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THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISINTEGRATION OF WORLD STALINISM

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NOTE

During the split in the world Trotskyist movement, which lasted for some ten years until it was finally healed in 1963, the two sides developed their own positions on the developing crisis of Stalinism and the repercussions of the blow against the cult of Stalin struck by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In many respects the positions of the two sides paralleled each other, particularly after the Twentieth Congress, although there were divergences.

The comrades of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International codified their analyses and programmatic proposals at three world gatherings which they considered to be world congresses of the movement as a whole.

The comrades adhering to the International Committee of the Fourth International (which was supported by the Socialist Workers Party), considered both sides as constituting factions of the Fourth International, and therefore did not recognize the congresses sponsored by the IEC as empowered to speak for the movement as a whole.

The positions of the International Committee of the Fourth International on the crisis of Stalinism were expressed in the documents of the various national sectors adhering to its views. This was because the IC had great difficulty in meeting at an international gathering during those years. The SWP was particularly hampered because of State Department prohibitions in the McCarthyite witch-hunt period against leftists traveling abroad. It was virtually impossible for leading Trotskyists in North America to meet with their cothinkers in other countries.

Most members and sympathizers of the North American Trotskyist movement are familiar with the positions of the IC on this subject, but are not so well acquainted with the positions developed by the IEC in that period, particularly since the documents are no longer readily available. We have therefore decided to issue the four key documents of the IEC in this educational bulletin, concluding with a resolution upon which both the IEC and IC reached agreement at the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International in June 1963.

The first document is a resolution, "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism," adopted by the Fourth World Congress" sponsored by the comrades of the IEC in 1954.

The second is a resolution, "The Decline and Fall of Stalinism," adopted at the "Fifth World Congress" in 1957.

The third is a report made by Ernest Germain at this congress, "Prospects and Dynamics of the Political Revolution Against the Bureaucracy."

The fourth is a resolution, "The Crisis of Stalinism," adopted at the "Sixth World Congress" in 1961.

The fifth and final document is the joint resolution, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Situation in the USSR and the Other Workers States," adopted at the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International that ended the split in 1963.

The documents are reproduced from three issues of the English-language edition of 4th International, No. 1, Winter 1958; No. 12, Winter 1960-61; and No. 17, October-December 1963.

February 1970

RISE, DECLINE, AND PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FALL OF STALINISM

I

Rise and Decline of Stalinism

RESOLUTION APPROVED BY THE FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS OF 1954

The evolution of the Soviet Union and of the world working-class movement since 1917 is fundamentally determined by the dynamic of the relation of class forces on the world scale. This development has passed through major phases: the rise of the revolution in 1917-1923, the ebb of the world revolution in 1923-1943, and the new revolutionary rise since 1943.

The October Revolution was the starting point of a new historic stage in numerous fields:

— It gave birth to the first workers' state upon one-sixth of the globe.

— It impelled a part of the working-class movement forward on the theoretical plane and favored its independent organization through the creation of the Communist International and of the Communist Parties.

— It gave a powerful impulsion to the colonial peoples in their initial struggles against imperialism.

The period from 1917 to 1923 is in the first instance a period of struggle for the survival of the new state and for the formation and consolidation of the communist vanguard throughout the world.

The defeat of the world revolution following World War I resulted in the Soviet Union in the crushing of soviet democracy by a bureaucracy which established a dictatorial political power under which the economic and cultural development of the Soviet Union has taken place for the last thirty years. Through the action and weight of this state, the Soviet bureaucracy has exercised a considerable influence over the mass movement throughout the world, in the first place over the organizations and movements created by the impulsion of the Russian Revolution.

The Communist International and the Communist Parties ought to have adjusted their activity to the new stage, that is to say, ought to have consolidated themselves theoretically and politically, strengthened their ties with the masses and in this way prepared

a future revolutionary upsurge. But the weight of the first workers' state and of its bureaucratic degeneration upon organizations that had scarcely emerged from the Social Democracy, without solid cadres, likewise led to a degeneration of these organizations. The Communist International became the principal instrument through which the Kremlin transmitted its orders to the Communist Parties. These parties, whose political and theoretical development was thus derailed and whose selection of cadres and central bodies was accomplished in a bureaucratic manner, utilized the masses and the mass movements not to promote the world revolution but for the benefit of the bureaucracy's interests.

