

INTERNAL

INFORMATION BULLETIN

November 1972

No. 5 in 1972

DOCUMENTATION ON LATIN AMERICA	Page
1. Report on Bolivia and Argentina , by Sabado and Enero	3
2 Additional Material on Bolivia	
a. Manifesto of the Frente Revolucionario Anti-Imperialista	8
b. Statement of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, February 6, 1972	9
c. Resolution by the POR(Combate) on the Frente Revolucionario Anti-Imperialista	10
d. Translation of Resolution from Bolivia	10
3. Additional Material on Argentina	
a. Revolutionists and the Democratization of the Country, Editorial from El Combatiente , May 1972	11
b. Manifesto of the PSA	13
c. Basis of Unification of the PSA-PRT(La Verdad)	17
d. Armed Struggle Is the Only Road to the Liberation of Argentina: Santucho Interview from Punto Final	21
e. Answers to Five Questions, by Mario Roberto Santucho Juarez	24
4. Material on the Sallustro Kidnapping—Public Statements	
a. Statement of the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, April 3, 1972	28
b. Press Release Issued April 13, 1972, by the Gruppi Rivoluzionari, Italian Section of the Fourth International	29
c. Statement of the Political Committee of the League for Socialist Action-Ligue Socialiste Ouvriere	29
d. Argentina: Increasing Support for Armed Struggle in Working Class, from the April 17, 1972, issue of the Red Mole	30
e. Statement from Was Tun , April 1972	32
f. Class Struggle and Armed Struggle in Argentina, from La Gauche , April 21, 1972	33
g. Neither Peron's Restraints nor Isolated Guerrilla Action—For a Fighting Program and a Socialist Pole, from Avanzada Socialista , March 29, 1972	36
5. Material on the Sallustro Kidnapping—Documents	
a. Excerpts from Minutes of the United Secretariat, April 15-16, 1972	39
b. Motion Passed by SWP National Committee Plenum	40
c. Statement by Ghulam, Livio, Petersen, Pierre, Sandor Walter, May 30-31, 1972	41

60 cents

Published by

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
14 Charles Lane, New York, N.Y. 10014

Page 2

was blank in the
original bulletin

- Marty Dec 2013

REPORT ON BOLIVIA AND ARGENTINA

By Sabado and Enero

[The information report on Bolivia and Argentina given by Peter Camejo to the May 11-14, 1972 plenum of the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party was based on the information contained in the following informational report that was drafted by Sabado and Enero on the request of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. At its meeting of February 5-6, 1972, the United Secretariat had passed the following motion: "To send Enero and Sabado to Latin America as representatives of the United Secretariat and plan to devote a major portion of the April United Secretariat meeting to report and discussion."]

BOLIVIA

The left suffered a terrible blow when the Torres regime was overthrown by the rightist military coup of General Banzer in August 1971. This coup ended the period under Torres in which the entire workers and peasants movement was able to function openly. The coup resulted in the immediate suppression of all left organizations. They were driven underground and the functioning of mass organizations became greatly curtailed.

Under the impact of this political defeat, the left in Bolivia fell into a general crisis. Many left groups have undergone splits and are in a state of disarray. Two examples of this are the MIR (Revolutionary Movement of the Left) and the PC-ML (Communist Party-Marxist-Leninist).

The MIR expressed the deep radicalization of the student movement in Bolivia. Once a sizable group, it has diminished rapidly since the Banzer coup. We understand that it is today split into four separate groups and is not really functioning as an organized current. The PC-ML, the Maoist group led by Zamora, has also undergone a crisis leading to a split. The PC-ML, like the MIR, is hardly functional. The fact that many of its leaders are now in exile adds to the general weakening of these organizations.

The major exception to this process of decline was the ELN (National Army of Liberation). Structured for underground work, the ELN was best prepared to maintain its existence after the rightist coup. However, in the early part of 1972, their clandestine apparatus in La Paz and possibly in other areas of Bolivia was apparently shattered by the repression, leaving the ELN rather weak.

Although the Moscow-oriented CP has also suffered under the repressive Banzer regime, it has not been as badly damaged as many other groups and has retained a sizable number of its leaders inside Bolivia. The POR (Lora), which has worked closely with the pro-Moscow CP, has suffered substantially. Our information is limited on the exact situation of the POR (Lora) today.

The Official Section

The POR (Gonzalez), the official section of the Fourth International, has also been hurt by the Banzer coup and its aftereffects. Today the POR is a small group. There is a small nucleus in exile which includes some

of the POR's leadership, a few rank-and-file members, and a handful of new recruits.

The sector of the POR inside Bolivia is numerically larger than the one in exile but it is unclear how organized it is. We do know that a group of about forty is functioning at least at a minimal level in La Paz. Other smaller groups may be functioning in other areas of Bolivia. Also many comrades are in prison although no exact information is available. We have an unconfirmed report that a mimeographed edition of the party's organ *Combate* has been published in La Paz.

In one mine in Bolivia, we have learned, the POR comrades, in a bloc with PC-ML, won the union elections, running against the MNR (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, which is part of the government). This report indicates that at least in some situations the Banzer regime has not sought as yet to smash the trade unions or take them over. The repression has been quite ferocious against the organized left groups but more cautious and calculating against the trade-union movement, in particular the miners. The first orientation of the government has been to manipulate the union elections and apparatus.

The comrades in exile naturally find it difficult to secure accurate concrete information about the organization inside Bolivia. Although we do not have a direct report on the thinking of the comrades in Bolivia, indirect information seems to point to general agreement between the exiles and those inside the country to orient toward armed actions as the immediate perspective. However—at least outside of Bolivia—beyond the generalization concerning armed struggle there are differences and confusion as to the current line and evaluation of the past period.

These differences find expression over such problems as the attitude to be taken toward the FRA (Revolutionary Anti-imperialist Front) and its perspectives over organizational matters, including previous methods of functioning; and over the lessons to be drawn from the past period.

A critical attitude toward the POR's past is now generally taken by all the comrades in exile. This includes key elements in the national and regional leaderships. The POR has apparently suffered difficulties due to both repression and internal problems over the past six years. At the time the organization made its turn towards guerrilla warfare, that is, in 1965-66, a significant number

of comrades left. (We learned about this only in 1972.) It appears that the majority of the Central Committee opposed the guerrilla-warfare line and left the organization. Unfortunately we do not have a clear idea of the internal differences that existed at that time. There are no documents available on the differences. Those who left the POR are reported to have either dropped out of political activity or to have joined the reformist Socialist Party of Bolivia, which is led by a person who served as a cabinet minister under the Barrientos dictatorship. This split involved about thirty comrades.

After this rupture, which took place approximately in 1967, the internal organizational problems continued. The POR lost members to the ELN sporadically over the past period. This was the result of various factors.

The POR did not hold a convention after the 1965-66 period, nor did its formal Central Committee meet. Although it differentiated itself from the ELN, there tended to be some confusion over the exact differences. This was compounded by the fact that—unlike the ELN—the POR, after it adopted the line of guerrilla warfare, did not carry it out in practice.

The ELN had the official endorsement of the Cuban leadership. This added to the generally unfavorable relationship of forces between the two groups. The lack of political clarity within the POR helped to increase the attractiveness of the ELN to the ranks of the POR. By way of example some comrades informed us that all except two of the POR comrades who visited Cuba quit the Fourth International and joined the ELN.

Although the POR did not engage concretely in guerrilla warfare and therefore did not receive the attention or fame of the ELN, it suffered the repression aimed at the guerrilla movement. The result was that in the period between 1967 and the creation of the Torres regime in 1970, the POR was weakened, because of the repression, to the point that for a while it did not exist as a structured organization.

The POR began to recover while Ovando was in power, and after the Torres regime was established in the battles of October 1970, it was able to reorganize and grow.

Under the Torres government the POR maintained its line of guerrilla warfare. It carried out work in the trade unions and some general propaganda, publication of its newspaper, etc. In the food-workers union in La Paz, in some mines, and among peasants near La Paz it made headway in mass work. The POR also recruited some students and strengthened its apparatus outside the capital in various provincial cities.

Although blocked by the reformists, including the POR (Lora), from participation in the Popular Assembly as a party, the growth of the POR reflected itself in its having six POR members elected to the assembly as individuals. They were well-known as POR members. The POR (Lora), which put priority on work in the Popular Assembly, had only five delegates.

However, membership in the party seems to have been ambiguous, sometimes including sympathizers or the personal following of local POR leaders involved in mass organizations.

During this period in trying to create groups for armed actions, the POR reflected this ambiguous membership, bringing into the party persons who do not consider themselves Trotskyists and are not in political agreement with the party's program but willing to struggle.

The POR's analysis estimated correctly that the Torres regime would not last long and that a rightist coup would take place. They held that the rightist coup could not be stopped but that after its triumph armed struggle would develop with mass support.

In spite of their prediction of the coup, it caught them totally unprepared, resulting in general disorganization of the party.

Looking back over the Torres period, the Bolivian comrades tend to be critical, believing they should have concentrated more on armed struggle.

We do not, however, have a written evaluation of the Torres period and the Popular Assembly by the Bolivian comrades. (An analysis has been submitted by Anibal Lorenzo from the PRT(Verdad) for the internal International Discussion Bulletin. Hopefully the Bolivians and others will also contribute their evaluations.)

As mentioned, all the Bolivian comrades are in agreement that the correct strategy for the present is to initiate armed actions. They are also in agreement that the Banzer regime should be characterized as "fascist."

Beyond these two points, their positions diverge. Some of the younger members are in strong opposition to the POR's participation in the FRA. They believe that the FRA is a multiclass, unprincipled bloc that includes bourgeois forces through the participation of the section of the army that defended Torres and the Socialist Party. (Torres has recently resigned from the FRA.) They believe the FRA statement, calling for the formation of a national government, was not an accident but indicates that the basic program of the FRA is class-collaborationist, and that the FRA can only lead to a repetition of the disastrous Torres regime. These comrades believe the FRA helps cover up for the reformist and trade-union bureaucrats who betrayed the revolution. They think it rather unlikely that the left wing of the FRA (they include in this the PC-ML, ELN, POR, and possibly others who favor starting armed struggle) can become the dominant force. They agree with the statement of the United Secretariat criticizing the POR's signing of the reformist FRA statement.

The Cubans have made it clear that they support the FRA and that their attitude toward all groups will be determined by their relationship to the FRA. Within the FRA it is the small sector of the regular military forces who defended Torres, led by a former major of the army, Sanchez, whom the Cubans favor for the leadership of the movement.

Some of the Bolivian comrades, mainly the older leaders, believe the FRA to be a working-class front but of a *sui generis* nature. They agree with the United Secretariat that the FRA's original statement reflected a reformist political line but consider that it is correct for the POR to remain in the FRA. They believe that the FRA is organized to initiate armed struggle and that in the process of the struggle itself the reformist wing will leave the FRA. They favor building the FRA. This is the line presented up to now in the POR's organ *Combate* published in exile.

The position of opposition to the FRA is supported by a majority of the comrades in exile. They are still discussing the matter and have projected a public statement in agreement with the United Secretariat's criticism. However the POR is still a member of the FRA.

Summary

Although weakened, the POR still exists. It is united in its agreement to initiate armed actions but is not in a position to do so. Its ranks are small, disorganized, and critical of the party's past. Its political leadership, as shown by the debate over the FRA, is divided over political orientation and its next organizational steps.

ARGENTINA

PRT Combatiente (PRT(C))

During 1971 the PRT(C) grew stronger. It consolidated its structure, making it possible to function in a more disciplined manner. After the Sallustro kidnapping, however, the organization came under unusually severe repression, and this has probably weakened it at various levels, although we lack concrete information.

Even prior to the Sallustro affair, about 120 of the PRT(C)'s members were in prison. Nevertheless, they were growing and had overcome the loose structure that existed a year ago. In the period between February 1971 and February 1972 the PRT(C) recruited substantially. Simultaneous losses, however, resulted in a net growth for the year of about 20 percent. The extent of this turnover in membership is indicated by the fact that 80 percent of the present members joined within the last year.

Thus the membership of the PRT(C) is very young, both in age and in political experience. Many of the more experienced cadres, and especially those considering themselves strong supporters of Trotskyism, have been imprisoned or killed. It should also be mentioned in this regard that during 1970 the PRT(C) suffered two splits. Although these splits, which created the organizations known as the Communist Tendency and the Workers Militia, only took a small percentage of the membership, they represented a majority of the original Central Committee of the PRT(C). Both the Communist Tendency and the Workers Militia have since suffered additional splits and are today very small groupings.

Thus while the PRT(C) became stronger in an organizational sense, it changed in its composition. The majority of those of Trotskyist origins, who represented the Trotskyist tradition in the original PRT(C), are not participating or are unable to participate in the leadership owing to the repression. This has been an important factor in the recent evolution of the PRT(C).

International Positions

The PRT(C) maintains that the Chinese Communist Party is a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party, that its leadership around Mao Tse-tung is a Leninist leadership. They agree with some of the criticisms of the Chinese CP leveled by the Fourth International around such events as those in Ceylon and Bengla Desh. But to the PRT(C) these are diplomatic mistakes of the kind made by honest revolutionary leaders. To them Mao was mistaken in these instances but is still essentially a revolutionary leader and should be treated as such by the Fourth International. The PRT(C) regards the position of the Fourth International favoring the formation of a Trotskyist Chinese section as wrong and the call for a political revolution to overthrow the Mao regime as openly counterrevolutionary.

They also believe that Kim Il Sung's regime and the regimes in Albania and North Vietnam are revolutionary and should receive political support from the Fourth Inter-

national.

Although the PRT(C) agrees with the Fourth International in a general sense regarding the nature of Cuba today, they differ strongly on the evaluation of the Cuban Communist Party and its leadership. Essentially they are less critical, although they disagree with some of Castro's positions, such as his support to the Peruvian regime. On other important questions they agree with Castro and disagree with the Fourth International. For instance, they support the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet bureaucracy, along the lines projected by Castro. They also believe that democratic centralism is operative in the Cuban CP.

The differences between the Cuban CP and the PRT(C), still existent at the time of the latter's founding in 1968, have narrowed in the past period toward a common outlook. As an example we should recall that at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the PRT(C) came out in complete support of the Fourth International's line of denunciation and opposition.

They favor the creation of a new international based on an amalgamation of Maoism, Castroism, Trotskyism, and various organizations struggling throughout the world such as the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the MIR in Chile.

Within Latin America the PRT(C) believes that the Cuban CP, the Tupamaros, the Chilean MIR, and their own organization are in general agreement on the correct strategy for the continent.

They oppose the formation of Trotskyist groups in countries such as Uruguay and Chile, where they believe revolutionary groups already exist. They argue that the Tupamaros support for the Uruguayan Frente Amplio, which included voting for a section of the Blanco Party, was essentially correct. They do not criticize the PRT(U)—the Uruguayan group that has declared support for the Fourth International and that generally follows the political views of the PRT(Verdad)—for its participation in the Frente Amplio and consider Joseph Hansen's criticism of the PRT(U) published in *Intercontinental Press* to be ultraleft. They do criticize the PRT(U) because it does not engage in armed struggle.

To clarify their general views both nationally and internationally, the Political Committee of the PRT(C) has submitted two long documents for the international discussion. The first is a major contribution that figured in the discussion preparatory to their Fourth Congress in 1968 called "The Only Road to Socialism and Workers Power." This document has been commonly referred to as the "Red Book" (because of the color of the cover). The decision of the PRT(C) leadership to formally submit this document to the International as a statement of the party's position settles the confusion that has existed since the Ninth World Congress as to whether it reflected the views of the PRT(C). The second document is the key resolution of their Fifth Congress held in the summer of 1970. It was at the PRT(C)'s Fifth Congress that the ERP (Revolutionary Peoples Army) was established. The ERP is broader than the PRT(C). The ERP functions on a minimal program of opposition to the military dictatorship and willingness to engage in armed struggle.

The submission of the documents indicates increased interest by the PRT(C)'s leadership in the International. Unfortunately, as a general rule the rank-and-file, for

various reasons including difficulties created by repression, are not knowledgeable about the International and its internal discussions.

The PRT(C) has made it clear, including in a statement submitted for the international discussion, that they are demanding the expulsion of the PRT(Verdad) group from the Fourth International.

The PRT(C) believes that the elections projected by the Lanusse military dictatorship for 1973 will probably occur. Their analysis is that the electoral solution projected by Lanusse is a ruling-class device to entrap the revolutionary movement. They recognize that the calling of elections will open up possibilities for legal or semi-legal work, that there will be less repression, and that concessions can be won. They believe it is crucial that no armed actions be halted because of the elections. The PRT(C)'s central slogan regarding the election is: "Against the Electoral Farce, Revolutionary War." One of their main efforts is to achieve unity among all the armed groups, Marxist and Peronist, around the above slogan.

They would also like to move in the direction of taking advantage of legal or semilegal work. To do this they have given support to the idea of creating Base Committees (rank-and-file committees). They have also arranged to have their views published in legal papers.

The concept of Base Committees is not exactly clear. These committees would function openly, giving political support to the "Revolutionary War." One such Base Committee exists, according to *Nuevo Hombre*, a Buenos Aires leftist bimonthly. *Nuevo Hombre* reports other Base Committees are projected in the near future. The program of the first committee to be set up, published in *Nuevo Hombre*, includes about 46 points. In spite of the large number of points, which range from a call for "modernized cemeteries" to demands for "equal distribution of wealth," the program leaves out essential demands of the labor movement such as a minimum wage and a sliding scale of wages.

The tactical orientation of the PRT(C) toward the 1973 elections has not yet been settled but tends to point to a boycott.

The concept of Base Committees and other open work is secondary to the PRT(C)'s essential strategy of Revolutionary War or, as it is sometimes called by the PRT(C), People's War. For them this is a far-reaching concept. They believe that in Latin America the objective conditions exist to initiate this war now. Thus they hold that they are presently engaged in a civil war in Argentina.

An "exemplary action" of the Revolutionary War was the Sallustro kidnapping. Actions of this sort require the entire organization to maintain an underground existence in order to survive. Without going into an analysis of their line—this must be left to the pre-World Congress discussion—one thing is, however, clear: activities such as the Sallustro kidnapping limit, if not eliminate, the possibility of semilegal or legal activities through Base Committees or through building trade-union tendencies.

Argentina is today entering a profound economic and political crisis. The mass organizations, above all the powerful trade-union movement, although bureaucratically controlled essentially by the Peronists, are alive with internal struggles. Throughout Argentina factory committees exist that are more subject to rank-and-file control and

participation than is to be seen in the trade-union movements of other Latin American countries or even some European countries. It is quite possible for revolutionists to participate, and almost all currents considering themselves Marxist do so. The fact that trade-union work can be done in Argentina is indisputable. Four of the major strikes in Argentina in the last year, including the Citroen and Chrysler strikes, were led by comrades from the PRT(Verdad). Even small groups such as Workers Militia have won in elections for factory committees.

The future of the class struggle in Argentina will have as its central motor force the powerful, organized industrial working class, which showed its might in Rosario, Mendoza and, most of all, Cordoba. In Cordoba especially, but also in other places, we have seen cracks in the bureaucracies' control over the organized working class and the development of new vanguard layers.

The PRT(C) against their desire is essentially isolated from the day-to-day struggles in the factory committees and trade unions. This is due to the repression aimed at them. Any identified member of the PRT(C) faces immediate arrest and torture. Thus they are forced to organize only clandestine groups in the trade unions, if at all. Today no functioning PRT(C) current exists in the trade unions.

PRT(Verdad)

The PRT (Revolutionary Workers Party) split in 1968 into two groups, each using the name PRT. The groups are differentiated by the name of their papers, *Verdad* and *Combatiente*. At the Ninth World Congress held in April 1969, both groups claimed to represent the majority of the PRT. However, both groups agreed that the PRT *Combatiente* had a majority in the Central Committee prior to the split. On this basis an agreement was reached, recognizing the PRT *Combatiente* as the official section and the PRT *Verdad* as a sympathizing group. Each agreed not to make public attacks on the other since they both remained within the Fourth International.

After the split in 1968 the PRT(V) concentrated on penetrating the trade-union movement. Today they have a base in approximately thirty-seven places of work, primarily major factories. In the last year they led four of Argentina's major strikes, including the Chrysler strike (which was lost) and the Citroen strike (which was won). Their influence among bank workers was indicated in February of 1972, when 6,000 bank workers staged a one-hour strike in support of the leader of the PRT(V) bank workers tendency and in opposition to the national Bank Workers Union bureaucracy.

