

INTERNAL INFORMATION BULLETIN

January 1972

No. 1 in 1972

CONTENTS

PAGE

**CORRECTION TO INTERNAL INFORMATION BULLETIN
No. 7 in 1971**

3

**REPORT TO SWP NATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE EVOLUTION
OF THE POLITICAL DEBATE IN THE WORLD TROTSKYIST
MOVEMENT, by Mary-Alice Waters**

4

20 cents

Published by

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

14 Charles Lane, New York, N.Y. 10014

Page 2

was blank in the
original bulletin

- Marty Dec 2013

**CORRECTION TO INTERNAL INFORMATION
BULLETIN No. 7 in 1971**

The following paragraph was left out by error of the printed version of the organization report approved by the 24th National Convention of the SWP.

“I wanted to make one comment on the functioning of party comrades in the youth. That is, that party members in all areas of work are bound by party discipline. Given the fraternal relations with the YSA, the nature of the YSA and the nature of its relationship to the SWP, there’s certainly no fractional intervention, as Frank pointed, in the YSA by the SWP at this time. But on the questions of important political differences that have been discussed and decided upon by the party, party members are bound by those decisions unless the party decides that party members may take up those differences inside the YSA.”

REPORT TO SWP NATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE
EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL DEBATE IN THE
WORLD TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT

by Mary-Alice Waters

The report already given to this convention by Comrade Joe Hansen (see October, 1971, *International Socialist Review*) concentrated on some of the central world political developments since our last convention. In particular he emphasized the evolution of the Vietnam war, its repercussions in the United States, and the meaning and effects of some of the political initiatives of the Maoist regime in China.

This report from the Political Committee has two objectives. The first is to outline the political discussion within the Fourth International on the points over which there were differences at the April 1969 world congress. The second is to explain how the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party views the current stage of this internal discussion in the world Trotskyist movement.

The International Executive Committee (IEC) has formally opened the discussion period leading up to the next world congress which will be the 4th world congress since reunification of the International in 1963. The date of the world congress has not yet been decided.

To begin with, it is worth taking a few minutes to review the differences that emerged at the 1969 world congress. The majority of comrades attending this convention, either as delegates or observers, have probably joined the movement since that time and may not clearly recall what took place at that congress.

The most important differences were those that arose over the question of the strategic orientation for the Trotskyist movement in Latin America. The majority of delegates at the world congress were of the opinion that the only alternative open to the Latin American comrades as a whole was to begin immediate preparations for or engagement in rural guerrilla warfare with the perspective that it would be necessary to continue on this course for a prolonged period and on a continental scale. They held that the severe repression in most countries virtually excluded the possibility of ascending mass mobilizations and the construction of mass revolutionary parties in any way parallel to the Bolshevik experience. Any significant motion by the masses would immediately be met by severe repression and the mass movements crushed, unless they were protected by armed guerrilla detachments from the start. And, in the opinion of the majority, it was virtually precluded that the Latin American ruling classes, backed by U. S. imperialism, could make tactical shifts for a period of time and support less repressive, reformist regimes in countries like Bolivia and Peru.

About one third of the delegates at the congress (and members of the SWP who attended as observers were in agreement with this minority) felt that it was a serious error to project the tactic of guerrilla warfare as a strategic orientation for an entire continent, for an entire period. In our view, guerrilla warfare should be considered a tactical question, to be decided by each section or sympathizing party and fitted into a broader strategy of building a combat party on the Bolshevik model. It should be up to the Trotskyists in each country to decide whether or not engagement in guerrilla warfare would advance

the revolutionary process and further the construction of mass revolutionary parties capable of successfully leading the revolution to victory. If guerrilla warfare is not viewed in this way, but as a main strategy, then, regardless of original intent, the Leninist concept of constructing a combat party as the main strategic task is called into question.

The majority held that they too were for building parties but that revolutionary parties could only be constructed today in Latin America if the Trotskyists proved themselves the best guerrilla fighters, arms in hand. Such was the only path to either the vanguard or the masses.

The minority felt that such a *strategy* could only lead to the political miseducation of the entire world movement and the decimation of the small Trotskyist parties and cadres in Latin America. Logically it would have to be extended beyond Latin America to other parts of the world.

(We will return to some of these questions later on. The intention here is simply to summarize the major differences as they emerged at the 1969 world congress.)

Chinese Cultural Revolution

The second major question over which there were divergent views was the evaluation of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and an assessment of Maoism. These differences were not so sharp as the differences over the Latin American document, primarily because they posed no immediate political problems. The Cultural Revolution was over by the time the world congress met. But the theoretical questions posed were, in our opinion, very important.

There were basically two kinds of differences. A number of things were questions of fact, or assessment of the factual information available. One of the central problems was absence of adequate information on which to base definitive judgments. In this category were questions such as the role of the army, the nature of the red guard movement, and the degree of damage done to education and culture by the "Cultural Revolution." We, of course, felt that our assessment of these questions—which put Maoism in a less favorable light than the evaluation adopted by the majority—was more accurate.

Secondly, there were a number of differences over questions we considered more serious. How significant was the Mao cult and how much weight should it be given in assessing the nature of the Chinese regime? We tended to think it was more important than did the comrades who supported the majority resolution. What is the nature of Peking's foreign policy? We held that it is not revolutionary but fundamentally opportunist; it combines ultraleftist elements in different concrete situations, and is based on the narrow nationalistic interests of a ruling bureaucratic caste. The majority of comrades felt Peking's foreign policy was often objectively revolutionary and that the best characterization for the regime was bureaucratic centrist.

There were differences over the exact nature of the Chi-

nese regime. We held it represented the interests of a crystallized bureaucratic caste; the majority rejected this characterization in their resolution.

There were differences concerning a definition of Stalinism.

And finally there were differences over how much of a danger ultraleftism posed for the world movement—in either its Maoist variety or its other forms. We were of the opinion then, and think it has been confirmed in the period since the world congress, that the ultraleftist pressures on our movement are significant and find their reflection within our ranks.

Comrade Peng also made a minority report on China. While he supported the minority resolution on the Cultural Revolution, he expressed his opinion that the Trotskyist movement should have given critical support to the Liu Shao-chi wing of the bureaucracy in its battle with Mao's faction inasmuch as, in Peng's opinion, the Liu wing represented a Khrushchev-type tendency favoring de-Stalinization.

A much more detailed analysis of all these questions is contained in two articles published in the *International Information Bulletin*, No. 4 and No. 5 in 1970. Comrades would find it worthwhile to go back and reread "The Differences Between the Two Documents on the Cultural Revolution," and "The Origin of the Differences on China."

While the disagreements were significant, comrades should bear in mind that there was agreement on the need for a political revolution to overthrow the privileged bureaucracy in China and establish workers democracy. This was a question of key political importance and marked an advance since some sectors of the world Trotskyist movement had hesitated or been opposed to taking such a stand.

