



Discussion Bulletin

14 Charles Lane, New York, N. Y. 10014

Vol. 31 No. 30
July 1973

Published by
SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

CONTENTS	Page
THE STRUGGLE FOR PROLETARIAN PARTIES IN CAPITALIST EUROPE , by Chris Marat (Internationalist Tendency), Washington D. C. Branch	2
SOCIALISM AND TECHNOLOGY: AN ANSWER TO COMRADE GARRETT'S VIEW OF ECOLOGY , by Steve Beck, Lower Manhattan Branch, New York Local	14
BUILD THE PARTY — NO CONCESSIONS TO ULTRALEFTISM AND STALINISM , by Bob Kissinger, Chicago Branch	19
THE CENTRAL ISSUES IN THE DISCUSSION ON LATIN AMERICA , by David Morrow, Chicago Branch	22
WHAT THE DISCUSSION ON THE GAY STRUGGLE HAS REVEALED , by Jon Hillson, Joe Johnson and Bill Perdue, Denver Branch	31
WHERE THE N. C. MEMORANDUM ON GAY LIBERATION GOES WRONG , by Steve Gabosch, San Francisco Branch	33
FOR DEMOCRACY? YES, COMRADE MASSEY! BUT JUST WHO IS FOR DEMOCRACY? by Al Greengold and Gerry Clark, Oakland-Berkeley Branch	36
A SPECTRE IS HAUNTING THE INTERNATIONAL: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PABLOISM , by Al Greengold, Oakland-Berkeley Branch	37

THE STRUGGLE FOR PROLETARIAN PARTIES IN CAPITALIST EUROPE

by Chris Marat (Internationalist Tendency),
Washington D.C. Branch

1. *Some Necessary Background Information*

By 1968 the Fourth International was reduced to a limited number of militants spread over Europe. At the time of the great wave of radicalization, these few Trotskyists were able to demonstrate that they had the capacities to provide the leadership of the revolutionary movement and to direct the struggles, beginning with the student movement and little by little the other movements, making it possible to build embryonic revolutionary parties in almost every country in Europe.

This building was accomplished by applying the organizational understanding of the Ligue Communiste, which while it was still solidifying its own organization proved capable of generalizing theoretical, political elements thereby permitting comrades of other countries to make the best use of the experiences of the Ligue, which were in some ways exceptional.

Given the fact that development is uneven, one step was to overcome the homogenous thinking of the Ligue by establishing a dialectical relationship which would permit the various sections to profit from their mutual political experiences and thus accelerate the construction of the Fourth International.

In their joining of the Fourth International in 1969, the Ligue Communiste brought political clarity to the European extreme left. It forced other newly formed groups to take stock of themselves and to seriously consider the program of the International Trotskyist movement in the years 1970-71. The balance sheet of the European sections is the most possible and promising in the history of the Fourth International.

Since 1969 the Ligue Communiste has gone from 150 members to 3,000 members; in addition they have 2,000 to 3,000 *organized* sympathizers. There has been a qualitative change in the organization and the creation of a number of mass leaders and the development of a young political cadre. Consider that the average age of the Ligue is 23 years of age. Forty percent are workers; this does not include the working students or the full-time staff which is about 2 percent of the Ligue. Today no mass mobilization, except possibly those of the Communist Party, is possible in France which does not include the Ligue Communiste.

2. *Problems and Solutions*

Needless to say, the European sections did not increase membership 19 times in just five years without running into difficult problems: How do you get past the stage of being a propaganda group and become activists directing the struggles? How do you shake the foundations of social democracy and reformism so that you can penetrate the working class?

In the same way our comrades saw that it was necessary to get on with the construction of the Leninist party (*Now!*), despite the many opportunist elements who argued "we must see the objective conditions" — "we are too weak" — "we have to wait." Snivlers and moaners always know the difficulties but that is all they know. Revolutionaries know

these difficulties also but they know that the building of the International cannot wait. It is a political, not just an administrative International that is needed, all the difficulties. For the building of the International is the only way to educate the vanguard about internationalism. It is the only means of assuring that the International is not only a juxtaposition of national experiences, but a synthesis of these experiences, thereby avoiding organizational chauvinism. It is the only way of speeding up and consolidating the growth of the different sections. It is the only way of building revolutionary leadership necessary to defeat international capitalism.

3. *The Ligue Communiste*

This contribution will be principally concerned with the experiences of the Ligue Communiste in France for three reasons:

1) The Ligue represents 3/4 of the cadre of the European sections and a criticism of the European sections cannot be done without drawing up a balance sheet on its work in France, particularly since many of the other sections did not exist in 1969.

2) Because the problems faced by the Ligue have long prefigured the problems that came up later in other countries. For instance the May 1972 strike in Quebec is a solid example. As Marx stated, "The French working class is the most advanced in the world."

3) Because it is possible to discuss the results of the political line carried out in France on the basis of undisputed facts and hopefully avoid the type of fruitless debate carried out by the comrades of the LTT in the Latin American discussion where they spun around the question of guerrilla strategy like whirling dervishes.

The resolution "Building Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" presented by the International Majority is a text outlining a strategy for party building. It is not a balance sheet of the sections. It is the result of political conclusions drawn from such balance sheets. The balance sheets of the different sections were prepared for the national congresses. This resolution cannot be criticized as if it were a detailed balance sheet for the same reason that one would not take a detailed balance sheet, even a good one, and try to present it as a general theoretical text or resolution.

The "Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" document outlines a strategy for the construction of parties in a period of radicalization marked by:

— the progressive disappearance of the classical Social Democracy;

— the crisis of the bourgeoisie;

— a slide to the right, toward Social Democracy, on the part of the Communist parties;

— the radicalization of vanguard elements who have no credible organization to join;

— the radicalization of different movements that we call "peripheral" because of their relationship to the "center" i. e., the working class.

This takes place in a period in which all of these radicalized elements are confronting the bourgeoisie more and more violently. Such a period is limited and not eternal. It has already been going on in Europe for at least four years. So that when the majority document foresees a crucial period of five more years, it is simply because they realize that such an accelerated pace cannot be kept up for more than a decade without a struggle which will be decisive for a long time after. Such a period favors the building of a party, *a party is created through struggles which it is capable of leading because that's the way the vanguard becomes conscious of the necessity of revolution.*

Party building, or even just the formation of a solid base for a Leninist party means that you carry out the organization of struggles in a different way—a way in which you are at all times building the party. Even May '68 would have been different if the JCR had not been there.

The emphasis on having a few years before the decisive struggles means, concretely, that the Fourth International must profit from the period by building revolutionary parties so that the outcome of confrontations with the bourgeoisie, which are to come, will be the success of the socialist revolution rather than a successful repression and defeat for the working class. Of course, nobody says that there is an absolute deadline for the revolution, but we do say that the party of the Fourth International must begin influencing the struggle and not just doing propaganda work—or the result of our abstention will result in yet another defeat for the working class.

We have already seen the period of quick radicalization of the 1960s peter out in the United States after the growth and decline of the antiwar movement, a process of about a decade. Failing to account for the essence of the radicalization and failing to project from the peripheral movements to the center, the SWP leadership's plans went up in smoke like so many Pollyanna-like pipe dreams. The process we are addressing ourselves to in Europe is similar but far more widespread and intense.

In the United States the absence of leadership and the fact that no revolutionary party was organized through work in the Black movement has allowed the liberal wing of the bourgeoisie to salvage the majority of elements and seriously weaken the Black struggle.

In Italy it was impossible to lay the basis for a revolutionary party in the mobilizations of 1969. The Italian section was swallowed up by the spontaneous mass movement and suffered a considerable setback to the extent that the leftist Italian parliament seems imperishable despite the permanent crisis. These are real and unfortunate examples of what it means to miss the boat in this period and it does not simply mean not building "mass movements." The so-called revolutionary catastrophism does not exist in the resolution of the International majority. You will not find the statement that the revolution will be made in five years in that text. Rather the catastrophism exists in the head of Comrade Mary-Alice stemming from the general outlook of the tendency of which she is a leading part. Later on in this contribution I will deal with these distorted interpretations.

4. The Center

Marxists should not have to convince each other why only the working class is capable of making the socialist

revolution. The situation which makes this necessary to do, inside the Socialist Workers Party, is one of the unique achievements of a peculiar method of "party building," American style. One might call it theoretical adaptationism sui generis (sui generis, as Comrade Hansen who is with Latin buff knows, means of a special kind).

Only the working class, the only creative class in society, is capable of proposing solutions and perspectives to other layers of society and thereby attract them to its banners. During the period after the war, because of the domination of the leadership of the class by Stalinism and because of the stabilization of capital and the post-war boom, the working class seemed incapable of offering a clear political perspective or of putting up anything other than the feeblest of fights.

Revisionists of various stripes seized upon this passing phenomenon to build theories based on a lack of social power such as student revolution, women's revolution, etc. Peripheral movements to the class grew around them and even those who considered themselves Marxists rushed to embrace them.

However, since the middle of the 1960s because of the crisis of the bourgeoisie, because of the crisis of Stalinism, the workers struggles have begun again. This combativity of the working class has been shown time and time again—it is all too evident to be missed or overlooked *except to those who have their heads turned in another direction, caught up, perhaps, in the embrace of a passing fancy!*

—May '68 in France;

— creeping May '69 in Italy—continuous waves of strikes of all categories of workers which seriously crippled the function of the state for six months;

— the Asturia strike in Spain;

— the strikes in England of dockworkers and ship builders;

— the first struggles in Sweden and Switzerland.

In every case the demands raised were not only quantitative, immediate and economist, but also qualitative, concerning working conditions and the problems of responsibility of workers in an enterprise.

At the same time there has been an effort to undercut the thrust of these demands:

● the bourgeoisie (particularly through DeGaulle) called for controlled production, preferring greater government control, to greater control by the workers.

● the reformist workers movements and parties called for self-management and workers power rather than workers control, this was true of the CFDT and the PSU and the Manifesto group in Italy.

Above all these reformist movements want to find a way to create "the economy of the revolution" by applying a program through the simple pressure of mass movements.

The European working class is still organized by the traditional organizations: the Social Democrats in the Anglo-Saxon countries and the Communist Party in the Latin countries. If the Social Democrats act more and more like the liberal wing of the bourgeoisie as they are now doing—and losing the working class, little by little—the European Communist parties are militant workers parties, hundreds of thousands strong which control millions of workers through the unions. They cannot be confused with the pitiful sect known as the Communist Party U.S.A. They are capable of directing and leading struggles, such as those against rising prices, curtailment of

democratic rights (120,000 people in Paris on June 20th 1973) and support to the Vietnamese struggle. But the way in which they lead struggles is subordinated to their electoralist tactic, to gain through a front with the Social Democracy whatever percentage of votes they might have lost, and to attempt to set up an Allende-style regime "moving toward socialism." That is why at the very same time they lead struggles to get support of the working class—they then turn around and sabotage those gains out of fear that they might suddenly find themselves caught up in the dynamic of a revolutionary crisis.

The radicalized elements of the working class feel lost in this context: they have less and less confidence in the traditional organizations and no credible alternative — so they start looking in a confused fashion for another way:

- sometimes this expresses itself violently: with occupations of factories.

- the isolation or sequestration of a manager, usually in his office (he gets put under office arrest). Reference to this practice were erroneously translated as "kidnaping" in the English text.

- confrontations with the police (as in France and Italy) (or with the fascists in Spain).

- sometimes it takes a mass character: with strikes in Europe which set the pace of political activity in an entire country and get front-page newspaper coverage and TV time because they take place with the active solidarity of the population.

- and at times such strikes become generalized and pose the problem of power for the working class: May '68 in France; creeping May in Italy.

- it shows up in the labor unions substituting themselves for political parties, or by wanting to style themselves as "revolutionary unions."

- it shows up outside the traditional administrative apparatus as workers "commissions" in Spain and shop stewards committees in England and Italy.

5. *The New Mass Vanguard*

In every period of struggle, different degrees of political consciousness become apparent. Those who show themselves to be the most advanced elements in their political consciousness are what is referred to as the elements of the vanguard.

One interesting feature of the present radicalization is that, for the most part, these vanguard elements are found outside of traditional political organizations, which bore them stiff. They see that the people who supposedly have a program, hide behind it as an excuse to do nothing. They see no need for joining an organization which is incapable of doing any *more* than they themselves can do alone. This is particularly true of rebellious young workers who are able to lead strikes in their shops without the aid of the traditional class organizations.

Of course, the task of a revolutionary organization is to bring up the political explanations which can dispel all of this confusion—and that means giving explanations of, and through ongoing struggles about, how to fight. As Lenin often stated, "the masses only learn through struggle."

The building of a *vanguard party* emanates from the existence of these vanguard elements:

- some of which belong to traditional organizations

- some of which are part of the new unorganized elements of the vanguard.

That is why we give our perspectives in the mass struggle to every layer of consciousness. It's the essential task of building a party. The characterization of the new vanguard in the context of the majority distinguishes between young workers, vocational school students, high school students, etc., in order to emphasize the fact that each sector in which we intervene requires precise perspectives for every struggle. We cannot perfect a single method of intervention to be applied on every occasion.

- The only contribution to the characterization of the new vanguard made by Mary-Alice Waters was *age*, and she goes to great lengths to point out that the principal elements of the vanguard come from a process of permanent and linear radicalization of the youth starting in the middle '60s—with a whole layer of people who would now be about 30 years old. The same elements who were radicalized in 1962 should still be radical in '68-73.

- It's just not true. Youth radicalization appears in waves, disappears and reappears around different struggles. Elements whose political consciousness is raised are not the same every time. Nor does the political consciousness of the youth, as a whole, progress in a permanent, linear fashion. Youth has no political memory. Youth, as such, has no organic connection to homes, families and bourgeois culture. It also has no organic connection to the world of work and no connection to the only class in society able to make the revolution. Political memory, like the ultimate responsibility for creating a socialist society belongs only to the working class.

That's why May '68 was not principally led by students who had been active at the time of the Algerian war, most of whom were in effect *deradicalized* in the interim. It should also be noted that the oldest high school students on strike this year in France were only 13 years old in 1968.

The Social Democracy, and even more the Communist Party, have erected an enormous barrier between the working class and all other radicalized elements and have sabotaged the class's gains. For these reasons the "peripheral" movements have had a considerable importance:

- their struggles have been more radical;

- they provide a place for educating the vanguard in leading struggles and *for directing them to the struggles at the center: the working class.*

These movements put forward qualitative demands which can only be granted in the framework of a socialist society after a revolution of the working class.

May '68 is a striking example of that.

That's why, more and more, these movements are showing themselves to be a direct function of the working class: the youth movement, the Basque struggle for autonomy, the women's movement.

6. *Vietnam*

Everyone knows the important place that support for the Vietnamese revolution has played for the European vanguard. The J.C.R. (the primary basis of the Ligue Communiste) before May '68, grew out of Vietnam committees. The F.S.I., the major Vietnam support organization in Europe, is made of just such committees now.

- the revolutionary support movement illustrates what

we mean by organizing mass movements and giving perspectives to the most advanced elements

— and it shows how to fight the C.P.

The revolutionary support movement for Vietnam in Europe is essentially different from the American antiwar movement in that those countries were not directly concerned with the war. Many governments remained totally neutral toward the conflict and in some cases elements of the government were openly critical of the U.S. policy. That was true of Sweden and it was particularly true of DeGaulle. An antiwar, anti-government, anti-involvement movement with strong pacifist overtones never developed in Europe because it had no basis in fact. What was needed in the U.S. was to build such a broad-based movement and develop strong revolutionary support inside. The latter was never carried out. What was possible in Europe was the building of only just such revolutionary support and that is what our comrades did. Right now that movement is stronger than ever and it continues to carry out its important tasks.

How was it built?

— Mobilizations were focused on the role of imperialism in the world with slogans such as: "It's in Vietnam now, in fact it's everywhere!"

— Emphasizing the struggle of the Vietnamese people as a symbol of the struggle against capitalism worldwide—and therefore, of the struggle of the proletariat against capitalism.

The C.P. stumbled by accident into organizing demonstrations for Vietnam:

— Because it didn't want to be cut off from radicalized students and workers but tried to keep the door open for both;

— Because they wanted to help out Moscow; a demonstration in Paris is far less dangerous than giving a sufficient number of arms—and what's more, it corresponded to their tactic of pressing for negotiations.

Its principal slogans were:

— "Peace in Vietnam";

— "Nixon, the Fascist Killer";

— "U.S. Out Now";

— and, of course, "Sign Now."

But very often, under the pressure of events and pressure from revolutionaries they would be forced to move to the left with slogans calling for "Victory to the N.L.F."

— also, to organize demonstrations several times a year;

— and to create solidarity funds such as for medical care.

You can't stay in Stalinist ambiguity for long when you're creating a support movement for the Vietnamese revolution. They had to operate on a different political level and get help from more advanced elements to structure an increasingly radical support movement.

— this was explained in the 1969 text of Mandel in which he discussed the difficulties of creating revolutionary support (particularly when the C.P. was doing it) from which Mary-Alice Waters wrenched a quote out of context to "prove" that antiwar work had been "abandoned."

The support movement for the Vietnamese revolution was built *after* '68 by sections of the Fourth International and often *after* '69 or '70 for the very good reason that many of them hardly existed before these dates. For example, the IMG in England had only 40 members in 1969.

And the movement was built, not on one, but on a series of slogans:

● explaining the Vietnamese revolution as an exemplary fight

● identifying with workers and peasants

● calling for "Support Until Final Victory" and by giving day-to-day support, despite the mood of the masses, sometimes along. (After all, in 1969 the Trotskyist movement was the only group talking about Vietnam in Europe. The C.P. did not jump on the bandwagon until much later.) They called for (1) "No Cease Fire in Support" and (2) the greatest possible unity in support which often meant that members of the Ligue were frequently beaten up by the C.P. for trying to join their demonstrations.

Within this framework, European comrades were able to attract the most conscious and combative elements:

— to build a mass movement, the F.S.I.

— to represent a greater and greater political weight in demonstrations

— to spread the movement: from 30,000 demonstrators in Paris in Nov. 1971 to 30,000 demonstrators in May 1973 . . . to Berlin, Copenhagen, London and Stockholm.

The large demonstrations were augmented by perpetual mobilizations of the European sections around day-to-day work in support of Vietnam. In Paris, they were capable of organizing a demonstration of 5,000 in just 24 hours.

How easy was it to do??

— remember that after '68 in France, many radicals preferred to concentrate on what they thought was revolution in their *own* countries rather than support the Vietnamese revolution

— their governments were not involved

— European countries were swept by strikes and mobilizations; to spend full-time only talking about only international movements such as Vietnam, the Basques and the Palestinians, would not have seemed serious.

— for 2-3 years now it has been illegal to organize a demonstration for anything in France (demonstrations are tolerated only because of the strength of the movement)

— every demonstration poses problems of provocation and violent confrontation with the police. For instance, the demonstration of January 20 of this year, when 15,000 people marched in a demonstration which had been forbidden. That demonstration featured police on every corner of Paris and was climaxed by a club-wielding attack by a phalanx of cops.

When one criticizes the '69-70 European showing on Vietnam and compares it to the showing made during the past year and a half, it must be done in the context of the consistency of revolutionary support and contrasted to the electoralist interruption every two years of the peace movement in the U.S.

The European sections carried out three kinds of work around Vietnam besides propaganda work:

1) *Meetings*—held several times each year in response to important events—in Paris, these ranged from 3,000 to 4,000; local meetings were held in neighborhoods of Paris and in smaller cities as well.

2) *Clandestine organization of demonstrations* (of 3,000 to 5,000, the first occurring in January of '69). In November of 1969 the Ligue Communiste was able to organize a demonstration of 3,000, despite the fact that some 500 of their comrades were held in preventive detention.

Within the marches organized by the C.P., the Ligue organized "revolutionary poles" ranging in size from 3,000 to 10,000 people.

3. *Minority actions* undertaken in tactically correct political conditions. By definition these actions are those which the party engages in alone. It does not mean actions carried out in isolation from the understanding and support from the masses. In *all cases* when the Ligue carried out such actions it had that kind of support. Remember the famous attack on the American Express office in Paris was the spark that set off the student mobilizations of May '68.

The F.S.I.

In 1971 the F.S.I. was launched. The F.S.I. is a coalition of extreme left groups and individuals functioning on the basis of grass roots committees organized in areas of Paris, other cities, factories, etc. These committees elect delegates to decide upon the direction of the movement. It gained prestige after its first demonstration in Paris in 1971 that mobilized over 30,000.

By November 1972 the F.S.I. was based on 180 committees. For the most part the people making up these committees were not Ligue members but were drawn from the layer we call the new mass vanguard. The F.S.I. is a viable organization *supporting* the Vietnamese revolution.

The demonstration earlier this year in Milan underlines the international character of the revolutionary movement in Europe. The F.S.I., along with other European anti-imperialist organizations created by the work of our comrades called and organized that demonstration.

What, concretely, did support for the Vietnamese revolution mean to our European comrades? In terms of functioning within a mass movement such as the F.S.I. it means that:

- you organize the masses for mobilizations as quickly as possible around the changing political situation to try to assure the Vietnamese revolution support when needed

- you lead militant campaigns:

- a) *against* international war industries and firms which profit from the war, e.g., Honeywell

- b) *for* medical aid to North Vietnam which only advanced industrial countries can provide

- c) *for* freedom of political prisoners, with no conditions

- you explain why you support the revolution and the struggle of the workers and peasants

- you point to the best aspects of that struggle:

- a) the organization of the liberated zones and the agrarian reforms

- b) the organization of mass education

- c) the organization of health care (this is accomplished through films, pamphlets and educational at universities, factories or in the neighborhoods)

- d) and in all your propaganda work you explain the political situation and the difficulties encountered by revolutionaries.

The F.S.I. was successful in directing this propaganda to all sections of society, not just the student population. That utilized the opportunity to educate the working class by explaining the concept of proletarian internationalism. And by showing that the fight against capitalism in Viet-

nam was part of *their* struggle.

Only the mobilization of the workers can give the movement a decisive character. We can only imagine what kind of strength such a mobilization would have given the American antiwar movement.

To *raise the political consciousness* of the mass movement, it is necessary for the SWP to:

- 1) put forward theoretical and political explanations which are not the same as those of the mass movement

- 2) put forward slogans and actions which are more advanced than those of the mass movement and, when necessary, to take action alone if the situation warrants it.

- 3) utilize the mass arena to bring forward the full program of the party.

The Ligue Communiste has done all the things outlined above and the results have proven effective. There is much for a revolutionary party to learn from the discussion of the democratic organization of the mass movement. It is imperative for the party to keep its ability to act unilaterally and its ability to criticize, even when operating inside a united front.

It is exactly this kind of an organization that the International majority document points to. It points to organizing mass movements, structuring the vanguard elements within them and giving them a clear advanced political perspective. We will find that it is the best of the vanguard elements who will "build the party."

Only in the context of permanent, continual and active support to the Vietnamese revolution can the kind of education needed on the Vietnamese leadership and Moscow's role be given. This topic merits an entire separate discussion.

In order to find the position taken by the Ligue Communiste and the other European sections reread the February *I.P.* article written by Comrade Sterne. The principal points of his article are:

- 1) Vietnam has proven to be a political and military impasse for U. S. imperialism

- 2) The struggle continues: it has not ceased since the spring offensive although it has been isolated by Moscow and Peking and by the weakened American antiwar movement during 1972

- 3) the support must continue, "No Cease-Fire In Our Support"

- 4) No military victory is possible at the present time—the treaty is only a stage in the military and political struggle

- 5) The treaty cannot be seen as a step backward (an analogy with Brest-Litovsk is faulty); there are no territorial concessions and no military retreat

Certainly we now see that:

- 1) the military and political situation has not worsened since the treaty has been signed

- 2) the struggle has not stopped, especially in Cambodia

WHAT WAS IN THAT TREATY?

A. What *Moscow* saw was:

- an opportunity to improve relations with the U.S.

- an opportunity to disengage even more from its revolutionary obligations

- an opportunity to create the illusion that they could stabilize the situation

B. What the *Vietnamese* saw was:

- a way of continuing their struggle, militarily and politically

- a way to limit the possibility of U.S. re-intervening with ground troops on the massive scale of the Johnson era

- recognition that Vietnam is one country

- an understanding that neither the "neutral forces" nor any other aspect of the treaty could stabilize the situation definitely in Thieu's favor

The political cost of this treaty was the de facto recognition of Thieu's presence. However, the treaty did nothing to legitimize his regime. Further, despite the loyal sounding claims of support for his regime from Nixon, Thieu was unhappy with the treaty and balked at accepting it.

The Ligue Communiste realized that the treaty did not halt the revolutionary process. They also understood that the period before the signing of the treaty was marked by the international isolation of the Vietnamese revolution, the betrayals of Moscow and Peking. The Vietnamese needed strong support, therefore the Ligue saw the necessity to explain that the struggle in Vietnam clearly could not be reduced to a discussion among only the great powers. From this understanding their principal slogans flowed: "Till Final Victory" and "No Truce in Support."

These slogans were common to all the sections in Europe. In addition the Ligue also raised conjunctural demands distinct to France, which were seen as reinforcing the diplomatic offensive of the North Vietnamese before the presidential election in the U.S. One of these demands was "Nixon Must Give In By the 30th." That slogan was the closest of any of our European sections came to calling for "Sign Now" (meaning that the Vietnamese had won, which is the position that the SWP falsely assigns to the Ligue).

Of course the only way to deal with such a treaty was to build support for the revolution. The treaty was in effect a double-edged sword. (You were bound to be damned if you did support the treaty or if you did not.) That kind of support for the revolution is the best way to fight against peaceful coexistence. If the International minority has a better way to create real support for the Vietnamese revolution in this period:

- they are going to have to tell us the miraculous slogans they would have used

- if they wanted "Out Now" as a slogan, they must explain why the Trotskyist movement in Europe had the same central slogan as the Stalinists

- they must explain why a tactic which failed to rally the American people for any meaningful support in Indochina in response to the blanket bombing of Cambodia is the right tactic for supporting the Vietnamese revolution, in Europe, or anywhere else for that matter. And above all, they are going to have to explain why the L.T.T. believes that the crucial time for supporting the Vietnamese is long past, and why they fail to put it forward as an important task before the Fourth International *right now*. If they do see it as such, where is their criticism of the failure of support in the U.S. during the months before and after the signing of the treaty?

7. Ireland

The violence of the Irish struggle in the recent period is a well known phenomenon. Everyone knows that be-

neath the surface religious conflict there exists a class war of singularly vicious proportions. This war has been ongoing throughout practically the entire 20th century. To Marxists it is apparent that the British linked Protestant bourgeoisie is engaged in an open war against the Catholic working class. Between these two poles the Protestant working class is forced to waver. Trying very hard to find its identity it recently launched a very hollow version of the IRA which places emphasis on both religion and its own class character. The contradictions involved are obvious.

The bourgeoisie of the North constitutes the apparatus of the state, supported by the strong arm of English imperialism when necessary.

The Catholic bourgeoisie of the South has proven equally incapable of satisfying the demands of the Irish Catholics living in the North, even though verbally supporting their struggles. Meanwhile it persists in jailing revolutionaries in the North and uses diplomatic maneuvers and repressive measures to remove this thorn in its side.

This confrontation with the bourgeoisie has taken on the aspects of urban guerrilla warfare during the past three years. The struggle has been led in Derry by both sections of the IRA until last year, when the "officials" took their distance from the "provisionals" in order to conform to the wishes of the bourgeoisie in the South. Contrary to popular opinion there remains only *one* IRA.

Despite the fact that political consciousness has been raised considerably during this period, the struggle for socialism remains just an "extra" to both the masses and the IRA. This is explained by the absence of organization, of political work, and by the traditional militarist deviations of the IRA. Nevertheless, the revolutionary dynamic of the struggle is real and is best symbolized by the prestige of the IRA.

This example of a religious minority that quickly is transformed into a class struggle has an echo in the Irish population in England, and to a lesser extent in the USA and in continental Europe. With this in mind, the comrades in the IMG, even though theirs was a very small section at the time, undertook the organization of support for the Irish struggle in England, a struggle in which it now plays a leadership role. They patiently explained now a defeat for the bourgeoisie of Northern Ireland would be a victory for the British working class.

The IMG's solidarity campaign emphasized this theme and adopted slogans which reflected the political situation at each juncture: "Against the Presence of the British Troops in Northern Ireland" and "Against Internment."

It would have been disastrous to underestimate the importance of the working class by taking the only demand recommended by Comrade Mary-Alice: "Bring the British Troops Back." At most that means let the bourgeoisie of Northern Ireland take care of itself. Also it calls for nothing more than letting the Irish Catholics of the North fend for themselves. It adds nothing to the consciousness of the British working class, particularly since the bourgeoisie of Northern Ireland had been defending itself for two years *before* the arrival of the British troops. Any kind of analogy with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, where the American troops intervened to defend a regime about to crumble under its own weight would be dead wrong.

