

The logo for the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is rendered in a stylized, white, sans-serif font against a dark blue background. The letters 'S', 'W', and 'P' are interconnected, with the 'S' and 'W' sharing a vertical stroke and the 'P' being positioned to the right.

discussion bulletin

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THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

(P.C. Draft Resolution)

The Sino-Soviet dispute is -- next to the Polish and Hungarian revolutions of 1956 -- the most striking manifestation of the death agony of Stalinism. It shows that the de-Stalinization processes affecting the relations between the Soviet bureaucracy and people are also transforming the relations between the Kremlin and the other workers states and between the Russian CP and the Communist Parties of other countries. These developments have already shattered the monolithic controls which were exercised over international communism under Stalin's autocracy.

The mortal crisis of Stalinism has been brought about by the revolutionary changes in the world situation and in the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. Most important are the startling industrial, scientific and social progress of the USSR which has made the masses ever more demanding toward the totalitarian power; the extension of Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe followed by the destruction of capitalism there; the victory of the Yugoslav, Chinese and North Vietnam revolutions; the irresistible spread of the colonial revolution culminating in the establishment of a workers state in Cuba, and the favorable shift in the balance of world forces between the camp of the revolution and counter-revolution. All these developments have introduced new

contradictions into the Soviet sphere which threaten the Kremlin's supremacy. The acute differences dividing Peking from Moscow are the most important expression of the eruption of these contradictions in the relations between the workers states.

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The present conflict between the Russian and Chinese CP leaderships originated with the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP in 1956 when Khrushchev denounced the cult of Stalin and clearly enunciated the reformist views flowing from his aim of accommodation with imperialism. It first came into the open during 1959-60 at the time of the Camp David discussions with Eisenhower. Today the differences have sharpened to the breaking point.

The dispute has raised for consideration many of the most fundamental questions confronting the world struggle for socialism. Nationalism vs. internationalism; a policy of accommodation to imperialism or class struggle against it; the attitude toward the colonial revolution and the colonial bourgeoisie; the problem of war and peace; the road to power; workers democracy.

What are the positions of the two chief protagonists on these questions and how should they be judged?

1. The Nature of Imperialism. Khrushchev contends that, since Lenin's day, the world relationship of military, political and economic forces between the capitalist

& socialist camps has altered to such a degree that imperialism can be neutralized and world peace assured even though imperialism continues to survive in its major strongholds. Therefore the most urgent and central task of Soviet diplomacy and working class politics is no longer the struggle to abolish capitalism. It is the need to induce "progressive" and "peace-loving" statesmen among the capitalist powers to recognize the wisdom of peaceful co-existence with the workers states.

The Chinese answer that imperialism has not changed its fundamentally aggressive and war-like character, as the record of the Cold War and U.S. interventions in South Vietnam and Cuba freshly demonstrate. Therefore, in the struggle against the imperialist war preparations, it would be a fatal illusion to base socialist policy upon the peaceful inclinations of any capitalist group.

These differences are focused around the nature of U.S. imperialism today. The Chinese consider the American imperialists as the greatest threat to world peace and to the colonial revolution and Kennedy as their executive head in the White House.

The Soviet leadership (and its echoers in the American CP) take a quite different attitude towards the Democratic President. It has never characterized the U.S. commander-in-chief as a war-monger but has placed prime responsibility for the aggressions of U.S. foreign policy upon right-wing militarists and the Pentagon. Khrushchev wants to keep

the road clear for summit conferences with Kennedy which will successfully crown his course towards peaceful co-existence.

2. The Struggle for Peace. The Khrushchev tendency argues that the risk of nuclear war can be averted while imperialism and capitalism is left intact. The war-making potential of the profiteers can be nullified without destroying the capitalist system and transferring supremacy to the working people.

The Chinese answer that there cannot be any guarantee of world peace, no end to war, until and unless imperialism is overthrown, above all in the underdeveloped countries where the colonial revolution is in progress. The only reliable anti-war force is the people engaged in struggle for their own ends against the representatives of the rich.

3. Attitude Towards the Colonial Revolution. In its search for diplomatic allies, the Kremlin, fearful of upsetting the status quo, has not hesitated to set aside the claims of the colonial revolution and subordinate these to the alleged needs of "peaceful co-existence." To curry favor with DeGaulle and lure France out of the Atlantic Alliance, the Soviet government and the French CP refused until the last hour to aid the Algerian fight for independence.

The Chinese, who supported the Algerian rebels from the first, say that the aims of the colonial revolution should be given priority over diplomatic considerations. The

two sides clash most sharply on this question in southeast Asia (Laos) and in Latin America where the Communist Parties under Moscow tutelage are opposed to the development of the revolutionary movements along Cuban lines which the Chinese spokesmen encourage.

4. Attitude Towards the Colonial Bourgeoisie.

Where the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and semi-colonial countries is neutralist or friendly towards it, the Kremlin counsels the resident Communist Parties to go along with them. The Moscow declaration of 1960 and the new program of the Soviet CP even set up a special category of "democratic national states" of indeterminate socio-economic nature which all progressive forces were duty-bound to support. The support accorded Nehru by the Soviet government and most of the Indian CP leaders in the border conflict with China is the ripe fruit of this policy.

The Chinese advocate distrust of the national bourgeoisie and reliance upon the independent struggle of the masses to secure national and social emancipation. They point out that a colonial revolt which begins with a struggle for national independence, unity or agrarian reform cannot be halted at the elementary democratic stage but tends to pass over into the socialist stage where capitalist property and power are eradicated and economic planning through control of all national resources can be instituted.

This pattern of the colonial revolution unfolding in an "uninterrupted way," empirically deduced from the experience of their own revolution and now extended to cover the struggles in other colonial lands, comes close to Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution. However, the Maoists obstinately refuse to acknowledge this similarity and continue to denounce Trotsky as a "traitor" who prefigured the path of Tito.

5. The Road to Power. At the 20th Congress of the Soviet CP Khrushchev proclaimed the doctrine that a "peaceful road to socialism" is now possible in the imperialist countries through purely parliamentary means. He has since stated that this revision in Communist theory was introduced by Stalin in the ~~advice~~ he gave for drafting the current program of the British CP.