Finally, there were differences at the world congress over the United Secretariat's draft resolution, "The Worldwide Radicalization of Youth and the Tasks of the Fourth International." The differences on this question came as somewhat of a surprise as none had been expressed prior to the world congress. But the French comrades there indicated that they disagreed with the whole concept of a transitional program for the student movement and the need for a separate youth organization in constructing the Trotskyist movement.

* * *

Three things should be emphasized about the last world congress. The first is that while the differences were significant, they occurred within a framework of fundamental agreement on most basic questions which unite the world Trotskyist movement. In addition, there were no differences concerning the evaluation and analysis of key political events of the last few years, such as the 1968 explosions in France, Mexico and Czechoslovakia. There was agreement on the character and central importance of the international youth radicalization; on the central political importance of the Vietnamese revolution and the struggle against American imperialism's intervention; on the conjunctural economic analysis and its implications for the class struggle. The fundamental questions on which there was agreement outweighed those over which there were differences.

Secondly, the divisions on each of the disputed ques-

tions cut across each other. For instance the minority on Latin America was not the same as the minority on China and the youth document had the unanimous support of the United Secretariat. This had an important bearing on our attitude of opposing the crystallization of international tendencies. We wanted to ensure maximum freedom of debate and place the fewest obstacles in the way of comrades' changing their views as new facts and arguments were presented.

Thirdly, the majority of delegates at the congress felt there had not been adequate discussion of the important questions before the world congress. This was reflected in the fact that the written internal discussion on all three disputed issues was continued after the congress. (In the case of Latin America the discussion was reopened by the next meeting of the IEC.)

In most sections of the world Trotskyist movement there had been very little, if any, discussion prior to the world congress. A large number of delegates had not seen several key line documents before arriving at the world congress itself, much less had an opportunity to study and think about them or discuss them with the leading committees in their sections, or even read them in their own language.

Observers from the SWP were in complete agreement with the decision to keep the written discussion open. The world congress really marked the beginning of the debate, not its conclusion. And we were not at all pessimistic about the outcome. Objectively, we felt, time was on our side. We are not going through a period of stagnation and decline for the revolutionary movement, when the adverse pressure of the general political situation weighs heavily on the movement and exacerbates all differences. On the contrary, we are going through a period where the revolution is on the rise on a world scale, when it is possible for positions to be tested in action and it is not necessary to wait years for the results, for the accumulation of fresh evidence concerning the correctness or incorrectness of conflicting lines. At the same time new events, new arenas of mass struggle might result in common analyses and line in the world movement, not necessarily divergent ones.

As the world congress closed, we looked forward to a very rich debate involving the entire world movement. We knew that sections, leaderships and individual leaders who had not received the documents early enough would be able to make their views known.

The SWP and the Fourth International

Before going any further in discussing the evolution of the current debate, it is worthwhile to take time to place it within the context of the recent history of the International. To do this helps clarify what is at issue in the discussion, and what is not.

Due to reactionary legislation which has been in effect in this country since the beginning of World War II, the SWP does not belong to the Fourth International. But that legislation does not prevent us from being in fundamental agreement with the Fourth International and taking a keen interest in its policies and progress.

From its inception our party has always been based on and fought for an international perspective. That is the very bedrock of revolutionary Marxism. The founders of our movement in this country were won to Trotskyism on the basis of an international program — Trotsky's

criticism of Stalin and Bukharin's draft program for the 6th Congress of the Third International. American Trotskyists took the lead in establishing contacts internationally with communists sympathetic to Trotsky's views. Together with Trotsky, the SWP was instrumental in helping found the Fourth International in 1938. We were the first to adopt the Transitional Program and Trotsky asked us to present it to the founding congress for adoption.

We always had a keen interest in the problems of building the Fourth International and fought any tendency toward isolationism or rejection of our international responsibilities. For years we were the strongest party within the international movement, and we did everything possible to support and help build a strong central leadership team in the International. We never tried to substitute for the construction of such a leadership or to become that leadership ourselves.

As the founding of the First International in 1864 reflected, internationalism has always been the very heart of Marxism. While the first three Internationals failed—and that in itself is a fact worth reflecting on as an indication of the extreme difficulties inherent in building a revolutionary International, even under leaders of such calibre as Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky—the Fourth International stands in the tradition of their revolutionary accomplishments and represents the historic continuation of Marxism.

A correct international revolutionary program and the necessity of establishing an international party are not secondary or tactical questions for us. The need for an international party flows directly from the very nature of the capitalist system itself and the necessity of an international struggle against it. We never succumbed to the American exceptionalist illusion that we could construct the party of the coming American revolution without an internationalist program and separate from the fortunes of the International.

The preamble of the draft statutes of the International puts it very well:

"The politics and economy of capitalism, its markets, its crises, its wars—all have an international character. Never before has this been so plain as today. The revolutionary party that seeks to overturn capitalism must also be international. Just as socialism cannot be realized in one country without a world revolution, so no revolutionary national grouping can develop completely without a world party."

The international interconnectedness of the revolutionary struggle grows increasingly obvious. Every revolutionary victory anywhere—just as any defeat—is immediately reflected around the world. The importance of the colonial revolution in inspiring and giving rise to the new youth radicalization; the worldwide impact of the Black liberation struggle in the U.S.; the international repercussions of the May-June 1968 events in France are but a few of the most obvious examples. The Vietnam war itself provides one of the most striking examples of the international character of the capitalist system, the possibilities of organizing internationally to combat that system, and the interconnectedness of the revolutionary struggle in different countries around the world.

Agreement with the Transitional Program as the fundamental programmatic guide to all our activities both national and international is only the beginning. Building an International is not an easy task. It is far more difficult than the task of constructing a revolutionary party

in any particular country. One of the most striking features and central contradictions of the capitalist system is that while it is international, it is also based on the nation-state. Far from overcoming national differences, capitalism has exacerbated them.

It is the existence of the nation-state that sets the stage for the construction of the world party of socialist revolution. In each country the class struggle develops according to its own peculiarities and logic. Each nation has its own level and tempo of development within the context of the interdependence of the world capitalist system and the struggle against it.

But revolutions themselves take place on a national basis. For this reason, a successful revolution in any country depends on the development of a mass revolutionary party deeply rooted in the class struggles of that country and possessing a strong national leadership capable of leading the struggle through to victory. No International can substitute for such a leadership if none exists, and that is why the central concern of the International is to maximize the development of such parties, primarily through political collaboration and cooperation; to help build leaderships capable of standing on their own feet. First and foremost this means national leaderships thoroughly grounded in our *program*, possessing a deep appreciation of the transitional approach and method which represents the highest expression yet of revolutionary Marxism. This is why we place such emphasis on the whole question of party-building.