The PRT(V) is in the leadership of several trade-union caucuses, the major ones being in auto, metal, meat, printing, plastics, banking, teachers and telephone. These tendencies are organized around a program of class struggle based on the following demands: a 40 percent pay increase across the board; for a sliding scale of wages; for a minimum salary of 70,000 pesos per month (in 1972, 1,000 pesos= US \$1); political independence for the trade unions from all bourgeois parties including the Peronists; for trade-union democracy; against American imperialism. They also include the call for a rank-and-file congress of the CGT to project a plan of struggle around these demands.

Much of the day-to-day union work of the PRT(V) is in

some ways similar to the work of some of our European comrades. However, in Argentina the PRT(V) has been able to win leadership in factories and in important strikes because of the unique factory-committee structure of the unions. Thus PRT(V) leadership in a strike or factory does not imply any maneuvers or blocs with sectors of the bureaucracy but their ability to win rank-and-file elections to the factory committees and through them to lead struggles.

In Argentina each political organization has its own student tendency. The PRT(V)'s current is about equal in strength to the PCR (left split-off from the CP). The strongest current by far is the Peronist, followed by the Radicals, and then the Communist Party. After those three come the PRT(V) and the PCR. Various other smaller groups also have organized tendencies. Outside of the organized currents there is substantial unorganized spontaneous support among students for the groups engaged in armed struggle, especially the ERP.

The PRT(V) is particularly strong in the universities in La Plata, Tucuman, and in three departments in Buenos Aires. But it is in high-school recruitment that it has recently shown most promise.

The PRT(V) is structured in cells. Various cells form a region. Cells meet weekly. The organization functions along Leninist lines.

The PRT(V) like the PRT(C) estimated that elections will be held. They also believe the elections are aimed at derailing the mass mobilizations with the hope of winning popular support for the government.

However, the PRT(V) has projected a line of intervention through establishment of a "socialist pole" against all bourgeois candidates. They have called for unity of all socialists to oppose the attempt by the trade-union bureaucracy, the CP and the Peronists in the labor movement to lead the working class into a bloc with sectors of the bourgeoisie.

The PRT(V) has given high priority to winning the right to function legally. To achieve legal status, it has made an agreement with the left wing of the Socialist Party of Argentina (PSA).

PSA

The PSA was created out of a split in 1958 with the right wing of the Social Democracy in Argentina. During the 1960s the PSA came under the influence of the Cuban Revolution. In 1963 it entered the elections as a pro-Cuban group (the Peronists were not able to run in 1963), and beat the major bourgeois parties in the city of Buenos

Aires, polling close to 300,000 votes.

Soon after this electoral victory, the PSA split again. The youth in the party, reflecting the impact of the Cuban Revolution, were expelled by the more reformist, older wing of the party. The youth were led by Juan Carlos Coral. Both wings of the PSA were essentially electoral formations with little base in the trade unions but with a large layer of sympathizers, including many industrial workers.

After six years of military dictatorship, the PSA hardly existed as an organized force. But with the new call for elections, it automatically had legal status (at least until June 1, 1972). The PRT(V) came to an understanding with the PSA(Coral) on the basis of a joint programmatic statement in support of a socialist electoral pole.

The PSA(Coral) is pro-Cuba, opposed to the two-stage theory of revolution, opposed to blocs with any sectors of the national bourgeoisie, opposed to the Allende regime as a bourgeois government, and opposed to the concept of a peaceful road to socialism. The PSA(Coral) is a left-centrist formation with no more than 100 organized members but with a large periphery and formal legality.

To maintain legality, the PSA(Coral) has to acquire the signatures of four formal members (registered voters) for every 1,000 voters in five provinces. In working together to achieve this the PSA(Coral) and the PRT(V) opened a process of fusion. The right wing of the PSA has since evolved, uniting with a populist formation and changing its name.

The PSA has now achieved the number of signatures required for a place on the ballot but the government has not yet ruled on their status.

The PSA-PRT(V) publish a weekly paper called *Avanzada Socialista* with a run of 8,500. Prior to achieving legality the PRT(V) had eleven semilegal headquarters; the PSA had one. They now have over thirty and project having fifty by September 1972. They also plan to publish a magazine for Argentina and one for continental Latin America.

The PSA-PRT(V) fusion presents various problems. The education of new members and the line the joint organization will follow is apparently to be the same as those of the PRT(V). Exactly how this will work out cannot be determined as yet.

The PRT(V) is in general agreement on all international questions with the Fourth International. Its rank-and-file members are very much abreast of the internal discussion in the International.

MANIFESTO OF THE FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO ANTI-IMPERIALISTA
[FRA — Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Front], reprinted from *Intercontinental
Press*, December 6, 1971

[We have translated the following statement from the November 14 issue of *Siglo*, an organ of the Chilean Communist party.]

* * *

La Paz

People of Bolivia:

The August 21 coup imposed a fascist government on Bolivia, a government in the service of Yankee imperialism and the antinational forces.

The coup was aimed both at blocking the achievement of national liberation—as the consequence of the popular mobilization—and at ousting a democratic and antifascist regime. The Banzer-Selich government is the product of a coordinated action by the CIA and the Brazilian "gorillas." In this operation, they used reactionary and venal military officers, who relied on the complicity of the FSB [Falange Socialista Boliviana — Bolivian Socialist Falange] and the corrupt right wing of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario — Revolutionary Nationalist Movement].

The fascist coup was staged because Bolivia had become a danger point for Yankee imperialism, an advanced position in the revolutionary rise in Latin America. The coup could not be carried out bloodlessly. The murderous assault was met with heroic popular resistance in La Paz, Oruro, and Santa Cruz, in which workers, students, revolutionary officers, progressive priests, and peasants gave their lives.

The dictatorship is the executioner of the Bolivian people. In order to maintain itself in power against the will of the people, the regime is using methods like slaughtering defenseless blue- and white-collar workers and teachers; massive arrests and detention in concentration camps, as well as exile; suppressing the freedom of the press and other civil liberties; repressing the progressive religious movement; shutting down the universities and denying Bolivian youth the right to study; eliminating university autonomy; bombing dormitories; returning the lands of the peasants to the big landowners; and violating the legal rights of trade unions. Political terror has been elevated into a method of government. Stories are being in-

vented about guerrillas as an excuse for shooting the political prisoners.

These bloody methods are being used to consummate the sellout of the country to imperialism. From the first day, before the bodies of the fighters were even buried, the fascists and their hangers-on have been paying the price of the aid they got from imperialism and the Brazilian "gorilla" regime. Thus, they announced and are carrying out the following measures—denationalizing the petroleum industry as well as the commercial exploitation of mining by-products; the sellout of the Mutún iron to imperialism; capitulation in the case of the Matilde mine; the sellout of our antimony and the foundries; and the return of the Pujre mine to its former owners.

When we think of the people murdered, shot, and tortured, we must understand that Banzer and Selich are only the executors of a plan for which the responsibility falls directly on the United States.

This government is not a government of Bolivians; it is a puppet regime of the Yankees. Before the coup, those who now hold power threatened to dismember the national territory by seditious means. Today they are parceling it out to the international consortia. Foreign hands prepared the coup, and the power is now in the hands of foreigners.

It is evident that the August coup was directed against national independence and sovereignty, against the liberty and fundamental rights of the Bolivian people. It is also clear that the coup could not be consummated without eliminating the progressive sectors of the Fuerzas Armadas de la Nación [Armed Forces of the Nation], which were beginning to take their place in the process of liberating the country. And, finally, it is obvious that the coup was directed against the popular will to achieve national liberation. Therefore, the need is undeniable to build a fighting unity of all the revolutionary, democratic, and progressive forces so that the great battle can be begun in conditions offering a real perspective for a popular and national government.

This is not a struggle that can be carried through to victory with the support of only one part of the op-

pressed people. This is not a battle that concerns only one sector of the exploited people, or one class, institution, or party. This is a struggle between the majority of the now oppressed Bolivian people and the reactionary dictatorship of Banzer. Any form of sectarianism is counterrevolutionary. Let us be worthy of the sacrifice of those who fell August 21 defending Bolivia.

Our unshirkable task is to close ranks around the FRA [Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista — Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Front], organized by the forces that fought in the battle of August, to win political power for the people. Every factory, every mine, every village, every former ranch and latifundium will become a front line in the people's struggle for liberation. The people have not been defeated; to the contrary, they are on their feet.

We warn the imperialists and the native reactionaries that the weapons in this struggle will be those they themselves force us to take up. All-out repressive violence reigns today in Bolivia. We put them on warning that they cannot use such methods with impunity, that the people will respond with the same force that is used against them.

Our goal is not just to eject the dictatorship from the Palacio Quemado. We propose to establish a government of Bolivians under the leadership of the proletariat, the ruling class of the revolutionary process.

From the underground we declare that we have formed the Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista, which today assumes the leadership of the struggle that will end in the crushing of the fascist beast and in the final victory.

All acts of resistance must be directed in accordance with the tactics of struggle adopted by the Frente. Every measure in defense of a persecuted patriot, prisoner, or exile; every action to rescue the natural resources and political sovereignty of Bolivia; every step in defense of university autonomy, of freedom of the press and the code of trade-union rights, in short the entire battle, must be directed with the following in mind. The Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista (FRA) is not only the instru-

ment for ousting the dictatorship but the power by which the people will win their rights and Bolivia will consolidate its independent existence.

We call for a mobilization of all Bolivians to snatch the patriots suffering in the concentration camps and jails from the claws of the "gorillas," to save those who are in imminent danger of being shot.

We appeal to all Bolivians, we ask the international solidarity of the revolutionary parties and movements, of the trade-union and people's organizations throughout the world, we urge all to unite in the defense of the mining towns facing an imminent threat of military invasion. The fascists are getting ready for a new "Noche de San Juan."¹ We must unite to block this massacre!

Our struggle has begun. We warn the imperialists and their satellites that no concession wrested from the puppet regime—a regime they themselves have created—will be recognized by the People's Government. The Bolivian people—who have never been terrified by tyrants or the rigors of battle—are determined to face any kind of struggle against the dictatorship.

We call upon the workers, the peasants, the university and high-school students, the revolutionaries in the armed forces and the police, noncommissioned officers and cadets, on the men and women of Bolivia, to join us and struggle in the ranks of the Frente Revolucionario Antiimperialista (FRA).

*War to the death against fascism.
Stop another "Noche de San Juan."
Reopen the universities and restore
their autonomy.
Defend our oil, agriculture, and
mines.
Forge the unity of workers, peasants,
students and revolutionary
officers.*

November 1971

Signed: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Mayor Rubén Sánchez Valdivia); Partido Comunista de Bolivia [Communist party of Bolivia]; Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacio-

nal [Revolutionary party of the Nationalist Left]; Partido Obrero Revolucionario Masas [Revolutionary Workers party—*Masas*];² Partido Obrero Revolucionario Combate [Revolutionary Workers party—*Combate*]; Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario [Movement of the Revolutionary

Left]; Partido Comunista de Bolivia Marxista-Leninista [Marxist-Leninist Communist party of Bolivia]; Ejército de Liberación Nacional [National Liberation Army]; Partido Socialista de Bolivia [Socialist party of Bolivia]; General Juan José Torres González, ex-president of Bolivia.

STATEMENT OF THE UNITED SECRETARIAT OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

February 6, 1972. Reprinted from *Intercontinental Press*, February 21, 1972.

[The following statement was issued February 6 by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.]

* * *

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International has had an initial discussion of the situation in Bolivia and the new conditions of struggle facing the revolutionary vanguard. It reaffirms its agreement with the consistent political differentiation maintained in the period prior to the Banzer coup by the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian section of the Fourth International, in contradistinction to the stands taken by all the opportunist tendencies towards the capitalist Torres government and the clear threats of an ultraright coup d'etat. The establishment of the dictatorship has thrown the workers' movement back into clandestinity and subjected it to a ferocious repression. In this situation the insistence of the POR on the need to combine mass actions with the development of armed struggle in order to move toward the organization of armed mass action against the Banzer dictatorship is correct.

In the framework of this orientation toward struggle against the military

dictatorship of Banzer, the POR recently decided to join the "Frente Revolucionario Anti-imperialista" [FRA]. Unfortunately, the founding document of this front* presents a false political line. The theme of multiclass national unity, which it advances, reflects the positions of the majority sectors in the leadership of the front—not only reformists and Stalinists, but also bourgeois elements, including Torres himself, who bear a crucial part of the responsibility for the success of the Banzer coup d'etat. The United Secretariat cannot agree with the POR's signing such a text, which is directly contradictory to the longstanding program of the POR and the lessons of the struggle against the Torres regime and the Banzer coup, which the POR itself had drawn.

The United Secretariat will discuss this and other questions with the POR leadership in a comprehensive way in the coming period. The United Secretariat of the Fourth International calls on all revolutionaries to express greater solidarity than ever with the difficult and courageous struggle being carried on by the Bolivian comrades. □

2. There are two POR's in Bolivia, usually distinguished by the names of their respective leaders, Guillermo Lora and Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso. The Lora group's paper is *Masas*; the Gonzalez group's is *Combate*. — IP

1. On St. John's day in June 1965, the government of Rene Barrientos sent the army into the mining towns to crush the trade-union organizations. — IP

* For the full text, see *Intercontinental Press*, December 6, 1971, p. 1077.

RESOLUTION BY THE POR (COMBATE) ON THE FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO ANTI-IMPERIALISTA

(undated)

1. We reaffirm our conception that the first task of the Bolivian Trotskyists is construction of our party, as the party of the working class.

2. In this process, at specific moments, the POR may have to conclude pacts or alliances with other worker organizations under condition of greatest clarity and political and programmatic delimitation.

3. Having arisen after the coup of August 21, the FRA, which includes all the political and mass organizations against the fascism of Banzer, the manifesto of the month of December 1971 is an unclear document that does not clearly delimit the tasks of the Bolivian revolutionaries and leaves the impression that it admits forms of government of national unity, the POR does accept such a formulation contrary to its concepts of a socialist dynamics of the revolution and of a worker-peasant government. The signing of such a document without publishing

at the same time its criticisms and formulated delimitations, was an error for which we criticize ourselves.

4. The POR in remaining in the FRA delimits itself from the reformists and ratifies its strategy of armed struggle and revolutionary war to overthrow fascism, destroy the capitalist regime, and build the socialist society under the dictatorship of the proletariat. In this sense its participation in the FRA has a tactical character under present conditions of the Bolivian left and does not compromise its political, organic, or military independence.

5. The POR through a public document will delimit its political and programmatic concepts and bring out a clarification on the responsibilities of the parties in the August events and will unmask the tendencies guilty of the defeat of the masses. In participating in the FRA, it will not yield to its revolutionary duty before the masses.

The Collective Leadership

TRANSLATION OF RESOLUTION FROM BOLIVIA

1. The meeting held April 1, which was attended by the delegate from the Fourth International, Comrade Juan Pedro, and the collective leadership of the POR, approved the resolution on the Frente Revolucionario Anti-imperialista (FRA), ratified the constitution of a collective provisional leadership in the party, which is to function on the basis of four members—Comrades Eduardo, Ricardo, Raul, and Victor. During the deliberations of the meeting, Comrade Gonzales admitted the inexistence of the party in our country, the existence of a patriarchal leadership, and constant restraint and sabotage in carrying out the Bolivian revolution.

It was decided that the principal task at present is construction of the party. In coming meetings the outlines of constructing the party will be drawn up in accordance with

the agreement reached at this meeting, in the sense of carrying out all the work of returning to the country and constructing the party, taking as the basis Argentina and the section established there.

2. In compliance with the resolutions adopted at the April 1 meeting, the leadership began its work of carrying out the commitments undertaken up to now, sending a group of worker comrades to Cuba and shifting members of the leadership to Argentina.

3. Also along the same lines, the Bolivian comrades began the work of building an infrastructure inside the country, and all the stumbling blocks to making linkups at the present time are being overcome, indicating a perspective of being able to overcome almost definitively the party's crisis.

Ricardo
April 15, 1972

REVOLUTIONISTS AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRY
Editorial from *El Combatiente*, May 1972. Reprinted from *Intercontinental Press*,
July 31, 1972.

[The following editorial appeared in the May 1972 issue of *El Combatiente*, the organ of the Argentine PRT (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary party of the Workers). The statement was entitled "Revolutionists and the Democratization of the Country." Translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

The elections [planned for March 1973] represent a concession by the military dictatorship to the working class and to the people in order to divert them from revolutionary war and to contain the upsurge of the mass movement, while at the same time defending the interests of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. But the idea that "bourgeois legality" in no way expresses the interests of the proletariat is completely incorrect. This absurd idea boils down either to the narrow notions of the intellectual petty bourgeoisie to the effect that the electoral road to power stands in contradiction to the path of revolutionary war and that for this reason we have no need of bourgeois political freedom, or else to anarchism or ultra-leftism, which denies the proletariat any participation in bourgeois politics and in bourgeois parliamentarism.

At least legality makes it that much more a guarantee that the proletariat will become organized; this conclusion is the origin of the Leninist thesis that in a certain sense the electoral process will be a greater aid to the proletariat than to the bourgeoisie.

The people may be confused since certain sections of the bourgeoisie (Perón, Balbín, Frondizi) include certain democratic demands in their programs, but they do not go beyond reformist measures that do not endanger the interests of the class that they represent.

For the bourgeoisie, it would not be desirable for the new parliamentary regime to overdo things by eliminating all the measures instituted by the

military dictatorship, as for example the repressive legislation and the police and military bodies that it created in its struggle against the masses and their guerrilla movement; in other words, it would be best not to take this "democracy" to its ultimate, logical, and full conclusion.

Revolutionists maintain that the bourgeoisie betrays the cause of freedom, that it is incapable of developing a consistent democracy, and that it is unable to follow an independent policy in the face of imperialism. Many bourgeois sectors speak of "peaceful change" and "national liberation," but always with full respect for the honorable provisions of the dictatorship's laws so that the organization and consciousness of the working class and the people are developed as little as possible by this change. For the working class, in contrast, it is best to win all reforms through mass mobilizations and the development of revolutionary war, for only in this way—and not by taking the path of pacifist reformism—will the true accumulation and organization of forces for the socialist revolution be achieved. This is why Perón dreads violent revolution but uses revolution to frighten the dictatorship; this is why he is concerned about avoiding armed confrontation and instead proposes petty reforms in order to hold back the advance of revolutionary war. And it is not only Perón, but Frondizi, Balbín, Ricci, Cámpora, and all the defenders of the GAN [Gran Acuerdo Nacional—Great National Agreement] who defend this point of view.

Many of them put forward a program calling for democratic freedoms, as well as freeing political prisoners and abolishing the repressive legislation. But their situation as an expression of the ruling classes leads them to desert the struggle for democratization. Fearing the advance of the proletariat, they pull back, each time observing an even greater silence in the face of the government's policy, in the face of the hunger, the exploita-

tion, the removal of our wealth, the repression, and the torture. The conditions of economic, political, and social oppression that the proletariat must endure compel it to take a consistent approach in struggles for democratic and economic demands. Evidence can be seen almost daily of the upsurge in new mass mobilizations for economic and political demands, such as the mobilization against the electricity rates, the struggle against hunger, and the struggle for the release of political prisoners and against repressive legislation.

We also know that any kind of political and economic reform of the framework of the capitalist system in our country has its limits. The economic crisis is getting worse and worse. The needs of imperialism are so great that stable capitalist development becomes impossible. No sector of the bourgeoisie is capable of pursuing a policy independent of the big monopolies that run our economy and of pulling the country out of stagnation.

By developing the struggle for democratic goals, the proletariat will continue to gain in strength. And the greater the number of sectors involved in fighting the dictatorship; the less sectarianism there is; and the more the revolutionary and progressive forces join together against the common enemy, the broader will be the scope of the struggle and the more resolute will be the progress toward the socialist revolution.

If we turn to the rich theoretical arsenal of Marxism-Leninism, we will see that the great classical thinkers always maintained that the proletariat should energetically participate in democratic struggles, be the vanguard of the struggle for democracy, and take every advantage of legal opportunities; if it does not, the mass movement will run the risk of falling into the hands of forces that are hostile to the revolution.

Many times we will meet certain revolutionists who fear participating in

legal struggles in a front with other nonproletarian, reformist, and populist currents, or belonging to various mass organizations together with these currents when the latter formally enjoy the leadership of the movement. But what should interest revolutionists is the practical role that we play in this struggle and the determined participation of the workers in this struggle, which are both incorporated into our strategy of revolutionary war. By proclaiming "independence" from reformism and populism, petty-bourgeois sects isolate themselves in practice from the mass movement and transform themselves into mere spectators who know everything and criticize everything but who in practice mobilize no one, do not actively participate in mass mobilizations, and leave this movement in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

As we can see, our perspective for making alliances with reformist parties and groups and other nonproletarian forces is of vital importance for the development of the immediate struggle of the proletariat.