The Chinese, although they still praise Stalin as the foremost disciple of Lenin, have correctly stated that this is a relapse into the Social-Democratic reformism flayed by the Bolsheviks. The Chinese, like Castro, do not exclude the theoretical possibility of a peaceful transfer of power to the workers. But they say that history has not yet provided any such example and it would be folly to base the strategy of the struggle upon such a prospect. They insist that socialism cannot achieve victory without breaking up the bourgeois state apparatus and creating a new type of

regime based upon the workers and peasants.

6. Bureaucratic Nationalism vs. Internationalism. Now that its commands no longer exact immediate and total obedience from the other workers states and communist parties, the Kremlin has been trying to work out new types of control over the international communist movement. But even these modified forms of manipulation on behalf of the Soviet bureaucracy collide with the independent national interests of the other workers states and their ruling groups, the leftward -- and even at times (Italy!) the more rightward -- inclinations of powerful communist parties outside the Soviet domain as well as the needs of the anti-capitalist and anti-colonial struggle.

Resistance to the "great power chauvinism" of the Kremlin has been most vigorously expressed by the Chinese. They accuse the Soviet leadership of abandoning proletarian internationalism and violating "the normal relationships of independence and equality that should exist among fraternal parties." As evidence of these "abnormal, feudal patriarchal relationships," they refer to the Soviet mistreatment of Albania (but not Stalin's mistreatment of Yugoslavia), the withdrawal of economic aid to China, the supplying of war materials to India, the unilateral rejection of the 1957 Moscow declaration, and the master-servant relations between the Kremlin and such satellites as the Communist Party of France under Thorez.

However, they talk as though all this degeneration began with Khrushchev's rise to the top in 1956-1959. Actually, the men in the Kremlin are continuing the Stalinist practice of subordinating the other sectors of the struggle for socialism to the narrow interests of the upper crust of Soviet society.

The sum of these positions put forward in their polemics shows that the Chinese CP advocates a far more aggressive class struggle policy than the utterly opportunistic and reformist course pursued by the Soviet leadership and its followers from Calcutta to New York. On most of the key issues of the international class struggle in dispute Peking is to the left of the Kremlin and takes more militant stands. The Chinese Communists have thereby moved closer to correct Leninist positions on these points, although they have by no means arrived at a consistent Marxist world outlook.

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Having recognized this, it must be noted that on a number of crucial questions the Chinese CP has far from cast off its bureaucratic character and Stalinist heritage either in its principles or practices.

1. Khrushchev, the American CP, Kennedy and the capitalist press all accuse the Chinese of wanting to foment world war in order to achieve socialism. This is a falsehood and slander. In recent statements the Chinese have carefully explained that they favor the peaceful co-existence

of countries with different social systems and do not view world war as a necessary or desirable means of bringing about the downfall of capitalism.

Nevertheless, the Chinese statements consistently underrate the frightful costs of nuclear war and do not adequately take into account the changes introduced by the unprecedented destructive power of the new weapons. They sometimes speak as though capitalism alone would crumble in the atomic blasts and that socialism might be erected on radioactive ruins. The grim fact is that nuclear war would be the greatest of all defeats suffered by the working people, even if humanity should somehow survive its terrible effects. This underestimation of the perils of nuclear war has helped the Kremlin and others to confuse the issues by playing up "the nuclear teeth" of "the imperialist paper tiger" as a cover for its opportunism.

How is imperialism to be disarmed? The Chinese have a deficient perspective on this crucial question. They effectively develop the argument that only the revolutionary struggle of the masses can defend world peace and that these progressive movements should not be suspended or subordinated for fear of "nuclear blackmail." At the same time they imply that the achievement of military preponderance by the "socialist camp," plus the "peoples' revolutionary struggle," can pull the nuclear teeth of imperialism.

There are two wrong assumptions implicit in this position. First, that a drastic shift in the "balance of power" between the opposing power blocs can by itself compel imperialism to surrender its warmaking capacities. Second, that the successes of the colonial revolution plus the economic and military advances of the "socialist camp" can change the international balance of forces enough to paralyze imperialism and prevent the button from being pressed.

This line of reasoning leaves out of account the paramount factor in the world situation: the class relations in the imperialist strongholds. The development of the workers movement there will be decisive in determining the destiny of mankind in the nuclear age. No matter how many economic, military and political successes are registered by the workers states and in the colonial lands, the key to permanent peace and a world socialist society of abundance lies within the centers of capitalism, above all the United States. The war-making powers can be taken from the atomaniacs only through the struggle for the conquest of power by the socialist workers movement there.

The Chinese do not see or clearly state this fundamental fact. Moreover, in such an advanced capitalism as Japan, the Chinese take no exception to the position of the Japanese CP that the main task there is, not the fight for workers power and socialism, but to win national independence from U.S. imperialism.

2. Most reprehensible is the refusal of the Chinese to favor the de-Stalinization moves taken in the Soviet bloc since 1956. The continued confirmation of the Stalin cult places them at odds with the most progressive forces and anti-bureaucratic tendencies within the Soviet bloc and the communist parties. This antagonism toward the relaxation of authoritarian rule serves to counteract the support which revolutionary militants in the Soviet sphere might otherwise be disposed to give to their criticisms of Moscow's line.

This reactionary attitude is symbolized on the state level in Peking's unprincipled bloc with Hoxha's Albania, one of the most despicable Stalinized regimes in Europe. In the factional fight against Khrushchev the Chinese are also giving aid and comfort to the discredited Stalinist diehards in the Soviet Union headed by the deposed Molotov "anti-party" group.

Mao stands at the opposite pole in this respect to Castro who has not only supported the de-Stalinization processes in the Soviet bloc but has taken prompt and energetic steps to check any spread of that bureaucratic infection in Cuba.

3. While Peking praises Albania as a model Marxist-Leninist state, it unwarrantedly dismisses Yugoslavia as a capitalist state which should be excluded from the "socialist camp." Yet the internal regime of Communist Yugoslavia is much freer than the unmitigated despotism of its Albanian

neighbor.

4. Although the Chinese Communists attack political submission to the colonial bourgeoisie, they are not consistent in this regard. For example, they have expressed no objection to the craven support given by the Indonesian CP to the government of Sukarno who is Nehru's counterpart in that country. It appears that, even in the colonial sphere, Peking's principles are tailored to fit the momentary needs of its foreign policy.

