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Contents:

ON THE SITUATION OF THE LEFT OPPOSITION

A letter to the Sections.

By G. GOURCY December 16, 1932.

The most important result of the trip to Copenhagen was undoubtedly the coming together of Oppositionists from many countries. The original intention was to call together a dozen comrades from the points nearest to Denmark in order to make the necessary safety measures. In point of fact, however, twenty-four comrades (of whom two were delayed) arrived among them the most responsible functionaries of several sections, and including sympathizers, a total of thirty men.

If Stalin informed the capitalist police by radio of a "Trotskyist" conference" meeting in Copenhagen, that was a lie. Since it came by accident, the trip to Copenhagen necessary caught the Left Opposition by surprise. The preparatory work for the conference was still in its early stages. There could be no question of accepting a platform or programmatic thesis in Copenhagen. Even the European Sections were not completely represented by far, and not all the comrades who arrived had strong powers. Unfortunately a conference did not take place and in the course of events could not have taken place.

It is needless to say, however, that the comrades who came there took advantage to a great extent of the opportunity to get to know each other and to discuss in private consultations the most urgent and burning problems. The unforeseen, hastily improvised meeting of two dozen Bolshevick-Leninists from seven European countries will undoubtedly be recorded as an important achievement in the history of our international fraction.

The Left Opposition has grown considerably. The cadres of functionaries know the history of the Left Opposition in the various countries, orientate themselves freely in theoretical and political questions, and embody all together, and each separately, a considerable political experience. The consultations which lasted several days, fused together the comrades solidly, a fact which will have fruitful effects on the entire future work. Without falling a victim to official optimism, we can say with assurance that all who participated in the consultation took home from it a new supply of force and confidence.

The SPANISH OPPOSITION.

One question threw a shadow over the consultation: the situation of the Spanish Opposition. If we could observe certain

nuances within the international Left Opposition with regard to the sicknesses and mistakes of the Spanish Opposition, these nuances stepped completely into the background in the course of the consultation, before the feeling of common concern. All the participants were completely in accord with the view that we must have an open and complete discussion with the Spanish comrades, and that this discussion must not be limited this time to the leaders of the opposition; only if all the members of the sections are made familiar with the questions in dispute can the Spanish Opposition be brought on the right road.

It would be criminal to close our eyes any further before the real situation or to palliate it: if we do not succeed in obtaining clarity in time and completely through an open discussion on all disputed questions--- and too many of them have piled up--- then the push of events may divide us into different camps.

Unfortunately the Spanish section was not represented at the consultation. At the last minute certain obviously accidental circumstances proved an obstacle, but I take the liberty of expressing my certainty that the leading Spanish comrades, if they locked themselves less into their environment and showed more interest in their international organization, would have found the way to the Copenhagen consultation without difficulty.

But that if precisely the chief misfortune of the Spanish Opposition, that its leaders have persistently kept the organization away from the internal life and the internal struggles of the other sections, and thereby have shut it off from access to an irreplaceable international experience. But insofar as the Spanish section, through its official position was after all compelled to mix into international questions, its leaders; bound up neither with the experience of the other sections nor with the public opinion of their own organization, let themselves be guided by personal connections, sympathies or antipathies. They substituted all too often--- we must say it openly --- for a Marxist analysis of the situation and the differences of opinion, a petty bourgeois psychologizing and sentimentalizing. So it was in the case of the Catalan Federation (Maurin), where the hopes of several comrades from Barcelona in the "friendly personal relations" for a long time took the place of the principle struggle against petty bourgeois nationalism, and thereby put a brake on the development of the Left Opposition in the most decisive period. So it was in the case of Landau, whom "Communism" surprisingly listed as a collaborator, after Landau, who had shown his utter inadequacy and had remained in the minority, had left the Left Opposition. So it was in the differences of opinion within the French section where the Spanish comrades privately agreed that Rosmer's ideas and methods were worthless, but in public supported Rosmer, indirectly if not directly, on the ground that Rosmer "appealed to them" more than his opponents. So it was in the question of Will, whom the leading Spanish comrades thought it possible to choose as their representative on the International Secret-

ariat, after Lill's political worthlessness had been completely shown. In all these cases, we have not heard from Madrid or Barcelona even a sound of principle-grounding or political explanation.