Building the International and building such revolutionary parties on a national basis is a process that goes hand in hand, and it is important that we not allow ourselves to develop any illusions about where we are in this process.

The International is today stronger than it has ever been before. There are more sections, a broader circulation of our press. On a world scale the Fourth International has more political weight than ever. To us this is a great source of inspiration.

But the world Trotskyist movement is still extremely limited in its resources, cadre and forces. In the majority of the countries of the world, Trotskyism has no organized reflection. In most countries where we do exist, we are a small handful, and the main task before us *everywhere* is to assemble that indispensable nucleus around which a mass revolutionary party can be constructed—to recruit and educate an initial cadre, to gain practical experience in the developing mass struggles, to participate in them, learn from them and help lead them in a revolutionary direction.

In a few countries our forces are strong enough to directly affect political life, at least in a limited way. This is true in the U.S. for example, with the decisive role the SWP and YSA have played in building the opposition to the Vietnam war into a mass political force. Our comrades in New Zealand, Australia and Canada are playing a similar role in the Vietnam war opposition. The Ligue Communiste in France has also been able to conduct campaigns with national political weight such as those in defense of the rights of soldiers, high school struggles, and the Krivine presidential election campaign in 1969.

The May 15 Fourth International demonstration in Paris commemorating the 100th anniversary of the Commune, which drew some 30,000 participants from all over Western Europe, was sizable enough to elicit a surprised response not only from the major bourgeois papers, but

from the CP press as well.

But the reality of the international movement, despite the tremendous progress we have made, is that we are still faced with the same basic task that confronted the international Trotskyist forces in 1938—recruiting, educating and consolidating the basic cadre of future mass revolutionary parties.

We do not find that assessment of the international Trotskyist movement discouraging. It is in no way a condemnation of our history or program. On the contrary, the fact that the Fourth International survived the years of war and reaction and emerged in the 1960s to begin recruiting from a new generation in dozens of countries—that is a confirmation of the correctness of our program and the tremendous opportunities before us.

The Reunification

The process of building the Fourth International has not been a straight line. There have been ups and downs and great obstacles to overcome. For example, World War II was a great blow to our movement. For years, even communication was nearly impossible. Many of the most valuable cadres of the international movement were assassinated either by the Gestapo or by Stalinist agents during the war.

But since the International was founded, there has been only one big split with serious worldwide consequences, and that was the split that lasted from 1954 to 1963.

Within the International there are still differences over the historical evaluation of the causes of the split. In our opinion, we were not responsible. It was due to a very bad series of errors committed at that time by the leadership of the International under Pablo, who was then the general secretary of the International. The errors were both political and organizational. On the political side was Pablo's theory that the historical perspective was for centuries of degenerated workers states, and his theory that the Stalinist bureaucracies in the workers states and of the Communist parties outside the workers states were capable of reforming themselves under mass pressure.

On the organizational side was Pablo's ultra-centralist concept of the International and his factional maneuvering behind the backs of the elected leaderships of sections and sympathizing organizations. In the SWP, for example, he gave secret factional support to the liquidationist minority in the Cochran fight.

Other differences emerged that I won't go into here.

These problems were aggravated by the objective world situation. It was at the height of the cold war years, with McCarthyism at its peak in the U.S. Leaders of the SWP were unable to leave the country and leaders of the International were unable to come to the U.S. It was thus impossible for us to give a clear picture to the International of our positions on certain questions, and a whole series of additional misunderstandings resulted. The international movement split into two factions, the International Secretariat supporters and the International Committee supporters including the SWP.

Very early, however, leaders of both factions of the International recognized that a principled political basis for reunification existed. For our part, we made an attempt to start the process of reunification as early as 1957. In assessing the meaning of the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech, in evaluating and reacting to the Hungarian revolution

and the Polish events of 1956, the political positions adopted by both factions were essentially the same.

In light of this, James P. Cannon sent a letter to Leslie Goonewardene of the Ceylonese section, which supported the International Secretariat, indicating that he believed steps in the direction of reunification were in order. The letter is interesting in that it outlines the general approach toward reunification that was finally adopted some six years later.

The point is worth stressing because it helps correct the misconception that has grown up, largely at Healy's prompting, that the real basis for reunification was a common assessment of the Cuban Revolution. Agreement on Cuba was certainly important, but the principled political basis for reunification had been laid several years before.

In his letter of March 12, 1957, Comrade Cannon states: "In the past year, since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the positions taken on the most important questions of the day came even closer together. If the thinking of the two sides should continue to evolve in the same way, then they both would have to consider the question of unity, not as a demagogic slogan to maneuver with, but as a project to be realized. . . .

"It would not be wise to pretend that . . . differences do not exist or to try to get around them by ambiguous compromise formulations which would be subject to different interpretations. It would be better and more realistic to contemplate a possible unification for common political action, and to agree to disagree on some questions, allowing the test of events and clarifying non-factional discussion to bring about an eventual settlement."

Comrade Cannon then goes on to indicate: "There remains the organization question, if it is permissible to apply such a narrow definition to the different conceptions of the International in its present stage of development and the whole complex of organizational and administrative practices which played such a big role in exacerbating the conflict and finally precipitating the definitive split. As far as I can see, there has been no approach toward agreement in this domain. If one is seriously interested in the actual unification of the movement and not simply in talking about it for propaganda purposes, he will have to realize that this difference exists and come forward with some practical and realizable formula to deal with it.

"The question is not what ideal conception of the International and its functioning one may have in mind, but rather by what forms and methods all the Trotskyist organizations in the world can be brought together."

This 1957 overture to reunification, however, was turned down by the International Secretariat. On the side of the International Committee, it later became apparent that Healy also was opposed to reunification. And the separate maneuvers of Healy and Pablo were successful in preventing reunification for a full six years after it was objectively possible and more and more necessary. The entire international movement paid a very heavy price for that continued division, especially in Cuba, Ceylon, Algeria and Britain.

Despite the obstacles, however, by 1963 it was abundantly clear that the overwhelming majority of the International was for reunification and it was carried through without Healy and his French allies, the followers of Lambert. In the process leading up to reunification the Inter-

national also shed Juan Posadas and his followers. Posadas, the head of the Latin American bureau of the International Secretariat, was best known for his theories on the desirability of a pre-emptive nuclear war to be initiated by the Soviet Union. Soon after the reunification, Pablo also found life in the International intolerable, his political views came into deeper and deeper conflicts with the positions of Trotskyism, and his repeated violations of discipline finally led to his expulsion.