The solution to this problem of alliances can be seen in the fact that these parties and groups (CP, socialists, Christians, PCR [Partido Comunista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Communist party], VC [Vanguardia Comunista—Communist Vanguard], rank-and-file Peronism, Radical Left, etc.) represent certain working-class sectors, and essentially sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and progressive bourgeois sectors, that is, sectors that suffer from the political and economic oppression of the regime and can have an interest in the revolution, but not with sufficient consistency to be able to lead it forward.

In the same way, we emphatically oppose the sectarian characterizations of petty-bourgeois intellectuals who claim that these parties and groups are the objective allies of the government. To them we reply that they are allies of the proletariat and that whether we march with them together in the struggle for socialism depends not so much on the vacillating activity of these groups as on the ability of the proletariat and its party to implement a frank and sincere policy of alliances.

We must bear in mind which forces are standing up to the policy of the dictatorship and can lead the strug-

gle against the big bourgeoisie and imperialism, as well as the parties and political groups that represent these social forces.

These forces cannot be the big bourgeoisie, the landholders, the imperialists; these forces cannot be Perón, Balbín, Paladino, Cámpora, Alsogaray, Frondizi. We know that they are incapable—they demonstrated this in their time—of developing a decisive struggle against the monopolies, against the big landowners, against the army and the mercenary police. As representatives of the bourgeoisie in its various shades, they need the entire state apparatus and all the repressive forces in order to defend themselves against the working class and the people.

The working class is the main party interested in this change. The peasants, the students, the teachers, the professional people, the small merchants and other sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, as well as a very small sector of the bourgeoisie, are standing up to the regime. Various representatives of these social forces are suffering in prison, confronting the repressive forces daily, and are undergoing torture in workers' and people's struggles. The economic crisis is spreading increasingly to these sectors and compels them to enlarge the ranks of the proletariat. Through its party, the working class must be the first to bring together these forces and hurl them against the enemy in whatever camp, making use of all forms of struggle and organization. At the present political conjuncture with its concessions from the bourgeoisie and the rising mass movement, it is more necessary than ever that in the area of struggles around economic and democratic demands the proletariat and its party make use of legality and, through active participation, transform themselves in practice into the vanguard of the democratic struggles.

The victory of the revolution and of the revolutionary war will be a victory of the people. It will be a victory of the workers, of the urban bourgeoisie, of the poor and middle peasants. For this reason, we speak in the program of the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary Army of the People] of a revolutionary people's government led by the working class.

It is necessary to overcome sectar-

ianism and stress the kind of joint activity on behalf of the interests of the people that can daily unite greater people's forces, while at the same time independently carrying out an intense ideological struggle on behalf of the historic interests of the proletariat.

With its policy of the GAN, the dictatorship wants to isolate us from our strategic allies (CP, socialists, and other progressive sectors), portraying us as enemies of "institutionalization," portraying us as enemies of the democratic demands of the people. To this we reply that we will tirelessly struggle for the democratic freedoms of the people.

Revolutionary proletarians sincerely want to have fraternal relations with the organizations and sectors that are confronting the dictatorship in the struggle against the paltry concessions of the GAN, and that are mobilizing and organizing the entire people to free the political prisoners from jail, to put an end to torture, to prevent any kind of electoral ban from being applied, to see to it that the working class and the people have their representatives in parliament, and to oppose attempted coups by a military that is constantly looking for ways to keep itself in power, and to oppose hunger, exploitation, and poverty.

This entire popular mobilization, this entire democratic struggle, will make it possible for the people's forces to gain in strength. We have no illusions about the legality being offered by the dictatorship or about the future parliamentary regime lasting forever; neither the bourgeoisie nor imperialism have been placed at bay by the sudden attack of the masses and the development of revolutionary war—"legality" will find itself again circumscribed by new military coups or by a fascist evolution of the future parliamentary regime. It is thus perfectly clear that our participation in legal struggles and our view that a regime replacing the dictatorship would be desirable do not represent our strategic goal and do not represent a definitive and total solution for the working class and the people; this is only a tactic that will make possible a broader organization of the masses and thereby respond to their immediate needs. But giving this tactic concrete form is of fundamental importance for the revolution.

These legal or semilegal struggles,

and this use of bourgeois legality, must be inseparably linked to the development of revolutionary war, to the independent building of the Revolutionary party of the Workers and the Revolutionary Army of the People. Thus if the proletariat and its party are able to become the vanguard of the democratic struggle, without the prejudices in the minds of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals about losing the formal leadership of the democratic movement, in practice we will be able to play our vanguard role. The revolutionary forces of the people will be so powerful and have reached such an organizational level that repressive attempts by the regime will be in vain. Popular indignation and rage and the struggles of the masses will develop to such an extent that the dictatorship will have to fall back on the forces of imperialism as its last attempt to hold back the triumphant socialist revolution.

The revolutionary war began a short time ago; it still has a long way to go. It is true that the influ-

ence of our party on the masses is still insufficient, but our war clearly demonstrates the existence of forces capable of fighting a decisive struggle until the final victory. Each step of the revolutionary war, each step forward in the present development of the struggles of the working class and the people, with the active participation of our party and the other revolutionary and popular forces, will quickly awaken the consciousness of thousands of workers, peasants, students, and intellectuals. By making the party's policy a concrete reality, and by developing our practice, the masses will be irresistibly drawn toward the goals of revolutionary war and socialism since they are the only goals that fully and consistently express the interests of the working class and the people.

Our party, the Revolutionary party of the Workers, has decisively undertaken to participate along with all revolutionary, reformist, and progressive forces in the struggle for democratization, making use first and fore-

most of the struggle for the release of all political prisoners, and the struggle against repressive legislation, against torture, kidnappings, and police crimes, against any kind of ban, against the rising cost of living, and against the penetration of imperialism. We are ready to participate in and form any kind of trade-union, student, peasant, political, and working-class neighborhood group that will make it possible to organize struggles among broad layers of the people for their social, economic, and political demands.

Our party, the Revolutionary party of the Workers, has decisively undertaken to be in the front lines of all proletarian and revolutionary layers in order to build the great PRT and the ERP by developing the revolutionary war closely linked to the struggle of the masses and to the struggle for socialism.

This will be in practice the policy of the PRT for leading the working class and the people step by step down the victorious road of revolutionary war and socialist revolution. □

MANIFESTO OF THE PSA

Reprinted from *Intercontinental Press*, July 31, 1972.

[In its June 21 issue, *Avanzada Socialista*, the weekly paper of the Argentine Socialist party, announced that it had fulfilled the requirements for taking part in the elections that have been promised by the military dictatorship. Among other things, the Socialist party was able to register 35,000 people as members to meet the stipulations for getting ballot status. The party offered the platform it gained in this way to all revolutionary forces that wanted to campaign against the dictatorship and for a socialist Argentina. This offer was repeated in the manifesto of the Socialist party convention, which we have translated below.]

* * *

To the revolutionary activists, to the anti-imperialist fighters, to the workers, to the students, and to the militant youth, the Fifty-First Convention of the PS [Partido Socialista—Socialist party] reaffirms its determination to fight for a socialist revolu-

tion.

Anti-capitalist struggles are spreading around the globe. This is the dynamic our Vietnamese brothers and sisters are following and it is present in all countries, even in the very entrails of the imperialist monster, which is being rocked by the struggles of the American masses themselves. Day by day, these struggles are growing in intensity, despite the counterrevolutionary agreements signed between the imperialists and the bureaucrats of the workers states, who themselves are being shaken by demands for proletarian democracy.

Our country is not absent from this red battle map of workers' and popular offensives. Since 1969, the date of the historic uprising in Córdoba, we have been caught up completely in the revolutionary torrent sweeping indiscriminately over national borders. Although our main enemy is imperialism, which exploits the country as a whole, our national liberation can be achieved only by getting rid of the bourgeoisie, which is in-

timately linked to, allied with, and dependent on the foreign monopolies.

The present occasion is a special one for a convention of Argentine socialists on two accounts. This is the sixth anniversary of the rise to power of the "Argentine Revolution" [the military dictatorship], and this date coincides also with a redoubled militant offensive of the workers and students, who have just carried out a new Tucumán uprising and are in the course of waging more than a dozen trade-union struggles.

This coincidence offers a good occasion for drawing up a balance sheet of the last six years, which have been rich in revolutionary lessons and experience.

A direct result of the "Argentine Revolution" is the dire need that is creating despair in the homes of our people. Other results are the million unemployed clustering in our cities and the fury of the repressive forces, who are imprisoning and torturing our best young people. The final outcome of the "Argentine Revolution" is the

political scheme called the "gran acuerdo nacional" [the Great National Agreement] by which the big capitalist parties (the Peronistas, the Radicales [liberals], etc.) are trying to set up an electoral trap as their last defense against the onslaught of the masses.

The bonapartist government rose to power ostensibly to right the wrongs done by imperialism and the bourgeoisie. Like the monarchs of old, it promised an era of progress and happiness. And now, at the end of six years, the regime must prepare to retire ingloriously from the scene, junking all of Onganía's pretenses and illusions.

This failure epitomizes the historic incapability of the Argentinian bourgeoisie to develop the country, free it from the yoke of imperialism, and guarantee its inhabitants a decent standard of living. This long period of more than half a decade—in which the most powerful sectors of the national bourgeoisie, concealing their nature behind military swagger and gold braid, have ruled us—has brought a worsening of the catastrophic trend of the last twenty years. For this whole time the country and the workers have steadily lost ground economically.

The Bonapartist government of Onganía found its direct support in four powerful sectors that have alternated in the leadership of the country's economic and political life—the land-owning oligarchy; the big modern national monopolies; the big foreign industrial and financial monopolies; and the bourgeoisie serving as the intermediary for foreign investment—the sector favoring industrial development, represented by Frondizi and Alende.

With a few differences in their points of view, these sectors concurred on a governmental program whose essence boiled down to two points—getting an inflow of investment from abroad and increasing the productivity of labor, that is, the exploitation of the workers. They began to get their investment after they crushed the great strikes of the stevedores, railroad men, and sugar workers. They achieved this with the complicity of the trade-union bureaucracy. The sellout was symbolized by the tie that Vandor put on for the first time to meet Onganía; it was embodied in a wage freeze, compulsory arbitration, and repeal of the law on firings in the construction

industry.

The setback of the workers and the defeat of the student movement were the exact barometer of imperialist penetration. When the new team led by Krieger Vasena took over, representing the rise to dominance of the financial bourgeoisie, it achieved the "miracle" of stabilizing the peso and getting a strong flow of investment into the modern and high-productivity industries. In the face of such "success," the liberal middle bourgeoisie ousted from power by the coup and the Peronista industrialists prostrated themselves, putting the wraps on their criticisms. From Madrid, Perón said: "We will have to wait and see."

But far from bringing progress, the Yankee capital that the Argentine bourgeoisie pined for introduced an enormous imbalance into our economic structure. There were no bounds to investments and financial penetration, and so foreign capital began to flood sectors previously reserved for the Argentine bourgeoisie—the banks, agricultural sectors, modern light industry, supermarkets, etc. This situation led to growing opposition from wings of the bourgeoisie. Frondizi, Alende, and other politicians who had played leading roles in assisting colonization, became alarmed at the disastrous result of financial penetration. The lead of this bourgeois opposition was taken by Perón and Balbín, in the name of the middle bourgeoisie in ranching and agriculture and new light industry. This was the beginning of the history of the Hora del Pueblo [Hour of the People—a middle-class united front], whose final chapters are being played out in these days.

The government that shortly before had been all-powerful began to show its intrinsic weakness. It could no longer play the role of arbiter in the conflicts between different sectors of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Lacking any support or strength of its own, it was left suspended in midair. At the same time, the first symptoms appeared of a wave of worker and student rebellions, especially in the interior of the country where the trade-union bureaucracy was weaker and less able to hold back struggles. Under the influence of new leaderships, new battles started up. One of these, the fight waged by the SMATA [Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Trans-

porte Automotor—Union of Automobile Mechanics and Related Workers] against layoffs culminated in the Córdoba uprising, which could only be understood in the context of the economic crisis and social discontent embracing the various strata of the population.

While the tremendous imperialist offensive served to dislocate the structure of the economy and accentuate still more the economic crisis and conflicts within the bourgeoisie, the explosion of rebellions in the interior profoundly altered the entire situation in the country as a whole. They left an indelible imprint. The changes went beyond the fall of the Onganía government and a shift in the political line of the "Argentinian Revolution." They left their impress on the mentality, experience, and organization of the Argentinian masses. In this sense, the Córdoba uprising was the same thing for us as the "spring revolution" for Czechoslovakia, the Gdansk rising for Poland, the Tet offensive for Vietnam, the colossal mobilization against the war in the United States, the Uruguayan strikes, the great advance of the revolution in Bolivia, and the French May, all of which occurred in the same period.

For the workers and people's movement the Córdoba uprising was a landmark in the cycle of struggles that are continuing and intensifying in this period, a cycle which has now also passed through other memorable episodes such as the rebellions in Rosario, Mendoza, Mar del Plata, and now, once again, Tucumán. This cycle has various features that make it unique. In the first place, the student movement and the middle class have broken out of their traditional isolation from the working class and joined with the workers in a common front against the regime. In the second place the process of developing new leaderships has intensified. In the previous period this was proceeding in a scattered and molecular way. Now in the living reality of the immense majority of workers' struggles led by independent or left leaderships, the process has become concentrated. There is an objective tendency for these new leaderships to group together in class-struggle and revolutionary nuclei outside the Peronista apparatus, which is controlled by the trade-union bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. The

high-water mark of this trend has been the development of the group around Sitrac-Sitram [Sindicato de Trabajadores de Concord-Sindicato de Trabajadores de Materfer—the Materfer and Concord plant unions]. Although this formation suffered a temporary defeat, it can be repeated on a higher, directly political, level in the Polo Obrero y Socialista [Proletarian and Socialist Pole].

The Córdoba uprising and the workers and people's struggles forced the government and the exploiters to change their political plans completely. Onganía himself tried to carry out a change in course, but he was already discredited in the eyes of the bourgeoisie. So, they pulled the Levingston transitional government out of the hat. This regime tried to continue the Bonapartist administration, basing itself on the pro-European development sector represented by Alende and Ferrer. It tried to answer three needs—to make some precautionary concessions to the masses, such as civil liberties, pay rises, etc., to cool their militancy; to placate the bourgeois opposition and the imperialists themselves by promising elections and a return to constitutional government; and to save what was salvageable of the national economic sectors not yet swallowed up by the financial penetration of Yankee imperialism. This necessary line of timid nationalism and populism ended up seeming derisory both to the masses and the bourgeoisie itself. So, the Junta Militar decided to make a decisive shift. Lanusse took over with his new variant of the "Gran Acuerdo Nacional" (GAN).

Lanusse accentuated the nationalist-populist course, which is an objective necessity for the bourgeoisie as a whole and which coincides with the demand for elections by the Yankee imperialists, who see a return to parliamentary democracy as the only means for sidetracking the mass upsurge. The present government is continuing the Bonapartist tradition of the "Argentinian Revolution." However, it has tended to favor and base itself on the big agricultural bourgeoisie that produces for export. It has sought by this means to reinforce the capitalist economic structure as a whole and in the process shoved the financial sectors somewhat to the back-

ground.

But Lanusse's classical Bonapartism is combined with a need for achieving a parliamentary type of agreement with the bourgeoisie as a whole and its political parties. He needs unity in order to confront, divert, and devitalize the social struggles that are shaking the foundations of the regime. This is the significance of the "Gran Acuerdo Nacional," or the pact with the big bourgeois parties and with Perón in particular, which is aimed at preparing the way for an electoral solution. As a result of it, we are now suffering a kind of Lanusse-Radical-Peronista coalition government.

It should be pointed out that the bourgeois parties and Perón have accepted this variant and that the tensions and conflicts are due to the extreme gravity of the economic crisis, which leaves little room for making populist concessions and setting the final seal on a "gentlemen's agreement" between the bourgeoisie and imperialism. The greatest supporter of the "bosses' agreement" and the government is still the Peronista trade-union bureaucracy, which has put on the white shirt and tie of class collaborationism for good. It is seconded by the Communist party, which through the ENA [Encuentro Nacional de los Argentinos — National Meeting Ground of Argentinians] is proposing partial alliances within the camp of the bourgeois and imperialist forces who subscribe to the "acuerdo."

The Holy Alliance of Perón, the trade-union bureaucracy, the imperialists, and the government has proved insufficient to contain the colossal upsurge of the working class and the working people. With fresh fighters moving into the front lines and new cadres developing, the struggle gives no respite. From the automotive industry to education and the courts, there are constant struggles going on. And these are continually reinforced and deepened by the student movement, which, although lacking a leadership that could give its struggles a mass character and a revolutionary direction, is confronting the problems that flow from inadequate state financing of the schools and from bourgeois and professorial domination. These problems keep the student movement on a permanent battle footing.

It is the duty of socialists and revolutionists to unify all these struggles of the workers, popular sectors, and students by stressing the need for mutual solidarity and support. It is their duty to give a conscious expression to the objective tendency toward unity in action and the development of a common front of struggle for common objectives.

Our party has devoted itself to an unconditional defense of the democratic liberties that the bourgeoisie tramples under foot every time they constitute a threat to the regime. Presently the working class and the popular sectors are the sacrificial victims of a criminal apparatus of repression and coercion. It is the duty of all democrats and revolutionists to fight for the release of the prisoners, for the abolition of the repressive laws and apparatuses. Along with this, we demand political rights for all parties and leaders. This means the right for Perón to return freely and exercise all his civil rights, and for the Communist party and the rest of the groups on the left to carry on their political and propagandistic activity legally. This demand for civil rights for all overrides any differences we may have with other groups.

In our demand for the release of Tosco, Flores, and Santucho, as well as the other prisoners, and for ending the outlawry of Perón and the Communist party, we want to sum up the democratic objectives that should lead us to carrying out common mass action against the government.

The formation of a coordinating committee by the youth groups of the Peronistas, the Communist party, and other parties can be a very positive step forward in waging this democratic struggle. We are well aware that this move holds the danger of a maneuver by the government and the bourgeois forces to promote a kind of organization that would fit in with the "acuerdo," such as the Frente Cívico de Liberación [Civic Liberation Front]. But the mere formation of such a coordinating committee raising democratic demands is a step we must support and further by calling for a consistent struggle for the democratic objective that it has set itself.

There is only one way to unify and give a mass character to the demands of the workers, popular sectors, the students, and to demands for democ-

racy. The highest body of the organized workers, the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor] must issue a plan of struggle and carry it out. This plan must set forth a minimum program including the following, among other workers' and popular demands: an emergency raise, a sliding scale of wages, a guaranteed work week, wages for the unemployed, higher appropriations for education, health, etc., the immediate release of the prisoners, and repeal of the repressive laws and bans.

All of our mobilizations must be designed to press the CGT leaders to call a congress of the rank and file that could draw up a plan of struggle and elect a new proletarian leadership capable of carrying it out. We must be guided in this by the examples of the Mendoza teachers and the Mar del Plata students, who were able to force the CGT to support them. The day-to-day struggle against the bureaucracy that we are waging in the factories must be combined with making public demands on the bureaucracy to assume its leadership responsibilities. By making such demands, without placing the slightest confidence in the bureaucracy, we can force it to move or to end up by exposing its betrayals in front of the masses.

But checkmating the new style Bona-

partist dictatorship, confronting the bureaucracy, and shaking the regime by mass struggles is not enough. What we win in a hundred mobilizations, we can lose in an instant if our enemies are able to get their "Gran Acuerdo Nacional" off the ground without our being capable of projecting an adequate political response. Against the background of the Argentinian crisis, what we are discussing is the crisis of revolutionary leadership, the lack of leadership of our heroic masses, who despite their selfless militancy have been continually sold out and betrayed.

The political stage opened by Lanusse has enabled us to begin to overcome this tragic lack of a strong revolutionary leadership capable of leading the proletariat and the people and directing their struggles toward the political objective of a genuine socialist revolution.