The LTT insists on exporting to Europe the US anti-war movement wholesale, down to the last slogan, whether applicable or not. The LTT has no notion of how to use revolutionary support in bringing the troops back. Worse still, once the troops do come back home as far as the masses are concerned they have no idea of what to do next, in the US or England or anywhere else.

8. *The Basques*

Here again we have another example of the struggle of a minority nationality which is transforming itself into a class struggle as its needs become clearer.

This Franco-Spanish province is the "cradle of the Spanish working class." There the strong nationalist current is supported by the local bourgeoisie which desires autonomy the better to exploit the wealth of the province.

The ETA launched violent actions and quickly became extremely popular, its popularity even extended into certain sections of the church because its bombing campaign against the fascist regime of Franco paralleled a split inside the church's hierarchy. Because of these actions the ETA has been subjected to harsh repression and torture. In Burgos, 12 members of the ETA were put on trial and threatened with death.

In defense of the ETA, solidarity demonstrations were organized in France and elsewhere. The demonstrations in France were initiated by the Ligue Communiste through organization of the "Red Help." The first authorized demonstration since '68 took place in December of 1970, which mobilized about 10,000 on the first day and some 20,000 later. The C.P. was forced to orient to the second and was forced to take to the street in support of the Basques.

This internationalist support campaign reached such proportions Franco was forced to relent, even though the ETA was holding the German consul hostage throughout the trial.

This struggle of the Basques is clearly an attack on the fascist Spanish state.

After the trial a reshuffling took place inside the ETA: —those on the right remained nationalists and kept their emphasis on the militarist rather than the political aspects of the struggle,

—while those on the left have linked up the fate of the Basques with the need for a Spanish socialist revolution.

A section of the left wing of the ETA, VI is in the process of political clarification with the express goal of joining the Spanish section of the F. I., the L. C. R. (that is the section of the LCR close to the politics of the IMT), not the other branch which has had a split with a part of it going to the Lambertists (the LTT group).

9. *Worker and Student Youth*

According to Mary-Alice Waters' schema, intervention in the youth requires a preexisting youth organization on the model of the YSA, an organization to which young people are supposedly recruited during struggle. Our approach to the problem of youth work is from the opposite direction. We say:

—we must intervene in the youth,

—we must organize the struggles,

and from that organization will flow a youth formation, not the reverse.

Let us examine the youth work of the European com-

rades in three distinct periods; before, during and after the May '68 events:

1) Before May '68. In this period the youth radicalization served as a detonator to a number of workers' struggles. This period also marked the first real ruptures inside the Stalinist youth, the JCR helped accomplish this and set the stage for the primitive accumulation of cadre for the party.

2) During May-June '68. These mobilizations clearly showed the potential of the workers' movement. They further raised demands that posed the problem of qualitatively changing society, and proved what the motor force behind that change would be.

3) After May-June. The level of struggle had advanced and the problems were posed differently. It was learned by the radicalized elements affected that it is quite possible to lead sectoral struggles and make gains within those struggles, but the question of overthrowing the system is immediately posed if you try to go beyond that.

It was also learned that through mobilizations the masses are educated and that such mobilizations provide an opportunity for revolutionaries to demonstrate they are capable of organizing struggle. Such mobilizations are the means by which revolutionaries can penetrate the center (i.e., the working class) by consciously directing the student movements toward the class (of course there are other ways to accomplish this, e.g., colonization). Also it can provide the vehicle for linking the two: for example, the struggle of medical students and that of hospital workers in France.

In our youth work the arena of trade schools is fundamental. Even when the duration of training there is short, it is the opportunity to give the youth a political education *before* they fall under the oppressive weight of the trade-union bureaucracy and the factory management. Trade school youth have been mobilized along with young academic students since 1968, but because they are linked directly to the working class they have retained a certain autonomy, as is evidenced by the movement of March '72 in France.

We believe that any struggle is better than no struggle because even the most minimal struggle permits the injection of a political education: (1) on the means of organizing the struggle and (2) on the mechanism of society for exploitation.

By taking the initiative, by proposing actions and by directing the struggle democratically, we have the best method for combatting ultraleftism. It is necessary to explain that the problems of youth are the problems of the working class. It is necessary to understand that the youth is mobilized in waves and not in a linear fashion; as a result, the type of organization needed must be proposed for the struggle. This means concretely:

* *inside the movements*, strike committees that are elected and subject to immediate recall,

* coordination of these committees;

* *outside the movements* it is an illusion to think that it is possible to organize a mass union of students (the failure of all European student unions stand as a testimony to this). Only the student vanguard is capable of sustaining a constant level of activity, therefore, those are the students we seek to organize and structure.

This is essentially the way we can gain hegemony in

the mass movements in an unbureaucratic way. It happened in the struggle against *selectivity in education* during 1972 in France; with students in medicine and liberal arts; fights against repression, particularly among high school youth in both Luxembourg and France; and again in 1973 in Belgium and France this March. In every one of these actions our sections were in the forefront of struggle playing leadership roles.

A telling example is the struggle against the Debre Laws. After a campaign about the draft laws, directed at first to the vanguard, a movement was unleashed that mobilized more people than did May '68. It was, for the most part, directed and led by the Ligue Communiste more than any other left tendency. During the Debre events a leader of the Ligue spoke on national television and radio about the strikes, which had shut down practically every school and university in France. The Ligue had a *majority* of the elected leadership in the 3 national coordinating committees (from high schools, trade schools and apprentices, and the universities). The Ligue gained such notoriety that even *Le Monde*, the most prestigious paper in France, printed an article entitled, "Trotskyism and Communism," which was translated and reprinted in *The Militant*. It should also be noted that both the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* stated quite clearly that the French government had considered the Ligue dangerous as a result of the strike and that it was that particular incident and not the confrontation over the fascists that resulted in the Ligue's being outlawed.

What concretely does it mean to build a youth organization? We should be clear in our own minds what we mean when we use the term "youth organization." It does not mean an organization of the youth of the party. It is not an appendix of the party organizing close sympathizers. It is, rather, an organization in which the great bulk of the membership is not in the revolutionary party, in which autonomous activity is carried out and which has a different basis of recruitment than the party. Two examples of what we are talking about would be the CP influenced Student Union in France and the JCR.

In the period before 1968, youth organizations in the European sections often functioned as substitutes for the adult organizations (which in many cases simply did not exist). Such organizations flourished without a real structure and were therefore exposed to two types of diversions:

- 1) By the fact of their autonomy, and the absence of real ongoing party activity outside the movements, these kinds of organizations can be swallowed by the mass movements, which is what happened to the Italian section.

- 2) Consciousness of the dangers of spontaneism can cause the opposite danger, relegating such organizations to staying on the sidelines of the movement.

This second case results in engaging in sectarian abstentionism as the German section in fact did, in its failure to orient toward the S. D. S. of Germany or as the Lambertists characteristically do.

Rather than trying to pressure the youth organization from the outside to maintain a correct line, it was more correct to fuse the small adult party and the youth organization. Certainly, this did not mark the European sections' abandonment of youth intervention, but it meant considering the political problem of the place of a youth organization at each concrete step of party building as a

function of priorities of work.

In England, for example, you would have to build a youth organization mainly oriented toward students, because the working class is more radicalized than the students. In France, the L. C. must build a leadership and an organization capable of intervening in the working class. To say, as the SWP does "say", that a youth organization of several thousands would help the party and would allow it to give more time to the workers' movement in Europe, presupposes that in 5 years the Ligue would have enough cadres and money for a youth organization as big as the L. C. now, and a separate organization of "workers" and the ability to synthesize the work of both. It does not reveal an understanding of the problems the Ligue is faced with. It would lead to the development of two organizations doing very different kinds of work and would lead to two main dangers: spontaneism and workerism, and would lead only to one possible result: a split in the Ligue.

Instead the Ligue Communiste has preferred to build organizations of youth sympathizers which are appendices of the Ligue: Red Circles (for students) and Spark Committees (for trade school youth and apprentices).

The Red Circles number between 1,500 and 2,000 members (of which several hundred are trade school youth). This is where the Ligue gives its education and experience in struggle. Everyone applying to the Ligue for membership must stay at least six months in a Red Circle. There the turnover in membership is much greater than in the L. C., which has a very stable membership. Within the Ligue itself, new members remain "candidates" for between 6 to 18 months. During this period the candidate has a consultative vote. After this candidacy the person's membership is voted on by secret ballot. So the political basis of recruitment is very clear, resulting in a high level of political consciousness.

Giving administrative autonomy to such a youth appendix:

- 1) creates the illusion of building a youth organization, when in fact you are not doing so,

- 2) it weighs down the work of the party,

- 3) it causes organizational and political unclarity particularly when the percentage of party members involved is high, you never know who is speaking in the name of what,

- 4) it can only mean a manipulative way of leading the youth.

There are several examples of where these errors in approach can lead, but the best is the Lambertist youth (which incidentally number closer to 1,000 than the 3,000 so often cited). The AJS is characterized by sectarian abstention and manipulation. They recruit only on the basis of attendance at a big meeting, with no followup whatsoever. As a result they succeed in staying on the same level since 1968.

10. *The Women's Movement*

On the continent of Europe, all of the attitudes which reinforce the patriarchal family, which are generally recognized as being "Latin," definitely played a part in retarding the development of an autonomous women's liberation movement. Since May of '68 women have played an active role in all the ongoing struggles. Still in some ways the evolution of the women's movement parallels

that of the movement in the U. S.

In the period after May '68 in France, the women's liberation movement attracted the most anarchistic elements into a very small group united around such slogans as, "Kill the Man in Your Head" and "Feminist Revolution." When pro-working class women talked about socialism, they would respond, "Your pimp put that idea in your head." Through such actions as organizing women's festivals and speaking in the streets (as well as a number of minority actions) they were able to get a large audience for their ideas without having any real organization or leading women in struggle.

However, a change occurred in the situation when a number of women workers went on strike in '71 and '72. Struggle around childcare unleashed a number of these strikes. Most notable of all was the strike of women department store workers in Thierville, which was supported by all the national political groups on the left. With these events the need for struggle became apparent, and concomitantly a better understanding of the need for mass actions — and not just "killing the man in your head."

The Ligue Communiste has always placed emphasis on the problems of women in the factories by raising such questions as childcare and working conditions. In addition the Ligue began to organize the mobilizations around women's issues outside of the factories, particularly on the question of abortion.

The issue of abortion in France came to the fore in 1972, when about 300 women, some of them well known, such as Sagan and Deneuve, signed a manifesto saying that they had had illegal abortions. It was after this incident that Choisir was formed, primarily by liberals in order to provide legal defense for the less famous women who had risked jail by signing the manifesto. The Ligue Communiste supported this group, whose focus was primarily on providing propagandistic support and information about abortion, and helped create the M. L. A.-C., the Movement for Free Abortion and Contraception.

The MLAC and other leftist groups, organized the demonstration of 30,000 this year at Grenoble. This demonstration called for "Free Abortion on Demand" (a demand, incidentally, which had been abandoned by WONAAC because it was "too extreme" supposedly to mobilize large numbers of women). This slogan was taken up by all the European sections for the women's work, and around which women have been mobilized with great success not only in France, but in Belgium and elsewhere.

The Ligue was conscious that abortion was always accessible for the rich in Europe. Therefore their demand for *free* abortion was important for two reasons: (1) this demand appeals to the workers on the lowest economic level, who know that the right to abortion is meaningless unless she can pay for it; and (2) it is more difficult for the bourgeoisie to grant such a demand (it would be an error to say that such a concession is impossible).

What became apparent in Europe, as in the United States, was that the bourgeoisie was trying to "head the movement off at the pass," coopt it, by taking up its less dangerous demands and by granting some in the hopes of defusing the movement and turning it away from mass action. This was accomplished in the U.S. by the decision of the Supreme Court.

The Ligue Communiste was never limited in its women's work to a single issue campaign which could disappear

overnight, but rather it leads a campaign around all the aspects of the exploitation of women:

- * the nature of the family and the position of women,
- * *free* childcare,
- * working conditions,
- * and the double problems encountered by the women immigrant workers.

The women's movement in Europe is taking up the class question because the illusion that there are no class lines among women, that class lines are not preeminent above all other divisions, is rapidly disappearing. Even in Switzerland, where our comrades are struggling to gain the right to vote for women, the understanding that the problems of society will be changed only through a socialist revolution is the starting point for the vanguard of the women's movement. Such lessons still elude the SWP leadership.

11. *From the Periphery to the Center*

For the most part the peripheral movements arise from the problems of the working class and therefore we must be conscious to orient these movements toward the working class. The peripheral movements have a role to play in setting the example, but we must be careful not to sow the illusion that they can provide a substitute for the working class or that these movements can achieve meaningful victories without the working class.

By the center we mean the class itself, primarily, the organized industrial proletariat. It is there that the mass CPs and Social-Democratic parties are strongly organized in Europe. Concretely, this means that a whole generation of workers have received a false and distorted political education. It was, therefore the Fourth International's task to penetrate these existing organizations which erect barriers between the working class and revolutionaries. We must recognize that for the most part the class is not ready to leave these organizations.

These mass organizations have what can only be defined as a dual nature, on the one hand they have not made the revolution (and are not about to) and on the other hand they acted to defend the working class. Their leaderships have broken the back of every important struggle and because of this the combative elements are completely disenchanting and have begun to display a certain arrogance in their struggle.

A series of major strikes have broken out which got important support from public opinion, such as the JOINT Francais in Brittany where the L. C. organized collections across France for the strikers. Other major examples include the Fiat strike in Spain and Italy and the dockworkers strike in Great Britain.

There are two major features in organizing the working class under these conditions: (1) to back every movement that is making a break from Stalinism, or is developing in that direction; and (2) to back workers' unity in struggle and to cut across the wall between workers and revolutionaries. That is how the hold of the bureaucracy is broken. Struggles around even minimal demands are extremely important because they permit pushing for united actions, strike committees, etc.

At an even higher level, we begin to educate workers on the need for workers' control. It also provides an opportunity to take up the whole series of demands that Trotsky raised with the intention of placing the workers in control of capitalist production without accepting re-

sponsibility for capitalism. It should be understood that workers' control is *incompatible* with capitalism because it serves to destroy the base of that system, the capitalists' prerogatives. Consequently it poses which camp will dominate the other. That is the wellspring behind the Transitional Program, raising demands that are incompatible with capitalism.

The fight for workers' control does not exist in a period of calm. The example of the Clyde shipyards in Great Britain are a case in point. There, after the workers established control of the means of production and claimed the products as their own, they were confronted with a dilemma; they were either obliged to stop work altogether or integrate with capitalist production, in this case in order to get bank loans. What we mean by workers' control, the Trotskyist meaning, is a situation of dual power. That's why it transcends the realm of immediate or democratic demands and becomes a transitional one.

Preparing the working class for workers' control means finding, in one factory after another, the way to raise a whole series of demands: the right to veto hiring and firing, open the books, the sliding scale of wages and hours.

In effect the question about *who* in the working class is able to take control: "The masses" in the abstract or the unions or strike committees which are elected and subject to recall. These are the means you use in confronting the bourgeoisie, the means of protecting the advances made by workers' control. Precisely here is where the problem of armed struggle comes to the fore, much to the chagrin of the LTT.

Mary-Alice Waters showed awareness of this when she was insisting on the need for educating about armed pickets and workers militias. Why the LTT accepts such formations for Europe but not for Latin America is difficult to explain, unless Comrade Waters is guilty of what the LTT refers to as a militarist deviation.

Standing at the factory gate and calling for workers' control would not accomplish anything. This is a truism that needs to be restated. One must find the possibilities in every concrete situation which favors the organization of organs of control such as strike committees, even if only for directing a strike for immediate demands. One of the Ligue comrades was able to do just this during the Brest strike of last spring. Another necessity is finding the means appropriate to the place, such as a strike for administrative apparatus of the hospital (in fact, organizing free medical care), while not stopping the medical care. Exactly this was done by another comrade last November in Paris.

Trotsky insisted on giving this kind of education and the importance of *not* waiting to begin it. For example, he proposed for the party in United States, not to wage vague struggles but rather to fight around the sliding scale of wages and hours.

The LTT is more than a little embarrassed about this approach and characterizes it as "sectarian." The demand for "workers' control" is something left over for Sunday speechifying or at most an occasional sop to orthodoxy in *The Militant*. They do not see it as "immediate." Of course, it is something aimed to the vanguard first and foremost, long before it could be possibly realized. Trotsky insisted on an orientation to the vanguard, but that

should astonish no one, he was a revolutionary.

In order to worm out of a difficult emprise, Novack and Hansen wrote an introduction to the Transitional Program that is quite a new dish — thick slices of Wonderbread with a tiny sliver of meat (thanks to Leon Trotsky) hidden deep inside. In doing this they would have us believe that the Transitional Program needs to be "updated." That put forth the innovation that democratic demands *are* transitional in the advanced capitalist sector. We have reached the point where the Transitional Program is seen as a mere introduction to George Novack.

In the company of Novack, Mary-Alice doesn't do so bad in a comparison (all things are relative). She recognizes that calling for workers' control is going much too far ahead of the masses (as do Hansen and Novack) but she goes on to at least mention the sliding scale of wages and hours. But she neglects to tell us that it is an element, and one of the main slogans raised in the fight for workers' control. It's a little like a dog chasing his own tail; where can these comrades lead us?

The LTT is very selective about which parts of the Transitional Program they are enthusiastic about. If they want to oppose basic proposals of the Transitional Program in lieu of the mystical "party building" or delay work which Trotsky to be basic and necessary, until some future time when the "masses" will be more receptive, they must justify these decisions *politically*. Look to their work in the working class (if you can find it) or their suggestions about how to carry it out. Look for these things in their documents and you will look in vain, because they do not exist. They are too busy being the best defenders of the Transitional Program.

Right now intervention in the trade unions is the *top* priority work for our European sections.

In France, the Ligue Communiste is building revolutionary tendencies. So far they have organized such a tendency which includes 10 percent who have organized the "Free School" grouping. They are strong in the second largest union in France, the CFDT, particularly among postal workers and public utility workers. Even the leadership of CFDT has been forced to carry out polemical debates with the Ligue.

In the largest French union, the CP controlled CGT, the shops which the Ligue is strongest in have been subject to repression and harassment from the CGT leadership, even to the point of damaging the union. In a response to this the Ligue has led, along with other left groups, a campaign around union democracy.

While in Spain the comrades of the LCR have worked through workers commissions with such success that the CP has been forced to recognize them as a political force of some consequence.

In England, the IMG has worked through shop steward committees, where, despite the fact that they are a new organization, they've been able to function as a real political force in a number of places.

One of the roles the party must play in the factories is carried out by means of leaflets and factory newspapers. Over 200,000 such leaflets a month are printed in Paris by the Ligue. They also write brochures dealing with the problems faced in the unions and on other political subjects as well, on the average of one every month. These often deal with important strikes and the lessons that can

be drawn from them.

The Ligue's political intervention extends to 300 factories. They have built 150 cells with about 10 militants per cell. In addition to this are the Red Mole groups consisting of organized sympathizers of the Ligue who help to carry out its interventions. The last national conference of the Red Mole groups drew 800 workers for a three-day meeting for education and discussion.

The Ligue also engages in selected nationwide campaigns. For instance the campaign around selling copies of the Manifesto of the Ligue, which sold around 30,000 copies. Also the campaign around an across-the-board wage increase for everyone.

As has been shown, an intervention in the working class means both political intervention and intervention in the unions. It must be done on a day-to-day basis, even the workers seem to be indifferent. Marx never failed to explain, after all, that we are like moles, underground, who will only appear on the day of the revolution. The task of the party is to prepare for struggles and thus to lead them.

12. Elections

In order to put the recent French elections into proper perspective, we will make the following points:

1) Parliamentary elections are not presidential elections
2) A left-liberal candidate is not the same as a workers' candidate, even when the latter is a Stalinist.

3) The principle of the united front of workers advanced by Lenin in the Third International was to *strengthen the unity of the working class* and to demonstrate that only the revolutionary leadership is capable of supplying direction. It was a tactic often used by the small CPs to demonstrate to the many Social-Democratic workers the bankruptcy of the Social Democracy.

4) The correct yardstick in measuring the united front is not the content of its program, which at any rate will not be either supported or respected by the revolutionary party in most cases, but whether or not the front helps to increase the combativity of the working class.

The Communist Party, the Socialist Party and later on the tattered remnants of the Radical Party joined together in the "Union of the Left" to which the Ligue Communiste gave *critical* support in the second round of the recent French elections. In the first round, the Ligue joined with the LO (Lutte Ouvriere) in presenting a slate of revolutionary candidates. Together these two parties got 300,000 votes, still less than the necessary 5 percent for presenting candidates in the second round. Therefore, the Ligue was left with two alternatives in the second round: either abstain entirely or support the "Union of the Left." The following considerations influenced the choice:

1) The working class was undergoing the first wave of struggle and radicalization since '68 and it was important to both encourage and support the militancy of the workers.

2) The SP, though it was moving closer and closer to being a bourgeois party, is still trading on the currency of the Social Democracy and has a sizeable following in the working class.

3) The only bourgeois elements (so identified by members of the LTT) were individuals of the Radical Party with some political following who ran their elections more in their own names than in that of the party (as a whole

they received less than 5 percent of the votes in the 2nd round) and it did not include most of the Radical Party.

4) The candidates of the CP would have been supported in any case.

The position of the Ligue was to give critical support to the Union of the Left—with the emphasis on "critical" in the extreme—with no support to the program adopted and the Ligue took the slogan, "We Are Preparing for a Springtime of Struggle." And, if you followed the events of this past spring in France, you will have an idea of what they were talking about: factory strikes, the strike of high school students organized by the Ligue, and 30,000 people in the streets of Grenoble in support of the abortion movement.

The comrades of the LTT have attempted to construct a case of "principles" around the elections, but they're having a hard time imposing some kind of logic on their criticisms:

Accusation number one: "You sported a popular front." Not true. There was a popular front in France in 1936, then the major parties were the SP and the Radicals. In the '73 elections the CP was the principal one, then the Socialist Party, and lastly only a handful of radicals who ran their campaigns more in their own names than that of their party. Unless you are virgin pure and clean out every last small party drifting toward the bourgeoisie that has a following in the working class (e.g., the French SP), the comrades of the LTT will jump on you for joining a popular front. They will find it difficult indeed uniting the working class with such an abstentionist position.

Accusation number two: "You gave critical support to the reformist program of the Union of the Left." No again. The Ligue gave its support to the Union of the Left and not to its program, in exactly the same way we would give critical support to individual candidates of the CP or the CP and SP, or the Union of the Left. The handful of bourgeois liberals did not change this program by so much as a comma.

Accusation number three: "You should have called for a class vote." Isn't this another way of saying that the Ligue should only support CP candidates? The SP, in reality, is no more clearly a workers' party than it is a clearly bourgeois party. Its following among workers was the reason for its participation in the Union of the Left. A call for a class vote is necessary when the class lines are clearly drawn. This was not the case. At best it would have led to serious confusion on the part of the working class and would have seemed a purist and dogmatic stand for the Ligue to have taken.

The thrust of the criticism of many members of the LTT has not been concerned with the particular tactics employed in giving critical support to the Union of the Left or over a call for a class vote, but rather in support of sectarian abstentionism on the basis of "principle" and that is another debate than the LTT puts forth as its official position.

The building of a revolutionary party is accomplished by (1) moving the peripheral sectors in the direction of the working class and (2) political work in the center to build nuclei of revolutionary communists.

There are not shortcuts in this process! If you attempt to build the party in the periphery *first* without attacking the center, it leads directly to every possible political fluc-

tuation; overestimating the historical task of the sectors and giving in to an opportunistic pressure which can show up as ultraleftism or in a turn to opportunism. Of course, convincing the petty bourgeoisie does not necessarily mean adapting to them; rather it should mean showing this layer that only the working class can bring about a social revolution.

Real problems exist that must be taken up by revolutionaries when they leave the stage of doing only propaganda work, unfortunately they are not dealt with by Mary-Alice in her text. Bypassing the working class and bypassing the real problems are the twin characteristics of the LTT.

For Marxists, the class struggle continues; its outcome depends upon the capacity of the vanguard to direct the struggles. Throughout the development of the class struggle there are a series of phenomena which accelerate it, slow it down, or provoke crises. But in no case is there any individual action, in and of itself, whether ultraleft or otherwise, capable of changing the course of the class struggle.

For example, the assassination of Sallustro did not fundamentally alter the political situation in Argentina, while the Cordoba and Mendoza events did to some extent. Likewise, in the Middle East it wasn't the "terrorist" actions of al Fateh which unleashed the repression of "Black September," but the fact that the masses in the West Bank region were taking up arms, controlled a section of Amman and other places, couldn't put up with Hussein much longer. And the same can be said of Ireland. The actions of the IRA have never ceased to include terrorism from the beginning. It's the level of the class struggle that has changed and made the IRA a force to be reckoned with.

Believing that ultra-left actions can substitute for a strategy is overestimating the role that such actions can play. If you believe it, you are saying that the ultralefts are right; if you can modify the class struggle by a single action, then what you ought to be doing is finding the right one! The Ligue Communiste has fought this theorization which up to now has been defended only by Maoist-anarchists.

However, in every case the Ligue's criticism takes into account the political context, the tasks of revolutionaries and their place in the class struggle as it unfolds. Only in this context can you even begin a discussion about errors, political mistakes and deviations—not in the abstract or certainly not from a moral point of view.

This crusade against "terrorism" on the part of the LTT is taken one step further when they start looking behind every bush for everything that could possibly lead to a "strategy of terrorism." They begin to attack and criticize a whole style of action taken up by the new revolutionary generation and judge it ultraleft, as leading to terrorism.

We have the end result of this approach when we begin to hear that a true supporter of the LTT should be scandalized that an American flag was burnt in a demonstration supporting the Vietnamese revolution (that's bending a little too much in the direction of U. S. nationalism). This paranoid fear of ultraleftism has a kindred spirit in the campaigns of the CP for a "dignified and respectable" mass action, with important people (celebrities) leading the march.

In her document Comrade Waters devotes numerous

pages to the question of minority actions without so much as analyzing even one or two of the most important ones in a concrete fashion. She would have a difficult time criticizing, *in the concrete*, the attack on the American Express office which unleashed the events of May '68, and equally hard-pressed to explain away the positive political effect of the actions of the comrades of the Ligue who occupied the Czechoslovakian embassy during the trial of Peter Uhl, which focused the attention of the press for a week on this important defense case, and thereby provoking a severe diplomatic incident, without having a single comrade convicted.

The Ligue has never maintained that such actions can be substituted for any other kind of political work. To imply that the Ligue *counterposes* such actions to mass work, while the Ligue has organized, for example, 20,000 people in Paris to protest the Trelew massacres, is at best a poor joke. Considering that despite six years of mass work in the antiwar movement, in the midst of the "biggest," "broadest," "deepest" radicalization of American history, we find the SWP and a few die-hard NPAC members in feeble demonstrations against the hated Thieu. Mary-Alice would be best advised to think twice before discussing minority action.

13. Perspectives and Analysis

From the level of discussion on Latin America, it was almost impossible to discern the line of the LTT. Much of what was said reduced itself down to, "we're going to do what was done before," which is abstract and dogmatic at best. One object of the present discussion of the Fourth International is to elaborate a revolutionary strategy based upon our experiences in the recent past. It is alien to Marxism to try and mechanically reproduce a sequence of events beginning with 1905. Certainly any discussion of Europe ought to be the place where we get down to cases. Why? Because both sides agree that the largest section of the International, the Ligue Communiste, followed the line of the majority which is being debated. This is not the case in Argentina. In Bolivia no one can agree on a set of facts to start from. Such is not the case in France; it provides the best example of the line which the LTT seeks to change—and everyone has access to the facts. That is why the LTT prefers to stay on the level of abstractions.

Here is a good example of what I mean: we hear a lot of talk about the "masses" and "mass action." Supposedly, you place the party on the level of the "masses." Even the bourgeois press' accounts of Marxism tell us that the "masses" are mainly made up of the working class by virtue of its size and its political weight and it should be ABC that revolutionary propaganda should be directed toward it:

* toward the 20,000 Fiat workers who occupied the plant in Turin, protected by strike pickets and supported by the entire population.

* toward the Spanish workers of Ferreol who organized themselves during a strike into self-defense pickets.

* toward the French workers who, at least for the present have established workers' control in a watch factory.

But to the SWP this is not impressive. For it, if the working class is good, *the sectors are even better!* This contrast comes across in bold relief, when over a hundred thousand workers can take to the streets of Europe

and rarely merit an article in *The Militant*, while 2,000 supporters of free, legal abortion take up a whole page. It doesn't make any sense, unless you think, as does the SWP, that several hundreds of thousands in the peripheral sectors *are* the masses and not the millions and millions of workers involved in struggle right now.