A Principled Reunification

Opponents of reunification—and of these Healy is probably the most vociferous—repeat the charge, whenever there is an appropriate or inappropriate opportunity to do so, that the reunification was unprincipled. We even find a version of this charge amongst the 30-odd pages of lies and distortions concerning the history of the International in the Community Tendency's resolution. Of course the Communist Tendency bases its condemnation of the reunification on the fact that the SWP as well as the International Secretariat supported the Cuban Revolution and considered Cuba to be a workers state, not definitely deformed as in the case of China or the Eastern European workers states. By adopting this position, the Communist Tendency asserts, the SWP slid back into the centrist swamp represented by the International Secretariat. In other words, the reunification itself was not an unprincipled combination, but since it was based on "centrist" positions, it was certainly politically unprincipled from a revolutionary Marxist point of view!

What is the truth about reunification? Was it principled?

Reunification occurred on the basis of a document originally drawn up by the Political Committee of the SWP, and agreed to by both factions within the world movement. The document codifies in 16 points the fundamental principles on which both sides of the International agreed. No one, including Healy, challenged that document either then or since, and it is interesting to note that the Healyites have never even published it. To have done so would have exposed their unprincipled refusal to accept reunification.

The reunification document is available in the May 11, 1970, issue of *Intercontinental Press* (Vol. 8 No. 18). There is also an article by Farrell Dobbs and Joseph Hansen in the Fall 1963 *International Socialist Review*, summarizing its main points.

The document recapitulates in highly condensed form the views put forward by Trotsky in the Transitional Program explaining the world crisis of our epoch reflecting at bottom the prolonged crisis of revolutionary leadership.

It characterizes the Soviet Union as a degenerated workers state with a parasitic bureaucratic caste that must be overthrown. And analogous analyses are made for new workers states since World War II. Cuba is characterized as a workers state.

The document recognizes de-Stalinization as a two-sided development involving concessions to the masses but intended by the bureaucrats to perpetuate their own rule.

It recognizes the prominent role of the peasantry and guerrilla warfare in the colonial revolution since the end of World War II and indicates that those experiences must be incorporated into the strategy of building revolutionary Marxist parties in colonial countries.

The document places strong emphasis on potential de-

velopments in the imperialist countries where the decisive battles will occur. And in addition to the political positions, the document makes organizational recommendations to be considered at a subsequent congress.

It was on the basis of such fundamental programmatic agreement that a principled reunification was carried through. In addition, the reunification congress adopted as its major political document, *Dynamics of World Revolution Today* (ISR, Fall 1963).

The movement did not, of course, unite on a monolithic basis. Nor should it have. The Fourth International reunified in accordance with *political* principles. There remained differences on some questions of theory and historical interpretation. Most important were the differences over the historic estimate of the causes of the split in 1953. It was agreed to disagree on that question for the time being, as both sides felt it was their revolutionary duty to heal the split and enable a reunited International to take advantage of the exceptional opportunities for growth open to it.

There were also differences over whether or not the Fourth International should explicitly call for a political revolution in China. The formula agreed on included the substance of a call for political revolution without using that term explicitly. It should be noted that there was agreement on specific points drawn up as the political platform of struggle for proletarian democracy in China.

We held a perspective of genuine and total reunification in which the old factional line-ups would be dissolved. We hoped that as new differences emerged—and it was inevitable they would periodically in any healthy and viable international movement—they would cut across the old factions. We felt that this would be one of the central tests of a successful reunification. And it is one that has been met.

The reunification of the International made possible, and was a prerequisite to, the gains that have been made in the last decade. Reunification maximized the attractive force of Trotskyism to the new generation of revolutionaries. It helped weaken the influence of Stalinism on a world scale. It made us a strong pole of attraction for those radicalized by the Cuban Revolution. It made possible a united world response to U.S. aggression in Vietnam, a campaign which won to us another whole layer of revolutionary-minded youth.

It maximized the advantages gained by the entire world movement from the French May-June events in 1968. Those events themselves, the role of the French Trotskyists in them, and the successes of the Communist League, have in turn given impetus to Trotskyist organizations throughout Europe, bringing hundreds of new recruits to the Fourth International. The response of our movement to events in Mexico, Czechoslovakia, the Middle East, Bengal and elsewhere would not have been as effective if our forces remained divided.

On the organizational side, we should also cite *Intercontinental Press* as one of the major gains of reunification. *World Outlook*, as it was then known, began publication within weeks after the reunification congress and has appeared regularly since then providing for the first time in the International's history an invaluable international weekly press service and voice for the world Trotskyist movement. The American Trotskyists contribute considerable resources and cadres to the publication of *IP*, and we consider this one of our major contribu-

tions to the expansion of the world Trotskyist movement.

Preparations for the World Congress

All of this provides a vitally important framework for the discussion now occurring within the world Trotskyist movement. We are discussing and debating with growing numbers of new forces most of whom, like most of us in the SWP, have been recruited to the world Trotskyist movement since reunification.

It is in this context that we should return to the discussion in the world movement and take up its evolution since the last world congress and the preparations for the next.

The tentative agenda for the next world congress includes: (1) the situation in Latin America and our tasks; (2) the evolution of the China regime; (3) the question of the youth radicalization; (4) the statutes of the Fourth International; (5) the new rise of workers struggles in Western Europe; (6) the situation in the Middle East and the Arab revolution; and (7) the women's liberation struggle. Another IEC will be held sometime before the world congress and additional points will undoubtedly be included in the agenda. The entire discussion bulletin is to be printed in English, French, Spanish and German.

For comrades accustomed to the speed and efficiency with which bulletins appear and discussions on them are organized in the SWP during a preconvention period, it is sometimes difficult to imagine what a world discussion is like. But there are numerous and difficult problems in organizing a world discussion.

First is the simple time factor for distribution of documents. Even leaving aside translation time, it usually takes months for the bulletins to reach all the sections of the world movement. For example, Hugo Blanco did not see the criticism of the draft Latin American document until months *after* the last world congress. A bundle of bulletins by sea mail to Ceylon may take months to arrive, if it makes it at all. That is one problem.

Second is the translation difficulty. Getting the documents into even the four major European languages is a big job, but one without which there can be no pretense of a genuine discussion or an authoritative world congress. There is frequently a long delay in this process, although there has been some improvement. Just as an example, however, Comrade Hansen's latest contribution on the Leninist strategy of party building, which has been available in English for four months, has just now appeared in French, and not yet in Spanish.

For the Asian comrades in particular, the translation problem is immense. Getting even the major documents into Japanese, Chinese, Bengali, Hindi, or Sinhala, just to mention a few of the key Asian languages, is virtually an impossible task for our forces. It means that those comrades who know one of the major European languages are, of necessity, much more familiar with the international discussion.

Thirdly, there are all kinds of legal barriers to the exchange of information and experience. The Voorhis act and immigration restrictions in the U. S. are just one example. At the present time Comrades Mandel, Maitan, Tariq Ali and Hansen are all banned from France. Comrades in Ceylon and India find currency restrictions a big obstacle to leaving their countries.

