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INTRODUCTION

The Sixth Plenum of the International Executive Committee was held October 9-12, 1948. The Agenda consisted of the following points:

- a) Report on the Activities of the IS.
- b) The Social Struggles in Europe Since 1944.
- c) The Building of the European Sections of the Fourth International.
- d) Yugoslavia.
- e) Miscellaneous Questions (the Irish Case; the Spanish Case; the Belgian Case; Germany; Italy).

The report on the activity of the IS was adopted unanimously.

The discussion under the second point on the agenda was concluded with the adoption of two important resolutions. One treats specifically with the present situation in France and the de Gaullist danger.

The report on the building of the European sections provided the occasion for an important discussion in which all members of the IEC participated.

The Plenum approved the resolution on Yugoslavia presented by the IS.

The evolution of the situation in France was given special attention by the Plenum. It was decided to issue a manifesto on this question addressed to the world proletariat as well as an appeal to the European sections of the Fourth International to come to the aid of the French Party and its organ La Verite.

The Plenum voted to send its greetings to the American Trotskyists for the energetic election campaign which made known for the first time the Trotskyist program to thousands of American workers. Greetings were also sent to the Chinese Trotskyists and to the German comrades who had just held their National Conferences.

We are publishing here all the motions and resolutions voted by the Plenum.

RESOLUTION ON THE SOCIAL STRUGGLES IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1944

A. The Character of the Struggles

Taken as a whole, and leaving aside certain national differences in the form of struggle that are often very important, the social struggles in Western Europe since 1944 have undergone four distinct stages: a) the stage of the so-called "liberation" struggles; b) the stage of relative lull and social peace interrupted by "wildcat strikes"; c) the stage of great strike movements around economic demands ending in more or less aborted general strikes; and d) the stage of clearly defensive combat which characterizes the struggles at present.

a) The struggles coinciding with the end of the German occupation and so-called "liberation" battles. These struggles (insurrections of partisans, seizure of factories, regional or national general strikes, etc.) took on a semi-insurrectionary form in France and in Italy. Their lack of cohesion, and the Stalinist leaders' policy of collaboration with the bourgeois civil and military authorities, prevented these struggles from being transformed into open insurrections. They thus ended in the suppression of the elements of dual power created spontaneously by the vanguard workers. In Greece, the movement took on an openly insurrectionary character in December 1944.

In the course of these struggles the working class put forward its own demands. On the one hand, these were minimum demands: for the suppression of all Nazi legislation affecting conditions of work, for wage increases to conform to the rising cost of living since the start of the war, etc. On the other hand, they were transitional demands such as those for the nationalization of banks and key industries, for workers' control, against layoffs and for the sliding scale of wages (the last two demands were won by the Italian working class after the insurrection of the partisans in the North of the country). In France, experiences of workers' control and even of workers' management continued for months (Berliet factories).

These great struggles were confined geographically to Greece, Italy, France and to a certain degree, Belgium, during that period. The special conditions accompanying the liquidation of German occupation in Holland (a winter of famine, prolonged military combat on its territory, etc.) explain the absence of important movements in this country at the time of the "liberation." Only the dockers' strike of July 1945 in **Rottordam** indicates the desire of the Dutch workers to emulate the efforts of their brothers in the neighboring countries.

In Germany and in Austria, this same period, extending from the Summer of 1944 to the fall of 1945, is the period of the complete destruction of the revolutionary potential of the masses which had reached a new high at the moment of the Allied invasion and the Stauffenberg attempt on Hitler's life. After the failure of this attempt repression finished off what remained of the free workers' cadres in these countries. There followed increased aerial bombardments, the extension of military operations on the territory of Germany and

Austria themselves, the disastrous effects of the Russian occupation, the complete disintegration of all economic and social life after February 1946, the migrations of millions of refugees. All these factors completely broke down the material and moral premises of the German revolution, which had already been greatly damaged by eleven years of Fascist dictatorship but had nevertheless appeared still strong in the course of the second phase of the war. The rare examples of local initiative that took place at the time of the collapse were immediately suppressed by the occupation forces. Under these conditions the masses fell into a state of complete frustration and passivity in the months following the armistice and left the victorious powers exclusively in position to decide their fate.

As to Great Britain, under the conditions of military victory and of a relative stability of the living conditions of the masses, the discontent and radicalization slowly accumulating over the years found an essentially electoral outlet. It led to the crushing victory of the Labour Party in the parliamentary contest of the Summer of 1945. This victory determined the course of the class struggle in this country for several years.

b) The period of relative calm extends from the middle of 1945 to the end of 1946. It is characterized by a state of relative social "peace," interrupted only by sporadic and isolated struggles carried out against the resistance of the trade union leaders and the apparatus of each of the two traditional parties. These "wildcat strikes" occurred in all countries of Western Europe outside of Germany. The movements that took place in May 1947 in Austria, and which were led by the Stalinists in opposition to the reformist trade union leadership, can be classified in the ~~same~~ category.

This period of apparent lull in the class struggle in Europe coincides with the period of the most important strike waves in the United States and the vast insurrectionary movements in the Far East. It must not, however, be deduced that the European proletariat remained passive because it was "demoralized" or less militant than its overseas brothers. Characteristic of this period is the fact that everywhere in Western Europe parties were in power in whom the working class still had confidence (the Labour Party in Great Britain, the SP in Austria, the SP and CP in France, Italy and Belgium, the SP with the tacit support of the CP in Holland, etc.) and from whom it expected a decisive transformation of the social structure of the country. It was the period of the grand illusions in "structural reforms," illusions spread and encouraged by the Stalinist and reformist leaders. A certain amount of experience was necessary to demonstrate to the workers that their hopes were illusory and that under the cover of the promised "structural reforms," the labor bureaucracies actually sweated the workers for the reconstruction of the bourgeois state and economy, often utilizing new and subtle forms of class collaboration (production committees, national labor conferences, etc.).

The passivity of the workers was all the stronger wherever their hopes in the governmental action of "their" parties were greatest and where the living conditions of the workers deteriorated the least (Great Britain).

The first wildcat movements broke out on the industrial periphery, where the stranglehold of the bureaucracy was less thorough or where the living conditions were the most intolerable (postal workers in France, dockers in Belgium, shoe workers in Austria) or in industries where the workers had the advantage of conditions exceptionally favorable for struggle (British and Belgian miners, French printers). They thus called attention to the need for direct action to adjust wages to living costs, before the entire working class.

In Germany, during this period, the first signs of an awakened militancy appeared among masses, weighed down above all by the conditions of misery and virtual military dictatorship produced by the occupation and the division of the country. Assuming the most elementary forms (petitions, verbal and written protests, demonstrations) the first movements did not as yet rise above the framework of sporadic and isolated actions.

c) This period takes in practically the entire year of 1947. During this period a development occurred in Italy, France and Belgium which began to manifest itself in Great Britain and Austria only in 1948, and which will take place in Germany as well as soon as economic conditions there become somewhat "normalized." Drawing the lessons of the governmental experience of "their" parties, the workers begin to break through the bureaucratic barriers under the stress of the constant high cost of living, amidst an increase in production which fills the store-shelves, and with a distribution of the national revenue to the evident disadvantage of the working class. In industry after industry this break-through proceeds into action. It is clearly demonstrated that the relationship of forces between the classes is still decisively favorable to the proletariat.

Under the increasing pressure of the rank and file, the Stalinist trade union bureaucracy was forced to undertake a turn which did not always coincide with the breakdown of the government coalition or with carrying out the foreign policy of the Kremlin. (In Belgium, the coalition was disrupted in February 1947 and a year passed before the Stalinists began to support strikes. In Italy the coalition was dissolved in May, but the strike pressure began only in September-October. In Austria, the Stalinists supported the strikes of May 1947 while still remaining in the government). Struggles of a vast character unfolded, ending in one form or another of aborted general strikes as a result of the policy of dividing the workers practiced by the dominant bureaucracies, and the lack of clear and adequate objectives, which the leaders failed to present to the workers.

In Great Britain the transition to this stage was retarded due to the extremely great confidence of the workers in the Labour Party government and the relatively slight deterioration of the economic situation of the workers (inflation is developing infinitely more slowly than elsewhere). In Austria, it was retarded, among other things, by the occupation. In Germany, this period was marked by a series of great strikes and demonstrations against inadequate food rations which, while not to be considered as class movements indicating that the working class has regained its social cohesion or its confidence in its own forces, was nevertheless an important stage toward this objective.

d) Finally, there is the period of defensive struggles opening up in Belgium, France and Italy after the failure of the great movements of the preceding period. This period is characterized by the beginning of a direct offensive of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat on the economic field. This takes on the form of attacks on wages and social security, of speed-ups, of dividing the trade union movement and of victimizing the most militant trade unionists. The division in the labor movement especially led to a relationship of forces more favorable for the bourgeoisie. To defend itself against this offensive, the working class has to build a united fighting front first of all. This has become more difficult as a result of the defeats of the preceding period and the division in the working class, which is the most important material and moral obstacle to a new wave of struggle. Beginning with very limited struggles (walk-outs of a half hour or an hour, etc.) for minimum objectives, the defensive movement of the working class grew as the consequences of division within the labor ranks and the political offensive of the capitalists became clearer. Bourgeois provocations (Clermont-Ferrand in France, attitude of the bosses toward the metal workers in Belgium, attempt on the life of Togliatti in Italy) had a similar effect. As long as the relationship of forces is not fundamentally overturned -- and it has not been in any country in Western Europe, where the bourgeoisie continues to be harassed by continual economic difficulties -- these defensive movements of the proletariat can be amplified rapidly, attain and even surpass the level and the importance of the struggles of the preceding stage. The unity of the proletarian front then succeeds in re-forging itself in the very fire of the struggle, as has been the case in the current movements in France and Italy.

In Great Britain, the relationship of forces is such that a direct offensive of the bosses against the wages and living conditions of the workers is very difficult. For the present, the measures applied by the Labour government to combat inflation (wage and price freezing, etc.), while causing the living conditions of the workers to deteriorate, are comparable only to similar measures imposed by Stalinist or social democratic ministers in France, Italy and Belgium in 1946-47. Developments in Great Britain are thus slower, placing on the order of the day for the next stage great trade union struggles for the sliding scale of wages, of the kind which took place on the continent in 1947.

In Greece, the defeat of the civil war was followed by a period of retreat of the labor forces up to the Spring of 1946. The social contradictions sharpened to such an extent that one year after the Varkiza Agreement great social struggles broke out anew, resulting in new partisan warfare. Betrayed by its leadership and broken by the bourgeois terror, the movement in the cities nevertheless fell into complete prostration, only recently beginning to raise its head again in defensive economic strikes.

In Germany, the struggles which previously concentrated on the question of food rationing, began to touch the problem of prices and wages, beginning immediately after the monetary reform, and now encompass all the economic problems posed by "reconstruction." The struggle against plant removals has for the first time assumed aggressive form on a large scale in the French zone.