From the Córdoba uprising up to today, the Argentinian proletariat has produced thousands of revolutionists, who have participated in and frequently led the factory and popular struggles. For these activists and fighters against the bosses and the bureaucrats we raise the historic possibility of grouping ourselves in a Polo Obrero y Socialista [Proletarian and Socialist Pole], in a front capable of forging a revolutionary party. Concretely, we call on the compañeros who led the

historic Chocón strike, on the members of Sitrac-Sitram, on the supporters of the Lista Marrón that has won in the Córdoba SMATA, on workers at Banco Nación, Petroquímica, Chrysler, Citroën, as well as all the class-struggle tendencies and activists involved in the new day-to-day struggles to use the recognized legal status of the Partido Socialista to constitute a force that can unify the new revolutionary worker and student vanguard on a national scale. This organizing on a political level will immediately be reflected in a qualitative leap forward for the mass struggle.

Finally, the Fifty-First Convention of the Partido Socialista declares that by mobilizing the workers and popular sectors and by organizing the Polo Obrero y Socialista, we will be able to carry on the task of building an internationalist revolutionary party capable of undertaking the construction of a socialist Argentina, which is the only alternative to a bourgeois and semicolonial one.

We affirm the necessity of the socialist road and restate once again our methods of thought and action—revolutionary Marxism as our philosophical approach, and mobilizing the masses on the basis of their immediate needs and constantly raising the level of the struggle as our method of action. □

BASIS OF UNIFICATION OF THE PSA-PRT (LA VERDAD)

Reprinted from *Intercontinental Press*, November 13, 1972.

[At the end of 1971 a unification took place between the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (La Verdad) and the Partido Socialista Argentino (Coral). The PSA was one of the groupings that emerged from the Argentine Social Democracy when it split up under the impact of the Cuban revolution. Under the leadership of Juan Carlos Coral, the PSA moved to the left as the economic and social crisis deepened in Argentina.

[The PRT (Revolutionary Workers party), organized around the weekly journal *La Verdad* (the Truth) was headed by Nahuel Moreno, a well-known Argentine Trotskyist leader.

[The two organizations merged under the name of the Partido Socialista Argentino. The PSA publishes a weekly journal *Avanzada Socialista* (Socialist Vanguard). This replaces *La Verdad*.

[The basis of the unification was set forth in the following declaration of principles, unanimously approved by the executive committees of the two organizations. The translation is by *Intercontinental Press*.]

* * *

That the Republic of Argentina is a capitalist country of uneven development that has become increasingly dependent upon the exploitation and capital investment of world imperialism, operating in close association with a highly concentrated and centralized big national bourgeoisie.

That the exploitation of the country by imperialist capital is not being carried out against the wishes of and in spite of the national bourgeoisie, but through its most highly concentrated sectors and with its backing and complicity.

That the high degree of concentration and centralization of capital in Argentina remains an economic and

political burden upon the sectors of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, which are semi-exploited by big national and international capital, lack any possibility for independent development, yet at the same time exploit the working class through their enterprises.

That this middle and petty bourgeoisie cannot, as a result, play any decisive leading role in the struggles the Argentinian people must undertake if they are to achieve their liberation, since historically these classes always end up acting as instruments of the big imperialist monopolies.

That the economic and social structure of the country requires linking the struggle for national liberation from the imperialist yoke closely to the struggle against the capitalist regime and the big national bourgeoisie.

That the Argentine Socialist party and the PRT (La Verdad) pledge to allocate all their forces to building the party.

That the party will establish the most fraternal relations with all groups that are struggling—legally or illegally—for national liberation and socialism, in order to jointly work out programmatic, strategic and tactical questions.

That in the course of building the party organization, there must be a deepening of theoretical criticism of the opportunist, reformist and populist deviations that divert the Argentine proletariat from its historic goals, but this critique must not be seen as a hindrance to alliances between the party and all working-class layers that are struggling, around concrete and clear issues, for national liberation and socialism.

That it is essential for the party to establish fraternal ties with the working masses who today are caught up in Peronist populism and its bourgeois reformist ideology. The party must encourage and join with these

masses in all of their concrete struggles against exploitation and oppression, helping them to understand how the political structure and the trade-union bureaucracy serve to block their desire to struggle and limit achieving their historic objectives, which are none other than those that lead to the destruction of the capitalist system and the construction of socialism.

That the party must utilize every method of struggle required by the changing political reality.

That although we are convinced that the state is always an expression of the dictatorship of the ruling classes, even though it may be masked by bourgeois democratic forms, nevertheless, every opening provided by bourgeois legality must be utilized to promote the organization of the workers politically and economically and to assemble a force capable of making the revolution that objective conditions in Argentina and throughout the world have made the most urgent task of the day.

That the utilization of the legal methods of struggle within its reach must not be allowed to divert the attention of the party away from the tasks of also preparing its organization to take up the struggle for political power on all levels and by every means that conditions permit or require.

That the party, through a front of the workers and the exploited masses, must tirelessly struggle to bring about a workers and people's government that will assure national liberation and the revolutionary construction of socialism. Both committees stress the fact that although it may proclaim itself to be socialist, no state is truly socialist unless the working class exercises direct control over the entire state apparatus—the armed forces, the executive administration, the courts, and the legislative power.

That the only combination in which the proletariat and its party can participate is one that moves toward the conquest of state power by the working class, that is, socialist and working-class combinations. Treacherous combinations with any sector of the bourgeoisie are rejected as a way of taking power.

That both executive committees acknowledge the existence of layers of small peasants (growers of fruit, tobacco, cotton, sugar cane, grapes, etc.)

who are exploited by the big proimperialist bourgeoisie, and who are agitating and struggling against their exploiters. Although in the final analysis these sectors are struggling to maintain their position as small producers, just as they will struggle tomorrow against any attempt to socialize agricultural production, the party nevertheless supports their struggles as a social movement (but not politically) so as to isolate the main enemy—the big national bourgeoisie and its senior partner, imperialism. But through that support it will strive to make its momentary allies understand that their problems as human beings can only be solved through socialism, and it will try to win the best ones to the cause and the party of the proletariat. The party will adopt the same position toward the movements that the small shopkeepers, manufacturers, and craftsmen might form in their struggle against the monopolies, whether imperialist or not.

That both executive committees obviously reject the so-called Gran Acuerdo Nacional¹ in which the national bourgeoisie and imperialism are attempting to cover up their cruel dictatorship through "La Hora del Pueblo"² as a response to the profound revolutionary mobilizations of the working class that have been developing since the Cordobazo.³

That this masquerade is possible

1. Gran Acuerdo Nacional (Great National Agreement). The GAN is Lanusse's name for the preparations leading up to the elections scheduled for 1973. It is a coalition through which the dictatorship hopes to unite the ruling class behind one candidate and bring the Peronist union bureaucracy into collaboration with, and participation in, the new government.

2. "The Hour of the People." A middle-class united front formed in November 1970 that advocates a greater role in national politics for political parties. Among the groups associated with it are the Partido Conservador Popular (Popular Conservative party), the Partido Demócrata Progresista (Progressive Democratic party), the Union Cívica Radical Bloquista (Bloquista Radical Civic Union), the Peronist movement, the Union Cívica Radical (Radical Civic Union), and the Partido Socialista Argentino (Argentine Socialist party, Selser wing).

3. A massive workers' uprising in the city of Cordoba in May 1969.

only because of the complicity of the Peronist leadership, which seeks to divert the workers from their great historical tasks and keep them within the bounds of mildly reformist and conformist activity that is designed in the last analysis to preserve the capitalist system and imperialist domination.

This rejection includes the ENA⁴, a new opportunist attempt to raise the slogan for a bourgeois democratic revolution, and the new Frente Cívico⁵ proposed by Perón as a way of reaching an agreement with Frondiferismo,⁶ as another variant for protecting the capitalist system.

That the tragedy of the organized Argentine workers' movement is the sinister union bureaucracy—an agent within the workers' movement that has prostituted itself to imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. That, faithful to the soundest principles of proletarian internationalism, both executive committees point out: that the main enemy of the workers of the world is U.S. imperialism, world cop of counter-revolution and the major exploiter of the nations and masses of Latin America; that there must be stronger ties with and total support for all peoples struggling for their liberation, for all the forces and all the systems that are heroically struggling to build socialism, and especially for the revolutionary movements of Latin America, for socialist Cuba, and for the present vanguard of the world revolution—the heroic Vietnamese guerrillas.

That without failing to defend the so-called socialist states from any imperialist attack, we will support any struggles by the working class of those countries for socialist democracy, since

4. Encuentro Nacional de los Argentinos (National Forum for Argentines), a Communist party-inspired popular front with "progressive" sectors of the capitalist class.

5. Civic Front. In addition to sectors of the Peronist movement, the ENA has also participated in this formation, which represents "prodevelopment" sectors of the capitalist class and which is designed to promote the elections.

6. Movement led by former President Arturo Frondizi and Rogelio Frigerio. Its official name is the Movimiento de Integración y Desarrollo (MID—Movement for Integration and Development). It calls for increased governmental support to the development of national industries.

socialism is the highest expression of democracy for the workers and toiling masses—which means complete freedom of expression and criticism for the workers and their organizations, parties and unions.

That, while recognizing the need for an International, neither of the executive committees, nor the party, will yield their inalienable right to determine strategy and tactics to any leadership or tendency that is not rooted in the proletariat and the Argentine people.

That on the basis of these points, both executive committees are devoting their efforts to building a great Socialist Party, a revolutionary workers' party, deeply rooted in the realities of the nation, in solidarity with all the socialist movements of Latin America and the world, and into which they hope to regroup in a solid vanguard the currently dispersed Argentine revolutionary left.

Demands for Immediate Struggle

i. *For democratic rights. Down with the repressive bodies and laws.*

For the immediate release of all political and social prisoners, especially the guerrillas and trade-union activists.

For a national campaign including all individuals and organizations that want to struggle for the release of Flores, Santucho, Tosco, and their comrades.

For the repeal of all repressive legislation.

Down with the Cámara Federal [Supreme Criminal Court].

For the immediate abolition of all repressive bodies—the Office of Security, SIDE [Servicio de Informaciones del Estado—State Information Service], DIPA [División de Investigaciones Policiales Antidemocráticas—Bureau for Investigating Antidemocratic Activities], etc.

For the allocation of free prime time on radio and television to all political parties, whether officially recognized or not.

For freedom of the press—the Graphics Union to guarantee the publication of any newspaper. Printshops to be obligated by law to accept for publication the organs of political parties, whether officially recognized or not.

Down with the state of siege.

Legalize the Communist party.

For the right of Perón to return to the country and become a candidate.

For the right of every citizen to reside in the country, take part in political life, and form a political party.

II. *In defense of the living conditions and jobs of the working class.*

An immediate 40 percent wage increase and a minimum salary of 70,000 pesos [\$1 equals 10.20 pesos].

For a sliding scale of wages, to be readjusted every sixty days.

Against unemployment. For unemployment insurance that guarantees a full salary during a period of unemployment.

For a ban on the profits of foreign monopolies being taken out of the country and for their reinvestment in new areas of work in accord with a plan drawn up by the working class.

Elimination of all taxes harmful to public consumption and the work force.

For nationalization without compensation of all industries that close down or stop production, so that they will continue operating for the government but under workers' control;

For the application of law 14,250 on collective bargaining and for parity of labor and management.

For a special parity that makes up for weak trade unions having to negotiate from a position of weakness.

III. *For trade union democracy. Kick out the union bureaucracy.*

For the unconditional defense of the CGT [Confederación General de Trabajo] and the unions.

Against bureaucracy in the union movement.

The same salary for trade-union leaders as they earned when they were working.

Total replacement every two years of the leading cadres so that leaders go back to the factory or their jobs.

No worker can be expelled from the union unless his expulsion is approved by his co-workers in a section or department. Let his working-class morality be judged by those who know him and not by the bureaucrats.

Every worker or activist fired by management to continue to remain a full member of the union for a minimum of two years in order to prevent any joint attempt by the bureau-

crats and the bosses to keep the best activists not only out of a job, but out of the union.

Annual rank-and-file conventions of all trade-union organizations, from the CGT to the smallest regional organization. Delegates must be democratically elected by their co-workers and represent the number of votes they received in the election. All sectors of the workers' movement to be represented.

For the formation of a Class-struggle Union Movement that will include all union activists who are ready to struggle for union democracy, for the removal of the union bureaucracy, and for its replacement by a new, class-struggle leadership.

IV. *For women's liberation*

Free and legal abortion, performed in state clinics that have prior authorization from official medical bodies and all the necessary guarantees for safeguarding health.

For the free sale of contraceptive devices once they are approved by state medical schools. Full protection for the unmarried mother and elimination of any legal differences between legitimate and illegitimate children. Equal rights for legal and common-law families.

For completely free, twenty-four-hour child-care centers.

Forty percent of the minimum wage to be paid to working mothers for every child under eighteen years of age.

For effective implementation of the principle of equal pay for equal work. Against all discriminatory practices against women that deny them equal opportunity in carrying out their activities. Obligatory inclusion of women in all union bodies, in proportion to the number of women in the corresponding branches of work, as well as in all governmental and popular bodies. Elimination of any regulation or practice that impedes free sexual relationships between men and women.

Elimination of any discriminatory law or regulation between men and women.

V. *For education that serves the working class and the people.*

For student control of exams.

For curricula that help students serve the working class and the people. Scholarships so that students who

lack the means to study can do so without having to work.

For the elimination of state economic aid to private universities. Free admission to the university.

For a university government comprised of students, teachers, and non-teaching workers freely elected by each sector, and with the majority consisting of students.

For a university that serves the struggle for socialism in our country. Compulsory, secular, and truly free primary and secondary education for all.

Supply all students in state schools with materials, books, and uniforms. Coeducation and a full program of sex education.

Integration of productive labor at all levels of education. An aggressive campaign to end illiteracy. End all repressive regulations and guarantee the full right of secondary and university students to organize. Repeal the Jorge de la Torre act.

Increase the budget for education and pay for it out of the budgets of the military and repressive forces.

VI. *For the democratization of the armed forces.*

For an end to the repressive role of the armed forces and their use in the service of capital.

For a lowering of military service to a period of three months. For the right of students and workers to fit their military service into a schedule convenient to their studies and their occupations. For the right to organize military service through the universities and the unions. For the constitutional right of soldiers and officers to take part in politics. State-paid wages for draftees. Opening up the rank of officer and field officer to noncommissioned officers.

A ban on soldiers performing any domestic tasks or personal services.

VII. *For socialized medicine.*

Free medical care and medicines for every inhabitant.

For the nationalization of all the clinics, hospitals, and factories that produce medical supplies. For workers' control of all welfare institutions. For a national health plan drawn up by the workers' movement with the aid of doctors and all health service workers.

And Struggle on a Permanent Basis

I. *For a socialist economy in Argentina.*

For immediate nationalization without compensation of all national and foreign banks, insurance companies, foreign trade, the big meat-packing plants, and monopolistic national and imperialist-owned industries.

Repudiate the debts and concessions to imperialism contracted by the dictatorial and reactionary governments.

For workers' control in the big plants, in nationalized industries, and in foreign trade.

For an agrarian reform based on the expropriation without compensation of the big estates, and for their being handed over to the wage workers and small rural producers to be developed into collective forms of production.

For the return of occupied lands to the indigenous communities.

For a new colonization in agriculture, implemented on a socialist economic basis in which the priority will go to rural workers settled on tenant lands, those who have been forced to migrate to the cities by the present latifundist set-up, and immigrant workers from neighboring Latin American countries.

Respect for the holdings of small farmers and the organization of co-operatives for them with low credit rates and technical help from the state.

For the immediate expropriation and urban development of the districts where the workers live in shantytowns. For an urban reform that provides every proletarian family with a comfortable home, paid for out of a small percentage of a worker's salary.

For expropriation of all luxury homes not permanently occupied in Mar del Plata and the other summer resort areas, so that they can be turned over to squatters in the shantytowns. For creation of jobs for those who move into these areas.

For the drawing up of an economic plan by a rank-and-file congress of the CGT that can get the national economy rolling and raise the working class's standard of living.

This plan shall take into account the necessity of reaching agreement with the trade-union movements of Chile and Uruguay on a joint plan

to move toward uniting the economies of our countries.

II. *For an international policy aiming toward the unification of Latin America within a Federation of Socialist Republics.*

For breaking the pacts that bind us to imperialism (bilateral Rio de Janeiro agreements, OAS [Organization of American States], IMF [International Monetary Fund], etc.

For the immediate recognition of Socialist Cuba.

For economic and diplomatic support to the steps taken by the governments of Chile and Peru to nationalize imperialist companies and to all other anti-imperialist measures taken by any other Latin American country economically blockaded or attacked by Yankee imperialism.

Unconditional defense of Socialist Cuba against any external attack, especially by Yankee imperialism, aimed at interfering with the construction of socialism.

For proletarian internationalism.

For the unconditional defense of any workers state attacked by the United States or any other imperialist power.

For solidarity with the people of Vietnam and all peoples struggling for national liberation and socialism.

III. *Build a workers and socialist united front to:*

Fight, on all fronts, against "La Hora del Pueblo," the ENA, the Frente Cívico, and any similar coalition that the bourgeoisie and imperialism have cooked up to divert our heroic working class from the revolutionary mobilization that began with the Cordobazo.

Present a class-struggle and socialist program in the coming elections.

Denounce these elections as merely a diversionary maneuver of the exploiters.

Struggle resolutely for the only solution for the country and the workers—a workers and people's government; for the convocation of a free and sovereign constituent assembly on the basis of a genuinely democratic ballot; and to lay the basis for building a *Socialist Argentina*.

Long Live the Future Socialist Argentina! □

ARMED STRUGGLE IS THE ONLY ROAD TO THE LIBERATION OF
ARGENTINA

Santucho Interview from *Punto Final*

[The following interview appeared in the August 29 issue of *Punto Final*, the bi-weekly magazine of the Chilean Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), from which it has been translated by *Intercontinental Press*. Because of a delay in the mail, we just received this issue of *Punto Final*.

[The editors of *Punto Final* in a note of their own explain their delay in publishing the interview. They also identify the two leaders of the ERP who were interviewed, "Miguel" and "Ricardo," as being in reality Mario Roberto Santucho Juárez and Enrique Haroldo Gorriarán Merlo.

[The interview appeared under the title "La lucha armada es el único camino para la liberación de Argentina." We are publishing it for the information of our readers without taking any responsibility for the views expressed, many of which we obviously disagree with.]

* * *

Some time ago, our compañero *Hernán Uribe Ortega* interviewed two leaders of the *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo* [ERP—Revolutionary Army of the People] in Tucumán, Argentina. They were *Mario Roberto Santucho Juárez*, thirty-six, and *Enrique Haroldo Gorriarán Merlo*, thirty, who were later arrested, tortured by the Argentine police, and sent to the Rawson military prison in Chubut Province, where political prisoners are held. The interview with the ERP by the PF's special correspondent was held until now for various reasons. *Santucho* and *Gorriarán* reached Chile in the group of ten Argentine revolutionists who escaped from Rawson on August 15 and fled to our country in an Austral Airlines plane. With the authorization of ERP, we are now publishing this interview with *Santucho* and *Gorriarán*, whose replies to *Hernán Uribe's* questions will clarify for our readers the goals for

which Argentine revolutionists are fighting.

"An upsurge in rural guerrilla warfare in Argentina is attainable in the short run." The statement comes from top leaders of the Revolutionary Army of the People. Miguel and Ricardo are in the eleven-member executive committee, the highest body of the PRT [Partido Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary People's party] between meetings of the Central Committee; they likewise belong to the "Military Committee," which constitutes the leading nucleus of the staff of the ERP. It was in order to speak to them that we went to Tucumán, capital of a province that was formerly called the "Garden of the Republic" but that is today becoming poorer and poorer as a result of the crisis in the sugar industry, the main economic activity there.

Formed in 1964, the PRT underwent a five-year period of internal ideological struggle, achieving greater doctrinal maturity at its 1970 congress, at which time it decided to form the army of the people in line with the concept of party-army unity. The movement's brief existence and its clandestine nature have given rise to speculation about the ideology and methods of the PRT-ERP—all the more so because it is affiliated to the Fourth International, which, for many today, seems an artificial feature in the context of the Latin American revolution.

The "Trotskyism" of the PRT, nevertheless, contains some very peculiar facets, for at its last congress, it maintained: "The Trotskyist movement, it must be explained, involves heterogeneous sectors: from counterrevolutionary adventurers who use its banner while at the same time prostituting it, to consistent revolutionists."¹ In this

1. "Resolutions of the Fifth Congress" of the PRT, section entitled "Minuta Sobre Internacional" (a summary of discussions at the congress on the international Marx-

connection, the PRT noted: "We confirm our adherence to the Fourth International while at the same time we are conscious of the fact that we must have no illusions that it can become the world revolutionary leadership that we consider necessary."² And it added: "This should neither hinder nor facilitate the closest relationships with non-Trotskyist revolutionary currents throughout the entire world, especially with the organizations engaged in struggle in Latin America, together with whom we will succeed, by significantly developing our war, in gaining a hearing from the Communist parties of the revolutionary workers states."³

Other PRT-ERP positions are expressed in the following unedited replies to the reporter's questions.

