

# INTERNAL BULLETIN #16

---

## COMMUNIST LEAGUE of AMERICA.

---

Issued by the Internal Committee

SEPTEMBER, 1934.

FOR MEMBERS ONLY

price 5¢

### CONTENTS

Documents on orientation of the French Ligue.  
By Lenier, Vidal, Lhiller, Naville, Frank.

Statement by the Resident Committee Communist League of America.

From the International Secretariat.

\* \* \* \*

1). The current evidences a daily aggravation of the world economic ~~crisis~~ crisis. Far from forming a horizontal plane, the first half shows a descending graph (less acute but nevertheless descending) of the crisis. The sharpness of the inter-imperialist contradiction forecasts the imminence of a world conflagration. On the French scale all the statistical figures show that French economy is becoming more and more involved by its policy of "security alliances", and speed-up in its armaments is openly preparing its positions for the coming war. The constantly more acute character of the economic crisis in France, the corresponding struggle of the social classes to find a way out of this situation--each to the detriment of the other--determines the rythm of violence of the struggle and the principle outlines of the present deep political crisis in France. This crisis does not any longer have any of the aspects of the previous crises since 1920. The period of solution through parliamentary competition is past. The February days, the violent offensive of the reactionary vanguard and the arduous and multiple defensive actions of the proletarian vanguard have opened up for this crisis the arena of decisive struggles.

There can be no question of a prolonged stability for the present transitory, bonapartist government, which is only the first form of bonapartism to follow after the February events. A return to the cartel type of government could come about only as a result of an intensification of mass pressure which would grow over the heads of this governmental form or recede through a reactionary victory of the extra-parliamentary field. The transition to another form of bonapartist government will have to rely for support upon a violent attack against the proletariat.

The reactionary forces, while they to be sure, scored a victory through their February offensive, have not however come to the position as yet of making themselves the master of the decisive section of the nation. Their rise seems indeed to have been checked among the poor peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the working masses,--social classes upon which the "truce-government" has brought nothing but heavy taxes. The vast propaganda offensive the reactionary vanguard is more clearly characterized by its aptitude than by its results. The ardently violent resistance of the organized working masses have had their echo among the intermediary layers and constitute a point of support for the "left" in its somersaults of resistance under the fierce attack of the right during the truce. (Oudenet, in his attack on Doumergue, the threats of Daladier).

The working masses, have been hard hit by the truce government and have not been able to resist effectively on the economic field because of the state of affairs in their organization. But on the political plane their ferment is clear. The battle appears to be extending its scope at an accelerated rythm. We have entered a period of sharp revolutionary struggles in which there will take place among the masses, regroupments which shall be decisive for a whole epoch. The reaction of the organized masses and those layers of society influenced by them is linked up with a deep consciousness of its position on part of the working mass. A will towards the unification of their efforts has become manifest in the character of their street demonstrations as well as in their trade unions. The latest C.G.T. conventions, involving categories of workers considered to be extremely conservative, ~~including~~, postal employes, government employes, railroad workers, have expressed a growth and a desire for unity of action. The bureaucratic leaderships of the workers' organizations have been forced to take account of all this. the 100% turn in the S.F.I.O. party in 1934 as compared to its position of 1933, the speeches of Jouhaux, the radical turn of the S.F. as a consequence of threats of split and disintegration (Saint Denis, the desertion of the ~~hundreds~~ boatmen and the arsenal stokers from the C.G.T.U.) The German example has borne its lessons although belatedly--the bureaucracies are seeking a foothold in the mass, the masses are seeking a solution in action. This convergence

of turns on the part of the apparatuses will have a progressive effect on the already seething mass, the political conscience of important sections of militants will rapidly become transformed in the course of action, the conservative resistance of the bureaucracies will be weakened in the course of action and so will their whole defensive arsenal. History itself is opening up its book and little attention is henceforth going to be paid to the catechisms of the bureaucracies.

All this creates for our vanguard an entirely new situation and a necessity for a serious examination of our tasks.

2). Our situation--the very fact of our existence internationally, of our principled homogeneity, of the cadres we have formed--such as they are--constitute an acquisition for the revolutionary movement which may become decisive. Politically our ideas are victorious at the present moment. But the disproportion between the potential strength of our policies and the recruiting strength of our organization still appears to be of considerable scope. This proportion is in large part a product of a situation which we have ourselves created. Our ~~struggle~~ struggle was and remains "against the stream", ~~the~~ but this current is exploiting all the possibilities which the aureole of the October conquests has ~~procured~~ procured for us. Adapting ourselves to the environment we have progressed ~~xxx~~ little by little in the course of a terrible upheaval.

On the terrain of political penetration our League has made serious progress. In the field of organizational consolidation--in line with the favorable possibilities created for it by our new orientation and by the development of the political situation--the League has been marking time for more than a year. The League has rooted our conception in every part of France and its colonies. There are not workers districts in which our antennae have not penetrated. But antennae--that does not mean groups working systematically, according to a plan and a coherent central impulse, increasing its recruitment little by little systematically. Only in the Parisian district has such an attempt been made. The leading cadres of our organization are weak, new people have not yet come to us. A new process of selection is taking place. The ability to improve the old cadres remains limited due to the lack of mass base which would serve advantageously for its development.

The League has not become a magnetic revolutionary pole, a force to be reckoned with. The desire to get a place in the present struggle in France has galvanized all our activity during the whole of the past period. This was a very progressive step, but our organic weakness arose as an obstacle at each step, as did our social composition. The united front with the S.F.I.O. (Comite D'Alliance, Pere Lachaise) has appeared on these occasions and in others as a caricature of the united front tending toward the Amsterdam line or else the S.F.I.O. would pull us out of their sleeves whenever they liked. The attempt to win over the St. Denis militants resembled more a patient and unfortunate wooing than a political struggle. The Verite appears too absorbed in other vineyards to pay much attention to our own. (I am only referring, I am ready to amplify on each case if necessary).

In the revolutionary struggle which are commencing, our frail cruiser is ready to go into battle, but great formations of destroyers are ready to hit the line in the united front in a concerted order of battle. The manoeuvre itself is getting the participants too engrossed their eyes are fixed on the horizon too anxiously, and the more the struggle is becoming tense, the more the general staffs are becoming intent on isolating our frail ship, even to sink it. That is the real danger in the present situation; we are arising in these struggles from the outside, we do not appear as a force rooted in the mass organization, particularly in the trade unions, our direct contacts with the working-class are almost nil.

N  
Nowhere in the Unitary trade union movement (Red Trade Unions) is there a solid fraction, only 12 members at the maximum hold responsible posts in it...

There is no fraction at all in the C.G.T. (Reformist trade unions).

There is no nationally centralized fraction in the S.F.I.O. although we have militants active in it.

There is generally nothing at all of fractions in ~~any~~ mass organizations; there prevails an underestimation of this work and of the necessary attention to be given to militants active in them and to their observations. (All this extends nationally and for the adults).