B. The Social Movements and the Development of the Economic Situation

For all of Western Europe the economic situation since 1944 can be considered as highly favorable for the outbreak of great social struggles. The fluctuations in this situation have only a secondary effect on the development of the social struggles, the ebb and tide of which are determined in the first place by subjective factors (relationship between the proletariat and its leadership).

The entire post-war period in Western Europe is characterized up to the present by the partly successful effort of the big bourgeoisie to reconstruct the broken-down economy at the expense of the working class. Wage freezing and governmental arbitration of conflicts on the one hand; spiralling inflation in living costs, export campaigns, restricted consumption and shortages in consumers' products on the other hand -- the entire policy of the governments which have succeeded each other since 1944 in all the countries of Western Europe, aims to create the optimum conditions for the reconstruction of the capital destroyed during the war by means of super-exploiting the working class and raising the rate of surplus value.

However, this fundamental policy of the bourgeoisie, applied by the Stalinist ministers in 1946 as well as by the socialist ministers in 1947 or by future cabinets without "labor" representatives in 1948 or 1949, clashes with a fundamental contradiction inherent in the whole situation of capitalism in Western Europe: The (relative) social equilibrium and the (relative) economic equilibrium mutually exclude each other.

In reality, the bourgeoisie has been able to surmount the extremely dangerous peaks of the so-called "liberation" days -- and the liquidation of the war in Great Britain -- only at the cost of a series of reforms to appease the working class. These reforms, while not ameliorating seriously the living conditions of the working class, nevertheless represent an unbearable load upon the delapidated economies of the capitalist countries weakened by the war and standing on the brink of ruin. (In France -- the nationalizations, wage adjustments of 1944 and 1946, social insurance services, 40-hour week. In Belgium -- the wage adjustments of 1944-45-47. In Italy -- the freezing of lay-offs, the sliding scale, etc.). These concessions, premiums for the presence of "labor representatives" in the government, were the price the bourgeoisie had to pay for the maintenance of the social equilibrium in 1945-46. But as international economic relations become "normal," and the world market no longer feels the extraordinary demand existing after six years of disruption of trade relations, while international competition is resumed and in each country the shrinking of the national market as a result of the war becomes evident, the liquidation of the factors of (relative) social equilibrium becomes inevitable with the quest for a new (relative) economic equilibrium and monetary stabilization. This conflict can be definitively solved only on the plane of direct class struggle. For, it is excluded that with the present relationship of forces the working class will permit the implied lowering of its living conditions without more or less general resistance.

Moreover, the new phase of social struggles in Western Europe coincides with two economic phenomena which make clear the imperious necessity for the bourgeoisie to find a means of "stabilizing" the economy at the expense of the working class.

a) THE MARSHALL PLAN. Contrary to the claims of the liberal sycophants of American imperialism, the application of the Marshall Plan has not at all permitted the European bourgeoisie to make economic concessions to the working class. On the contrary. Since the application of the Marshall Plan has only been able to maintain production at an established level which would have been impossible without the necessary raw materials and foodstuffs should the American credits therefore have been cut off; since American imperialism demands ever more urgently "monetary stabilization" as a condition for the further continuation of aid (a monetary stabilization which can be attained, from the bourgeois point of view, only at the cost of imposing new sacrifices on the working class), the first period of the application of the plan has been marked by a sharpened bourgeois offensive against the living standards of the workers. There is no sign indicating that this trend has ended or that it is being reversed. Only if the bourgeoisie carries out its recovery and rationalization "plans" on the backs of the workers can a relative economic stability be regarded as possible in the final phase of the Marshall Plan. This could then lead to an amelioration of conditions for certain privileged strata of workers. But that period, as eminent figures in the bourgeois states point out (Vincent Auriol, Stafford Cripps, etc.), will coincide with the maturity date of 1952 (end of American aid) and will occur in a profoundly changed world conjuncture (end of the American boom, crisis in the countries producing raw materials, etc.). Thus, nothing permits us to foresee for the coming years a conjuncture even relatively similar to that following 1923.

b) The business crisis which is taking place at present in Belgium, France, Austria, Italy and in a lesser measure, in Great Britain and the Netherlands.

This business crisis is marked by a slow but incessant increase in bankruptcies and judicial liquidations, by an appreciable decline in wholesale trade and department store trade figures, by a heavy increase of stocks in a number of important consumers' goods items, by beginnings of unemployment in light industry (attaining a much more serious extent in Belgium, where the number of jobless, including those partially employed, increase from 55,000 in July 1947 to 130,000 in July 1948).

The bourgeoisie considers this business crisis as a "crisis of recovery." It sees in it above all the elimination of unprofitable enterprises established due to the first post-war conjuncture, when "everything could be sold" and the reestablishment of a labor reserve army. Although modest, such a reserve army serves as a sufficient means for disarming the trade union movement and continuing its drive for "rationalization." In reality, however, while serving the fundamental orientation of the bourgeoisie in this way, the business crisis serves to express at the same time a much more profound phenomenon, more important for the estimation of the chances of recovery of capitalism in Western Europe. It demonstrates a considerable shrinking of

the internal market for consumption goods, in view of the decline in the share of the national revenue received by the laboring masses. This fact was concealed during the first post-war years by conjunctural phenomena (war savings, inflation in means of payment, accumulated shortages). That is why the American conditions for the Marshall Plan, the fear of the maturing of the loans in 1952, the modifications of the market structure -- all point to one imperious need for the European bourgeoisie: that of rationalization. The rationalization effort pervades the internal economic and trade policy of all the countries of Western Europe. The organization of labor resistance to the burdens of rationalization, undoubtedly combined with a series of inflationist phenomena not as yet "digested," constitutes the task of the trade union movement in the coming period.

C. The Relationship Between the Proletariat and Its Leadership

Immediately after the "liberation," the bulk of the proletariat in France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, in Greece etc., had a relationship to the Stalinist leadership which was profoundly different from that existing today.

The period of the so-called "resistance" struggles had largely wiped out the memories of the pre-war betrayals of the Stalinist leadership (People's Fronts, Stalin-Hitler Pact, etc.). The worker cadres of the CP were the only worker cadres that had behind them a long tradition of militant class action. They were the only cadres in whom the labor masses had a real measure of confidence. On the other hand, broad masses previously unawakened to political life, within the proletariat properly speaking as well as among peasant layers and the impoverished urban petty bourgeoisie, flocked en masse to the CPs of these countries, seeing in them the only party capable of putting an end to social misery.

In Austria and in Great Britain, where the CP never succeeded in penetrating deeply into the working class and also lacked a tradition of militant actions in the past as well as sizeable cadre rooted within the class, the radicalization of the masses was expressed in their overall adherence to the SP and the Labor Party, from whom they expected a whole series of measures overturning fundamentally the capitalist structure of their country. In Austria the concrete experience of Soviet occupation has been the decisive element in diminishing, if not completely eliminating, the measure of influence still possessed by the CP at the time of the crack-up of Fascism.

The period that followed was characterized by the slowly developing recognition by the masses of the anti-labor character of the policy of the coalition governments, in which the CP participated, or which it supported. This developing consciousness did not directly signify an understanding of the treacherous role of the Stalinist leadership itself, especially because the latter made every effort to cast responsibility for all the unpopular measures upon the other participants in the coalition. But the ferocious opposition of the Stalinist leaders to all strike movements, as well as the maneuvers and the calumnies utilized by them to avoid the outbreak of such movements, aroused an atmosphere of irritation and opposition on the part of the vanguard towards the Stalinist leadership. The "wildcat" strikes in

1946 and 1947 in France, Belgium and Italy broke out in this atmosphere, which became most sharply defined at the time of the Renault strike.

The CP was by-passed at that time not as a political party -- for that a much longer and more complicated experience will be necessary -- but as the expression of its policy at a given stage. What it threatened to arouse was not so much a break between the CP and the broad masses as a systematic opposition of the worker vanguard inside the CP against its leadership. That is why the Renault strike was the alarm signal which causes the disruption of the coalition in France.

In the following period of strike movements organized by the Stalinist leadership itself, the main characteristic is the contradictory development of the masses in relation to their Stalinist leadership. On the one hand, the vanguard of the most active militants is satisfied to be able to fight, and fights with fierce energy, while realizing more and more that the Stalinist tactics (bureaucratic maneuvers, lack of generalizing slogans, the method of "consecutive waves of strikes," the brusque timing of the movement etc.) cannot lead to a victory. On the other hand, a development in an inverse direction appears among the masses. These masses suddenly come to feel the pressure of bourgeois public opinion, (Marshall Plan, anti-communist propaganda, etc.) which the reformist leaders fully support, as well as the material burdens of the reaction. As the working class splits take place, the most militant layers increase their attachment to the CP, despite the fact that their attitude is much more critical than ever before. They consider the CP is the only effective alternative to the policy of class treachery and open collaboration with the bosses, carried out by the reformist leaders.

But that does not at all mean that the possibility of by-passing the CP is excluded for this period. As the example of Bergougnan, and especially that of the general strike of July 15 in Italy, demonstrate, even the "radical" language of the Stalinists in this period can become fatal to the leadership of the CP. In this atmosphere generally favorable for struggle, the masses begin to take the Stalinist leaders at their word and follow their "directives" to their logical conclusions.

The situation created by the splits in the working class (between SP and CP in the political field as well as in the trade union field), of France, Italy, Belgium and Greece, and the "anti-Communist hunt," in the trade unions in Great Britain and in Austria, weighs down upon the vanguard and constitutes the most important obstacle to detaching a serious vanguard from the CP. It is also the main obstacle to an effective defense of the proletariat against the lowering of its living standards. But as long as the situation remains pregnant with explosions of the type of July 15, 1948 in Italy, experiences present themselves which at one blow allow the vanguard workers to advance more rapidly in their understanding of the nature of the Stalinist leadership than is ordinarily the case over a long period.

The essential psychological brake obstructing the transition of advanced layers of workers to the revolutionary party, in spite of their disillusionment with Stalinist policy, is their awareness of the

need of an organization capable of fighting effectively for a given program. This program, for layers ten, and even a hundred times as big as our party is today, is the Trotskyist program. But these same layers do not as yet have any confidence in the effectiveness of the Trotskyist organization, which they consider too weak in numbers, as well as composed of elements still untested in the class struggle (too many intellectuals, too many splits etc.). That this obstacle cannot be suppressed by the formation of centrist conglomerations, whose program appears to the workers even inferior to that of the Stalinists and whose organizations inspire even less confidence than the Trotskyist organizations, is evident for anyone who judges objectively the French experience (RDR), the Italian experience (Iniziativa Socialista), the Dutch and the Belgian experiences (little centrist groups inside the social democracy). Thus, there is no other solution to this problem than the slow and patient building of a Trotskyist vanguard in the factories and trade unions. This vanguard must strive in times of lull as well as in the course of strikes, to function as a genuine alternative to Stalinism and reformism, to win the respect and then the confidence of the advanced workers. Through them, the masses will learn to identify the revolutionary party after a period of conclusive experience. This work can succeed only if the party organization learns to support and utilize the efforts of our militants in the plants by all methods of activity (press, political lectures, work among sympathizers, systematic education of new recruits, realistic and clear understanding of the rhythm of development, etc.).