And, of course, there are the exceptionally difficult circumstances faced by comrades in prisons and living under repressive regimes around the world. Fortunately, with

all of our Mexican comrades now released, and since Blanco and Creus were freed last year, the number in prison has been reduced. But there are still many comrades facing very harsh conditions in the jails of Argentina, Greece, China and elsewhere.

Perhaps the most difficult obstacle of all, however, is the absence of common experience and common activity, common campaigns and publications which would provide a basic frame of reference for communication and discussion. It's not only a question of the unevenness of access to information, but of even having a common understanding what words and terms mean.

For example, most party comrades have lived in more than one city since they joined the movement, and if you think back on your own experience, you will remember how much you learned just from the process of moving about. You learned—not just in theory but in practice—that there is more than one way to solve problem "x." When you transferred to Atlanta from Seattle, you realized that the way some things were organized in Atlanta was better than the way you had organized them in Seattle. And you also brought along some good ideas from Seattle that helped improve the functioning of the branch in Atlanta. This process of "cross-fertilization" is a continuous one in the SWP, and from it the whole party—as well as individual comrades—grows. It increases the homogeneity of the party, the body of experience common to all members and our common understanding of the problems of building a revolutionary party.

Our common national interventions in the antiwar movement, the women's liberation movement, the Chicano movement, etc., also play a vital role in welding the party together.

But these are things that don't exist on an international scale, or exist to a very limited extent. Very few comrades are able to spend any time in another country, learning about the movement there and exchanging experiences. Any comrade who has been able to do this has inevitably found it to be a tremendous education. While there are a few areas of common activity, such as the defense of the Vietnamese revolution, the tactical problems faced by the movements in different countries are so varied as to minimize the common frame of reference.

These are very real problems that can often give rise to misunderstandings.

For example, when we in the SWP talk about "party building" that phrase immediately evokes a whole series of concepts and ideas which are very concrete. It means the whole complex of activities that go into constructing strong branches rooted in the political life of each major city; the forging of fractions capable of intervening in the mass movements, leading them, recruiting the best from them; it means systematic education of all the membership in the basics of Marxism; it means constantly pushing to expand and improve our national press; it means constructing a professional national and local apparatus capable of implementing all the decisions of the party and capable of expanding rapidly to meet any new, unexpected demands created by a sudden upsurge in any arena of struggle; it means putting together and testing over time and in struggles a national leadership of various generations, races, sexes, and experiences; and much more.

The phrase summarizes for us all the battles we have had over the decades with all the opponents of Leninism, both inside and outside our movement, who have

come up with every gimmick in the book to find a shortcut around the difficult, hard work of constructing such a political machine. It assumes the availability for every member of a written history of our party and the lessons of its construction. It summarizes for us what we know in our bones to be true—that we are in the process of constructing a mass revolutionary party that will be capable of leading the successful American socialist revolution.

But to a comrade who has just joined the movement in Sweden, for instance, where there has never been a Trotskyist party before in history, the term party-building doesn't mean much in terms of the continuity of the Swedish movement. The problem is how to help comrades in countries like this to absorb the valuable lessons that have been learned, often painfully, through the experiences of the world Trotskyist movement. It is not an easy obstacle to overcome. It will be with us for a long time, and it does no good to become impatient over it. We should just be conscious that this is one of the main problems in conducting an international discussion and try to make our ideas more understandable.

Evolution of the World Discussion

What has been the evolution of the discussion on the key points and where do things stand now?

First on China. On a whole series of points there has been no further evolution of the discussion, primarily because there has been little new information to shed more light. This is true of things like the role of the army, the nature of the red guard and so forth.

But on the key question of the nature of Peking's foreign policy and the nature of the bureaucracy, in our opinion the events since the last world congress have strongly borne out our basic analysis. It was over the question of Mao's peaceful-coexistence overtures to Nixon that some of the most polemical debate took place. Our draft of the document called special attention to these overtures as reflecting the fundamentally opportunist character of Peking's foreign policy. The comrades who supported the majority position held the view that Mao's supposed overtures did not signify much and that it was a mistake to even mention them.

On the basis of that evaluation, the draft adopted by the majority eliminated from the SWP's draft the two references to Mao's offer to Nixon.

One of the deleted paragraphs read as follows: "The bankruptcy of this foreign policy became glaringly clear when, after deposing Liu Shao-chi as a 'lackey of imperialism, modern revisionism and the Kuomintang reactionaries,' Mao offered 'peaceful coexistence' to the Nixon administration." And the second deleted section said: "[Peking] has extended material aid to guerrilla forces as well as countries like Tanzania, thus helping to create an image far to the left of Moscow. Nevertheless, Peking's basic policy, as reiterated many times by its leaders and voiced once again upon the inauguration of the Nixon administration, has been 'peaceful coexistence' with U. S. imperialism."

Two and a half years later, those two paragraphs struck out by the majority read extremely well.

Events of the last few months, including Peking's open support to the counterrevolutionary butchers of Pakistan and Ceylon, have simply provided new proof of the Stalinist character of Peking's foreign policy—peaceful

coexistence with imperialism based on the construction of socialism in one country, reflecting the interests of a crystallized, petty-bourgeois bureaucratic caste. That opportunist foreign policy can also involve simultaneous ultraleftist jags.

This is certainly a question on which there will be further and very interesting debate as we head toward the next world congress.

Youth Radicalization

The discussion on the youth radicalization has reached a kind of impasse. Following the world congress the French comrades contributed two articles to the discussion, attempting to clarify their disagreements. (*International Information Bulletin*, April 1970, No. 2) The most important arguments they raised were that it is reformist to struggle for student demands; that students have no common interests to defend; that it is impossible to have a strategy for the student movement; that it is incorrect to encourage students to begin struggles unless you are sure the working class can be mobilized too; and that the transitional program for the student radicalization outlined in the youth document is not transitional.

These arguments were taken up by Comrade Caroline Lund in her report adopted by the YSA convention in 1969. That report constitutes what is in my opinion a devastating critique of the position put forward by the French comrades in those two articles, but it is one they have never replied to. In fact, it has not yet even been translated into French. So we frankly don't know what the thinking of the French comrades is now.

I attended the last convention of the Communist League as an observer for the SWP. At that convention there was a rather extensive discussion about the student movement and what the League should be doing in it. Many of the delegates felt that there were in fact two contradictory positions before the convention, both supported by the Political Bureau, and both of which were adopted. One outlined certain steps to be taken in the direction of forming a more organized high school fraction or organization; the other ruled out the formation of a youth organization prior to the consolidation by the League of a sizable base in the factories. The convention also voted to continue the discussion on the youth question to try and resolve these problems.

In our opinion, the correctness of the international youth document has been confirmed by the unfolding of events since the last world congress. There is hardly a day that goes by without reports of new student revolts somewhere in the world, and almost without exception they raise one or another, or a combination, of the demands contained in the transitional program submitted to the last world congress. The relationship between those student revolts and the broader class struggle on an international scale has also been frequently reconfirmed.