Question. Could you indicate the ideological principles on which your movement is based, how it is structured, and what its political objectives are at the moment?

Answer. The Revolutionary Army of the People is an armed organization, created and led by the Revolutionary Workers party, a working-class party with a Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The ERP, because it is attempting to carry out the tasks of revolutionary war, of a people's war, must bring together, under the leadership of the working class, all the exploited masses of the country. As a result, it puts forward a broad program, the main points of which are national independence from Yankee imperialist domination—that is, the national liberation of Argentina—and a series of other demands of a democratic nature, such as the basic freedoms, and at the same time more profound demands of a

ist movement), subsection 3, "The Fourth International," p. 41—IP.

2. *Ibid*, subsection 4, p. 42.—IP.

3. *Ibid*, subsection 4, p. 43.—IP.

socialist character that point not only toward freeing the country from imperialist domination but also toward its economic and social transformation—toward the elimination of capitalism, which ERP considers an unjust and treacherous system, and—following the triumph of the revolution, following the triumph of the working class and the people in the process of revolutionary war—the establishment of a socialist society.

Q. Could you give a chronological sketch of the birth and evolution of the movement, as well as explain the relationship between the Revolutionary Workers party and the Revolutionary Army of the People?

A. The Revolutionary Workers party was founded in 1964 and from that point on intervened in the struggle of the Argentine masses. Beginning in 1967, confronted with the establishment of a military dictatorship—the Onganía dictatorship—the party posed the problem of armed struggle. It understood that in our country there was no other solution, no other way to confront the enemy but to initiate and develop armed struggle. Following a period of preparation and working things out—a costly process, and a bit slow—the party managed to clearly define its goals and its conception of armed struggle. At its fifth congress, which ended on July 28, 1970, it founded the Revolutionary Army of the People and entered the struggle in an organized way, intervening militarily in the process of revolutionary war that the masses had opened up against the military dictatorship in Argentina. For us, the beginning of the process of revolutionary war in our country started with the big mass mobilizations in 1969 in the major cities.

As for the relationship between the party and the army, our organization has taken and applies the classical Marxist concept with regard to the organizations that the working class and the people require in order to effectively carry out a process of revolutionary war. That is, a military force, a people's army that leads various sectors, broad sectors, all exploited sectors, the broadest sectors of the masses, to take up arms, to get organized militarily, and to take on the enemy military force, the military force of the bourgeoisie and the

bourgeois army, which constitute the mainstay of the capitalist regime and of imperialist domination. This, as we say, is a broad-based mass organization; the programmatic requirements for participating in it are very broad. In other words, its sole goal is to remain prepared, to understand the need to put an end to the military dictatorship, and to understand that the way to achieve this is through armed struggle.

But, given the fact that politics is at the heart of a process of revolutionary war, a people's army needs to have a clear political leadership. A clear political line is a determining factor in any victory for the people, who start out from a position of relative material inferiority compared to their powerful enemy, and whose main strength, in fact, lies in the clarity of its political leadership. It is for this reason that we understand that the people's army must rely on the leadership of a Marxist party, of a Marxist-Leninist party, which, by applying the revolutionary science of the proletariat, is able to solve all problems, the difficult problems that arise in the course of a process of revolutionary war. Thus, our military force, the Revolutionary Army of the People, is under the leadership of the Revolutionary Workers party, which, as we said earlier, is a workers' party with a Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Q. Regarding the ideological outlook of the party, of the movement, you have said that it is Marxism-Leninism. Where, then, do the indiscriminate characterizations of it as a Guevarist or Trotskyist movement come from?

A. Yes, well, the Revolutionary Army of the People is an organization for the masses whose goal is to achieve the national and social liberation of our country. It calls on the masses to wage a determined war for our second independence, following the ideas and actions of General San Martín and Comandante Guevara.

The party that leads the Revolutionary Army of the People, the Revolutionary Workers party, defines itself ideologically as Marxist-Leninist and welcomes the contributions of various revolutionists from other nations, including those of our main Coman-

dante, Che Guevara. It also welcomes the contributions that Trotsky, Kim Il Sung, Mao Tsetung, Ho Chi Minh, and General Giap have made to the revolution. We believe that it is inadequate and inappropriate to ideologically define a given organization as Trotskyist. We certainly feel that Trotsky was a revolutionist and most of our members have read his contributions to revolution, especially his contributions toward a critique of the bureaucracy and on permanent revolution.

Q. How would you characterize the political, economic, and social situation in Argentina today?

A. Argentina is going through a process of revolutionary war, which, as we were just saying, began for us in the year 1969. As you know, since 1966, our country has been ruled by the army, by a military dictatorship that overthrew the bourgeois-parliamentary government of Illia in a coup, and attempted to reorganize the country from a capitalist point of view by increasing its dependence on imperialism and seeking a new development of the country on the basis of the superexploitation of the masses. Through police methods and civil-war measures, the military dictatorship managed to achieve a relative social stabilization of the country in 1967 and 1968; by violently crushing any attempted mobilization, it managed to reduce the scope of social struggles, of the struggle of the working class, the students, and the people as a whole. But, beginning in 1969, the mass movement reacted and opened up the process of revolutionary war that we are experiencing today.

Together with the vigorous resurgence of the mass movement, the armed vanguard made its appearance on the country's political scene—various groups that, from 1966 on, beginning with the violent repression of the Onganía dictatorship, began to get organized in order to confront a powerful enemy on the military terrain using the tactics of guerrilla warfare—both urban and rural guerrilla warfare—with a strategy of revolutionary war. Our organization is one of these groups.

At the moment, with the government in which Lanusse is taking his turn

as president, the military dictatorship is on the defensive. After six years of government, its plans for a certain development and reorganization of capitalism in Argentina have come to naught, so at the moment it finds itself on the defensive and is attempting to get around the serious problems facing it. It is trying to do this at the moment through its much publicized plan for a "National Agreement": It has promised elections and is attempting to involve in this "National Agreement" sectors with a certain popular influence — bourgeois parties, the radicals, and other populist parties like the Peronist movement that maintain a certain influence among the people; and at the same time it is seeking to isolate the guerrilla movement and the class-conscious vanguard, the workers' vanguard, and the student vanguard, which have been bearing the brunt and providing the leadership of the mass struggles, and thereby hopes to hold back the development of revolutionary war.

But these plans are destined to failure because in the past few years the Argentine people have become aware — and are continuing to become aware — of the fact that they can have no confidence or hope in the bourgeois army, nor in the various populist and bourgeois parties or tendencies that have also failed to solve our country's social problems and its problems of dependence. And they are increasingly orienting toward a socialist outcome and the path of armed struggle, the path of violent struggle, in order to reach this goal.

So, to sum up, for us the "National Agreement," which is the current line of Lanusse's military dictatorship, is destined to failure, and we believe that the immediate prospect in our country is for the most wide-scale development of revolutionary war; for the broadest development of the mass struggle, under the leadership of class-conscious sectors; and for a development of military activity on the part of the guerrilla units on the broadest scale — both in the city and in the countryside — and that in a unified process these forces will continue to drive the military dictatorship into a corner and sap the enemy's strength by opening up and broadening the participation of newer and newer mass sectors, and by stepping up the development of

the people's war, of revolutionary war.

Q. Judging by what you say, one would deduce that the ERP has adopted armed struggle as its fundamental approach to the liberation of Argentina. Could you describe some of your experiences along these lines?

A. Well, when the Revolutionary Army of the People was founded, an initial plan of military operations was drawn up, the ultimate aim of which was to make the organization known and to familiarize the masses with its program and its aims. This was essentially a stage of armed propaganda; the main actions that were carried out were the disarming of police, propaganda actions intimately linked to the masses, such as redistribution of goods, kidnapping of factory guards, etc. Aside from propaganda, the purpose of this initial military plan was to consolidate and train the membership as a whole in small actions that would prepare it for other kinds of operations of broader scope. This plan was considered fulfilled six or seven months after it was put into effect.

As a result of this military activity and, of course, that of the other organizations operating in Argentina, there was a change in the repressive forces. For example, individual policemen were no longer seen in the streets; repression was carried out differently and began to become more and more concentrated, which indicated the approach we should take in our second plan of operations.

As for military operations — which were what we then began to carry out — they are basically harassment actions in which a larger number of persons are involved. An example of such an operation would be to surround a police station with members of the repressive forces inside, offer them a chance to surrender, and if they refuse, open fire on them, try to confiscate their arsenal, and disperse rapidly. It would also include ambushing repressive patrols. The main thing from the military point of view that would mark a qualitative step forward in the development of revolutionary civil war would be — and this is included in the ERP's second plan of military operations — the initiation of actions in the country-

side, that is, the launching of rural guerrilla warfare; we think that this can be accomplished within a short period of time.

The entire kind of operations that we have been carrying out and that we will always carry out during the development of revolutionary civil war in Argentina must be operations that are intimately linked up to the masses, have a mass line, in which the outlook of the masses is reflected in every action.

I think it might be useful to explain the nature of the distribution of goods that we carry out on a continual, we might say almost daily, basis in our country and why we carry out these actions. The distribution of goods has had an extraordinary result from the point of view of political penetration since the masses immediately identify the war with their own needs and allow us to quickly gain political entry into the various neighborhoods where we carry them out. Preferably, we always carry out these operations in places where we already have teams, or functioning neighborhood cells; after the operations, they take charge of explaining what they were all about, the need to get organized, and the need to develop the war in order to win freedom for our country. There are many neighborhoods where we have been able to organize the inhabitants with a view toward collaborating in developing revolutionary war. For example, committees have been formed to receive and distribute the food that is delivered. Without any doubt, as I said before, this greatly favors the carrying out of political work among the people, and these neighborhoods are continuing, although in a still incipient way, to develop into genuine bases of support for the ERP.

Q. The ERP initiates its armed actions in the city and aims to launch a rural war; in other words, it can be assumed that from a military point of view, the tactic is to continue to build up the army of the people from the level of guerrilla warfare until it is what we could call a regular army. However, it is an objective fact that there are other armed groups in Argentina and it could thus also be concluded that unity between these armed groups would be an essential tool in making the armed struggle a success. How do you view this problem?

A. Yes, it is an objective fact that there are a number of groups that are carrying out military actions in Argentina, but the existence of fraternal relations between the various organizations is a positive factor. And we are convinced that the prospects are for unity of the armed vanguard, and in this sense we are trying on a permanent basis to strengthen our ties to the other armed organizations, with which we have excellent relations, by discussing fundamental problems, by clarifying the questions that separate us, and by laying the groundwork that will make possible the future unity on a firm, principled basis that we believe is possible and feasible.

Likewise, following the example and approach of Comandante Guevara, we realize that unity among the various revolutionary organizations in each country that are leading the struggle of their people is necessary in the face of the common enemy—Yankee imperialism, which is the en-

emy of all the people of Latin America. Along these lines too we have succeeded in establishing fraternal relations with various organizations in other Latin American countries and we are striving toward a unification of our forces in this continental process of revolutionary war by the peoples of Latin America against North American imperialism.

We are likewise aware of the fact that the recognized leadership for all Latin American revolutionists in this struggle is the Cuban Communist party.

Q. In regard to the political process that Chile is currently undergoing, some North American agencies gave out alleged opinions of the ERP on the Allende government some time back in which the ERP appears to express a negative view of the Chilean process in formulations that would appear to have been distorted.

A. Yes, there is no doubt they have

been distorted, since all we did in the news conference in Buenos Aires was to state what Allende himself has stated many times: that he has control of the government, but he does not hold power.

Our modest opinion of the Chilean situation is that the correct line and approach for the victory of the revolution in Chile is that of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left [MIR—Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria].

Q. Thank you very much for answering our questions. I wonder if there is anything else you would like to say?

A. Yes. If it is possible, we would like for you to give our fraternal and revolutionary greetings to the heroic Cuban people, who are holding high the revolutionary banner of anti-imperialist struggle and socialism in our continent. That's all, compañero. □

ANSWERS TO FIVE QUESTIONS by Mario Roberto Santucho Juarez

[The following are the written replies by Mario Roberto Santucho Juarez, a leader of the PRT(C), Argentine section of the Fourth International, to questions sent to him in October, 1972.]

* * *

Question 1- The document "El Unico Camino" refers to the concept of "Revolutionary War" as a fundamental concept of the PRT. Is this the present position of the PRT? And could you explain exactly what is meant by the term "Revolutionary War?"

Answer 1- "Revolutionary War" is a Marxist-Leninist concept applied to one of the two revolutionary strategies for taking power which developed in humanity's present epoch of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.

As we know, one of the questions of principle which every revolutionary party must correctly resolve in its process of construction and maturation is to develop a strategy of power for the country in which it struggles, i.e. it must scientifically predict—based on an intimate

knowledge of the country, its economic-social structure; the traditions, history and characteristics of the masses; the different characteristics of each region of the country and of the country as a whole, and its composition (city-rural, etc.)—what will be the approximate behavior of the classes, the dynamic of the class struggle, the different and complementary roles of the regions, the type and extent of resistance that the bourgeois state apparatus (principally the enemy army) will offer, etc. And it must extract from these predictions the line and the strategic and tactical tasks of the party. A spontaneist group which isn't concerned with a strategy of power cannot, from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, be considered a revolutionary party. The lack of a strategy of power leaves the spontaneist groups at the permanent mercy of the transitory fluctuations of the class struggle, spinning around immediate questions, and as a result condemns these groups to the crudest opportunism—today of the right, tomorrow the left.

This question of the revolutionary strategy for the seizure of power has been dealt with by Bolshevism and specifically by Lenin since the formative period of the party.

He took off from a class analysis, delineating the role of the proletariat, the peasantry, the radical bourgeoisie, the conservative bourgeoisie, the role of the cities, and of the countryside, and he based himself on the correct prediction of the proximity of interimperialist wars ("transform the interimperialist war into revolutionary civil war"), a situation which would allow the decomposition of the army, the passage of important sections of it into the revolutionary camp, and the victorious assaults of the masses, leading to power through urban insurrection in the vital centers of capitalism, i. e. in the large cities. This strategy was revealed to be completely correct and provided a powerful beacon for the daily practice of the Bolsheviks who built their party on these predictions. It allowed them to approach 1917 with (a) a clear understanding of the possibilities of mass insurrection, of the role of the soviets and of the possibilities of political work in the enemy army; (b) a strong and dynamic Marxist-Leninist party and a military organization led by it (Red Guards, detachments of armed workers). The party's predictions were thus decisive for the triumph of the October insurrection.

In the case of the Asiatic countries, most specifically of China and Vietnam, the conscious revolutionaries of those countries encountered, in their respective countries, different characteristics than those in the Czarist Empire, among them a fundamental strategic difference: in their countries one could not count on the decomposition of the enemy army through interimperialist or interbourgeois wars. The scientific understanding of the Chinese and Vietnamese about the character of the revolution in their countries made the development of a new type of correct strategy possible, a creative continuation of Marxism-Leninism, which is today known as the strategy of revolutionary war and which led the Chinese and Vietnamese people to victory under the leadership of their respective revolutionary parties.

The theory of revolutionary war, the seeds of which are already found in Engels, maintains that an exploited people, politically and militarily subjugated, can defeat a superior enemy in the course of a prolonged war which is initiated by starting from small revolutionary units. In a prolonged process of political and military struggle, armed and unarmed, legal and illegal, under the firm and clear leadership of its Marxist-Leninist party, any people, no matter how small it may be and how weak it may seem, can confront and defeat a powerful enemy. For this, the Marxist-Leninist party must unite the whole people around the proletariat and under its leadership. It must deploy, to the maximum extent, the inexhaustible energy of the masses. It must develop the struggle in all fields. It must build a military force, a People's Army, a National Liberation Front which includes every type of mass organization, including the entire progressive population. This struggle can be expanded until conditions make a final insurrection possible, in which the people as a whole, under the leadership of the working class and backed by the People's Army, destroy the resistance of the capitalist state and its armed forces and establish workers' and peoples' power, socialist power, the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

Our party, the PRT, understands that in the Argentine context the correct strategy of power is a strategy of revolutionary war, that the theory of revolutionary war is ap-

plicable to the concrete conditions of our country.

Question 2- Since the Ninth World Congress there have been two organizations in Argentina affiliated to the Fourth International. Could you summarize your view of the strategic orientation each organization has carried out and your views of the results and the political conclusions that can be drawn from this concrete experience in Argentina?

Answer 2- Permit me to clarify one thing. Since the Ninth Congress, there has been one section of the International in Argentina, which is our party, the PRT, and one sympathizing group which maintains, with our authorization, relations with the International. This is an anomalous situation, foreign to Marxist-Leninist internationalism, which arose at the IX Congress and for which the Statutes of the International had to be amended as follows: to article 30 which says in its final sentence "Where a section exists, the International will in no case recognize a vying formation as a 'sympathizing group'," a sentence was added which says "except by agreement with the section."

This abnormality occurred because the minority at the IX Congress placed themselves in an intransigent position which threatened the unity and the majority chose to make this concession to remove any organizational pretext and to maintain the polemic on the level of political positions. Although the group in question promised not to make problems for the work of the section, to not make public criticisms, etc., later it broke this agreement and constituted itself as one of the most recalcitrant public critics of our line and activity. To my way of thinking that solution of the Ninth Congress was a mistake and must not be repeated in connection with any other country. In the meantime our party already decided to revoke the authorization which allowed the existence of the sympathizing group at the next World Congress. It defies all logic and it confuses the vanguard [to see] that while our section applies the line of revolutionary war another group, also claiming membership in the International, applies a line opposed to and sharply critical of our activity.

With regard to our strategy, the experience of these three years already clearly has confirmed the validity of our line, resulting in an important expansion of our party, in its solid rooting in ever broader sectors of the factory proletariat, the rural proletariat and peasantry; in the prestige of the military force, the ERP, created and led by our party; all of which has enabled us to play a significant role in national politics and to place us before the eyes of the masses as a revolutionary alternative.

As far as the Moreno group is concerned, it maintains its spontaneist characteristics and, regarding the strategic question of power, can only come up with the loose idea of a general strike based on the union movement as the nucleus of an insurrection of short duration.

From the standpoint of growth, the Moreno group remained these last three years reduced to a basically student sect in Buenos Aires and La Plata, a sect completely unknown among the masses and discredited within the vanguard, which led them in recent months to enter one of the number of reformist socialist currents, the PSA. The PSA's perspective at present is to fill a vacuum in Argen-

tine politics, that of a social democratic party, and in this undertaking it compares unfavorably with the PSA led by Gregorio Selser, the PSIN of Jorge Abelardo Ramos, the PS[SP] led by Lopez Acotto and others, the PC[CP], and various others of the same type.

Question 3- The document "El Unico Camino" declares general agreement with the continental strategic and tactical orientation of Castroism. Does this remain the position of the PRT and could you clarify what the essential political line of the Castroists is which the PRT finds itself in agreement with?

Answer 3- Our agreement with the Cuban leadership is related to the idea of the Latin American revolution as a unit, as a single interrelated process from country to country, leading to socialism ("either socialist revolution or caricature of revolution"—Che), a process which the Cuban revolution is the vanguard of, and which will in general develop principally through the road of armed struggle, of revolutionary war ("We will make the Andes the Sierra Maestra of the American continent"—Fidel).

Various incidents and some errors have weakened the contributions, experiences and orientations of the Cuban revolution and its leadership. This is basically true with respect to the non-Marxist theory of the "foco," especially as Regis Debray explained and popularized it in his book *Revolution within the Revolution*. Such a concept is an extreme simplification, a distortion, a caricature of the Cuban experience which confused the Latin American vanguard for a while. Our party always fought the "foco" theory and continues to firmly fight it today when it shows itself in sections of the vanguard. But it is necessary to make it clear here that our ideological and political struggle against focoist concepts and practices is done from a Marxist-Leninist basis, from the point of view of revolutionary war. There are reformist and spontaneist currents who use the criticism of "focoism" to defend rightist points of view. They magnify it and blast the focoist deviation in order to oppose the correct line of armed struggle, of revolutionary war, which answers the needs of various Latin American countries, as in the concrete case of our country.

Question 4- Could you outline the overall strategy you feel is correct in Argentina in the coming period based on your experience in the last three years?

Answer 4- As I implied in the answer to question 2, the balance sheet of the experience of these last three years shows the validity of our strategic line of revolutionary war.