5. Most important of all is the status of the internal regime of the Chinese workers state ruling party. The obdurate resistance of the Chinese CP leadership to de-Stalinization and its proponents is connected with strict maintenance of its own bureaucratic hold. Since the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the quick withering of the "Hundred Flowers Bloom" experiment in 1957, the Mao regime has been very apprehensive of opposition and maintained rigid control over all domains of social and political activity.

This refusal to abandon Stalinist practices at home not only offends powerful progressive currents in the Soviet bloc but runs counter to its own conduct in the dispute with Moscow. Its demands for the open confrontation of views in the sphere of international party relations conflicts with its refusal to permit expression of dissent from the official line within their own party and country.

Crucial events test the policies and define the positions and directions of all governments, parties and tendencies claiming to be guided by Marxist-Leninist principles. Two major developments in the past year have provided such a testing ground in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In the India-China border conflict Moscow took an equivocal diplomatic posture which was tantamount to supporting capitalist India against Communist China. It even supplied war planes to India. The majority of the Indian CP backed Nehru. The followers of the Khrushchev line elsewhere joined Nehru in the anti-China chorus. Peking correctly characterized this conduct as a betrayal of proletarian internationalism. It was the first time that the Soviet rulers allied themselves with a bourgeois regime against a workers state.

In the Caribbean crisis the Kremlin placed its missiles in Cuba less for the sake of defending the Cuban revolution than for using them as pressure upon Washington for concessions in a prospective settlement of the Berlin affair. When this move backfired, Khrushchev not only agreed to withdraw the missiles but also to U.N. inspection of military establishments on the island without consulting the Cubans.

The Chinese have stated that the Kremlin was "adventuristic" in putting the missiles in Cuba in the first place and "capitulationist" for removing them under Kennedy's

ultimatum. Unlike Khrushchev, they supported from the first, the "five conditions" proposed by the Cuban government to safeguard its interests against U.S. aggression.

The disregard for Cuba's sovereignty displayed in the Caribbean crisis has hardened the suspicion of the Chinese, Cubans and others that the Kremlin will not hesitate to sacrifice the most vital interests of other workers states to its line of "peaceful co-existence" with Washington. That is why Peking speaks so bitterly of "appeasement." In truth, both the Indian and Cuban affairs furnish fresh evidence that Stalin's successors place their own national-bureaucratic interests above the rights of other workers states and the achievement of the anti-imperialist struggle.

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The root-causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute are to be found in the very different national and international situations of the two workers states which give rise to conflicting interests, aims and policies of its ruling strata.

As the heads of an independent and powerful state of 700 millions who have conquered power through victorious revolution, Mao and his colleagues not only feel on a par with the Soviet leaders but superior to them in capacity to give direction to "the socialist camp." They bitterly resent the many manifestations of arrogant behavior on the part of Soviet "elder brother" which they have experienced beginning with the unannounced repudiation of Stalin in 1956.

There are profound economic, political, domestic and military reasons for the growing breach between the Soviet Union and China. The disparity in the economic levels of the two countries is a continuous source of friction. Communist China had to start modernizing and industrializing its economy after 1949 on a more primitive foundation than the Soviet Union in the 1920's. Its more rapid rate of development in the early 1950's has been interrupted and set back by the failures of the "Great Leap Forward" and the widespread distress caused by the natural disasters since 1959.

At the 22nd Congress in 1961, while China was suffering from hunger and its economy was in a critical slowdown, Khrushchev announced that in 20 years the Soviet Union, having already achieved socialism, would approach communism. The Soviet people were promised the highest living standards in the world. Imagine the reaction of the Chinese as the Soviet leaders go ahead with this perspective, callously disregarding the massive material needs of China and its somber difficulties. Hit by poor harvests and plagued by millions of mouths to feed, Peking has had to spend scarce foreign exchange to import grain from Canada, Australia, and elsewhere. The Soviet Union has none to spare for them. Moreover, it has given more aid in the past decade to such neutralist nations as India, Egypt and Indonesia. Now Peking has revealed that, after the Bucharest conference of 1960, Moscow broke

hundreds of economic contracts with China and cut its aid and trade to a minimum.

It is a mockery of socialism and fraternity to say that one people, a third of mankind, must live on 15¢ a day while the other is being lifted to western standards. If the economic levels and resources of the two nations cannot be immediately equalized, as they cannot, then the Chinese would at least like to see Soviet foreign aid reallocated with a greater percentage going to them and the revolutionary forces in the colonial areas than to the neutralist bourgeois regimes.

The Khrushchev faction cannot meet the requests of the Chinese Communists for many reasons. It is bound by the utopian policy of building "communism in a single country" at the fastest pace. More substantially, the Soviet Union does not possess the capacities to increase its production, raise the living conditions of its people, sustain the expense of the nuclear arms race, go to the moon, implement its diplomatic objectives in the "third world" -- and take care in addition of the immense and pressing requirements of 700 million Chinese. The Chinese have come last in the priorities of the Kremlin's planners.

China's poverty and underdevelopment, as well as Russia's inadequacies, have been inherited from their pre-socialist pasts.

The truth is that the unevennesses between the two countries and the frictions these engender cannot be

fundamentally eliminated except through the extension of the socialist revolution to the advanced capitalist countries. Mutual aid and planned cooperation could place the necessary productive forces of the wealthier lands at the disposal of the poorer ones and narrow the gap between the haves and have-nots in the shortest possible time.

Ironing out the vast disproportions between the two sectors of humanity is the paramount task of the entire transitional period from capitalism to socialism. A genuine Marxist leadership would at least acknowledge the existence of this problem and honestly explain its gravity to the working class public, as Lenin's Bolsheviki did. But the false ideology and nationalist outlook of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies have kept them from even mentioning this fundamental fact. It smacks too much of the heresy of "Trotskyism."

In exposing their economic mistreatment at the hands of the Kremlin, the Chinese expose some of the consequences of Khrushchev's neo-Stalinist program of building "communism in a single country." But they have not delved into its root causes.

Dissimilarities in the international positions of the two nations are as estranging as the disparity in their economic situations. The Soviet rulers are far more privileged, conservative and contented with the status quo than the Chinese.

Communist China is the outcast of world politics among the workers states. It is diplomatically and economically isolated and militarily encircled. The U.S. stations its forces in South Korea, sustains Chiang in Formosa, and has its Seventh Fleet in adjacent waters. The Pentagon supervises anti-guerilla operations in South Vietnam, intervenes against China and its allies in Laos and neighboring countries, sends arms to India. Now China is not only excluded from the councils of the major powers and cut out from American trade but also from Soviet aid.