The same features revealed themselves in no less sharp and painful a form in the inner life of the Spanish organization. The crisis which broke out in its leadership caught by surprise, not only the international Opposition but also the Spanish Section. The members of the Central Committee resigned, one after the other. The whole leadership was concentrated de facto in the hands of Lacroix alone. Then, just as surprisingly, it appeared that Comrade Lacroix was outside of the Central Committee, in fact for a time outside of the Opposition, while the leadership went over to Barcelona. Why? What do the differences of opinion consist in? What are the grounds of the crisis? Nobody knows, at least nobody outside of the narrow circle of the initiated. Such a regime is absolutely impermissible in a revolutionary organization, and can bring it only defeats. By refraining from participation in the struggle on principle questions, and by substituting personal evaluations for political differences of opinion, the Spanish comrades themselves fall victims to inevitable personal conflicts and "palace revolutions"

Such subjective arbitrariness in politics would be completely impossible if the Central Committee of the Spanish section worked under the control of their own organization. But this is not the case. In their defense, several leaders of the Spanish Opposition pointed more than once to the insufficiently high theoretical and political level of the Spanish oppositionists. Obviously an objection that will not hold water! The level of a revolutionary organization rises all the faster, the more immediately it is brought into the discussion of all questions, the less the leaders try to think, act, and behave as guardians for the organization.

The first condition for Party democracy consists of all-sided information. The beginning must be the international documents on the Spanish Opposition; the Spanish Central Committee must obligate itself to communicate these documents to all members of the Opposition; every Spanish Bolshevik-Leninist must study, think through and judge not only the experience with Lill but also the essence of the crisis of the Spanish Central Committee itself. Through this the Spanish Oppositionists will learn much more than through a dozen abstract articles on democratic centralism and the correct relation to "human beings".

The Bordigists

At the consultation the question of the Italian "Prometeo" Group (Bordigists) was subjected to a thorough-going discussion. It was not a case of the principle estimation of this fraction. The experience of many years has proved that the differences between the "Prometeo" group and the International Left Opposition are completely irreconcilable. In such questions as the revolutionary application of democratic slogans or the policy of the united front, the Bordigists are in agreement not with us

but with the Stalinists (insofar as the Stalinists grow through with an ultra-left and not an opportunistic phase). To take upon ourselves so much as the shadow of responsibility for the tactical views of the Bordigists would mean for the International Left Opposition, and in the first instance for our German section, to hang a stone around one's own neck. Unity by no means signifies absolute salvation. Under certain circumstances, an open and honest split, i.e., one carried through on a principle basis, proves to be necessary, not only to free the hands of both sides, but also to prepare the possibility of a future real, and not a fictitious, unification.

No one at the consultation denied that the Bordigists represent a serious revolutionary group, which must not be placed on the same level as the rotten cliques of Landau & Co. But the fact is, that the conditions of emigre existence permit this group safely to hold on to such views as we, on the ground of our collective international experience, hold to be sectarian and most profoundly injurious. Living in common with the Bordigists for three years has shown absolutely no positive results. The Bolshevik-Leninists, in the form of the New Italian Opposition, have not succeeded in penetrating into the Bordigists, in spite of numerous attempts. On the other hand, the Bordigists have not been able to win anyone for themselves within the International Left Opposition. This fact is most instructive. If in spite of constant contact between two fractions there is no kind of fusion of ideas, i.e., no reciprocal interpenetration and influence, then there remains only the conclusion that we have before us two different and sharply distinguished groupings. In common work they can only paralyze one another.

The fact that the Bordigists have no one to share their views outside of Italy and thereby represent a purely national sect, results from the Marxist standpoint in an annihilating verdict as to the value of this group. The policy of the international revolution cannot be carried out "in one country". The Bordigists feel this themselves. Just for this reason they hang on tightly to the signboard of the International Left Opposition, their fictitious membership in which helps them to mask their own national isolation. But we cannot have the slightest ground to keep up the mask. On the contrary, here, as in so many other cases, we must proclaim openly that which is. This is required too by the well-understood interview of the Bordigist fraction itself.

Where the criticism of ideas does not help, the criticism of events is needed. Instead of obstructing each other, paralyzing each other, and complicating profound differences of opinion with daily friction and organizational quarreling, it is incomparably better to separate in time, peacefully and without enmity, and thus leave the examination of the two lines to the further course of the revolutionary struggle.