This utilization of Communist Parties in the service of the Kremlin's diplomacy contributed to bringing about a series of heavy defeats of the workers' movement which culminated in the triumph of Nazism in Germany and in the unleashing of World War II.

On the eve of the Second World War, the Communist Parties in the principal capitalist countries were minorities inside the working class. Stalinism, that is to say, subordination of the interests of the world proletariat to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy — operated through a relatively simple system:

— a workers' state under a police dictatorship;

— weak workers' organizations directed by the Communist International, itself tightly controlled.

At the end of World War II and in the years that followed, events of cardinal importance have brought it about that there now gravitates within the present orbit of Stalinism the following complex aggregate:

a) the *Soviet Union*, which, after putting up an extraordinary resistance during the war thanks to the power of the productive relations established by the October Revolution, and to the attachment the masses feel for those relations,

has continued its economic development which has, in fact, made it now the second industrial power in the world;

b) *new workers' states in Eastern Europe*, which have been established essentially by bureaucratic action, without a prior plan by the Kremlin;

c) *China*, where the Chinese CP has come to power on the basis of a formidable peasant uprising;

d) *a series of colonial movements* under Stalinist or pro-Stalinist leadership;

e) *the Communist Parties in the capitalist world*: those in Western Europe experienced toward the end of World War II important growth as a consequence of the « Resistance Movement »; during the following years the Communist Parties have lost the ground which they had won in a whole series of countries; but in important cases such as France and Italy, these parties have acquired an influence over the majority of the working class and, despite certain fluctuations, have preserved it since then;

f) *Jugoslavia* might have been added to these, up to June 1948; there the JCP had conquered power thanks to a heroic mass struggle which it had led.

The fundamental conditions under which the Soviet bureaucracy and its tight hold over the Communist Parties developed, namely, the ebb of the revolution, the isolation of the Soviet Union and the backward condition of its economy — these conditions have disappeared.

The equilibrium which assured this control prior to World War II — and which in its own way reflected the relative world equilibrium during this same period — has been disrupted.

Far from constituting a factor of consolidation, the « expansion » of Stalinism contained within it tendencies acting toward its own disintegration, which have been demonstrated by: the break-away of the JCP; the numerous purges of the CP leaderships in the « People's Democracies »; the acceptance of a sort of co-leadership with the Chinese CP in regard to the Asian Communist movements; the weakening of certain Communist Parties, to the verge of their virtual liquidation; the end of political immobility within the Soviet Union; and the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge in the glaci.

One of the most striking manifestations of this new situation is the inability of the Kremlin to reestablish, in place of the Communist International dissolved in 1943, an international centre in any way viable.

Finally, despite the growth of the mass Communist Parties and of the attraction of the Soviet Union as a power, there have been formed in the course of

this post-war period mass currents evolving toward the left outside Stalinist influence (Bevanism, Asian Socialist Parties...).

Various factors however are operating to prolong the Kremlin's influence over the world workers' movement and the non-capitalist countries: the threat of imperialist war; the power of the Soviet state exercised over materially weaker partners; the fact that the masses, making use of organizations at their disposal in order to solve problems posed by revolutionary situations, are first rallying around the existing leaderships. There is finally the fact that the conceptions and methods acquired during the period of the rise of Stalinism continue to operate because of inertia and tradition, all the more so because the bureaucratic structure of these parties and countries and their relations with the Soviet Union, have survived.

In no place where the Communist Parties possess a mass base, except in Jugoslavia, have mass breaks with the Kremlin been produced; and similarly there has not been any mass break within these parties. The disintegration of Stalinism has begun by assuming the form of penetration into these organizations of ideas opposed to the interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy; and of a process of modification in the hierarchical bureaucratic relations previously established. It is first of all and above all in this manner that the disintegration of Stalinism will proceed for a whole period: the Communist organizations with a mass base will maintain themselves, but within these forms of organization there will develop tendencies toward a new content, both as regards the ideas which they express and as regards the existing organizational relations through which the tight hold of the Soviet bureaucracy finds its expression.

In countries where the Communist Parties constitute a small minority of the workers' movement, the revolutionary rise, by channeling itself in other organizations, accentuates the isolation of these Communist Parties and thus provokes profound crises in them.