It is impossible to set a time limit for this task. To say that this solution is impossible in the present international conjuncture, that it is impossible at present to build anything solid outside of the grip of Kremlin or of Wall Street, means in reality to consider the social contradictions less fundamental than the contradictions of international diplomacy. It means, not to understand the need of the Stalinists themselves to adapt their "line," essentially dictated by the requirements of Russian diplomacy, to the concrete conditions of the labor movement and to the specific mentality of the proletariat in each country, and at any given moment. For example: While it is true that the break with the policy of Yalta and Potsdam on the international scene, formalized at the Paris Conference of 1947, provides the general framework for the break-up of the national coalitions between the CPs and the bourgeois and social democratic parties, these facts must be borne in mind: In **Belgium, the coalition was disrupted earlier, in February 1947**; in Italy, in May; in France, in June; in Austria, as late as November -- in each case as a result of an important incident in the development of the class struggle in every one of these countries. Every time it occurred under the pressure of events which put the existence of the mass base of the CP to a certain test. It will not be different in the future.

As to those who want to set a definite time limit to the construction of the party, the experience of the workers' movement demonstrates that with their conceptions they can neither build anything solid nor solve the problem of a time limit (war, victorious counter-revolution, etc.). We must understand this phase of our program, that as long as **the revolutionary party is not built** none of the fundamental problems of humanity can be solved, in the most direct and immediate sense. That is why in the inter-action between the development of the objec-

tive situation and the tasks it poses before the revolutionary vanguard on the one hand, and the need of building the revolutionary party on the other, the greater emphasis must imperiously be placed on the second factor.

This is especially correct in the case of Britain and Austria, where the slower rhythm of radicalization of the masses and of their opposition to the policies of the Labour and social democratic leaderships, allows us a whole period of preparation. In the course of this period our militants can win the confidence of the advanced sections of the LP and the SP, the left wing of tomorrow. This also applies to Germany. There the almost total lack of confidence of the masses in their legal organizations, the prostration of all political life, points to the need of concentrating on forming and educating cadres during this whole coming period, which coincides with the slow and contradictory reconstruction of Western German economy. In the ensuing period, such cadres will be able to play a vital role in the rebuilding of the German workers' movement.

D. The Policy of Our Sections in the Post-War Social Movements

a) The so-called "liberation" period was generally a period of hesitation and of errors for our sections in Europe. In view of the weakness of their cadres, the danger of Stalinist repression, all of the objective and subjective conditions unfavorable to our movement prevented an understanding by our leaderships of the need for a sharp and thorough turn toward legality. Amidst the general confusion of the first days after the "liberation," it was possible to achieve legality without grave difficulties. This mistake weighed heavily upon the development of our French section, especially due to its exploitation by the Right wing in the factional struggles. It was also a great obstacle to the expansion of our Dutch section, preventing open political intervention by our party in the dockers' strike in Rotterdam (Summer 1945). There where it was the result of a whole false orientation during the occupation (Greece) it dealt our movement a blow threatening its very existence. Although in Belgium the transition to legality was swift and without friction, our party's extreme weakness in cadres, and its inability to politicize the broad influence it had gained during the occupation in the trade union movement of Charleroi, caused the loss of several invaluable springboards for expansion in the course of a number of weeks.

Although in general our insufficiently experienced cadres lacked boldness during this period, it would be no less wrong to attribute the delay in the development of our movement to these errors, which played only a limited and secondary role. The entire period immediately following the war was dominated by Stalinism. No matter how correct our policy had been, we could not have fundamentally changed this situation before a broader worker vanguard had gone through its own experience with Stalinism. In Germany and Austria, under conditions of the strictest illegality, the situation required, first of all, the establishment of contact and the first steps in regathering our cadres. In Britain, our section conducted a correct and dynamic campaign around the slogan "Labour to Power" which for the first time established a tradition of action for our movement among broader proletarian layers in that country. Finally, in Italy our movement

committed a grave error during this period. Neglecting the first signs of differentiation within the united Socialist Party (PSUP), our sparse cadre tried unsuccessfully to build a viable organization with the sincere but sectarian and ossified group of workers led by Mangano. It could have entered the SP and, within it, educated and organized a Left wing of adults and youth. This mistake retarded the formation of the revolutionary party in Italy for several years.

b) In the period of so-called "social peace" and wildcat strikes, our organizations generally followed a correct and effective line, achieved more progress and intervened more often in the social conflicts, receiving a great deal of publicity. They correctly conducted agitational campaigns against the slogans "first produce" and "reconstruction of the bourgeois economy and state." They correctly denounced this policy as aimed at placing on the backs of the workers the costs of the war and of "reconstruction." They organized energetic campaigns against all forms of class collaboration, for a minimum living wage, for the sliding scale of wages and workers' control as the only means of defending the real wages of the workers and for a return to strike action as the only effective weapon for defending the vital interests of the working class. In general, despite their small forces, our organizations succeeded in supporting energetically and dynamically the wildcat strikes. (The party's campaign in France supporting the postal workers' strike, the special press campaign aiding the printers' strike -- La Verite reaching a circulation of 150,000; the actions and mass meetings of the Belgian PCI in support of the dockers' strike at Antwerp; the action of the RCP aiding the dock workers' strike in London and various miners' strikes; the IKO action supporting the shoe workers' movement in Austria, etc.). This period also marked the beginning of work in building an opposition against the bureaucratic leadership in the trade union movement.

The essential weakness in the policy of our sections during this period was the often abstract character of their campaigns against the policies of the coalition governments, as well as a weak and routinist interpretation of the concrete program of socialist reconstruction and planning within the framework of the Socialist United States of Europe. There was also often a tendency to reduce our policy to trade unionist agitation, superficial and shrill, sometimes lowering the level of our press, and in some cases causing depoliticalization even among the militants in our own ranks. Finally, we must mention the hesitations of the French section in the question of perspectives, which resulted in the lack of preparation for the following stage, that of the great strike movements.

c) The period of sharpening strike movements beginning in France, Belgium and Italy early in 1947 once again required a rapid turn of our sections. Their task was that of becoming the champions of a long and tenacious campaign for the general strike. This turn was made only by the Belgian section, whose campaign for the general strike was one of the few that was successful. In Italy, the leadership of the POC (Mangano) did not at all understand what was happening and consequently remained outside of all of the great strike struggles of the Summer and Fall of 1947. In France, the Right wing leadership of the PCI committed the grave mistake of launching

a belated and half-hearted campaign for the general strike, which should have been begun in January-February in order to gain momentum after the first Renault strike. The entirely impressionist policy of the Right wing leadership, which abandoned the campaign for the general strike from week to week, as soon as there appeared to be a relative calm in the social struggles, will always remain for our comrades an example of how not to conduct oneself in such a period. This false policy bears a heavy share of the responsibility for the fact that the party has not been able to derive all the prestige and credit possible from a situation in which the whole working class and even the leadership of the CPF proceeded in a few weeks along a path that the militants of the PCI had pointed to as correct in the course of more than a year's agitation. As the struggles sharpened, and when the November-December movement began, the party under its new leadership in general correctly accentuated its revolutionary agitation. It put forward as main objectives: the proclamation of a general strike by the CGT; the formation of strike committees and their confederation; the adoption by these committees of a program of struggle making possible the most effective mobilization of the working class. This policy corresponded to the thoughts of the workers' vanguard in and around the CP (the layers to which our propaganda must be directed in the first place). The party nevertheless committed the mistake of not grasping soon enough the growing and decisive importance of the factor of division within the working class during the strikes. As a result, it delayed putting forward the slogan of the united front between the CP and the SP during the strikes, a slogan necessary in order to unmask the policy of dividing the workers, pursued in the course of these struggles by the reformist and Stalinist leaderships.

A review of the policy pursued by our sections, especially by the French section, during this period is vital for our organizations in Great Britain and in Austria, who will face analogous situations in the years to come (with the SP replacing the CP as the dominant party in the working class).

d) Finally, during the workers' defeats at the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948, as well as at the beginning of the direct offensive of the bourgeoisie, our workers' section implicated in this situation generally made a correct and rapid turn toward the campaign for trade union unity, unity of action and the united front of workers' organizations against the bosses. This campaign attested to the increasing maturity of our organizations. Compared to the campaigns of 1946 against class collaboration and coalition governments, it has been distinguished by its more concrete and more incisive character in most cases. Nevertheless, it was hampered especially in France by the organizational crisis suffered by the section there and by the difficulties which forced it to limit and even to suspend temporarily the publication of its organ. The question which has remained most obscure for our cadres during this stage is the question of the united front. Altogether too often this has been wrongly considered as a united front proposed by our sections in all kinds of situations to the big workers' organizations on a national scale. In reality, the propaganda of our sections for the united front is essentially propaganda for the united front between the big workers' organizations on a national scale and can only imply concrete proposals on our part in isolated cases (in a factory, a neighborhood, etc.) where the rela-

tionship of forces permits it; on a national scale, only under special circumstances, when it is a matter of proposals tending to extend concrete efforts of militants engaged in the struggle for the united front in a given sector.

E. The Forms of Action Taken by Our Sections in the Social Struggles

In general, the actions undertaken by our sections in the social struggles, in view of the numeral weakness of our organizations on the one hand and the more or less correct orientation of their work on the other, assumed forms that can be classified in the following three categories:

a) Actions conducted from the outside of the movement. These occurred especially in the period of the so-called wildcat strikes, in Britain, in Belgium, in France (printers' strike) etc. The party did not have any militants among the strikers and conceived its support of the strikes as a demonstrative and symbolic action (press and leaflet propaganda), calling upon the workers to demonstrate their solidarity with the strikers. Occasionally, there were solidarity meetings or rallies, appeals for funds and organized collections for the strikers, defense campaigns for the strikers against boss government or bureaucrats' slanders, etc. In isolated instances the party succeeded in this fashion to win the sympathy of the strikers to a point where collaboration between its representatives and the strike committees was established. Thus, it could influence the conduct of the strikes to a certain degree in this indirect way.