All this is particularly evident in the document submitted by Mary-Alice Waters. As I've already stated she takes the European text for a detailed balance sheet, which it is not, and proceeds to criticize it on that basis, without trying to deal with the problems brought up by the experience of the European sections. The text talks about penetrating the working class and organizing it against the influence of the bureaucrats in the present political situation. Then Mary-Alice Waters does something a little peculiar; she devotes very little space to the political and economic situation in general, which is what you take into account when you project a political strategy, she passes over this analysis lightly because she *has no major disagreements with the majority*. A first in Marxist methodology! She does not even attempt to show us how the LTT arrives at a completely different set of conclusions about the political that needs to be done from a basis of agreement about the situation.

Considering the level of the working-class struggle in present-day Europe, Mary-Alice is condescending, not only to the comrades, but to the masses of working people in Europe as well. The masses of workers are talking about workers' control already and some of them have put it into practice as in Bersancon and Clyde. One of the major debates going on right now concerns "self-management" along the lines of Yugoslavia. A *sliding scale of wages* is a demand which has already been taken up by the unions; what must be done now is to link it to the *sliding scale of hours*. Strike committees and shop delegates are becoming a general phenomenon in Europe, the task of revolutionaries is to give these formations a perspective that will lead the workers toward furthering their struggles.

Mary-Alice's suggestions constitute not just tailending

the vanguard but tailending the masses of workers! Why? Because she finds it difficult to believe that the class is capable of taking steps toward revolution, without benefit of following her script to the letter, even when they are taking up and fighting around demands right out of the Transitional Program. The only section of the working class she is concerned with are the women workers and "young" workers—and the only work she would have us carry out is finding a way to draw these two groups out of the context of the class struggle and into the struggle in the peripheral sectors.

14. Conclusion

Revolutionaries in Europe are working out a revolutionary strategy; they are not quarrelling over whether or not to raise democratic demands (something they never fail to do) or whether or not to work within the armed forces (something, again, they never failed to do). The discussion is really around strategic orientation, choices and revolutionary tactics. Definitely it can not be around how best to turn the Fourth International into an advertising agency for socialism.

While the LTT was supposedly analyzing the situation in Latin America, they were in fact preoccupied with the mythology of the Russian revolution. Now on the subject of Europe, they are so busy talking about their propagandistic conception of class struggle and the necessity of making it worldwide, that they forget to mention even the major differences between the countries. They are trailing at least 5 years behind the debate and run a dangerous risk of compromising the newest sections of the Fourth International.

We must ask the comrades of the LTT to present us with a strategical text for Europe which can act as a guide for our sections.

Therefore, we ask that comrades reject the text of Mary-Alice as insufficient, superficial and unfounded. We urge comrades to support the *Building of Revolutionary Parties In Capitalist Europe* as the best way to build the Fourth International in Europe.

July 20, 1973

SOCIALISM AND TECHNOLOGY: AN ANSWER TO COMRADE GARRETT'S VIEW OF ECOLOGY

by Steve Beck, Lower Manhattan Branch, New York Local

The environmental movement is a contradictory phenomenon, poised between outright anticapitalism and the shallowest reformism. This is because it openly poses the question of who shall control technology. To avoid the obvious revolutionary implications of this issue, its liberal leaders are forced into the most bizarre intellectual contortions.

Comrades who have had to defend our program will note that the questions most often asked about the environment by independents are: "Isn't pollution caused by ordinary people, as well as capitalists?" and "Wouldn't industry pollute even under socialism?" These questions reflect a skepticism about the ability of a truly democratic and human society to overcome pollution, a cynicism which has been carefully drummed into people's heads by the ruling class through an intense media bar-

rage which repeats in myriad ways that "people cause pollution." Though it is clearly a self-serving ideology for the polluting class, this concept is very difficult to combat even among radical youth because of the uncritical acceptance of it by influential reformist ecologists, the recent lull within the movement and the absence of a viable powerful radicalization within the workers movement which would make "workers' control" more than a propaganda phrase.

Nevertheless, it is saddening to see such ideas appear even within the revolutionary party. I believe Comrade Garrett's "anti-accumulation theme" to be a softening in the face of some of the mistaken notions now holding sway within the ecology movement. It appears in the context of his general assault against the Marxist method and

historical materialism, which I believe Comrades Reed and Novack have successfully defended.

Though Garrett's confused critiques elsewhere diminish his credibility in this arena, *Three Flaws in the Party Leadership's Policy on Ecology* (Discussion Bulletin no. 3) is not to be taken lightly. Comrade Garrett himself has exercised a certain leadership in this area, in both our campaigns and discussions, as well as being respected for his experience and courage. But this attack can add to the confusion of our new members and YSAers who are interested in the environmental movement, but vulnerable to the elitism, counter-culturalism and other weaknesses of that milieu.

Before dealing with the points which Garrett raises, it is necessary to place them in the context of the movement's development.

Strontium 90 to "Shell No.!"

The explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki shattered the myth that science under capitalism was a force at the service of humanity. To drive the point home, Oppenheimer, "Father of the Atomic Bomb," was hounded from government service by the witchhunters.

A few scientists fought against what they saw as the prostitution of their profession. During the era of open-air atomic tests, it was their testimony which helped break through the government lies that tests were harmless. But the growth of the military sector and introduction of more and more harmful industrial processes continued to accelerate.

By the 1960s environmental pollution was a phenomenon plainly visible to the average citizen in the form of smog, foamy drinking water and oil-soaked beaches. But pollution wasn't the only "unintentional" byproduct of the third industrial revolution. Millions of technical personnel were needed by industry. Reacting to their alienation and more or less familiar with scientific concepts of ecology, students and some professionals began to construct a movement against the environmental danger.

By 1969 the storm clouds were plainly visible for the ruling class. "Consciousness-raising" events were growing in frequency, and the disclosures of Ralph Nader were a continual embarrassment. This was also the period of intense antiwar activity, which provided the new movement with a healthy example of independent mass action.

But the ecology movement failed to learn the same lessons as the antiwar movement. Rather than being a prelude to an upsurge, the "teach-in" phase in many ways contributed to its decline. The Earth Day extravaganzas were often a vehicle for injecting bourgeois concepts into the infant movement.

Liberal Democrats and the media in general were the initiators and enthusiastic builders of the April 1970 teach-ins, which mostly reflected their population hysteria, anti-technology demagoguery, and desire to counterpose ecology to other social struggles. This miseducation, combined with the conjunctural ebb of the student, Black and antiwar movements, tended to isolate revolutionists and strengthen the reformists. This was particularly visible in the area of recycling. Real recycling means the reclamation of *all* solid, liquid and industrial wastes, thus both eliminating a source of pollution and conserving resources. A few environmental activists organized small-scale recycling projects (can, bottle and paper collections), claiming they

could "raise consciousness." As time went on, these projects sapped more and more energy; the task of confronting government and industry with the demand for real recycling receded, and the groups degenerated into ingrown cliques, often with government or private foundation support. Recycling had become the sandbox of the ecology movement.

Nevertheless, the movement has continued, especially in the form of small, ad-hoc coalitions formed around local issues (such as the construction of a nearby power plant). The campaign to stop SST, though successful without involving any mass mobilization, illustrates the caution with which the ruling class now approaches environmental questions and their awareness that a mass consciousness exists which could be provoked into active opposition.

Much of the resurgence of activity has centered around union-led struggle. Black lung disease and job safety became explosive issues for the United Mine Workers, where rank-and-file revolt toppled an infamous bureaucracy and forced through stiffer protective legislation. Pesticide control, aimed at protecting both workers and consumers, has been a major issue for the United Farm Workers Union (AFL-CIO). The recent strike of Shell Oil refinery workers of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (AFL-CIO) had the support of every major environmental group.

Such solidarity, expressed in more and more militant actions will have to be exhibited in the coming years by the movement if it is even to hold onto the few gains won already. This is because the polluters have launched an aggressive counterattack against conservation as part of their "energy crisis" scare. But the powerful traditional conservationists, the counter-culturalists and the panorama of local groups have yet to unite against this threat.

The Nature of Economy?

Despite such possible openings for our propaganda, the movement in its current form places severe strains upon a revolutionist. A few comrades respond to the despair and reformism of so many environmentalists by washing their hands of it. Garrett has responded by adapting to all of its weaknesses.

This adaptation centers around a scientific sounding, but utterly unproven assertion that "human economy is a totality that feeds off another totality, nature. . . . It is the nature of economy, of human labor, to consume nature's products." This contradicts the belief of Commoner, Nader and many environmentalists who, in their better moments, declare that humanity and its productive forces can live in harmony with nature.

Once one accepts the notion that production is a parasite upon nature and can never be anything else, compromise after compromise must be made. Garrett makes these compromises, by retreating before the population fetishists, by misinterpreting the important theories of Barry Commoner, and finally with his "anti-accumulation theme" which tosses nearly the whole corpus of socialist economics out the window.

Having accepted technology as an inevitable polluter, Garrett is forced to conclude that some checks must be made upon human growth, even if planning and equitable distribution give us some breathing room after the socialist revolution. "Just because capitalism is the ultimate

cause, population as an immediate cause is not automatically ruled out," he says, though qualifying it by noting that "population is not a major factor among immediate causes."

Both environmentalists and dialectical materialists feel uncomfortable with such cause-effect simplicity. Population is not a cause, major or minor, of either pollution or impoverishment. Rather than being an independent force, it rises and falls due to the conscious schemes of the ruling class (colonization, wars and genocide, population control through coercion, or child-bearing through coercion) and even more through the blind forces of industry. Thus population tends to level off when people's lives improve and their children are no longer indispensable economic assets, or when women are given the opportunity to be fully productive human beings and not simply baby makers and tenders.

This explains the very noticeable tendency for the birth-rate to level off in a country which has had a socialist revolution. That is not to say that we should advocate socialism as a means of controlling population (a labor shortage can be a serious thing for a struggling workers state) but only that we see population as a false issue.

By giving it the status of an "immediate cause," Garrett falls into the latest trap laid by Paul Ehrlich, chief population fetishist in the U.S. Seeing his credibility going down and suffering from quite justifiable charges of racism from Black and foreign students, Ehrlich now "concedes" that both technology and population are to blame for pollution. But his call for us to "grapple simultaneously with overpopulation, excessive affluence, and faulty technology" is simply a means of salvaging the shreds of his position. Ehrlich's method is still to blame both capitalists and workers for pollution, and to set the stage for demanding sacrifices from the latter. It is Garrett, not our party spokespeople, who is "seeming to be ecologically naive and politically opportunistic" in bending to this false ideology.

More serious is his confusion over "productivity." He sees correctly that capitalism is forced to adopt more and more powerful productive techniques in its competitive drive for higher profits, and that it is not concerned with the effects of this technology. He also sees that higher productivity is the key to higher profits. From this he implies, however, that productivity itself creates pollution. In responding to the correct statement of Linda Jenness during her campaign that we wish to orient technology to human needs, Garrett enunciates what must stand as one of the most bizarre formulations in the history of the SWP: "This implies that we can do with technology what Marx and Lenin said we could not do with the bourgeois state, simply seize the old machinery and turn it to serve positive social needs."

I trust that Comrade Garrett will be with us when we seize the machines, banks, railroads, communication lines, natural resources and other elements of technology as part of the coming American revolution. I doubt that he'd vote to destroy it all; like the vast majority of working people even now, he'd probably want to devise the most stringent controls over its use, and go about the task of devising nonpolluting methods of production (the principles of which exist already). In the meantime, I hope he is more serious in the way he paraphrases dead revolutionists.

This statement also miseducates new members about the

actual practice of our party in regard to productivity gains. When painting contractors violate their union contract by using rollers, our comrades in Painters Local 5 in San Francisco are the first out on the picket line. When "containerization" was introduced at the expense of longshoremen's jobs, we supported the ILWU strike of 1972 all the way. And in the railroad industry, where workers' attempts to fight speedup and defend their jobs and pensions are labeled "featherbedding" by the media, we explain the real issues to as many as will listen.

The very heart of the "30-for-40" demand is the reasonable proposal that the working class should expropriate every gain which is made in productivity, through shorter hours and full employment. It is thus news to all of us that our movement has gone soft on the productivity drives of the ruling class.

The fear of technology expressed in *Three Flaws* is largely based upon a misinterpretation of the theories of environmentalists Dr. Barry Commoner. His book, *The Closing Circle* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1971), suggests that "the postwar technological transformation of the United States economy has produced not only the much heralded 126 percent rise in GNP, but also, at a rate about ten times faster than the growth of GNP, the rising levels of environmental pollution." (P. 146.) The transformation he refers to is the replacement of soap with detergent, wool and cotton with synthetic textiles, wood with plastics, steel with aluminum and so on. The new "man-made" materials, and the galloping increase in energy consumption which goes with them, have been the culprits in the present crisis.

The reason for this change he correctly identifies as the above-average profits to be made with the new processes, and he ends with an indictment of the profit system. As an immediate measure, Commoner calls for a return to the older, "natural" materials and industries, and the introduction of new pollution control techniques. This might involve some loss in productivity, but in turn would create many new jobs as well.

The enthusiastic interest in these disclosures expressed in the party's publications (the Pathfinder pamphlet, *Pollution: Who is Responsible?* by Reosti, the Feldman article, "Growth, Technology and Human Survival," in the September 1972 *ISR*, my review in the September 22, 1972 *Militant*) is not enough for Comrade Garrett. He insists that we must now oppose productivity, and even technology itself. Under the slogans "*People Before Productivity! People Before Technology! Technology for the People - and No More!*" we must educate the workers not to demand higher living standards, because "nothing is humanly recyclable 100 percent" and we must "allow nature the living space it needs to regeneration the preconditions of human life and economy which the labor process tends to negate."

The problem with these statements is that they go far beyond what Commoner himself said. As the very title of his book is intended to suggest, he insists that we can "close the circle," instead of breaking these cyclical natural interrelations, and do it in the context of an industrial society. He opposes "counterecological technology" but indicates that another kind is possible.

For example, urban planner Charles Abrams has written that "the world's engineers could make a greater contribution to society by inventing a chemical or other sim-

ple means for disposing of human excrement on earth than by making contact with the moon." (*Man's Struggle for Shelter in a Urbanizing World*, MIT Press, 1964, p. 294.) Commoner himself is to be credited with such a (heaven forbid) technical innovation. In a lecture at Berkeley on February 7, 1972, he outlined a plan for a sewage pipeline linking all cities with food-producing regions. Simultaneously the waste-disposal problems of the cities, the over utilization of chemical fertilizers in the country, and the declining quality of chemically-grown food would be overcome. "I am not a Luddite, I approve of technology," he said, adding with mock pride, "my technology is a brilliant invention."

Nevertheless, Commoner is not a socialist, and reached his conclusions via empirical, not dialectical reasoning. It is up to us to draw the correct conclusions from his work: that the means for eliminating pollution exist and are not being used, and it is thus necessary for the masses of people to take control of technology themselves. We cannot do this if we reject the possibility of nonpolluting industry at the outset.

But if technology was so utterly disastrous, then surely Comrade Garrett would oppose its introduction where it is not yet entrenched. Not so. He suggests that "the anti-accumulation theme is directed against U.S. capitalism. . . but not those countries oppressed by foreign imperialism."

As the concept of uneven and combined development suggests, newly developing nations do not repeat all the stages of industrial history, but adopt the latest and most advanced technology—and therefore the most environmentally disruptive technology. (I refer comrades to the massive anthology *The Careless Technology: Ecology and International Development*, Natural History Press, 1972, for a collection of case histories). If Garrett hesitates to apply his program to the colonial and neocolonial countries, they are fortunately not exempt from the present Trotskyist program. The mass environmental struggles in Japan, many led by our comrades, and the recent outbreak of opposition to the "superports" in Puerto Rico indicate that environmental issues can indeed be enormously explosive outside the U.S. and Europe.

Marx and Engels on Pollution

Regrettably, Garrett seems to be reacting to the backwardness of the activists which he calls "the larger sector of the radicalization which. . . is against, if not all technical developments, at least the majority." In attempting to placate these elements, he does them a disservice. Behind the confusion of the average ecology activist lies the miseducation they have received from the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Zero Population Growth; and behind these environmental reformists lie the Club of Rome, the Rockefeller Foundation, Volkswagen Foundation, Fiat and all the newly converted "friends" of the environment seeking to find a way of making the working class assume the burden of the massive dislocations caused by even minimal pollution controls.

Had he been as familiar with the socialist position on technology and productivity, I don't think he'd have made such an error. Although technology was not powerful enough in Marx's day to create the sort of dislocations we see today, the process leading to our present predicament was clearly revealed by the founders of scientific socialism.

In *Wage, Labour and Capital*, Marx dwelled upon the

forces driving the capitalists to continually adopt the newest machinery they could afford. "One capitalist," he wrote, "can drive another from the field and capture his capital only by selling more cheaply. . . hence, general rivalry arises among the capitalists to increase the division of labour and machinery and to exploit them on the greatest possible scale." (Progress edition, Moscow, 1970, p. 38.) Thus, the owners can never stand pat with old machinery, but must always increase their workers' productivity, make their jobs more specialized, and indirectly have a greater impact on society and the environment. Worse, this tendency continues and accelerates.

"The privileged position of our capitalist is not of long duration," Marx continued, referring to a boss with new machinery, "the other competing capitalists introduce the same machines, the same division of labour; introduce them on the same or on a larger scale, and this introduction will become so general that the price of linen (the example Marx used) is *reduced* not only *below its old*, but *below its new cost of production*. . . (this is) the law which gives capital no rest and continually whispers in its ear: 'Go on! Go on!'"

This is a formula for both ecocide and social upheaval. The capitalist introduces machinery to cut costs, not because he cares if his workers' workday is shorter or easier. But if he is in competition, he cannot concern himself with the fate of workers laid off due to the new "labor-saving" equipment, or pay for its effects on the environment.

At the same time, the unemployed workers cannot buy what he produces. New technology is *too* powerful, it creates a surplus which in turn leads to periodic crises when the items produced cannot be sold. While the literature on boom-and-bust cycles is well known, that on environmental deterioration is somewhat obscure.

Dialectics of Nature, Engels' unfinished work on science, includes an unfinished essay entitled "The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man." It deals with the concept that it was labor, or the human ability to manipulate nature by means of tools, which caused and accelerated our evolution. The idea that we "master" nature is disturbing to ecologists, until the article is read to its conclusion:

"Let us not, however flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first."

Engels then gave a host of examples: the spread of scofula along with the potato in Europe, the destruction of watersheds in Asia Minor when forests were cut, and so on.

"Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature—but that we, with flesh, blood and brain belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly. . . ."

"This regulation however, requires something more than mere knowledge. It requires a complete revolution in our

hitherto existing mode of production and simultaneously a revolution in our whole contemporary social order. . . .

"The individual capitalists, who dominate production and exchange, are able to concern themselves only with the most immediate useful effect—inasmuch as it is a question of the usefulness of the article that is produced or exchanged—retreats far into the background, and the sole incentive becomes the profit to be made on selling." (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, pp. 180-182.)

We are surrounded by examples of this process today, much to the distress of our ears, eyes and lungs. Even agriculture has become so highly mechanized that both the "productive unit" (farmland) and the food itself is highly adulterated. Rather than use science to produce better and more nutritious food, technology under capitalism is used to improve "shelf life" or appearance.

Commoner often points out the destructive effects of the runoff of chemical fertilizer from farms that are striving to get that slightly higher yield that means the difference between profit and loss. In the introduction to *The Chemical Feast* by James Turner (Grossman, New York, 1970), Ralph Nader notes that "colored additives, preservatives, seasonings, and tenderizers camouflage the rapid increase of fat content in frankfurters, their decrease in meat protein, and the substandard quality of the meat . . . heavy promotional emphasis on 'unfoods' such as near-zero-nutrition 'snacks,' chemically dosed bakery goods, and soft drinks have a serious distorting effect on young people's food habits and concepts of nutrition . . . small wonder that the United States Department of Agriculture shows a decline in nutritional adequacy of American family diets."

While some comrades may scoff at the organic food mania, it represents an awareness that commercially produced food has deteriorated due to the unceasing pressure to drive down production costs, and the capitalists' lack of concern with the result. The bicycle boom is likewise a cultural response, with occasional political outbursts, to the marked deterioration of urban transit conditions. The capitalists food and transportation techniques are an attack on living standards, though from an unexpected direction.

This example places the "new" concern with ecology within the context of the class struggle. While workers (especially in the imperialist countries) may not be absolutely impoverished, their relative share of the wealth produced tends to be driven down. The environmental movement has popularized the concept, however, that one's "standard of living" involves much more than what one can immediately purchase with wages. Air, water, open space are destroyed by the byproducts of production, and increasingly so as more powerful techniques are used. Even if the workers manage to hold the line on wages, they can't buy clean air, or even a nutritious meal. More than likely, the same process which is causing harm to the environment, is hurting the workers in the plant or the field workers on the farm even earlier.

Would the socialist revolution reverse this process? Without question. In the absence of competition, the unsparring pressure to adopt new technology without regard for consequences would disappear. Society could allow plenty of time to evaluate the effects of a new technique before introducing it widely. International economic planning could for the first time apply all that is known about pollution

control.

This caution, however, would not necessarily mean a long-term decline or stabilization of productivity. For one thing, the means exist *today* to produce clean energy, through solar power, wind power, rivers and tides, ocean currents, and from the hot water and steam trapped underground. Even before the invention of a controlled fusion process, there could be almost unlimited power without pollution; and under socialism, the road would be clear to develop this area while creating more leisure time, not more unemployment, in the process.

Marx himself had some rather pointed words about productivity. In *Grundrisse* ("The Introduction"), which has only just been translated, he notes that modern industry makes the worker's life dull and regimented, pollutes his environment, or throws him out of work entirely. "Social wealth becomes, in ever greater and greater proportions, an alien and dominating force opposing the worker." (p. 150.)

But when an early anti-technology freak by the name of J.S. Mill suggested that the methods for manufacturing goods had "the character of physical truths," Marx took strong exception, calling the idea "absurd." "The 'laws and conditions' of production of wealth and the laws of 'distribution of wealth' are the same laws in a different form," Marx insisted, and they would both change drastically through social revolution.

Rather than seeing productivity as a sin, he wrote that "capital in this instance has quite unintentionally reduced human labor, the expenditure of energy to a minimum. . . this will be to the advantage of emancipated labor, and is the condition of its emancipation." (p. 138.) I strongly suggest that comrades obtain this book, which in the David McLellan edition (Harper and Row, 1972) is not only a good summary of the range of Marx's thought but "printed on 100 percent recycled paper," and thus a reminder that such a thing is possible.

The Future of the Movement

The draft resolution takes note of the environmental struggle, noting that such issues "provide us with an opportunity for basic socialist education" since they "cannot be solved short of socialist planning on a world scale." This is the proper direction as well for reorienting the activists now influenced by counterculturalism, population fetishism and fear of technology.

Concretely, we should try to reproduce the Engels article, either as a separate pamphlet, or along with a relevant article like Feldman's essay. Comrades should also be conversant on the subject, and not rely on a few technically-trained individuals. Bookstore committees should note that *The Closing Circle* is now out in an inexpensive paperback edition; the biweekly *Environmental Action*, published in Washington, D.C. is also worth including with your periodicals.

The "energy crisis" will probably remain a major issue for years, if not decades. Even if we do not intervene in a major way at this time, we can popularize the idea of nationalizing the energy industry under workers management and encourage the now fragmented movement to begin moving toward the building of national conferences and coalitions. A major point in our favor, but one we will have to fight to bring out, is that non-polluting alternatives have been invented but are not being developed

and implemented.

Campaigns and propaganda around the energy crisis should be done in cooperation with the Trotskyist organizations in countries like Venezuela, Iran and Palestine, where the maneuvers of the oil imperialists are focused. Since there is no complete set of transitional demands for this issue as yet, we should pay close attention to the experiences of our comrades around the world.

Until then, our present program contains the proper orientation. Every increase in wealth created by the working class through modern industry should go to them: through the sliding scale of hours and wages, full employment and so on. Every decrease in living standards accompanying new technology must be paid for by the ruling class; through expropriation, or special taxes, or special trust funds. The best formulations remain to be

worked out.

In 1970, Comrade Jan Garrett helped write the *Red Paper on the Destruction of the Environment* for the Minnesota SWP campaign; it demanded that society begin to "restructure U.S. industrial priorities to maximize the recycling of waste" and concludes that "only such a socialist society can live up to the need for striking a harmonious balance with nature, which the greedy 'individualism' of capitalism has made impossible." That pamphlet was a major influence in convincing me to join the party, and my confidence that such a "harmonious balance with nature" can and will be achieved has grown since. It is this confidence, and not unsubstantiated fears, that will enable us to educate and win over the best environmental militants.

July 20, 1973

BUILD THE PARTY—NO CONCESSIONS TO ULTRALEFTISM AND STALINISM

By Bob Kissinger, Chicago Branch

The purpose of this document is first, to demonstrate the consistently faulty method proposed by at least some members of the current Internationalist Tendency for our work in the trade unions and to show that this method is but a continuation of the method proposed in the past for our work in the broad new left. Second, it is necessary to point out the most recent twists and turns of the Internationalist Tendency in order to make themselves appear to be one and the same politically with the International Majority tendency.

One of the valuable acquisitions of our movement has been the written pre-convention discussion which enables a comrade to get a hearing before the entire membership. On the other hand it enables newer comrades to go back to previous discussion periods in order to get a background for issues now under discussion.

Work in the Student Movement

In Part III of the counter political resolution submitted by the Internationalist Tendency we find the following: "Viewed within a broader context, the party came to counterpose the recruitment of newly radicalized reformists to the recruitment of revolutionary-minded ultralefts, often with previous political experience." Later in the same paragraph the document continues, "The party on the whole displayed a sectarian attitude toward the broad phenomenon of ultraleftism, and failed to establish any consistent dialogue with it. As a result many of the best militants of the new generation were never given a chance to consider the politics of Trotskyism and either became demoralized or joined the ranks of Maoist and other centrist currents." During the oral discussion in the Chicago Branch members of the Internationalist Tendency have gone so far as to say that our recruitment of pacifists, liberals, and reformists necessitated our adopting the "pacifist" slogan—"out now." This is a rather serious charge—that we are watering down the level of recruitment and in turn our program.

Indeed, this is a strange charge coming from the Inter-

nationalist Tendency—most of whose members were either members or supporters of the For A Proletarian Orientation Tendency in 1971. In 1971 we were told that we are missing the boat by not colonizing our membership into the unions; and we were told that we were not in the unions because we are so embedded in the student movement. But now, according to the most recent revelations, we missed the boat a long time before that in the student movement. For at least one leading member of the Internationalist Tendency this is not a new position. One need only go back to the 1969 pre-convention discussion Vol. 27, No. 10 where we find a document titled "On Confronting SDS," by John Barzman. In that document Barzman explains how he feels that the YSA missed the boat in not getting *inside* SDS and in turn Progressive Labor Party made the most gains. Barzman states, "We should be ready to take full advantage of the opportunities to present our line in those formations [SDS—B.K.] without any organizational barriers such as not holding formal membership in these formations." He later states "At the Chicago convention of SDS, PL took the best elements who were committed to SDS." In speaking of the "exceptional circumstances" in Boston where the YSA did send 5 members into SDS, he says, "The best elements in SDS considered themselves Marxist and saw the working class as the main agent of social change long before the rest of SDS." Barzman then goes on to state the work done by the YSA inside SDS. Near the end of the document Barzman makes reference to our main source of recruitment as being "politically virgin" individuals. Perhaps these are the same "newly radicalized reformists" mentioned above.

To see the value of the Boston entry into SDS we need only go back to another 1969 contribution by another Boston comrade, Linda Sheppard. Sheppard's document begins by noting that in the summer of 1967 we sent several comrades into the PL-dominated labor committee of Harvard SDS. Originally the comrades got jobs in hospitals for the summer so they could do some hos-

pital organizing. In fact the 5 comrades sent into SDS in Boston consisted of the entire Harvard and Boston University fractions. The results of the entry according to Sheppard were: "Throughout the duration of our work in SDS, and for a period after we ceased to work in SDS, we did not have one functioning campus or city-wide SMC." "Prior to that time we had good, functioning anti-war committees on a couple of campuses." "We failed to recruit one person as a direct result of our work in SDS."

According to Sheppard the main reason for our actions inside SDS was a *very pessimistic view of building the YSA as an alternative to SDS*. She states, "The main reason given for the necessity of going into SDS was that the comrades had made a number of attempts to build the SMC on campus but that it was simply impossible to build the SMC. The reasons given for this were that the student movement had gone on an ultra-left binge, that the SMC was never more than a paper organization, that SDS was recruiting all the healthy radicals on campus and *had the potential of becoming the mass revolutionary socialist youth group*, that we should not become isolated from that process by creating unnecessary organizational barriers to SDS, that SDS was in fact a coalition of student radicals who did antiwar work, *consequently there was no real need for the SMC*, and that at least locally, the building of the SMC would be sectarian and unrealistic." [my emphasis]

The question of the quality of recruits was answered best in a document also in Vol. 27, No. 12 by Larry Seigle. He states, "What Barzman does not see is the fact that a 'virgin' antiwar activist who agrees with us on the necessity of militant mass action against the war is on a level infinitely more advanced than the theoretician of SDS who has had years of "experience" with the thought of Chairman Mao, the gross sectarianism of a Klonsky, or the hooligan tactics of a Rudd."