In response to these conditions, the Soviet and Chinese leaderships have developed divergent foreign policies and asserted different attitudes towards U.S. imperialism and western capitalism. Despite the rebuffs encountered along the way, the Kremlin has persistently sought to reach a modus vivendi with Washington since the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference. Meanwhile, it wants to confine any changes in international relations within the compass of its special aims and interests.

Peking, on the other hand, has to break through the blockade imposed by a hostile United States. Neither the neo-colonial bourgeois governments nor the Soviet Union, it has found, will help it enough to serve that purpose. To disrupt the Pentagon's strategy and beat back its enemies, China has no recourse but to turn towards the colonial

revolutions, above all in southeast Asia. The expansion of the anti-imperialist struggles in the colonial lands is today a life and death matter for Communist China.

The Chinese revolution bears the same relation to Asia as the Cuban revolution to Latin America. Both must spread in order to survive and counter the aggressions of U.S. imperialism which wants to stop and suppress any imitation of their example.

The attitude adopted towards the colonial bourgeoisie is decisive in colonial politics. Here the Chinese have sharp differences with the Russians. They have extorted admission from Moscow that it supports "just wars of colonial liberation." But they are aware that the Soviet leaders are more intent upon lining up uncommitted governments behind their diplomatic objectives than encouraging forces and movements which aspire to go beyond neo-colonial status and take the socialist road to liberation.

Since the erosion of the agreements reached at the Bandung Conference in 1955, Peking has looked upon the neo-colonialist bourgeois regimes as actual or prospective tools of western imperialism. Nehru's conduct in the border dispute has fortified this view. The spread and strengthening of the worker-peasant movements in Asia offers Peking the most effective means of "neutralizing" governments inclined to play imperialism's anti-China game.

Their possession of H-Bombs and the means of delivering them gives the U.S. and the USSR an equal stake in maintaining the present "balance of terror" as part of their condominium over the rest of the world. So long as universal disarmament is not enforced, the Chinese believe they have as much right and need as any other power to atomic bombs. However, the Soviet chiefs are not disposed to help China acquire nuclear weapons.

The Soviet removal of its missiles from Cuba under Kennedy's threat has intensified Chinese resentment against the Russian resistance to its independent nuclear development. They feel that Khrushchev cowers before the imperialist "paper tiger" and in the showdown, yields too readily and too much to its blackmail.

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Ironically, Moscow today has friendlier relations with Washington, and even the Vatican, than with Peking. Both sides have agreed upon a high-level meeting to compose their differences. But they have different aims and approaches in the negotiations. The Chinese view the meeting as a preliminary to another international conference of all communist parties. At this point Khrushchev prefers a two-power parley because he fears the Chinese will use an international conference to promote and reinforce support for their position.

As things are moving, another conference of all the Communist Parties would more likely deepen and hasten

a split than ease the differences. The Communist Parties have already held three such conferences, one at Moscow in 1957, another at Bucharest in 1959, and a third at Moscow in 1960. Although the statements issuing from the two Moscow meetings were unanimously adopted, they did not dispose of the differences. On the contrary, these flared up more fiercely afterwards.

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Moscow's hegemony over international communism is now challenged by rival centers of authority in Peking, Havana and Belgrade. The divergences between the leaderships of the workers states not only threaten to disrupt their diplomatic relations; the divisions between the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking forces generates differentiations and splits within, as well as between, the Communist Parties.

The Great Debate which has been provoked by the disagreements between Moscow and Peking is irrepressible and cannot be arbitrarily suspended or suppressed. It would be most beneficial if the worldwide discussion could be conducted freely, openly and democratically without disrupting the unity of the workers states against the imperialist coalition and without reprisals on either a state or party level against any of the participants. But the Chinese attitude towards Yugoslavia, and the Soviet economic reprisals against China and its diplomatic breach with Albania, indicates that this is unlikely to be the case. The depth of the differences, as well as the bureaucratic methods pursued by the officialdoms involved, prevent an unimpeded clarification of the controversial issues.

Nevertheless, The Great Debate has many progressive consequences. It is striking hammer blows at the Stalinist monolithism which has strangled the Communist movement for 25 years. It is stimulating critical thought and free discussion. It has posed for reconsideration many of the key issues of socialist policy in connection with the most burning problems of our era.

The controversy has involuntarily promoted processes of public debate in the Communist world. The Chinese Communists are publishing in their press the documents directed against their views and dared the Kremlin and other parties to do the same. They have declared that they are now a minority in the world communist movement and have the right to be so. They assert that a majority and a minority can co-exist in a communist movement and that sometimes a minority can be correct against the majority. In turn Khrushchev has said that communists of different countries may hold different opinions on specific questions, including some very important ones.

These welcome departures from the totalitarian uniformity of the Stalin era can help break the ground for a return to Leninist practices which permitted the free expression of minority views and the formation of tendencies and factions around them.

As the Italian CP youth organization demonstrates, the demolition of monolithism not only opens doors for the expression of unofficial views but also for the introduction of authentic Marxist-Leninist ideas along Trotskyist lines into The Great Debate. From the standpoint of revolutionary Marxist politics, this is the most positive feature of the controversy.

The Sino-Soviet conflict confirms the thesis upheld by our movement that the subordination of the communist movement to the Soviet bureaucracy was a transitory phenomenon which could not withstand the extension of the socialist revolution to other countries. This was first illustrated by Yugoslavia in 1948. Although Yugoslavia is now ranged alongside the Kremlin, the collision between the Russian and Chinese leaderships is similar in origin and significance to the Tito-Stalin break.

At bottom both stem from the clash between an independent regime issuing from a powerfully progressive worker-peasant revolution and the conservatized Soviet bureaucracy which wishes to distort and restrain its development for its own narrow ends. The requirements of these national revolutions and the interests of its ruling groups have proved incompatible with the designs and demands of the Kremlin.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has incomparably greater magnitude and importance than its predecessor because of the greater size and power of China and the different position it occupies in the unfolding world revolution. Unlike the Yugoslavia of 1948, China is not situated between

a Stalinized East Europe and Western capitalism with a conservatized workers movement but in the storm center of the colonial revolution and the anti-imperialist struggles of Asia.