The events which have taken place in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death constitute on the one hand the beginning of the maturing of the objective and subjective conditions for the political revolution in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, these changes likewise constitute the relaxation of the brake, which operated in the most conservative and even reactionary way upon the organizations which today still group together the largest number of revolutionary militants, even in the many countries where the Communist Parties are extremely weak. As a result there has opened up a new stage not only in the Soviet Union but also in the development of the Communist Parties and

of the non-capitalist countries, accelerating the disintegration of Stalinism in the sense indicated above.

The role of the Fourth International, which was created to assure the continuity of the revolutionary Marxist programme and organization in order to build a new revolutionary leadership for the proletariat, has the task of intervening in this disintegration in order to rally around its banner the healthy communist forces influenced up until now by Stalinism.

I

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

1. The revolutionary rise unleashed by the First World War shook only the weakest of the imperialist powers. It left intact the colonial empires and thus permitted those imperialisms that possessed colonies to crush in the bud the upsurge of the revolutionary movement by granting important concessions to the masses (8-hour work day, universal suffrage, etc.). When this revolutionary rise occurred, the United States, having passed through a half-century of feverish economic growth, still had not experienced a social crisis sufficiently deepgoing to bring the mass of the American industrial proletariat, constantly renewed by waves of immigration, to trade-union or political consciousness. The field of action of the revolutionary rise was thus limited to Central and Eastern Europe, essentially to Russia, Germany, and Italy among the great countries of the world. But Russia was an economically and culturally backward country, with a very small industrial proletariat, relatively low in skill and culture, crushed under the weight of scores of millions of illiterate peasants. Only the fusion of the Russian Revolution with the German and Italian revolutions could have provided the dictatorship of the proletariat with a material and social base broad enough to be able to guarantee soviet democracy. The defeats of the Italian revolution in 1922 and of the German revolution in 1923 marked the end of the revolutionary wave, leaving the revolution isolated in a backward country. This isolation imposed enormous material sacrifices upon the Russian proletariat, led to the gradual exhaustion of its combat potential and enthusiasm, an increasing abandonment of political activity and interest. In this way the objective conditions were created for its political expropriation by the Soviet bureaucracy.

2. Nevertheless, the end of the revolutionary wave of 1917-1923 did not signify a profound prolonged defeat of the international working-class movement. The sectors of the world proletariat which had remained relatively quiet during the revolu-

tionary rise of 1918-1923 began one after another to move in the following decades: Great Britain in 1925-26; China in 1925-27; Spain in 1931-38; France 1936-38; the United States 1934-37. In Germany itself, the 1929 world economic crisis created conditions favorable for a new revolutionary rise. If, in the end, despite these many opportunities the ebb of the revolution became more and more accentuated, that was not due to the dynamics inherent in the mass movement but to the pernicious role played by the workers' leaderships. In numerous cases, it was above all the Stalinist leadership which brought about the defeat of these movements. If the appearance and rise of Stalinism were determined in the last analysis by the accentuation of the ebb of the world revolution, this development was neither fatal nor inevitable. The efforts of the revolutionary forces in the Soviet Union and the world over (Left Opposition, Bolshevik-Leninists) to reverse the trend, to reënforce the weight of the proletariat in the Soviet Union thanks to industrialization and to victories, even if partial ones, gained on the world scale, prove, as these events recede into the past, to have been perfectly realistic. The junction of the Russian revolution with the world revolution remained possible during this entire period. If such a junction did not come about, that was above all owing to the role of the leadership of the Soviet Union and of the Communist International. Stalinism is just as much the product as the cause of the revolutionary ebb of the entire period from 1923 to 1943.

3. The isolation in a backward country, the overwhelming specific weight of the peasantry, the numerical and cultural weakness of the proletariat, its lack of democratic traditions — all these factors brought about in the Soviet Union the exhaustion of proletarian democracy, growing passivity among the masses, the more and more exclusive wielding of political power by functionaries of the party and the state. The existence of such a body of functionaries is unavoidable during the epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism. But they should decrease in number and importance to the extent that the society and the economy issuing from the socialist revolution become consolidated, and that classes, social inequality, and social contradictions wither away. Their withering away is in large measure identical with the withering away of the state. Up to this withering away a strict control exercised over the functionaries by the working class in democratically organized power should as much as possible limit these abuses. What happened in the Soviet Union was quite different. Under conditions of general scarcities and poverty, the political power administrating or distributing all of the country's