But Barzman insists that PL was winning the best elements—those who considered themselves Marxists. The best elements are not those who *talk* about being more Marxist-Leninist than the next person, but those who *act* on their convictions. When "virgin" contacts come around us, they look to *us* as the Marxists and are very open to *learn* from us. Not so with the people Barzman is referring to—they think they know what Marxism is, but they're wrong. We were able to involve the pacifists and reformists—"political virgins" in actions which contradicted their philosophical outlook and as a result changed their philosophical outlook.

If one needs any more convincing as to who has the correct orientation toward our "new mass vanguard" one need only open her eyes and look around to see the changed relationship of forces in the American left—the growth of the SWP and the YSA—where every other political tendency has to consider the SWP before acting and where practically every other tendency considers us to be their major political opponent.

Work in the Unions

The second part of this document will attempt to show that the Internationalist Tendency's orientation in trade union work is but an extension of the orientation toward SDS approved by Barzman above and that the Inter-

nationalist Tendency has the same pessimistic attitude toward building the party that some YSA members inside SDS had toward building the YSA in 1968.

In section 4 of the counter political resolution note is taken of the existence of a number of "broad anti-leadership caucuses." In addition note is taken of "a number of more or less successful [?] groups initiated by radicals have coalesced some politicized elements." Teamster Rank and File, United National Caucus-UAW, "various formations in the teachers union and welfare workers union," and PL's Workers Action Movement are mentioned. One has to go to the end of the same section to find the purpose for mentioning these formations: "Existing anti-bureaucratic caucuses, and in some cases, caucuses set up by radicals can be fruitful areas in which to popularize the demands that will make up the platform of a new class-struggle caucus. Although as a general rule the party is not in a position to initiate caucuses, in some particular cases, this will be a useful tactic."

Indeed, this is the only clear cut proposal for trade union work in the whole document—other than vague "campaigns" over "class struggle issues." This from a group that two years ago said "sinking deep roots in the class" would solve most of our problems. The question is not whether to have most of our members get into trade union situations or not; but rather what we do when we get there. Apparently from the above quote we are starting to get an answer from the Internationalist Tendency.

First of all it is necessary to put to rest the idea that to do effective trade union work a comrade must be part of a caucus. Caucuses are no panacea and at times can get in the way. The trade union director of the Oakland-Berkeley Branch summarized our present attitude toward caucuses in his document, "Political Work in the American Federation of Teachers (AFT)" in the Party Builder, Vol. 7, No. 7. He states, "In general there are no rules or formulas for organizational forms our ideas will take in the union movement. The road to the construction of a class struggle left wing must start with the recruitment of the best militants to our party. Sometimes the formation of an opposition group gets in the way of this process. By the same token, we are not interested in accumulating 'brownie points' for doing endless amounts of routine work of a non-political nature. While a certain quantity of this kind of work is often necessary, it is a mistake to assume it as a prerequisite for introducing our political ideas into the unions."

For example, if there had been a national orientation for our teachers fraction to enter existing opposition caucuses, our main work and international duty—defense of the Vietnamese Revolution—would have suffered. For we would have spent much more time involved in other issues the caucuses stood—most likely on a program we disagreed with. (like becoming "good" SDSers). We would have been inside organizations which are hostile or at best indifferent to the antiwar movement; and we would not have built the lever for mobilizing teachers against the war—the teacher peace committees. This is exactly the criticisms of the previous adaptation to SDS. But it is more than that. Many of these "initiated by radicals" caucuses are in fact the same people we missed recruiting before—those who "considered themselves Marxists" and "saw the working class as the main agent of social

change"—"the best elements who were committed to SDS."

At this point the careful reader might object because the counter political resolution did not say that we should take organizational responsibility for any of these caucuses. That was exactly the original proposal for work inside SDS. The results were quite the opposite. In this regard I have the good fortune to be in the same trade union fraction, the teachers fraction, with one of the leaders of the Internationalist Tendency, Comrade Don Smith.

Just before the Chicago teachers strike this past January, we held a teachers fraction at which time it was decided that our orientation to the strike would be to relate the supposed lack of money for schools to the question of the vast amounts of money spent on U.S. imperialist aggression in Southeast Asia. We did this in the form of leaflets to strike rallies and picket lines calling for a teachers contingent to march under the banner, "Money for Schools, Not War—U.S. out of Southeast Asia Now!" Previous to this meeting Comrade Smith mentioned that he thought there were gains to be made by orienting to a group called Active Chicago Teachers (ACT)—a caucus in the Chicago Teachers Union initiated by the Progressive Labor Party. This caucus is opposed to our position on Black and Latin community control of schools and does not see the war as a central issue in its politics. During the strike before January 20 we were able to get the verbal endorsement of this caucus for January 20. To their next meeting we sent 3 comrades, Smith, myself, and, ironically, John Barzman. I was able to get a point on the agenda for the Vietnam caucus. Almost everyone who spoke talked about "the class struggle" and "the working class." So I appealed to their interest in the working class and explained that the class struggle is international—thus the need to defend the struggle in Vietnam. They once again voted their support and some people wanted to do work, most took *our* leaflets to distribute on the picket lines. Comrade Barzman—not a teacher—drove us to the meeting and only observed, but Comrade Smith's actions were strange to say the least. Smith voted on every question that came up in the meeting—the main question being the contents of a leaflet stating the minimal demands that must be won before ACT would approve going back to work. Comrade Smith *spoke for and voted for their program* thru the entire meeting. This is the program of an opponent grouping. At this meeting, for example, out of 25-30 people present, there were 5 members of NCLC; 1-2 members of International Socialists 2-3 open members of the Progressive Labor Party; 1 member of the Young Workers Liberation League, and 3 SWP members. I, in turn, did not speak to or vote for any issue other than the issue I was there for—gathering support for the defense of the Vietnamese Revolution. On the way home I asked Barzman if Comrade Smith's actions represented his conception of a proletarian orientation. He said he had no objection to Smith's actions. Need we wonder why?

What Comrade Smith's actions represent, beside a conscious violation of discipline by someone who knows better, is a misunderstanding of what a revolutionary party is and a pessimistic attitude toward building the party. In fact when I confronted Smith with his actions the very next day at a special fraction meeting, he said that he considered his actions "trivial" and that "we ex-

pected something from them (ACT) so we should be willing to give a little to them." We must say a resounding *NO* to this method! The revolutionary party must differentiate itself from these ultralefts—and I did by talking to individual people about *our* full program and by distributing *The Militant*.

On the question of how to do antiwar work Comrade Smith, as any other member of our fraction could testify, has been for the last three years attempting to get us to enter all types of opposition caucuses or to change the Teacher Mobilization Committee into a caucus with a full program. Comrade Smith does not understand the importance of setting up *our* own pole of attraction. In May 1970 the Teacher Mobilization Committee—initiated with the help of Trotskyists and our sympathizers—with regular meetings of between 15-40 people, was able to force CP teachers and assorted other radicals to come to the TMC meetings and follow *our* program. Another example of this pessimism in building the party has been Comrade Smith's attitude toward selling *The Militant*. At least for the past year he has refused to sell *The Militant* to teachers at work, on picket lines, at strike rallies, and at regular union meetings. One reason for this might be that *The Militant* is mainly directed to politically healthy "virgins" and not to these infantile leftists who think they know the last word on Marxism. None of us in the Socialist Workers Party will be satisfied until we become a mass revolutionary (Trotskyist) party; but the building of that party will not be done by making concessions to ultraleftism.

The above criticisms of the method of the Internationalist Tendency are important in terms of the international discussion. Their proposed adaptation to ultraleftism in this country seems to parallel the adaption of certain European sections to the "new mass vanguard." But there is where the similarity ends. It must be stated that the Internationalist Tendency and the International Majority tendency are two distinct entities. I believe that the International Majority tendency comrades are indeed honest revolutionaries with whom I have disagreements and with whom an open, comradely discussion can aid the world movement as a whole. On the other hand I believe the Internationalist Tendency to be neither honest nor in political agreement with the other International Majority comrades on much of anything. If the other IMT members do not understand this they will be making a grave error.

The differences can be seen in the IT's new attitude toward the theories of Ernest Mandel. In 1971 his theories were the key to all our errors; in 1973 these same comrades base their politics on those theories without any explanation of this drastic change. Another point is their original position in opposition to the 9th World Congress document on Latin America. Now they are part of a tendency which wants to reaffirm the basic line of that document—again with no explanation. Also there are the original disagreements with the IMT on the characterization of Maoism, the character of the DRV-NLF leadership and program—six months ago these comrades in Chicago were calling for the building of the Vietnamese section of the 4th International *now*. All this has been swept under the rug for convenience sake.

In the past period in the Chicago Branch we have observed gross violations of discipline, ultimatums to the

party, withdrawal of financial support to the party, and the recruitment of new comrades who bear striking resemblances to the SDS "Marxists" mentioned above. That is we have recruited people to our movement, who think that they have nothing to learn, that they are going to teach the party, and who view branch meetings as some

sort of intellectual game. We must reaffirm that we are one party with one program and one discipline for all comrades. And we must make it very clear that those who cannot abide by the above procedure will be shown the way to the door.

July 19, 1973

THE CENTRAL ISSUES IN THE DISCUSSION ON LATIN AMERICA

by David Morrow, Chicago Branch

Two tendencies and several individuals in the party have declared themselves in agreement with the positions of the Mandel-Maitan-Frank tendency in the International. (I will refer to it in the rest of this contribution as the MMFT.) By doing so they assume responsibility for these positions, and have a duty to defend them in the discussion within the party.

The essential difference that divides the two tendencies in the International is the value of armed struggle which does not grow out of the mass movement and which is carried on without the participation of the masses. In their resolution on Bolivia the MMFT declared, "The strategy of armed struggle should begin with the presupposition(!) that, owing to the aid and intervention of imperialism, the enemy is equipped with sizeable political and military resources, that it will be impossible to defeat them in relatively short battles, that the culminating stage of the revolution when large masses of workers and peasants mobilize will be preceded by other stages where armed struggle will be the task of sectors or nuclei of the vanguard. Thus the need for this specific form of armed struggle which is guerrilla warfare." ("Bolivia—Results and Perspectives," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 6, p. 11.) Again, in their resolution on Argentina, they stated: "It was in this context that the revolutionary Marxists said that unleashing the armed struggle is a task belonging specifically to the vanguard. It must take the initiative, while putting the emphasis from the start on those forms of armed struggle (such as . . . ?—D.M.) that make it possible to establish or strengthen ties with major strata of the masses." ("The Political Crisis and Perspectives for Revolutionary Struggle in Argentina," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 6, p. 17.) In the Latin American resolution passed at the Ninth World Congress, the present supporters of the MMFT said that armed struggle was the fundamental perspective for Latin America, and then went on to state: "Even in the case of countries where large mobilizations and class conflicts in the cities may occur first, civil war will take manifold forms of armed struggle, in which the principal axis for a whole period will be rural guerrilla warfare, the term having primarily a geographical-military meaning and not necessarily implying an exclusively peasant composition of the fighting detachments (or even necessarily preponderantly peasant composition). In this sense, armed struggle in Latin America means fundamentally guerrilla warfare." ("Draft Resolution on Latin America," *Discussion on Latin America* (1968-1971), p. 7.) This may be synthetic, elliptical, and even parabolic, but the meaning of it is perfectly clear. In the political situation that existed in Latin America at that time (as well as the present situation) this could only mean in practice armed struggle

without the masses. I think that the discussion will proceed on a somewhat clearer basis now that the leaders of the MMFT have spelled out what they were thinking of when they wrote the 1969 resolution.

It is this—armed struggle without the masses—that the LTT (Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency) is opposed to. We do not believe in a peaceful road to socialism as some comrades of the IT (Internationalist Tendency) in the Chicago branch have tried to imply. The issue is not for or against armed struggle. The key question is whether it is mass armed struggle. Without the masses armed struggle is disastrous. Nor do we believe, as other comrades in the IT have stated directly, that the masses will necessarily arm themselves spontaneously. We simply advocate a different approach to arming the masses: the transitional approach. More on this later.

Armed Struggle Without the Masses

What exactly, concretely, is supposed to be accomplished by armed struggle without the masses? In a purely military sense it is counterproductive. Any small revolutionary party which takes on the repressive apparatus of the state by themselves, arms in hand, will be out-numbered, out-financed, and out-classed in every way except moral purity and high ideals, which aren't much use in the class struggle by themselves. By engaging in armed actions in isolation from the masses, they give the ruling-class an excuse to use unusually vicious repression against them. They can only suffer terrible set-backs, defeats, and murders of their cadre. It becomes almost impossible to carry on any of the normal functions of a revolutionary party, from leafleting to selling the press to holding regular conventions and branch meetings. It's no accident that the Bolivian section hasn't had a congress or even a plenum since 1966. Rather than disorganizing the state, this sort of adventure disorganizes the party.

At the same time, the masses in Latin America don't already understand the need for armed struggle. It's not just a technical question of organizing them into an army and getting things going. Even if they did understand the need, they would not be likely to join a small organization launched by a relatively isolated group which didn't appear to have much to do with their own mass organizations and struggles. If comrades disagree with this they have to explain why the masses in Argentina and Bolivia never joined the ERP or ELN.

However, there's no reason to believe that the masses will be convinced of the need for armed struggle just by the example of a small armed group which is suffering set-backs. This ultraleft monkey-see, monkey-do theory of mass behavior has no foundation in reality. The masses

have to have good reasons before they undertake something as serious as armed struggle. The masses can sometimes be convinced by example, but it must be an example of success. Armed struggle by the "vanguard" can't produce this success.

The fact is that armed struggle by the "vanguard" alone miseducates the masses. For those who do accept the example uncritically, it doesn't just teach them the need for armed struggle. They learn that it is a *small band* of armed revolutionists who will win their liberation; that it is enough for them to applaud passively from the sidelines.

Others could just as easily draw reformist conclusions. They could look at the defeats and setbacks suffered by these small armed detachments and conclude that maybe it would be better to try a peaceful road to social change. In fact, there are any number of guerrilla groups that have drawn exactly this sort of conclusion themselves, supporting Allende's regime in Chile, the reformist military regime in Peru, etc. One of the most striking examples is Hector Béjar, a former guerrilla leader in Peru who is now a functionary in the reformist Peruvian government. In this country we have the example of the evolution of the Black Panthers. (As one comrade in Chicago pointed out, the Panthers were much *less* isolated than the ERP—having the support of more than two-thirds of the Black population—but suffered setbacks for exactly the same reason: they took up arms without the *participation* of the masses. It's not just a question of isolation, as Germain seems to think.)

The most backward sectors of the masses draw completely reactionary conclusions they decide that revolutionists are a bunch of terrorists and murderers and they want nothing to do with them.

At best, certain very limited sectors of the masses who already understand the need for armed struggle (In most countries in Latin America today, such people would actually be more classified as part of the "vanguard.") draw the purely negative conclusion that only *mass* armed struggle can accomplish anything. Significant sectors of the masses regard these isolated armed activities as irrelevant, having nothing to do with their own struggles.

And finally, isolated armed struggle cuts across mass work. It drives the party into the most extreme illegality. Papers can't be sold openly, leaflets can't be distributed openly, the party has extreme difficulty engaging in any kind of political activity among the masses except on an extremely minimal, cautious, one-to-one basis.

The point becomes even clearer if you look at the kind of armed actions the MMFT is talking about. These are outlined in the MMFT resolution on Argentina: "The actions of the ERP—which was led by the PRT—fitted into a framework of many-sided urban guerrilla warfare, taking in general the following forms: (a) actions aimed at accumulating financial resources (in the tradition of the Bolsheviks); (b) actions aimed at acquiring arms, medical supplies, medical equipment, etc.; (c) actions of confiscating food, clothing, etc., and distributing it in poor neighborhoods in order to win the sympathy of the most deprived strata of the population; (d) actions linked to mass mobilizations (What kind of actions? What kind of 'links'?—D.M.); (e) actions inflicting punishment on the hangmen of the dictatorship who were well known and hated for their crimes." ("The Political Crisis and Perspectives for

Revolutionary Struggle in Argentina," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 6, p. 18.)

How does confiscation and distribution of food and clothing contribute to the mobilization of the masses? How do assassinations of hated figures prepare the masses themselves for armed struggle? Does the MMFT really believe that actions such as these taken by a small group of, at the most, several hundred revolutionists can seriously undermine the bourgeois state; undermine it more than revolutionists are undermined by the inevitable counter-measures such as the Trelew massacre?

Armed Struggle for State Power

The MMFT compounds their error on this question by projecting a line which works out in practice to be, not only armed struggle without the masses, but armed struggle for *state power* without the masses. This is never made very clear in the written discussion because the MMFT constantly blurs over the distinction between armed self-defense in the narrow sense of the term and armed struggle for state power. In fact, several years ago Germain and Knoeller explicitly denied that they were for such an armed struggle for state power without the masses. The comrades of the IT in Chicago also flatly denied that the MMFT ever supported this.

But look for a moment at the resolutions, the positions and the practice of the MMFT. They project carrying out a systematic campaign of armed actions against the state and the ruling class in general in violation of the laws of the bourgeois state, a systematic campaign "which may last for long years." They do not outline any *general* goals or demands for this struggle aside from the goal of overthrowing the bourgeois state. It is not enough to outline goals and demands for specific actions as they come up, as the ERP has done. If you embark upon a *campaign* of such actions, the masses are going to want to know what the goal of the *campaign* is. It is not enough to declare in an internal bulletin that you aren't struggling for state power. If you don't state clearly *to the masses* what the goal of your armed struggle is, they will draw the obvious, logical conclusion that you are trying to destroy the capitalist state since that is, after all, the ultimate goal of any revolutionary organization. How else are they supposed to interpret a systematic campaign of kidnappings, assassinations, bank robberies, factory occupations, etc.? Until recently in Argentina, neither the Bolivian nor Argentine comrades made any public statement that their armed struggle had any goal other than the overthrow of the capitalist state. In fact, in Argentina, the PRT(C) formed a revolutionary "army" for the express purpose of overthrowing the dictatorship. The Bolivian comrades actively supported the ELN, another revolutionary "army" which made it crystal clear that it was aiming at the overthrow of the bourgeois state. Until recently, the actions of the ERP met with nothing but praise. The MMFT has yet to criticize the Bolivian comrades on this point. If they did it would be most unjust. The Bolivian and Argentine comrades were merely carrying out a reasonable interpretation of the 1969 resolution on Latin America. What else is "prolonged civil war on a continental scale" ("Draft Resolution on Latin America," *Discussion on Latin America* (1968-1971), p. 5.) between opposing classes supposed to mean if not armed struggle over who will hold state power?

At best the resolutions of the MMFT leave themselves wide open to misinterpretation on this point. The lack of clarity on this very important question is just one more example among many which shows that the MMFT has no coherent theory about the role of armed struggle in the Latin American revolution. All they have is a series of rationalizations for a political position—in support of guerrilla warfare in Latin America—adopted under the pressure of ultraleft currents in Europe and Latin America.

The twistings and turnings of the MMFT in their efforts to justify their position should not be allowed to obscure their fundamental line. In any case, the basic mistake of armed struggle without the masses is still the same. Making it an armed struggle for state power merely compounds the error.

Argentina and Bolivia

I'm not going to deal at length with what happened in Argentina and Bolivia, or refute the many distortions and obfuscations in Germain's recent contribution and the resolutions of the IEC majority. I'm sure that will be dealt with more than adequately in the international discussion. But I think it would be useful there to put this discussion in its proper context. It is crucial that the International draw the correct lessons from the experiences in Argentina and Bolivia. But these experiences are not so important in and of themselves. They are most important *for what we can learn from them about armed struggle and party building*, in Latin America and in other parts of the world.

In this sense, the contributions of the MMFT miss the point entirely. In all of their contributions they do not cite *a single concrete example* from Argentina or Bolivia to show how armed struggle without the masses mobilized the masses, taught them the need to take up arms themselves, or inflicted military setbacks on the class enemy. Nor do they point to a single instance from the living class struggle where the masses have shown a readiness to participate in a *strategy* of armed struggle for a prolonged period. They do make a few—very few—general claims about what was accomplished. But these claims are not backed up with facts. For the most part they confine themselves to vague generalities about what armed struggle by the "vanguard" could or will accomplish in the future. After five years of concrete experience with their line all they have to offer us are the same sterile, abstract schemas they came up with at the beginning of the discussion.

The closest they come to buttressing their position with facts is a short passage on Argentina from Germain's contribution. ("In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 17.) He attempts here to prove essentially three things: that the PRT carried on successful mass work in the trade unions; that their armed actions were very popular among the masses; and that they have participated in mass armed struggles such as the second Cordobazo. Fred Halstead's article effectively demolishes a significant part of this and raises serious questions about the accuracy of the rest of it. Even if all of it were true, however, it would by no means prove the need for strategy of armed struggle. In particular, the alleged popularity of the ERP means nothing. It isn't just the popularity of socialist organizations which makes a revolution. It's the mobilization of the masses themselves

under the leadership of that socialist organization, and the ERP has contributed nothing to this. Revolutionaries don't just do anything that will make them popular. They win the allegiance of the masses by popularizing the program of Trotskyism, both through propaganda and through participation in the mass movement. Any other road is nothing but opportunism.

And what is proved by the participation of the ERP in the second Cordobazo? This was a mass armed struggle led by the trade union movement in which many different tendencies participated. Germain doesn't even try to show that the ERP's isolated armed actions had anything to do with starting or deepening the struggle. You don't need armed detachments autonomous from the mass movement to participate in mass armed struggle. The task is to become firmly rooted in the mass movement so as to have real influence over it when the question of armed struggle is posed in real life.

In the same passage Germain also cites the many times the ERP has occupied factories and lectured the workers on socialism and armed struggle. What this is supposed to prove is somewhat obscure.

The bulk of Germain's document does not deal with the issue of guerrilla warfare or armed struggle by the vanguard at all.

The main point he tries to establish concerning the Bolivian experience is that the Bolivian comrades didn't have a guerrilla warfare line under the reformist Ovando and Torres regimes, and that they never carried out rural guerrilla warfare, even under Barrientos. He attempts to show that they correctly applied the transitional approach in intervening in the mass movement under Ovando and Torres. Even if this were true, how would it prove the correctness today of "guerrilla nuclei in the rural zones, armed action in the mining provinces, and urban guerrilla initiatives in the provincial centers"? ("Bolivia—Results and Perspectives," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 6, p. 11.) How does it prove the correctness of a guerrilla warfare line, rural or urban, before Ovando? The MMFT has a responsibility to answer the criticism of the LTT that their guerrilla warfare line disoriented the Bolivian section when the reformist Ovando and Torres regimes came to power. This they attempt to do. (How successfully is another question.) But this alone (or in combination with horror stories about Moreno's history) is not enough to prove the *correctness* of a guerrilla warfare line. The MMFT has failed to show how attempts to start guerrilla warfare contributed anything to the Bolivian class struggle before or after the Torres regime. They have failed to make a case for continuing this line.

Germain's comments on Argentina consist mostly of a torturous, back-handed attempt to justify the decision at the Ninth World Congress to designate the Maoist-Castroist PRT(C) as the official section there (This was only made possible by keeping the PRT(C)'s positions secret from the delegates); and an attempt to lay the groundwork for trying to reaffirm this decision at the upcoming congress. This looks particularly ludicrous now that the PRT has left the International of its own accord. Germain also attempts at the same time to disown responsibility for the "militarist deviations" of the PRT by means of newly discovered differences with them. One wonders where these differences were hiding before the fall of 1972. Their artificiality can be seen by the lack of any concrete pro-

posals as to *how* the armed detachments are to be transformed into militias of the mass movement; *how* to "arm the masses with the desire of arming themselves"; *how* the armed detachments are to be "linked to the mass struggle"; *how* they are to be "closely linked" with party building; and so forth. (quotes from "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International" IIDB, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 19.) Germain cautions the ERP against confronting the army and state apparatus by themselves, but fails to explain how they're supposed to engage in armed struggle without doing this. Armed struggle is a violation of bourgeois legality which is enforced precisely by the army and state apparatus.

In any case, again, none of this proves the correctness of armed struggle by the "vanguard."

The Transitional Program

The line of the MMFT runs counter at every point to the Transitional Program. The Transitional Program is based on the recognition that the problem of making the revolution boils down to three central, inter-related problems: overcoming the crisis of leadership of the working class (building a mass Leninist party); overcoming the gap in consciousness between revolutionists and the masses; and mobilizing the masses against capitalism, beginning with its concrete manifestations (war, inflation, etc.). These three elements cannot be separated. It is through mass mobilizations that the consciousness of the masses is raised and a broader layer is created which can be recruited to the revolutionary party. It is in the course of mass struggles that the reformist and ultraleft misleaders of the masses are most effectively exposed in their own eyes. By helping to lead mass mobilizations the revolutionary party comes in contact with the most conscious, dedicated, recruitable elements of the radicalized layers. Mobilization of the masses is the only way a revolution can be made. And it is precisely in order to most effectively mobilize the masses and lead their struggles forward to its logical conclusion that a Leninist party is needed.

These problems can only be solved by using the transitional method. The revolutionary party must approach the masses at their present level of consciousness and draw them through successive struggles towards a higher level, towards the socialist revolution. The revolutionary party must participate in the day-to-day struggles of the masses in order to help them draw the lessons of their own experience and propel them forward. It is necessary to elaborate a system of democratic and transitional demands, based on both the objective needs and the subjective consciousness of the masses, which can lead them, step by step, to the socialist revolution. It is necessary to recognize that the masses learn primarily through their own experience.

This is not just my interpretation of the Transitional Program. Trotsky summarizes: "The strategic task of the next period—a prerevolutionary period of agitation, propaganda, and organization—consists in overcoming the contradiction between the objective revolutionary conditions and the immaturity of the proletariat and its vanguard (the confusion and disappointment of the older generation, the inexperience of the younger generation.) It is necessary to help the masses in the process of the daily struggle to find the bridge between present demands and the socialist program of the revolution. This bridge should

include a system of *transitional demands*, stemming from today's conditions and from today's consciousness of wide layers of the working class and unalterably leading to one final conclusion: the conquest of power by the proletariat. . . .

"The strategical task of the Fourth International lies not in reforming capitalism but in its overthrow. Its political aim is the conquest of power by the proletariat for the purpose of expropriating the bourgeoisie. However, the achievement of this strategic task is unthinkable without the most considered attention to all even small and partial questions of tactics. All sections of the proletariat, all its layers, occupations and groups should be drawn into the revolutionary movement. The present epoch is distinguished not for the fact that it frees the revolutionary party from the day-to-day work but because it permits this work to be carried on indissolubly with the actual tasks of the revolution.

"The Fourth International does not discard the program of the old 'minimal' demands to the degree to which these have preserved at least part of their vital forcefulness. Indefatigably, it defends the democratic rights and social conquests of the workers. But it carries on this day-to-day work within the framework of the correct actual, that is, revolutionary perspective. Insofar as the old, partial, 'minimal' demands of the masses clash with the destructive and degrading tendencies of decadent capitalism—and this occurs at each step—the Fourth International advances a system of *transitional demands*, the essence of which is contained in the fact that ever more openly and decisively they will be directed against the very bases of the bourgeois regime. The old 'minimal program' is superseded by the *transitional program* the task of which lies in the systematic mobilization of the masses for the proletarian revolution." (*The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution*, Pathfinder, pp. 74-76.)

The Gap Between Revolutionists and the Masses

This is what the Ninth World Congress resolution on Latin America has to say about the present level of consciousness of the masses in Latin America: "Far from improving, the lot of the peasants remains tragic and is even getting worse. Hence the persistent impetus to struggle and revolt. This is all the more true because the peasants are less and less isolated from the international political and ideological currents' have assimilated the lesson of the Cuban revolution, whose fortunes they continually follow; have learned a great deal from the guerrilla experience and are not cut off from the student revolutionary movements, whose influence reaches them through a thousand different channels." ("Draft Resolution on Latin America," *Discussion on Latin America* (1968-1971), p. 2.) And again: "In Latin America, the polemic between the advocates of the 'democratic' and 'peaceful' road and the advocates of the revolutionary road has been entirely outmoded; the first hypothesis does not have the least objective justification and can be defended only by naive and unrepentant utopians or by ossified bureaucrats who have lost all revolutionary perspective and inspiration and whose sole concern is to cover up their conservative, routinist practices with theoretical obfuscation." (*Ibid*, p. 6.)