The more militant and progressive views of Peking are finding a responsive audience in Asia, Africa and Latin America where the colonial revolution is in full flood. Most of the communist parties in Asia except for the Indian, Ceylonese and Outer Mongolian, sympathize with the Chinese. The arguments and actions of the Chinese can have the most powerful and radicalizing effects upon the communist movements in the colonial lands.

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The Sino-Soviet dispute is not a mere personal quarrel between two ambitious heads of state. It is more than a conflict between the two communist governments and parties of China and the USSR. It goes beyond the division between East and West, prosperous and poor peoples, colonial rebels and metropolitan conservatives. It concerns nothing less than the fundamental problems of our epoch.

This dispute extends and deepens the historic controversies which have shaken and reshaped the world socialist movement at previous turning points in its development.

Most notable have been those between revolutionary Marxism and revisionism-reformism at the beginning of this century, between Bolshevism and Social-Democratic chauvinism and centrism during the first world war and the Russian Revolution, and the Communist Left Opposition and Stalinism after Lenin's death. The current debate has grander dimensions since it directly affects forty per cent of the world's inhabitants. And it will have even more portentous consequences for the fate of mankind.

As the heads of giant states representing hundreds of millions of people, the Russian and Chinese CP leaders are the principal protagonists in The Great Debate. They have regulated its unfolding to date and their decisions will shape the main lines of its next stage. But the discussion is not, and will not be, restricted to the positions and decisions of the officialdoms headquartered in the communist capitals. The breakup of Stalinist monolithism is encouraging anti-bureaucratic sentiments down below and stimulating broader currents of dissent which tend to go beyond the limits set by Moscow and Peking.

A world-wide realignment of revolutionary forces is being set into motion by the same vast changes of recent years which have brought about The Great Debate. In Latin

America such groupings have already begun to draw together under the impetus of the Cuban example.

This process is only in its beginnings. It will have to pass through a series of turns and stages before it arrives at fruition. Its outcome will depend, among other things, on the correctness and effectiveness of the intervention of the Trotskyist cadres in its unfolding.

How should Marxists orient themselves in the crossfires and complexities of The Great Debate at its present stage?

In determining which of the contending parties take the most progressive stands, the Fidelista Cubans can usefully serve as a standard of measurement. They not only have a record of persistent advance toward revolutionary Marxist positions but have the most correct attitudes on the two most important aspects of the dispute: workers democracy and international class struggle policy. Peking and Albania most gravely default on the first; Moscow and Belgrade on the second.

The Chinese Communists have views close to the Cubans on a series of key issues connected with the major problems of anti-imperialist action, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. But, apart from their inconsisten-

cies in these areas, their resistance to the processes and proponents of de-Stalinization array them against the forces striving for democratization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and harms the Chinese Peoples Republic itself.

The Khrushchev tendency is the official banner-bearer of liberalized reform in the Soviet bloc. But its opportunistic and even treacherous course in foreign affairs has a pernicious influence on the progress of the mass revolutionary movements against U.S. imperialism and Western capitalism.

The Tito leadership, allied with the Kremlin, has introduced significant innovations in workers control of industries and other fields. But it stands at the far right wing of the Communist states in its positions on the nature of imperialism and its policies toward the revolutionary movements against capitalism.

For a correct orientation it is necessary to avoid making sweeping and one-sided judgements which disregard the wrong positions and the inconsistencies of the contending parties. The Moscow-Peking dispute is not that of a clear-cut opposition between a reformist-bureaucratic and a Marxist revolutionary party, as some contend.

This is a confrontation between two bureaucratic formations, both of Stalinist schooling. One heads a

politically degenerated workers state in process of internal reform; the other a deformed workers state where the revolution is still vital and vigorous. The two contending regimes are being subjected to very different pressures from imperialism, the worker-peasant masses at home, and the international revolution. This accounts for the zigzags in their policies and the contradictions in their positions .

Moreover, they are not the only participants in the dispute. Five distinct political and ideological tendencies have already been drawn into the discussion. In addition to the positions advocated by Khrushchev's and Mao's regimes, there are those put forward by the Yugoslav communists, the Fidelista Cubans and the Trotskyists.

What are the tasks of the Trotskyist cadres in this new phase of the death-agony of Stalinism?

We enter The Great Debate equipped with our own traditions, program, proposals and goals. We are not Khrushchevists, Maoists, Titoists or even Fidelistas. The Trotskyists represent a distinct ideological and independent political tendency. We make clear our support to any correct conception or progressive position taken by any of the other tendencies. But our long-range purpose is to bring people, individually and collectively, organized and unaffiliated, to our program and perspectives and fuse with them on that basis.

Our intervention has two different aspects. Predominant at this stage is our ideological participation in the discussion.

The Yugoslavs, the Chinese and the Russians have all accused each other of behaving like "Trotskyists" on one or another aspect of this dispute. It is no accident that Trotskyism, even though in falsified shapes, has appeared from the first on the arena of the debate. Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin at the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the Russian CP and the de-Stalinization processes have already opened the eyes of many Communists to the correctness of the Trotskyist analysis of Stalinism and broken down the ban upon the ideas of the Fourth International. This interest in Trotskyist views will receive another strong impetus from the progress of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the vital issues it has posed to the world Communist movement.

The Trotskyists must bring forward their own views at every opportunity, not only to set the historical record straight but because we have an irreplaceable contribution to make toward clarifying the controversial questions.

The strategic goal of the world Trotskyist tendency is to see that the prolonged process of reorientation and regroupment is consummated by a return to genuine Leninism through the strengthening of the Trotskyist cadres and the

extension of their influence. Tactically the problem is how to get closer to the CP dissidents favoring the Chinese views who are breaking with Stalinism to facilitate the broad re-alignment of revolutionary forces promoted by the dispute.

The task of the SWP is somewhat simpler on the tactical side than that of Trotskyists in other places. Although the American radical movement is small and weak, we hold a strategic position within it. The developments of the dispute, especially the Chinese CP attack upon the attitude of the American CP toward the Kennedy administration, should further demoralize and discredit the CP. The pro-Mao grouplets are scattered and incohesive. Moreover, in the Western hemisphere, the example of Cuba and the issue of the Cuban revolution is more important in separating the revolutionary from the reformist elements than the more remote Sino-Soviet dispute. This is especially true of the United States where the Cuban question is in the center of American foreign policy.