wealth swiftly became the regulator of distribution, arrogating to itself the essential privileges of consumption. The bureaucratic elements set themselves up as a distinct and conservative bureaucratic layer which defended, in alliance with the exploitive or petty-bourgeois elements (kulaks, Nepmen, etc.) material interests opposed to those of the proletariat; and later as a bureaucratic caste conscious of having special social interests and determined to defend them against any other layer of society. The formation and consolidation of this bureaucratic caste found its principal reflection in the political field, in the factional struggle which tore apart the Bolshevik party, the only arena of political struggle in the country. The Stalinist faction triumphed in this struggle because it received the support of the bureaucracy. This triumph culminated in the destruction of internal party democracy, the last bastion of proletarian democracy in the USSR, in the complete upset of the social superstructure of the country save for the property relations, and in the establishment of the Stalinist Bonapartist dictatorship, based essentially upon the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy and fundamentally defending them.

4. The revolutionary upsurge had found its clearest expression in the victory of the October Revolution. The ebb of the revolution found its essential expression in the victory of the Soviet bureaucracy in the USSR. But this retreat took place within a framework where world capitalism was profoundly characterized by the decline of its system. This decline was already too advanced, the imperialist antagonism too acute on the basis of this decline, the workers' movement still too powerful on a world scale, the wretched remnants of the former Russian possessing classes or the nucleus of a new bourgeoisie still too feeble in the Soviet Union itself, for the ebb of the proletariat to bring capitalism back to power there. The counter-revolution was, by and large, confined to the domain of the superstructure. The mode of production characterized by the nationalization of the means of production, foreign trade monopoly, and over-all planning of the economy — this foundation, produced by the October Revolution, which detached the Soviet economy from the world system of capitalism and opposed it to the latter, was maintained, strengthened, and consolidated in the course of the history of the Soviet Union. The struggle between capitalism and socialism, which according to Lenin's formula characterizes the period of transition, passed within the Soviet Union itself from the field of production — where practically all capitalist forms were eliminated — to the field of distribution. The Bonapartist dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy is therefore the product of a *political* counter-revolu-

tion; a *political* revolution is needed to overthrow it. But the Soviet state is the product of the *social revolution* of October whose economic and social conquests it continues to defend, even though in a special and often inadequate manner. This state could not be overthrown except by a *social counter-revolution*, reestablishing, if only by stages, the rule of capital and of the private ownership of the means of production. Our definition of the Soviet Union as a *degenerated workers' state* embraces the two fundamental elements of contemporary Soviet social reality: the survival and growth of the social foundations deriving from the October Revolution, on the one side; the victory of a political counter-revolution on these same foundations, on the other. Our policy of the unconditional defense of the Soviet Union corresponds to this same contradictory Soviet reality: to assure the *progress* of the Soviet Union through the overthrow of the bureaucratic dictatorship and the establishment of socialist democracy; to prevent the *defeat* of the Soviet Union which would entail the overthrow of its social foundations and the reestablishment of capitalism.

5. Within the framework of this same Soviet reality there appears the contradictory character, *the dual nature of the Soviet bureaucracy*:

a) On the one side, it is a parasitic caste whose privileges derive from the special social structure of the Soviet Union. It is therefore obliged, in order to survive, to defend in its own way this structure against the internal and international bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces which are seeking to destroy it and to reestablish, whatever may be its form, capitalist economy.

b) On the other side, it is a parasitic caste whose privileges could not be extended and temporarily stabilized except through the political expropriation and the political passivity of the proletariat, its lack of revolutionary perspectives. The bureaucracy is therefore obliged to try to maintain, against the proletariat, domestic and world conditions which would prevent a new upsurge and new revolutionary activity of the Soviet proletariat.

The contradictory nature of the bureaucracy reflects itself equally in the fact that, to the extent that it defends the Soviet Union and its social base against imperialism and against restorationist forces of all kinds, it definitively aids the rebirth of soviet democracy inside the country; while, conversely, to the extent to which it succeeds in temporarily holding back the Soviet proletariat or the world proletarian upsurge, it undermines and disorganizes definitively the social base from which its own privileges derive.