The understanding by our party of the new situation opened in Argentina by the Ongania military coup, allowed an active and leading intervention by Marxist-Leninists in the class struggle of our country and gave the process a new and revolutionary content. We will explain through synthesis why:

The aim of the Ongania military coup in June 1966 was to find a structural solution to the crisis of Argentine capitalism. In order to correct the anachronistic structure and to overcome the low level of productivity, a sector of the army with the advice and aid of imperialism resolved to install a classical Bonapartist dictator-

ship. This would achieve social tranquility in order to reorganize the economy, through the straitjacketing of the masses, through the smashing of the mass struggles utilizing methods of civil war. Thus the Ongania regime adopted drastic measures against the Argentine people, against their democratic rights, against their standard of living, against every kind of popular victory, measures which neared completion thanks to the merciless participation of the army and the joining together of the repressive forces. Thousands and thousands of workers were thrown out of work, into hunger, into misery; every demonstration and struggle of the masses was savagely repressed, the combative unions were intervened and their leaders jailed; all the opposition parties were proscribed; all the left parties were outlawed and persecuted (Anti-communist Law). The merchants, the small businessmen, the poor and middle peasants were attacked economically through openly pro-monopolistic legislation.

Our party understood that the masses would resist and that this resistance would probably also take place in the armed sphere. In January 1967 the EC decided to prepare the organization to incorporate violence in the struggle of the masses and to likewise organize independent armed detachments, guerrilla units. This meant important changes, demanded a radical shift in the life of the party, paralleling the major changes in the masses and in the vanguard which were then already making themselves felt and which we defined as "ideological revolution."

The accommodation of the party to its new line, its transformation into a combat party, was not accomplished without difficulties. This was to be expected given the predominately petty bourgeois character of the party in 1967. The timidity and indecisiveness of the non-proletarian classes, the pressure of these classes which was manifested as hostility to the armed struggle, provoked several splits in the party in a process which our Fifth Congress characterized as "class struggle in the bosom of the party." In 1968 (January-February) the Moreno group left. In 1970 (February-August) the Milicia Obrera and Grupo Obrero Revolucionario groups left.

The great reaction of the masses in 1969, known as the "Cordobazo," came as a confirmation of our line and helped the party's adaptation to the new circumstances. Finally, in July 1970, the Fifth Congress of the PRT was the point of departure for our conscious, active and organized intervention in the process of revolutionary war which had been simmering under the surface since June 1966 and which began to show itself openly starting with the "Cordobazo" which marks a milestone in the history of the Argentine class struggle.

From the "Cordobazo" on, the bourgeoisie saw no more possibility for short or medium-term achievement of the goals which had led to the Onganist experiment, and it passed onto the defensive. Little by little, moves were made in the direction of the possible reestablishment of bourgeois democracy as a means of gaining the breathing space necessary to reorganize and again begin the offensive against the people. But the Argentine masses and their vanguard had already been brought into motion and the turmoil did not stop. The mobilizations continued and the first urban guerrilla units emerged before the populace. Ongania overthrown, the interim rule of Levingston was brusquely cut short by the "viborazo," a new massive mobilization of the working class and people of Cordoba. But the "viborazo" more seriously worried the military

dictatorship and the bourgeoisie since the active presence of our organization and flag among the mobilized masses showed the nascent fusion between the working class, the people and their most radical vanguard. It is not coincidental that Communiques 29 and 30, which the head of the repression (Lopez Aurbane) addressed to the people during the "viborazo," made direct anticommunist references to the presence of our flag and of the Red Star which symbolizes the ERP.

Levingston toppled by the "viborazo," Lanusse assumed the presidency and rapidly laid out the general lines of a new defensive governmental strategy (GAN) based on an understanding with the political parties of the bourgeoisie and the gradual reestablishment of parliamentarism. The objective of this strategy consisted of using deceit to hold back the struggle of the masses, to isolate the working class vanguard and the guerrillas in order to smash them and politically and militarily destroy them. This new strategy required a tactic which would combine democratic concessions, mainly to the bourgeois parties, with the most savage repression. In this context the barbaric Trelew massacre is perfectly consistent with the agreement with Peron and his clique!

But is this new strategy dangerous for the revolutionaries? Can the bourgeoisie achieve its objectives, to install a parliamentary government with a populist stamp and thus halt the open process of revolutionary war? Absolutely not! The masses in Argentina cannot be tricked by a parliamentary government simply because their standard of living is catastrophically low, in the last year alone it has fallen 20% in absolute terms, and the bourgeoisie is not in any condition to improve this situation. One must expect that after a few months of parliamentary government the masses will be fighting in the streets even more energetically, making use of every legal recourse, and because of this all the more broadly and energetically. Neither will the bourgeoisie, nor any parliamentary government, be able to declare a broad amnesty of political prisoners because the military will not permit, under any conditions, the liberation of the hundreds of imprisoned guerrillas nor the legalization of the armed organizations. This makes it necessary to continue the armed struggle with the same firmness and greater breadth, being ever more careful to make sure the masses have a clear understanding of each and every armed propaganda action.

Moreover, the maneuver of the bourgeoisie will not succeed because we oppose it with a skillful policy, based on the use of every legal recourse, which will permit us to

broaden our organic connection with the masses, as we have already been doing in recent months. We will not join in their game of closing us off and isolating us. We will not fall into ultraleftism, but rather we will know how to manipulate their very democratic concessions to protect ourselves, using every legal recourse to the maximum extent.

To repeat, I will say that definitely our line of revolutionary war will be fully operative in the next period, that the class struggle in Argentina will continue to develop in a combined and interrelated form, armed and unarmed, around the axis of the construction and growth of the revolutionary organizations, fundamentally of the party and the army, of the future construction of the NLF, with the participation of the broadest worker and popular masses, in the course of their struggles.

The past three years have been years of rich experience, of celebrated advances of the revolutionary forces in our country, and of preparation, establishment of the ideological, political, organizational and military bases for the broadest expansion in the coming period, in the next months and years, of the powerful revolutionary energies of the masses. A basic leading role in these circumstances falls to our party, the PRT, and to the military force organized and led by it, the ERP. Our party is conscious of this and feverishly prepares itself to assume its responsibilities with firmness, and to overcome its deficiencies and limitations.

Question 5- Do you believe that the general line on Latin America voted by the Ninth Congress was correct and do you believe that the actions of the ERP including the Sallustro affair were within the line of the Ninth Congress?

Answer 5- Yes, definitely. I believe that the line of the Ninth Congress is generally correct for Latin America although I believe that it is too general and must be made more precise in the future regarding various questions and must include new elements. In a word, it must be made even more concrete, more defined. Similarly I am convinced that armed propaganda actions like the Sallustro kidnapping fall within this general line. To better illustrate I must point out that the kidnappings of big bourgeois and other enemies of the people have been expressly praised by the Central Committee of our party, in its resolution relating to the First Plan of Military Operations adopted at its first meeting, in August 1970, immediately after the Fifth Congress.

STATEMENT OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

April 13, 1972

The following statement was issued April 3, 1972, by the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party.

The kidnapping of Oberdán Sallustro by the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP) created an international sensation, as was to be expected in view of Sallustro's prominence as the general manager of the Argentine branch of Fiat Concord. The sensational aspects were further heightened by the exceptional ransom the guerrillas sought from the government and the company, by the ultimatum of the guerrillas to place Sallustro before a "firing squad" if the terms were not met, and by the decision of General Alejandro Lanusse not to "negotiate" with the ERP even if it meant the death of the hostage.

However, this particular action was only the most spectacular in hundreds of guerrilla actions that have been carried out in Argentina in the past two years by seven guerrilla groups of varied political coloration.

The rise in such actions is ascribable to four fundamental causes: 1) the economic impasse of Argentine capitalism and the efforts of the ruling class to find a way out by further depressing the standard of living of the working masses; 2) the imposition of dictatorial military rule and the banning of political opposition; 3) the use of troops and police against workers who engage in strikes or students and others who initiate protest demonstrations; 4) the arbitrary imprisonment of unionists and union leaders, use of torture on suspects, secret killing of persons seized by the

police, and imposition of abysmal conditions on political prisoners held by the hundreds in the jails of the country.

The victimizations under the military junta headed by General Lanusse have led to numerous international protests. We are in full solidarity with this campaign for the release of all the political prisoners in Argentina and an end to the repression.

The anger and bitterness of the youth in Argentina are understandable. Their natural reaction is to turn to revolutionary means to open up a new perspective for Argentina. They have been encouraged in this way by the explosive social tensions that have given rise to repeated upsurges by sectors of the masses.

Unfortunately no mass revolutionary-socialist party exists in Argentina that could draw these youth into its ranks and provide them with the most effective avenues of struggle. The example set by the Bolsheviks in preparing for the Russian revolution has become obscured because of the repellent policy of "peaceful coexistence" with capitalism followed by the Soviet bureaucracy since Stalin's time. Thus, many revolutionary-minded youths are attracted to the examples set by Che Guevara in Bolivia and by guerrilla formations like the Tupamaros in Uruguay.

Under the influence of such examples, the ERP has committed everything to practicing urban guerrilla warfare. In place of powerful actions by the masses themselves, the ERP is attempting to substitute small actions by a tiny group. Their hopes

are placed on these actions serving as examples to the people living in the slums. They hope that the dramatic nature of the "exemplary actions" will inspire the masses to begin moving toward toppling the old regime and establishing a government of their own.

In reality, the work of bringing the masses into the political arena in all their invincible power differs qualitatively from such notions. It requires deep involvement in the daily life of the masses. It requires patient struggling, under the guidance of a revolutionary-socialist party, to project demands directly linked to the economic, social, and political needs of the masses, and to organize support for these demands in such a way as to raise the self-confidence of the masses and take them through transitional steps onto the road of a socialist revolution.

The primary task at present is to build a revolutionary-socialist party capable of providing effective political guidance in this process. Guerrilla actions like the kidnapping of Sallustro separate the revolutionists from the masses, divert attention and energy from party building, and lead to unnecessary defeats.

Of the courage of the ERP guerrillas and their readiness to stake their lives in the cause of socialism, there can be no doubt. Nonetheless, in our opinion, actions like the kidnapping of Sallustro represent a mistaken course, which we urge the ERP and the other guerrilla groups in Argentina to reconsider.

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED APRIL 13, 1972, BY THE
GRUPPI COMUNISTI RIVOLUZIONARI, ITALIAN
SECTION OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL.

The National Secretariat of the GCR (Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari—Revolutionary Communist Groups), Italian section of the Fourth International, denounces any view of the Sallustro affair that presents him as an innocent victim of a barbarous act. The Sallustro affair must be considered in the Argentine context—a context of at least partial civil war.

For years there has been a military dictatorship in Argentina that cannot claim the slightest democratic legitimacy. It was imposed and maintains itself through armed violence; it throws oppositionists into prison; it tortures and kills those who fight back.

The revolutionary organizations have no other road but armed struggle, and at this stage of the confrontation guerrilla war is the tactical form most adequate for lead-in this struggle. The ERP had demonstrated its capacity to fight with great decisiveness in trying to tie its actions to the aspirations and demands of the most exploited masses, and by integrating itself into the dynamic of the struggle of the most combative layers of the proletariat, especially in Cordoba.

The ERP had decided not to execute Sallustro—despite

the heavy responsibility this industrialist bears in the severe repression carried out by both Fiat and the Argentine government against the workers in Cordoba's factories. But the Argentine government wanted a tragic outcome and succeeded in provoking one—under circumstances that are still unclear and about which we do not have the ERP's version.

The Secretariat of the GCR considers the declaration of the Italian metalworkers unions deplorable. These unions have never condemned the exploitation of the Fiat workers in Argentina, have never said a single word about the mass firings of the factories' most combative cadres, and have maintained silence about militants like Pujals and Gomez, who were brutally tortured and murdered.

On the other hand, on one hour's notice they put out a communique joining the hypocritical chorus of the self-seeking moralists. If FIOM, FIM, and UILM (the three metalworkers' unions) consider it appropriate to take a position on the Sallustro affair, the way to do this would be to consult, through their rank-and-file organs, the Fiat workers, whose opinion is the only important one for the militant Argentines engaged in revolutionary struggle.

LSA ON ARGENTINE KIDNAPPING

The following is a statement of the Political Committee of the League for Socialist Action-Ligue Socialiste Ouvriere.

On March 21 the general manager of the Argentine branch of Fiat Concorde was kidnapped by commandos of the ERP (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary People's Army). Their action has aroused wide attention across the world, including Canada where an action similar in many ways was carried out in October 1970 under the banner of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ).

The violence in Argentina today clearly originates from the repressive measures carried out against the masses by a dictatorial regime.

Argentina has been under military rule almost continually since 1955. The present military junta of General Alejandro Lanusse has crowded the jails with political prisoners. Union and student militants have been abducted and secretly killed by the police.

A worldwide solidarity campaign is now underway to protest torture and repression in Argentina and to aid

its victims.

Under the influence of guerrilla strategies such as those carried out in other parts of Latin America by Che Guevara in Bolivia or the Tupamaros in Uruguay, many revolutionary militants in Argentina have staked their hopes in dramatic actions by small groups. Such actions, they feel, can spark the masses into moving to overthrow the dictatorship and taking power into their own hands.

Similar thinking motivated the FLQ kidnappings of Pierre Laporte and James Cross in Quebec in October 1970.

Carried out by a handful of persons in the name of the FLQ, the two kidnappings were seen by many in the Quebec left as a spark which would ignite a revolutionary upsurge in Quebec. In the first days following the kidnappings, considerable sympathy was evident for the demand of the FLQ—liberation of political prisoners. But these actions by their very nature sought not the participation or mobilization of the masses but their applause.

The LSA-LSO said at the time that "the FLQ has substituted the isolated actions of a small handful for the mass political action of the working class, the only road

for Quebec's liberation."

Reducing the masses to the role of spectators, the kidnappings created the conditions for a massive wave of government repression. Quebec was occupied with 7,000 troops; civil liberties were suspended; over 500 persons were jailed, including leaders of the LSA-LSO.

It was only after months of concerted cross-country and international campaigns to defend civil liberties and to expose government sedition trials that the mass movement recovered in Quebec. It did so through a series of mass actions around the defense of political prisoners and through independentist demonstrations which expressed the deepening nationalist consciousness of the Quebecois.

This experience has been indeed "exemplary" for the entire left and nationalist movements in Quebec and Cana-

da.

The ERP action, like that of the FLQ supporters in Quebec, reduces the masses to the role of spectators. It avoids the necessary consistent work of bringing the masses into struggles around a program linked to their most urgent economic, social and political needs.

Our recent experience in Quebec convinces us all the more that rather than involving the revolutionary forces in mass struggles, such actions separate the revolutionaries from the masses, thus posing a block on the path to building a revolutionary party. The task in Argentina as in Canada and Quebec is the construction of such a party capable of leading the working class in the struggle for power.

ARGENTINA: INCREASING SUPPORT FOR ARMED STRUGGLE IN WORKING CLASS

[From the April 17 issue of the *Red Mole*.]

Sallustro, enemy of the Argentinian people, is dead. The manager of the Argentinian subsidiary of FIAT was captured on 21 March by the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army), six months after he had brought in State police to occupy the factory, arrest trade union leaders and impose sufficient terror to sack over 250 men. The ERP hearing convicted him of this, of conniving in the assassination of 3 Peronist guerrillas, and of monopoly operations to the detriment of the Argentinian nation. This was not the first time the ERP had intervened decisively in FIAT since it was founded by the PRT (Revolutionary Workers Party, Argentinian Section of the Fourth International), a short 18 months ago: last February Cordoba units occupied and disarmed the internal police post of the plant there to enable a factory meeting to be held.

Sallustro was now condemned to death, but his reprieve was offered if certain demands were fulfilled: the bourgeois press here has most emphasised the demands for the release of 50 ERP comrades, and for \$1 million from FIAT in the form of clothing and equipment for Argentinian schoolchildren, bearing revolutionary messages from the ERP. In addition, though, the ERP demanded the release of the imprisoned FIAT trade unionists, and the reinstatement of the total of some 500 men sacked in recent months. In their communiqués, widely published in the press, the ERP denounced the repression by the military regime, the severity of the emergency courts, and the holding and torturing of hundreds of political prisoners. Sallustro was shot only when the intransigence of the Lanusse regime prevented concession of the demands.

The significance of the action is the greater because it

comes at a time when the reformist leadership of the working class is exposing its bankruptcy to more and more workers, so that there is increasing support in the organised working class itself for uncompromising forms of struggle for socialism and national liberation. The Lanusse military regime is faced by an acute aggravation of the economic crisis—in recent months there has been 50 percent inflation, and unemployment is soaring. This increases Lanusse's difficulties in engineering the facade of "democratic" elections planned for March next year. Already the CGT, the main trade union federation, has been forced to call one 48-hour general strike against the regime (29 February-1 March). Even such action, the bureaucracy's forced response to the spontaneous movement of the working class, has brought it into conflict with the Peronist leadership. Shortly afterwards Peron himself wrote from Madrid to the CGT, urging it to suspend demonstrations against the military government for now. The 2-day strike he said, had been inopportune: "The time is not ripe for actions which could lead to violence and risk endangering our main objectives." Peron is, of course, manoeuvring for a "peaceful" return to power (for his appointed successors if not for himself) through the 1973 elections. To do this he of course has to accept the military's terms for the elections. In February he hastily retracted an attack he had made on the army in an article, for which it was suing him. His attempts to cool down the militancy of his popular support are part of the same process: but in fact for the first time since he went into exile they are beginning to alienate important sections of his support. The Peronism of the Argentinian Trade Union movement stems from the period of

the late '40s and early '50s when the Peronist regime and the Argentinian industrialists relied on mass support against the landowners and British imperialism, and the working class was able to make very substantial economic and organisational gains. In the present crisis of imperialism and of the Argentinian economy such a situation is unrepeatable. This is becoming apparent to the left wing elements of Peronism as they see Peron manoeuvring for power.

If Peron has some problems with the CGT bureaucracy, the militants at the base and the Peronist guerrilla forces are much further outside his grasp—many of the latter have now dropped the slogan "Peron will be back." Despite some initial confusion when elections were first announced, the Peronist armed forces (Montaneros and other groupings) have reformed for joint action, and accepted a line similar to that of the ERP and PRT: if there is a possibility of "democratic" elections and the mood in the mass of the working class makes it possible to use this, there will be intervention by the forces which stand for the armed struggle for national liberation; if not, there will be active boycott.

As struggles arise which the regime is forced to suppress, the latter eventuality becomes increasingly likely; and as Peron engages more closely in negotiations with the regime (though a last minute retreat should not be ruled out), the logic of workers' struggles is to break with the illusions of Peronism. The conjunction of events of the past few weeks demonstrates the importance of the intervention of the revolutionary armed forces in this process. Because of the nature of the ERP demands in the Sallustro case, and their denunciation of the repression which the

trade unions and reformist parties had been unable to challenge by purely verbal protest, it was difficult even for the bureaucracy of the labour movement to denounce the kidnapping.

Very shortly after the expiry of the Sallustro ultimatum, in Easter week, the events of Mendoza demonstrated once again the need of the mass movement for armed defence. Police fired on a workers' demonstration in Mendoza against rising electricity prices, and two died. The events also demonstrate the widening gap between the spontaneous activity of the working class and the reformist leadership. The response to the shootings by the working class was an immediate political strike against police repression, with sympathetic actions starting up in the rest of the country. When the CGT gave official backing to the strike and the funeral demonstrations, the Lanusse regime immediately froze all trade union funds. The response of the CGT, after anxious all-night consultations, was to back down and reverse their decisions.

The present situation, then, offers the possibility of a great advance in the armed struggle in the working class and the Argentinian masses, and in the building of a revolutionary army. The process is the more urgent as the situation in Chile draws nearer to confrontation: a confrontation in which the counterrevolutionary regimes of Brazil, Bolivia and Argentina would undoubtedly be all too ready to intervene. A leadership of the armed struggle in Argentina with a base in the working class and the masses, and an international consciousness, will have an important role to play in the next stage of the continental war.

—J. W.

STATEMENT FROM WAS TUN
April 1972

The following statement on the kidnapping and killing of Oberdán Sallustro, the general manager of the Argentine division of Fiat, and the assassination of the Argentine general, Juan Carlos Sánchez, appeared in the April issue of Was Tun, the West German monthly publication of the Revolutionar-Kommunistischen Jugend (Revolutionary Communist Youth), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. The translation is by The Militant.

