For example, the leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency may contend that it has no connection with their position on armed struggle in Latin America, yet members of their tendency in Spain hailed the assassination of Carrero Blanco, and the *Red Weekly* of January 11, 1974, published a headline: "Spanish Trotskyists give total support to Carrero Blanco assassination." Naturally, no Trotskyists were involved in that assassination. The declarations of support, however, involved the most serious departure from the *programmatic* position of the world Trotskyist movement on armed struggle.

I said that this resolution marks the completion of the turn adopted at the Ninth World Congress, the turn toward guerrilla war. This is not quite accurate. It can also be said to have opened a new stage. If adopted, it would place the Fourth International in a rather ignominious position—standing on the sidelines hailing the "minority violence" committed by others. Could this position be maintained for long? I don't think so. The pressure would mount to go still further in departing from the programmatic position of Trotskyism on this question. I hope that the comrades will draw back from this road before it is too late. If they do not, our movement will face the most disastrous consequences. To turn resolutely away from this fatal perspective, the resolution on armed struggle must be defeated.

## APPENDIX IV: UNITED SECRETARIAT MAJORITY RESOLUTION ON THE ELECTORAL TACTICS OF THE FCR, May 30, 1974

[The following resolution was adopted by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International by a vote of 12 for, 5 against, on May 30, 1974.]

\* \* \*

The decision of the Front Communiste Révolutionnaire to call for a vote for Mitterrand in the second round of the French presidential elections has given rise to important discussions and positions have been taken in several sections of the International. For this reason the political leadership of the FCR asked the United Secretariat to detail its position on the disputed questions.

1. The presidential election held under the French constitution lends an especially important role to the individual candidate. But that is no excuse for neglecting to analyze a candidacy by starting from the nature of the political forces that it represents and that are embodied in it. In effect, one would then be led to determine one's position essentially on the basis of the "personal program" of the candidate (Mitterrand, in this case) or to advocate abstention as a matter of principle in presidential elections (as opposed, for example, to legislative elections). This is why an analysis of what the Union de la Gauche represents is so important for determining a vote recommendation in the May 1974 presidential elections in France.

2. The "Union de la Gauche" represents essentially an alliance between the two main French reformist workers parties, the Social Democratic party (of which Mitterrand is a leading member) and the Stalinist party. During the most recent elections, it was strengthened by the support of the two main workers trade-unions, the CGT and the CFDT (FO, being extremely pro-employer and very small, did not endorse any candidate), and of the teachers union (the FEN) and the Parti Socialiste Unifié, a left-centrist group. The rallying of the "left radicals," a handful of bourgeois politicians, to the "Union de la Gauche" after the signing of the Common Program, could not have changed the nature of this alliance. During the 1973 legislative elections, the revolutionary militants should have called exclusively for votes for the CP and SP, because the left radicals symbolized and concretized the *desire* for an interclass alliance. But the left radicals did not bring any section of the bourgeoisie into the Union de la Gauche with them. The same is true of the call for a second-round vote for Mitterrand raised by some leftover "left Gaullists" who rejected the candidacy of Giscard d'Estaing, an Independent Republican. (This electoral call was not accompanied by any organic or programmatic modification of the Union de la Gauche nor did any significant bourgeois formations rally to his candidacy.

On the contrary, behind the left vs. right electoral confrontation there emerged an unprecedented electoral class polarization. And it is symptomatic that Mitterrand, despite the narrow margin that separated him from Giscard in

the polls, *refused* to negotiate with Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber about changing the Common Program on the question of nationalizations.

Thus, the Mitterrand candidacy can in no case be characterized as the candidacy of a fully-formed Popular Front.

3. The real question, then, hinges on the analysis of the Socialist party. If the SP is defined as a bourgeois party, then the vote for Mitterrand would be a vote for a bourgeois candidate. The whole policy of revolutionary militants during the electoral period would have had to be modified in line with that definition. But this is not the analysis of the United Secretariat—or of the Tenth World Congress in its document on Europe. The French Socialist party remains a reformist workers party (or, as Lenin said, a bourgeois workers party). And this constitutes the nub of the analysis.

4. To be sure, the *desire* for an alliance with sectors of the bourgeoisie was many, many times reaffirmed during the election campaign by Mitterrand, the SP, and the CP. This desire was concretized in the form of the appeals put out to the Chaban voters between the first and second rounds. That is why one of the axes of the FCR campaign was denunciation of the perspective of class collaboration and warning against it. But this project did not materialize, for Mitterrand and the "Union de la Gauche" are not *currently* seen by any sector of the bourgeoisie as a desirable solution to the bourgeois crisis of governmental leadership or to the social crisis. Now, to make a *plan* of class collaboration and alliance with important sectors of the bourgeoisie a determining criterion in deciding what vote revolutionary Marxists should call for in an election would amount to throwing the revolutionary Marxists into a tangle of insoluble contradictions. It can lead to a generalization of an abstentionist position, because *every* reformist Social Democratic party—and, today every Stalinist party as well—has a political line of class collaboration and has a program of alliance with sectors of the bourgeoisie. That should not make us forget that reformists, when they are in the government, do not necessarily need bourgeois ministers to practice an anti-worker, counterrevolutionary policy. For that would make light of what is the *foundation of revolutionary-Marxist policy on electoral questions: the necessity for the masses to go through the practical experience of reformism "in power" if they are to shed their bourgeois-democratic illusions* and how the *actual fact* (and not the abstract possibility) of significant sectors of the bourgeoisie entering the government (like the military figures entering the Allende government) can allow for a shift in the attitude of revolutionary-Marxist militants toward a government of reformist workers organizations.

5. That is the essence of the problem. It is not a question of saying that Mitterrand (any more than Wilson in Britain) in any way represents the *interests* of the working class or of suggesting that his policy would be "so-

cialist." On the contrary, the FCR campaign insisted on showing how much Mitterrand could not—and did not want—to break out of the framework of bourgeois society. It is enough to say that it was up to the revolutionaries to help the masses go through the indispensable experience of what they believe should be "their" government. On this point, the case of France is especially clear, almost a caricature. It is not only that a serious electoral defeat of the "left" would have weighed very negatively on the relationship of forces between the classes. It is that for the first time since 1958 (and, for the CP, since 1947) workers parties could have been endowed with governmental responsibilities. *The only alternative to a Mitterrand vote on the second round was a call for abstention, which was proposed only by the Mao-Stalinist sects. Since the abstention rate was the lowest ever, and since Giscard obtained a majority of less than one percent, the revolutionaries would have been seen very concretely as the ones responsible for stopping the working class from going through the experience of reformism in power, of the reformist road to socialism, and of having been "neutral" in a confrontation between the whole organized working class under reformist leadership on the one side and the totality of parties representing the bourgeoisie on the other side.*

6. The FCR's electoral tactic falls completely within the logic of the one Lenin proposed to the Communists of Great Britain in "Left-wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder." In fact, the union of bourgeois political forces around Giscard d'Estaing was greater than that ever assembled in Great Britain. And the rallying of workers around Mitterrand was greater than the rallying of British workers to Labour candidates ever was. That a tiny handful of liberal-bourgeois politicians also joined the Mitterrand camp changes nothing in this situation. Elsewhere, Lenin explicitly mentioned the rallying of a few liberal-bourgeois politicians to the Labour party, which occurred at the beginning of the 1920s.