This method of action reflects both the weakness of the party as well as the power of its correct policy, a policy which in given circumstances allowed it to play a role altogether out of proportion with the forces at its disposal. But it would be a mistake to overestimate the results achieved by such actions. The results were generally limited to the creation of an atmosphere of diffuse sympathy for our movement among some layers of advanced workers. Only rarely have they led to even limited recruitment and hardly ever to the establishment of genuine party influence in the categories affected. Experience shows that it is impossible to gain a serious foothold in a workers' organization by outside action; no matter how much general sympathy strikers may have for an organization supporting them, their distrust of political parties as a whole is even greater in the case of a party which suddenly enters the situation by an "outside" action.

b) "Combined" Actions.- Among the strikers there are rank and file members of the party whose influence is not yet sufficient for them to be able to assume a leading part in the struggle. Parallel with their participation in meetings (by oral propaganda, distribution of leaflets, etc.) the party also undertakes action from the outside, through its press, through campaigns on a national scale, etc. A series of such movements took place in France, in Holland, in Belgium, in Britain and elsewhere. A mistake often committed by our organizations in such cases has been that of conceiving the outside action of the party as one needing to "surpass" the limited possibilities of their militants inside the movement. However, experience shows that the quest for more spectacular successes (direct contact with strike

committees, with the leaders of the movement, etc.) never leads to lasting achievements: and, that the essential effort of the party should be directed to supporting its own militants engaged in the struggle, for whom the strike movement presents an important opportunity to win influence previously lacking among their shopmates.

c) Actions led inside the movements by the party. - Such actions have taken place when the party had a fraction, cell or nucleus among the strikers, sufficiently influential and solid to be able to form in the course of the movement a leadership opposed to that of the bureaucratic leaders; to put forward our own slogans, methods of action and forms of organization at every stage of the struggle, against those of the reformist or Stalinist leaders. During the November-December strikes in 1947, this form of action was applied most successfully by our French section. As already indicated, such experiences are vital and essential for the genuine penetration of our organizations into the working class. It is important to note that our militants must conduct themselves in such cases as real leaders of the workers' movement, assuming responsibility for each of their slogans, and knowing how to beat a retreat with closed ranks when an attentive examination of the situation requires it. Nothing so discredits revolutionary militants as giving the appearance of being purely "negative" demagogues, endlessly criticizing everyone's policy without knowing how to conduct a struggle effectively through all its stages. On the other hand, a movement that is well led by our militants can give the party more prestige than ten movements aborted as a result of the treacherous policy of the bureaucrats, no matter how perfectly we have explained the mistakes.

The extreme youthfulness of our cadres and their lack of experience makes some mistakes inevitable in the first period of their development as genuine workers' leaders. The entire party must follow this experience attentively and give constant political aid to the militants placed at advanced posts of the class struggle. We must, however, indicate three general conclusions that can be drawn from the experiences undergone by our organizations up to the present in the course of direct participation in the social struggles:

a) It is necessary above all to avoid any kind of adventurism. This consists in having revolutionary militants assume leading posts which do not correspond to the political influence they possess in the movement. This danger is particularly great in Belgium and, to a lesser degree, in Holland and elsewhere, where our militants often appear exclusively as trade union militants and where they are placed in charge of strike movements on the basis of their devotion to the union rather than on the basis of the given orientation that they stand for. Such actions never prove to be of any value in building the party and often end up by demoralizing and breaking revolutionary militants, who feel themselves isolated and submerged by administrative trade union tasks.

b) It is necessary to abandon all organizational fetishism. The most glaring mistakes of this sort (such as that of the proclamation and maintenance of the Foggia "Soviet" for several years) have been avoided by most of our sections. They have also successfully resisted the pressure to desert the trade unions, particularly strong after a

number of repeated betrayals by the same group of bureaucrats (Antwerp dockers, EVC in Holland, etc.). However, the abstract and general utilization of the slogan of committees of struggle (or committees of action, of agitation, etc.) as a permanent slogan has often led to sectarian and adventuristic mistakes. The French example, particularly, has shown that this slogan, valuable during a given period of preparation for struggle (January-February 1947) rapidly lost all meaning once the strike movement began to spread (July 1947).

c) It is also necessary to maintain a necessary flexibility in the relations between the policy applied by our militants inside a strike movement (or leadership) and the general policy put forward by the party. The task of our striker militants consists above all in aiding layers of the workers' vanguard around them to compare their own experiences with the treacherous policy of the traditional organizations with that of the revolutionary party at every step. The task of the party (in its press, mass meetings and propaganda gatherings, etc.) consists of linking up the strike events and experiences with its own more general policy and analysis; and thus to be able to win over the more advanced elements in this vanguard as well as to educate more thoroughly limited groups around these advanced elements. The mechanical application of the entire policy of the party at every moment inside the strike movement, makes our militants mere propagandists and prevents them from taking part as effective leaders, a task so essential in building the party. The central task of the party leadership is precisely that of guiding its militants in the plants from day to day in such a fashion as to enable them to put forward increasingly more advanced positions in their agitation, with a view to consolidating their positions and of aiding experience in ripening the understanding of the workers. This should also be reflected in the general agitation of the party (editorials and basic articles in the central organ, in leaflets and factory papers, etc.). At the same time it is likewise indispensable for the progress of the party that the latter develop its own propaganda, draw more general conclusions as the situation develops, and complement the actions of its militants by a rounded explanation of the whole revolutionary strategy put forward.

The secret of a genuine Bolshevik-Leninist policy in the course of social struggles lies precisely in a dynamic interaction between these various tasks; autonomous leadership of the strikes themselves, an agitation taking on a progressively more radical physiognomy, general revolutionary and communist propaganda. To achieve it will require a long period of experience and groping on the part of our sections, still weak in cadres and in means of action. Once achieved, such a policy will transform every strike movement into a major experience for ever broader layers of the working class, and place on the order of the day the transformation of our parties from workers' leaders (which we can, and should become in the present period) into the leading parties of the working class. (the task for the period to come).

CONCLUSIONS

In general our organizations and the International itself, while conscious of their extreme numerical weakness, have had an exaggerated view of the possible tempo of their development at the time of

the "liberation." This view was not based on a mistaken analysis of the objective situation -- on the contrary, events have demonstrated that the latter made possible a break-away of quite large sections of the workers' vanguard from their traditional leadership -- but rather on an overestimation of the spontaneous process of political and organizational regroupment of the vanguard, on an insufficient understanding of the decisive importance of a homogenous leadership in building the party, as well as of worker cadres rooted in their class, and of a political tradition established in the course of years.

While it is consequently necessary today to revise realistically our conception of the tempo of development of our parties -- not empirically, but by proceeding from a thoroughgoing analysis of the general problems of building the party in the epoch of decaying capitalism -- it is important to note that most of our European sections have succeeded in making a fundamental turn in their general activities in line with such forces as they possess, and in the orientation of their work. This turn has required them to regard participation in social movements and the formation of independent combat leaderships around their own militants, as the essential task at the present stage. This turn will appear in the history of our movement as a decisive turn opening the road to its definitive expansion.

RESOLUTION ON THE PRESENT SITUATION IN FRANCE AND
THE DANGER OF THE "AUTHORITARIAN STATE."

1. The events in Italy and France since July 1948 make possible a more precise characterization of the present stage in the development of the social struggles in Western Europe. Although tendencies favorable to the proletariat have gained expression particularly in Italy, and favorable to the bourgeoisie particularly in France, the parallel line of development in these two countries is evident in the following features:

a) The efforts of the bourgeoisie toward the "rationalization" of its finances and its economy have become accentuated in the same degree as the pressure of American imperialism upon the bourgeoisie itself. During the first period of the application of the Marshall Plan, the inflationist tendencies, as well as the one-sidedness in the balance of payments, became even greater in all the countries of Western Europe with the exception of Great Britain. (The German monetary reforms only lent a more "normal" form to the same phenomena in these countries.)

b) Governmental instability, above all the successive ministerial crises in France, have led the most representative bourgeois circles to favor all authoritarian aims to gradually eliminate the parliamentary "rules of the game." Such support is accorded above all to the de Gaullist movement in France.

c) Under the joint effects of the recent experiences, of the economic situation and the "leftist" demagogy of the Stalinists, important layers of vanguard workers have become more clearly conscious than in the past of the necessity of a revolutionary and anti-capitalist program of action. They frankly pose the question of taking power by extra-parliamentary action. This was expressed mainly in Italy in the course of the general strike of mid-July, but also in the course of the more recent September strikes in the Parisian metal industry.

d) What profoundly differentiates these events from those in 1934 and '35, which marked stages toward the upsurge of 1936 (Brest and Toulon in France, Asturia in Spain, etc.), is this: the progress in consciousness is achieved by the vanguard within the framework of growing demoralization and skepticism among broader layers of workers, which is due above all to their increased lack of confidence in their traditional organizations and to the absence of a revolutionary party sufficiently strong to crystalize the radicalization of the advanced elements.

Under these conditions the bourgeois regime sharpens its semi-bonapartist characteristics (rule by decree, "full powers," etc.), reinforces its repressive apparatus to which it resorts ever more, adopts an entire system of anti-labor legislation and thus furnishes the weapons to be used later on by an authoritarian government. Faced with the growing discredit of the parliamentary and constitutional

regime of the "Fourth Republic," a "cold" transition in power is desired by the bourgeoisie. Ever since the failure of the Reynaud Plan, this alternative has become the most probable and has been placed on the order of the day in France.

2. The de Gaullist movement contains all of the characteristics corresponding to the very limited possibilities and ambitions of the decrepit European bourgeoisies. At the same time its own physiognomy reveals its own social origins, which differ from those of German or Italian fascism:

a) While German industrial power made Nazism formidably dynamic, the structural weakness of French imperialism and its desperate efforts to maintain an empire which has become too big for its limited capacities, determine the conservative and defensive character of de Gaullist policy, whose supreme ambition is to become the chief mercenary of Yankee imperialism on the continent. While the violent and pseudo-revolutionary character of Nazism corresponded to the despairing situation of the impoverished German middle classes wiped out by the inflation, de Gaullist conservatism corresponds to the bloated profiteering character of great layers of the "old" middle classes (middle peasants and tradesmen), who are the main beneficiaries of inflation in France.

b) The social origins of Nazism gave the latter an opportunity to terrorize and partly to disrupt the labor movement, before seizing power. The bourgeoisie yielded power to Nazism only when it had no other way out. The different origin of de Gaullism makes possible a much earlier appeal for support by big business, but at the same time prevents serious application of terrorist methods before the seizure of power. The fact that the relationship of forces is much less favorable to the bourgeoisie than that of 1933 in Germany (absence of chronic unemployment, etc.), emphasizes even more this particular feature of de Gaullism and causes it to avoid, as far as possible, any violent and physical struggle capable of whipping up proletarian resistance, the capacity for which remains by and large intact.

c) While Nazism was presented as a "new" and "revolutionary" movement, Fascist ideology and power are today so discredited in the eyes of the European laboring masses and middle classes that they react with great sensitiveness to the least sign of a development along the Fascist road. From this arises the necessity for the bourgeoisie to respect the "democratic" jargon even within the framework of its authoritarian solutions, to maintain certain parliamentary forms, and to eliminate only gradually the most dangerous centers of proletarian resistance (revolutionary party, Stalinist party, trade unions, cover organizations which cannot be integrated into the state, etc.). The Greek regime, as it has been existing for two years, gives a picture of what will be introduced in France after a de Gaullist victory, or in Italy after the application of a similar "authoritarian" solution.

3. The development of the international situation is working in the same sense at present. American imperialism is exasperated by the series of successive ministerial crises in France and has begun seriously to reconsider the wisdom of its continued investments in an en-

terprise as unprofitable as is French capitalism ruled by the "third force." The stabilization of its finances and the "normalization" of the state process are minimum conditions for the continuation of Marshall Plan aid. Only de Gaulle could possibly be strong enough to fulfil these effectively. On its side the French bourgeoisie fears that if the present situation continues, Washington will be led to play its German trump in Europe in the end. In order to "conquer" the post of first lieutenant of Wall Street on the Continent, de Gaulle appears as the only candidate it is capable of putting forward against a Western Germany in the process of reconstruction. Finally, the increasing international tension makes the application of a new form of tri-partyism or "people's front," with Stalinist participation in the government, very improbable, if not excluded. The enforced alignment of French imperialism with American policy, so completely illustrated by the Berlin episode, brings de Gaulle's assumption of power on the order of the day as much as the political and economic evolution of France itself.