We have only made the very faintest beginnings of direct agitation among the masses, each militant groping in this direction has to admit to himself that we have not yet hit on the proper "tone" there. Often our agitation remains superficial because our social composition cuts us off from the local workers after the given meeting is finished. How many courageous efforts have been made? Do not the participants experience a certain astonishment at the feeble response to these efforts? In the sum total causes of this disproportion, even the most serious mistakes can be considered only as insignificant factors for this. It is possible to further improve our efforts, to establish serious rules in the organizational relationships, to modify the character of the paper, change ~~it~~ this or that aspect, but all this would continue to develop within the limits of our original handicap. To be sure, mistakes can be avoided, efforts can be made, advances achieved--but at what pace and in what proportion to this sea of problems that rises up and engulfs us?

What sort of a reception will our little organization receive at the moment when all eyes will be riveted on the struggle, on the destruction and the cementing of the "old houses"? What chance will it have when its main lever of the United Front will be wrested from its hands? The broad layers of the population will not be able to pass judgment merely by a perusal of the files of our ever so valiant Verite. Who can dare to even feign that in this new situation we can become the decisive magnetic pole for these struggles without a radical change of tactic? When it is raised beyond the hearing of the crowd, our slogan of a new party resembles more a medicament than a decisive weapon. It stands the risk of grouping about it much rather the "intellects" than the fighters. Spartakus was crushed because it was insufficiently bound up with the masses. What are we as compared to Spartakus?

3) ..The problem of the new party is more urgently posed than ever before. In this whole period of struggles of a revolutionary character, in which all the problems of revolutionary strategy and of the conquest of power (the organs of power etc.) have to be solved, the vanguard party is the indispensable instrument for the victory of the proletariat. The bureaucratic somersaults of the Stalinist party have nothing in common with the tactics of such a party. Let the yoke of "socialism in one country" be loosened and who can tell what will become of it tomorrow? The characteristic of absolute independence for the proletarian party has nothing in common with the Stalinist formation which is held in chains by the conservative interests of the Soviet bureaucracy. The method of selection of cadres through Marxist ~~examination~~ examination of the action to be undertaken has nothing in common with forced acceptance of the present turn by the C.P.F. This aggregation of revolutionary workers tied down to a miserable centrist apparatus by their attachment to the Russian Revolution is not by this fact alone the party of the revolution. That party still has to be created. Not one whit of our ten years of criticism, of our explanation of the defeats that have been suffered, of the significance and the conclusions that they imply needs to be modified or forgotten. Turns and ~~xx~~ somersaults of the centrist apparatus may constitute elements that are progressive or retardive, according to the case at hand. But the guide of the proletariat is no longer the C.I. Today, just as yesterday, in the face of the rising tide of revolution and the threats of ~~xxx~~ world war, the first point in our program remains the creation of the revolutionary party, the formation of the new Fourth International.

Is there anything to retract of our analysis of the Second International and the S.F.I.O., of its role in the relationship of classes. What is of interest to us in the differences between this reformist party and the Stalinist centrist party is this:

a) the fact that the failure of the C.I. instead of ruining it, has

a) the fact that the failure of the C.I. instead of ruining it, has permitted the regroupment and the growth of sections of workers who, under the impetus of events in Germany, Austria and France, are becoming oriented toward revolution--which will not fail to pit them against their bureaucracy in a struggle to come.

b) the fact that the internal regime, in spite of the omnipotence of the bureaucracy, is not yet tightly ~~xxx~~ riveted from below and permits a turnover of sections of workers.

In the Stalinist party there exists a dependence on part of the rank and file upon the bureaucracy; in the S.F.I.O. there exists up to the present a relative independence between the bureaucracy and the ranks. This form of internal regime was the original form of the democratic party in the democratic state and will suffer the consequences of the state crisis; the present form is favorable for the rank and file in this period of regroupment, the bureaucracy may receive a certain blow from it. As revolutionary parties, S.F.I.O. and S.F.I.C. (Stalinists) are equally impotent. But in this period of upheavals and readjustments it is our task to adjust our tactics according to our knowledge of the environment and of the possibilities of creating from its midst the new revolutionary party. We must therefore observe that the political life of the Stalinist party is nil, that the possibility of developing a tendency in its midst is excluded, (the apparatus undertakes a 180 degrees turn in the work of the party members and Monmousseau is surprised that no one is surprised). The socialist party, on the other hand, experiences in this whole period, a relatively intense life; taking into consideration the differences in proportion: this period is comparable to that which preceded ~~xxxx~~ the Tours congress.

4) ..What is the solution?

Shall we continue along the path we have followed?--Even if we improve our methods, my answer to that is already given in section 2. No matter what path we choose, it will be necessary to rearm our organization in all its internal life, in all of its organizational relationships--that is an urgent task, it means tempering our arms anew. But that does not mean making the same use of them as before. It seems that with the present state of our forces, we shall not be able, maintaining the present position, to grow with sufficient rapidity to become a decisive magnetic pole. On the contrary, we shall be kept out of the centres of struggle to the detriment of their outcome. Throw the greater part of our forces into fractional work within a mass organization--we must not disregard the weak return we have received from our independent work. Given our numerical weakness, that would mean not making much of an impression on any ~~particular~~ particular scene. If some of our League militants are brought up on the carpet here or there in the S.F.I.O., they will be handicapped because of the secret way in which they entered it. This fractional work in the S.F.I.O. which has been neglected for more than a year, cannot suffice now even if it is improved.

It is necessary to clear a decisive distance, to bring ourselves closer to a working mass which is developing toward revolutionary ideas, to become its catalyst, thereby increasing considerably our possibilities.

Without renouncing any of our positions and without dissolving ourselves, it is necessary to transport ourselves into the very midst of such a mass regroupment which is in course of evolution. We have outlined our original difficulties and weaknesses, but we must not underestimate the value of our propagandist nuclei and their possibilities. We must place them in a position where ~~th~~ their slow advances can become transformed into decisive leaps forward.

Where? Access to the S.F.I.O. Stalinist party is cut off to us because of the internal regime. We must not in any case consider a capitulation.

There remains the S.F.I.O. Its internal state of affairs permits of the possibility of our entering it under our own banner. The environment suits the aim we have set ourselves. What is

There remains the S.F.I.O. Its internal state of affairs permits of the possibility of our entering it under our own banners. The environment suits the aim we have set ourselves. What is necessary now is that our declaration shall not in any case strengthen the leading bourgeois wing, but much rather support the progressive proletarian wing; that its text and its distribution shall allow us to hold our heads high in case of acceptance as well as in case of dilatory maneuvers or rejection. We must not in any case think of dissolving ourselves. We enter as the Bolshevik-Leninist faction, our organizational ties remain the same, our press contingents to exist just as does the "Bataille Socialiste" and other.