If this is true, why do you need a Transitional Program? Where's the gap that needs to be bridged? (Note that the second passage also underestimates the problem

of the crisis of leadership.) There is nothing wrong in principle with comrades deciding that reality has changed and that the Transitional Program has been superceded, but they should do so openly and honestly and think out the theoretical and practical implications of what they're saying.

There are important indications that part of the leadership of the International has already consciously drawn this conclusion. In "Preparatory Text for the 1971 Conference of the Leaderships of the European Sections," Vergeat and Delphin state: "Propaganda founded on the 1938 Transitional Program is obviously not enough to serve as a basis for intervening in this area (Europe—D.M.)." (IIDB, Vol. IX, No. 5, p. 7.) If they think this is true for Europe, what do they think about Latin America, where the masses supposedly already understand such important lessons as the need for armed struggle? Where does the MMFT stand on these questions?

In reality, there is still a very big gap between revolutionists and the masses in Latin America; the masses have not absorbed the lessons of the Cuban revolution; and the debate over a peaceful road to socialism is far from over. Chile is only the most obvious example.

We haven't heard so much lately about the allegedly revolutionary consciousness of the masses in Latin America, since the MMFT has come up against the reality there. But the MMFT still claims to stand on this resolution, and they have a responsibility to defend the views put forth in it. This is especially true because these particular views were one of the main original justifications for the guerrilla warfare line.

The Crisis of Leadership and the Need for a Leninist Party

Elevating armed struggle to the level of a strategy eliminates the need for a Leninist party. It is a truism in the Trotskyist movement that organizational forms flow from political goals and programs. The central purpose of a Leninist is political: to overcome the crisis of leadership of the working class; to overcome the gap between revolutionists and the masses; to lead them into action against capitalism. The task is to teach the masses the need for a socialist revolution and how to make one: that is, to bring the program of Trotskyism to the masses. The obvious form of organization is a party based on the program of Trotskyism in which membership is conditional on basic agreement with the program, and all political activity in carrying the program to the masses is under the supervision of the party.

But if you make the main task a military one, the logical form of organization is not a Leninist party, but something like an army. It is not political activity which needs to be supervised, but military activity. There is no reason not to admit Maoists, anarchists, or any other opponents of Trotskyism as long as they're willing to pick up the gun.

The logic of the position of the MMFT has been obscured by their abstract statements about "closely relating the armed actions with party building based on a clear political programme", "relating to the successive waves of mass struggles and confrontations of the masses with the enemy" ("In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 19), "coupling mass mobilizations with the instruments of armed struggle" ("The Stakes in Argentina," Livio Maitan, *Intercontinental Press*, June 11, 1973, p. 699) and other vague generalities about

combining mass work and armed struggle without the masses. But they have yet to demonstrate what this means concretely in theory or in practice. The truth is that they can't be combined. When revolutionists stage armed actions without mass participation which aren't clearly defensive in character they lay themselves open to victimization and are driven into the strictest illegality, making mass work almost impossible.

Germain even admits that the MMFT hasn't been able to solve this problem: "It remains to precise how this strategy (of armed struggle—D.M.) ties in with the strategy of the permanent revolution, with the need of organizing the masses, with the building of Leninist vanguard parties, etc." ("In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 4) After five years it still "remains to precise" what the strategy of armed struggle has to do with the central strategic tasks of revolutionaries in this epoch! And after this admission Germain still has the nerve to criticize the PRT for not solving this problem which he can't solve himself, and tries to disclaim responsibility for their inevitable failures.

The MMFT really has two lines. One is the written line as explained in their documents, and the other is the practical application which results when they try and apply the written line in the real world. The written line projects doing both mass work and guerrilla warfare (but attempting to "link up" the guerrilla groups with the masses), armed struggle being the main task. When they try and apply this line in practice they come up against the impossibility of doing both at once effectively, and since armed struggle is seen as the main task, mass work is shelved. When the need for mass work in Bolivia became too obvious to be ignored, the Bolivian comrades had to temporarily *abandon* their attempts to launch guerrilla war in order to do mass work. As the Bolivian comrades themselves explained, "To pursue these two tasks at the same time, to combine them, is an extremely difficult thing. Under the Ovando government the party operated in completely clandestine conditions and was totally absorbed in armed work. Since last November, after Torres came to power, we have been able to redevelop our legal work aimed at the unions but also the peasants and the universities, where we had done very little before." ("The Current Situation in Bolivia," Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso, *Intercontinental Press*, June 14, 1971, p. 545. Quoted in "Argentina and Bolivia—The Balance Sheet," IIDB, Vol. X, No. 1, p. 18.)

More recently, the MMFT has tried to get around this problem in Argentina today by projecting mass work as the main task and armed struggle "initiatives" as strictly subordinate: "At the present stage, priority must go to political action among the masses, and any armed struggle initiatives must be subordinated to this necessity. This does not involve—as we have already stressed—any perspective of disarming." ("Argentina in Neo-Peronism's Hour—Mass Struggles and Revolutionary Organization," *Intercontinental Press*, July 2, 1973, p. 797.) What this means isn't very clear. It could be taken to mean that our comrades should only engage in armed struggle when the masses do, and our armed struggle "initiatives" should be confined to initiatives taken within the mass movement in proposing and helping to organize mass armed self-defense. If this were the case this new position would be a very big step forward for the MMFT. However, it is

more likely that they only mean we should carry out more mass work and less armed actions. (The very lack of clarity is an important indication.) This is like trying to mix oil and water by adding more water. They just don't mix. Revolutionists just can't do effective mass work at the same time as they are practicing armed struggle "initiatives" without mass participation. We will never find out how this new line would resolve itself in practice because the MMFT has lost the grouping in Argentina they used to claim as their own. But we can be sure that armed struggle "initiatives" and mass work wouldn't be combined, because it simply can't be done.

We can see how seriously the MMFT takes their own prescriptions about mass work by the glaring absence, in all of their documents for the first four years of the discussion, of even the sketchy outlines of a transitional program for mobilizing the Latin American masses. The talk of mass work on the part of the MMFT is intended more for comrades who are uneasy with their line than as for the work of the Latin American sections.

Whenever the contradiction between systematic armed struggle and mass work is resolved in favor of armed struggle, as in Bolivia before and after Torres, and in Argentina throughout the past period, the logic of the MMFT position comes through clearly. (It's worth pointing out once again that until recently the complete lack of mass work in both countries during these periods was not criticized at all by the MMFT. In fact, they had nothing but praise for both sections. They still don't criticize the Bolivian comrades on this point.)

In Argentina, the PRT has completely liquidated its public face and issues public statements only in the name of the ERP—a "mass army" which welcomes political opponents of the PRT. There is no evidence that I have seen that it hasn't completely stopped functioning as an independent organization and for all practical purposes dissolved itself into the ERP. If this isn't the case, what concrete purpose it serves is a little obscure. In addition, it has liquidated the program of Trotskyism into an eclectic mish-mash of Maoism, Castroism, pseudo-Trotskyism—and in the case of the ERP-August 22—Peronism. It now appears that it has left the International altogether.

In Bolivia party membership was defined very ambiguously and people were admitted into membership who did not consider themselves Trotskyist but supported armed struggle. (See the "Report of Bolivia and Argentina" by Sabado and Enero, Internal Information Bulletin, No. 5 in 1972, p. 4.) More importantly, they joined the Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Front (FRA). The FRA is a multi-class front including all of the reformist working class parties in Bolivia and sectors of the bourgeois armed forces. In the beginning it even included General Torres. Our comrades joined this front because they thought doing so would facilitate launching armed struggle. Until they were criticized by the United Secretariat, they appeared willing to follow the centralist organizational rules of the FRA and refrain from any public criticism of it. They did all this because they thought it would facilitate launching the armed struggle, even though the FRA was not clearly committed to this perspective. If this is how far the Bolivian comrades are willing to go with an organization that hasn't even firmly committed itself to armed struggle, how far would they go with one that had?

The comrades of the MMFT can deny the logic of their

position, but they can't escape it in practice.

Even in their written contributions, the MMFT reduces the role of the Leninist party to an adjunct of the armed struggle. It is necessary to acquire a "minimum of forces" before beginning guerrilla warfare. The existence of a revolutionary party "corresponds to the needs of the armed struggle." (See the "Draft Resolution on Latin America," Discussion on Latin America (1968-1972), pp. 7-8.) They project armed struggle as the *central* task, rather than building a Leninist party to overcome the crisis of leadership. Instead of viewing armed struggle (We're not talking here about situations of advanced dual power where the direct seizure of state power is on the agenda.) as one among many tactics which under certain concrete conditions can be used to build the party, they talk about the party as merely a means to the armed struggle.

Mobilization of the Masses

The MMFT also conceives of mobilization of the masses using the transitional approach as merely an adjunct to armed struggle, even in their written positions. (I've already shown that armed struggle itself without the masses doesn't contribute to mobilizing the masses. The MMFT admits this implicitly when they talk about the need to combine mass work and armed struggle. They don't understand that armed struggle is only a correct tactic when it *is* mass work.) Here's what the MMFT has to say about the relationship of mass mobilizations and armed struggle:

"Under the perspective of a prolonged civil war with rural guerrilla warfare as its principal axis, even in the most difficult phases of severe repression and temporary prostration, the problem of liaison between the guerrillas and the masses will be a vital one.

"In a situation of prerevolutionary crisis such as Latin America is now experiencing on a continental scale, guerrilla warfare can in fact stimulate a revolutionary dynamic, even if at the start the attempt may seem to have come from abroad or to be unilateral (which was the case with Che's Bolivian guerrilla movement.) But in any case it must be realized that without the active sympathy, the protection, and the solidarity of certain sectors of the masses, the chance for consolidating and strengthening the guerrilla nuclei diminish to the extreme and the political repercussions which the armed action is striving to provoke dwindle. Secondly, a major problem which no clear-sighted revolutionary leadership can sidestep is how to utilize all the explosive social potential (which for structural reasons cannot be channeled into the framework of the actions and initiatives proper to revolutionary minorities) during the whole struggle and not just at the culminating moment of the overthrow of the system.

"Hence the necessity to:

"(a) Take advantage of every opportunity not only to increase the number of rural guerrilla nuclei but also to promote forms of armed struggle specially adapted to certain zones (for example, the mining zones in Bolivia) and to undertake actions in the big cities aimed both at striking the nerve centers (key points in the economy and transport, etc.) and at punishing the hangmen of the regime as well as achieving propagandistic and psychological successes (the experience of the European resistance to Nazism would be helpful in this regard).

"(b) Advance a program not just of immediate economic and political demands but also transitional demands able to mobilize and raise the political consciousness of the worker, petty bourgeois, and plebeian masses as well as the student masses and thus create growing tensions threatening the system (this would also make it more difficult for the governments to concentrate their repressive forces exclusively in the zones of armed struggle). An orientation and mobilization based on a transitional program conceived in accordance with the logic of an anticapitalist struggle would, moreover, help certain revolutionary organizations to overcome the difficulties arising from the fact that while having been formed for revolutionary combat and armed struggle, these organizations have been unable for conjunctural reasons to put their ideas into practice. They thus run the risk in practice of combining abstract revolutionary propaganda with mobilizations for immediate goals which do not involve a revolutionary dynamic, even if pursued by extra-parliamentary and extralegal means. The determination of the themes of a transitional program is clearly the task of revolutionists in the various countries." ("Draft Resolution on Latin America," *Discussion on Latin America* (1968-1972), pp. 7-8. If it's so obvious, why didn't Trotsky leave it to individual sections in 1938? Isn't agrarian reform a valid demand throughout most, if not all, of Latin America? Is a sliding scale of wages and hours unnecessary in some countries in Latin America? Is there any country in which workers control of industry doesn't express the objective needs of the working class?)

Armed struggle is not something separate from the Transitional Program, as this passage seems to imply. The purpose of mobilizing the masses with the transitional method is not just to take some of the heat off of small guerrilla groups; nor is it to solve the problem of "liaison" between these guerrilla groups and the masses; nor is it to give something to do to sections which for some reason are unable to put guerrilla warfare into practice. The ultimate purpose of mobilizing the masses is the destruction of the bourgeois state and the construction of a proletarian one. Only mass struggle can accomplish this. The direct mass struggle against capitalism can only be prepared for by mass mobilizations for specific goals.

Armed struggle is an *integral part* of this process. In a certain sense, the entire Transitional Program is designed to prepare the masses for armed struggle as one of the essential elements of a successful revolution. But only two or three pages of this forty-page resolution deal directly with the question of armed struggle itself. This is because Trotsky understood that preparation for armed struggle is mainly a political problem. You can't have mass armed struggle if you don't even have mass struggles to begin with. The masses learn the need for armed struggle when their own mass actions and organizations are attacked and they have no choice but to defend themselves or give up. The task is to build a mass movement which is too deep a challenge to bourgeois rule for them to tolerate. We are preparing for armed struggle whenever we build a demonstration; whenever we form a caucus in a trade union to move it toward more resolute struggle against the bosses; whenever we participate in a strike; whenever we run an election campaign to explain to the masses the need to rely on their own

strength; whenever we do mass work of any kind. We are preparing for armed struggle because we are helping the masses learn through their own experience what the ruling class is and what they must do to fight it. The ruling class cannot allow mass mobilizations to deepen continue undisturbed indefinitely. The logic of such mobilizations is to lead toward a situation of dual power in which the masses transfer their loyalty to their own mass organizations. At some point, if not many points, the bourgeoisie will fill compelled to launch a direct, armed attack on the mass movement. It is then, and only then, that the broader masses will begin learning the need for armed struggle.

This is not to say, of course, that it isn't vitally necessary for the revolutionary party to warn the masses of this necessity in advance. The masses as a whole can't consistently draw the correct conclusions from their experience without the help of a revolutionary party. It is sometimes possible for the masses to arm themselves spontaneously, as in Wounded Knee, but the revolutionary party can never count on this possibility. It is a slander to claim that the LTT believes that the masses can be depended upon to arm themselves spontaneously, or that armed struggle will be confined to the final insurrection against the state. The ruling class can and does resort to repressive tactics at many different stages in the class struggle. That is why it is necessary to have a mass revolutionary party rooted in the mass movements which can insure that the masses respond correctly and defend themselves. It is precisely because there was no such mass revolutionary party in Bolivia which knew how to correctly apply the Transitional Program, that the masses were not armed and Banzer came to power with hardly a fight.

The tempo of developments doesn't change anything essential in this analysis. Even if any mass struggle does meet almost immediate repression, even if the question of armed struggle is posed almost from the outset, the correct method still remains the same. Mass armed struggle can only grow out of the mass movement and can only be prepared for by participation in mass struggles.

Mobilization of the masses using the transitional approach is not a tactic to be used in combination with other tactics depending on the situation, as the above passage from the Latin American resolution projects. It is a global strategy, valid in every country in the world for an entire epoch, the epoch of proletarian revolution. Which demands, which issues, which forms of struggle are best suited to doing this varies from country to country, but there is no country in the world in which it is possible to make a revolution without mobilizing the masses. There is no country in the world in which the working class doesn't suffer from a crisis of leadership. There is no country in the world in which there is not a gap in consciousness between revolutionists and the masses. When these problems are solved it will signify nothing less than the arrival of the socialist revolution. It is not for nothing that Trotsky included the particular concepts he did in the founding document of the entire Fourth International.

There is no country in the world in which the masses are mostly intellectuals, where they don't learn primarily through their own experience. They're not all going to get subscriptions to *The Militant* for several years, much

less the *ISR* or *IP*. You can't just ask them to read a book.

People's minds don't work differently in different countries. It is always easier for people to understand socialist revolution when it is concretized in terms of their immediate needs, wants, and struggles. It is always easier for workers to understand workers control of industry, a sliding scale of wages and hours, etc. than it is to understand "socialism." It is always easier for peasants to understand land reform than "socialism." It is always easier for the masses in the deformed workers states to understand simple democratic rights than "political revolution." And it is always easier for the masses to understand armed self-defense of their own mass actions and mass organizations than it is for them to understand a "revolutionary army of the people" waging guerrilla warfare by the "vanguard."

Faced with the impossibility of actually doing mass work while waging guerrilla warfare by themselves, the MMFT has begun to develop their own concept of how to reach the masses, a concept very different from the transitional approach. They project actions such as expropriating and distributing food and clothing, occupying factories in order to give the workers lectures on socialist revolution, assassinations of hated figures, etc.

These actions do not provide a *bridge* between the present level of consciousness of the masses and consciousness of the need for armed struggle. Instead they try and tie the two together in an artificial manner different from the way they are related in the real class struggle. The masses want food; the ERP gives them food through armed struggle therefore . . . they should take up arms themselves. The masses hate certain government officials; The ERP gets rid of them through armed struggle; therefore . . . they should take up arms themselves. (The factory occupations aren't connected in any way, artificial or otherwise, with the immediate needs and concerns of the masses.) It just doesn't follow. There's no reason for the masses to conclude that *they themselves* must take up arms. If the ERP were to pay for the food out of the money they've taken from banks, would the masses conclude that they should all go and hold up banks as the only road to their liberation? The real reason why the masses need to take up arms—the necessity to defend their own organizations and struggles (eventually including the defense of soviets and their right to rule) from the inevitable attacks by the ruling class—is completely ignored. The necessity for the masses themselves to conduct this defense if it is to be successful is likewise not clarified—it is obscured.

The connections which the transitional method tries to draw between immediate needs and the socialist revolution are not artificial connections dreamed up by revolutionists. They must be based on the objective needs of the masses and their struggles. They are connections which exist in real life whether or not revolutionists are there to point them out.

Trotsky on Armed Struggle Itself

It is on this question—preparation for armed struggle in the narrow sense—that the contradiction between the Transitional Program and the line of the MMFT is clearest. This is what Trotsky had to say about armed struggle

in the Transitional Program: "Only armed workers detachments, who feel the support of tens of millions of toilers behind them, can successfully prevail against the fascist bands. The struggle against fascism does not start in the liberal editorial office but in the factory—and ends in the street. Scabs and private gunmen in factory plants are the basic nuclei of the fascist army. *Strike pickets* are the basic nuclei of the proletarian army. This is our point of departure. In connection with every strike and street demonstration, it is imperative to propagate the necessity of creating workers' groups for *self-defense*. It is necessary to write this slogan into the program of the revolutionary wing of the trade unions. It is imperative wherever possible, beginning with the youth groups, to organize groups for self-defense, to drill and acquaint them with the use of arms.

"A new upsurge of the mass movement would serve not only to increase the number of these units but also to unite according to neighborhoods, cities, regions. It is necessary to give organized expression to the valid hatred of the workers toward scabs and bands of gangsters and fascists. It is necessary to advance the slogan of a *workers militia* as the one serious guarantee for the inviolability of workers organizations, meetings and press.

"Only with the help of such systematic, persistent, indefatigable, courageous agitational and organizational work, always on the basis of the experience of the masses themselves, is it possible to root out from their consciousness the traditions of submissiveness and passivity; to train detachments of heroic fighters capable of setting an example to all toilers; to inflict a series of tactical defeats upon the armed thugs of counterrevolution; to raise the self-confidence of the exploited and oppressed; to compromise fascism in the eyes of the petty bourgeoisie and pave the road for the conquest of power by the proletariat.

"Engels defined the state as bodies of 'armed men.' *The arming of the proletariat* is an imperative concomitant element to its struggle for liberation. When the proletariat wills it, it will find the road and the means to arming. In this field, also, the leadership falls naturally to the sections of the Fourth International." (*The Transitional Program for Socialist Revolution*, Pathfinder, pp. 85-86. Trotsky's emphasis throughout.)

In another passage from "Discussions With Trotsky on the Transitional Program" the contrast with the approach of the MMFT is even clearer.

"*Question:* How do we go about launching the defense groups practically?

"*Trotsky:* It is very simple. Do you have a picket line in a strike? When the strike is over we say we must defend our union by making this picket line permanent.

"*Question:* Does the party itself create the defense groups with its own members?

"*Trotsky:* The slogans of the party must be placed in quarters where we have sympathizers and workers who will defend us. But a party cannot create an independent defense organization. The task is to create such a body in the trade unions. We must have these groups of comrades with very good discipline, with good cautious leaders not easily provoked because such groups can be provoked easily. The main task for the next year would be

to avoid conflicts and bloody clashes. We must reduce them to a minimum with a minority organization during strikes, during peaceful times. In order to prevent fascist meetings it is a question of the relationship of forces. We alone are not strong, but we propose a united front." (Ibid., p. 140.)

This is so clear it hardly needs commenting on. Armed struggle must begin on the basis of the experience of the masses themselves, not artificially introduced into the mass movement from without. Armed struggle should be clearly posed in terms of self-defense of the mass movement, not in terms of kidnappings, bank holdups, assassinations, etc. The party should not launch its own defense organizations—the task is to create such a body in the trade unions. The basic nuclei of the proletarian army is strike pickets, not Germain's "autonomous armed detachments" created directly by the party.

The MMFT has never shown why their line of armed struggle without the masses should be confined to Latin America. If armed struggle by the "vanguard" can teach the masses the need for armed struggle in Latin America, why couldn't it do so in other parts of the world, both today and in the past? They have never explained clearly what their criteria are for engaging in armed struggle that separate Latin America from other parts of the world. They have abandoned the traditional criteria of Trotskyism: armed struggle must grow out of the mass movement and have the participation of the masses. But what they propose to substitute for this is not at all clear.

In 1969, the comrades who now belong to the MMFT advanced two main reasons for guerrilla warfare on a continental scale in Latin America. They claimed that there was a prerevolutionary situation on a continental scale and at the same time there were repressive military dictatorships in almost every country. The clear implication was that it would be correct to project guerrilla warfare (or, if you prefer a "strategy of armed struggle"—it works out to the same thing in practice in Latin America today.) wherever and whenever these conditions exist. Events since then have shown clearly that it is a gross over-simplification to describe all of Latin America in these terms for a whole period. Most countries in Latin America today do not fulfill one or both of these conditions. This includes the two countries in which our sections actually carried out this line. In Bolivia after the Banzer coup there was clearly not a prerevolutionary situation. Yet the MMFT has come out four-square behind the strategy of armed struggle in Bolivia today, even spelling it out as armed struggle by "sectors or nuclei of the vanguard" for a considerable period. Does this mean that the MMFT supports a strategy of armed struggle under any dictatorship? Why not? What's different about Bolivia that makes a strategy of armed struggle correct there but not in modern Spain or Greece? Hitler's Germany? Tsarist Russia? The Soviet Union today or in the '30s?

Argentina today is a bourgeois democracy, and the MMFT no longer supports a *strategy* of armed struggle there. But they still support armed struggle "initiatives" which are "subordinate" to the mass movement. Do they, then, support armed struggle "initiatives" in any prerevolutionary situation? If not, why not? Which prerevolutionary situations would they support it in? What's dif-

ferent about Argentina? What are the criteria? And what exactly are armed struggle "initiatives," and under what concrete conditions does the MMFT consider them to be "subordinate" to the mass movement?

Furthermore, modern-day Latin America is not the only example where we can find countries with repressive dictatorships confronting prerevolutionary situations. Would the MMFT advocate a strategy of armed struggle for Tsarist Russia in 1916? What about 1904? If not, why not? What's the difference?

The MMFT has also never explained *why* the strategy of armed struggle should be confined to the specific conditions of a repressive dictatorship and a prerevolutionary situation. If armed struggle without the masses can teach the masses the need for armed struggle under these conditions, why not under any other conditions?

The MMFT hesitates to draw the logical conclusions of their positions because it would reveal more clearly the difference between their position and the traditions of the Trotskyist movement.

The above questions are not trivial ones, debating points. They involve, among other things, what positions the International will take on future developments that can't yet be foreseen. It's not just to the United Secretariat how they will go about deciding positions on new developments between world congresses. The entire International has a right and a responsibility to discuss and decide democratically what general guidelines it will use in approaching new developments. Without these guidelines the United Secretariat is likely to flounder and make serious mistakes. The MMFT has a responsibility to the International to explain what their general guidelines are. The comrades in the SWP who support the MMFT have a similar responsibility to the party.

* * *

To summarize, I would like to ask the comrades who support the MMFT a series of questions.

1. In what other countries besides some of those in Latin America today do you believe it is correct for revolutionaries to take armed actions even without the masses, and why? What are your general criteria for engaging in armed struggle? How do you answer all of the more specific questions in the previous passage?

2. What is the purpose of armed struggle without the participation of the masses? Of the possible functions I outlined earlier, which does it accomplish and which doesn't accomplish? Why and how does it accomplish what it does? What prevents armed struggle without the masses from miseducating them in the ways I described?

What is the purpose of armed struggle *for state power* without the masses?

3. How do you propose to do both mass work and armed struggle at the same time? How, *concretely*, do you propose to link the autonomous armed detachments to the mass struggle? How, *concretely*, do you propose to transform the armed detachments into workers militias?

4. If you elevate armed struggle to the level of a strategy, what is the purpose of a Leninist party? What *concrete tasks* are impeded if political opponents of Trotskyism are allowed to be members? What *concrete tasks* is

the party supposed to carry out that an armed united front such as the ERP or ELN couldn't do?

5. How do you reconcile the line of the MMFT with

the Transitional Program? In particular, how do you reconcile it with the specific concepts and passages I referred to earlier?

July 20, 1973

WHAT THE DISCUSSION ON THE GAY STRUGGLE HAS REVEALED

by Jon Hillson, Joe Johnson and Bill Perdue, Denver Branch

The current wave of struggle for the democratic rights of gays began a little over three years ago. For two of those years we have been trying to decide what to do about it. That discussion has revealed a sharp and widening division in the ranks and the leadership of the party.

At present, there are four views on the question. The two major views are those presented in the memorandum and the counterposed Green-Thorstad resolution "For an Intervention Into the Gay Liberation Movement." In addition, some comrades still cling to the conservative and economist views presented by Weinstein and an even smaller number to the utopian and counterculturalist views of Comrade Gebert.

In our view, this division is not an indication of a crisis nor a signal for the development of a factional situation. Rather, it should be viewed as an opportunity for the party to clear up a major problem of ambiguity and lack of consistency.

Nevertheless, it is a serious matter. Leadership and rank-and-file comrades alike are divided, and the differences are sharp.

As supporters of the Green-Thorstad amendment to the PC draft resolution, and the general line of the political resolution, we think that a further sharpening of the issues is necessary. The party must have a clear idea of what the memorandum calls for. There should be no illusions that the differences between the memorandum and the Green-Thorstad counterresolution are minor or semantic. Further, no one should be under the illusion that, if it is passed, the party will go any further than what is contained in the memorandum. Comrades who say otherwise do *not* understand the memorandum.

Is a Memo Enough?

The memorandum was hesitantly passed at the recent plenum of the National Committee. It is the product of a discussion that began in the party shortly after the change in membership policy in late 1970. Our opinion is that it is a departure from the general line of the political resolution in 1971 and the draft political resolution of the PC now before us. In addition, we think it is internally inconsistent and ambiguous, and that it prevents a reasonable and balanced partywide orientation to the gay struggle.

This is apparent from an analysis of the character, history and content of the memorandum itself.

First of all, it is merely a memo, a reminder. Following two years of discussion, during which its authors apparently underwent a significant and unexplained change of mind, the party is now presented with — a memo.

The Memorandum and our Analysis of the Radicalization

For the last two conventions, our political resolutions have analyzed the radicalization and mapped out a response to it. That analysis has enabled us to enter the movements aroused by the radicalization, intervene, recruit, gain valuable experience in the use of the program and proletarian norms of struggle and raise our program before wider layers than ever before.

Central to that approach has been the perspective of intervention. At the last convention the party decisively rejected the FAPO line of abstentionism and sectarianism. The 1971 political resolution, "Perspectives and Lessons of the New Radicalization," stated:

"The existence and growth of this radicalization prior to the radicalization of major sections of the working class is of vital importance to the Marxist tendency. Our capacity to recruit and educate a Marxist cadre that is active and influential in the movements as they arise, that fights for leadership against the claims of all our opponents, is decisive in building a mass Leninist workers party capable of leading the coming struggle for power to a victorious conclusion.

"In all stages of building the mass revolutionary socialist party its cadres must be alert to, recognize and embrace the new forms of struggle and the demands of oppressed groupings that appear as the radicalization develops. The Leninist party champions the fighting movements of all oppressed social layers and advances and develops their key democratic and transitional demands as part of its own. The revolutionary vanguard consciously uses its participation in these movements to draw the lessons necessary to bring revolutionary socialist consciousness to as broad a layer of militants as possible.

"In view of the decisiveness of the construction of the revolutionary party, our most important objective in involving ourselves deeply in these mass movements and absorbing their lessons is to recruit the best militants and help them to assimilate Trotskyism, and gain the political experience necessary to become integrated in the expanding Trotskyist cadre."

What we have done is to carry out, in a new situation, the line and method of Leninist party building in battle after battle—except one, the struggle for democratic rights of gays.