To wait for the official conference in order to separate finally from the Bordigists, would be superfluous and harmful

formalism. In view of the unusual difficulties to which the International Left Opposition is exposed, we cannot state with assurance whether the conference will be able to meet in the immediately next period. In Germany it is possible that serious events can develop before we succeed in calling the conference together. It would be inexcusable to leave hanging in mid-air a question which is so ripe and clear to everybody.

The consultation had sufficient authority, in the sense of reflecting the true views of the International Left. It expressed itself in favor of immediate liquidation of the fictitious tie between the Bordigists and the Bolshevik-Leninists. We must hope that the national sections will express their agreement with the view of the consultation and thereby transform it into a final decision.

The French Section

The major part of the preparatory work for the consultation lay as usual upon the French Ligue, which was broadly represented in Copenhagen. If, in the Second and Third Internationals, the French section has already borne features of national limitedness, the French section of the Left Opposition, on the contrary, is marked by a very great international initiative. The Ligue took an active participation in the making of contacts with almost all the other sections and contribute to their development through illuminating all questions of the International in the pages of its organs.

The internal development of the Ligue itself in the meantime has gone on until very recent times under great difficulties. All attempts to assimilate the numerous old split-up groups, which are especially numerous in France, have led to nothing. The latest attempt of this kind was wrecked by the resistance of Treint. Certainly it is to be deplored that Treint has recently shown a lack of political perspective, i.e., the ability to distinguish the important from the unimportant, the episodic from the permanent, as well as a lack of the necessary persistence in working his way into the organization and occupying that place in it which would correspond to Treint's indisputable positive qualities. Only the further growth of the Ligue itself, and first of all the expansion and consolidation of its basis among the workers, will create the conditions for the utilization and assimilation of such obstinate and undisciplined elements as Treint. As for the present Treint group is concerned, it is just as fruitless and hopeless as the groups of Rosmer, Souvarine, Landau, Spartacos, Weisbord, etc. All the accidental formations of this kind, without having an independent principle basis under their feet, are condemned by their very existence to remain outside of the workers' movement. They have the same relation to revolutionary politics as the amateur theater in art, i.e., they serve exclusively for the diversion of the participants themselves and their nearest relations.

The Ligue itself in any case has passed the period of uninterrupted internal struggle and has worked out the indispensable

unity of ideas and methods. Without wishing to minimize this achievement in the least, we must still remember that with so narrow a basis in the working class, the political unity cannot be distinguished by great permanence. Security against a relapse into the destructive inner disease can lie on only one road; to direct all attention, all efforts, below, to the workers - in the Party, in trade unions and in shops.

The leading comrades of the Ligue are well aware of the fact that they must concentrate in the next period on the questions of French social life and the French labor movement. This refers to theoretical as well as practical work. The Ligue, which has welded together valuable cadres, must now acquire at all costs a solid proletarian foundation.

Again on "Fraction" and "Second Party"

In the British section the question is under discussion, whether one ought to limit oneself to internal work within the Communist Party or create independent ties with workers outside of the party. This question, which at various times has arisen before all the sections, is not one of principle. The attempt to derive the scope and character of our activity from the concept of the "fraction" would be purely doctrinaire. The transition from "propaganda", i.e., the education of cadres, to "agitation", i.e., the influencing of the masses through cadres, has always provoked difficulties and differences of opinion within young revolutionary organizations, without their being faced by the dilemma, "Fraction or Party?" The question must be decided depending on the real forces and the situation. But since all our sections, including the youngest, the British, have taken over very valuable cadres from the Party, we must endeavor as quickly as possible to find our own points of support in the workers' organizations, naturally without giving up even for a minute the struggle for the unification of the Communist ranks.

The inclination of certain comrades (e.g. in France) to interpret the role of the fraction in such a sense that the Opposition must not undertake a single step outside of the Party limits, is completely false. Our actual relation to the Comintern finds its expression, not in abstaining from independent action, but in the content and the direction of such action. It would be ridiculous to behave as if we belonged, in fact, to the official organizations of the Comintern. We must carry out such policies as will open to us the gates of the Comintern. For this, we must become stronger, which cannot be achieved if we tie our hands as against the Stalinist bureaucracy by an artificial and false discipline. We must turn to the workers where they are, we must go to the youth, must teach them the ABC of Communism, build cells in factories and trade unions. But this work must be carried on in such a manner that the ordinary Communists can see that for us it is a question, not of building a new Party, but of reviving the Communist International.