This step can transform completely, within a short period of time, the whole political constellation in the labor movement, but there are two conditions for its success: cohesion of the organization (through the conviction of each member) and promptness in its execution. To drag out such questions means to lose the opportune moment for their realization, that is, to put oneself at a disadvantage.

Further on we shall examine some suggestions on the variants of realization. The organization must take an inventory of its forces and understand that in the present situation the means of increasing them ten-fold lies not in sticking to routine, but in making a courageous move to rally thousands of workers to the revolutionary ideas, whom the degeneration of the C.I. has repelled from taking the path of Bolshevism.

Before proposing variants of its realization, I must emphasize that this whole orientation is directly dependent upon the political characterization of the present crisis and of the relationship of forces in the proletarian movement.

It would not be ~~use~~ without use to draw attention of the membership to the necessity that our debates on this question have and retain the character of a serious discussion made before the whole labor movement. All mere polemicising can seriously hamper the achievement of the aims which we have set ourselves.

How are we to enter on this path?

A) Bring this orientation on the order of business of the leading organisms: 1) Political Bureau, 2) C.C., 3) and edit a resolution on it.

B) Immediately publish an internal bulletin containing the eventual resolution of the C.C., send them out to the groups, assign a C.C. reporter to each of them, distribute the bulletin in time to have an adequate discussion.

C) Assign a comrade for preparation in the press (an article giving an orientation to the discussion), to convince our circle of ~~xxxxxx~~ sympathizers

D) ~~Assign~~ Assign a comrade to look up Georget and Danno for the purpose of probing into the possibilities of one of the Left Wing factions (Just or another) issuing an appeal.

E) Prepare a ~~quick~~ draft declaration to the S.F.I.O. and send it up with a delegation. Popularize the text and the reply.

F) Prepare a special number of Verite with the text of the declaration to the S.F.I.O. and of the program of action which is to serve as the basis of our propaganda.

G) Not to neglect the "youth" aspect of the problem. ~~xxxxxxx~~ On point A ~~it~~ it is at the same time necessary that our C.E.C. convince our national youth committee and to consider with them seriously the "youth" aspect of the problem--perhaps the appeal (D) can be issued by the Federation of Young Socialists. In any case, this attitude may imply a slowing down of the rhythm toward a split (for the immediate period) in the Y.S.

H) Call a National Plenum for the purpose of submitting the declaration to the N.C. of the S.F.I.C. on July 15.

--Linier.

Paris. June 29. 1934.

DOCUMENT ON THE ORIENTATION OF THE FRENCH LEAGUE.

The League in Face of the Turn.

1. It is not enough for a ~~revolutionary~~ revolutionist to have ~~a~~ correct ideas. Let us not forget that correct ideas have already been set down in Kapital and in the Communist Manifesto. But that has not prevented false ideas from being broadcast. It is the task of the revolutionary party to weld together the correct ideas with the mass labor movement. Only in this manner can an idea become a driving force.
2. A revolutionary organization does not mean, a paper and its readers. One can write and read revolutionary articles day in and day out, and still remain in reality outside of the revolutionary movement. One can give the labor organization a good ~~subliminal~~ advice--from the sidelines. That is something. But that still does not make a revolutionary organization.
3. Although the living conditions inside the Comintern are hardly normal, the Left Opposition as a faction would have developed in constant contact with the mass movement. But the Stalinist apparatus isolated the Opposition ~~with~~ mechanically from the very first steps of its existence. Two aims were achieved by this: 1) the internal life of the Comintern was choked off and 2) the Opposition was deprived of the necessary sphere of political action.
4. The League (like other sections) was forced to develop as an isolated propaganda group. This determined both its positive sides (an honest and serious attachment to the principles) and its negative sides (observing the labor movement from the outside. In the course of the elaboration of the principles and methods of the Left Opposition, the positive sides of the Ligue carried the day. At present, when it becomes necessary to circulate the accumulated capital, the negative sides are threatening to get the upper hand.
5. The leadership of the Ligue has entrusted the circulation end (of the paper) to a capitalist concern. For a group of literati the circulation end is an unpleasant burden. For a revolutionary organization it is an important lever. How can one entrust such an important lever to the enemy when we are seriously preparing for the struggle? The revolutionary movement is composed of dozens and hundreds of different sorts of just such "uninteresting", "technical" labor. Without detailed and assiduous preparatory work it is impossible to begin with a militia or with a strike and even less so with the general strike or the insurrection. A revolutionary organization which is incapable (or more clearly, unwilling), of taking care of the circulation end thereby foregoes in advance leadership in the execution of more complicated labors.
6. In relation to the socialist party the Ligue has not only shown insufficient initiative but also a hide-bound sectarianism. Instead of taking for its task the creation of a faction inside the S.F.I.O. (French section of the socialist and labor International), just as soon as the crisis in the latter became obvious, the Ligue demanded that every socialist become convinced of the correctness of our ideas and leave his mass organization to join the group of Verite readers. In order to create an ~~internal~~ internal fraction it was necessary to pursue the mass movement, to adapt oneself to the environment, to carry on menial daily work. Precisely in this very decisive field the Ligue has not been able to make any progress up to the present--with a few exceptions. A great deal of valuable time was allowed to be lost. After a delay of a whole year the political bureau now poses the task "to create an internal fraction". No ~~task~~--that is no longer sufficient. The situation requires more decisive measures.
7. The criticism, the ideas, the slogans of the Ligue are in general correct, but in this present period particularly inadequate.

The revolutionary ideas must be transformed into life itself every day through the experience of the masses themselves. But how can the League explain this to them when it itself is out off from the experience of the masses, It is necessary to add: several comrades do not even see the need of this experience. It seems to them to be sufficient to form an opinion on the basis of newspaper accounts they read and then to give it expression in an article or in a talk. Yet if the most correct ideas do not reflect directly the ideas and actions of the mass they will escape the attention of the masses altogether.

8. In that case the Ligue is bankrupt, is it not?--an absolutely false conclusion. The successes of the Ligue are obviously much smaller than many of us had hoped. Much smaller than they could have been if there were not the fetters of an abstract conservatism. But despite the immense obstacles there have been undoubtedly some successes. The Ligue has exercised certain influence on the ideas and slogans of the labor movement in its entirety (United front, the workers militia, trade union unity). But it is exactly these successes, when taken into consideration together with the whole situation and particularly with the changed tactics of the bureaucratic apparatuses that demand on the part of the Ligue a new and decisive turn. Whither? To the masses.

9. The general situation in France puts the entire conscientious labor movement before a task of short perspective: either the proletariat will in the course of six months, a year, or perhaps the two coming years destroy Fascism and take a tremendous step forward all the way to the struggle for power or it will itself be destroyed and all of Europe will become the arena for fascist tyranny and war. The pressure of this terrible alternative has forced both of the labor parties to strike out on the road of the united front. But in an exact sense this great victory poses the question before the Ligue in all its amplitude: to be or not to be.