4. The policy of the Stalinist party is the main subjective factor strengthening the probability of a de Gaullist victory by "cold" means. The policy of so-called "roving strikes," combined with electoral maneuvers favoring reaction, tends to keep the successive bourgeois coalition governments continually on edge, and obliges the bourgeoisie to choose between accepting a new Stalinist participation in the government (very unlikely) and the authoritarian solution which thus becomes ever more urgent. On the social plane the results of this policy, which is supposed to be very subtle and especially suited to the indecisive condition of future relations between USSR and USA, are nevertheless such that they also precipitate an authoritarian solution. The working class is becoming worn-out and discouraged in these fruitless struggles. The middle classes are becoming unnerved and exasperated, while there is no sufficient demonstration of proletarian strength to cause them to lean towards a working class solution of the crisis. The bourgeoisie is left to perfect its apparatus of repression, which tends to serve as a logical step leading with precision to assumption of power by de Gaulle.

The Stalinist policy thus appears as a new combination of an "ultra-left" line (the parallel between the Brown Referendum in Prussia and the vote for the de Gaullist motion for cantonal elections in October is self-evident; so also is the Stalinist propaganda according to which the present Government is already de Gaullist) with an ultra-right opportunism (absence of any slogan of arming, offer of a Government and a policy "acceptable" to the bourgeoisie, concentration on electoral propaganda activities, limitation of strike objectives to economic demands so inadequate that they are incapable of stimulating the proletarian will to struggle, etc.). At the same time, however, the dangerous frittering away of their trade union strength has forced the Stalinists to undertake a campaign for trade union unity of action which, although limited to a narrow bureaucratic framework, has undoubtedly been an element in stimulating the workers of several regions and industries to recement their front of struggle. It is all the more important for a revolutionary party to proceed from these positive trade union experiences in order to explain to the vanguard communist militants the disastrous consequences of the labor splitting tactics carried on by the Stalinists on the political plane.

5. Nothing has, however, been decided as yet. The factor which can still reverse this whole process and all of the calculations of the bourgeoisie is the spontaneous combativity of the working class. As long as the relationship of forces remains what it is today and as long as the bourgeoisie is not yet forced by a violent crisis to risk everything, it must proceed with a maximum of caution. The more the outbreaks of working class resistance become spirited and violent, the more they demonstrate to the bourgeoisie that de Gaulle in power means civil war. The more, consequently, it will hesitate, and even retreat for the moment. It is on this plane, therefore, that the policy of the revolutionary party must be developed.

The struggle for influence among the vanguard communist workers can become the decisive factor in the situation. With all its forces, and with the additional means which the International must bring to its aid, the revolutionary party has to strive to stimulate and coordinate the will to resistance of the proletariat. It must launch a vast campaign explaining the de Gaullist danger and appealing for proletarian struggle. It must utilize every opportunity to sharpen and advance the forms of struggle of the proletariat, to stimulate physical resistance against de Gaullist penetration into workers' quarters. The organization of physical struggle against de Gaullism will play a first rate role as a catalyst for the combativity of vanguard communist militants. The PCI must therefore stress in its agitation the fact that assumption of power by de Gaulle is the concrete stage in the preparation for war. De Gaulle in power means war, today with bombers against the colonial masses and tear gas against the workers, tomorrow on all the battlefields of the world. To prevent de Gaulle from taking power means to seriously set back the outbreak of Atomic war. The PCI must concentrate its agitation on the slogan of the United Front of the SP, CP, CGT, CGEFO ("Workers Strength" Organization), around a program of transitional demands capable of inspiring the confidence of the masses and of stimulating their enthusiasm. This slogan must be concretized specifically in a program of demands casting upon the capitalists the burdens of inflation, in a program of anti-Gaullist struggle by various methods, and in the first place by arming the proletariat, setting up united front committees in the plants and in the villages. The struggle for a united front government controlled by, and based upon, these committees should be the culminating objective of this campaign. An agitation of this kind alone is capable of propelling the vanguard of the workers, of enlisting behind it the great masses, who have not in the least lost their will to engage in decisive struggles against their exploiters.

THE BUILDING OF OUR SECTIONS IN EUROPE

The Second World Congress confirmed the orientation of our movement, established as far back as the pre-Conference of 1946, to concentrate its efforts upon transforming itself from propagandist groups into parties leading important sectors of the laboring masses in action. This orientation is determined by the character of the present period. Along this road there are many stages to pass: first, by imbedding our organizations more firmly in the working class, we must pass from the stage in which propaganda for our program is predominant to one in which it is linked with agitation of ever increasing scope based on slogans from our program of action; then to a stage in which is added the capacity to direct and control the actions of more or less extensive sections of the working class. From this point of view, the European sections have acquired a very rich experience during the years since "liberation," and from this we can now draw theoretical conclusions and general practices as the basis for our future activity. This report will rely mainly on the experiences of the French section, which have been the most extensive and by the very errors which have been committed are the most fruitful in their lessons. But all the sections, even those which are still taking only their first steps along the road of transforming themselves, have something to contribute to the joint experience of our International.

The Conditions in Which They Were Formed

For a better understanding of the activities of our various sections since "liberation," it will be helpful to recall what they were on the eve of the war and what happened to them during the war.

Most of our sections had their origin partly in the communist parties as the result of a struggle of small nuclei against the bureaucratization of these parties and partly within socialist parties as the outcome of action upon their left wings. This activity, taking place in the course of a period of general ebb-tide, that is to say, of organizational and political disintegration of the workers' movement, and under the blows and slanders of the Stalinists, succeeded in isolating us from the working masses and their activities. This inevitably brought with it a series of consequences of which the following are the principal ones:

1) With a few rare exceptions (Belgium, Greece), our sections were not the result of the splitting off of even a small part of the old working class parties with well-known leaders, but were formed by individual regroupings (in the course of numerous crises) of members having no previous joint experience and more important, having no real experience in mass action and in leading mass organizations.

2) Because of this most of our sections were unable to participate effectively in the great workers' struggles (the Spanish revolution and June 1936 in the main passed them by) and the process of selection took place on the basis of internal questions within the sections (abstract tactical differences and organizational questions) more often than on concrete problems of the class struggle.

3) Our sections were unable to widen their base; in fact, their working class base was generally very limited, and their stability extremely precarious. The emigre leaderships and sections disintegrated (German) or never arrived at any internal stability (Italian).

4) These general conditions have favored the recruiting of unstable elements and impeded the recruiting of proletarian elements, which added to the difficulties encountered by our sections in their development.

The war brought new and very harsh blows. Eliminating most of our old cadres, it placed the task of reconstituting and renewing the cadres of our organization upon very young members, who often did not have even the slight experience of the leaders of our old propaganda groups. In certain cases, the latter practically disappeared (Germany, Italy, Poland). In most cases, the new leaderships lived by withdrawing politically into their own shells (Greco). The only instance of a different development is that of England which took place under conditions of legality for the working class movement in general and for our tendency within the workers movement. From this there resulted gains and proletarianization, which allowed the English section to surmount the pre-war stage of mutually hostile sects, and to achieve unity and create the RCP, thereby laying the foundations for real penetration into the mass movement.

The political and numerical weakness of our organizations at the end of the war had as a consequence, to some extent everywhere, an inability to emerge quickly and easily from illegality and attack the political struggle on the legal plane. (There is obviously no question about legal activity for our sections in Germany or in Austria under present conditions.) This delay in emerging from illegality was certainly not the cause for an immeasurable delay in the rapid development of our organizations, as the former right-wing of the French ICP claimed. We could not have experienced a rapid growth anyway for many reasons of an objective character. But this delay -- understandable as it is in view of the disproportion between our forces and those of the Stalinists, and the dangers of annihilation which this factor presented in the days of "liberation" -- weighed upon our organizations, aided the development of centrifugal tendencies within them by reason of the fact that for several months our organizations were no longer adapted to the development of the situation and were even operating in the reverse direction. The most disastrous consequence of this error manifested itself in France with the development of the opportunist wing.

The Problem of Leadership

All these conditions of the formation of our movement have produced this fact that on the morrow of "liberation" in Europe our organizations were pursuing a double task, that of building parties at the same time that they were selecting their leaderships. The propagandist period passed, and as a result of factors beyond the control of our movement, it failed to yield the leaderships which might have avoided or reduced the gropings and errors, as much in the political sphere as in the organizational.

This problem of leadership is the key problem which is the most difficult to solve. On the one hand, the weakness of our organizations is an adverse factor in the selection of a leadership; on the other hand, the weakness or non-existence of a leadership is a main obstacle to the development of our organizations. A leadership is a selection in each of our sections and it is impossible to achieve a certain quality if a certain quantity is not available -- but a leadership is also an instrument for selection, making the choice of tasks which the party must carry out from among all its possible activities.

Although it is true that we have a certain number of leading members in most of our sections, we do not as yet have a genuine leadership, a united leading staff, possessing the necessary minimum of experience and authority in a given section. With all its difficulties, the French section nevertheless possesses the greatest number of leading cadres, but it would be premature to say that it has a stable leading staff as yet. Most of our other sections so far have only a very limited number of leading members. Creation of a stable leading nucleus, and without that the stability of an organization is always extremely vulnerable, can only be the result of long years of cadre selection. For a leadership presupposes a series of qualities (theoretical knowledge, political, organizational and administrative abilities, authority within the organization, ties with the working class and the workers movement), which the members of the European sections could acquire only at the price of long experience and such experience has proved very costly up to now.

Our Politics -- Our Propaganda and Our Agitation

Our relations with the working class are determined primarily by our politics. The transformation of our sections from propaganda groups into leading parties of working class mass action is above all a function of the capacity of our sections for utilizing the Transitional Program of 1939, of giving forms to these general slogans corresponding to the specific conditions of the moment, and of knowing how to intervene in workers' struggles.

This most essential point is the basis of Comrade Germain's report on the workers' struggles in Europe since "liberation." We will therefore use this report for reference. We will confine ourselves to adding, however, that the experience of the French section in concretizing the slogan of the minimum living wage is a favorable argument for a great deal of flexibility as regards the precise slogan which can serve as a starting point for workers' action (the 10 francs at Renault, for example). At the same time it is a good argument for exercising extreme firmness against the sly maneuvers of the Stalinists aimed at distorting these slogans in the interests of their fundamental policy of class collaboration (incentive plans, wage differentials). Likewise it is necessary to prepare our sections for considerable flexibility in the concrete presentation, which must vary with changes in concrete circumstances, of the slogan for the Workers and Farmers Government.