The vote for Mitterrand no more constitutes support to the program, political line, or class-collaborationist plans of the leaders of the French SP and CP than the vote for the Hendersons and Snowdens in 1921 implied support to the same sort of program of the social-patriotic and social-imperialist traitors of that era. (Lenin noted that the Labour leaders preferred an alliance with bourgeois parties and that this in itself was not at all sufficient for Communists not to vote for them). The Mitterrand vote has but one function: to create better tactical conditions for a greater section of the masses, who still partially hold reformist illusions (the fault of the Stalinist leaders); thus enabling them more rapidly to divest themselves of these illusions and to begin to accept the alternative, revolutionary solution.

According to the results of the first round, there are in France today 12 million workers who hold partial reformist illusions, and nearly one million workers who no longer do. The central problem for revolutionaries is to convince these 12 million workers of the pernicious character of these illusions. That can be accomplished only on the basis of experience and of common battles in prac-

tice, and not on the exclusive or principal basis of abstract propaganda against coalition with any bourgeois politician.

If these one million workers had abstained on the second round, that is, if they had declared themselves indifferent and neutral in the conflict between Mitterrand and Giscard, thus in practice identifying the reformist leader of the organized workers movement with the political chief of the united bourgeoisie, the differentiation and progression of political consciousness among the masses of workers influenced by reformism would have been retarded. By calling for a vote for Mitterrand, all the while expressing the indispensable criticism and suspicion of his political program, the FCR on the contrary created the tactical conditions needed for a more rapid break with reformist illusions. It goes without saying that, had Mitterrand been elected, and had he included bourgeois ministers in his cabinets, the revolutionaries would have called for their removal.

The references to Trotsky's analyses on the Spanish Popular Front within which only the "shadow of the bourgeoisie" was present, are totally off the mark. Trotsky spoke in these terms when referring to the Popular Front after Franco's coup d'etat (before this coup, one of the main bourgeois parties had been supporting the Popular Front), that is, after the workers had formed their own organs of dual power, after they had armed themselves, and after they had occupied and taken over the management of the factories and the large agricultural enterprises.

Under these conditions, when the immediate problem at hand was the opposition between the embryonic workers power and the program of re-establishing the bourgeois state, the counterrevolutionary role of the CP, the SP, and their allies was ideologically justified by the presence of the "shadow of the liberal and 'anti-fascist' bourgeoisie" within the republican government.

The situation in France today is totally different. There are scarcely any organs of workers power. The bourgeois state is not being reconstructed but is still solidly standing. The workers do not have to be led back to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; they still believe in it in large part. Under these conditions, to allow the reformist experiment to go into effect through the election of Mitterrand would mean allowing the class consciousness of the majority of the working class to advance. It would not mean complicity in a catastrophic retreat of this consciousness, as in Spain after July 1936.

7. The essential condition for calling for a vote for a reformist candidate is that the revolutionaries maintain their total independence of propaganda and agitation and that this independence be utilized. This is what the FCR did with all the means at its disposal by running Alain Krivine on the first round and by waging a revolutionary campaign aimed at organizing distrust of Mitterrand. The two vote recommendations—for a revolutionary candidate on the first round, for Mitterrand on the second round—were fully justified, both from the standpoint of the general revolutionary-Marxist policy on electoral matters and from the standpoint of the concrete political situation that existed in France.

## APPENDIX V: CORRESPONDENCE—The Publication of World Congress Documents and the Course Followed by the Majority Since the World Congress

April 8, 1974.

New York, N. Y.  
April 15, 1974

Dear Joe,

I hope you have in the meantime received the Argentine resolution (Mary-Alice already confirmed reception of the Bolivian one).

We have received your corrected contributions on Argentina and Bolivia, as well as your corrected counter-report on armed struggle in Latin-America.

The minority contribution on Argentina and Bolivia remains unacceptable for publication in public magazines, in our opinion. It is essentially polemic, and raises a great number of issues to which the majority position is not known. It would entail, if published, at the very least a simultaneous publication of several discussion articles by the majority to make positions on both sides understandable to the reader; such a widening of the special world congress issue of the magazines transforms it into a book, which corresponds neither to the purpose of world congress documents publication nor to our present needs and possibilities.

As to the minority counter-report on armed struggle in Latin-America, we see no objection to publishing it in the special issue of the magazines devoted to the world congress documents:

(a) provided we publish too comrade Roman's report;

(b) we cut in the minority counter-report the first and the final two paragraphs, which deal with matters which have nothing to do with Latin-America and on which again the majority position is therefore not clear to readers. I would add that the way in which the final two paragraphs (as well as the first one!) is phrased, creates in addition, in our opinion, a grave security problem which we should eliminate.

It goes without saying that we shall carefully go through comrade Roman's report too, and eliminate any extraneous matter not dealing with Latin-America from that report equally.

Please let us know as early as possible whether you can agree with these short cuts in the minority report, so that we can give its translation (which is already underway) to the printer's.

We also received your revised version of the minority political counter-resolution, which is already at the printers.

We are sorry that the names of Vincent R. Dunne and Connie Weissman were omitted from the list of comrades who died since the 9th world congress. We apologize for this error, the origin of which we can't understand, as these names were included in the minutes on which the drafting of the communiqué was based. We shall correct it in the magazines.

Since the beginning of March, we haven't received "Avanzada Socialista". Is this due to something which happened with the paper, or with the mail, or what?

Fraternally yours,  
s/Ernest

Dear Ernest,

I received the copy of the resolution on Argentina on April 11. In the same mail I also received your letter of April 8. Mary-Alice is answering some of the points you ask about, and I am sending separately a few notations on a couple of words in the photocopy of the manuscript that were not legible or spots where the sequence was not clear. Please let us know about these as soon as possible as we have begun the translation into English.

Meanwhile I would like to take up two points in the resolution that in my opinion call for urgent attention.

1. The resolution on Argentina includes a public attack on the PST and what is called "morenoism." The reference to "morenoism" is incomprehensible to me and I am sure will be incomprehensible to most readers of the world Trotskyist press. That the authors of the resolution view it as something bad can be gathered from its being coupled with "posadasism"—whatever that is. The linkage smacks of innuendo and is not far removed from the technique of the amalgam, neither of which belong to the school of Trotskyism, as you well know.

The arguments used in the attack on the PST are fallacious, being based on exaggerations, malicious half-truths, and outright misrepresentations. These arguments, characteristic of the most vulgar level of deadend factionalism, were answered in various documents during the discussion preparatory to the world congress and again at the congress itself in such a definitive way that one would think all responsible leaders of the international would join in blocking any new attempt to revive them.

I hope that on these grounds alone you will agree that it would be best to remove the attack on the PST from the resolution.

There are even more serious considerations that ought to be weighed. The PST was among thirteen groups in countries where splits had occurred that came under the provisions of the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International." These included groups in Spain, Mexico, Australia, etc. The formula eliminated any value judgments on the groups. Under that agreement, a considerable organizational concession was made to the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency; namely, not to designate the PST as a section despite its size, its record of faithful adherence to the program of Trotskyism, and its activities in the class struggle in Argentina.