10. The joint meeting of July 2nd gives a remarkable clear picture of the situation created. Just as the Ligue has so often predicted the very first step of the united front which has aroused an extraordinary enthusiasm among the masses. The possibility of victory along this road is beyond all doubt. And yet neither the Stalinists nor the Socialists utilized the unification in order to advance aims of struggle but on the contrary directed their energy towards having the mass find satisfaction in the fact of unification itself. Yesterday the greatest danger was the sabotage of the united front. Today the greatest danger lies in the illusions of the united front, very closely related to the parliamentary illusions; the diplomatic notes, the pathetic speeches, the handshaking, the bloc without revolutionary content--and the betrayal of the masses. At this symbolical gathering, the Ligue did not get the floor. And this is no accident: we face the program of action of both these bureaucratic parties for the whole period coming.

11. This program can be realized practically only because the Ligue remains isolated from the masses. The attempt to skin over this isolation through an exchange of diplomatic notes with the Central Committees or through attendance at the sessions of the socialist National Council is nothing but diplomatic horseplay which aims to conceal the unfavorable relationship of forces. That is not at all worthy of us. The relationship of forces has to be concealed-- changed, not concealed. It is necessary to go to the masses. It is necessary to find a place for oneself within the framework of the united front, i.e. within the framework of one of the two parties of which it is composed. In actual practice that means within the framework of the S.F.I.O.

12. Is that not a capitulation before the Second International, Such a complaint can be lodged with much more justice against the Stalinists. It was they who renounced inside of 24 hours and on command from Litvinoff, the theory of social fascism, when they realized that democracy is to be preferred. And they even



gave up all criticism of their newly friends. But we have nothing to renounce. We merely admit honestly that our organization is too weak to establish for itself a practical independent role in the struggles that are looming ahead of us. At the same time, as good revolutionists, we do not want to stand on the sidelines. In 1848 Marx and his weak Communist organization entered the democratic party. In order not to stand on the sidelines, Plekhanov attempted to join his group "liberation of Labor" to that of the "People's Will" (Narodnya Volia), with which he had broken on principle grounds only five years before. For different reasons and in a different situation Lenin advised the Communist party of England to join the Labor party. We, on our part have been ready to form a new International together with the S.A.P. and O.S.P. We urgently advised our British comrades to enter the I.L.P. and some of them took our advice. Was that capitulation? Not at all. We are now concerned with applying and developing the same policy in France.

13. Nevertheless--have we not proclaimed the necessity of creating a new party and a new International? This program remains in force in its entirety. But we have never promised to stop and ruminate until such a time as the Fourth International gathers about us. We have always declared that the means for its creation are complex and not of the same character in the different countries, just as was the case with the Third International. Comrade Trotsky reminded us particularly, a year ago of the French example. There, in spite of the break of the Bolsheviks with the Second International the whole section was won over to the Third International. We know of no law that says that a repetition of the Tours Congress is impossible. On the contrary. Many of the prevailing conditions speak for such a possibility.

14. But in that case the S.F.I.O. will not accept us!--It is quite possible that the big shots will refuse. But the local organizations, on the other hand, will for the most part go with us. Inside of the party, the struggle of the tendencies continues to pursue its course. The left wing will be for us. Our ties with the left wing will be strengthened. And the developments themselves appear to work for the left wing.

15. And we are to agree to maintain discipline? To be sure, we shall work in the membership and maintain discipline. We shall develop into a faction. In return for that, we shall be in constant contact with tens of thousands of workers and we shall receive the right to participate in the struggle and in the discussion--and, we shall have the opportunity, particularly indispensable for us, of controlling our ideas and slogans daily in the actions of the masses.

16. But, does not entry into the S.P. imply the danger of an opportunist adaptation of of a degeneration? Undoubtedly. Yet it would be naive to think that one can escape this danger through self-isolation. The Ligue is at present independent. But unfortunately its position on the S.F.I.O. policy contains elements of an impermissible adaptation. It is not necessary to use strong words against the leaders, but it is absolutely necessary to expose the danger of such a purely decorative attitude toward the "struggle against Fascism" as has been expressed in the columns of the "Populaire" (or the "Humanite"). The proletariat is facing a deadly enemy who is prepared for all events and who will be armed to the teeth if necessary. The proletariat vanguard should develop in its own ranks and among the broad masses an unshakable preparedness for struggle, an iron discipline, a revolutionary spirit of discipline, a military pugnacity. Parades at given times, demonstrations with permission of the police and other such symbolic actions tend only to lull the watchfulness and the will power of the workers. A fighting organization is necessary, steel battalions are necessary, instructors and officers are necessary. It is necessary to disarm the enemy, to sweep him off the streets, to terrorize him. The task of the Ligue--whether it remains independent or joins one of the parties of the united front--

joins one of the parties of the united front--demands imperiously, an explanation to the workers as frank, as clear, ~~as~~ as honest as the seriousness of the situation and the tasks flowing from it require.

17. In that case, what will be our position as regards the Communist party? We shall come more closely in contact with it than before--through the united front. We must clearly bear in mind that the C.P.F. is capable only ~~without~~ of such a dissolution of the S.P. as will be of no advantage whatever to the revolution. It is notorious fact that this has been the result of the coalition between the C.P.E. and the I.L.P. But if we can implant our hand, have a new and invaluable opportunity to influence the proletarian core of the C.P.F. In such a manner, a powerful section of the Fourth International may evolve.

18. But the proletarian party must be independent. Quite so. But the Ligue is not yet a party. It is an embryo and an embryo needs covering and nourishment in order to develop.

19. But if...and then...and if? To foresee everything and to provide for everything in advance is impossible. It is necessary to understand the situation clearly, to determine the tasks and to proceed with their fulfilment. In six months we can lose forever that opportunity which we are offered now. We must look at things from the short perspective.

20. To conclude: the Koran says that the mountain came to the prophet. Marxism counsels the prophet to go to the mountain. ~~---~~ --Vidal.

DOCUMENT ON THE QUESTION OF THE FRENCH LIGUE

Document Number Three (3)

On the Turn of the C.P. and S.P. in France and  
The Tasks of the Ligue.

The united front being built up between the S.P. and C.P. obligates our international as well as our national organizations to probe seriously the objective causes of this phenomenon in order to elaborate a course of action for our organization.

In the first place there is the pressure of the working masses. They were already aroused and made distrustful by the victory of German fascism and Austrian bonapattism. The reactionary coup d'etat of February 6th served as a further warning for the masses impoverished by the economic ~~and~~ crisis and it was they in turn who influenced the two centrist parties and forced them to collaboration.

In the S.P. this development was furthermore facilitated by the previous split of the right wing (Reraudel, Deat, Marquet). In all likelihood the orientation of the recently elected national council which has decided for the united front will lead to a new split with the so-called attentistes (Frossard, Grumbach and Co.) who continue to defend the positions of "democratic socialism" that is, of the coalition with the radicals in place of the united front.