In this political activity, our sections have experienced great difficulty in giving appropriate proportions to agitation (which at

times can and must be very extensive) and propaganda, which aims to root the party in specific sections of the class, by winning over and shaping politically solid militants. This tendency has been very pronounced in the French section which has conducted great election campaigns (and these were all the more justified because they could to a certain extent have regained all the lost territory resulting from bad emergence from illegality), but failed to capitalize upon them. For during these campaigns the party did not orient itself towards establishing itself in industry and in certain neighborhoods, and when they were over, the party kept on agitating itself apart from and outside of the class, with the sole result of wearing out its own members.

It would be incorrect to counterpose agitation and propaganda in an absolute way under the present conditions of our sections; we must rather place the emphasis on a labor of patient explanation, although events are offering us important turns which we must know how to exploit in order to increase the influence of the party.

Where We Must Work -- Our Means of Expression

It is not enough to have correct politics. Because of our limited forces, it is also necessary to know where and how to present our politics in order to get the greatest profit.

Since the end of the war, the question of where to work has most frequently been decided by our sections on the basis of independent activity in the working class. A concrete tendency has been manifested in working along this road, the tendency towards working in the trade unions and along the lines of extending the activity of the party by basing it on the creation or on an orientation towards the creation of revolutionary oppositions within the trade union movement (France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland). It is obvious that results in this sphere are primarily a function of the strength of the party itself. The trade union question, because of the splits which have taken place in the trade union movement over a period of about a year, makes a discussion within our organization necessary, in order to reach a precise orientation and attitude not only towards the Stalinist and classically reformist currents, but also towards the trade union currents of various shades which are opposed to the Stalinists and reformists but which, by their confused positions on the questions of the State and of the party, threaten to hamper our comrades in their trade union work.

In France, Belgium and in Holland, our comrades were able to resist the current of trade union desertion. But difficulties arose and errors were committed (especially in Belgium and in Holland) when the splits took place, by keeping members in responsible positions with an unfavorable relationship of forces, and also because the sections did not provide their trade union members with an adequate political education.

But independent activity by the party, which was entirely justified for most of the European sections, should have been considered only as one of the forms of activity of our organizations. It was necessary at the same time to take into consideration the existence

of other favorable environments for our development, and for them it was necessary to proceed to other forms of work.

On the morrow of "liberation" the old workers' organizations (social democracy and Stalinism) became filled with workers who saw in them a means of bringing about the triumph of their aspirations and their hopes, which had ripened in the years of Nazi occupation. It was therefore inevitable that sooner or later crises would arise in these organizations as a consequence of the contradictions between the needs of the masses and the policies of these organizations. It was inevitable that within certain limits left currents would form or be discernible. It was consequently indicated that we had to devote an important part of our activity to work within these organizations. In this way either fraction work or the question of total entry became posed.

This question warrants special reexamination by the IEC and by our sections. It goes without saying that we categorically reject entrism theories like Demaziere's in the RDR or like Shachtman's (members of the Workers Party who are more consistent than Shachtman are turning to the Socialist Party), which do not consist of bringing our program into a specific environment for work, with appropriate forms, but which consists of discarding our program and going, with or without certain "key values," in search of another program. We likewise reject the conception of the currents developed by Craipeau and the practice of Dunoyer which consist exclusively of a series of organizational maneuvers without political content, designed to take the leadership of a left current and preserve that leadership solely by organizational means.

Work in the old organizations, or in the centrist organizations separating from them, has a very great importance. It is a historical fact that in those countries where the working class is already strongly organized, it does not build new organizations from the outside but on the contrary it proceeds in this task by striving to use the old formations to the limit. It is consequently within these formations that the currents are developing, and will develop even further, from which will emerge the new mass revolutionary parties. This was seen in the formation of the Third International and is being confirmed by the fact that the only centrist formations which have had some influence on the working class are those which were formed within the class itself and not those combinations formed on the outside, such as the RDR. This does not at all condemn the process of formation of our movement which was, moreover, born in the C.I. and received a section of its forces from the social democratic parties, and was also subject to given historical conditions outside of its control. But this historical fact coupled with the present conditions of social crisis, with their resultant conditions of crisis within the old workers' organizations, compels our movement to attach a very special importance to the most favorable environment for work, and we must place our present forces there, in order to drive towards the most rapid creation of revolutionary parties during the course of the workers' struggles.

Work in a reformist or centrist political organization can and inevitably must take on extremely varied forms. The greatest flexi-

bility is necessary, but it is a work that must essentially have political activity for its base, subordinating the winning of posts and maneuvering to the task of politically educating the surrounding groups in which we have to operate. That is why such a work can only be carried on with a very firm political leadership and demands strong politicalization of the members who take part in it. This is all the more true because this kind of work is incomparably more difficult than that of a member of an independent organization, appearing as such before the working class.

We must admit that in the past period our organizations have oriented towards fraction work within the organizations of the social democratic youth in a rather empirical way. This work was conducted with inadequate coordination and in the case of France, where the right wing monopolized the work and spoiled it, with enormous mistakes. With the exception of France, where the working class base of the social democracy has been sharply reduced, there are still great possibilities in the social-democratic adult or youth organizations. We must not forget that despite the development of the Stalinists, there is a whole series of countries where the social democracy constitutes a very strong party of the working class: England, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, without speaking of Italy where the crisis in the old organizations is the most advanced.

The political resolution of the Second World Congress has drawn the attention of our movement to the fact that in the absence of a strong revolutionary party we are witnessing a kind of coming-and-going of the worker masses between the social democracy and Stalinism. In certain social-democratic parties we find workers who had left the Communist Parties, because of their policies and their methods, and rejoined the social-democratic parties with an extremely critical manner regarding them as well.

Our organizations have made inadequate progress. But they do now possess political forces and points of support in the class which are, in general, superior to those we possessed before the war. Our ideas are meeting a powerful response in the workers' movement. In the question of environment for work as well as in that of the application of our program, it is absolutely necessary to conquer the danger of sectarianism which (save for a period in the French section) constitutes the main danger in our organizations. Sectarianism does not always consist of a false, abstract program, presented dogmatically. In a period as confused as the one in which we are living, it is even more likely to consist of routine work, satisfaction with customary activity and from a few successes which come to us from the situation itself rather than from our own activity.

In the case of fraction work within another political organization, the development of this work is dependent in a large part on the independent work of the party itself, on which our fraction must lean for support. One of the principal errors committed in France lay precisely in the opposition between the fraction work and the independent work of the party (see reports and declarations of the leaders of the ICP between the Third and Fourth Congress of this section), and this occurred precisely at a moment when the workers' struggles, by their increased

scope, broke off a wing of the social democracy in search of workers' policies. And this wing did not find the answer to its search in the policies of the ICP.

It is impossible to fix, in advance and with precision, the program and the organizational forms for all cases in which our fraction will organize a left wing in the old formations, and means it will utilize to develop this left wing. The experiences of our international movement show that the possibilities are of very many kinds. Fraction work or entrisism can be of longer or shorter duration depending on the specific case. But our experiences also show (1) that we must not forget that the field will be won only through an unremitting political struggle, all the more difficult because we are dealing with members having very little political education; (2) that the most delicate period begins when the left wing breaks and starts an independent existence. From this moment on, effective realization of existing possibilities demands an intensive and rapid politicalization, in order to guarantee the speediest passage over to the positions of the Fourth International.

Up to now fraction work or entrisism have been carried out with social-democratic organizations or those of social-democratic origin, in which a certain political life is possible and where a left current can form in a more or less normal way. In the future one of the most important problems which our sections will have to solve is the one posed by the growing crisis of Stalinism: How are we to direct our work towards the Stalinist parties and, eventually, towards groups breaking with the Stalinist parties or with their discipline. It is obvious that in the case of these formations, where the possibilities for organizing political currents will still remain limited for a whole period, the work will take forms altogether different from those in the social democracy.

Our means of expression consist principally of our press: our theoretical periodicals, our factory papers and pamphlets.

A first point to signal out is that our sections have devoted relatively little effort to theoretical publications or to the utilization of existing ones. This is tied up with a general phenomenon of depoliticalization of our movement.

In general, following a period after the war during which our sections were able to put out their papers weekly with considerable regularity, the last year, because of financial difficulties, has been marked by a decline as regards the frequency and regularity of their appearance. It is essential that all sections consider this question as the number one problem for solution, for the paper is at once the foremost propagandist, foremost agitator and foremost organizer of the party. Without a regular paper, all other activities of the sections find themselves heavily handicapped. The development of our sections in the coming period, in which new great workers' struggles are in preparation, is dependent in a very large part on the widespread intervention of the party by means of a press which each week brings its members and sympathizers the means allowing them to intervene in the working class.

From the point of view of content, although our papers have made some progress in the direction of popularizing our politics, they still frequently exhibit, in their articles and their language, the old tendencies of the closed circle in which our movement has lived.

It is equally necessary to emphasize that there has been a manifestation of the above-mentioned depoliticalization in our press. Agitation has taken an important place there and our papers have often been lacking in more general analyses and explanations.

One of the most serious weaknesses of all our sections is that with a correct policy and despite the weakness of their means, they are unable to utilize such means as they do have in the most intelligent and effective way. The fact is that in most cases our sections are not united groups, fighting as united groups, but are assemblages, more or less interrelated and compact, of members or of branches, each doing his best in his sphere, often accomplishing miracles, but not capitalizing on their activities because they do not appear before the workers as one element of a group. Our sections are able to conduct good general political campaigns (for general strikes, for the living wage, for the united front...) but they have very little idea of what a campaign is in the sense of organization (recruiting, subscription to the press, etc...). General political activity is generally not tied up with party organizational objectives. As a consequence, the dividends for our sections are very slim in the sphere of organization, and the effectiveness of our political campaigns remains limited, despite the serious response they may have in the working class and despite the verification that events bring to them. This has been especially evident in France and perhaps even more so in Belgium where organizational weakness has prevented capitalizing on a real influence in certain sections of the working class.

The Internal Life of Our Sections

Very great changes in the life of our sections are in general necessary if we really want to make the transition from propagandist groups to parties leading class struggles. In the past, bringing our doctrine and program to the outside world has really been a subordinate task of our sections. The internal life of our sections was not conceived as the instrument for deciding the best ways of intervening in the class; it was far more that of the closed discussion circle. There can be no question that these traits have persisted in our sections, the more so since we had to defend the unified character of the program of the Fourth International up to the Second World Congress and for this Congress. But it is necessary to make our sections understand that we do not discuss all problems which arise, and those which one group or another within a section wishes to raise, merely for the sake of clarification. Our internal life has rather the object of arming the party in its entirety and each of its members in particular so that it can succeed in acting in the masses. Internal life, education, discussion cannot be considered objectives in themselves, party democracy cannot be considered as a principle above all party activity: these are means for allowing the party to intervene (in mass action).

Education

There can be no question that the tendency of our sections to intervene within the working class has been accompanied by neglect of the education of party members in certain sections. This was all the more noticeable at the time of the "left" turn of the Stalinists, accompanying the creation of the Kominform, when a number of our members became disoriented because they had been fighting the Stalinists for a number of years on the grounds of their open policy of class collaboration.

Education of the party members must be fundamentally linked with the class struggle and must not have the character of studious withdrawal within closed circles.