Why?

The 1971 political resolution noted the rise of several new components in the radicalization, including the GI, prisoners and gay movements. In spite of the fact that prison guards and MPs had some effect in limiting our ability to orient to the barracks and prisons, we covered them in our press, compiled and published books and

pamphlets and held occasional support actions, all of which were correct and important.

However, our orientation to the gay liberation struggle was different. Press coverage was limited, no publications were authorized and few support actions carried out. This was in spite of the fact that there were no guards to limit our access, except internal ones.

Apparently hesitant and unsure as to how to proceed, the PC launched a probe prior to the 1971 convention. At that convention a panel was held to hear reports on the probe. Instead it spent the bulk of its time discussing the next motion of the PC which was to "freeze" gay work pending a discussion.

After nine months delay, in May 1972, that discussion began and was concluded in August of that year. Finally, in April of this year, the PC presented the memorandum to the plenum.

In the 23 months between the launching of the probe and the plenum, without formal guidance, the branches did some minimal work. Most adopted a wait-and-see attitude, and several held an occasional forum, although even that was difficult in some branches.

What Is the Content of the Memorandum?

Some of the formulations and one whole section of the memorandum are adequate. The long-range estimate of the weight of the gay struggle in the class struggle, the inserted section rejecting antigay prejudice and the bulk of the third section are adequate.

However, we must look at the document as a whole and determine the general thrust of its orientation, its general line. That is what's up for vote. That can best be done by noting the limits it places on possible orientation to the gay liberation movement.

1. No mention was made in the PC's original draft to the plenum of a rejection of antigay prejudice. This omission is consistent with the general line of the memorandum.

2. Even following editing, the memorandum offers no serious analysis of the role of antigay prejudice. That too is consistent with the general line of the memorandum.

3. The memorandum makes no reference to the need or even the desirability of recruiting the best elements of the gay struggle.

This omission is also consistent with the general line of the draft, which would allow little more than occasional press releases or occasional participation in actions we cannot organize. Without opportunities for common work, why worry about recruitment? This is a marked departure from our attitude towards every other layer of the radicalization.

4. The memorandum makes a totally false amalgam between questions of personal taste—the "value" of gay sex—and a prime question of politics and science for the gay movement—the "nature" of gay sexuality.

It is correct to take a totally hands off attitude on the question of the "value" of gay sex.

But it is another thing entirely to amalgamate that with a question of science and politics, and on that specious basis, attempt to ignore it. The answer to the question of the nature of gay sexuality is that it is a naturally occurring form of human sexuality.

5. The memorandum, sternly and without any attempt at justification, says that any attempt to make use of

a scientific definition of the nature of gay sexuality by the party would ". . . dilute its nature as a political organization . . . narrow its appeal, and cripple its ability to mobilize the masses. . . ."

That is patently absurd. The women's movement and the gay movement take up combined questions of science and politics to combat the lies and prejudices upon which the ruling class bases its discrimination and oppressive laws.

The use of science by the party on the woman question is now welcome. It is a valuable tool. To be consistent and correct, the same method must be used in defense of the rights of gays by the revolutionary party. To state as the memorandum very clearly does, that the party will not use this valuable tool in a political struggle, as a political weapon, will indeed ". . . dilute its nature as a political organization . . . narrow its appeal and cripple its ability to mobilize the masses. . . ."

6. To bolster and justify the unnecessarily limited and narrow approach outlined in the memorandum, it states that it would be impossible to try to make a distinction between scientific fact and bourgeois "fantasy" on the question of the nature of gay sexuality.

We have already pointed out that the party must make precisely this distinction or abstain from the struggle for gay rights. We cannot rely on a moral reason, or no reason at all, as the basis for our support to this movement—that would be stepping out of the political bounds and traditions of the SWP.

Further, it is unbelievable that the SWP cannot tell fact from bourgeois fantasy. We are sure that the party based on the ideas of the authors of *The Communist Manifesto*, *What is to Be Done* and the Transitional Program can set the record straight. It is utterly ridiculous to state that the party that analyzed the radicalization, that added and updated a major theoretical contribution to our understanding of the national question, the party that aspires to leadership of the international revolutionary movement, cannot, with little effort, see through the slime and offal of bourgeois prejudice!

7. The memorandum contains inconclusive information and analyses of the conjunctural state of the gay struggle. It elaborately refuses to take note of the central fact of that conjuncture. That is, that the gay movement is not a casualty of the lull, that it has not won any major concessions or large victories, that it is still around, alive and kicking, and that it involves both significant forces and opportunities for us to intervene.

That central fact about the current stage of the gay movement is entirely absent from the memorandum! Reading it, one would be led to believe that it is a casualty of the lull. The memorandum has an entirely inadequate appreciation of the current stage of the gay movement.

8. The fifth section of the memorandum dealing with organizational questions and problems, some of which came up in the course of the discussion, makes points that are by-and-large correct.

However, its placement in the memorandum is very incorrect. It is objectionable, out of place and context and potentially misleading.

The authors of the memorandum hotly deny that they had any intention of directing the fifth section only to gay comrades or that it was a warning about the dangers of recruiting gays. We believe them. We also believe that

they should separate point five from the rest of the memorandum at the convention, for the sake of clarity.

Conclusions

The view put forward in the memorandum, in reality and in spite of its ambiguity, denies that we can or should carry out an intervention into the gay struggle. It would limit us to an occasional press release and marginal participation in an occasional demonstration. It denies us the ability to discern the difference between antigay prejudice and scientific fact, and warns us against the attempt. It omits the key element of the conjunctural state of the gay movement and does not advocate, contrary to our general policy, recruitment or other possible gains

from the gay struggle. Even the insertion, after strong protest from the comrades at the plenum, of a rejection of antigay prejudice is inconsistent with the general line of the memorandum.

On balance, the memorandum would make almost impossible an intervention in, contact with, or recruitment from, the gay struggle. That has been the case since the inception of the gay movement.

The memorandum should be rejected and replaced with Green and Thorstad's "For an Intervention Into the Gay Liberation Movement." Then we can intervene, present our program to a wider layer, and gain valuable recruits to the party.

July 23, 1973

WHERE THE N. C. MEMORANDUM ON GAY LIBERATION GOES WRONG

by Steve Gabosch, San Francisco Branch

This contribution is being written in support of the Thorstad-Green counterresolution on gay liberation, "For an Intervention into the Gay Liberation Struggle" (Vol. 31, No. 15).

Abstention

The National Committee memorandum on gay liberation, passed April 29, 1973, and printed in Vol. 31, No. 3 of the internal discussion bulletin, proposes a line to the party that amounts to abstention from the gay liberation movement.

This is indicated throughout the memorandum in a multitude of ways.

The memorandum states that branches "have the responsibility" to "support" gay rights struggles when they occur, and to "carry out any such work within the context of carrying out the major campaigns being conducted by the party" (page 9).

What the memorandum means by "support" is spelled out in the preceding paragraph on the same page: ". . . we should make no reallocation of our forces to generally assign comrades to this movement. Our support to this movement will be mainly in our propaganda in the next period, as it has been." "As it has been" means keeping *The Militant's* "In Brief" column well briefed, and occasionally attending gay rights actions when we have nothing better to do.

There is no analysis of the gay movement. There is nothing in the entire memorandum that could be construed to be a *political analysis* of the gay liberation movement. It would be generous to characterize the few sentences devoted to the gay movement in this conjuncture as sketchy. The picture of the gay liberation movement that is drawn by the memorandum is so distorted and full of so many omissions and so apolitical that with a little editing they would be far more akin to a blurb from *Newsweek* than from the pen of a revolutionary socialist, especially one with the caliber of Comrade Barry Sheppard.

There is no analysis, and there is no strategy. The memorandum provides no guide to action. The memorandum provides no discussion of any strategical or

tactical questions with one exception: why our party should not march out and construct a national focus or national organization for the gay liberation movement in the immediate future. But that is all we are going to get from this document that plans to guide our party's activities in the gay liberation movement for the next two years.

The memorandum manages to sidestep any mention whatsoever of the emergence and growth of *gay pride*. This alone exposes the memorandum as non-serious. And the memorandum makes no mention of the remarkable growth of the gay liberation movement not only throughout the U. S., to the south, the midwest, etc.; but it neglects even a passing remark on the *international* growth of the movement.

The memorandum implies that the gay liberation movement poses no threat to the family system; and in doing so, raises a question mark over our analysis of feminism and the family. "The reactionary institution of the patriarchal family, *and the ideology and morality that buttress it*, will wither away *only* in the process of the construction of socialism. . . ." (page 8, my emphasis).

The memorandum insults homosexual Trotskyists when it discusses our membership policy, "exotic" images of the party, and various other organizational questions that have nothing to do with the title of the document. It degrades this discussion and demeans the gay movement when it associates disciplinary questions with the questions involved in the gay liberation movement. Yet at the same time, these comments reveal something. This same thing occurred more than once in last summer's literary discussion on the gay liberation movement. After discussing the issue of homosexuality for a time, the compulsion was apparently overwhelming to finish off with a stern warning for comrades not to act queer.

There are two fundamental errors in the memorandum that deserve close attention.

A Preposterous Rejection

The section in the memorandum devoted to rattling off several elaborate arguments against taking any position on the nature of homosexuality is so chock full of con-

traditions and straw horses that it deserves this year's double-talk award.

Section "2" begins with the announcement ". . . we reject with contempt all forms of bourgeois prejudice against gay people. . . ." (pg. 7).

But that is the last we will hear of any such "contempt" for anti-homosexual prejudice.

After deftly setting up and knocking down the straw horse of the party taking positions on only political issues, which is perfectly correct but irrelevant because *how* homosexuality is regarded by society *is* a political issue, the memorandum outlines a rather dubious motivation for our party to avoid taking a stand on the political issue of the nature of homosexuality.

It says "Especially concerning homosexuality, little is known, and it is difficult to ascertain what is objectively based and what represents prejudice in what knowledge is available" (page 8). In other words, we plead "ignorance"! Not too long ago, our attitude was full of "contempt"; but in the short space of a couple of paragraphs, we find that the memorandum has spun on its heel exactly 180 degrees and is facing in the opposite direction, copping a plea of "ignorance"! Almost at the speed of light, the memorandum retreats, streaking away from its original, bold position. Now facing in the opposite direction under the shadow of "ignorance"! one has to ask if we won't see some more action.

We aren't disappointed. Just in case you aren't sufficiently convinced by the plea of "ignorance"! the memorandum proceeds to turn this monster on its back and reveal its underbelly. "If we were to attempt to adopt a *particular viewpoint* on the nature of homosexuality or sexuality in general, we would become *embroiled in a hopeless tangle* of opinions, prejudices [!], and personal preferences with little hope of reaching any scientifically valid conclusions . . ." (page 8, my emphasis).

Clear and simple: our party is too prejudiced to reach a scientific conclusion. We aren't just ignorant: we're downright *prejudiced!* Too much anti-homosexual prejudice exists within the party to adopt that "particular viewpoint," the one that contains those "scientifically valid conclusions."

What an astounding argument. First, anti-gay prejudice is rejected "with contempt." Then, it is suddenly "difficult to ascertain." And now, we are "embroiled in a hopeless tangle" of it!

Well, in spite of this hopeless tangle of bourgeois prejudice, the memorandum seems to have enough sense to make one true statement about future sexuality in a classless society. "We cannot go much beyond the assertion that the present sexual misery of the masses of people will be overcome" (page 8).

Excellent point—if one has a taste in straw horses as a method of argument. We don't know very much about communism at all; we don't even know what color people will be. And we can't go much beyond the assertion that racism will disappear, just as sexism and the institutions of capitalist society that repress and warp human sexuality will vanish forever.

But no one advocates that the Socialist Workers Party adopt an official position on sexuality in the year 2973, 3973 or 4973. *We want a scientific position on homosexuality in 1973.*

But It's Not Here In the Blueprints

The memorandum utilizes a method of analyzing the historical potential, tasks and role of the gay liberation movement that is alien to Marxism.

It asserts that the gay liberation movement only "directly relates to a relatively narrow sector of the population." Whereas the movements of women and the oppressed nationalities raise "class" demands, the gay liberation movement is "essentially limited" to democratic demands, and raises issues which are "much narrower in scope." In comparison with the women's and national liberation movements, the gay liberation movement does not have the same "potential mass" or "social weight." Finally, "In our long-term strategic priorities, the gay liberation movement is much more peripheral to the central issues of the class struggle than either the women's movement or the movements of the oppressed nationalities" (page 9).

1. The assertion that the gay liberation movement only "directly relates" to a "relatively narrow sector" of the population is wrong on two counts. It misses two historical facts: the size of the homosexual population, and the role of the struggle for democracy in the age of permanent revolution.

As far as the size of the gay population is concerned, until someone challenges the statement in the counter-resolution that "The Kinsey studies, for instance, show that at least 25,000,000 Americans have at least a few years' homosexual behavior during their adult lives" (vol. 31, no. 15, page 7), it is assumed that the party as a whole accepts this rough figure as good coin. That is a whole lot of people, at any case.

The question of the relationship of the homosexual rights movement to the permanent revolution strikes at the very heart of this discussion.

The extension of the most elementary democratic rights to this hitherto terrorized layer of the human population is a very important question to all other social sectors that are struggling to maintain and extend their rights, especially the working class. It is a very important question because of the special subordinate social role that homosexuals play.

Homosexuals, for all practical purposes, have no democratic rights in society whatsoever. They don't have the right to free speech, to freedom of assembly, freedom of privacy, or any other basic right associated with the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries. The life of the homosexual must be led in the dark, clandestinely, with the constant fear of discovery. Like a German Jew under the Third Reich, the homosexual lives a life of daily terror. Who dares take sides with a homosexual?

In the general struggle for democracy in the process of permanent revolution, homosexuals have a special position. Because they are the *most* persecuted and the *most* denied and devoid of democratic rights, their battles with the capitalist state for precisely those rights have high odds against them. But this invests in the gay liberation movement great significance for the masses as a whole, endowing the militants in the gay movement with a vanguard relationship in the struggle for democracy. For every discriminatory practice in the schools, the trade unions, the army, the office-places, the factories, the prisons, in housing, employment, or in the hospitals

suffered by any sector of the oppressed, homosexuals are likely to lack even the right to exist.

As such, victories won by the gay liberation movement can only be inspirations and examples for the entire mass movement, spurring the revolutionary process forward.

2. The implication that the homosexual population has no "potential mass" and no "social weight" is also ahistorical.

First, the sheer size of the gay population in and of itself has obvious implications. But we also know that very large numbers of gays tend to concentrate in the big cities to "find their own kind." S. F. is known as a "Gay Mecca," and close to one third of its adult population is acknowledged by most authorities to be gay. (100,000 gay adults out of a total population of 750,000.) L. A. and N. Y. have gay populations in the millions.

Second, millions of trade unionists are gay, as are millions of unorganized workers, millions of unemployed, millions of Blacks, millions of women, millions of students, and huge numbers of other social sectors, such as other oppressed nationalities, G. I.s and professionals. This gives the gay liberation movement a unique relationship to the other social struggles.

Third, gay people have a rather special power that is endowed upon them by the incredible mystification and persecution they are subjected to. Homosexuals can "come out," and cause a very big stir. One single homosexual minister or teacher or writer or singer can have a significant impact. Any comrade that hasn't taken notice of this over the past several years either doesn't pay close attention to the mass media, or suffers illusions about just how hostile the population really is to homosexuality.

3. The memorandum counterposes the gay liberation movement to the movements of women and the oppressed nationalities in a false and sectarian way.

The memorandum counterposes the "class" demands of the women's and national liberation movements to the "democratic" demands for homosexual freedom.

Compared with the "class" demands of the women's and national liberation movements, the demands of gay liberation are "much narrower in scope."

When the women's and national liberation struggles are compared side by side with the gay liberation movement, "their mass and the scope of the questions they raise" as well as their "potential mass" and their "social weight" are larger.

While the movements of women and oppressed nationalities are "central issues" of the class struggle, gay liberation is "much more peripheral."

Finally, gay liberation is not one of our party's "long-term strategic priorities."

This method is identical to the method employed by all workerist tendencies to explain why they don't like feminism or nationalism. They ruthlessly nag about their weakness, and tirelessly counterpose them to the class moving as a class, trying to belittle and discredit them. The workerist sects treat them as though they were mere fringe products, and at best peripheral to the only real class struggle: the trade-union battles.

Schematism or Marxism?

Schematism is a very dangerous and highly contagious

virus that has been haunting the revolutionary movement for over century. It is the deadly disease of substituting schematic blueprints for what the class struggle is supposed to look like in place of an historical materialist analysis of the unfolding class struggle as it develops in the concrete. It is a virus that keeps the sights of its victims firmly locked onto a map of the terrain, and renders its victims incapable of looking up to see where they are really going.

This is the method of our opponents on the left, and this was the method of the workerist combination grouped around the FAPO document in 1971, and this is the method that the MMF tendency and its subscribers in the U. S. propose for adoption by the entire Fourth International.

It is the method of adapting to petty-bourgeois pressures and incorporating bits and pieces of Stalinist and Social-Democratic illusions in the capitalist system into the program of Marxism in order to appease and please our opponents in the workers' movement. It is the method of confusing the class collaborationist politics of the parasitic labor bureaucracies with the objective needs and aspirations of the working class itself.

It is a clear cut adaptation to Stalinism when a comrade counterposes democratic demands to transitional demands, or feminism to class consciousness or nationalism to the struggle for workers' power. It represents giving in to Stalinist pressure, and trying to get out from under some of the fire.

In the same exact way, the N. C. memorandum on the gay liberation movement represents a capitulation to Stalinist pressure. Some comrades are fearful of our identifying ourselves with the gay liberation movement too closely. They are worried that this will endanger our party being taken seriously by "the class"—but in reality, "the class" they are thinking of is really only the objective political needs and illusions of the labor bureaucracies, which they are mistaking for the real masses of wage slaves, and their real historical interests.

The entire notion that gay liberation is a "peripheral" task of the socialist revolution and a relatively insignificant ally of the working class is in and of itself a terrible compromise of our revolutionary principles and a serious concession to the class enemy and its collaborators. Every fighter on this side of the class line is welcome and totally equal; and no ally is "peripheral" because we are all struggling against one single common enemy.

But the memorandum goes on and on and on with an array of frivolous and slick arguments, counterposing "class" demands to gay liberation demands, counterposing the strengths of other movements to asserted weaknesses of the gay movement, and blindly pouring over a schematic blueprint of the class struggle that doesn't include a gay liberation movement, and unaware that in the process it has gotten stuck in a ditch and is churning its wheels wildly, kicking up a lot of dust and gravel, and digging an immense grave for itself.

The April 1973 National Committee memorandum on the gay liberation movement should be rejected by the party . . . with contempt.

July 21, 1973

FOR DEMOCRACY? YES, COMRADE MASSEY!
BUT JUST WHO IS FOR DEMOCRACY?

by Al Greengold and Gerry Clark, Oakland-Berkeley
Branch

Comrade Massey's "An Open Letter Of Protest" (SWP Discussion Bulletin Vol. 31, No. 10) is a most welcome addition to the discussion now taking place both in the International and the SWP. His proposal for democratizing these discussions deserve the support of all who would follow the Bolshevik tradition. At this crisis-laden juncture of the FI, what is needed above all is a principled discussion of the issues. The first step in such a discussion must be to lay as democratic a foundation as possible such that all views and positions can be most clearly understood. Only by clearly understanding the opposing views on questions can a serious and principled discussion take place. Thus a democratic discussion is not to be desired as a bourgeois-democratic fetish, but rather to be energetically sought after as the *sine qua non* of a principled discussion.

In light of this, Comrade Massey (on behalf of the Internationalist Tendency) approvingly quotes in his "Open Letter Of Protest" the following passage from the "Declaration of the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency": "A preferable course would be to postpone the congress until the nature of the crisis we face has been *most clearly defined*, the issues at the bottom of the dispute have been *fully clarified*, the documents have been published, *translated* and disseminated, and *the ranks have had full opportunity to discuss them and make their own contributions.*" (Our emphasis—A.G. & G.C.) Bravo, Comrade Massey!

Comrade Gerry Clark submitted his "The Only Road to Revolution Is Through the Proletariat" as a contribution to the international discussion. As such he rightly and reasonably requested that it be printed in the International Internal Discussion Bulletin. The following is the reply he received from the United Secretariat.

April 24, 1973

Gerald Clark
3536 Telegraph Ave.
Oakland, Calif. 94609

Dear comrade Clark,

This is to acknowledge (sic) receipt of your letter of March 20, 1973 submitting to the International Internal Discussion Bulletin your article "The Only Road to Revolution is Through the Proletariat."

Because of the growth of the world movement and the number of contributions which are anticipated for the International pre-world congress discussion, the United Secretariat adopted at its December 5, 1972, meeting the following motion: 'That all contributions to the International Internal Discussion Bulletin must be submitted through the leadership bodies of the sections and sympathizing groups'.

This applies not only to sections and sympathizing groups of the Fourth International, but also to organizations like the S.W.P. that are prevented by reactionary legislation from affiliating with the Fourth International.

Such groups, which are in fraternal solidarity with the Fourth International, have access to the International Internal Discussion Bulletin and contribute views to it.

The Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party recommended that your individual contribution not be submitted to the International Internal Discussion Bulletin. It informed us that your contribution has been printed in the preconvention discussion bulletin of the S.W.P. At its April 1973 meeting the United Secretariat unanimously concurred with the recommendation of the S.W.P. Political Committee.

Comradely yours,
For the United Secretariat
s/Walter

Copy to P.C. of S.W.P.

Two points emerge from this letter. First, the SWP, in spite of its call for democratic discussion as spelled out by its fraternal cothinkers in the "Declaration of the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency" cited above, is supporting democracy only for itself and its fraternal cothinkers. It wants the "democratic" opportunity to win *others* to *its* positions. But when it comes to comrades in the SWP who hold opposing views to that body and who wish to win people away from the perspective of the SWP, then "democracy" is tossed like an old rag into the garbage heap of history. Since Comrade Clark's document will not be published as an International Internal Discussion Bulletin, virtually none of the ranks of the FI will receive an opportunity to read it and draw their conclusions. This whole farce is particularly revolting as it has been the SWP that has moved to the forefront of "democracy" in recent years by adopting the old, moribund fetish of Social-Democracy of the suprahistorical importance of democratic demands in winning people to socialism. Presumably once people are convinced socialists there is no more need for "democracy." Democracy is as democracy does, comrades of the SWP leadership.

The second point to emerge from Walter's letter is the complicity of the Mandel-Maitan leadership of the United Secretariat in this affair. They too do not see any reason why Trotskyists in *their sections* should read Comrade Clark's document. This distortion of proletarian democracy is given an ingenious rationale by Walter who explains that as the FI becomes larger, democratic rights of oppositionists become smaller. In this they are at one with the SWP which has managed to cheat the pro-United Secretariat minorities in the U.S.A. by gerrymandering delegate votes as so convincingly demonstrated by Comrade Massey in his "An Open Letter of Protest."

Thus the Mandel-Maitan leadership sentences Clark's article to remain simply as a contribution in the SWP Discussion Bulletin which of course the ranks of the FI will never see, since SWP DBs are not distributed to the ranks of the FI as are the IIDBs. This position flies in the face of what Comrades Krivine and Frank wrote in their "Again

and Always, the Question of the International" (IIB No. 5 July 1971 p. 5). We quote: "The absence of a strong center injures not only centralism in the International, but also and perhaps *even more* democracy within it, because without a strong center the sections cannot be informed on the life, the activities, *the points of view* of the national organizations, indispensable for insuring democracy." (Our emphasis — A. G. & G. C.)

Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, is it the position of your cothinkers that until there is a strong international center there is no need for democracy and democratic discussion? Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, is it the position of your cothinkers that the larger the world Trotskyist movement becomes the smaller will be the proletarian democracy within it? Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, is it the position of your cothinkers that "points of view of national organizations" are to be restricted to *majority* "points of view of national organizations"? Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, is it the position of your cothinkers that since *you* are in a minority in a national organization that *your* points of view should not be "translated and disseminated" to the ranks of the FI? Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, is not the above the logic of the positions held by your cothinkers? If it is, Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, then will you differentiate yourselves from these positions that follow from such a logic? Or will you *continue* to abjectly apologize for the deviations from the road to Trotskyism practiced by your international cothinkers?

The fact that these questions are directed against the supporters of the International Majority, in no way relieves the SWP of the stigma of having connived with the International Majority in depriving the ranks of the International of a chance to read and discuss comrade Clark's

article. We do not regard this as an isolated incident. We can safely, but sadly predict based on our experiences in the SWP that there will be more undemocratic procedures by those who in the leaderships of the two tendencies preach piously of "democracy". This incident only proves that as regards the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency (what an ironic misnomer!) vs. the International Majority dispute, both sides are so far, yet so near.

For our part, Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, we support your proposals as outlined in your "An Open Letter of Protest" for a more democratic discussion wholeheartedly, unreservedly, and unconditionally. We will continue to support these proposals in spite of any machinations of the SWP and the International Majority to stifle discussion. We will support these proposals even if implicitly or explicitly you will support the suppressing of Comrade Clark's democratic rights. (and the rights of other who hold minority viewpoints)

As you, Comrade Massey, so emphatically and correctly point out, "A democratic world congress cannot take place if the discussions in the sections are abruptly cut short." If we understand the spirit of this indignant aphorism correctly, we would assume that this includes the right of the FI as a whole to read and discuss Comrade Clark's "The Only Road to Revolution is Through the Proletariat," as well as all other oppositional documents. And not just the *right* to read and discuss oppositional viewpoints, but the inescapable *duty* to do so!

We will support your democratic rights, Comrade Massey and comrade supporters of the International Majority, under all conditions. Will you support Comrade Clark's? As victims of undemocratic procedures, you comrades are duty bound to state your opinion on the suppression of Comrade Clark's document. Which side are you on Comrade? Which side are you on?

July 20, 1973

A SPECTRE IS HAUNTING THE INTERNATIONAL: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PABLOISM

by Al Greengold, Oakland-Berkeley Branch

This contribution to the international discussion in no way pretends to be complete. A document of this sort must, of necessity, assume the form of a general outline. The current discussion in the Fourth International is taking place under the most crisis-laden conditions since the split in 1953. In view of this, what I have sought to do is outline the history and ramifications of that revisionist tendency, Pabloism, which helped lead to that split, and show that such a current is still prevalent in the International. Thus I feel that both sides in the present dispute are in-supportable as both are guilty of succumbing to Pabloist errors, and as result neither side can admit past errors nor can they fundamentally learn from them, thus continuing in practice the basic methods of old errors and compounding them. To paraphrase both Marx and Santayana: Those who do not learn from history are condemned to relive it as a farce.

I. The Fourth International was conceived of and found-

ed by Trotsky and his supporters as a democratic-centralist world party of socialist revolution based on the theory and practice of Bolshevism and supplemented by Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism.

II. Although the conjuncture at which the FI was founded was very unfavorable to revolutionary parties, it nevertheless remained an important and necessary historical step. However the fact that it was founded at such a conjuncture severely limited its supporters and influence.

III. The cadre of the early FI, small in number to begin with, were further severely reduced during and after WW II by their murder at the hands of the Gestapo and the GPU. The loss of this hardcore cadre was to weaken the FI quantitatively as well as qualitatively in the subsequent lack of capable revolutionary leadership.

IV. The end of WW II proved disastrous to the FI. Whereas Trotsky had projected that the end of the war would either bring the destruction of Stalinism by the suc-

cess of revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries, or else the failure of these revolutions and the subsequent destruction of the Soviet Union and its gains by world imperialism, a third alternative presented itself. There were no successful revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries and Stalinism strengthened itself by its expansion into Eastern Europe, and a few years later ascending to power in China.

V. This unexpected reality caused much theoretical confusion in the FI. The question of Eastern Europe was particularly nagging. Mandel held that Eastern Europe was in the process of becoming workers states because they were being formally incorporated into the USSR. However Yugoslavia had a workers' and peasants' struggle for national liberation against the Nazis which led to the placing of the Yugoslav CP into power without the slightest bit of help from the USSR or the Red Army. (In fact the Kremlin conspired with British imperialism against the YCP.) Furthermore, since the YCP formally broke with the Soviet Union in 1948 Mandel could not apply his theory of structural assimilation (i.e., formal incorporation into the Soviet Union) to Yugoslavia and therefore held it to be capitalist. Mandel also advanced the notion that the reason that the Soviet Union had nationalized property in Eastern Europe was because of mass pressure from the workers.

VI. This was the beginning of the liquidationism that would later bear Pablo's name. If Stalinism could be pressured by the masses to install socialism, then perhaps Stalinism could be pressured by the FI into making revolutions. Then of course there would be no need for Trotskyist parties, just a need for left wings inside the European CPs.