The left wing in the S.P. has been strengthened in the last few years especially in the last few months, especially through the development of the conjuncture and also due to the influx of new adherents who came particularly from Communism and had been repulsed by the Third International with its zig-zag policies and by the bureaucratic internal life of the C.P.F. The C.P.F. itself faced a rising demand for an extension of the united front from its own members and sympathizers. That in turn caused the crisis of of the Amsterdam-P level movement and the Doriot tendency, etc. On the other hand, the foreign policy of the Y.S.S.R. oriented on the retention of the status quo (France, etc.) against

the revisionists (Germany, etc.) required a new political orientation of the C.P.F. In order to resist the pressure of the right wing bloc on the Doumergue government it was necessary to create a left wing bloc as a counter-balance. In this sense it is also worth observing that Soviet diplomacy makes such demands that in the last appeal of the West European Communist parties only the French right wing parties are attacked while there is no mention made of French imperialism as such or of its present standard bearers, Barthou, Herriot, Doumergue. The orientation towards an eventual merger into a single party comes from the same direction.

It seems that the two bureaucracies would like to have the united front which has been realized, lag on in passivity, exhaust itself in meetings. Their perspective is that of the maintenance of the inner-political status quo. But such meetings as that of Vincennes (on July 8th, the first great united front meeting against Fascism called by the Communist and socialist organizations in Paris--tr.) in themselves prepare inside of the S.P. and C.P. a creation of a fighting left wing against both bureaucracies.

The active united front can have as its only orientation the struggle for workers' power in France. That will create such confusion in both parties that new splits and regroupments can confidentially be predicted. The united front in the form in which it exists today cannot last long. It is quite likely that in the development of the united front and its possible extension, the bureaucracies, or at least one of them, will be forced to a break. That will give us enormous possibilities of influencing the opposition in both parties.

If the united front continues we will force our ways into the local committees and there defend our slogans. Thus we will overcome the present isolation. But even in case the two bureaucracies succeed in excluding us from this united front we will continue the propaganda for a genuine united front in the masses. And in this propaganda for entrance into the united front is much more realizable than propaganda for entrance into the S.F.I.O. once the top leadership have repulsed us.

How and in what sense shall we influence the united front?

We must realize the united front locally and make proposals for the transformation of the united front into a united front of struggle.

How and by what means?

2. By working in the trade unions where the struggle is extraordinarily facilitated for us by the fact that the trade unions and especially the C.G.T. are not homogenous blocs, but on the contrary organizations in which the struggle of the tendencies is already quite lively. This struggle can only become even more accentuated in view of the developments inside of the S.P. and the unmistakable intentions of the reformist trade union leaders to boycott a bloc in which the Communists can participate. Precisely through such patient work in the trade union we shall win the laboring masses and not on the high agitational tribunes. For the workers are there in the trade unions.

1. By continuing our independent work just as we have in the past.

3. By means of a fraction in both parties which will propagate our slogans, the extension of the united front, workers' militia, arming of the proletariat, revolutionary orientation.
4. Through cooperation with the existing currents (Doriot, P.U.P., autonomous trade unions, left socialists) in so far as they can be approached, for participation in a revolutionary regroupment, and insofar as certain slogans of their own resemble our own.
5. For the intensification of our work in the existing united front committees in connection with the youth organization, ~~in~~ through an active policy on a local and shop scale, for ~~a~~ ~~the~~ direct struggle against fascism.

#### The Proposed Turn and its Perspectives

At the present ~~critical~~ moment under the pressure of an ~~increasing~~ ~~unavoidable~~ unavoidable, and in our opinion, an entirely transitory isolation ~~has~~ been proposed to us to enter the S.F.I.O. in order to link "ourselves with the masses". By maintaining that our ~~organizational~~ weakness makes it necessary and that the character of our organization is merely one of a "paper and its readers", outside of the labor movement. This is now being proposed. We ~~reject~~ this proposal because we believe that precisely such a turn will achieve the direct opposite of a "better contact with the masses".

1. The evaluation of our organization is incorrect. Precisely in the last ~~three~~ months it has begun to overcome this condition. The proposed turn will destroy all these results without offering any better ones.
2. The development of the united front which we foresee will change the present condition of isolation and give us (naturally only if we increase our activity and pursue a correct policy) the broadest possibilities of rallying different tendencies and organizations. In the ~~left~~ S.P. the perspective of a split of ~~the~~ the ~~left~~ left wing is unavoidable. By submitting at the present moment to the discipline of Leon Blum we will lose our influence in the leftward tendency and the further development will proceed without our influence and for the most part in the direction of the Stalinists. For one of the ~~fundamental~~ fundamental errors of the ~~proposed~~ proposed concept appears to us to be that of ignoring entirely the Stalinist tendency, which nevertheless continues to exist, and has as yet under its control, considerable means and forces. This error robs all of the historic parallels torn out of ~~the~~ the past, in order to justify the turn, of all their value. Aside from that we must not forget that our turn will deprive ~~us~~ us of all sympathies inside the Stalinist camp.
3. Entrance into the S.F.I.O. cannot be realized otherwise except through a complete submission of Blum and a certain degree of capitulation to the Two-and-a-half International. In any case, not even the left wing, who still respect the statutes of their party, will ~~not~~ support ~~our~~ our admission.
4. We must not disregard the effects that the entrance of the French Ligue into the S.F.I.O. will have on the International League. Such a step cannot but call forth demoralization, confusion and disintegration in our international organization, our main instrument.
5. These effects will be all the stronger, because the evaluation of the Ligue as a circle of Verite readers which has lost its right to independence, can be applied equally as well to all the other ~~sections~~ sections and because it can hardly conceal the idea that the whole past of our organization is to be renounced and its existence in its present form liquidated. By rejecting this evaluation for the French Ligue as well as for the international organization, we reject this turn and seek a solution along progressive lines, without a liquidation and ~~with~~ without a brusque turn.

6. We regard the situation and its perspectives with utmost seriousness and we reject the proposal made, at the same time making positive proposals with the aim of strengthening our organization, which we regard as the embodiment of our correct policy, as well as of our revolutionary tendency, that of the new party and International.

Under the given circumstances, there is no other way out than the maintenance of the independence of our organization. We do not doubt that the majority of the members of our national and international organization will side with us.

In this situation, our duty is not to drop the banner, but on the contrary, to increase our criticism of the two bureaucracies. That is the only means for us to play our role as leaders of the working class and to let the masses go through the experiences of this struggle, so that we will be able to lead them to ~~victory~~ victory.

J. Lhuillier

July 16, 1934,

Statement of the Resident Committee  
Communist League of America

The National Committee of Communist League of America supports the orientation proposed for the Communist League of France to enter as a faction into the Socialist Party of France (S.F.I.O.) and urges the French comrades to accept this orientation.