Many sections and organizations around the world have had very rich experiences with the student movement and have learned a great deal in efforts to construct revolutionary Marxist youth organizations. One of the tasks of the next world congress will be to draw up a balance sheet of the student movement since 1969, assess the youth radicalization document in the light of new developments, and assess the progress made in the construction of Trotskyist youth organizations.

Latin America

Since the last world congress the most extensive written discussion has been on Latin America, with seven major contributions already: two by Comrade Hugo Blanco, two by Comrade Maitan, one by Comrades Germain and Knoeller, and two by Comrade Hansen. It would be impossible in a report such as this to summarize or recapitulate the central arguments contained in those documents, but comrades should go back now and reread the entire sequence of the discussion, including the documents which preceded the last world congress. I simply want to emphasize a couple of points.

The first is that there has been an evolution in the position expressed by some of the comrades who supported the majority resolution on Latin America. Some have tended to back off of the rural guerrilla warfare position in favor of urban guerrilla actions. One could say that at least such an evolution reflects greater appreciation for the decisive role of the struggle in the urban centers, but in our opinion it is not much of an advance. The emphasis remains firmly fixed on guerrilla warfare as *the* strategy for taking power in Latin America.

Other supporters of the Latin American majority document have tried to shift the discussion onto the axis of "for or against *armed struggle*." We reject any implication that that is what the discussion is really about. If supporters of the minority view were against armed struggle they would be Social Democrats or Stalinists, not Trotskyists. What we reject is the *strategy* of "pick up the gun" as the road to power. As a strategy it stands in the way of the construction of mass revolutionary parties throughout Latin America, and that is what the debate is about.

Secondly, the comrades who support and speak for the majority position on Latin America maintain that they are just as concerned as we are with promoting mass struggles and building a mass revolutionary party. They maintain that such concern is one of the features distinguishing the Trotskyist guerrilla warfare strategy from the Debrayist and related focoist concepts. They maintain that their guerrilla warfare strategy is based on *linking up* with the mass movement.

We reject that concept. In our view armed struggle, whatever its form, is something that grows out of mass struggles, not something that is hooked onto them. Perhaps Hugo Blanco has expressed this most succinctly and accurately. In his letter to Comrade Maitan on October 17, 1970, Blanco writes, "to state that the discussion between guerrillerismo and mobilizing the masses is no longer of fundamental importance signifies merging with Guevarism in evolution. It is a way of 'superseding the discussion' by identifying with them.

"It is true that these comrades are already talking about mass work, but we should take note, not only by their practice but by the contradictory way in which they refer to this work, that their conception is different from ours. It is typical to hear them talking about 'linking armed struggle with the mass movement,' or that it is necessary for 'the guerrilla fighter to carry on preliminary work among the masses before launching the struggle.' Although these affirmations show us that a healthy process is going on, we cannot identify with it. They still stand within the guerrillerista schema.

"For us what is central is the mass movement, which at a certain moment arrives at armed struggle in one

form or another. We are not guerrilla fighters carrying on prior work preparatory to the outbreak of guerrilla war, placing fundamental importance on the geographic locale, the establishment of supply lines, etc. We are *revolutionists* carrying on *political* work in the ranks of the masses, leading them toward revolutionary maturity, organizing the party on this basis. At a certain moment we can become guerrilla fighters if this is the form the armed struggle has to take. Our work is *political*, the military is incidental. For the guerrilleristas it is the reverse; they are 'guerrilla fighters' who incidentally carry on 'preliminary work.' This is not a play on words, comrade; it involves profound differences in the mode of confronting every task. Their 'preliminary work' is not the same as the Leninist conception of mass work."

The third thing we have emphasized is that the discussion over strategy for Latin America has implications and repercussions which affect the activities and line of the International in other areas of the world. In our view, the guerrilla warfare strategy adopted by the last world congress represents an adaptation to ultraleftism in Latin America. If the Fourth International adapts to this pressure in one area of the world, it only reinforces the tendency to bend to ultraleftism in other areas of the world as well.

As with any tactic that can be interpreted as a shortcut to, or substitute for, the Leninist strategy of party building and intervention in the mass movements, it can only encourage similar "quick breakthrough" advocates in other sections.

The discussion of Latin America strategy is continuing in preparation for the next world congress, and we hope it will broaden out considerably. We particularly hope that the Latin American comrades themselves will participate more extensively. At any rate, we can be sure that the fourth world congress since reunification will not be simply a rerun of the third. New forces are involved; some comrades have altered their opinions since the last congress, both in Latin America and elsewhere; and everyone has had a chance to think about it much more extensively. In addition, we can safely anticipate that there will be more important political developments in Latin America between now and the world congress that will affect the discussion.

Great Britain

In addition to the three major issues carried over from the last congress, differences of opinion have emerged on some new points. While not taking time to go into any of these questions in detail, it is important to mention them and indicate our attitude.

First, in the process of interpreting and applying to Britain the political line adopted by the last world congress, differences have appeared within the British section, giving rise to a minority tendency which has expressed opposition to the majority line on the Labour Party, Vietnam work, women's liberation and a number of other questions. It is quite likely that the minority tendency will also be in general agreement with the contributions made by Comrades Hansen and Blanco on Latin America.

In our opinion these differences within the British movement are not of just parochial British interest. They are closely related to activities in other sections and groups

and are of general interest throughout the world Trotskyist movement. For example, the IMG's analysis of the Labour Party, and attitude toward a Labour government in England has political ramifications for almost every section. Because the debates in England are so important, we published last year, for the information of the membership of the SWP, the major documents of the 1970 IMG convention.

It is no secret to anyone in the International that the leadership of the SWP finds itself in basic sympathy with the positions put forward by the minority tendency.

But we reject the unfounded and unsubstantiated accusations contained in Comrade Massey's somewhat misnamed contribution to our pre-convention discussion entitled "Comrade Tussey Versus the Proletarian Orientation Tendency." The SWP leadership has not, as he charges, interfered in the internal life of the IMG. That is an extremely serious charge to make, and Comrade Massey would be well advised to learn the facts before spouting off light-mindedly. The relations between the SWP and IMG leaderships have always been correct and fraternal.

We specifically reject Comrade Massey's charge that it was a factional act to invite Comrade Susan Williams to give a series of talks on the history of British Trotskyism at the summer school sessions which will follow this convention.

The United Secretariat, and through it other sections and sympathizing groups of the International, including the IMG, were informed months ago of the dates for the SWP convention and urged to send fraternal observers. We anticipated that the leadership of the IMG would send someone, as the French, New Zealand, Canadian and other parties did. Had they been able to send an official representative of their Political Committee we would have welcomed the opportunity to schedule time for that comrade to give a series of talks on any topic he or she wished—just as we have scheduled time for the comrade representing the French Political Bureau and the Canadian comrades. Any implication that we invited Comrade Williams, a leader of the minority tendency, as opposed to someone from the British majority is false.