VII. Liquidationism classically has two phases which in terms of duration have a great degree of variation. In its incipient stage it consists of trimming a revolutionary party's program. The party will start playing down this demand or that strategy, a principle here and a principle there. At some point it may openly revise its program and officially drop any number of points. But such overtness is seldom seen. By the consistent trimming of its program a revolutionary party thus becomes more and more indistinguishable from the Social Democrats, the Stalinists, or in extreme cases the bourgeois party of liberal imperialism. At this point its members realize that there is no need for their party as the Social Democrats or whatever have a party that is to their liking. The party thus liquidates—folds, collapses, disappears, and evaporates as for example did the Shachtmanites in the late '50s liquidate into the SP. This then is the second and final phase of the "dynamic" and "logic" of liquidationism.

VIII. Reality has proven on more than one occasion to be more complex and tortured than theory had envisioned. Pablo's liquidationism did not proceed along a straight line. Preceding Pablo's attempt to liquidated the FI into the Stalinist movement, Pablo came forward as a staunch hater of Stalinism. Thus Pablo could write, *"The expansion of the Soviet bureaucracy brings about not only a strengthening of Stalinism but also powerful factors of crisis and disintegration for Stalinism."* A few lines later in the same document we read, *"But there is no possible stabilization or historic future for Stalinism."* ("Yugoslavia and the Rest of the Buffer Zone," International Information Bul-

letin May 1950, emphasis in original.) All orthodox protestations notwithstanding, Pablo was looking with longing at the masses of European workers who were in the CPs and wished he was there with them. As proof or at least a good indication of this, Pablo spelled out his new rationalization for orienting toward the Stalinists in the very same document: "Experience has shown in the case of Yugoslavia that, first of all, certain Communist Parties in a favorable conjuncture, when they are linked with a real revolutionary movement of the masses, can detach themselves from the yoke of the Kremlin, and begin to act on their own. Consequently to regard every victory achieved by a CP as synonymous with a victory of Stalinism, that is a victory of the Soviet bureaucracy, is an absurd generalization." Thus did Pablo simplify reality. Stalinism is the ideology of the Soviet bureaucracy. Yugoslavia is independent of the Soviet bureaucracy. Therefore its ideology is not Stalinist. This spurious syllogism has provided to this day in the FI the basis of an apology for Maoism and the Vietnamese leadership and differences on China which have yet to be resolved.

IX. The polemic between Mandel (structural assimilation is the main criterion for workers states/Yugoslavia is capitalist) and Pablo (nationalization of industry, monopoly of foreign trade, etc., the main criteria for workers states/Yugoslavia is a workers state) and the subsequent tail-ending of the FI vis-a-vis Tito were given expression in the SWP. Initially there was a split on the Political Committee. About one half of the P.C. supported the Mandel thesis and the other half supported Pablo. The difference was finally resolved in favor of the Pablo thesis. Thus in a report delivered to the 14th National Convention by Murray Weiss for the National Committee we are told, "We want Yugoslavia to be a base for world revolution." (Shades of Comrade Livio Maitan and Bolivia!) And furthermore Weiss stated, "In Russia (sic) the bureaucracy has, hand in hand with imperialism, dealt murderous blows to the world revolution. In Yugoslavia the opposite direction is to be observed. Yugoslavia represents at this point, in its predominant tendency *a revolt against Stalinism* (my emphasis — A.G.) the chief obstacle of world revolution." The lesson to be drawn from this was that the N.C. of the S.W.P. constructed the same spurious syllogism as Pablo, whose basis was—Stalinism could only be practiced by the *Soviet* bureaucracy!

The Titoists were proclaimed by the N.C. to be anti-bureaucratic. Thus Weiss could pontificate, "Important changes occurred after the break with the Kremlin. The revolution again moves forward. A genuine struggle against bureaucratism is opened by the Y.C.P.—not simply against bureaucracy in Russia (sic) but against their own bureaucratic deformations. Again to deal with superficial 'theorists.' They reduce this struggle against bureaucracy to pure demagogy; they compare it with the Stalinist sham struggle in Russia (sic) against bureaucratism." This shallowly empirical line of reasoning was to be duplicated in the S.W.P.'s attitude toward Castro, i.e., the apotheosis of his anti-Escalante purge. But the main point is that Tito's maverick Stalinism was presented as some kind of left centrism at worst. On this the S.W.P. and the Pabloists in the FI were in complete agreement. (All quotes from S.W.P. Discussion Bulletin Jan. 1951.)

X. During the end of the '40s and the start of the '50s

Pablo began to develop in detail his notions of WW III. It had been taken for granted in the Trotskyist movement that WW II had no more solved the problems of imperialism than WW I had. Pablo began projecting a new approach in theorizing about WW III. He held that while in WW II Stalinism had blocked with western imperialism in order to fight Japanese and German imperialism, the next world war would be a "pure" class war—imperialism on one side and the workers states on the other. Thus WW III would have the character of an international civil war. Out of this international civil war more and more workers states would spring up until imperialism would be obliterated. Pablo gave to this process the name War/Revolution. In addition Pablo felt that Stalinism would not survive this War/Revolution. However, in analyzing this, one fact should be kept paramount: *For Pablo, Stalinism was the outlook of the Kremlin and not any other workers state. Stalinism was Stalin.* The War/Revolution thesis was taken from Trotsky's projections about WW II. But to these valid projections Pablo added: (A) an ultra-leftist notion of a global civil war; (B) centuries of degenerated workers states; (C) the need "to get closer to the ranks of the C.P.s"; (D) a revolutionary role of the C.P.s.

XI. These ideas are spelled out in a few documents of the FI at this time, notably "Thesis on the International Perspectives and the Orientation of the FI" (International Information Bulletin Jan. 1951.) and his personal contribution "Where are we going?" (International Information Bulletin, March 1951). "Thesis. . ." was where the concept of war/revolution was really spelled out in detail for the first time. The "Thesis. . ." strongly affirmed that "The Soviet bureaucracy has no historic future." (My emphasis—A.G.) This is an orthodox Trotskyist concept which proved to be hollow and sterile as it was linked up with a false and revisionist conception of the European C.P.s. Here is the nub of it all: "XV. Neither in the leaderships bound to the Soviet bureaucracy, nor in their base, nor in their relations with the working class and masses of the poor in general are the *Communist Parties exactly reformist parties.*" And furthermore: "On the other hand, to the degree that they are tied to a real revolutionary movement of the masses, they are subject to its pressure, and may *under certain favorable conditions, go beyond the aims set for them by the Soviet bureaucracy and outline a revolutionary orientation.*" Again we are told that, "In the long run objective conditions determine the character and dynamics of the movement of the masses which, raised to a certain level, can overcome all the subjective obstacles on the road to the revolution. This conception continues to be the basis of our revolutionary optimism and clarifies our attitude toward the Communist Parties." And finally, in case there are any doubters, we learn, "From that moment on they would cease to be strictly Stalinist parties, mere instruments of the Soviet (nota bene!—A.G.) bureaucracy, and will lend themselves to a differentiation and to a politically autonomous course! (all emphasis in original).

Here is the empirical method of Pabloism. At first the International looked toward the "Sovietization" of Eastern Europe as the wave of the future. But then along came the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions and the Pabloists dropped that line and picked up the one about "autonomous" and "not exactly reformist" C.P.s leading revolu-

tions. In most empiricists there sleeps an idealist, but in the Pabloists the idealist was wide awake. It *was true* that the Y.C.P. and the C.C.P. were forced to take state power and nationalize property relations, set up a state monopoly of foreign trade, etc. On the other hand it *was not true* that they were forced to do so by the masses as Mandel theorized in 1947. (International Information Bulletin Vol I No. 2 March 1947) and as Pablo apotheosized in 1951. *In both cases, the Stalinists were forced to take and keep and develop state power in the name of the working class because of the danger of an imperialist intervention into their countries.* In the case of the Y.C.P. the danger came from British imperialism and in the case of the C.C.P. it came from American imperialism (the Korean war). *In neither was it the "pressure" of the workers and/or peasants that forced the Stalinists to engage in the overturn of capitalist property relationships.* So the Pabloists went from the empirical fact that two C.P.s had made revolutions "autonomously" and idealized that such would be the wave of the future. They did this by conveniently overlooking the empirical reasons why the Y.C.P. and C.C.P. had done so. This empiricism-idealism in short was based on impressionism, i.e., seeing only the barest outlines of a phenomenon, its superficial attributes and theorizing them into an ersatz weltanschauung.

XII. The Pabloists having gone from the political concept that C.P.s *could* in very *special* situations be in the leadership of revolutions to the idea that C.P.s *would* in *general*, and drew the appropriate organizational conclusions. As the "Thesis. . ." states, "In a series of countries where Stalinism and reformism *do not* constitute major obstacles, our movement will strive in the next few years to become the principle revolutionary leadership." Furthermore to paraphrase the "Thesis. . ." ; Where the reformist parties are strong, the Trotskyists should do entry work in them; Where the C.P.s are mass parties the Trotskyists should do entry work in them. In the buffer states Trotskyists who are not known as such should enter the C.P.s and do entry work there. In Asiatic countries (since the C.P.s are strong there) the Trotskyists should enter the C.P.s and do entry work there. The sum and substance of the "Thesis. . ." was entryism. The "escape clause" about places where Stalinism and reformism (notice how Stalinism was *counterposed* to reformism) not constituting major obstacles was sheer hypocrisy—in what country is or could that be the case? In short, the "escape clause" in the Pabloist plan of liquidationism served as a touching epitaph on the tomb of the Trotskyism of the Pabloists.

XIII. It is important to note that the crux of the rottenness and unprincipled nature of Pabloism did not lie in its desire to do entry work *per se*. There is nothing in principle wrong with that. Its unprincipled character lay in the following: Pabloism apologized for and objectively served as a left cover for the C.P.s and some Social-Democratic tendencies. In particular it miseducated the working class as to the nature of Stalinism and the C.P.s, holding forth the line that C.P.s *would* make and lead revolutions the world over. Pabloist liquidationism flowed from this in that: (A) by holding that C.P.s *would* make revolutions, the differences between Trotskyism and Stalinism were eroded, thus expunging the *raison d'etre* for the existence of the Trotskyist program; (B) as the poten-

tiality for "autonomous" C.P.s was projected as a long-term affair, the organizational derivative was long-term entry work. It was this that led to the second phase of liquidationism. In Britain the Lawrence group went openly over to Stalinism. In France the Mestre group went over to Stalinism. And in Italy in the mid-'60s many members were lost from the Italian section due to the hesitancy of the G.C.I. to leave the C.P. Entryism had always hitherto been conceived as a short-term tactic to be abandoned as soon as feasible. With Pablo it was elevated to a grn soon as feasible. With Pablo it was elevated to a grandiose principle. To sum up, Pabloism is and was a revisionist tendency in the Trotskyist movement. It sought to reconcile Trotskyism with other tendencies, notably Stalinism. It did so by viewing political phenomena impressionistically. As a result it trimmed the Trotskyist program of many of its essentials. The net result was the loss of cadre and the chance to lead revolutionary struggles.

XIV. Pablo evidently felt that the "Thesis. . ." did not spell out in enough detail the entryist schema so he added a personal contribution to the discussion entitled "Where Are We Going?" (International Information Bulletin March 1951.) He reaffirmed and emphasized the concept of WW III-International Civil War-War/Revolution. He also insisted that the Stalinist monolith would be broken up as a result of the contradictions that accrued to the Soviet Union as a result of the transformation of the buffer states into workers states. But again for Pablo, Stalinism referred to the outlook of the *Kremlin*, not of any other bureaucracy (whether it had state power or not). According to Pablo, in the process of imperialism being rolled back by the formation of workers states arising from WW III, and Stalinism breaking up as a result of internal contradictions, some "new type of transitional states would appear." Here is how he put it in "Where Are We Going?": "This transformation will probably take an entire historical period of several centuries and will in the meantime be filled with forms and regimes transitional between capitalism and socialism and necessarily deviating from 'pure' forms and norms."

The question naturally poses itself as to exactly what these new "forms and norms" would be. If they were not to be "pure," i.e., healthy workers states then there were only two other possibilities: either they would be degenerated workers states or deformed workers states. Since the existence of a degenerated workers state presupposes that a healthy Bolshevik type of a party had led the revolution, and Pablo never went so far as to hold that the C.P.s were healthy Bolshevik parties, it was taken for granted that Pablo was referring to centuries of deformed workers states. For Trotskyists these could only be some variety of Stalinism, for example Maoism, Titoism, or Dubcekism. This was the theoretical buttress for the Pabloists' loss of faith in the ability and *necessity* of Trotskyists to lead revolutions under their own banner and program.

XV. Mandel supposedly had subtle subterranean differences with Pablo. Mandel's contribution to the discussion was known by its subtitle "Ten Theses." Evidently these were originally projected as a counterresolution to the "Thesis. . ." but Mandel decided against having them voted on. He agreed, although not heavily, with Pablo's

War/Revolution conceptions. Mandel pointed out that while Stalinism *could* lead *some* revolutions, it was organically incapable of conducting a worldwide revolution against imperialism and thus the historic role of Trotskyism was assured. He believed that *Soviet* Stalinism kept a wary eye on urban insurrections and did not pay too much attention to rural ones. It was for this reason, he claimed, that there arose workers states in China and. . . Yugoslavia. (Structural assimilation aside, he now agreed that Yugoslavia was a workers state.) Mandel projected this same process being repeated in the Mid East or South-east Asia (and many years later in Latin America, but without the C.P. to be sure). Since the Kremlin would be busy watching the cities in these areas, the C.P.s *could and would* be able to lead revolutions unobserved from the countryside to the cities without having to break from the Kremlin as it would all be over successfully before the latter got wind of it and precipitated the split with the maverick C.P. This schema meshed perfectly with the Pabloist plan of Trotskyists burying themselves in the C.P.s of Asiatic countries.

Mandel thoroughly agreed with Pablo's appraisal of the C.P.s as "not exactly reformist." As he put it, "It is thus necessary to conclude that the Communist Parties are not simply reformist because they can, under certain exceptional conditions, conquer power in an independent fashion." ("Ten Theses," International Information Bulletin April 1951.) Mandel also had difficulty in conceiving of Stalinism as a political outlook which can express the needs and aspirations of a bureaucracy other than that which dwells in the Soviet Union. In the same "Ten Theses" we read, "Wherever. . .the Communist Parties have been propelled into power by the mass movement, *Stalinism* has actually found itself weakened." (Mandel's emphasis.) In short we see that Mandel made the same basic mistakes of Pablo: (A) limiting Stalinism to the Soviet Union; (B) claiming it was "mass pressure" that forced the Y.C.P. and the C.C.P. into overturning capitalist property relations, when in fact it was simply the threat of imperialist intervention into these countries. As a result Mandel accepted the Pabloist plan of entryism into the C.P.s. In short, Mandel was a Pabloist.

XVI. The Third World Congress of the FI was held in 1951. It codified the entryism into the C.P. (and in some cases the S.D.P.) strategy. But this was not regular entryism—it was entryism *sui generis*, i.e., a "unique" form of entryism. It was liquidationist in sum and substance, in form and content, from start to finish. For example, the Austrian section was to make a very deep entry into the S.P. of that country. In case there is any doubt about the liquidationist approach of the FI at that time we quote: "The activity of our members will be governed by the following directives: (A) not to come out as Trotskyists with our full program; (B) not to push forward programmatic and principled questions." ("Minutes of the Third World Congress," International Information Bulletin Dec. 1951.)

XVII. While the FI was developing its "unique" approach to the working class, the S.W.P. was evolving at its own pace. The S.W.P. had gone into WWII with the Burnham/Shachtman that took 50 percent of the members away from the party and the youth (Y.P. S. L.-F. I.). But unlike the European Trotskyists the S.W.P.'s cadre never suf-

ferred a loss by decimation with the notable exception of those party members who as sailors in the Merchant Marine went down at sea as a result of Axis torpedo attacks. Thus it came out of WWII significantly weakened but not decimated of its leadership as the European Trotskyists.

The end of WWII saw a labor upsurge in the U. S. that was caused by: (A) the struggle of American workers to raise their standard which had been severely reduced as the result of the no-strike pledges of the unions during the hysteria of war patriotism; (B) the lack of jobs for the returning veterans who numbered in the millions. To the S. W. P. this was the light at the end of the tunnel of isolation. It saw, and quite rightly so, great hope and promise for growth in numbers and influence of the S. W. P. But the optimism did not end there, however. This labor radicalization and upsurge was seen as the beginning of the American revolution—not in any long-term historical sense but rather in the most immediate sense. This concept was spelled out in the "Thesis on the American Revolution" which was adopted by the 12th National Convention of the S. W. P. in November 1946.

The Thesis on the American Revolution is characterized by its ultimistic, mechanical, and schematic way of analyzing the American political situation at the time. Thus it is pointed out, "The major factors that once served to foster and fortify American either no longer exist, or are turning into their direct opposites."

Also it is noted, "Every single factor underlying the current 'peacetime' prosperity is ephemeral." And in comparing the post-WWII radicalization with the situation of the 'thirties, the Thesis on the American Revolution stated, "U. S. imperialism . . . is heading for an even more catastrophic explosion in the current post-war era." And in case there was *any* doubt about the imminent approach of revolution it was pointed out a few lines later, "the impending economic paroxysms must, under existing conditions, pass inexorably into the social and political crisis of American capitalism, posing in its course point blank the question of who shall be master in the land." Simply put, the question of state power was knocking on the door. The working class was in consequence consciously revolutionary, as the document put it, "The class as a whole has not been infected with the debilitating poison of reformism, either of the classic 'socialist' variety or the latter-day Stalinist brand. As a consequence, once they proceed to action, they more readily accept the most radical solutions."

Besides the mechanical and highly undialectical nature of the resolution there is a curious omission that strikes one upon reading it. There is no assessment of the C. P. U. S. A. or of any other C. P. In point of fact there isn't a mention of any of the obstacles offered by Stalinism. The only reference to Stalinism is in passing, in the excerpt offered above. Rather than deal with the question of the increased strengths of Stalinism in the post-war era, the S. W. P. chose to ignore them. This was an important sign of weakness on the question of Stalinism which was the harbinger of the incorrect role of the S. W. P. role at the Third World Congress.

XVIII. The Third World Congress of the FI came in 1951. The tone and framework of this congress was set by the "Ten Theses" by Mandel, "Where Are We Going?" by Pablo, and finally "Theses on the International Per-

spectives and the Orientation of the FI" which had been adopted by the Ninth Plenum of the I. E. C. of the FI.

By that time the prospect of the immediacy of the American revolution had evaporated just as suddenly as it had formed with the rise of McCarthyism and the preparations for the Korean war by U. S. imperialism. With all of this the S. W. P. had quietly laid the "Theses on the American Revolution" to rest. At the Third World Congress, the S. W. P. did not open up a fight on the pressing questions of the day for the Trotskyist movement such as the historic role of Stalinism, (or lack thereof) the Chinese revolution and the nature of Mao's maverick Stalinism, the prospect of "autonomous" C. P.s and their leading revolutions, and of course Yugoslavia ("The base for world revolution"—note section IX of this document). The S. W. P. *supported* the resolutions and the thrust of the Pabloists including entryism *sui generis*.

Clarke was the official observer for the S. W. P. at the Third World Congress. Cannon had evidently given him some "amendments" to be added on to the resolutions of the T. W. C. According to Cannon's speech on the 25th anniversary of the plenum of the S. W. P., Clarke burned these "amendments" without ever even showing them to the FI. (S. W. P. Discussion Bulletin Jan. 1954.) In any event, the content of these "amendments" could not have been very anti-Pabloist because Clarke was never disciplined for this act (which he openly admitted to the plenum) and because Cannon did not make their contents known or raise the question of them again. Clarke, however, was quite enthusiastic about the T. W. C. To him this meant a new lease on life for the Trotskyist movement. This was especially so since the abject failure of the overly optimistic predictions and prognostications of the "Theses on the American Revolution" had utterly and completely failed to materialize, while the labor radicalization had dissolved and the cold war with the Soviet Union, the hot war with Korea, and McCarthyism were on the rise. For Clarke the decisions of the T. W. C. were the way out of the cul-de-sac of the S. W. P.'s isolation.

Clarke was not the only one who wanted out of the slow and often tedious work of building the revolutionary party. Cochran represented the same feeling. He spoke for the older layer of workers in the party (mostly in auto with some in rubber) who were tired of swimming against the stream. While Clarke wanted to cozy up to the Stalinists, Cochran wanted to snuggle up to the labor bureaucracy. In spite of the differences, both wanted an out and Pablo's "new world reality" complete with "autonomous" C. P.s and entryism *sui generis* gave it to them. *Furthermore as the S. W. P. had fully politically supported the T. W. C. Cochran and Clarke could present Pabloism as good coin to their followers.*

XIX. While Cannon and the S. W. P. leadership as a whole had politically supported the perspectives and resolutions of the T. W. C. it was felt that in the U. S. there was no need to enter the C. P.—a sort of American exceptionalism. In fact the Pabloists had mentioned the U. S. situation as part of their "escape clause" on the strategy of entryism *sui generis*. This exception of course was to prove to any doubter that they did not want to liquidate *all* Trotskyists into the C. P. or the Social Democracy (as in Austria). But when Cochran-Clarke sought to be consistent Pabloists and apply the decisions of the T. W. C. of the FI to a fraternal party, Cannon and the S. W. P.

leadership suddenly realized that Pabloism was revisionist and that a struggle had to be waged against it. All of a sudden a new look had shown liquidationist tendencies in the T. W. C. and in articles and documents that had preceded. Cannon even went so far as to explain that in spite of *many differences* the S. W. P. had had with the Pabloists, they were soft-pedaled because of "general agreement." Here is how Cannon put it in his report at a majority caucus meeting in N. Y., on May 18, 1953: "Our relations with the leadership in Europe at that time were relations of the closest collaboration and support. There was general agreement between us. These were unknown men in our (international) party. Nobody had ever heard of them. We helped to publicize the individual leaders, we commended them to our party members and helped to build up their prestige. We did this first, because as I said, we had general agreement; and second, because we realized they needed our support. They had yet to gain authority, not only here but throughout the world. And the fact that the S. W. P. supported them up and down the line greatly reinforced their position and helped them to do their great work.

"We went so far as to soft-pedal a lot of differences we had with them . . . many differences known for the most part only in leading circles, that we have had in the course of the last seven years." ("Internationalism and the S. W. P." in "Defending the Revolutionary Party and Its Perspectives.")

All of a sudden these "many differences" came to the surface when Pablo's vegetable garden in the U. S. sprouted forth with a few radishes, red on the outside, but white on the inside through and through. All of a sudden there was a new relationship with the FI. The S. W. P. was not going to take "orders" from the FI. As Cannon put it so delicately, "As a matter of fact we are not going to accept it from anywhere, from anyone, under any circumstances. We regard the International Secretariat—who are a group of comrades we esteem—we regard them as collaborators, but *not as masters not as popes.*" (Cannon, *ibid.*, emphasis in original.)

Gone was the concept laid down in the Transitional Program itself, that the Fourth International was democratic-centralist. In point of fact it never had been very democratic-centralist since the murder of Trotsky along with almost all of the original cadre in Europe and Asia. Now in Cannon's speech it was codified into a principle. Now, Cannon explained—and we must remember it is not Cannon as an individual but Cannon as the voice of the S. W. P. leadership—that this sad deficiency was simply inexorable. This position on the FI was one of the "many differences known only in leading circles."

Here is how Cannon put it: "One difference was a tendency on their part toward 'Cominternism' in organizational matters—a tendency to set up the International as a highly centralized body, on the order of the early Comintern, which could make decisions, enforce orders and so forth in the old Comintern fashion. We said to them all the time, 'You can't do that. The International is too weak. You can't have that kind of International under present conditions. You will only end up weakening your own authority and creating disruption.'

"The old Comintern of Lenin's time had the concept of a highly centralized international organization from the first days. But there was a reason for it then. The

reason was that there had been a revolution in Russia, and the whole world movement of socialism was reacting to it. The leaders of the Russian Revolution had an absolutely decisive moral and political authority. There were Lenin and Trotsky and Zinoviev and Radek and Bukharin—new great names that the revolutionary workers of the world were recognizing as the authentic leaders of the Revolution. These were the men who set up, with the aid of a few others, the Comintern, the Third International." (Cannon, *ibid.*)

These remarkable passages illustrate what must be the most peculiar set of criteria for judging the ability of an International to be centralized. While it is certainly true that the Comintern benefited enormously from the success of the Russian revolution (success is used in a relative sense as when the Comintern was founded in 1919 the infant Soviet Republic was in the midst of a civil war with its outcome somewhat less than assured) and the prestige therefore of its leaders, nevertheless what held the Comintern together in essence was *programmatic unity*. The "Twenty-One Conditions" a party had to agree to before being admitted were the basis in a programmatic sense of the unity of the Comintern. These conditions separated the sheep from the goats by forcing the reformists and centrists to show their hand. (Two of the best examples being Serrati and Paul Levi.)

Of this Cannon said not a word. (Again Cannon here is not just an individual but the embodiment of the outlook of the S. W. P. leadership.) Instead his entire emphasis is laid upon the prestige of Lenin and Trotsky and the Russian revolution. The prestige was important, to be sure. But to attempt to pass off prestige as the glue which holds together either an individual revolutionary party or especially a revolutionary International is, to put it mildly, a bit simplistic. In point of fact the concept of an International as simply a collaborative body as Cannon described it in the above speech is the concept of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals. It is the application of the Menshevik/Bundist "federationist" organizational outlook on a global scale. Should the Bolshevik Party have been centralized prior to the October revolution? By this logic it should not have—it did not have enough "prestige."

This problem of a democratic-centralist International was further compounded by a legal problem. The S. W. P. then and now is prohibited from belonging to an international organization by the Voorhis Act. However that should not have stopped the S. W. P. from urging its co-thinkers to set up and re-organize the FI along the lines of basic programmatic unity and democratic centralism. On the other hand, the S. W. P. should have waged a case against the government to abolish this law which abridges the bourgeois rights of freedom of assembly and freedom of association. One would especially hope that the S. W. P. would conduct such a campaign in this period seeing how it apotheosizes the role of democratic demands as an impetus to socialist revolution. At no point in its history has the S. W. P. even *discussed* the possibility for such a struggle.

The reason why there has not been a democratic-centralist FI in more than one-third of a century is two-fold. First, as pointed out nearly all of the original leadership was destroyed by the Gestapo and the G. P. U. As a result many people who were new and inexperienced

stepped forward to take their places. This lack of revolutionary continuity cannot be overemphasized. It led to the second factor, namely the development of principled differences expressed for the most part in revisionist deviations from Trotskyism of which Pabloism was the most notable (Shachtmanism and Healyism and Posadas-ism being examples of secondary and tertiary revisionist currents). All of Cannon's (S. W. P. leadership's) bombast about lack of prestige of individual leaders and sections was simply a big fig leaf over the unmentionables of principled and programmatic differences which the S. W. P. did little to fight against.

XX. The Cochran-Clarke faction was expelled from the S. W. P. for a breach of discipline, i. e., refusing to attend the 25th Anniversary Banquet of the S. W. P. They took with them the majority of industrial workers who had stayed in the S. W. P. after the failure of "The Coming American Revolution" (many had left before then). It is true that they were workers who had become conservatized but it still deprived the S. W. P. of an industrial base—a lack the S. W. P. has yet to get over. Shortly after this split the S. W. P. openly broke with the Pabloist dominated F. I. It was now the fall of 1953—two years after the T. W. C. had presented, with all its unadorned charms, the liquidationist Pabloist line. It should be remembered that the origins of Pabloist thinking go back to the end of WWII so that the line of the T. W. C. should not have come as a shock to anyone, and in fact did not shock the S. W. P. at the time.

A few months before Clarke was expelled from the S. W. P. he was still the managing editor of *Fourth International* (the predecessor of the *ISR*). As such he wrote an article for the Jan.-Feb. 1953 issue entitled "Stalin's Role—Stalinism's Future." This article was an *open expression* of Pablo's line on Stalinism. Thus for example we read on page 9, "The death of Stalin prefigures the end of Stalinism." This of course was the logical derivative of Pablo's idea that Stalinism was something that could only emanate from the Kremlin. (A weakness which Mandel was later to codify at the Ninth World Congress of the F. I. in 1969 as regards Mao.) Further on, we are treated to another dose of Pabloism with, "Stalinism, on the other hand, was already dying before the demise of its foremost spokesman." And finally we are given the thinking out loud of a Pabloist as he tries to reconcile Trotskyism and liquidationism, to wit, "Will the process (of the collapse of Stalinism—A. G.) take the form of a violent upheaval against the bureaucratic rule in the USSR? Or will concessions to the masses and sharing of power—as was the long course in the English bourgeois revolution in the political relationship between the rising bourgeoisie and the declining nobility—gradually undermine the base of the bureaucracy? Or will it be a combination of both forms? That we cannot now foresee."