In France the united front between the Stalinist party and the Socialist party is a fact. In essence it is a bureaucratic combination between these two centrist parties to the exclusion of the revolutionary current. After having consistently sabotaged the united front over a long period of time, the two centrist parties have finally found agreement in a bloc based upon a non-aggression pact without revolutionary content, and as is now already clear, without actual preparation for struggle against the mortal enemy. This bloc incapable of pursuing a revolutionary policy, is proceeding in the direction of organic unity and to new betrayals of the masses. Similar developments are to be expected elsewhere particularly since the Third International, carrying out the line of the pacifist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, has made a turn on an international scale which represents an adaptation to the position of Social Democracy.

The French proletariat faces the ~~alternative~~ alternative of being crushed or to struggle on to victory against the advancing Fascist enemy. The decisive hour is near; the tempo of developments is becoming constantly accelerated. Unquestionably, large masses have already been set into motion by this united front, many of whom will forget their past disillusionment of either party or of both parties, rally to the united front, and rally more decisively to one organically united party, however, to meet new disillusionments out of which will inevitably develop the possibility of regroupments and of new revolutionary currents emerging within the movement itself. This is the most hopeful aspect of the present situation.

On the other hand the Ligue with its numerically small cadres has of necessity, by these developments and despite its correct position, become more isolated from the masses and practically excluded from this mass movement. While the masses are under pressure they naturally ~~gravitate~~ gravitate to the "strong" movement where they see possibility to beat off the threatening danger. They cannot wait for the Ligue to become sufficiently strong to serve to serve as this medium of action. The Ligue cannot stand aside and await the new revolutionary currents to develop by themselves. It must be with the masses while in motion as an inseparable part, participate in these developments and thus more effectively bring its influence to bear and help to shape the course for the next stage.

The immediate issues in France is the beating back and the defeat of advancing Fascism. That involves not only the unification of the proletariat but also its active preparation for combat. It involves revolutionary action during the course of which the issue of the seizure of power will be posed. Our objective is the proletarian revolution; the instrument for its accomplishment is the revolutionary party, the revolutionary International; today this means a new party and a new International--the Fourth International. The creation of this instrument is the historical task of the epoch.

Neither the united front of the Stalinist party and Socialist Democracy, nor their merger into one organically united party can serve as such an instrument. The bureaucratic combination that has been created will function as an impediment to its creation. Nevertheless the new revolutionary currents developing out of the antagonism to the bureaucratic obstacles and failures in both of the centrist camps will furnish a basis for the new party, for the Fourth International. It is these new considerations that demand a strategic reorientation of the course pursued by the League. It must be accomplished with the greatest possible speed. There is no time to lose. To get nearer to the masses, to get nearer to the Communist and Socialist workers, to participate in their discussion and the solutions of their problems, to help them find the way to a revolutionary position, to the new party and the new International and to test our own ideas and slogans in action requires that the Ligue enter integrally into the united front movement, by the avenue open to it. This means that it enters as a faction into the Socialist party of France. Such a strategic step has now become mandatory by the situation created and by the revolutionary position it holds.

However, in our opinion, it is of the greatest importance that the Ligue should come unanimously to the acceptance of this strategic reorientation which by the fact of the great difficulty of execution and the great dangers on the road require the attention and the devotion to such a task of a united Ligue. It is, of course, necessary that the publication of the International Communists be maintained in France.

This strategic reorientation cannot be considered for France alone and as an isolated phenomenon. The Stalinist turn is executed on an international scale and the tendencies toward a united front are apparent elsewhere; but the issues are not posed with the same acuteness in every country nor is the tempo of development the same.

In the United States, it is apparent that the united front of the Stalinists will be accepted by the Socialist party. There need be no doubt that the Stalinists here will also adapt themselves to the position of Social Democracy and finally accept the conditions it lays down. There need be little doubt either that a united front here will also become a bureaucratic combination of the centrist parties with efforts at exclusion of the revolutionary current and to that extent seriously effect the position of the League and its struggle for the creation of the new party. In this respect some of the manifestations now apparent in France will find an echo here but on a far lesser scale and far less acutely. In the first instance, neither of the two centrist parties represent a corresponding mass force, quantitatively or qualitatively. Far from it. In the second place the League in the United States has certain advantages in its favor, i.e. certain possibilities of mass contacts, certain contacts among the leftward moving socialist workers, possibilities of fusion with other groups standing on the platform of the creation of a new revolutionary party and a new revolutionary international.

Nevertheless, these developments in the United States present a changing situation, not to the extent of posing the question of a strategic reorientation, but making imperative the most

serious consideration by the League. The League must use every avenue open to it and bring pressure to bear for its demand for inclusion in the united front as an independent body, for its demand for the establishment of a genuine united front. The League must undertake with the greatest possible speed the organization of a nation fraction in the C.P., a task decided upon some time ago but which has not yet passed its initial stage and has been too long delayed. The League must utilize every means at its disposal to speed up and press for action in its negotiations and discussion with the A.W.P. for fusion in a new revolutionary party.

An important part of the work necessitated by the new situation which is in the making in the United States must be assigned to the Spartacus Youth organization. As a youth movement, its basis is narrower and its position more isolated than is the case of the League. However, insofar as its cadres are concerned, they can be of real service as means of penetration into a broader movement and into an important section of the developing united front movement. In respect to the Spartacus Youth clubs, and with this object in view, it is necessary to consider a strategic reorientation. The National Committee of the League must give consideration to the possibility of the Spartacus Youth clubs entering as a faction into the Young Socialist League.

-----  
 S.F.I.O.--French section 2nd International  
 S.F.I.C.-- " " 3rd "

Letter from the International Secretariat  
 Geneva, July 24th

To All Sections:  
 Comrades,

Since the issuance of the March manifesto of the International Secretariat of the L.C.I., you have been urged to focus your careful attention upon the events now taking place in France. It is becoming increasingly evident that the march of events in France will decide the fate of the European continent, and that is why the policy of our organization in the French situation is of such decisive importance.

You undoubtedly know the about-face which the Socialists and Stalinists have just made on the question of a united front. Upon orders from Moscow, the French Communist Party has just come to an agreement with the leadership of the S.F.I.O. regarding "united action". It is a matter of fact, so far this agreement only applies to joint meetings and assemblies. The Stalinists' abrupt reversal of their position (after their usual manner) amounts to a capitulation to the very group they were denouncing only the day before as social-fascists.

These are the facts. Where will the Stalinists get to, impelled on the one side by the trend toward unity and on the other side roused by the danger piling up as a result of their fatal policies? At the present time that does not matter much. What is important is to know and define the method of making possible a victory over fascism and of using this victory as the keystone for the creation of the new party. We must find a prompt solution for the problem of the Fourth International, the means of shifting it from the sphere of theory and propaganda into the sphere of action by millions of workers. A heated discussion of this question is going on within the International Secretariat and in our organization in France.