We are not fellow travellers, camp-followers, uncritical supporters and still less capitulators to any opportunist, bureaucratic or centrist currents, whatever tactical readjustments and organizational expedients are required to effect closer relationships and unrestricted communication with other tendencies. We must tell the whole

truth about all the issues at stake and present a rounded picture of all the contending participants in order to carry out our political function and win over solid supporters to our cause.

Elementary as this may be, it is necessary to make the point sharply and explicitly when our movement is being drawn into a tremendous turn in world socialist development. The tactical readjustments required to take advantage of new openings must not involve sliding over into adaptation to Maoism or Khrushchevism.

In this connection our newer members should study and absorb the lessons of our movement in dealing with centrist currents moving to the left. There is danger of losing old members instead of gaining new militants if our program and aims are lost sight of and sacrificed to tactical expedients.

Such adaptation or capitulation is all the more unwarranted and reprehensible since the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet dispute is in its own way a vindication of Trotskyist foresight. The two main issues at the bottom of the Sino-Soviet dispute are the same as those which pitted Trotsky against Stalin in the 1920's. These are the questions of socialist internationalism and workers democracy. It would be impermissible for Trotskyists to hide or abandon their

views on these and related questions at a moment when they are being reconsidered not only by small groups of propagandists but by millions upon millions of fighters for socialism throughout the world.

April 2, 1963

FOR EARLY REUNIFICATION OF THE WORLD TROTSKYIST MOVEMENT

Statement by the Political Committee of the SWP

The world Trotskyist movement has been split since 1954. Various efforts in the past to heal the rupture proved unsuccessful. On both sides, however, it has been felt for some time that a new and more vigorous effort for reunification should be made in view of the encouraging opportunities that now exist to further the growth and influence of the Fourth International, the World Party of Socialist Revolution.

The Socialist Workers Party has stressed that a principled basis exists for uniting the main currents of the world Trotskyist movement. During the past year, the International Secretariat took the initiative in urging the necessity and practicality of ending the split. For its side, the International Committee proposed that a Parity Committee be set up. Although some of the comrades in the IC viewed this as involving no more than a practical step to facilitate common discussion and united work in areas of mutual interest, the majority, it appears clear, welcomed the formation of the committee as an important step toward early reunification.

While substantial differences still remain, especially over the causes of the 1954 split, the area of disagreement appears of secondary importance in view of the common basic program and common analysis of major current events in world developments which unite the two sides. With good will it should be possible to contain the recognized remaining differences within a united organization, subject to further discussion and clarification, thus making possible the great advantages that would come through combining the forces, skills and resources of all those now adhering to one side or the other.

The main fact is that the majority on both sides are now in solid agreement on the fundamental positions of the world Trotskyist movement. As briefly as possible, we will indicate the points of common outlook:

(1) The present agonizing world crisis reflects at bottom a prolonged crisis in revolutionary leadership. The development of the productive forces on a global scale has made the world overripe for socialism. Only a socialist planned world economy can rapidly overcome the economic underdevelopment of the colonial and semicolonial countries, deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear extinction and assure a world society of enduring peace, of boundless plenty, the unlimited expansion of culture and the

achievement of full freedom for all. Without the international victory of socialism, decaying capitalism will continue to waste enormous resources, to hold two-thirds of the earth's population in abject poverty, to maintain social and racial inequality and to support dictatorial regimes. To complete this grim perspective of hunger, insecurity, inequality and oppressive rule, capitalism offers the permanent threat of nuclear destruction.

(2) The delay of the world socialist revolution beyond the expectations of all the great Marxists before our time is due basically to the lack of capacity of the traditional leaderships of the working-class movement and to their cynical service as labor lieutenants of the capitalist class or the Kremlin bureaucracy. They are responsible for preventing the main revolutionary postwar crisis of 1918-23 and of 1943-47, as well as the lesser crisis of 1932-37, from ending as they should have ended with the proletariat coming to power in the advanced capitalist countries.

(3) Only by building new revolutionary Marxist mass parties capable of leading the working class and working farmers to power can the world crisis be met successfully and a third world war prevented. To build such parties is the aim and purpose of the world Trotskyist movement. A program of transitional slogans and measures plays a key role in party-building work inasmuch as the principal problem in overcoming the crisis of leadership is to bridge the gap between the present consciousness of the masses -- which is centered around immediate problems and preoccupations -- and the level of consciousness required to meet the objective necessity of overthrowing capitalism and building workers states based upon democratically elected and democratically functioning councils of the working people. Leninist methods must be used to construct revolutionary-socialist parties. These include patient, persistent recruitment of workers to the nuclei of revolutionary-socialist parties already established; but also, where necessity or opportunity dictates, flexible advances toward various tendencies in mass organizations which may eventually be brought to the program of revolutionary Marxism. Individual recruitment and tactical moves of wide scope are complementary ways of party construction, but each carries its own problems and special dangers. In the one instance a tendency toward sectarianism can arise out of converting enforced isolation into a virtue; in the other, adaptation to a reformist environment can lead to rightist opportunism. In the tactic known as "entryism," where unusually difficult and complicated situations can occur, it should be the norm for those engaging in it to maintain a sector of open public work, including their own Trotskyist publication. Departure from this norm must be weighed with full consciousness of the heavy risks involved.

(4) The Fourth International as an international organization, and its sections as national parties, must adhere to the principles of democratic centralism. Both theory and historic experience have demonstrated the correctness of these principles. Democratic centralism corresponds to the need for quick, disciplined action in meeting revolutionary tasks while at the same time assuring the freedom of discussion and the right to form tendencies without which genuine political life is denied to the ranks. In its adherence to internal democracy, the world Trotskyist movement stands at the opposite pole from the stifling regimes imposed on working-class organizations controlled by bureaucrats trained in the schools of Stalinism, the Social-Democracy or reformist unionism.

(5) The bureaucratic reformist and Stalinist machines do not use the organized strength of the working class to overthrow capitalism where this is possible. They are primarily interested in their own privileges and power instead of the long-range interests of the working class. Because of inertia, an antisocialist outlook, or recognition that an upsurge can sweep over their heads, they undertake struggles in the interests of the proletariat only with great reluctance and under great pressure. While condemning and opposing the twin evils of reformism and Stalinism, Trotskyists refuse to identify the genuinely socialist or Communist workers of these mass organizations with their treacherous leaderships. The Trotskyist movement recognizes that the main task is not simply to wage literary war on reformism and Stalinism, but to actually win these socialist and Communist-minded workers to the program and organization of revolutionary Marxism.