This becomes all the more inevitable as the sections orient towards wider recruiting and tend to cease to be cadre organizations. It is nevertheless essential that the sections organize systematic education of their members on the fundamental questions of revolutionary Marxism, particularly of those members who indicate the greatest tendency towards becoming leaders (cadres) in the working class movement. Every section must organize itself so as to give new adherents the necessary minimum of Marxist education so that they follow the development of our policies with understanding. We should point out the example of the Austrian and Swiss comrades, as well as the cadre schools of the French section held during the vacation periods; we believe that we can use these schools in the future for members of other sections having a knowledge of French. It is also essential that each section set up its educational materiel (courses, pamphlets...) as this has been lacking in most of the sections up to the present time.

Organizational Forms

In most cases our members are grouped on a neighborhood basis which in general corresponds to the present possibilities of most of our sections. However this organizational form is becoming extremely unfavorable where great mass meetings are taking place, and subdivision into neighborhood groups has not up to the present yielded good results under these conditions. This arises from the fact that workers often work in places which are very far from their homes; also, in the absence of a local base which is relatively strong numerically, local groups have no real ties with their neighborhood; their members conduct no common neighborhood work there and they meet once a week like a group of people whose only real tie consists of the general ideas which are at the basis of our movement. Such groups can have concrete activity only under rare conditions and it is very difficult to follow and control the individual activity of everyone. It very often results that the functioning of these groups degenerates, they end up in abstract theoretical discussions, favoring the maintenance of our organizations in the stage of closed circles.

In this sphere, the experience of the Paris region of our French section is highly interesting. Development of the organization has been assured by the creation of factory branches, grouping together members of the party working in the same firm, assisted by a small

number of outside comrades having the function either of political development or of carrying out practical tasks of the branch. These branches have shown a very great viability, have been the basis of resistance for the party in the past crisis, and have been instrumental in the real progress of the French section along the road of establishing a workers party. As for the neighborhood branches which exist, they are experiencing all of the difficulties of the past, and their work is being organized from now on with the objective of creating new factory branches, around members who are still isolated in their plants. This work is organized on the basis of contacting sympathizers in the local area. There can be no question for us of mechanically transferring this experience to all sections; it has certainly on its side the CP tradition of factory branches (which was followed by the formation of socialist factory groups and even Gaullist), and in favor of it is also the intense political life that the plants of the Paris Region are experiencing, where the different currents and tendencies of the workers movement are being continuously opposed to each other and where the workers thus have the possibility of meeting in the course of their continuous struggles the different programs and organizations which are seeking to gain their confidence. But this experience should serve all our sections as a lesson that their basic organizational units tend to find forms corresponding with concrete objectives of the members which compose them. Organizational forms must be such as will best contribute to overcoming the tendencies towards the closed circle and the tendency to remain only propaganda groups developing our entire program to individuals. They must allow instead the bringing of the organization's policies into the working class, wherever the latter is acting as a working class.

Without drawing rigid conclusions, we believe that the principle must be that the basic organizational unit of the party, the decisive element in its functioning, must have a decisive proportion of active members, and that it must be set up in a way that will correspond with a given outside activity and so that the active members will be supported in their outside work.

The basic organizational unit must be the object of great attention from the leaderships. The relations between leadership and basic organizational unit are often defective (the political memorandum of the French ICP was useless to the branches most of the time; the minutes of the Belgian ICP on the other hand bring a whole series of irrelevant questions before the branches). We have on several occasions in the course of this report pointed out that the turn undertaken by our sections has had a certain depoliticalization as a consequence; there is good reason to fight this, and the leaderships must be watchful to supply the basic organizational units with political nourishment, without which their outside work cannot be effective or profitable.

Internal Regime

Democratic centralism is the means which should allow our sections to develop their policies under the best conditions and to act with maximum effectiveness as an organization. Unfortunately, by reason of the past in which our organizations were closed circles and also because of reactions against the internal regime of the Stalinist

organizations, there exist in our sections strong tendencies to consider that party democracy consists of an eternal discussion and an eternal debate between tendencies. The French section is the one which has suffered the most from this disease, from which it is just beginning to recover. The most extreme example of this tendency is, very fortunately, presented outside our ranks, by the Workers Party, where this point of view has been theorized into the idea of the "all inclusive party," and which has ended as a circle wherein anyone can raise any problem whatever, where all discuss this problem without coming to any kind of conclusion, while waiting for another problem to arise. Although it is not carried to this extreme, we must point out that this tendency does exist in certain sections, and all the more strongly wherever activity in the working class is weak.

It is essential to educate the sections in the idea that demonstration and verification of a political line cannot alone be the result of theoretical demonstrations and discussion, but must also and above all come from the activity of the party in the class, and not alone from a single action of the party, but from systematic activity pursued during a fairly prolonged period.

We are against everything which may harm the expression of different points of view within our organization, and preparation of the World Congress has shown this. But at the same time we believe it necessary to be on guard against the tendencies to set up rigid tendencies. Here again it was the French section which has had the most unfortunate experience and (this certainly helped the development of the right wing and its conquest of the leadership in 1946). This problem is, however, very closely bound up with that most important problem for the development of our sections, the problem of leadership, which we mentioned at the beginning of this report.

In this sphere, the holding of a cadre school by the IS, as was the case two years ago, while providing some assistance to the sections, can only be a very limited contribution to a solution of this problem. There is, in fact, essentially no other method than to introduce promising members into the present leaderships in order to allow them to become familiar with the problems of leadership and to develop their capacities as leaders.

It is equally important that the most extensive and most frequent contacts should exist between the leading members of the various sections. Exchanges of experiences from section to section constitute one of the most important elements in the formation of section leaders.

Conclusion

The experiences of our European sections in the course of recent years show that there is undoubtedly a tendency -- although unequally developed in the different sections -- to emerge from the framework of the propaganda groups and link itself up with the working class and its struggles. This tendency also is translated specifically into a tendency towards a greater proletarian composition of our organizations. It is nevertheless equally evident that this development has taken place up to now with very serious errors in the relative proportions to be given to outside activity as against internal life, in the rela-

tions between propaganda and agitation as a function of the conditions and forces at our disposal, and with a very great delay in the realization of our organizational tasks as compared with those of our tasks which are more specifically political. A certain share of these errors was perhaps inevitable because of past conditions, but we now have sufficient experience in very clear lessons so that our sections can pass to a new stage in their development, without going through the groping and searching experienced in the course of these past years. It is particularly important that we understand that the present state of our sections is only a stage and a starting point, from which we will have to deal powerful blows against the old organization in the coming period. And that is also the starting point at which we will have the more difficult task of assimilating members and currents coming from Stalinism and the social democracy. This will demand, bearing in mind the numerical disproportions, a very great organizational flexibility and very great political capacity. The greatest obstacles to our development are at present within ourselves, primarily in tendencies inherited from the past, to withdraw to ourselves, to a sectarianism which is expressed not in an incorrect political line but in maintaining forms and methods of a period which we must leave behind. It is not at all a question of achieving miracles -- and the experience of the French section during a certain period has shown, that we can, by passing over to another extreme, do even more damage to our movement -- but it is a question of resolutely finishing with the period of internal ideological probing and to pass with equal determination to a period of systematically carrying our program into the working class.

This report has examined several of the principal questions raised by this orientation. The discussion at this IEC can only be considered as the beginning of an international discussion into which each section will bring its own experience and from which each section will profit from the experience of the others. The progress of our sections has been shown by the formation of relatively stable leaderships, far more responsible than those which existed before the war, which depended almost exclusively on the contributions of Trotsky. It is important that the International Executive Committee set up by the Second World Congress should increasingly fill this role of international leadership by attacking these problems of the building of our sections, that it examine the experience of the principal sections and bring to all of them the lessons which have been acquired up to now at such great cost.

RESOLUTION ON YUGOSLAVIA AND THE CRISIS OF STALINISM

1. The conflict which has broken out between Belgrade and Moscow is an expression of the crisis of Stalinism, developing under the new conditions created by the coming to power of the Communist Parties in the European countries incorporated within the Soviet zone of influence.

2. The relations between the Kremlin and the Communist Parties are regulated by the direct and absolute control exercised by the former upon these parties in order to utilize them exclusively as agents of its policy in defense of the narrow interests of the Soviet bureaucracy.

3. This relationship has become modified by Soviet expansion in Europe and the new role of the Communist Parties in these countries. These parties at present dispose of their own state apparatus, control the economy and are responsible for the general policy of the whole country. Due to this fact they are subject to a series of influences and reactions which do not always take into account the narrow interests of the Soviet bureaucracy.

To the degree in which social and political relationships of forces are established wherein the power of these parties no longer depends directly for support by the Kremlin, conditions are created for the first time in the history of Stalinism that permit resistance on the part of the Communist Parties against the ukases (edicts) of the Kremlin.

In order to combat this danger of the Communist Parties becoming even partially, and in a deformed fashion, transmission belts for interests other than the narrow interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, the Kremlin has only one means: that of imposing its direct agents upon the leaderships of these parties, while eliminating by successive purges all those elements which escape its absolute control, or potentially contain such tendencies.

4. This attitude is the source of a chronic crisis which can only become aggravated, since the policy of the Kremlin goes counter to the interests of the masses of these countries, and even to the interests of the bureaucratic apparatus of these countries.

The Soviet bureaucracy pursues in all the countries under its control a policy of economic and political exploitation conforming to the economic and strategic interests of its regime in the USSR, not of "socialization" to permit the free development of their own productive forces in a socialist direction.

On the other hand, these countries will experience ever more the need to rid themselves of all the burdens and obstacles imposed upon them by the Kremlin (reparations, Soviet trusts, trade treaties favorable to the USSR, etc.), in order to be able to trade freely among themselves and with other capitalist countries, and in order to unify their economies.

The difficulties which these countries encounter in their development, given their present state of national isolation, and due to the inability of the USSR to furnish them the necessary industrial aid (tools, raw materials and capital), and the survival of a capitalist sector of the economy (peasants, artisans, traders), which is still predominant and constantly hampers industrialization plans and economic planning while stirring up the class struggle, are another source of discontent and friction.

All these tendencies are reflected of necessity within the relations inside of the Communist Party, as well as within the relations of these parties to the Kremlin.

5. The eruption of the Yugoslav affair, and the effective resistance put up until now to the assault of the Kremlin, have been favored by the peculiarities of the development of the situation in Yugoslavia.

Due to the role it played during the war in heading a vast movement of worker and peasant masses against the imperialist occupation and the national bourgeoisie, the Yugoslav Communist Party renewed and reinforced its social composition by the influx of partisans, and was able to make itself more autonomous and independent than the other Communist Parties.

The Red Army in reality refrained from direct intervention in Yugoslavia and the Tito Government came to power by basing itself upon the plebeian movement of worker and peasant masses.

The profound reforms undertaken in Yugoslavia immediately after the "liberation" reflected the peculiar conditions of the development of the class struggle in this country during the years of occupation, as well as the instinctive revolutionary upsurge of the masses, upon which Tito based himself.