To now single out the PST for a special "explanation" constitutes a gross violation by the Majority Tendency of the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International." In my opinion, the violation is so flagrant as to amount to a unilateral repudiation of that agreement.

This ought to be reason enough to drop the point from the resolution.

\* \* \*

It should be added that a public attack of this kind leveled against a sector of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction constitutes an attack against the faction as a whole. If the attack is not removed from the resolution, it will, as I see it, leave the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction with no alternative but to reply in public.

As you will most likely agree, these are strong reasons for the Majority Tendency to drop the public attack on the PST from the resolution.

2. The account given in the resolution on Argentina of the reasons that persuaded the delegates at the Ninth World Congress to recognize the PRT (Combatiente) as the official section in Argentina does not conform with the facts. You, of course, were not a member of the commission that met on this question and that reported its findings back to the delegates. However, as I remember it, you were present at the session where the report was made. If you don't recall the details, you can check it out with others.

In my personal opinion, this account in the resolution constitutes a falsification of the record. If it were published, I do not see how any responsible comrade who attended that congress and who recalled the report of the commission could help but feel morally obligated to state publicly what the facts were.

I hope that in view of this reaction, you will do your utmost to persuade the leadership of the Majority Tendency to reconsider these two points and eliminate them from the final draft of the resolution.

Nonetheless I can't help but express pessimism over the chances that the majority of the leaders of the Majority Tendency will reverse themselves on these two points. It is my impression that the two points were included in the resolution because of a provocative orientation that appears to have been adopted by the Majority Tendency immediately after the congress; namely, to increase tensions in the international to the point of destroying comradely working relations with the various minority tendencies.

This course is the opposite of the one adopted by the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, which it announced at the congress and which was confirmed at a subsequent faction conference; that is, to do everything possible to relax tensions in the Fourth International in the postcongress period and to work in a comradely way so as to provide the Majority Tendency with the maximum opportunity to test its line in practice.

The public attack on the PST and thereby the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, which has been included in the draft of the resolution on Argentina, obviously dovetails with the decision to give the minority only token representation on the United Secretariat and to exclude it from the Bureau unless it meets arbitrary specifications laid down by the Majority Tendency as to its representatives. The immediate effect of thus converting the Bureau into the organ of a faction was to heighten tensions, as you are aware.

Finally, it appears to me that the arguments you use in your April 8 letter against publishing the documents of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction on Argentina and Bolivia, even in an edited version, would seem to be inspired by the same general motivation.

You contend, for instance, that the two contributions raise "a great number of issues to which the majority

position is not known." But this flies in the face of the fact that the positions of the Majority Tendency are detailed in its resolutions. The positions, moreover, are stated with definite targets in mind (the attacks being masked by eliminating direct references to the opposing positions). In addition, the versions of the two documents that we proposed be made public along with the documents of the Majority Tendency were edited in such a way as to include only references to public documents written by members of the IECMT (with possibly an exception or two that could hardly be objectionable). The main thread of the argumentation in the two edited documents of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction concerns precisely the question of "armed struggle" that is dealt with in some detail in the Majority Tendency resolutions, especially the one on Argentina.

In the light of these considerations don't you agree that it would be in the best interests of the Fourth International as a whole to make these edited documents available in the same issue in which the key documents of the Majority Tendency are made available? Wouldn't this present a much more balanced and rounded picture of the deliberations and decisions of the congress? Wouldn't this constitute proof of the capacity of the Fourth International to conduct a vigorous internal debate, thereby increasing its attractiveness to radicalizing layers of the workers and youth?

As to your proposal to publish the report by Comrade Roman, this is acceptable *provided that his arguments and examples are not altered*. To publish a highly altered version could make the counterreport seem to have little connection with what was actually said. After all, it was in reply to a report that *was* made.

I do not understand your reasons for wanting to eliminate the first and the last two paragraphs in the edited counterreport. You say that they deal with matters not connected with Latin America and on which the majority position would therefore not be clear to readers. But they deal with a theme and with arguments that were presented at the congress.

You say in addition that a security problem is involved. I am, of course, not opposed to security editing; however, I fail to see what the problem is concretely. Perhaps you could take this up with Comrade Johnson at the next United Secretariat meeting or before if possible.

Fraternally yours,  
s/Joe

\* \* \*

April 30, 1974

Dear Joe,

This is to confirm the oral acknowledgment of, and answer to, your letters of April 15 and 16, given to Mary-Alice on April 21. As I had to leave that same evening on a previously planned lecture tour in Britain, I was unable to write this confirmation before my return to Brussels, and asked Mary-Alice to inform you immediately about the contents of my reply.

Contrary to what you assume in your April 15 letter, we are ready to drop from the publicly circulated version of the resolution on Argentina adopted by the Xth World Congress all criticisms made of the P. S. T. We

propose to put just suspension marks in point 22, and to replace point 36 with the following sentence: "Point 36 of this resolution concerning the orientation of the PST is published in an Internal Bulletin".

Likewise we are ready to change the passage of the resolution which indicates the reasons why the PRT (Combatiente) was recognized as official section of the FI at the IXth World Congress. We propose the following sentence which seems in strict conformity with the record: "The IXth World Congress recognized the PRT (Combatiente) as representing the continuity of the Argentine section of the FI, because it spoke in the name of a national congress convened by the majority of the previously united section's Central Committee, whereas a minority of that Central Committee, which constituted the "La Verdad" group, refused to recognize the authority of that congress". Is this formula acceptable to you?

However, precisely in the light of our dropping all public criticism of the PST—whose policies we strongly disagree with, which we consider on several key issues in open breach with leninist principles, and which were condemned by the majority vote of the Xth World Congress—two conclusions become obvious:

1.-The publication, either of your revised version of the article "Argentina, Bolivia, a Balance-Sheet", or of the final two paragraphs of the minority's counter-report on armed struggle, is totally unacceptable to us (With regard to the first paragraph, a few words' change, as indicated to Mary-Alice, could make publication possible). Both these texts contain sharp attacks on our Bolivian section, on our British section, on our Spanish comrades, attacks which, as you so aptly describe, are fallacious, being based on exaggerations, malicious half-truths and outright misrepresentation. These arguments, characteristic of the most vulgar level of deadend factionalism, were answered in various documents during the discussion preparatory to the world congress and again at the congress itself in such a definitive way, that one would think all responsible leaders of the International would join in blocking any new attempt to revive them.

We would consider any publication of such attacks for public circulation as a public attack on the majority tendency of the F. I. and a public attack upon the decisions of the world congress itself. This would leave us no choice but to print also in public the various answers such attacks have already received in the internal bulletins of the pre-world-congress discussion, as well as additional replies they make necessary.

It strikes us as really inadmissible that you make such a strong case against publishing criticism of the PST adopted by the World Congress, and then calmly go on requesting the right to publish public criticism of a whole series of organizations of the FI supporting the majority. Such double standards are certainly not favorable to a decrease of tensions in the International.