Here is Pabloism laid out simply. On the one hand the bureaucracy might reform itself out of existence by giving innumerable "concessions" to the working class until the distinctions between the bureaucracy and the working class are nonexistent. On the other hand there might be a political revolution against the bureaucracy because they can't give enough concessions to the working class. And on the third hand there might be some hybrid compromise between this orthodox Trotskyist approach and the impressionist Pabloist approach such that the

bureaucracy might almost completely reform itself out of existence and with just a little revolutionary push from the working class the bureaucracy would draw its last breath as a serious force and continue to vegetate in a Soviet equivalent of an honorific House of Lords.

This article by Clarke is simply permeated with doubts about the historic future, indeed the very need of Trotskyist parties. Yet not only could Clarke write such revisionist lines but he was the managing editor of the S. W. P.'s theoretical journal, and furthermore he was never called to account by the S. W. P. leadership for this article.

The March-April issue of *Fourth International* had an article by Pablo in it. Ironically Pablo wrote of a particular type of pessimist whose outlook had been shaken by the death of Stalin. "Weeping over the sad fate of the workers' movement and of socialism, depressed by the perspective of a long world reign of an immutable Stalinism extending over an entire historic period, the Casandras are now distressed and worried." No one could guess simply by looking at the article that in fact Pablo of 1953 was describing (albeit unconsciously) Pablo of 1951 and pre-1951. In this article Pablo also raised the question of "revolution from above" (self-reform, concessions, and interclique fights) destroying the Soviet bureaucracy vs. "revolution from below" (political revolution) accomplishing this task. Here is how he put it. "The dynamic of their concessions is in reality *liquidatory* of the *entire* Stalinist heritage in the USSR itself as well as in its relations with the satellite countries, with China, with the Communist parties. It will no longer be easy to turn back. In reality events will *oblige* them as is being demonstrated in Eastern Germany, and partly in Czechoslovakia, to quicken and extend the concessions, to keep the impatient masses in other buffer-zone countries and in the USSR from taking the road of action. (Read political revolution—A. G.) But once concessions are broadened, the march forward toward a *real liquidation* of Stalinism becomes *irresistible*. *What form will it then take?* Will it be that of an acute crisis and of violent *inter-bureaucratic* struggles between the elements who will fight for the status quo, if not for turning back, and the more and more numerous elements (read bureaucrats—A. G.) drawn in by the powerful pressure of the masses?" (*Fourth International*, March-April 1953, my emphasis.)

Pablo did not answer his own questions in this article, but the answers are implicit enough in the manner the questions are formulated in. Pablo and his "ism" had turned 180 degrees—from centuries of deformed workers states to the immediate and irresistible breakup and evaporation of the Stalinist legacy. He went from impressionist-inspired adaptationism and liquidationism to impressionist-inspired adventurism, adaptationism and liquidationism. "Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose"—The more it changes, the more it stays the same.

The split between the "anti-Pabloist" S. W. P. along with its supporters was announced by an open letter in *The Militant* in November 1953 coupled with a public attack on the Pabloist International Secretariat that provided the sole content of the Sept.-Oct. issue of *Fourth International*. This article entitled "Against Pabloist Revisionism" was a polemic against the resolution of the I. S. of the F. I. (it was passed unanimously by the I. S.) entitled "Resolution on the Rise and Decline of Stalinism" (*International Information Bulletin*, Sept. 1953) and its

sister resolution which drew the appropriate organizational conclusions (entryism) "Our Integration in the Real Movement of the Masses, Our Experience and Perspectives." These two resolutions were to form the basis for the pre-Congress discussion of the Fourth World Congress of the FI. The S.W.P. attacked the growing liquidationism of the FI on a generally correct though abstract basis. The attack of the S.W.P. pulled its punches in that it could not explain in any great detail the *origins* of Pabloist liquidationism—revisionism which dated back some seven years. The S.W.P. could not show how the political axis and premises of the pre-Fourth World Congress discussion departed fundamentally from the political conclusions of the Third World Congress. In other words it couldn't attack Pabloism historically. The S.W.P. couldn't do any of these things because all along it had supported Pablo and "soft-pedalled many differences" with him. This soft-peddalling process went on for some two years after the T.W.C. right up to a few months before the split with Pablo as evidenced by the two articles quoted above. In short the S.W.P. could not really expose Pablo without exposing themselves as quiet accomplices to Pablo's historical degeneration.

XXI. The result of this *public attack* on Pablo (since the FI was not and is not democratic-centralist it is "permissible" to attack sections of the FI publicly) was that the S.W.P. split from its fraternal relationship with the FI. The International Committee was formed in 1954. It was a rump organization which accomplished little in either building itself or fighting against Pabloism. The I.C. consisted of the Socialist Labour League (Healy), the French P.C.I. majority (which had been expelled two years or so earlier by Pablo, with the tacit support of the S.W.P., for its anti-Pabloist leanings), and in a fraternal relationship, the S.W.P. There were also some splinter elements such as some Swiss supporters and the Chinese Trotskyist emigres.

Having broken its fraternal ties with the FI, the S.W.P. promptly proceeded to ignore the I.C. which it had helped organize. During the ten year split between the S.W.P. and the I.S. (Pablo), the I.C. under S.W.P. "leadership" published about six International Information Bulletins. It held no international congresses and needless to say had no centralized leadership. In short the S.W.P. abstained from the rump anti-Pabloist "International" it had created. By virtue of this abstention, Healy of S.L.L. fame, to this day poses as The Leader of the FI.

XXII. Having very belatedly taken up the cudgels against Pablo when the latter had developed some support in the S.W.P. preserves, the S.W.P. came out of the fight significantly weakened. It had lost most of its industrial proletarian base; its "Coming American Revolution" dream evaporated; and McCarthyism had purged the trade unions and instilled a vicious anticommunist outlook in them.

An example of how *theoretically* weakened the S.W.P. was after the Pablo fight was its characterization of McCarthyism as "Fascism on the March." The S.W.P. began to regard McCarthy at the *end* of his career and influence as a full-blown fascist. This position is quite clearly spelled out for example, in the summer 1954 issue of *Fourth International* in an article by Murry Weiss and also by Joe Hansen in S.W.P. Discussion Bulletin A-25 of Nov. 1954, in which Hansen argues against Vern and Ryan's

calling McCarthy "just another bourgeois democrat." The McCarthy question showed that the S.W.P. had succumbed to the type of impressionism typical of the Pabloists.

Another example of weakness on the part of the S.W.P. in theoretical matters which was even more akin to the Pabloist method was the attitude of the S.W.P. toward the Bolivian revolution. Here is how Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso of the P.O.R. (Bolivian section of the FI) described the situation some 15 years later in the anthology "Fifty Years of World Revolution"; "In Bolivia, on April 9, 1952, the masses defeated the tin magnates' government of General Ballivian. What was initially projected as a *coup d'etat* involving only the police, the military, and the MNR [*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement] became a popular insurrection through the intervention of the industrial proletariat of La Paz and impoverished sections of the middle class. The coup d'etat was defeated and the uprising victorious. The P.O.R. [*Partido Obrero Revolucionario*—Revolutionary Workers' Party] helped to bring about this victory, but because of its *organizational weakness* the political power did not fall into its hands but into the hands of the petty-bourgeois M.N.R. This meant that while the masses triumphed over the army and the oligarchy, they did not themselves take power. A *petty-bourgeois party with leftist and anti-imperialist trimmings stole the victory from them.*" (My emphasis—A. G.)

Here on the other hand, was the *official position* of the S.W.P. as put forward in an unsigned article in the Jan.-Feb. 1953 issue of the *Fourth International*: "The P.O.R. began by *justifiably granting critical support* to the MNR government. That is it *desisted from issuing the slogan 'Down with the Government'*; It gave the government critical support against the attacks of imperialism and it *supported all progressive measures.* But at the same time it *avoided any expression* whatever of confidence in the government." (My emphasis—A. G.)

The article went on to outline the potentials of the MNR government. "By the very logic of things, in order to maintain itself in power such a government is obliged to form itself into a *Bonapartist* government like Kerensky, like Mossadegh, like Paz Estensorro. In a more advanced stage of the revolution it will fall under the drive of the right seeking to impose a military dictatorship, or of the left to establish a genuine workers and peasants government, the dictatorship of the proletariat allied to the peasant poor and the urban petty bourgeoisie." (Original emphasis.)

Two facts clearly emerge from the Moscoso evaluation of 1967 and the S.W.P. evaluation of 1953. First of all Moscoso apologizes for the failure of the P.O.R. to play a leading role in Bolivia due to "organizational weakness." But in reading the S.W.P. panegyric to the P.O.R. at that time, we see that the P.O.R. while it suffered from "organizational weakness," was positively debilitated by political anemia. On the one hand we are told that the P.O.R. would not give any expression of confidence in the MNR government, and on the other hand it refused to call for its downfall. If this is not Pabloist liquidationist politics by commission, then it is certainly Pabloist liquidationist politics by omission. This approach can most kindly be described as confused. As a further proof of the Pabloist nature of the P.O.R.'s line, which the S.W.P. agreed with, was its concept that the MNR gov-

ernment can go either way, toward revolution or reaction. This was simply an extension of the Pabloist line about "autonomous" C. P.s being pushed by the masses toward revolution—thus destroying the *raison d'etre* for the FI.

The second fact is the political outlook of the S. W. P. as evidenced by this article. It totally agreed with the Pabloist line! This was just a few months before the split with Pablo. In short the S. W. P. had adopted, if not Pabloism in toto, then it had adopted Pabloism in methodology—looking at the surface of political phenomena in a schematic way and generalizing temporary situations into long-term ones with the inexorable result of seeking to substitute formations other than Trotskyist parties for carrying out the struggle against imperialism. Algebraically put this "formula" reads, revisionism raised to the Nth power of impressionism equals liquidationism.

XXIII. The net effects of the degeneration of the FI into Pabloism showed themselves during the period of regroupment in the U. S. A. which culminated in the formation of the Y. S. A. As a result of the revelations of the Twentieth Party Congress as well as the upsurges in East Germany, Poland and Hungary which took place in the '50s, there arose some "rethinking" among C. P.ers and their periphery as well as in Social-Democratic circles. The S. W. P. attempted to reach some of these elements, especially the C. P. types. Thus the National Committee of the S. W. P. issued in early 1957 a statement entitled "Regroupment: A Programmatic Basis for Discussion of Socialist Unity." It centered on three major points: socialist internationalism, a "Leninist-type" party, and united action for civil liberties. Under the first category we read, "*A clean break with Stalinism and a repudiation of its crimes and betrayals are a necessary part of the program of revolutionary socialist regroupment in this country. This signifies also support of the struggles of the workers in the Soviet bloc which are leading up to a political revolution.*" (Emphasis in original.)

Evidently some in the Stalinist milieu could not swallow the purgative of political revolution, and the S. W. P. was forced to tone down its approach to the question. Thus we read in the *I. S. R.* of spring 1958 in an article by Joe Hansen entitled "Proposed Roads to Soviet Democracy" the following, "It is much closer to reality to view the program of political revolution as *the total series of reforms gained through militant struggle, culminating in the transfer of power to the workers.*

"No revolution comes in a single oversize dose like a horse pill. It develops in interlinked stages affecting interlinked fields. If any of the demands of any of the stages be fiewed in isolation, or fixed as an end in itself rather than a means to a higher goal, it appears as a reform. If its connections to the demands of other stages be kept in mind, it appears as a transitional step. It is only when the process is viewed as a whole—in its origin, its fundamental aims and final results—that it appears for what it is, a revolution; an organic qualitative change in whatever structure is involved" (P. 50, Hansen's emphasis.)

Further on in the article we read, "To remove any further misunderstanding, I want to emphasize that political revolution is not proposed as a slogan for immediate action (nota bene! This was written two years *after* the Hungarian uprising—A. G.) nor is it proposed as a slogan for agitation. It is a *strategic line* to be used as a guide for understanding and helping to shape coming

events in the whole next historical period of Soviet development." (P. 51, Hansen's emphasis.)

This statement is an almost classical recapitulation of left Social-Democratic thinking. Minimum reforms evolve into transitional "reforms" which in turn evolve into revolutionary "reforms." But not in one dose to be sure. This process must be stretched out over a whole historical period. In the meantime, Trotskyists are not to agitate for revolution. Compare this outlook of the S. W. P. to some of the Pabloist decisions of the T. W. C. especially as regards the Austrian section. (See section XVI of this document.)

XXIV. The high point in the regroupment was the United Socialist Ticket. This was a coalition of ex-C. P.ers, S. W. P.ers, and Social Democrats running on what the S. W. P. described as a "minimum socialist program against the big business parties." (*I. S. R.*, Fall 1959.) This coalition was not very influential (in fact hardly existed) outside of N. Y. state and could boast of no real gains in N. Y. itself. While participating in the United Socialist Ticket the S. W. P. avoided bringing up the question of the Hungarian uprising, and let the Stalinists (those who had left the C. P. and were looking for a new place to hang their hats) have most of the slots on the ticket with little fight. (*Young Socialist Forum*, Nov. 1958, Vol. II, No. 1.)

XXV. The United Socialist Ticket failure was followed by what the S. W. P. called the IBM clubs (the acronym of Independent Broad and Militant). After falling out of the U. S. T. and other sundry activities, the various Stalinist and Shachtmanite elements began to organize themselves into discussion clubs. The purpose of these clubs was to analyze such phenomena as the nature of Stalinism, the workers states, the role of Leninism, the civil rights struggle, etc. These clubs attracted many Shachtmanite youth who felt alienated by Shachtman's liquidation into the S. P. in the late '50s and wanted a live alternative to that moribund outfit. The S. W. P. saw these clubs as a possible source of recruitment to itself through the medium of the Y. S. A. There was nothing wrong in principle with this; it was the liquidationist and generally un-Trotskyist fashion in which it was done that determined its unprincipled character.

For example, writing in the *Young Socialist Forum* (Vol. 1, No. IV, July 1958) Comrade Bob Himmel explained, "I think it is a mistake to characterize the IBM groups as finished products in any sense of the word. At the present time they are neither revolutionary or (sic) reformist, nor are they 'centrist' formations as I have been led to understand these terms." For a Trotskyist such a "know-nothing" attitude is totally impermissible. If a formation is not revolutionary, not centrist, not reformist, then what is it? If we have an animal which is neither fish nor fowl, neither mammal nor reptile nor amphibian, and neither vertebrate nor invertebrate, then what kind of animal are we dealing with? If all old categories are exhausted then we are duty-bound to create new ones. In "In Defense of Marxism," Trotsky raked Shachtman over the coals for defining the Soviet Union as "not a workers state." To Trotsky's rightfully indignant queries of Shachtman as to what the Soviet Union *was* as opposed to what it was not, the latter could not even mumble a reply. In point of fact Himmel's sweeping of the Marxist criterional categories under the liquidation-

ist carpet, serves a good opportunist motive, i.e., it allows for the watering down of the revolutionary program, especially the contributions to it made by Trotsky.

This point is more clearly illustrated by Comrade Evelyn Sell in her article in the same issue of the *Young Socialist Forum*. She wrote "Letters from overseas youth such as have appeared from Japan and Germany are one of the best features of the Young Socialist (newspaper). The problems and discussions around events abroad should be reflected in the YS through such letters and answers by American youth to such letters—*not in horrendously partisan tones on the Hungarian revolution*. Overseas events certainly are of the greatest importance but to be *utterly practical* about the question of how to convince the American youth, political and non-political, of their stake in socialist actions, let me stress the fact that it is the American question that will turn them to revolutionary socialism, not the Hungarian, not the Polish, the East German or the Russian question."

Taking up the leitmotif begun by Comrade Himmel she continued, "These independent groups are in such a transitional stage right now that it would be an error to definitively label them; and, they promise enough future growth to make our work in them well worthwhile." That is the classic rationale of opportunist politics—lack of quality is compensated for by plethora of quantity.

And finally we learn, "Debates with the Stalinists on what's going on in Indo-China or what happened thirty years ago in the Soviet Union will not convince the newly recruited socialists to adopt the policies and programs of revolutionary socialism. The *best* argument for adopting these policies and programs are the *ideas themselves*, presented in a straight-forward, patient *non-polemical fashion*." (All emphasis mine—A.G.) Comment would be superfluous.

XXVI. During the ten-year split in the International, the I.C. never held a world congress and never attempted to build sections in any country. The I.S. (Mandel-Pablo) did hold world congresses but did not attempt to win supporters in countries where the I.C. was based except for France. The Hungarian uprising set the two "Internationals" to thinking about reunification as both saw in it the promise for Trotskyism's role. Thus in 1957 some overtures were made from each side to the other. These overtures never really got off the ground because of the opposition of the French and English sections of the I.C. They were highly suspicious of the Pabloist I.S. and did not believe that its Pabloist sickness had been cured. The S.W.P. was willing to believe that the I.S. was indeed cured and awaited a chance to proclaim it so. The S.W.P. had become softened by the isolation caused by the McCarthy years and realized that the I.C. had been an abject failure at least from the organizational point of view. Thus it had the motivation for reconciliation with the Pabloists and only lacked an event to express it. The Cuban revolution proved to be such an event. Both the S.W.P. and the I.S. reacted to it in an impressionist manner. It had two good points in their eyes: (A) it was a successful socialist revolution, and (B) it was independent of the Soviet Union and the Cuban Stalinists.

The S.W.P. reacted to the Cuban revolution in a typically Pabloist way. There was almost no criticism of the

Fidelista movement; Cuba was categorized as a healthy workers state; and a new angle was added: the S.W.P. put on an un-Marxist defense of the Cuban revolution with its Fair Play for Cuba Committees. These committees put on a social-pacifist defense (socialist in words pacifist in deeds) of Cuba. The line of these committees was "Hands Off Cuba!" with no education around why there was a need for a workers state in Cuba or why imperialism had to be defeated. This was consciously done so as not to scare liberals away.

The S.W.P. had difficulty in explaining just how it was that a non-Trotskyist party had led a successful socialist revolution. The idea current at the time (we don't hear it these days to be sure) was that "Fidel is an unconscious Trotskyist." The whole impetus for this had been provided by (among other things) the uncritical praise the Pabloists and the S.W.P. had had for the Yugoslav revolution. The same impressionist method that had characterized the FI then now characterized the I.S. and the S.W.P. on Cuba. In short what had happened was this: the S.W.P. had split away from the FI on a hollowly left-wing basis. The years of isolation and continual loss of membership had softened up the S.W.P. to such an extent that it began moving to the right. The I.S. for its part had not changed *fundamentally*. While they no longer spoke of "centuries of deformed workers states" and no longer held aloft the tattered rag of "entryism *sui generis*" as a battle-standard, they still had ambivalent feelings about Stalinism (to say the least) and still looked toward ersatz formations to lead revolutions rather than Trotskyists. Thus the rightward moving S.W.P. met the fundamentally unchanged I.S. on the question of Cuba, with S.W.P. residual fears of Pabloism in the I.S., allayed by the I.S. not raising those two slogans.

In an attempt to give some concrete programmatic basis to the attempted reunification, the Political Committee of the S.W.P. published in March 1963 a statement entitled "For Early Reunification of the World Trotskyist Movement." Generalizing from the Cuban experience of a guerrilla based movement taking state power and establishing a workers state, section 13 of this statement proclaimed, "Along the road of a revolution beginning with simple democratic demands and ending in the rupture of capitalist property relations, *guerrilla warfare* conducted by landless peasant and semiproletarian forces, under a leadership that becomes committed to carrying the revolution through to a conclusion, *can play a decisive role* in undermining and precipitating the downfall of a colonial and semi-colonial power. This is one of the *main lessons* to be drawn since the experience of the Second World War. *It must be consciously incorporated into the strategy of building revolutionary Marxist parties in colonial countries.*" (As quoted in S.W.P. Discussion Bulletin Vol. 24, No. 17, May 1963, all emphasis mine—A.G.)

It should be emphasized that the purpose of this statement on the part of the S.W.P. was to show where they felt there was agreement between themselves and the I.S. that could lead to reunification. In light of this it is most ironic that the current dispute in the International should be over guerrilla warfare. It is even more hypocritical of the S.W.P. to pretend that it has never supported guerrilla warfare and to propagate the myth that the deviation of guerrilla warfare dates merely from the Ninth World Congress held in 1969.

XXVII. The reunification of the FI in 1963 was unprincipled. Both the S.W.P. (without their British and French cothinkers, who refused to reunify with the Pabloists) and the I.S. agreed not to discuss the revisionist politics of the P.O.R. during the Bolivian revolution of 1952; the question of the nature of China (Is it a *healthy* workers state? Is Mao a Stalinist? etc.); entryism *sui generis*; Pabloism; in short wherever there were differences they would not be discussed—after all why beat a "dead" horse? By the S.W.P. not forcing a theoretical discussion of political errors, and by not forcing the I.S. to repudiate Pabloism, the I.S. in no way felt constrained to change its basic impressionistic outlook, and thus has tended to repeat old errors, in a *new* form to be sure. Most importantly however, by refusing to discuss Pabloism the S.W.P. freed itself of the need to explain why it saw Pabloism as a revisionist current only two years after the decisions of the Pabloist Third World Congress. This might have proved embarrassing to the S.W.P.

The refusal of both sides to discuss political errors was not in fact the shortcut to reunification that both sides wanted. It was a transparent attempt to cheat history its due. In the present discussion history is now collecting that debt with a usurious interest. A refusal to discuss China? Many leaders (e.g., Moreno) and much of the ranks of the FI look upon Mao as a left centrist, revolutionary Bonapartist, or a "pragmatic" revolutionary. A refusal to discuss entryism *sui generis*? This opened wide the door for the FI to practice deadly (politically and literally) liquidationist and revisionist politics in the guerrilla movement in Latin America. Refusal to discuss Stalinism? Much of the world movement (especially the S.W.P.) have over the past years refused to call the leadership of the Vietnamese revolution Stalinist. Would anybody who was not well versed in Trotskyist history know, for example, from having read the newspapers of the S.W.P., the I.M.G. or the Ligue Communiste that the current leadership in the D.R.V. under Ho's leadership was responsible for executing the Vietnamese section of the FI which had numbered in the thousands? Far from being a "dead" horse, Pabloism (adaptation to Stalinism) is a live bacteria carrying a deadly plague.

The reunification of 1963 was unprincipled. This is not an epithet—it is a description. It was unprincipled precisely because it avoided the discussion and resolution of many Trotskyist principles. This has led in practice to the abandonment of these principles. The FI cheated history out of a principled analysis of the first quarter of a century (1938-1963) of the FI's existence. History has in turn cheated the FI out of playing leadership roles in revolutionary struggles.

XXVIII. Pabloism has represented (and still does) the dominant tendency in the FI. The only opposition to Pabloism in fact is the S.W.P. politically supported "Leninist-Trotskyist" Tendency. The opposition from the LTT is distorted and warped in that it can't and won't admit that Pabloism exists, much less is the dominant tendency in the FI (to do so would be to expose their own weaknesses and revisionism). But even more importantly the LTT opposes some of the Pabloist deviations from the right while agreeing tacitly with others. Pabloism is a revisionist current. It seeks to water down the Trotskyist contributions to Marxism, especially on the nature of Stalinism and the role of Trotskyism *vis-a-vis* Stalinism.

Whereas Stalinism is a reformist and adaptationist current in the working-class movement in that it seeks to adapt and harness the policies of the workers states and the labor movement toward, in the first instance the liberal ("progressive") imperialists, and in the final analysis to nearly all the imperialists the world over, the centrist and revisionist Pabloist current of the United Secretariat majority seeks to adapt to the Stalinist and Social-Democratic adapters. Pabloism is a revisionist theory whose logic propels it toward a liquidationist practice. Pabloism is not "centuries of deformed workers states" nor "entryism *sui generis*" any more than Stalinism is forced collectivization (which happened in the Soviet Union but not China) or Third Period antics, or waving the Red Book. These are all *phases* that Stalinism and Pabloism respectively went through. To mistake a mere phase for the total phenomenon is deadly. It is in short the essence of empiricism and liquidationism.

XXIX. The current dispute and threatened split in the FI are sadly but predictably shadow boxing. How could it be otherwise? The United Secretariat majority has as its motor-force some thirty years of revisionism. The S.W.P. has as its motor-force years of adapting to, and finally outstripping Pabloism plus years social-pacifism in the antiwar movement, along with a reformist approach to women's liberation, "third world" struggles, and the homosexual question. Among others, these latter phenomena differentiate the S.W.P. from the Pabloists. While both the Pabloists and the S.W.P. look for substitutes for Trotskyist parties leading revolutions, the Pabloists look toward working-class tendencies while the S.W.P. looks toward petty-bourgeois and lumpen-proletarian groupings (e.g., middle-class women and prisoners) to substitute for Trotskyist parties in the U.S.A. Thus neither side can get down to a discussion of basics such as Stalinism, the unprincipledness of the 1963 reunification, and Bolshevik programmatic unity as a basis for a revolutionary democratic-centralist International. The S.W.P. cannot expose Pabloism as the dominant current in the FI without explaining why it took them so long to rediscover it and come to grips with it.

Thus the dispute in the International comes out over questions that are *relatively secondary*, such as the guerrilla warfare question in Latin America. What makes the dispute so distorted and miasmatic is that even on this question where the S.W.P. holds a more formally, although hollowly, correct position than the International Majority (Yes, Comrade Barnes, *they* are the majority!!) on the question of guerrilla warfare. The S.W.P. is both inconsistent and wrong. For while the S.W.P. issues pious and bombastic pronouncements against guerrilla warfare and terrorism, they uncritically support urban guerrilla warfare in Ireland (and don't educate around the need for a Leninist party and a Red Ireland) and have uncritically supported guerrilla warfare in the MidEast, Bangla Desh and Algeria, as well as hailing the American Indian utopian and adventurist guerrillaist action at Wounded Knee. All this is of course in addition to pretending that section 13 of "For the Early Reunification of the World Trotskyist Movement" statement never existed.

The wrongness of the S.W.P. and the unprincipledness of their position on Latin America lies in what they will not talk about—what they would substitute for guerrilla warfare. The S.W.P. would build such movements as

the petty-bourgeois reformist gay liberation movement, and the feminist movement which the Third Congress of the Comintern labelled as *bourgeois*. ("Theses on Ways and Means of Work Among Women of the Communist Party.") So much for the much touted "First Wave," Comrades Waters and Stone.

The International Majority also finds itself in a difficult position of attacking the "Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency." It can not attack the bloc that the S.W.P. made with bourgeois politicians in the antiwar movement because the Ligue Communiste just finished supporting an electoral bloc in France that included a bourgeois party which made the Union of the Left a popular front. They can not attack the miseducation the S.W.P. has perpetrated by refusing over these many years to categorize as Stalinist the leadership of the Vietnamese revolution because the International Majority itself does not believe that they are Stalinist. (Presumably the Vietnamese leadership liquidated the Trotskyists through a misunderstanding.) The International majority is in no position to call the S.W.P. to account for uncritically supporting the bourgeois-nationalist Fatah guerrilla struggle and not calling for a Leninist party because the International Majority has a history of doing the same thing, e.g., in Algeria. The examples could be multiplied on and on. The result is all the same. The possibility of a thoroughly principled discussion gives way to shadow boxing.

XXX. Looking back over history then we see the following. For years the S.W.P. felt content to live with Pabloism and even voted for its resolutions such as at the Third World Congress of the Fourth International. When Pabloism began forming in the S.W.P. it was discovered by the latter that the former was revisionist. The result was that the S.W.P. split to the left of the FI. The failure of the

"Coming American Revolution," the Cochran-Clarke split and the resulting loss of any real base in basic industry, the Korean war, McCarthyism — all this pushed the S.W.P. to the right. The Cuban revolution finally wedded the S.W.P. to the Pabloists. But the logic did not stop there. The S.W.P. has continued to move to the right with its incorporation of feminism, social-pacifism, studentism, etc., into its program. The right-moving dynamic that led it up to and into fraternal collaboration with the United Secretariat is now leading on a split away from the United Secretariat. Whether the split comes this year or next, whether it is *de jure* or *de facto* is tertiary. Of primary importance should be political clarity which there cannot and will not be as long as Pabloism is the dominant tendency in the FI and as long as it is only opposed from the *right*. For its part the historical momentum of the United Secretariat majority will give it impetus to conclude one rotten deal after another with the "Leninist-Trotskyist" Tendency in the vain hope of averting a split on the one hand, and avoiding principled political discussion on the other. It can only avoid the former if it wishes to abandon the working class and follow the S.W.P. lead in taking up the tattered and useless banners of feminism, minimum program approach to the masses, and generally classless approach to politics. It can only avoid the latter if it wishes to be doomed to playing the role of cheerleader for the struggles waged by other working class tendencies who are not Trotskyists.

For a Repudiation of Revisionism and Liquidationism!

For a *Principled* Political Discussion!

For a Return to the Road of Trotskyism!

For the Rebuilding of the Fourth International!

July 9, 1973