Argentina has yet to settle down since the workers' uprising in Cordoba in the autumn of 1969. During these events, and following them, the whole political scene was transformed. On the one hand, the limitations of the traditional workers organizations (particularly the CGT [Confederación General del Trabajo—General Confederation of Labor]) became clear. On the other, the military regime was unable, despite its initial successes following the 1966 coup, to overcome the economic problems.

In this situation the revolutionaries were able to achieve important successes last year in the trade-union elections (at Fiat in Cordoba), strengthening their roots in SITRAC-SITRAM [Sindicato de Trabajadores de Concord—Concord Workers Union; Sindicato de Trabajadores de Materfer—Materfer Workers Union (two unions in the automobile industry)].

The regime replied with brutal repression: More than 50 union leaders were arrested, hundreds of revolutionaries were thrown in prison and murdered, and in Fiat in particular, hundreds of workers were fired.

The PRT (Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores—Revolutionary Workers Party, Argentine section of the Fourth International) was particularly hard hit. This organization, along with several others, saw itself confronted with an almost insurmountable problem: the alternative of either being rapidly liquidated, or of winning such a broad mass base that class solidarity could protect it.

Since legal revolutionary trade-

union work was almost excluded and time was pressing, it was decided to attempt to win the sympathy of the masses through bold, and hopefully stimulating, revolutionary actions.

The ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—Revolutionary People's Army), founded by the PRT, had already successfully kidnapped the British consul, Stanley Sylvester, last year and—through distribution of large quantities of food, school materials, etc., won by this action—it had won a certain sympathy in Rosario. These actions were continued through various brilliantly organized bank robberies.

The Argentine comrades now hoped to strengthen class solidarity and thus effectively counter the repression through a new spectacular action.

On March 21 the ERP kidnapped the General Manager of the Argentine Fiat, Sallustro, and demanded the liberation of many imprisoned members and leaders of the SITRAC and SITRAM trade unions, the withdrawal of police units from the plant, distribution of school materials with a value of \$1-million, liberation of 200 revolutionaries, and the publication of ERP communiqués.

But the situation was no longer the same as in 1971. Only in very particular situations are such commando actions capable of strengthening the self-confidence of the masses and their readiness to struggle. By their very nature such actions evoke the sympathy and perhaps support of the masses, but exclude participation by the masses. The masses are really reduced to the role of spectators.

If such actions were successful under particular conditions in Uruguay, the conditions in Argentina were much more unfavorable because the repression had drastically increased since the kidnapping of Sylvester, and the ties of the armed vanguard to the masses had thus been loosened.

The ERP was surely aware that in this situation the execution [of Sallustro] would not be understood by broad layers of the population. This realization, and the hope

of achieving an agreement with Fiat, led the ERP to delay carrying out the execution order. However, when they had been tracked down they had little choice but to shoot Sallustro and flee.

A life and death struggle was then underway. It is thus clear why another commando of the ERP shot General Sánchez shortly thereafter. He was the hardest and the most brutal of those who tracked down revolutionaries. He had controlled the 2nd Military District (Rosario-Tucumán) since 1970. He turned to brutal and escalating repressive measures after the kidnapping of Sylvester, earning the hatred of the inhabitants of Rosario, particularly the slum dwellers and the "immigrants" from North Argentina and Uruguay.

The repression struck at every oppositionist. Sánchez accused priests of betraying the church and had 47 of them arrested in September alone. Rosario became "the capital of torture." Toward the end of last year he could boast of having "put out of action" 85 percent of the guerrillas.

Thus the regime has been able to prevent a fusion of the vanguard with the masses—on the one hand through the complete physical elimination of large parts of the vanguard, and on the other hand, through the smothering of a new Córdoba (in Mendoza) [refers to recent strikes in Mendoza]. In this situation it is fully possible that a new military putsch (similar to that of 1966) will take place in the next few months, and the working class stands powerless before this danger.

The miserable failure of the attempt of the bureaucratic CGT to launch a general strike in Mendoza, and the effect on the workers of the decision to temporarily delay the price increases (particularly of electricity) shows what a great intimidation and confusion prevails in the Argentine working class today. The partial success (liberation of some trade-union leaders, replacement of a governor)

cannot obscure the fact of the difficult situation.

But the conditions described here do *not* mean that the situation in Argentina has been stabilized. On the contrary, the economic difficulties have increased in 1972, the working class is *not* integrated, despite the treacher-

ous stand of the CGT, although it lacks a leadership and a correct strategy.

In such a situation, renewed and fierce clashes can break out at any moment. The question will be whether the Argentine working class will then be armed or will suffer a decisive de-

feat.

The Argentine working class deserves our full solidarity.

Struggle against the repression in Argentina!

Down with the military dictatorship!

CLASS STRUGGLE AND ARMED STRUGGLE IN ARGENTINA

[Editorial article translated from the April 21 issue of *La Gauche*, which is edited by Ernest Mandel.]

For years, Argentina has been undergoing a social, economic and political crisis of exceptional gravity. The bourgeoisie of this country succeeded in starting a process of accelerated industrialization, profiting from the Second World War and the immediately following period. In order to gain concessions from imperialism, it permitted the rise of a powerful mass trade-union movement under the Peronist regime.

Thanks to the resources accumulated during the favorable years, it was possible to grant considerable reforms to the working class. A strong Peronist trade-union bureaucracy participated in managing the institutions of social security, profiting from the strength acquired by the mass movement and aiding the bourgeoisie in keeping it within the framework of the capitalist system.

Behind the Crisis

The material foundation of this whole system melted away during the fifties and sixties. That is why we witnessed successively the downfall of the Peronist regime, a permanent crisis of the post-Peronist political regimes, the installation of a military dictatorship that is still in power, and the current attempt to bring Peronism back under the wings of the regime.

With the reestablishment of the world market, dominated by imperialism, the further development of Argentine industry was blocked. The concessions won by the working class following the Second World War proved to be incompatible with even a relative competitiveness of Argentine products on the international market.

The big imperialist monopolies increased their penetration of the Argentine market, becoming more and more associated with so-called "national" Argentine big capital. There was only one road open to the Argentine bourgeoisie to save themselves from certain economic ruin: brutal lowering of the workers' standard of living. Permanent inflation, unemployment, elimination of the state subsidies to public and social services—these were the main means utilized to achieve this end. Solely within the last seven months, the buying power of the wages

of the Argentine workers was reduced about 40 percent, as estimated by the trade unions.

The Argentine working class, of legendary militancy in Latin America, did not stand by passively in face of these fierce attacks against its elementary interests. It sought to answer blow for blow, particularly by means of powerful general strikes in which successively 3,000,000, then 4,000,000, and then 5,000,000 workers participated.

Although the capitalists engage in maneuvers in face of this impressive force, in order to gain time, they cannot concede anything substantial. The effectiveness of these broad struggles is limited moreover, so long as they are content to exercise pressure on the successive governments without posing the question of power, and in fact tolerate power being held in the hands of various factions of the bourgeois class.

But, while the Peronist bourgeoisie was able to utilize the advantages gained by the workers under the Peronist regime to maintain rigid control over the mass movement, the situation began to change during recent years. The experience of the Cuban revolution; the more and more heated anger of the toiling masses over the successive blows against their standard of living; the appearance of a new vanguard of workers and youth who no longer accept in any way the subordination of the mass movement to the interests of this or that faction of the bourgeoisie—all this has brought about bit by bit the erosion of the Peronist control of the working class.

Successive layers of the workers have liberated themselves from this control whether consciously or simply by the way they act. More and more they are going beyond the purely reformist slogans of the trade-union bureaucracy.

Thus a series of veritable insurrections of the workers have occurred on a local scale since 1969: two times in Cordoba, once in Rosario and in Tucuman. In the last few days, from April 4 to April 7, an insurrection of the same kind occurred at Mendoza in response to a decision of the government to double (sic) at one stroke the elec-

tric power rates.

A Country on the Verge of Civil War

The bourgeoisie, up against the wall, is perfectly conscious of the fact that the country stands at the verge of civil war. Its reply is being developed along two planes, or rather by a combination of two maneuvers.

On the one hand, by preparing a "Grand National Accord" with the Peronists and all the other bourgeois parties, the capitalists hope to reintegrate the Peronist trade-union bureaucracy into the government structures, divide the more moderate layers of the working class from the more radicalized layers, and reorient all the combative energy of the masses once again into reformist and electoralist roads. But the big obstacle to actual success in this maneuver is the incapacity economically of the bourgeoisie to grant genuine, substantial concessions to the masses.

On the other hand, the system is equipped with a military dictatorship. The attempts of the working class to provide itself with a class-struggle leadership are systematically repressed by violence. At the Fiat plant in Cordoba, the organization of the workers into two trade unions, SITRAM-SITRAC, under a left-wing leadership that led several victorious strikes, brought about occupation of the plant by the gendarmerie, the firing of 500 workers, the dissolution of the unions, the arrest of the trade-union delegates who had been democratically elected by the workers.

They joined in prison hundreds upon hundreds of political prisoners, who are being held indefinitely without any kind of trial, or who are deported to concentration camps in Patagonia. The total number of these political prisoners is held by some to reach 3,000. The Revolutionary Workers Party, Argentine section of the Fourth International, which is not a mass organization, itself alone has 150 members in prison.

The military dictatorship is not content with arresting militant workers and revolutionists. It tortures and assassinates. General Sanchez, commander of the 2nd military region—whom the guerrillas just executed—used torture in Rosario against all the political prisoners belonging to the revolutionary organizations. He boasted publicly (see the April 12, 1972, issue of *Le Monde*) of advocating the assassination of revolutionists: "If it was up to me," he said, "I would throw them out of a plane without a parachute."

It seems that more than he and his cohorts are involved, since the April 11, 1972, issue of the *New York Times* had to admit that many political prisoners disappear without a trace, that is, they are assassinated by the dictatorship.

This is the background that must be taken into account in judging the actions of our comrades of the Revolutionary Army of the People (ERP), led by the PRT. How is it possible not to denounce the hypocrisy of all the good souls, beginning with the Pope, who are shedding crocodile tears over the fate of the manager of Fiat, Sallustro—whom the Lanusse government cold-bloodedly sent to his death—or the sinister butcher, Sanchez, but who have not found a word to denounce, criticize, or even regret the abominable assassinations of workers and of revolutionists, against which the actions of the Argentine guerrillas are only replies.

Our comrade, *Luis Pujals*, one of the leaders of the PRT, was kidnapped in full view in the streets by the secret police, savagely tortured to death and murdered. What voice among all these "moral authorities," who are so voluble today, was lifted then to denounce these "methods contrary to all the laws of civilization"? To condemn these methods when they strike the butchers but to remain quiet when they strike their victims, to speak in emotional tones regretting the death of a boss and of torturers but accepting as the most normal thing in the world the death of workers and of revolutionary militants underscores the "moral" hypocrisy that is the rule in bourgeois society.

Is Guerrilla War Contrary to the Traditions of the Workers Movement?

As was to be expected, Berlinguer, the general secretary of the Italian CP, decided to join in the orchestra disapproving the actions of the ERP: "We reject the methods of individual terrorism, contrary to the principles and traditions of the workers movement," he hastened to proclaim, out of fear that the events in Argentina might cause him to lose a few votes in the current electoral campaign in Italy.

Our comrades of the ERP do not uphold individual terrorism at all and do not practice it either. They uphold the principles of urban guerrilla war, which is hardly foreign to the traditions of the workers movement. That is, unless one excludes from this workers movement Lenin, who advocated guerrilla war after December 1905 in Russia, Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara, who utilized it to facilitate the first victory of a socialist revolution in Latin America, and many others besides whom no sophisticated *distinguo* [hair-splitting distinction] can banish from labor and revolutionary history.

The position of the revolutionary Marxists towards the problem of guerrilla war is well-known and conforms to their principles.

In the countries where the workers movement has won its fundamental democratic rights, where it can blossom out freely, the application of the methods of guerrilla war is false and ineffective. The working class, which represents the interests of the immense majority of the nation, has no need of violence at all to attain its objectives. Violence is used against it at certain moments in its development by its adversaries when they see no way out. In this case, it must create bodies of self-defense, an outcome of its own forms of mass organization. In the same way, threats of the rebirth of fascism must touch of vigorous replies, but which can and must be implanted normally in the mass movement of the workers.

It is the growth and organic force of the workers movement that permits, under these conditions, saving the utilization of the forms of action of guerrilla warfare, which are incomprehensible to the masses as long as that free growth remains assured.

The situation is quite different in the countries where the democratic rights of the workers movement have been suppressed or severely limited, where an open fascist or military dictatorship rules, where assassination, torture, concentration camps become the daily form of government of the capitalists. In this case the masses find themselves either intimidated for a period, lacking an imme-

diate reply to an adversary ready to go to any lengths, or they see their movement condemned to take the form of a succession of spasmodic explosions, interspersed with phases of ebb and despair.

When the adversary systematically fires on any mass demonstration that displays the slightest radicalism, when he savagely represses any strike and any union that goes beyond reformist objectives, the concrete choice facing militant workers is reduced in reality to three possibilities: either deliberately restrain the movement in order to avoid a bloody confrontation with the repressive forces, or consider as inevitable a confrontation between unarmed masses and repressive forces armed to the teeth, or, without delay, to get on with preparing and organizing the arming of the masses.

The two first possibilities are politically inadmissible and in any case unrealistic. The Argentine experience clearly demonstrates that no matter what the "wisdom" may be of the slogans advanced by incurable neoreformists, when the anger of the masses reaches a certain level, successive explosions are inevitable. It is the elementary duty of revolutionists to act in such a way that they occur in the best possible conditions for the workers.

The third possibility is subdivided again into two variants. There are those who espouse the principle that it is requisite for the masses to answer with their own arms against the arms of the slaughterers. But they prefer to await the moment when the masses themselves find the means to take the initiative in this respect. It is not until after this moment that the vanguard is justified in taking the initiative.

This position appears to us to be tinged with spontaneous illusions. It transforms the vanguard into a tail-endist rearguard. In practice it condemns the arming of the masses to be delayed up to the moment the dictatorship sinks by itself. Because one cannot see very well how, under the conditions of dictatorship and the illegality of all political initiatives of the slightest radical import, the masses would find the means to openly constitute a military apparatus of a legal nature, so to speak.

There remains the last variant, which is that proposed and applied by our Argentine comrades. The revolutionists construct autonomous and clandestine armed detachments, which are implanted in the mass movement as it matures and attains higher and higher levels, in order to stimulate in it the formation of broader and broader armed detachments, which they can fuse.

At the time of the Mendoza insurrection—where our comrades were not yet implanted—the presence of such armed detachments would have served as an organizing pole for the most advanced elements among the workers, each fighting cell, already trained and armed, becoming the organizer of a larger group of workers. Instead, the workers had to confront bare-handed a band of assassins of the people, who fired without mercy on the crowds of workers and on their homes, massacring several dozen persons. But how to improvise on the spot the arming, organization, and tactics of self-defense groups?

Moreover it was this role of armed protection, cover, and regroupment of the insurgent masses that was played by the comrades of the ERP at the time of the last uprising in Cordoba. But to be able to play this role it is necessary first of all to be organized for this end, to be trained and experienced, to have gained the sympathy

of the masses and to have broken—in the mind of the masses—belief in the invincibility and invulnerability of the repressive apparatus. These are all functions that the guerrilla fighters must fulfill.

A Duty of Revolutionary Solidarity

Revolutionary Marxists, contrary to the populists or the partisans of Regis Debray, do not at all consider guerrilla war to be a universal panacea. It is only one form of struggle among others, even in countries where a dictatorship is in power. It must fulfill a precise function there which is attached to others: the construction of a revolutionary party; the elevation of the mass movement to a level of generalized revolutionary action.

Marxists reject any blind faith in this or that tribune, including armed tribunes, to free the workers. The emancipation of the workers can only be achieved by the workers themselves. On the road to that emancipation, in confronting bloody dictatorships, guerrilla war can be a remarkable weapon, under precise conditions and in a precise context, as the teachings of history confirm.

The Fourth International is not a hypercentralized organization. Its international bodies determine only the general political line of the movement. Tactical decisions are strictly the province of the national sections. It is in this sense that the Fourth International does not have to take the responsibility for every tactical decision of this or that particular national section, nor judge it either. To be able to express such a judgment in a responsible manner, it would be necessary in addition to have available a number of detailed facts, which we lack for the moment.

Our duty in face of the hysteria unleashed in the press against our comrades of the PRT and the ERP is summed up, under these conditions, in two points. First of all in the affirmation of our complete solidarity with these courageous comrades, targets of a campaign of denigration, the hypocrisy of which is disgusting. This solidarity, moreover, must not remain purely verbal. A committee for the defense of the political prisoners in Argentina has been set up in Paris under the sponsorship of Comrade Carpani, the representative of the Argentine trade-union confederation, the CGT. This committee is in urgent need of aid and of extension to other countries of Europe.* This must be assured to it.

Next, in the affirmation of our agreement with the general orientation of the PRT of developing the armed struggle, while expressing the hope that our comrades will find the means to link this struggle in the most intimate way to the development of the mass struggle, with the broadening of an organized base among the masses, and with a clear political orientation toward the socialist and proletarian revolution, against any concept of a revolution by stages.

The lesson to be drawn from the events in Argentina in this regard is, moreover, of universal importance. The temptation to resort to a fascist regime or to a military dictatorship constantly recurs to the bourgeoisie as soon as the class struggle becomes exacerbated anywhere in the world.

The possessing classes must be made to know that after

* Correspondence can be sent to : M. Duras, Impasse du Mont-Tonnere, 15. Paris 6, France.

the experience of the barbarous Nazi atrocities, the young vanguard throughout the world will never again tolerate the most abject form of civil war: that in which one camp is armed to the teeth, and murders, tortures, and oppresses without mercy, while the other camp is physically, psy-

chologically, and politically disarmed, and resigns itself passively to the role of victim. The example of Argentina demonstrates that this vanguard is already sufficiently strong and resolute so that such an ignominy will not be repeated again.

**NEITHER PERON'S RESTRAINTS NOR ISOLATED GUERRILLA ACTION —
FOR A FIGHTING PROGRAM AND A SOCIALIST POLE**
from Avanzada Socialista, March 29, 1972

The two articles on this page present the position of the Argentine Socialist Party headed by Juan Carlos Coral on the recent kidnapping of Italian industrialist Oberdan Sallustro by the ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo — People's Revolutionary Army). Under the title "Neither Perón's restraints nor isolated guerrilla action — For a fighting program and a socialist pole," they appeared in the March 29 issue of Avanzada Socialista. This is the newly launched weekly newspaper of the Argentine Socialist Party, following the establishment of a working agreement with the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (La Verdad).

The first echoes of Perón's order to the CGT [Confederación General de los Trabajadores - General Confederation of Workers] to cease using class-struggle methods had barely died down when two guerrilla groups took direct actions that have resulted, so far, in the death of Uzal¹ and the young member of the Montoneros, Rossi,² and the kidnapping of Sallustro, manager of the Argentine division of Fiat.

There is an obvious relation between the order to slow down the class struggle and the guerrilla actions. Emanating from polar opposites, with utterly different objectives and even with opposing impact on the workers, they are comparable in one decisive aspect: They each offer a false per-

spective to the Argentine masses.

Perón's order is an appeal to the workers to stop their struggles and give a blank check to the oppressive military dictatorship and its political-electoral scheme. That this "tactic" is presented as an intelligent way to achieve the goals of the masses, and that it comes from a leader like Perón, who still has great influence in the working class, makes it doubly dangerous.

All the traitorous leaderships have used the same argument to justify their big sellouts. For example, when the Communist Party or watered-down socialists³ called for support to the Democratic Union,⁴ they did it in the name of the most heart-felt demands of the people and by invoking their moral authority over the masses.

In the same way, when this old "left" called for support to the right-wing military coup in 1955, which clamped down on the trade unions and turned the country over to the monopolies,⁵ they did so in the name of trade-union democracy and anti-imperialism.

Because of these experiences, Perón's instructions (backed up by his trade-union agents, the CGT bureaucrats posed in the sharpest way the deep leadership crisis in which the Argentine workers are caught.

These workers are super-exploited by a government that serves the international monopolies and giant corporations. They are being dragged

into the electoral trap of the GAN⁶ [Great National Accord] by their leaders.

This crisis of leadership is all the more evident in view of the fact that throughout the country, in factories, offices, schools, and universities, new leaderships are appearing that are not willing to capitulate and that are conducting battles by the thousand, threatening the plans of the government, the bourgeoisie, and the Peronist bureaucracy to stifle the mass struggle.