Urbahns constantly proclaims a new Party in Germany, only to call for votes at election time for the Communist Party, which in his words is "finally disintegrated". Who can understand this? The

The contradiction is all the more crying since Urbahns, in former years, when he had not yet broken with the International Left and had not yet proclaimed a second Party, set up independent lists at elections of all kinds. With such startling "maneuvers" Urbahns knows how to blockade the road to the existing Communist Party as well as to a new and unknown one. It is no wonder that in a few years he has completely destroyed his organization, whose best elements have come over to the ranks of our German section. But nothing can influence this strategist, who shouts with all the more determination for a new Party, the less ground remains under his feet.

Our Belgian comrades, who are consistently strengthening their position, on the eve of the last elections to Parliament proposed to the official Party to set up lists of candidates in common, at the same time being prepared to occupy the uncertain positions on these lists. The political purpose of the proposal therefore consisted in supporting the official Communist candidacies with the votes of these workers too, who have confidence only in the Opposition. That was a perfectly correct tactical step, whose meaning is easily to be explained to every Communist worker. Although the Party refused the proposal, the Belgian Opposition called upon the workers to vote for the official candidates. It is needless to say that this second step was just as correct as the first. If the official Party could not obtain the votes of many and many a worker who trusted Lescail but not Jacquemotte, that was not the fault of the Opposition but of the official Party.

Our Spanish comrades, in this field too, have not utilized the experiences of the International Left. At their last conference they most unexpectedly declared themselves in favor of independent participation in the elections. From what has been said above, it is sufficiently clear that in this question too we are not inclined to Petichism. Under certain circumstances, the Left Opposition can and must put up its own candidates. But this must come as a result, not of the false hunt for "independence", but out of the real relation of forces and must be correspondingly made clear in the course of the agitational work: it is not a question of snatching elective offices away from the official Party, but of raising the banner of Communism where the Party is not in a position to do so. It is clear that under the present relation of forces independent oppositional candidacies can have only the character of an exception and not of the rule.

But perhaps the peculiar conditions in Spain justify the tactics of the Spanish Opposition, i.e., the course in effect toward a second Party? Let us assume this is so. Why then do not the Spanish comrades attempt to explain these conditions to us and enrich us with their experience? Surely they do not believe that the Spanish conditions cannot be understood outside of the borders of Spain? For in the latter case, we would have to ask, "Why do we have an international organization at all?"

The German Section

In the discussion of the report of the German section, the ques-

tion of the relation to the RGC (the trade-union organization of the Party) occupied the first place. We hope to make our position on this exceptionally important question clear in the near future in a separate article. The differences of opinion in the leadership arose - or at least became evident - in connection with the strike of the common carrier services in Berlin. Whether the dispute has a purely episodic character, or whether deeper differences are hidden under it, is hard to judge as yet. In any case, all the participations in the consultation were inclined to think that the leading German comrades were too hasty in bringing the question on to the pages of the "Permanent Revolution" and giving the discussion an unnecessarily sharp character.

Naturally in the presence of serious and lasting differences of opinion an open discussion is inevitable and indispensable. Although it weakens the organization temporarily, it is immeasurably more fruitful than an organizational struggle behind the scenes or half-concealed "allusions" in the press, which bring no results to anybody and only poison the atmosphere. But we must still regard it as completely impermissible to enter the path of public discussion without actual political necessity. The "Permanent Revolution" is an organ intended first of all to influence circles outside of the organization. The discussion can and must be opened in an organ destined exclusively for internal distribution (a bulletin, discussion paper, etc.). The interests of internal democracy are not in the least hurt by this. But at the same time unnecessary weapons are not placed in the hands of opponents and enemies. We must not forget for a moment the unusual, we can boldly say historically unprecedented, difficulties under which the Left Opposition labors. Suffice it to recall that the Stalinist staff over the radio denounced the "Trotskyist conference" in Copenhagen to the capitalist police. Such a situation lays double and triple responsibilities on the leaders of the Opposition. The experience of the preceding internal strife, which all too often took on the character of personal scrapping, has seriously weakened the authority of the German Opposition, and this burdensome inheritance has not yet completely disappeared. All the greater is the duty to be concerned about the maintenance of the unity of the organization and the solidarity of the leadership, and to avoid as much as possible such methods of discussion as will artificially sharpen the differences of opinion and are apt to poison the atmosphere.