2.-The resolution on Argentina was adopted by the world congress. The criticism on Moreno's past and present policies were not something subrepticiously introduced into that resolution at the last minute, but were part of the original draft, at least in its general line. They had been widely discussed in the world movement. It is therefore impermissible to suppress them from the record. If we can agree that they should not be *publicly* circulated—and this only on the basis of a general rule that all

polemics against sections and sympathizing organizations should not be made part of the public record of the Xth World Congress—they have however to be included in the internal minutes of the 10th World Congress.

We note with surprise that, simultaneously with requesting the suppression of these passages from the publicly circulating version of the resolution on Argentina, you rushed ahead publishing the world congress minutes, without including these nonpublished parts of the resolution on Argentina which you want us to suppress for the general public. Thus you put the leadership of the FI before the dilemma of either to go ahead with the publication in the magazines of these segments of the resolution on Argentina (thereby sharing responsibility in increasing internal tensions in the movement), or to become party to a falsification of the record of what actually was voted at the 10th world congress.

We cannot accept such a dilemma. We shall therefore include in the French and other language versions of the minutes those parts of the resolution on Argentina which are not published in the magazines of the movement.

We also believe that it was unwise on your side to just send us a copy of the minority faction's statement to be included in the world congress minutes, and then immediately to go ahead and print it, without new consultation of the Center. You explicitly asked for the right to make a statement *in reply* to the majority statement, and to draft it only after having read that statement. Yet you deny the majority the right to reply to your own statement. We are back at the use of double standards, which are unacceptable to us.

We therefore insist upon the right of the majority tendency to make a short reply to the minority faction's statement, a reply which will only concentrate on disputed facts. We are quite ready to grant you the right to make a like rebuttal, provided it keeps to a short statement of similar length. All this should be included in the same record, as should be the statement on the miners strike in Britain, the Chilean repression, the solidarity with the Greek students and workers, which the IEC was empowered to make in the name of the Congress,

In order to avoid new additional confusion and endless recrimination on these matters, we see no other possibility than to ask you to reprint a *complete* version of the minutes in English, including a clear indication that the previous version was incomplete, be it through no fault of the editors. We are sorry if this involves additional costs, but we are not responsible for this. May we remind you that you requested, and were granted, a similar procedure of reprinting a whole internal pre-world-congress discussion bulletin already published in French (the minority's draft resolution on China), only because some minor editing changes, which could have easily been reprinted in a subsequent bulletin, had not been introduced into your original draft which, in good faith, we had considered to be a definitive one? Surely, as the present matter involves a problem much more important than that previous one—i.e. the matter of not falsifying the record of what the world congress actually voted on Argentina—you will accept this request of ours.

We agree to include comrade Pepe's letter on the March 1974 Un. Secr. minutes as annex to the April 1974 minutes, with a short reply by the Bureau which is responsible for editing the minutes. To our knowledge, there

are no major changes in the printed text of cde. Roman's report as compared to his oral presentation; the only possible changes are editorial and very minor ones.

We do not agree with your interpretation of the reasons why, after the world congress, and contrary to the expressed intentions of *both* tendencies, there has been a sudden increase in tension. We believe that the responsibility for that increased tension lies squarely on the shoulders of the minority. The refusal to engage its main leaders in the international leadership, and the delay in regularizing its normal participation in the material effort to have a stronger center functioning—a decision specifically adopted by the world congress—could only be interpreted by the majority as shirking a major responsibility which it was dutybound to undertake.

We have made it clear many times during the pre-congress discussion and during the congress, that for us the main test for the minority would come after the congress. After having demanded and obtained a volume of internal discussion which, qua duration, cadres involved and resources spent, goes far beyond anything which a revolutionary movement of our size ever did in the past, including the past of Lenin's party itself, the formal ending of the discussion by a majority vote at a democratically convened and elected congress has to imply that thereupon, for a whole period, the stress would be laid upon public activity of party building, along the line of the majority, and that the greatest part of cadres and resources would be devoted to that task.

We understood that the main spokesman for the minority confirmed that common understanding of democratic centralism in his concluding speech at the congress. We expected actions to confirm these intentions. When we however noticed that the minority designated for participation in the leadership bodies of the FI *not a single one* of its previous representatives in the United Secretariat, and *not a single* of its reporters at the world congress, we could not but have serious doubts as to the willingness of the minority to apply its own expressed intentions. When we read your speech delivered before the minority faction caucus in New York of March 12, 1974, we see therein confirmation that you have had second thoughts as to the possibility of applying the normal rules of democratic centralism inside a united world movement, second thoughts which have no relation whatsoever to any "provocative" act of the majority but which are clearly of a political nature, as you say so quite openly. As they turn around a political document which was known to you for months prior to the world congress and which the spokesman of the minority knew (and knew to have been voted) when he made his concluding speech at the World Congress, it seems to us that powerful pressure was brought to bear upon him inside his faction to change his course towards a decrease of tensions, and that these pressures unfortunately have already born fruits.

It is neither a question of the absolute number of minority representatives on the United Secretariat (we made it clear many times that we were quite ready to increase that number, provided the minority designated its real leaders to that body) not a question of the formal right of the minority to designate its own representatives on leadership bodies. It is a question of what is implied by the choice the minority has made of its representatives.

For us, it implies a shirking, if not a refusal, to share normal responsibility at leadership level.

We repeat that for us this is the main test: whether the minority is willing to take its share of responsibility in leading cadres and material resources in the leadership of the International, along the line adopted at the 10th world congress. A refusal to do this means, in our eyes, a retreat from Trotsky's concept of an international organization, in the direction of the concept of a loose federation of tendencies or factions. It would imply that the world congress votes and decisions become void of any practical implications for the minority. This would, from the point of view of the majority, degrade the pre-world-congress discussion to the level of exercises of an international debating club. This is not and will never be our concept of building the F.I., and we shall not accept it.

The proposal announced to us at the last United Secretariat meeting of having comrades Pepe, Crandall and Williams nominated as members of the United Secretariat is at last a step in the right direction, of correcting the mistake made by the minority in selecting its representatives in that body from the exclusive point of view of factional convenience and not from the point of view of building the F.I. We accept these proposals. The nomination of comrade Arturo however we cannot accept. It goes against the 10th World Congress agreement. There never was any question of consultative United Secretariat members, all the more so as all IEC members (including consultative ones) have the statutory right to be present at United Secretariat meetings anyway (but not at the Center's expense). You yourself did not envisage such a novel interpretation of the 10th World Congress agreement, as you yourself abstained from nominating a representative of your faction's strongest component to the United Secretariat, at the IEC meeting immediately following the world congress.

On the question of the composition of the Bureau we cannot change our position. It is the duty of the minority to show its willingness to participate in the day-to-day leadership of the International by delegating at least one of its key political leaders to such a function. We are perfectly ready to include comrades Johnson and Martinez also among Bureau members, as soon as that additional nomination occurs.

However, to indicate our good will, we are ready to involve comrades Johnson and Martinez—as well as comrade Josephina as a technical assistant—immediately in the day-to-day work as members of the leadership team which does the actual Bureau work, on a full-time basis, provided the resources of the Center are increased (on our present resources we would be unable to do so), and provided this increase is not limited to exactly covering the expenses of the minority members of leading bodies (wages plus traveling expenses) but includes a reasonable contribution to support the activities of the international center.