Comrade G, along with others, thinks the time has come for the French organization to take its place in one of the two camps of the united front, working for a probable organic

page 10.

unity. The Stalinist camp being closed, the only way open is that of entry into the S.F.I.O. It is not at all a question of liquidating our organization. On the contrary taking such a step (made necessary by the about-face of our opponents and to keep from being crushed by them) requires a firm, solid organization capable of resisting all outside pressure, while using all the splits in the two centrist camps (that of Blum as well as of Cachin) for the building of the new party.

By this mail we are sending you the first papers on this important question by comrade G. and other comrades, with the request that they be studied carefully so that you can let us have your opinion on the basis of thorough familiarity with the problem. Other documents will be sent to you as the International Secretariat gets them.

Fraternally for the I.S.

Martin

\*\*\*\*\*



## Contribution to the Debate on "Unity"

Since the discussion taking place at present in the organization is apparently the most important one we have had since our foundation, it is necessary to put aside all disputes of a personal nature and the psychological appraisals of so-and-so, and to examine seriously the arguments that are presented. In this note I merely wish to examine some of the points that were brought out in the discussion and especially in the letters of com. Neville.

1) "The achievement of unity would be a huge backward step." Is this true? Organic unity, said a comrade during the course of the discussion, would show that the workingclass no longer had an independent vanguard. It would mean the liquidation of the Third International. Then why should we complain? For us, ever since last year, following the German defeat, the Third International has no longer been the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat. In deciding to work out a constitution for the Fourth International, we implied the liquidation of the Third International as well as the Second.

That there was no longer any revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat was understood up to the present by a small number of workers. If organic unity serves to deflate, for the thousands of revolutionary workers, the fiction that the Communist International was the revolutionary party of the proletariat, then this organic unity, far from constituting a huge backward step, would permit many steps forward to be taken. The only matters that can concern us are that: (1) It should not be by the victory of ; (2) that it should advance the progress of the revolutionary movement. Therefore, the present tendency of the masses pressing for organic unity is a progressive but very confused tendency--in any case a progressive tendency, and we should make use of it for the liquidation of the Third International.

II) The comrades are terrified when they say that "organic unity in France will mean the liquidation of the Third International." That we are not terrified we have just said. But what the comrades do not see, is that it would mean at the same time the liquidation of the Second International in France. A few minutes reflection will show that unification will not be made on the fundamental principles of communism any more than on the reformist principles of social democracy. Unification today is for us a method of speeding the break-up of the conservatism of the two bureaucracies against which we have struggled for years, a method of clearing out the rubbish of the 2nd and 3rd Internationals and clearing the path for the new party.

III) Organic unity as a method of founding the new party of the Fourth International had apparently not been presented among us, for the most part even a few months ago. At the very moment when the Doriot tendency was in full swing, we thought it would be possible to build this party by means of a regrouping of fractions broken away from the old parties. But fact is fact and it is on this nature that we must base ourselves: a tendency of the masses has come up that ignores the past of the old parties; that by the very fact that it is a confused mass tendency in the process of evolution, cannot at once be placed on the political platform of a new party that expresses its revolutionary aspirations in its desire to unite the workingclass movement.

To go against this tendency would be to cut off completely the masses who are in search of a revolutionary solution, and especially it would mean resigning the pass word of unity to all sorts of centrists and reactionary tendencies that would make use of this pass word to mislead the working class into all sorts of ill-advised directions.

Clearly we cannot compare the struggle for organic unity with the struggle for trade union unity. But I am convinced that we are now going to live through, in the field of organic unity, something similar to that which has passed for trade union unity and the united front. We shall see again all the alibis, all

2.

the "fundamentals", all the pretexts of the conservative machinery for using the pass word of unity against one tendency or another. We also have to know how to make use of this pass word of unity to help along the regrouping of the revolutionary forces of the proletariat.

IV) They say to us: "We shall be abandoning our independence, and that is the first of the eleven points that make up the charter of our international organization." It can simply be shown that in reality the concrete political struggle cannot be encapsulated in any absolute formula, valid everywhere and at all times. In the first place, our organization did not discover this subject, nor can we say that we have forgotten it during the last period. And further! Let us give two examples that will show better than any others that the independence of the organization does not exist outside of the actual situation in which it is placed.

In Austria it is incontestable that one of the causes of the weakness of the Austrian Communist Party even during the first years of the Comintern lay in the premature splitting off of the revolutionary kernel from the powerful Austrian social democracy. The price of this "independence", asserted too early, namely the break with the masses, was never made good although from 1920-24 the Austrian communist Party, like all the other communist parties in the world, drew on the glory and the prestige of the October Revolution. This first example shows that it is necessary to know how to become "independent".

The second example, also in Austria. I doubt if there is a single comrade in our international organization who can deny that before the German defeat, at the very moment when we were still a fraction of the Third International, it would have been preferable for our Austrian comrades to have constituted themselves a kernel within the fold of the Austrian Social Democracy (of the Second International) rather than to be in the clutches of the Landaus and the Freys.

V) Comrade Naville gives the following argument: If we win over the working class to the fold of the united party, we can equally win them over to the fold of the genuine united front and to the fold of the woviets." Unfortunately for Naville's argument, there are no soviets and it would not do us much good to repeat "workingclass alliance" in the same way that the Stalinists say "Soviets everywhere". This does not create Soviets, nor bring the alliance into being, because we have not much specific gravity in the working class. We have reproached the Stalinists for crying "Soviets everywhere" without taking adequate steps to create them. In the same way Naville shouts "workingclass alliance" without pointing out a way of bringing it into existence. All the more if the working class, instead of following the path that we are proposing of "Working class alliance" decides (for a number of reasons that we shall not consider here) on a different path: that of organic unity which could, just like working class alliance, permit the comparison and delimitation of political tendencies, Naville proposes to hold aloof. It is not at the moment when the Stalinists abandon their ultimatism that we should take it up.

We shall examine the other points later, especially that of the entrance into the S.F.I.O. in relation to this question of organic unity.

P. Franck (August 1, 1934)

-----  
The End  
---

To the Central Committee of the Communist League  
July 26, 1934

Dear Comrades:

I) From a private communication from Gerard I have learned that the C.C. (including the province) was convoked for Sunday. By whom and under what circumstances? I don't know. I can only feel surprise at not having been kept in touch with what is going on, that is, at not having been summoned and not having received the agenda. Besides I wish to emphasize that since my departure I have not received any circulars nor internal bulletins, nor one number of Verité. This is all the more incomprehensible to me since I was not one of those who declared that their "non-cooperation with the C.C. was to be effective" (Molinier) and who put this maxim into practice. I do not see why my absence from Paris should entail such a rupture of relations. I beg you to remedy it.