The reports of the German comrades, as well as the composition of the delegation, has proven beyond a doubt that in the ranks of the German section there exists a serious cadre of worker-Communists, who are adequately qualified politically and at the same time are tied up with mass organizations. That is a very great achievement, from which we must start and build further. In the first instance, we must assure a composition of the leadership which is more proletarian and more bound up with the masses.

Thanks to the special conditions of its origin, the Left Opposition was composed during a certain period (the period of decay) of individuals and little grouplets, predominantly of intellec-

tual or semi-intellectual character, without clear political views and without roots in the working class. Accustomed neither to serious work nor to responsibility, closely tied up to nothing and nobody, political nomads without baggage, who carried some cheap formulas, some smart critical sentences and some practice in intrigue from town to town and from country to country, such "oppositionists" - Landau is their most complete representative - for a long time put a brake on the development of the Opposition and compromised it in the eyes of the thinking workers. The cleansing of the Opposition of "Landauism" has taken no little time in the last four years, and the success in this field, as well as in others, is indisputable. But the real victory over the spirit of intrigue and of petty quarreling is conceivable only through the creation of a leadership out of firm proletarians, who are bound up with the masses and feel themselves to be the masters in their own organization. Our German section is completely ripe for such a serious internal reform. There remains only to wish that the coming conference of the German Opposition will be called and will be carried through under these auspices.

The Left Opposition in the U.S.S.R.

In the past year very important changes took place in the situation of the Russian Opposition. Their general direction can be characterized by the word "ascent".

Many hundreds, perhaps even thousands of former capitulators, particularly workers, have come back to the path of the Opposition; these are the elements which in the Spring of 1928 honestly but prematurely believed in the principle change of the official course. The places of exile and imprisonment are constantly being filled with such "backsliders". It is unnecessary to say how much this fact strengthens the authority of those oppositionists who never abandoned their banner for a single hour.

Among the older generation of Bolsheviks, including those who only yesterday were ardent Stalinists, can be observed the complete decay of the authority of Stalin and the group near him, as well as a decided turn toward greater attention and estimation of the Left Opposition. It is most significant that precisely the old Bolsheviks, who took an active part in the life of the Party under Lenin, but later let themselves be scared by the ghost of "Trotskyism", now, after their experience with the Stalinist regime, begin to discover where the truth lies. That is a very important symptom!

But incomparably more important is the process which is going on among the workers, especially the youth. Just as in its time the Tsarist bureaucracy called every dissatisfied worker, protester, striker, a "socialist", sent him to prison or to Siberia, and made it possible for him to meet real socialists there, so the Stalinist bureaucracy now arrests and exiles in ever-increasing numbers dissatisfied and protesting workers, declaring them "Trotskyists" and pushing them on to the road of the Left Opposition.

As far as the illegal organization of the Bolsheviki-Leninists in the U.S.S.R. is concerned, only the first steps have been taken to its reorganization. While in the West most of the oppositionist sections have important and well-knit cadres, which have not yet conquered the necessary mass basis, in the U.S.S.R. on the contrary, while there is a powerful basis, the cadres of the Left Opposition are still exposed to the merciless blows of the apparatus, which make the creation of a centralized leadership more difficult. But the clear and indisputable growth of the influence of the Left Opposition, the broadening of the circle of its adherents in the working class, the influx of sympathy even on the part of the apparatus, are the best assurance that the restoration of a centralized organization is a matter of the immediate future.

All foreign sections have the possibility of collaborating directly and indirectly to the revivification and strengthening of the organization of the Russian Bolsheviki-Leninists. We must make contact with Soviet citizens living abroad, particularly with young students; all opportunities and possibilities for the sending of oppositionist literature, especially the Russian Bulletin, to the U.S.S.R. must be utilized; contacts must be made with foreign workers travelling to the U.S.S.R. or living there; foreign tourists must be utilized to transmit literature, to maintain correspondence, to collect political information; contact must be made with Russian sailors in port cities, with a view to direct political influence on them as well as to transmit literature. All these kinds of work naturally require exceptional attentiveness and caution. The intermediaries must be carefully chosen, so that police agents, class enemies or Stalinist provocateurs are not mixed in among them. Systematic work in the directions indicated above can be of inestimable value to our comrades in the U.S.S.R. And it is scarcely necessary to explain the importance to all sections of the Left Opposition the rapid growth of the Bolsheviki-Leninists in the U.S.S.R. will assume!