Relaxation of tensions could be instantaneous, as soon as we receive adequate proof that the minority respects the general spirit and letter of international democratic centralism rules. After a long period of democratic internal debate, it should now be ready to take a share in the responsibility and costs of building the FI along the line adopted by majority vote at the world congress. We hope that it will live up to this test and that we shall

be able to utilize the increased opportunities for strengthening our International in the coming months and years by a common effort.

Fraternally yours,  
s/Ernest

\* \* \*

May 21, 1974

Dear Ernest,

To begin with, I'll take up the proposals in your April 8 letter, which you discussed with Comrade Waters, on the counterreport on armed struggle in Latin America.

I still do not see how it is possible to conclude that a "security" question is involved in either the first paragraph, or the last two paragraphs of the counterreport. The argumentation is of a programmatic nature. The specific references clearly concern program.

In the first paragraph, your point seems to be that a reference to areas outside of Latin America entails a "security" question. I think that is invalid. Comrade Roman, whose report you must have approved before he gave it, ranged far beyond Latin America. And in the debate in the preceding years, you yourself took the lead in going beyond Latin America in seeking points of support for your position. How can you now suddenly invoke "security" considerations?

Similarly in the last two paragraphs, the specific references involve in the one instance positions taken *publicly* by leaders or members of the International Executive Committee Majority. If "security" was violated, it was surely violated in voicing such views publicly. (They were also stated at the congress by delegates who were members of the IECMT.) In the second instance, the specific references are to the logical implications of your position on armed struggle. It is inadmissible to brand one's calling attention to this as a violation of "security."

I therefore disagree on making any changes in these paragraphs that would alter the *substance* of what I said.

Within that framework, I am willing to consider rephrasing the paragraphs so as to remove any possible misinterpretations. I propose the following.

Change the first paragraph to read:

"To properly judge the resolution that has been placed before the congress, and in particular the arguments made by Comrade Roman, the reporter for the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency, who went beyond Latin America—citing events elsewhere in the world—to bolster his arguments on the "programmatic clarification" offered by the resolution, it is necessary to consider the document in relation to the position on this question held by the Fourth International since it was founded in 1938."

Change the last two paragraphs to read as follows:

"We come to another very important point. The resolution on 'armed struggle' opens the way to all kinds of deviations of the most dangerous kind. For example, the leaders of the International Executive Committee Majority Tendency may contend that it has no connection with their position on armed struggle in Latin America, yet members of their tendency in Spain hailed the assassination of Carrero Blanco, and the *Red Weekly* of

January 11, 1974, published a headline: 'Spanish Trotskyists give total support to Carrero Blanco assassination.' Naturally, no Trotskyists were involved in that assassination. The declarations of support, however, involved the most serious departure from the *programmatic* position of the world Trotskyist movement on armed struggle.

"I said that this resolution marks the completion of the turn adopted at the Ninth World Congress, the turn toward guerrilla war. This is not quite accurate. It can also be said to have opened a new stage. If adopted, it would place the Fourth International in a rather ignominious position—standing on the sidelines hailing the "minority violence" committed by others. Could this position be maintained for long? I don't think so. The pressure would mount to go still further in departing from the programmatic position of Trotskyism on this question. I hope that the comrades will draw back from this road before it is too late. If they do not, our movement will face the most disastrous consequences. To turn resolutely away from this fatal perspective, the resolution on armed struggle must be defeated."

I have two other very small changes in the manuscript that do not involve any "security" question. It is the insertion of the adjective "older" in two places in the third to the last paragraph. The two first sentences would then read as follows:

"And sadly enough, some of the older leaders of the Fourth International, rather than seeking to overcome the ultraleft bias of these new recruits, bent to the pressure. As in the way they handled the non-Trotskyist PRT in Argentina, these older leaders drifted."

With regard to the points you raise in your letter of April 30, I would offer the following comments:

1. In taking out the public attacks on the PST contained in your resolution on Argentina, which are concentrated mostly in point 36, you propose something that is hardly acceptable. Your formula of a footnote saying, "Point 36 of this resolution concerning the orientation of the PST is published in an Internal Bulletin," publicizes the *subject matter* dealt with in the point and thereby raises a series of questions that remain unanswered. It would seem preferable to simply renumber the points from 36 in the resolution, eliminating any need for a footnote.

2. The sentence you propose as a summary of the stand taken by the 1969 world congress on recognition of the PRT (Combatiente) appears to me to be inadequate and therefore misleading. The view that the PRT (Combatiente) represented "the continuity" of the Argentine section of the Fourth International was challenged by Comrade Moreno. He pointed specifically to the anti-Trotskyist positions expressed in *El Unico Camino Hasta el Poder Obrero y el Socialismo*.

The reporter for the majority assured the delegates that the positions expressed in that pamphlet *did not represent the views of the leadership of the PRT (Combatiente)*. This assurance served to eliminate political considerations and to narrow the question down to a quantitative level. As you will no doubt recall, it was virtually impossible, in the underground conditions then prevailing in Argentina, to determine who actually held a majority. The delegates at the 1969 world congress found it extremely



difficult to come to a decision. The balance finally tilted in favor of the PRT (Combatiente) because the Argentine delegates at the congress acknowledged its claim of having held a slim majority on the Central Committee when the split occurred in the Argentine section. The underground conditions made it impossible to ascertain the circumstances under which this majority was obtained.

I think that if an assessment is to be made of the decision of the Ninth World Congress on this question, the difficulty of determining who actually held a majority should be indicated. In all objectivity, too, the correctness of Comrade Moreno's warning as to the political positions of the PRT (Combatiente) ought to be acknowledged. He and Comrade Andres were the only ones at the congress to state where the PRT (Combatiente) really stood and what could be expected from it. It was unfortunate that they were not listened to more attentively.

As you can see, this is not at all a question of "linguistics" as you suggest in your letter of May 7, but of the objective truth concerning the decisions at the Ninth World Congress. A "self-criticism" concerning the PRT (Combatiente) that left this out, or, still worse, distorted what happened at the Ninth World Congress would certainly call for public rectification.

3. In my opinion, your reasons for rejecting publication of the edited versions of our resolutions on Bolivia and Argentina do not stand up very well. Your main argument is that they consist of "sharp attacks" on sections.

This is simply not so. They contain sharp attacks on the guerrilla orientation adopted at the Ninth World Congress. The two countries cited deal with the application of that line. Here the whole point is that the comrades of the two sections carried out the line to the best of their ability. They faithfully applied the line, and it turned out in practice to be disorienting. The disasters in Bolivia and Argentina were consequences of applying the general line adopted at the Ninth World Congress.

We offered our balance sheet on Argentina and Bolivia not out of a desire to "attack" the sections in those countries; but because it was precisely in these countries that the line was tested in *practice*.

Thus in refusing to publish our resolutions on Bolivia and Argentina on the grounds that they consist of nothing but "sharp attacks" on sections, you deny the right of members or supporters of the Fourth International to utilize the *criterion of practice* in judging the worth of a line adopted by a world congress, or at least to publish conclusions based on use of that criterion. That denial is totally unacceptable. To acquiesce in it would mean converting the Fourth International into a debating club that banned all concrete questions.