Secondly, we did not bring Comrade Williams here to give classes. When we learned that she would be in North America on vacation this summer, and that it would coincide with the convention which she indicated she would like to attend, we considered it an excellent opportunity to help educate the membership of the SWP about the history of the Trotskyist movement in another country. That to our mind is not factionalism. It is an *opportunity* we do not often have, nor one that comrades with a genuine interest in the International would dismiss lightly.

Thirdly, Comrade Williams is not just a member of the minority tendency in Britain. She has been active in, and a leader of the British Trotskyist movement for some 25 years. Among the leading comrades in Britain, she may have more years in the movement than anyone else. She has invaluable first-hand knowledge of British Trotskyism during the entire period since the Second World War. When British Trotskyism was reduced to a literal handful of supporters in the early 1960s, Susan Williams was one of them and was instrumental in helping rebuild the British section.

She is also a leader of the International, Comrade Massey, elected to the International Control Commission by a unanimous vote at the last world congress, which is an

indication of the respect she has earned throughout the world movement.

We are frankly surprised that anyone could question the value of the contributions she can make in her classes here this week—which are not on the current differences within the British section but on the history of British Trotskyism. We are inclined to think that any objection to her classes can only be factionally motivated.

Women's Liberation

A second question over which some differences have emerged since the last world congress is the struggle for women's liberation. With the exception of England, the women's liberation movement has just begun to emerge on the continent, and the comrades there are just beginning to think out their attitude toward it. It would be wrong to assume or predict that there will be big differences. For example, the resolution presented to the last convention of the Communist League was, in my opinion, on the whole quite good. However, it was not discussed or adopted by the convention. It simply represented some of the initial thinking by the women's commission.

The British comrades, on the other hand, have written more and been more involved in the women's movement, and their orientation has been somewhat different from ours. They are in favor of an independent women's movement. But they have had quite a different assessment of some of the forms the rise of women's liberation struggles have taken. For example, the majority has opposed any involvement of comrades in the British equivalent of consciousness-raising groups because, as they state in the document adopted by their last convention, "the dangers of this are that we should become imbued by the feminist attitudes of these groups."

The document also implicitly denies the potential for, or importance of, an independent mass women's liberation movement, and seems to consider the women's movement to be primarily a subdivision of the trade unions or, even worse, contradictory to or irrelevant to the needs of working women. "To talk about a 'mass movement' ignores the fact that we already have a mass movement—2 million women TU [trade union] members. However successful the March 6th demo [a women's liberation demonstration], it is dwarfed by the number of women involved in the PO [post office workers] strike."

Their orientation has been toward building socialist women's groups rather than a mass movement around the most basic demands of women.

At another point in the document they seem to indicate that they do not consider issues like abortion, women's suffrage, and the right to divorce, to be a legitimate part of the women's liberation movement. They state, "In some countries, the battles are so elementary yet so vital, that a women's lib movement is unlikely to arise yet, as single issue campaigns take the center of the stage for the time being, e.g. Italy and divorce, France and abortion and recently Switzerland and the vote."

Although there are many things we would agree with the British comrades on, I think some of these quotes from their most recent document are enough to indicate that we might also have disagreements and that it would be worthwhile to discuss.

Finally, there are also some differences that have emerged over our position on the Middle East and the Arab revolution. There was an initial discussion of these differences at the last IEC meeting, and the question is on the agenda for the next world congress. The differences have centered around the questions of self-determination for Israeli Jews and the demand for a democratic, secular Palestine. Since the discussion parallels the issues we will be taking up during our convention, it is sufficient in this report simply to indicate that at the beginning of this discussion differences existed. Once again events, time, and fraternal and objective discussion will clarify this question.

The Domingo Letter

The next point I want to take up is the Domingo letter and the subsequent correspondence concerning it, and the new contribution to the international discussion by Comrades Pierre Frank and Alain Krivine. For the benefit of those who have not yet had a chance to read this material which has just appeared in the *International Information Bulletin*, a brief summary is in order.

The Domingo letter, which was authored by Comrade Livio Maitan, was a long mimeographed letter circulated throughout Latin America last winter. It purports to assess what Comrade Maitan understood to be the current situation in Argentina in regard to the different Trotskyist groups. Among other things it contained a sharp factional attack on the *La Verdad* group and Comrade Moreno, one of the leaders of that group, in particular. The *La Verdad* group is a sympathizing section of the International.

The letter also contains a factional attack on what is referred to as the "International minority," which Livio accuses of secretly sending a representative to attend a convention of the *La Verdad* group. This is another of the charges echoed by Comrade Massey in his document somewhat misaddressed to Comrade Tussey. The charge is adequately answered in the correspondence between the Political Committee of the SWP and the United Secretariat and there is no need to recapitulate the facts here.

On the more substantive points: We do not dispute the right of leaders, or members either, to write private letters. But, in our view, the Domingo letter can in no stretch of the term be considered "private" in nature. That is obvious to any objective person reading it. The fact that Comrade Livio's statements are not private in nature cannot be disassociated from the identity of the author, who is the head of the Latin American commission and a member of the United Secretariat.

The Political Committee of the SWP considered the Domingo letter to be a particularly serious matter because of the United Secretariat's response to our inquiries regarding it. Instead of concurring that the circulation of such letters was an unacceptable way for the leadership of the International to function, the Secretariat defended and endorsed this action. A whole series of questions were automatically raised: How many other "private" factional letters of this kind have been sent out? To whom? What other members of the United Secretariat engage in similar "private" correspondence? To whom? How long has this been going on? Even before the 1968 split in

the Argentinian organization? Why are the majority of the United Secretariat members not even interested in finding out the answers to these questions or seeing the correspondence between the Latin American commission and the comrades in Latin America?

These are all questions raised not by the Political Committee of the SWP, but by Comrade Maitan's actions and the endorsement they received from the majority of the Secretariat. By pretending that these serious questions have not been raised, the Secretariat is in our view defaulting in its international leadership responsibility. The United Secretariat's response to the Domingo correspondence opens the way to the most serious kinds of abuses, such as individual members acting behind the back of the Secretariat, behind the back of the leaderships of sections. It can foster the formation of personal cliques and contribute to the development of a very factional atmosphere within the international movement.

As the final letter from the Political Committee of the SWP to the United Secretariat explains, it is our opinion that the leaderships of sections and sympathizing organizations who are concerned about the implications of the Domingo letter and the subsequent developments should begin consulting directly with each other concerning the relationship of these developments to the political differences that have emerged and what course to pursue from here on. And this is a process we have begun.

Krivine-Frank Contribution

We have not yet had an opportunity to draft a reply to the contribution by Comrades Pierre Frank and Alain Krivine, but that will be done by the incoming national leadership following the convention. In addition, Comrade Pierre's open letter to our convention reiterated some of the same points, as well as raising some new ones which we feel must be answered.