Under the pressure of long years of prosperity in the advanced capitalist countries and in reaction to the crimes of Stalinism, petty-bourgeois intellectuals have opened a wide assault on the fundamentals of Marxism. It is necessary to wage a firm ideological struggle against this revisionist current.

(6) The Soviet Union is still a workers state despite the usurpation of power by a privileged bureaucracy. The mode of production is noncapitalist, having emerged from the destruction of capitalism by the socialist October Revolution; and, whatever its deficiencies, lapses and even evils, it is progressive compared to capitalism. The tremendous expansion of Soviet productive forces through a colossal industrial and cultural revolution transformed a backward peasant country into the second industrial power of the world, actually challenging imperialism's lead in many fields of technology. This great new fact of world history bears witness to the mighty force inherent in planned economy

and demonstrates the correctness of the Trotskyist position of unconditional defense of the degenerated workers state against imperialism.

(7) In the wake of World War II, the Soviet bureaucracy was able to extend its power and its parasitism into the so-called "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe and North Korea. But to maintain its position of special privilege, it had to destroy capitalism in these countries, doing so by bureaucratic-military means. That such means could succeed was due to the abnormal circumstances of temporary collapse of the local capitalist-landlord rule coupled with extreme weakness of the working class following the carnage of war and occupation. In this way deformed workers states came into existence. These are defended by the Trotskyist movement against imperialist attempts to reintroduce capitalism.

(8) In the workers states where proletarian democracy was smashed by Stalinism, or where it never came into existence because of Stalinist influence, it is necessary to struggle for its restoration or construction, for democratic administration of the state and of the planned economy by the toiling masses. Through a political counter-revolution, Stalin destroyed the proletarian democracy of the time of Lenin and Trotsky. The Leninist forces are therefore faced with the need to organize revolutionary Marxist parties to provide leadership for the working class in exercising its right to overthrow the dictatorial rule of the bureaucratic caste and to replace it with forms of proletarian democracy. This signifies a political revolution. With the rebirth of proletarian democracy on a higher level, the workers states -- the Soviet Union above all -- will regain the attractive power enjoyed before the days of Stalin and this will give fresh impetus to the struggle for socialism in the advanced capitalist countries.

(9) The appearance of a workers state in Cuba -- the exact form of which is yet to be settled -- is of special interest since the revolution there was carried out under a leadership completely independent from the school of Stalinism. In its evolution toward revolutionary Marxism, the July 26 Movement set a pattern that now stands as an example for a number of other countries.

(10) As a result of the new upsurge of the world revolution, above all the tremendous victory in China which changed the relationship of class forces on an international scale, the Soviet proletariat -- already strengthened and made self-confident through the victory over German imperialism in World War II and the great economic, technological and cultural progress of the Soviet Union -- has exerted increasingly strong pressure on the bureaucratic

dictatorship, especially since Stalin's death. In hope of easing this pressure, the ruling caste has granted concessions of considerable scope, abolishing the extreme forms of police dictatorship (dissolution of the forced labor camps and modification of Stalin's brutal labor code), destroying the cult of Stalin, rehabilitating many victims of Stalin's purges, granting a significant rise in the standard of living of the people, even easing the strictures against freedom of thought and discussion in various fields. The Khrushchev regime has no intention of dismantling the bureaucratic dictatorship a piece at a time; its aim is not "self reform" but maintenance of the rule of the caste in face of mounting popular pressures. But the masses accept the concessions as partial payment on what is due and seek to convert the gains into new points of support in pressing for the ultimate objective of restoring democratic proletarian controls over the economy and the state. This slow but solid strengthening of the position of the proletariat in the European workers states is one of the basic causes of the world crisis of Stalinism.

(11) The differences which finally shattered the monolithic structure of Stalinism began in a spectacular way with the ideological and political conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist party leaderships. This conflict was widened by the attempted political revolution undertaken by the Hungarian workers. The Cuban Revolution deepened the crisis still further. With the Chinese-Soviet rift it has become one of the most important questions of world politics. While expressing in an immediate sense the conflict of interests among the various national bureaucratic groups, and between the Soviet bureaucracy and the working classes of countries under its influence, the crisis reflects fundamentally the incompatibility of Stalinism with living victorious revolutions in which the militant vanguard seeks a return to the doctrines of Lenin. The crisis is thus highly progressive in character, marking an important stage in the rebuilding of a revolutionary Marxist world mass movement.

(12) In conjunction with the world crisis of Stalinism, the colonial revolution is now playing a key role in the world revolutionary process. Within little more than a decade, it has forced imperialism to abolish direct colonial rule almost completely, and to turn to indirect rule as a substitute; i.e., form a new "partnership" with the colonial bourgeoisie, even though this bourgeoisie in some places may be only embryonic. But this attempt to prevent the countries awakened by the colonial revolution from breaking out of the world capitalist system runs into an insuperable obstacle: it is impossible in these countries to solve the historic problems of social, economic

and cultural liberation and development without overthrowing capitalism as well as breaking the grip of imperialism. The colonial revolution therefore tends to flow into the channel of permanent revolution, beginning with a radical agrarian reform and heading toward the expropriation of imperialist holdings and "national" capitalist property, the establishment of a workers state and a planned economy.

(13) Along the road of a revolution beginning with simple democratic demands and ending in the rupture of capitalist property relations, guerrilla warfare conducted by landless peasant and semiproletarian forces, under a leadership that becomes committed to carrying the revolution through to a conclusion, can play a decisive role in undermining and precipitating the downfall of a colonial or semicolonial power. This is one of the main lessons to be drawn from experience since the second world war. It must be consciously incorporated into the strategy of building revolutionary Marxist parties in colonial countries.