In rereading these resolutions, I will grant that what is said about the Bolivian comrades participating in the FRA is sharp. Here they carried the guerrilla orientation to extraordinary lengths. But does criticizing the involvement of the Bolivian comrades in the FRA constitute an "attack" on a section? As I see it, the criticism is an attack on a line adopted at a world congress that in practice led to such consequences. You interpret it as an attack on a section . . .

But by the same reasoning, you are then really duty bound to publish our resolution on Argentina. It does not contain a single word of criticism, let alone a "sharp

attack" on a section or sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Argentina. The resolution, for instance, does not even incorporate our criticisms of the *Fracción Roja*, although we voiced our differences with the line of these comrades in no uncertain way at the world congress in February.

Thus even if your reasoning held for rejecting publication of our resolution on Bolivia—which I do not concede—by the same criterion you have no valid reason for not publishing our resolution on Argentina.

4. I shall now make some observations on what you say in defense of what you conceive as your right to include a public attack on the PST in your resolution on Argentina. In view of your agreement not to publish the attack, it should not be necessary to say any more. But I see that you appear to view your agreement not to publish the attack as some kind of concession or sacrifice, and that this feeling crops up in some of your other points. Consequently it might prove useful to make still clearer some of the things we already called attention to.

In this instance, the attack is an attack against a section (or sympathizing organization). The selection of "Morenoism" as the political axis of your polemic is sufficient proof. In the whole debate carried on in the international for the past several years this is the only case where such a political axis has been chosen.

For instance, in considering the practical application of your guerrilla-war orientation in Bolivia, we did not raise the scarecrow of "Gonzalezism." Again in Argentina, in analyzing the disastrous course of the PRT (Combatiente) we did not resort to such designations as "San-tuchoism." And in discussing the defects of the European documents we did not describe them as manifestations of "Mandelism." To have resorted to such personalizations would have sharply increased tensions in the international, as I am sure you would be the first to recognize. You would have interpreted it under the circumstances as a deliberate decision on our part to intensify the centrifugal tendencies. How could you expect us to reason differently when we discovered that you had included an attack on "Morenoism" in a congress resolution that you proposed to make public?

Argentina and Bolivia became centers of attention in the international discussion because it was in these two countries that the guerrilla orientation adopted in 1969 was tested in practice. From that experience, the international could draw the lesson of events. The actions of the organized Trotskyist movement in these two countries were intimately involved, but aside from the practical outcome of the guerrilla orientation there was no reason to single out the sections or leaderships in these countries for assessment.

There is no denying, of course, that something could be learned from a properly weighed balance sheet of the activities and capacities of most, if not all, of the sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International. Perhaps this should be done at some congress, proceeding in alphabetical order. But this was not on the agenda at the Tenth World Congress.

Consequently your decision to single out the PST for such an assessment—one going back decades and pegged to exposing "Morenoism"—is completely out of place. You

even concentrate on the PST to the exclusion of the other two sympathizing organizations in Argentina. Moreover, your balance sheet is not fairly drawn. It omits both the difficulties of the situation, the positive achievements of the PST, and the replies to your arguments (some of which come from sources other than the PST). The conclusion is inescapable that the purpose of such a polemic is not to illustrate the concrete consequences of the application of a general international line. It thus amounts to an attack on a section—or, if you prefer, on "Morenoism." (I leave aside the possibility that the PST was chosen as a kind of "Albania" for an attack aimed in reality at another sector of the world Trotskyist movement.)

You indicate that you agree in the strongest way with this condemnation of the PST and with the arguments adduced to support the condemnation. I have no reason to doubt your sincerity in this.

But to make such an attack against the PST a matter of public record goes in violation of the nine-point agreement, a document voted for by an overwhelming majority at the congress. To publish your attack against the PST would thus violate the will of the congress.

In face of this elementary consideration, your other arguments are beside the point. You say, for instance, that your resolution "on Argentina was adopted by the world congress." You add that the "criticism of Moreno's past and present policies were not something surreptitiously introduced into that resolution at the last minute . . ."

It is true that your resolution on Argentina was adopted by the congress. The congress, however, did not vote to publish the "criticisms" of Moreno. And the fact that nothing was introduced surreptitiously means that the delegates were informed concerning your "criticisms." Hence all the less need to publish them. The decision to make them public was taken *following* the congress. It was taken by your faction.

You argue that if the "criticisms" are not publicly circulated then they should be included in the minutes of the world congress. This is a novel contention. If the "criticisms" were not surreptitiously introduced, then they are already the common property of the international. Why should they be included in the minutes? Doesn't that falsify the minutes, inasmuch as this question did not come before the delegates at the world congress?

If you merely want the members of the Fourth International to have in their possession your final edited version of the "criticisms" of Moreno, why don't you submit the text for the next issue of the internal bulletin, with democratic provisions for a reply.

5. Now as to the publication of the minutes in the form in which they appeared in English and your decision to demand their republication in a revised form.

First of all, the United Secretariat, with you present, went over the draft of the minutes and approved this draft after making various changes, all of which were incorporated in the published final draft. From what you say, I gather that you propose no further changes in the minutes themselves. What you now want is additions to the attachments, particularly in relation to the statement of your faction and our reply to it.

I think it was a mistake on your part to ask that a statement, drawn up by your faction long after the congress

and the following IEC meeting, be attached to the minutes. Its proper place, in view of what you had in mind, should have been in the internal bulletin.

Without knowing what you intended to say in your statement, we acquiesced to your request out of our general policy of doing everything possible to reduce tensions. Naturally, we reserved the right to reply, which you agreed to as a matter of course in a "package deal." Actually our reserving the right to reply was only a precautionary measure. Had your statement been in the spirit of your closing remarks at the congress, I don't think we would have bothered to make a statement of our own. When we saw your statement and realized its nature, we had, of course, no alternative but to state our own position as clearly as possible.

As you indicate in your letter, you did not like our reply. Apparently you did not think things through when you took the initiative in proposing that belated statements be attached to the minutes. You now propose that you be permitted to attach a third statement, replying to ours, to which you add: "We are quite ready to grant you the right to make a like rebuttal, provided it keeps to a short statement of similar length." And you will not want to make a rebuttal to our rebuttal?

Isn't this becoming rather ridiculous? Doesn't it tend to convert the minutes of the world congress into a semi-internal bulletin in which questions that have arisen since the world congress are injected?

I do not understand why "the statement on the miners strike in Britain, the Chilean repression, the solidarity with the Greek students and workers, which the IEC was empowered to make in the name of the Congress" should be attached to the *minutes* of the congress. The IEC referred the question of drawing up the statements to the United Secretariat. All that had to be done was to issue the statements and *publish* them in the name of the world congress. What is the reason for taking statements, presumably published by all the main journals of the sections and sympathizing organizations, and attaching them to the minutes? Do we have to go to such lengths to make ourselves look absurd?