These peculiarities of the Yugoslav situation all tended to bring about resistance to the direct and absolute control of the Kremlin and its policy. Although Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party had not previously developed any coherent or firm opposition to the policy of the Kremlin (they still heatedly proclaim themselves its faithful disciples), the autonomous character of their party and their movement, left to its own development, was bound to lead to serious differences with the point of view of the Kremlin. In the long run these were differences between the needs of "socialist reconstruction" as envisaged by the Tito bureaucracy on the one hand, and the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy itself on the other. The differences were merely a deformed expression of the contradiction between the interests and aspirations of the Yugoslav masses and the policy of the Kremlin.

To forestall such a development the Kremlin had undertaken the elimination of Tito and his replacement by a clique of its direct agents. However, this operation failed in Yugoslavia, encountering the organized resistance of an apparatus controlling the state and based upon a mass party and movement. For the masses are still genuinely devoted to this state, in spite of its recent bureaucratization.

6. Tito and the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party represent up to the present a bureaucratic deformation of a revolutionary, anti-capitalist, plebeian current. But if the Yugoslav masses do not find the strength of imposing a revolutionary solution to the conflict with Moscow, the Yugoslav leadership cannot in the long run have any other alternative save that of either permitting itself to be eliminated by the direct agents of the Kremlin, or of capitulating to imperialism.

The entire Kremlin apparatus led by Stalin has been put in motion to crush the "renegades" of Belgrade. Their example can become dangerously contagious. In Yugoslavia itself and in all of the countries under Soviet control, the direct agents of Stalin are feverishly whipping up a political and economic campaign in preparation for the downfall of Tito and his "gang," undertaking the appropriate police measures to bring about this fall.

In failing to break with the Kremlin and to publicly denounce Stalinism, which is the only means of arming the membership of the party and the Yugoslav masses ideologically against the assault of the Kremlin, the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party have placed themselves in an untenable position. Isolated within the buffer zone, and also ever more isolated from conscious support of the masses, they will be forced to accentuate the bonapartist character of the regime which can become, if it is not previously overthrown by the direct agents of the Kremlin, the instrument of other class interests than those which it represents at present. Indeed, within the conditions of isolation, of inevitable internal difficulties and of increased imperialist pressure, this bonapartist apparatus can become, in the course of a series of stages, the spokesman for reactionary forces.

Against these perspectives of elimination by direct agents of the Kremlin or capitulation to imperialism, there is only one solution: the direct intervention of the membership of the CPY and of the Yugoslav masses in removing all the bureaucratic resistance that prevents reliance upon the masses of Yugoslavia and the whole world. Based entirely upon these masses, a genuine proletarian democracy can be established in the party and in the country, breaking with Stalinism and condemning it, calling for a genuine socialist revolution by the masses and for the masses, in Yugoslavia itself and in all the countries of the buffer zone, of Europe and of the world.

7. The policy of the Fourth International in the Yugoslav affair, as in the entire situation developing at present within the buffer zone, must be guided by the effort to deepen the ideological break **between the communists of these countries with the Kremlin** and to orient the former toward the genuine program of the socialist revolution. The Fourth International can only fulfill this role by explaining patiently, pedagogically, not in a sectarian or presumptuous fashion, in a language understandable to the rank and file membership of the Communist Parties and of the mass movements they influence in these countries, the deep causes of their conflict with the Kremlin, the nature of Stalinism and the road to pursue. From this point of view it is necessary for all the sections and all the members of the Fourth International to understand that, from the moment a splitting

conflict arises between a Communist Party and the Kremlin, this party ceases to be a Stalinist party in the same sense as the others and all kinds of possibilities of differentiation within it are opened up thereafter.

It is up to the International to find a growing response within the ranks of these parties and to hasten their split from Stalinism for the benefit of the program and the organization of the world socialist revolution.

8. The Yugoslav affair is in reality only the first manifestation, under special conditions, of a more general state of affairs existing in the entire buffer zone. This has already been demonstrated by the crisis taking place in the Polish Workers Party, and the extensive purge raging in almost all of the Communist Parties of the countries under Soviet control.

These events demonstrate that all of the "theories" about the stability of the Soviet bureaucracy and of Stalinism, or about the possibilities of extending the regime of "bureaucratic collectivism" or "state capitalism" beyond the USSR for an historic period, are guilty of a theoretical lack of understanding of the nature of Stalinism and its contradictions. These contradictions are incompatible with a process of world expansion on part of this extremely rigid bureaucratic and police system. The expansion of Stalinism in the buffer zone has, in fact, proved to be a decisive factor in unbalancing this system and in introducing within it centrifugal forces and new ferments that sharpen all of its contradictions and thus speed up and precipitate the crisis. From this point of view the Yugoslav affair is only the first sign of the process of convulsive disintegration into which Stalinism has entered.

RESOLUTION ON THE IRISH CASE

The 6th Plenum of the International Executive Committee which took place from the 9th to the 12th of October 1948, discussed the case of the Irish section.

It condemns the attitude of comrade Armstrong and the others who left Ireland to live in England, without prior notice to, or authorization from the International.

It decides to suspend the membership of these comrades in the International until such time as they furnish satisfactory reasons for their attitude and define the relations which they wish to have in the future towards the International and its discipline.

The next plenum of the IEC will take a final decision on their case, after hearing their explanations.

The IEC mandates the IS to give all possible help to those Irish comrades who continue the Irish section of the 4th International in the carrying out of their tasks.

Carried unanimously.

RESOLUTION ON THE SPANISH QUESTION

The IEC approves the convocation by the IS of a Conference of the Spanish Group owing to the failure of its efforts to have this Conference convened by the majority of the PB for the purpose of studying decisions of the Second World Congress.

The IEC likewise approves the decisions of Spanish Conference of August 28-29, 1948.

The Spanish Section of the Fourth International is to continue functioning with all the comrades who recognize the decisions of the Second World Congress and of the Spanish Conference of August 28-29.

The IEC declares that only the Spanish militants who accept the discipline of this section shall be considered members of the Fourth International with full rights to advance within the Fourth International their own political views.

The IEC calls attention to the fact that the appearance of the first number of "Revolucion" took place outside the control of the international organization and that continuation of such publication will be considered a hostile act against the Fourth International and the Spanish Section.

Adopted unanimously

RESOLUTION ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR ORGANIZATIONS IN ENGLAND

The IEC having heard a report on some incidents which have marked lately the relations between the RCP and the minority, reminds the two organizations that they must remain strictly within the framework of the agreement concluded at the IV Plenum of the IEC.

It calls the attention of the RCP leadership to the fact that the activity of the minority is conducted under the direct control of the IEC and IS and that all interference with this work or any act which may harm it will be severely judged by its organisms and will lead to disciplinary consequences.

It considers that it is especially necessary to insist on this latter point before the comrades of the RCP leadership and with this aim it decides that a delegation of IEC members discuss this question with the RCP leadership.

Adopted unanimously

GENERAL RESOLUTION ON YOUTH WORK

(Adopted by Delegated Conference)

Representatives of six Western European countries participated in the conference on youth work which was called by the IS and took place concurrently with the Sixth Plenum of the IEC. After an introductory report by a member of the French PCI active in work in the MRJ (Revolutionary Youth Movement) and a debate in which all took part, the following resolution was unanimously adopted by the conference with one abstention:

1. The conference on youth work, consisting of representatives of 6 Western European sections of the Fourth International calls the attention of all European sections to the need of studying and specifically organizing their work among all sections of the toiling youth of their countries. The conference reminds all the sections that the young workers, because of their unique problems as more exploited but less exhausted than the older generations, constitute a particularly fertile field for the penetration of our ideas. The direction of our sections into this field requires however the elaboration of a clear orientation as well as the formulation of specific demands which our sections should put forward and which should correspond to the special needs of the working and student youth as well as the selection of a limited field of activity suited to our small forces (socialist youth, technical and trade union organizations of the youth, youth hostels, scouts, professional schools, etc.).

Since conditions will vary in each country the conference recommends that each of the European sections assign a member of its leading committee in charge of the concrete examination of these questions and then put the youth question on the agenda of its CC for discussion during the coming year.

2. After due consideration to the national peculiarities of the various countries, the conference sets forth the following general lines for youth work. These generalizations have been arrived at by the study of previous experiences of the sections and from an analysis of the general living conditions of the toiling youth:

a) Since the politically organized youth are only an infinite proportion of the politically organized section of the proletariat (with the exception of those countries where a big mass current can be drawn towards the socialist youth -- Great Britain, Austria) the main orientation must be towards the youth layers who are not as yet politically organized (especially the social and sports organizations).

b) Under the present circumstances of our movement it is not opportune to constitute Trotskyist youth organizations. If the main aim of youth work is not directed towards fraction work, it should be oriented towards the constitution of revolutionary youth organizations like the MRJ which comprise young revolutionists who are not yet Trotskyists and which can serve as a center of recruitment and education for the parties.

3. The concrete content of the work should derive from the following considerations:

a) To combat the tendency towards the depoliticalization of the youth which is systematically promulgated by the State, the Church, the schools, the bourgeois agencies of propaganda and the orientation of the mass parties which claim to represent the proletariat. This depoliticalization reflects at the same time an instinctive reaction of the youth against the complete neglect of the official parties in fighting for fundamental solutions. It can become a stepping stone towards an active revolt against capitalism if the revolutionary militants succeed in intervening in the activities and the life of the youth with a policy of struggle for a better world.

b) To fill the gap created over a period of two generations in the education of the youth in the spirit of revolutionary socialism (class struggles and class interests, communist morale, internationalism, anti-militarism, proletarian solidarity, workers democracy, etc.). That is why the fundamental aim of all youth work remains that of systematic education of the young workers in this spirit of class consciousness.

c) To give conscious expression to the fear and hostility of the young workers facing the war danger, not only by explaining the meaning of imperialist war, its causes and the revolutionary methods of action necessary for its solution but also by engaging in a series of concrete actions against militarism and imperialism (work in the barracks, organization of trade union actions in solidarity with the soldiers, campaigns against the lengthening of time of service, against colonial expeditions, etc.).

d) To propagate transitional demands which correspond to the desires of the youth for better living and working conditions, the right to education and leisure, etc. To utilize in the limits of our organizational possibilities the concrete actions and campaigns as the best means for the education of the youth in the theory and practice of the class struggle.

4. The Conference points out to all sections that experience demonstrates the impossibility of developing youth work except in a very limited framework if this work does not give an international orientation to young workers who are prepared to organize politically. That is why it is imperative that those sections carrying on youth work, as well as the existing revolutionary youth organizations led by us, present openly and persistently to the young workers the perspective of building a revolutionary youth international.

The constitution of a youth bureau connected with the IS is highly desirable in the realization of this objective. Such a bureau can only work effectively if a minimum of sections carry on youth work and the International adopts a general platform for this work. In the interim the Conference proposes two immediate steps for the IEC.

a) The designation of an International Commission of three members who will elaborate and present to the next meeting of the IEC a general platform for youth work in Europe.

b) To organize simultaneous with the next plenum of the IEC an International Youth conference composed of delegates engaged in youth work in all the European sections who will draw up a balance sheet of activity on the international scale since the last IEC meeting.

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