We reject the unsubstantiated charges contained in the Krivine-Frank document. The SWP leadership has never in any way at any time violated the decisions of the last world congress, intervened in the Argentinian organization against those applying the line of the world congress, or violated the democratic centralist norms of the International. The assertion that we did so, and even more that it is a "notoriously known" fact, is totally unfounded. In fact, we cannot even imagine what the authors might be referring to. We consider it very serious to make such charges and irresponsible to do so without any attempt to supply even a single supporting fact or example of such conduct.

Secondly, we reject the charge that the SWP has a "federalist concept" of the International, not a democratic centralist one. Our democratic centralist organizational norms flow directly from our political program which we share with the entire international movement.

The Krivine-Frank document also seems to contain a number of arguments directed against some imaginary foe. For example, the authors take time to refute the argument that national sections must be built first, then an International—the "first the walls then the roof" theory. I don't know of anyone within the International who holds such a theory.

The main fire, however, is directed at a quotation taken from a speech given by Comrade Jack Barnes last summer in which he explained: "The principal condition for in-

ternational organization is international collaboration between leaderships developed out of the experiences of real organizations fighting to build mass revolutionary Trotskyist parties in every country."

That is a position we stand on, and we find ourselves rather at a loss to see what is objectionable in it. It is hard to imagine that Comrades Frank and Krivine would deny that genuine international collaboration is a necessary *condition* for the construction of an International. Without genuine political and organizational collaboration based on mutual trust and respect and open, honest expressions of differences as well as agreements, there can be no hope of constructing an international party. We are assuming, of course, basic programmatic agreement such as exists in the International and on which reunification was based. Such a mode of functioning is doubly important when differences such as those over Latin America emerge.

Our view is not that the International is essentially a coordination of sections, but we do believe genuine collaboration of elected leaderships is a prerequisite to a genuine collective leadership—and especially when there are political differences.

And that is precisely why we considered the Domingo letter to be so serious. For members of the United Secretariat to circulate private, factional documents behind the backs of the Secretariat and the rest of the international leadership, and for the Secretariat to say it is perfectly all right, goes in the *opposite* direction from genuine, honest and objective collaboration among the leadership of the International, sections and sympathizing organizations. One of the principles of democratic centralism—international or national—is that no leader acts behind the backs of others in the leadership. Members of the elected leadership do not act in secret, without consultation and collective decisions on all important questions. The biggest dangers facing the International lie in any violation of such norms.

These are all concepts we will want to elaborate on further in drafting a reply to the Frank-Krivine article.

Three Goals

What do we hope to achieve in the discussion now taking place in the Fourth International? Our goals are modest, but realistic and important.

First, we want to maximize the full, free discussion aimed at clarifying all the political issues that have already been raised and any new ones that may come up. We want to remove as many misunderstandings as possible. We want to prevent the development of a factional atmosphere that would tend to poison discussion and increase the tendency for comrades to decide issues on some basis other than an objective appraisal of the political questions involved.

We do not believe, however, that factionalism can be minimized by remaining silent when things happen that we consider to be violations of Leninist organizational norms. That only lays the basis for bigger problems in the future. That makes objective collaboration impossible. On the contrary, we raise our objections and criticisms when we see such things happen. We discuss our point of view in a fraternal, open way, with the correct bodies at the correct time.

In our view, the biggest danger to be guarded against is any illusion that the political differences within the

world Trotskyist movement can be settled by organizational means, by organizational reprisals or factional moves against loyal members or supporters of the International. That could only lead to a real crisis.

The kind of full, free debate we are after will do the most to build and educate the International, to educate young comrades around the world on how to conduct political debate over differences, and how a responsible political leadership acts when differences arise.

Our second goal is to reverse the line adopted by the last world congress elevating guerrilla warfare in Latin America to a continental strategy. We want it returned to its proper place as a tactic, one of the means of armed struggle to be employed or supported by revolutionary Marxist parties in Latin America according to the needs of the struggle to lead the working masses to power.

We don't make any big predictions as to the outcome at the next world congress, except that we expect debate on this question to be very lively. Many who voted for the Latin American line at the last congress consider it to be the most important achievement of the International in many years. It may take even more time and experience with the implementation of the line before the majority of delegates will become convinced of the incorrectness of that line.

Thirdly, we hope that in the process we will be able to clarify exactly what we mean by, and why we are so insistent on, counterposing to the guerrilla warfare strategy the Leninist strategy of party building. Most of the comrades who support the guerrilla warfare strategy reject this counterposition and insist that they too are for building mass Leninist parties. We do not dispute this intention, but unfortunately, all too often there is no real agreement on what we mean by the words being used. We hope that through common experience and discussion we can achieve greater meeting of minds on the question of how to construct mass Leninist combat parties, not only in Latin America but throughout the world.

We hope to achieve these limited goals in a number of ways. First is through direct debate, discussion, polemic. We have made a number of contributions already and will make more. We anticipate we will have allies in this process. Some of our own SWP resolutions are also very important in this regard, as they constitute valuable contributions to the international discussion on questions like women's liberation, the Middle East and the national question.

A second and very important part of the process is encouraging and maximizing direct personal exchanges. There is no substitute for this, for encouraging American comrades to take vacations and utilize school exchange programs to spend time in other countries. We think it is important for leading comrades to visit other countries in connection with defense campaigns, election campaigns, antiwar organizing and other tasks. We will do everything possible to organize tours and speaking engagements for comrades from other countries to visit the United States. We do all these things to broaden the level of common experience and activity within the world movement.

Thirdly, there are already numerous areas of common activity which are very important. There is our international campaign to defend the Czech students accused of Trotskyism. Also in relation to Eastern Europe, there are joint projects to publish more and more basic Trotsky-

ist material in Eastern European languages. There is our international campaign of mass action in defense of the Vietnamese revolution, demanding the withdrawal of all U. S. troops from Vietnam. This campaign assumes even greater importance in light of the international maneuvers by Nixon and Mao.

There are new possibilities for international collaboration and coordination around an international abortion campaign, with potential for building mass actions in numerous countries from Australia to England, France and Germany.

Already there have been numerous activities in support of the Bangla Desh liberation struggle, and we should have a perspective of a continued campaign, much as we

have had a sustained campaign in defense of the Palestinian struggle. There are common defense campaigns for political prisoners all over Latin America and in several other countries including Iran, Ceylon, Greece and elsewhere.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of the common campaigns and activity we are or can be engaged in.

Finally, as we head toward the fourth world congress since reunification and the discussions preparing for that congress, the tone and attitude set by comrades of the SWP will be extremely important. As one of the largest parties supporting the International, what we say and do carries great weight. We should keep that in mind, and the responsibilities that flow from it, in all our discussions with comrades around the world.