6. With regard to the very bad drift now observable in the international toward increased tensions, I note what you say about my concluding speech at the world congress on the desirability of lowering tensions in order to help maintain the unity of the movement and your supposition "that powerful pressure was brought to bear" on me to change my course, "and that these pressures unfortunately have already borne fruits."

But I have not changed my position. You overlook the fact that in not being in the majority I am not in position to decide the policy of the majority; I can only hope to influence the majority to act responsibly. The present state of affairs is the responsibility of the majority leadership. It is enough to list the main facts to prove that.

Your first move following the congress could hardly have been better calculated to counteract a reduction of tensions. This came at the IEC meeting where the incoming majority leadership announced its factional decisions on the makeup of the leading bodies.

First of all, you limited the representation of the minority unnecessarily. It was your *right* to do this, of course;

but you thereby eliminated seven of our ten nominations, including five top leaders of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, among them four former representatives on the United Secretariat and three of our reporters at the world congress.

Secondly, you made arbitrary demands as to the composition of that representation, denying the Leninist Trotskyist Faction the right to freely choose its own representatives. That was not your right.

I took the floor at that IEC meeting to argue—within the framework of what I had said at the closing session of the congress—that the majority was not displaying political wisdom in opening its stewardship in such a factional and highly ultimativistic way.

No one in the majority seemed to pay much attention to what I had to say. My impression was that it had been decided in caucus to discount in advance whatever I might say. The same attitude seemed to have been adopted toward the other leaders of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction who took the floor to explain what difficulties were created by your postcongress ultimatum, particularly in relation to the problem of reducing tensions.

Despite the attitude displayed by the majority in organizing the incoming leadership, we still sought to follow the policy of seeking to lower tensions that we had announced at the close of the congress. Apparently our stand convinced the majority of your caucus that it was advisable to at least make a tactical shift, and we were granted a few weeks time to work out the problems we had been confronted with by the imposition of your formula on the composition of our representation.

During these weeks we managed to arrange for four leaders of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction to become resident at the center. This list included a figure like Martinez. Your response was hardly conducive to reducing tensions. You rejected our list out of hand and went ahead to set up a bureau consisting solely of members of your own faction.

You are still following the same provocative policy. When we submitted a list of four comrades for positions on the United Secretariat, you rejected Comrade Arturo as not meeting your factional requirements.

Your arguments in justification of this decision are not very consistent. On page 3 of your letter, forgetting our nominations that you rejected at the IEC meeting, you say that one of the reasons for your doubts about "the willingness of the minority to apply its expressed intentions" of abiding by democratic centralism was that "the minority designated for participation in the leadership bodies of the FI *not a single one* of its previous representatives in the United Secretariat, and *not a single* [one] of its reporters at the world congress. . . ." I leave aside an account, which might prove depressing, of the experiences of our "previous representatives" on the United Secretariat, and confine myself solely to the case of Comrade Arturo. The fact is that he meets one of the requirements you list—he was the minority reporter on Argentina at the world congress.

Naturally I refuse to recognize such a criterion, which has never been advanced previously by anyone in the Fourth International so far as I know. Its arbitrariness is self-evident.

What is to the point is that Comrade Arturo is one

of the central leaders of the largest sympathizing organizations in the Fourth International. He is a member of the International Executive Committee, holding a consultative vote. According to the nine-point agreement passed by the world congress, consultative members of the IEC "have the same rights as full members in everything except voting." The agreement states "*everything*" The rule is the same as for alternates on the IEC, who also hold only a consultative vote.

It is a violation of the nine-point agreement to reject Comrade Arturo's candidacy as a member of the United Secretariat. In addition, it constitutes another infringement of the right of a minority in the Fourth International to select its own representatives.

I think this is sufficient to establish where the responsibility lies for the increase in tensions inside the Fourth International that began at the IEC meeting following the world congress. The responsibility lies with the International Majority Tendency leadership, which is following a policy of stepping-up the tensions.

In one of the paragraphs on page 3 of your letter, you ascribe "second thoughts" to me on the "possibility of applying the normal rules of democratic centralism inside a united world movement" and you claim that these alleged "second thoughts" have "no relation whatsoever to any 'provocative' act of the majority" but are "clearly of a political nature. . . ."

You are wrong on this. I think it is quite possible to apply the normal rules of democratic centralism inside our movement. What we differ on is the course of action that you initiated with the postcongress IEC meeting. Neither your ultimativistic demands concerning the composition of our representation nor your violations (or threatened violations) of the nine-point agreement approved by the world congress come within the normal rules of democratic centralism.

This judgment does not at all mean that I have changed my mind as to the need, in the overall interests of the Fourth International, to lower the tensions and to follow policies designed to achieve this. I still hold the same view that I expressed in behalf of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction at the closing session of the world congress. But I also observe that such a course is not being followed by the majority leadership. The majority is, in fact, following an opposite course of exacerbating tensions.

What is the explanation for this? I do not think that it is a matter of evil intentions or of warped personalities. The explanation is to be sought on the political level. At bottom what is involved is the guerrilla-war orientation adopted by the International Majority Tendency.

I explained this at a caucus meeting of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction in New York on March 12. You indicate in your letter that you received the bulletin containing a transcript of my remarks, so there is no need to repeat that explanation here. It is sufficient to note that the pressure on the majority leadership, causing it to adopt a policy of intensifying tensions rather than reducing them, comes from the sectors of your faction who want to throw caution to the wind in making further tests of the "armed struggle" orientation.

To acknowledge these political facts of life does not alter the desirability, from the viewpoint of the interests of the Fourth International as a whole, of changing the situation. But having monopolized the leadership of the

international—aside from formal meetings of the United Secretariat—only the majority is in position to take the initiative in this. It has not done so. Thus I see no way of escaping the conclusion that the majority is defaulting in its obligation to follow a policy of reducing tensions.

Fraternally yours,  
s/Joe

\* \* \*

There was no response to, or acknowledgment of, the May 21, 1974, letter from Joe Hansen to Ernest Mändel. The May 29-30 meeting of the United Secretariat adopted the following motion by a vote of 10 for, 4 against.

*Motion on World Congress documents publication*

1) That, following a request by the minority of the United Secretariat, the public magazines of the movement which will publish the world congress documents do not include in this publication the point of the adopted resolution on Argentina which criticizes the political past and present of the PST leadership. That however this point of the resolution, which was adopted by the world congress and is therefore part of the world congress record, be included in the International Internal Bulletin containing the world congress minutes.

2) That the public magazines of the movement which will publish the world congress documents include both comrade Roman's report and comrade Juan's counter-report on armed struggle in Latin America. That we accept the new draft of the first paragraph of that counter-

report. That we do not include the last two paragraphs of that counter-report in public magazines, for obvious security reasons.

3) That we cannot accept the request of the minority to include in the publicly presented world congress documents the minority document "Argentina-Bolivia, a Balance-Sheet." In the same way as the minority considers the point of the resolution on Argentina which criticizes the past and present policies of the PST leadership as an attack against the minority as a whole, to which it threatens to answer in public if it is published, the majority of the United Secretariat considers the attacks against various sections of the F. I. contained in the said minority document as an attack against the majority as a whole, to which it would have no choice but to print a public answer if it were published. As we consider such public polemics to be detrimental to the unity, coherence and public image of our world movement, we cannot therefore grant this request of the minority.