The Historic Role of the Left Opposition

In a previous letter the thought was expressed that under certain historical circumstances the proletariat can conquer even under a left-centrist leadership. Many comrades were inclined, as I have been informed, to interpret this thought in the sense of minimizing the role of the Left Opposition and of palliating the mistakes and sins of bureaucratic centrism. Needless to say how far I am from such an interpretation.

The strategy of the Party is an exceedingly important element of the proletarian revolution. But it is by no means the only factor. With an exceptionally favorable relation of forces the proletariat can come to power even under a non-Marxist leadership. This was the case, for example, in the Paris Commune, and, in a period which lies closer to us, in Hungary. The depth of the disintegration of the enemy camp, its political demoralization, the worthlessness of its leaders, can assure the decisive superiority to the proletariat for a certain time even if its own leadership is weak.

but, in the first place, there is nothing to guarantee such a "fortunate" coincidence of circumstances; it represents the exception rather than the rule. Second, the victory obtained under such conditions remains, as the same two examples - Paris and Hungary - prove, exceedingly unstable. To weaken the struggle against Stalinism on the ground that under certain conditions even the Stalinist leadership would show itself unable to prevent the victory of the proletariat (as the leadership of Thaelmann could not prevent the growth in the number of Communist voters) - that would be to stand all the elements of Marxist politics on their heads.

The theoretical possibility of a victory under centrist leadership must be understood, besides, not mechanically but dialectically. Not only the official Party as a whole, but also its apparatus, does not represent something immovable and unchangeable. If the original attitude of Newmann-Reumels-Thaelmann, "First the Fascists, then we", had remained in force, it would have been entirely possible that the Fascists might be in power today. Weak as the resistance was which the Party developed later, still it created the perspectives of a civil war, frightened the big bourgeoisie, and compelled Hitler to enter upon the "constitutional" road, which has obviously weakened him. At the same time, it is completely indisputable that in the change of position of the Party, the decisive role was played by the Left Opposition, if only through the fact that it posed the problem of Fascism clearly and sharply before the working class. To change this course of ours, to adapt ourselves to the prejudices of the Stalinists instead of appealing to the judgement of the Communists, would mean to imitate the desperate Centrists of the SAP (Socialist Workers' Party of Germany), who pass over from Rosenfeld to Thaelmann, then burn their fingers and pass over to somebody else.

If what has been said above is true of Germany, where the extraordinary pressure of circumstances temporarily overcomes the policies of failure of the Stalinists, what shall we say of those countries where the official Communist Party is in a condition of constant decay, as in France or in Great Britain? (The British Communist Party has dropped in ten months from 15,000 to 3,000 paying members).

We all agree that to counterpose the adventurist slogan of a second Party to the existing Party, as the existing Party, as the Stalinists accuse us, would mean to block our way to the Communist workers themselves. But to blur our difference with Centrism in the name of facilitating "unity", would mean, not only to commit political suicide, but also to cover up, strengthen and nourish all the negative features of bureaucratic Centrism, and by that fact alone help the reactionary currents within it against the revolutionary tendencies.

If recent years have proven anything, it has been the principle truth of the Left Opposition, its fitness to survive, its right to a great historic role. The accidental, unprepared consultation in Copenhagen has shown, that the cadres of the Opposition have fully grasped its mission and see their road clearly. We

can firmly hope that the consultation will give a serious impulsion to the further development of the sections.

G. Guroff

P. S. Because of the great distance, our Greek section could not take part in the consultation. But on the way, many comrades were able to meet with a substantial number of Athenian Bolshevik-Leninists and obtained a very favorable impression of them. Suffice it to say, that the Greek organization has assumed the task of changing their paper, the "Pali ton Taxeon" into a daily newspaper in the nearest future. How far from this are the other sections, unfortunately!

For similar reasons - the great distance, and for many, too, material and police difficulties - at the conference no representatives of the American League, the Tchecho-Slovak, Bulgarian, Swiss, Polish Oppositionists and other groups, could not take part.

The calling of a real conference, which will include representatives of all sections of the International Left Opposition, therefore remains a matter for the future.

Dec. 16, 1932

G.G.

V