(14) Capitalism succeeded in winning temporary stability again in Western Europe after the second world war. This setback for the working class was due primarily to the treacherous role played by the Stalinist and Social-Democratic leaderships, which prevented the masses from taking the road of socialist revolution during the big postwar revolutionary crisis. However, this temporary stabilization of capitalism and the subsequent upsurge of productive forces gave rise to more extensive, and ultimately more explosive, contradictions. These involve the other imperialist powers, above all the USA and Japan. They include sharpening competition in a geographically contracting world market; increasing incompatibility between the need to fight inflation and the need to transform potential major economic crises into more limited recessions; mounting conflict between the desirability of maintaining "social peace" and the necessity to attack the workers' standard of living, job conditions and employment opportunities in order to strengthen competitive efficiency. These contradictions point to increasingly fierce class battles which could become lifted from the economic to the political level in acute form and, under favorable conditions of leadership, arouse the labor movement to a new upsurge in the imperialist countries, challenging capitalism in its last citadels.

(15) Socialist victory in the advanced capitalist countries constitutes the only certain guarantee of enduring peace. Since the close of World War II, imperialism has methodically prepared for another conflict, one in which the capitalist world as a whole would be mobilized against the workers states, with the Soviet Union as the main target. Rearmament has become the princi-

pal permanent prop of capitalist economy today, an economic necessity that dovetails with the political aims of the American capitalist class at the head of the world alliance of capitalism. American imperialism has stationed counter-revolutionary forces in a vast perimeter around China and the Soviet Union. Its first reaction to new liberating struggles is to seek to drown them in blood. Its armed interventions have become increasingly dangerous. In the crisis over Cuba's efforts to strengthen its military defense, the billionaire capitalist families who rule America demonstrated that they were prepared to launch a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and even risk the very existence of civilization and of mankind. This unimaginable destructive power can be torn from the madmen of Wall Street only by the American working class. The European socialist revolution will play a decisive role in helping to bring the American proletariat up to the level of the great historic task which it faces -- responsibility for the final and decisive victory of world socialism.

(16) While participating wholeheartedly in all popular mass movements for unilateral nuclear disarmament, while fighting for an immediate end to all nuclear tests, the world Trotskyist movement everywhere clearly emphasizes the fundamental dilemma facing humanity: world socialism or nuclear annihilation. A clear understanding of this dilemma does not demoralize the masses. On the contrary, it constitutes the strongest incentive to end capitalism and build socialism. It is a suicidal illusion to believe that peace can be assured through "peaceful coexistence" without ending capitalism, above all in America. The best way to fight against the threat of nuclear war is to fight for socialism through class-struggle means.

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In view of agreement on these basic positions, the world Trotskyist movement is duty bound to press for reunification. It is unprincipled to seek to maintain the split. Reunification has also become an urgent practical question. On all sides, opportunities for growth are opening up for the revolutionary movement. The Cuban Revolution dealt a blow to the class-collaborationist policy of Stalinism in Latin America and other colonial countries. New currents, developing under the influence of the victory in Cuba, are groping their way to revolutionary socialism and seeking to apply the main lessons of the colonial revolution to their own situations. The Algerian Revolution has had a similar effect on the vanguard of the African revolutionary nationalist movement. To meet these leftward-moving currents, to work with them, even to combine with them without giving up any principles, has become an imperious necessity. Reunification will greatly facilitate

success in this task by strengthening our own forces and bringing the attractiveness of Trotskyism into sharp organizational focus. The immediate corollaries will be increased effectiveness of our defense of the colonial revolutions within the imperialist countries and the added weight which the principled program of Trotskyism will gain among all serious revolutionists who seek the fundamental economic, social and political transformation of their countries. On the other hand, it is self-evident that the continued division of the world Trotskyist movement in factions wrangling over obscure issues will vitiate its capacity to attract these new forces on a considerable scale.

Similarly, the crisis of Stalinism which has led to the great differentiation visible in the Chinese-Soviet rift, has unlocked tremendous forces within the Communist parties throughout the world. Attracted by our Leninist program and tradition, by the vindication of our decades of struggle against Stalinism, and by our insistence on internal democracy, many militants are puzzled and repelled by our lack of unity, by our seeming incapacity to mobilize our forces into a single cohesive organization. The reunification of the world Trotskyist movement would contribute powerfully towards reeducating Communist militants in the genuine spirit of Leninism, its real tradition of international solidarity and proletarian democracy. Obviously, a united world Trotskyist movement would prove much more attractive to all those forces within the world Communist movement who are increasingly critical of Stalinism and its offshoots, and who are ready to examine the views of a movement which appears serious not only in its theory but in its organizational capacity.

Finally, we should consider with utmost attentiveness the problem of appealing to the youth, both workers and students, who are playing an increasingly decisive role in demonstrations, uprisings, and the leadership of revolutionary upheavals. The Cuban Revolution was essentially fought by the youth. Similar young people overthrew the corrupt dictatorial regimes of Menderes in Turkey and Syngman Rhee in South Korea. In the struggle for Negro equality in the USA, for solidarity with the Algerian Revolution in France, against rearmament in Japan and Western Germany and against unemployment in Britain, the shock forces are provided by the youth. Youth stand in the forefront of the fight to deepen and extend de-Stalinization in the USSR and the East European workers states. Throughout the world they are the banner bearers of the struggle for unilateral nuclear disarmament. We can attract the best layers of this new generation of rebels by our bold program, our fighting spirit and militant activity; we can only repel them by refusing to close ranks because of differences over past disputes of little interest to young revolutionists

of action, who are primarily concerned about the great political issues and burning problems of today.

Early reunification, in short, has become a necessity for the world Trotskyist movement. Naturally, difficult problems will remain in various countries where the faction fight has been long and bitter. But these problems, too, can best be worked out under the conditions of general international reunification, so that it is possible for the outstanding leaders of both sides to begin the job of establishing a new comradely atmosphere and of removing fears which have no real basis in the situation in the world Trotskyist movement today. After a period of common fraternal activity in an increasing number of areas, we are convinced that what may appear at the outset to be insuperable local problems will be solved by the comrades themselves through democratic means.

We think that it should also be possible for a reunified organization to bring in recommendations for subsequent consideration and adoption which, without breaching the centralist side of democratic centralism, would remove any doubts that might still remain as to the guarantee of democratic rights contained in the statutes.

Our movement is faced with a responsibility as great and as grave as the one it faced at the founding of the Fourth International in 1938. We ask both sides to decide at their international gatherings in the next months that the time has come to reunify the world Trotskyist movement, and that they will do this at a World Congress of Reunification to be held as rapidly as possible after these gatherings.

March 1, 1963.