4) That the International Internal Bulletin containing the world congress minutes also should carry a reply of the majority tendency to the minority post-world-congress statement, itself drafted in answer to the majority post-world-congress statement. That the minority has the right to include in the same bulletin a rebuttal to that reply by the majority, provided it does not exceed the length of that reply. That in view of these various additions, a new version of the International Internal Bulletin containing the world congress minutes be published in English and that all other language versions of these minutes be based upon that second English version, or the French version.

## APPENDIX VI: CORRESPONDENCE—Resources of the Socialist Workers Party and the Finances of the Fourth International

New York  
June 28, 1974

Ernest Mandel  
Brussels

Dear Comrade Mandel,

The Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party has considered the report from Comrades Johnson, Atwood and Thésèse on the discussion that took place at the May meeting of the United Secretariat under the agenda point designated as "finances." Their report raised several questions which the PC asks be clarified.

First of all, we were extremely disturbed by the character of the discussion. As you well know, the SWP is prohibited from making any financial contribution to the Fourth International by the reactionary legislation in effect in this country. Until the recent period no attempt has ever been made, even by the most bitter critics of the SWP, to take factional advantage of this situation.

However, at the last meeting of the United Secretariat, some comrades of the majority, we were told, even went so far as to make remarks like, "We're getting tired of hearing about this Voorhis Act excuse," and comments of a similar nature. Threats were made by some to bring out alleged "records" to "prove" that the SWP has in the past given cash to the Fourth International. We can only assume that such comments stem from ignorance, since obviously there have been no such contributions.

Given the irresponsible attitude of several United Secretariat members as demonstrated at the last meeting, we advised Comrade Johnson that in the future it would be incorrect for him to participate in discussions of this nature.

On the substance of the matter, it seems to us that some of the implications are quite grave.

Since the SWP is unable to affiliate with, accept financial support from, or contribute to the Fourth International, it was always understood that the SWP took responsibility for legitimate SWP expenses, such as:

1. Living and travel expenses abroad for one or more SWP leaders;
2. Travel expenses for our observers, which are extremely high because of the fact that the headquarters of the world movement is located in Europe;
3. Printing and distributing free of charge as a fraternal courtesy to the United Secretariat an English-language internal discussion bulletin (in the last year this has been expanded to include a series of Spanish-language bulletins also);

4. Postage for international bulletins printed in the U. S. A.;

5. Purchase of substantial quantities of Trotskyist literature published in the U. S. A. to facilitate its circulation at reasonable prices in colonial and semicolonial countries;

6. Assuring the regular publication of *Intercontinental Press*, politically the weekly magazine of the Fourth International.

Since these expenses come to many thousands of dollars a month (several times more than the contributions of the largest sections and sympathizing organizations) our co-thinkers in the world Trotskyist movement have always agreed with us that morally this was equivalent to what official sections of the International contributed to the work of building the world movement.

The proposal made at the May United Secretariat meeting is a unilateral reversal of this basis on which we have collaborated in the United Secretariat since reunification. The SWP leadership was given an ultimatum: we will no longer be given moral credit for expenditures that have always been accepted in the past. A small portion of expenditures will be acknowledged, if we understand the ultimatum correctly, provided we *also* agree to meet a considerable part of the daily operating expenses of the center of the Fourth International. Since this is a demand you know we cannot meet for legal reasons, why is it made? We can only assume it is for factional purposes, to poison the atmosphere in the International and lead the ranks of the International into believing that it is we and not the comrades of the United Secretariat majority who have altered the mutually agreed upon basis that has governed the way in which we have functioned for the last decade.

Since we never before had any difficulty working out problems of this nature, we can only assume you have now decided that some of the expenses covered by the above six categories are no longer considered legitimate contributions toward building the world movement. It appears that you have decided to cease acknowledging any moral credit stemming from them.

Are these assumptions on our part correct?

Comradely,

s/Barry Sheppard, Organization Secretary  
for the SWP Political Committee

## APPENDIX VII: MINUTES—Post-World-Congress Meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International

*Full members present:* Rudi, Walter, Roca, Adair, Petersen, Abel, Crandall, Roman, Fourier, Georges, Aubin, Friedrich, Karl, Mintoff, T.T. Roy, Mikado, Claudio, Fideli, Sakai, Kihaza, Jaber, Key, Martinez, Tucco, Frey, Jensen, Duret, Atwood, Barman, Celso, Galois, Johnson, Pepe, Stateman, Thérèse, Antonio

*Alternate members present:* Fred, Brewster, Williams, Fireman, Lee See, Carlos, Domingo, Sylvia, Chandra, Edgardo, Ronald, Raoul, Juan

*Control Commission members present:* Bundy, Eduard, Hoffman, Karl, Tantalus

Chair: Claudio

Agenda: 1. Election of the United Secretariat  
2. Statement on British miners strike  
3. Statement on Chile

1. *Election of United Secretariat*—Reporter Walter  
The incoming United Secretariat will differ from the pre-world congress Secretariat in two respects: 1. tendencies will be formally represented; 2. it must represent a big step in the direction of establishing a resident secretariat. The IEC majority must have a larger than proportional representation in order to have a working body. The exact number of LTF comrades can be somewhat flexible depending on finances and how many are resident.

*Proposed* that the United Secretariat be composed of 14 IMT, roughly 5 LTF, and Karl for the Kompass Tendency in the GIM.

*Nominations for the IMT:* Fourier, Georges, Roman, Domingo, X (to be designated later by Walloon section), Roca, Walter, Claudio, Jones, Ghulam, Duret, Jensen, Rudi, Mintoff

*Request* by Celso for recess to allow LTF to consider its nominations. Had prepared list of 10 nominations assuming proportional representation. Need caucus to revise list. Also asks IEC majority to caucus and in light

of discussion to reconsider decision not to have proportional representation on United Secretariat.

*Recess*

*Election of United Secretariat continued*—Reporter Celso  
In view of insistence by IEC majority on residency or ability to meet on call as central consideration in composition of United Secretariat, and not knowing exactly how many places are open to the LTF,

*Nominations for the LTF:*

if one place: Marcel (resident)

if two more: Martinez and Johnson (can be resident within six weeks)

if two more: Adair and Friedrich (resident in Europe and on call for all meetings)

if two more: Y and Z (like Walloon section, need time to consult and decide exact individuals who will try to be resident)

if three more: Celso, Pepe, Thérèse (not resident)

*Request* by Walter for recess to allow IMT to consider nominations.

*Recess*

*Motion* by Walter: to elect a United Secretariat composed of Fourier, Georges, Roman, Domingo, X, Roca, Walter, Claudio, Jones, Ghulam, Duret, Rudi, Mintoff, Karl, Marcel, Martinez, Johnson, plus two American leaders as observers (not necessarily resident but must be top leaders). To leave places for two additional American leaders as observers, if resident (but must be top leaders). If final two American observers are added, IMT will add one more member.

For: 25; Against: 16

Control Commission: For: 4, Against: 0

2. *Motion* by Celso to refer statements on British miners strike and Chile to the United Secretariat.

*Carried*

Meeting adjourned.