Although I am ignorant of the agenda of the C.C. for Sunday, I am herewith submitting some propositions to you. I beg you to put them to a vote of the comrades.

a) The C.C. should direct the Political Bureau to elaborate a general resolution as a discussion basis for the national conference previously decided upon (end of August)

b) The C.C. should adopt the (joint) resolution as the basis of its work.

Until now the discussion has been conducted by false methods (meetings of parliamentary commissions, poorly thought out measures, etc.) Obviously it is not a question of discussion among the comrades, it is a question of making them relax their grip. This can only end in splits and fissions.

II) All the events of the past weeks militate in favor of the maintenance of the League as an autonomous organization. Let us take for example the discussion of the single party. Now, it is as to who will defend the single party. The position of our partisans is excellent if they can dictate the conditions of the single party on their base. It is necessary to encourage the tendencies who understand that making a union with Frossard & Thorez is a backward step. On the other hand, making a split from Frossard and Blum, in a word foreseeing the genesis of a new party as we have done (much too modestly) until now, that is progress. If you are in the S.F.I.O., in spite of all your howls you will have only one platform: Unity with the C.P. They tell us that the formula is "toward a new Congress of Tours!" what nonsense! This recalls Chamberland's new "Congress of Amiens". In the same year they wish to make us pass through August 4th (Hitler in power) Zimmerwald (bloc of the four) and...Tours! This is too much, comrades. It is all monkey shine. Tours was the split of a communist majority supported by the Third International which had split off from the Second. Doriot says today that it is necessary to "revise 1912" thus we must not do what was done at Tours. But this is not our opinion. Thus, far from being near Tours, we go ahead and draw back, like the divers who in the movies are made to splash up from the water to the diving board. It is a fact. Before making the split of Tours, we should have to have had unity. Remember 1905, remember 1912.

The supporters of the entrance into the S.F.I.O. dish out two contradictory arguments. Comrade Durand (of the I.S.) gave us a theoretical basis when he said we are at the crux of an immense period of recoil ("revolutionary" understood). To stay outside (the big opportunist parties) means to cut off from the masses; to hold together as a little group is sterile; therefore, we go to the S.F.I.O. (always with this argument which gives us no foothold at the bottom). Comrade Molinier says the opposite. Time is short. They or we--it is a matter of months. The masses are on the offensive: isolated we cannot lead them and our pass words will not penetrate. If we are in the S.F.I.O. we shall quickly be a leading fraction.

Finally all agree that we can get out if we must, but "with 2-3000 workers"! But tell me, 2000 workers when there are 2-300,000 in the other parties, is that not still isolation?

All these arguments are very painful; they will convince only those comrades who are still centrist, or politically demoralized (Craipeau, Frank).

The whole discussion tends to try to convince us that we are a hopeless sect. This is exactly the point of view of Cachin, if I am to judge by the report in l'Humanite. That there are very few of us, without an effective role of leadership of the masses, this is not to be doubted. But it is still the masses that must push us forward (and not literary combinations). To this the answer is: Even in the soviets, the little groups (anarchist, dyndicalists) were unable to develop; even Plekhanov and his group were unable to penetrate into the Soviets. Another powerful argument! Are we anarchists, syndicalists or Plekhanovists? As the spirit of attack and democracy develop, we shall progress with or without the support of Messrs. Zyromski, Fred Zeller and Co. But if this spirit does not progress, all the contortions we can make now, even in the S.F.I.O. or God knows where, will not make us a leading revolutionary party.

On this subject--heard a very interesting argument. In January 1917, it seems, Lenin found himself completely demoralized, the Bolshevik party was in fact obliterated or centrist in its majority and the war continued, wiping out physically the reserves of the future. Lenin thought the war could become a "permanent obstacle". This fact is extremely important. On the eve of February 17 (which transforms our perspectives), Lenin saw no way out. And why? Is it because the left Zimmerwaldists were still only a small group, that the Bolshevik party was reduced to its least common denominator? No, it was because they did not see any reaction of the masses against the massacre that pursued them. Who can say if after three or four more years of war there would not have been a reaction lasting for decades? How can we hope under such conditions that the revolutionary vanguard (which does not fall ready made from heaven, but can only live thanks to the general movement of the exploited) would play its role? But Lenin did not draw from this the conclusion that it was necessary to fit in with the centrists, to follow a watch word of "peace", etc. No, not at all! He fought all the more violently for the break with the centrists, while still keeping in touch with them. Thus he prepared the hour when the masses in motion could increasingly give their confidence to this group.

Again, comparison is not reasoning. But this is an excellent example. For it is necessary to show one characteristic of the situation. It is this: the general backward movement of the workers (international offensive of fascism) is operating in a period that included the liquidation of two Internationals. To fuse the new International in the fire of struggle we must on the other hand build on the rebirth of the workingclass movement. The separate existence of our organization is an expression of the fact that we are surmounting the ruins and the rubbish accumulated by two antagonistic centrist tendencies.

III) The critical examination of our errors, weaknesses (read "treacheries") is left out altogether. To begin by accusing the leadership of the League with being "satisfied" in order later to show them the S.F.I.O. on the road of uncertainty, is poor phrasing. Several of our documents sent to the C.C. claim that for six months we are following a semi-socialist line. It is even a result, it seems. Well, if we are so, if that is how it is, it is very clear: we must help to correct it, to change it! We must explain the source of this attitude, etc. But here on the contrary is the conclusion: Since you are so "adapted" to the S.F.I.O., why not enter it?

3.

Perhaps there you will learn to fight against Blum? Really it is ridiculous.

During the last month we published an action program (which was elaborated in the course of a study and discussion of more than a month) and which sums up our propositions for the present period. The League has encountered complete hostility on the subject from the international organization. An offensive of unheard of violence was initiated by the I.S. against the P.B. of the League accused of bankruptcy. Whom can we make believe that such criticisms and divergencies can be masked by the amiable proposition: Let us save the situation by entering the S.F.I.O.?

I hope the C.C. will know how to make an impartial and serviceable estimate of its action in view of the National Conference. I do not insist on the subject of the article in Humanite "among provocateurs". I think you immediately grasped the importance of this. On this subject we shall have to put out a good tract, we must speak of it at the tribunal of the 29; we must take action of coordination at the center and receive a retraction. I don't know the article in Liberte but it must have two objects: 1) to push the C.P. in its retractions, 2) the old one. The article in Humanite is an exceptional circumstance since it is a complete capitulation before the advance of fascism. This time it will be necessary to wage a vigorous offensive. It will be necessary to cite Lenin on the subject. The C.C. should make a political declaration of the organization on that subject. We must quote our action program, etc.

I am not making a theme for fear of repeating what you have prepared.

This article joined to that of Doriot show that we are not forgotten, dear comrades! We must spread our action program.

V) Events in Austria--It is necessary to agitate for joining the I.S. Apparently war is the central question. This we must also speak of on the 29th. I think this question will be covered in the special and in a tract.

Fraternally, P.N.

-----