Guerrilla war: false alternative

In the vacuum formed by the crisis of leadership — concretely by the CGT's rejection of a fighting approach and Perón's appeal to support the GAN (alias "Citizens'" front) — the recent actions by armed groups in no way constitute a correct alternative for the masses. And there is a basic reason for this: Instead of clearly calling for the organization and mobilization of the masses against the real dangers — the government's strategy and the treacherous bureaucrats — they persist in the erroneous view that the makeshift action of a small armed vanguard, isolated from the workers and their struggles as a whole, can represent the workers and win their goals.

For example, the nationalist, or Peronist, guerrillas of the Montoneros, by attacking the headquarters of the New Force, the stronghold of the anti-nationalist and antiworker monopoly

interests, have greatly missed giving the masses a clear picture of the real trap, GAN, in which Alsogaray's party [New Force], plays a minimal role because it has no influence among workers.

Such actions not only sow confusion as to who is the immediate enemy, they also fail to provide the workers with a political instrument with which to confront the major bourgeois parties and the New Force itself.

The same analysis is applicable to the kidnapping of Sallustro. Even when the socialist guerrillas of the ERP demand the rehiring of the fired Fiat workers and a billion pesos to indemnify "the people," experience teaches us that the bosses will in a few weeks be able to regain their money with interest through the simple expedient of a speedup. They can also soon turn around and once again fire the militants that give the bosses trouble.

Unless the workers as a whole learn to defend themselves through different means from those indicated by the guerrillas, such will be the case.

In this sense the experience gained from the kidnapping of Sylvester,⁷ the manager of Swift, is quite revealing. The meat-packing company agreed to the demands, but within a short time the bureaucracy won the trade-union elections and the bosses reestablished, intensified, and expanded all the vicious norms of exploitation.

The reason they could get away with it is quite simple: As long as there is no organized, tested vanguard inside the Swift plant — or Fiat — capable of mobilizing the entire work force behind it on a continuing basis (as has begun to be done in many places by the newly arising vanguard), there is nothing and no one to block the boss-bureaucrat combination.

The worst result is that a worker at Swift or Fiat might mistakenly expect that he can overcome his enemy through the providential intercession of some armed group instead of by his own daily activities. What we say for one factory or for trade-union demands applies even more to the political struggle against the bourgeoisie and imperialism: As long as the vanguard is not solidly organized into a mass revolutionary party, it is impossible to defeat the bourgeoisie.

Even the ERP's demand that the gov-

ernment free 50 imprisoned guerrillas indicates a wrong approach. Our party consistently fights with all its strength to free all political and class-struggle prisoners, including and especially, the guerrillas. That is why we have made the demand for Comrade Santucho's⁸ freedom a regular part of our public propaganda. In our opinion, Comrade Santucho as an indi-

Fiat and Sallustro

We have little to add to the charges leveled against Sallustro by the ERP. The whole hypocritical campaign of the government, the church, the Peronist leaders, and other political parties cannot hide the undeniable facts.

Sallustro, as a Fiat executive, is responsible for the persecution, firing, and jailing of the best worker activists who were fighting for the exploited workers' "bread and dignity." He is responsible for forcing men and women, sweating for Fiat's millions in profits, to work under the muzzles of police and army rifles. He is responsible for posting in the Fiat plant the troops who mowed down the militants who sought to take up the task of defending the workers.

The great "humanitarian" campaign in defense of Sallustro now being carried on by the regime cannot hide the open use of police in the service of the exploiters, in this case a voracious international monopoly that starves workers in half the world.

But the workers' real enemy is not a Sallustro, who can easily be replaced by Fiat. The real enemy is the capitalist and monopolist system and the government of the monopolies. It will not be possible to defeat them through isolated actions; that can be done only by the joint mobilization of the workers and the people.

vidual is symbolic of all the Argentine fighters.

Of course we want to win the release of all hostages of the regime as quickly as possible — some 3,000 (according to figures we cannot readily verify). In face of this situation we must continue to tell the masses that

the task of freeing our 3,000 comrades from the jails will require a massive mobilization as part of a fighting program of the workers and popular masses.

In this area also we cannot expect miraculous solutions. Only by organizing and mobilizing, circumventing traps laid by the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, will we be able to free the prisoners and return them to our class so that they can continue their fight against the exploiters.

The guerrilla actions have performed the service of clearly showing the close brotherhood formed by the Argentine bourgeoisie with its armed forces, its religious leaders, its press, and its propaganda apparatus, in order to advance the perfidious governmental scheme. Now they have come up with a new and macabre argument to help the GAN: the exploitation of the grief of the Uzal and Sallustro families.

In their condemnation of violence and their propagandistic utilization of its victims, Perón, Caggiano,⁹ and the government display calculated self-interest and hypocrisy that must be denounced before the masses.

Argentine socialists sympathize with all who suffer and do not wish grief to any family. But we declare that the main cause of all the tragedies that stir human sympathy lies in the bloody system of exploitation of man by man, which converts some into exploiters and police, and others — the exploited — into victims.

We declare, at the same time, that the rebellion of the oppressed compels them and will continue to compel them to employ violent means. We declare that this is the painful price that must be paid in order to initiate a new era for humanity.

Meanwhile, the political exploitation of personal suffering is motivated at bottom by class interests. The many who filed before the house of Uzal or Sallustro did not file before the bier of the youthful militant Rossi, nor the others who have been executed, persecuted, kidnapped, and tortured by the police, nor have they expressed anguish for the thousands of tragedies befalling those who endure grinding daily poverty.

For a fighting program

The armed action road subscribed to by the Montoneros and ERP is the wrong way of confronting the ex-

plotters; it does not educate nor help the working class.

It follows that our opposition to the methods of the Montoneros and the ERP is not based on a class difference, for we have a common enemy, imperialism, the government, the bourgeoisie, and the bureaucracy; our opposition is political, it is opposition to the false path they ask the workers to follow.

The Argentine Socialist Party invites all the *compañeros*, especially the worker, youth, and student leaders, to think over these two paths that, each from a different angle, have been offered to them in recent days—the path of Perón, with his appeal to suspend the struggle, and the path of the guerrilla groups, who insist on carrying out actions isolated and separated from the mass mobilizations and struggles.

We believe that with careful thought one fact will emerge as a certainty: Neither of these two paths offers an economic or political way out for the

masses.

On the other hand, the Argentine workers themselves have already given the proper answer. The memory is still fresh of the Cordobazo,¹⁰ which contains all the keys to what must be done. The Argentine Socialist Party calls upon everyone to gain inspiration from the Cordobazo and through a Rank and File Congress of the CGT to confront the bureaucratic union leaders and demand a real program of struggle for the workers and popular masses; for an increase in salaries, against the inflation and unemployment, and for the release of the political prisoners.

At the same time the Argentine Socialist Party urges all the worker and socialist forces to unite in a pole of political opposition, to forge the tool necessary to challenge the GAN and lead the struggle towards a government of the workers and the popular masses and toward a socialist Argentina.

1. Mario Roberto Uzal, a leader of the New Force, a party headed by a former minister of economy, Alvaro Alsogaray. Uzal was fatally wounded March 18 when commandos of the Montoneros, a Peronist guerrilla group, raided his home. He died two days later.
2. Jorge Guillermo Rossi, 22, was killed in the raid on Uzal's home.
3. The right-wing socialists who favor a bloc with sectors of the capitalist class.
4. A capitalist party.
5. "Monopolies" usually refers to foreign corporations.
6. GAN is the plan of the military dictatorship to gain nationwide support for its program for "class peace."
7. Sylvester was kidnapped by the ERP on May 23, 1971.
8. Santucho is a leader of the ERP and of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (Combatiente).
9. Caggiano is a cardinal in the Catholic Church who was involved in attempting to settle a strike.
10. Cordobazo refers to the mass uprising that took place in Córdoba in May of 1969.

EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF THE
UNITED SECRETARIAT,
April 15-16, 1972

Motion by Pierre:

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International disapproves of the *publication* in the *Militant* and in *Labor Challenge* of resolutions adopted by the leaderships of the Socialist Workers Party and the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvriere concerning the kidnapping of Sallustro by the Argentine ERP, the armed organization led by the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT), Argentine section of the Fourth International.

Such public declarations could well encourage sections to follow this example of public attacks against other sections, which would be highly damaging to the whole International.

In addition, these resolutions do not express any solidarity towards these comrades, at the moment when a fierce campaign is underway against them.

The United Secretariat of the Fourth International resolves not to publish these two resolutions in the International's organs, or in organs expressing its positions.

This resolution is *not* for public circulation.

For: 6 (Petersen, Walter, Livio, Kurt, Pierre, Delfin)

Against: 5 (Adair, Pedro, Juan, Hans, Therese)

Consultative For: 1 (Riel)

Consultative Against: 1 (Crandall)

Carried

Motion by Juan:

That the United Secretariat issue a public statement on the kidnapping of Sallustro making the following points:

1) Indicate the economic, social, political crisis racking Argentina, citing some examples, such as the massive strikes, demonstrations and uprisings in various cities, the latest one being Mendoza.

2) Indicate the origin and purpose of the military dictatorship, that it constitutes an illegal regime, ruling in violation of the constitution.

3) Outline the brutal methods used by the military dictatorship such as suppression of student and workers dem-

onstrations, suppression of strikes, arbitrary imprisonment of union leaders and union militants, the use of kidnapping, torture, and murder of political opponents. Name some of the political prisoners held by the hundreds in the jails of Argentina.

4) Give some facts on the frustration, anger, and instinctive elemental reaction, particularly among the youth, who want immediate direct action against the dictatorship.

5) Describe briefly the historical political crisis facing the Argentine working class, above all the absence of a mass revolutionary Marxist party of the kind the Fourth International is seeking to build in all countries, that could guide the struggle effectively toward and early revolutionary victory.

6) Stress the influence of guerilla struggles in Latin America and elsewhere in which the action of a small group has been substituted for action by the masses, leading to adventurism, and away from construction of a mass revolutionary Marxist party regardless of the intentions of the guerrilla fighters.

7) Specify in a few sentences that we consider the PRT-ERP to have fallen into errors of this kind, the most spectacular being the kidnapping and execution of Sallustro. Include a brief explanation of how acts like the kidnapping and execution of Sallustro injure the work of building the mass revolutionary party required to overturn Argentine capitalism, and how the world press has taken advantage of the Sallustro affair to attempt to discredit Trotskyism by identifying it with terrorism.

8) Affirm that the Fourth International expresses its solidarity with the courageous militants of the PRT-ERP regardless of their mistake course and pledges to step up its campaign in their defense and in defense of all the political prisoners held in the jails of Argentina.

Vote:

For: 5 (Adair, Pedro, Juan, Therese, Hans)

Against: 6 (Petersen, Walter, Kurt, Pierre, Delfin, Livio)

Consultative For: 1 (Crandall)

Consultative Against: 1 (Riel)

Defeated

MOTION PASSED BY SWP
NATIONAL COMMITTEE PLENUM

The National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, having considered the motion passed by a majority of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International at its April 15-16 meeting disapproving the publication in *The Militant* and *Labor Challenge* of statements adopted by the Political Committees of the Socialist Workers Party and the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvriere concerning the kidnapping of Sallustro, takes the following position:

1) The motion passed by the majority of the United Secretariat is factually in error in ascribing to these statements a failure to express solidarity with members of the Ejercito Revolucionario des Pueblo (ERP) and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT-Combatiente) in face of the repressive campaign opened against them by the Lanusse regime. The statements of both the SWP and the LSA/LSO clearly outlined the background to the kidnapping, pinned responsibility for the violence on the Argentinian ruling class and the dictatorial Lanusse regime, and expressed full solidarity with the worldwide campaign for the release of all political prisoners in Argentina and an end to the repression.

The record shows that the Canadian and American Trotskyists have been in the forefront in organizing material help for the political prisoners in Argentina and Latin America as a whole. To suggest otherwise, as the motion of the majority does, can only serve to prejudice the minds of uninformed members of the Fourth International against the SWP and the LSA/LSO.

2) Likewise in error factually is the assertion of the motion passed by the majority of the United Secretariat that publication of the statements made by the SWP and the LSA/LSO constituted a public "attack" against a section of the Fourth International. In actuality both statements did no more than to differentiate politically from a very bad error committed by the ERP-PRT, an error that was damaging on a world scale to the Fourth International and to all sectors of the world Trotskyist movement. This error consisted of substituting the action of a small, isolated group for action by the masses.

3) The statements of both the SWP and the LSA/LSO were in consonance with the principled position of Trotskyism in explaining how the error committed by the ERP-PRT could be avoided.

The statement made by the Political Committee of the SWP said the following on this: "In place of powerful actions by the masses themselves the ERP is attempting to substitute small actions by a tiny group. Their hopes are placed on these actions serving as examples to the people living in the slums. They hope that the dramatic nature of the 'exemplary actions' will inspire the masses to begin moving toward toppling the old regime and establishing a government of their own.

"In reality, the work of bringing the masses into the political arena in all their invincible power differs qualitatively from such notions. It requires deep involvement in the daily life of the masses. It requires patient strug-

gling, under the guidance of a revolutionary-socialist party, to project demands directly linked to the economic, social, and political needs of the masses, and to organize support for these demands in such a way as to raise the self-confidence of the masses and take them through transitional steps onto the road of a socialist revolution".

4) The United Secretariat did not issue a statement at the time of the Sallustro kidnapping specifying its stand. In face of the worldwide repercussions to the kidnapping, the various sectors of the world Trotskyist movement had little choice but to issue statements of their own. Besides *The Militant* and *Labor Challenge* such publications as *La Gauche, Rouge*, and *The Red Mole* also felt compelled to indicate their stands, although the latter were completely uncritical of the ERP-PRT.

5) The Political Committee of the SWP made its statement on April 3 in full expectation that the United Secretariat would, when it met, issue a statement of similar nature, expressing moral solidarity with the guerrilla fighters who had conducted the kidnapping while indicating that it differed with them as to the correctness of the action politically. Such a statement by the United Secretariat was all the more called for in view of the fact that none of the resolutions passed by the last world congress of the Fourth International sanctioned substituting the actions of a small, isolated group for actions by the masses.

6) It is true that the minority at the last world congress held that the positions taken by the majority in favor of rural guerrilla warfare for a prolonged period on a continental scale in Latin America, if taken to their logical conclusions would end up in diverting the Trotskyist cadres from accomplishing the necessary party-building tasks and in sanctioning the substitution of actions by small, isolated groups for actions by the masses. But the majority denied that this was the logic of their position. Thus it remained to be seen how they would react when an action occurred of the kind initiated by the PRT-ERP. It could be hoped that they would back away from the logic of the position they took at the last world congress and would reaffirm the principled position of Trotskyism against adventurism.

7) Instead of doing this the majority of the United Secretariat equivocated at the April 15-16 meeting. They neither approved nor disapproved the kidnapping and execution of Sallustro. They *abstained* from taking either a public or internal stand, rejecting a proposal by a minority of the United Secretariat to issue a public statement similar to those issued by the SWP and the LSA/LSO.

8) In all consistency this meant that the majority of the United Secretariat left it open to the various sectors of the world Trotskyist movement to take whatever positions seemed correct to them. Nevertheless the majority of the United Secretariat passed a motion disapproving the publication of the statements already made by the SWP and the LSA/LSO. These two acts together amounted to shame-faced condemnation of any political differentiation from the ERP-PRT error, such as that expressed by the

SWP and the LSA/LSO. It amounted to just as shame-faced approval of an "all hail" attitude toward the kidnapping and execution of Sallustro, such as that voiced by *Rouge*, *La Gauche*, and *The Red Mole*.

9) The National Committee of the SWP notes with special concern the specific instructions "not to publish" the two resolutions of the SWP and the LSA/LSO "in the International's organs, or in organs expressing its positions." This is the first time since the Reunification Congress of 1963 that such instructions have been issued. The effect of these instructions is to gag those who are critical of the error committed by the ERP-PRT and to encourage those who approve of the error, since no instructions were issued not to publish expressions of political solidarity with the ERP-PRT error.

More ominously, the clear implication is that the ERP-PRT, in kidnapping and executing Sallustro was acting in accordance with the line of the majority of the United Secretariat, that this line holds on an international scale,

that it should be promulgated by all the sections and organs of the Fourth International, and that the majority of the United Secretariat will brook no public criticism, however mild, of applying it. In this way a line is being foisted onto the Fourth International that was not explicitly formulated or adopted at the last world congress and that constitutes a departure from the traditions and program of Trotskyism.

10) In view of these considerations, the National Committee of the SWP approves the action of the Political Committee in publishing the April 3 statement which expressed moral solidarity with the guerrilla fighters of the ERP-PRT while criticizing the kidnapping of Sallustro as a political error. In addition, the National Committee of the SWP condemns the procedure followed by a majority of the United Secretariat and rejects its disapproval of the publication of the statements of the political committees of the SWP and the LSA/LSO.

May 11, 1972

STATEMENT BY
DELFIN, GHULAM, LIVIO, PETERSEN
PIERRE, SANDOR, WALTER
May 30-31, 1972

1.- The decision taken by the United Secretariat meeting of April 15-16, 1972 to disapprove the publication by the SWP and the LSA-LSO in their public organs of official party resolutions condemning actions by the Argentine section in no way was intended to "gag" any comrade or group of comrades, or to condemn anybody to "remain silent". It has only one content: to keep discussion of the policies of the Argentine section *inside* the movement, in national and international internal bulletins. In this way, the F. I. has conducted its fraternal discussions regarding the orientation of national sections for decades, without its members feeling "gagged" by that.

The only exception to this rule in the past have been cases when sections publicly broke with the programmatic basis of revolutionary Marxism, or crossed the class lines, like the renegade LSSP leaders did. By no stretch of imagination can the Sallustro episode be blown up into an analogous case of programmatic break with Trotskyism or class collaboration.

Therefore, the majority of the United Secretariat members present at the April 15-16 meeting considered the actions by the PC of the SWP and the PC of the LSA-LSO as a departure from the established norm of handling differences between sections or Trotskyist organisations prevented by reactionary legislation to be affiliated to the F. I. This departure could open a dangerous course of

escalating public polemics between leading bodies of many sections. The NC of the SWP and the PC of the LSA-LSO, while rejecting the April 15-16 meeting's resolution, do not show in any way in how far these legitimate fears of the United Secretariat can be considered unfounded.

2.- The statement by the NC of the SWP and the PC of the LSA-LSO justifies the public attack against the Argentine section by stating that the Sallustro affair represents, on behalf of the Argentine section, a break with the "long-held principled position of Trotskyism on terrorism". They even imply that the majority of the United Secretariat now takes a stand in favor of terrorism.

We reject all these characterizations. What the comrades of the SWP and the LSA-LSO presumably refer to is the principled opposition of revolutionary Marxists against individual terrorism. To our knowledge, neither the PRT-ERP, nor the United Secretariat of the F. I. have been converted to individual terrorism.

The PRT-ERP is applying organized guerrilla warfare in a prerevolutionary situation, under a terrorist dictatorship which ruthlessly kidnaps, tortures and kills trade-unionists and revolutionists, as soon as they don't limit their activities to the "rules" laid down by the dictator. Revolutionary Marxists have never condemned guerrilla warfare on principle. The position of the SWP and the

LSA-LSO leadership on this matter is all the more inconsistent as, to our knowledge, the world Trotskyist movement, including the SWP and the LSA-LSO, never condemned hundreds of episodes of guerrilla warfare similar to the Sallustro action, which occurred in the course of the revolutionary struggle in Kenya, Vietnam, Cuba, Algeria, Palestine, the Portuguese colonies—just to mention the most important examples—sometimes applied by groups which, at a given stage of the struggle, were by no means qualitatively stronger than the PRT-ERP.

Obviously what is involved here is not a matter of principle, but a matter of tactics, which can only be judged in the framework of a concrete analysis of the objective situation and its dynamics, the level of consciousness of the masses and of the vanguard, the numerical and political weight of that vanguard, the relationship of forces between the various social and political factors present in

the situation, etc. etc. For these reasons we are of course opposed to applying guerrilla warfare to Canada, the USA, Italy, France, Western Germany and many other countries. But we are in favor of applying it in concrete cases under concrete circumstances, like e.g. today in Bolivia, Argentina or Angola.

All other political considerations raised by the SWP NC and the LSA-LSO PC statement referring to Argentina will be dealt with more at length in the proceeding pre-world congress international discussion.

Members of the United Secretariat present at the April 15-16 or May 30-31 meeting: Delfin, Ghulam, Livio, Petersen, Pierre, Sandor, Walter

When the above statement was drafted, Comrade Vergeat was not present. He reserves the right, however, to make a personal statement in the subsequent minutes.