6. This dual and contradictory nature of the Soviet bureaucracy is reflected in its domestic and world policies as a whole since 1923. But the

concrete manner in which this manifests itself depends fundamentally upon conditions beyond the control of the Soviet bureaucracy: the relationship of forces between the classes on the world scale and inside the Soviet Union itself. From this point of view two major stages may be distinguished:

a) From 1923 to 1943: the international retreat of the revolution and of the workers' movement, in connection with the aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system and of the internal contradictions of imperialism, permitted the bureaucracy to consolidate its power by *balancing* itself between the international revolutionary movement and imperialism, among the different imperialist powers, between the classes inside the Soviet Union itself. The Bonapartist dictatorship is the product of these balances. The end pursued by the Soviet bureaucracy's policy is to maintain the *status quo*, to maintain the equilibrium. In this sense the global balance sheet of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy is a reformist one, because the bureaucracy aims not to overthrow world capitalism but simply to maintain the Soviet Union within the framework of the *status quo*.

b) Beginning with 1943: the new revolutionary rise in connection with the aggravation of the crisis of the capitalist system and the establishment of the crushing supremacy of American imperialism in the capitalist world, disrupted both the equilibrium between the international proletariat and imperialism, and the equilibrium among the different imperialist powers. These factors forced these powers to accept, whether they wished to or not, a world imperialist united front against the revolution and the anti-capitalist forces and rendered more and more illusory every policy of seesawing and of maintenance of the *status quo*. The disruption of the basic equilibriums of Stalinist Bonapartism undermines the very foundations of the bureaucratic dictatorship in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the upsurge of the productive forces in the Soviet Union, the numerical and cultural strengthening of the proletariat, and the repercussions of the international revolutionary wave within the country have broken the equilibrium (based on their political prostration) of social forces there, and are preparing the reappearance of the proletarian struggle for soviet democracy.

7. During the phase from 1923 to 1943, the dual and contradictory nature of the Soviet bureaucracy manifested itself at home as well as abroad in a number of sharp turns:

a) 1924-1927: alliance of the bureaucracy with the kulak and NEP elements in the Soviet Union against the proletarian vanguard. A rightist course internationally: unprincipled alliances with Chiang Kai-shek, with the British trade-union bureaucracy, with Balkan peasant parties, etc.

b) 1928-1934: Destruction of kulaks and Nepmen; forced collectivization of agriculture and headlong industrialization. At the same time, the destruction of the remaining political rights of the workers deriving from the October Revolution, the establishing of the omnipotence of the director of each enterprise, the accelerated growth of inequality within the working class. Ultra-leftist course internationally at a time when imperialism was weakened and paralyzed by economic crisis.

c) 1935-1939: A rightist course in the USSR, restoration of private peasant ownership of part of the cattle and of small strips of land; abolition of the old Soviet constitution; extermination of the entire generation of Old Bolsheviks; triumph of reaction in the sphere of morals, culture, etc., and in general encouragement of neo-bourgeois trends. At the same time, a rightist course internationally: alliance with the imperialist « democracies, » acceptance of national defense in these countries and in their colonies; the policy of People's Fronts; the strangling of the Spanish and French revolutions.

d) 1939-1941: Preparation for war including the halt of mass purges in the Soviet Union, and the consolidation of the individual positions of the bureaucracy. On the international scale, the sudden shift of diplomatic alliances results in an ultra-left policy of the Stalinist CPs.

e) 1941-1943: A rightist course during the war. At home: « great patriotic war, » the enrichment of the peasants, massive private appropriation of collective farm land, dissolution of the Communist International, restoration of the Church as an instrument of state policy, Pan-Slavic propaganda, etc. Abroad: close alliance with imperialism, policy of the National Front, struggle against liberation uprisings in the colonies, against the defense of the economic interests of the workers in the allied countries, etc.

8. The period from 1943 to 1947, during which the Soviet bureaucracy seemed at the peak of its power, appeared as a transitional period between the ebb and the new rise of the world revolution. It is, for the same reason, a transitional period between the phase of the rise and the phase of the decline of Stalinism. The world revolutionary rise was still not powerful enough to permit the outflanking of Stalinism; it remained, in general, restricted within limits where the bureaucracy and its agencies were able to control it through more or less traditional methods (France, Italy, Indo-China, Malaya, and in part Indonesia and China); the sole exception was Yugoslavia. But this wave was sufficiently menacing to bring imperialism to seek a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet bureaucracy. The latter undertook to halt or try to force back the revolution in return for territorial and economic concessions. This was the meaning of the Teheran,

Yalta, and Potsdam agreements, of the dismemberment of Germany and the division of Europe into two spheres of influence, of the counter-revolutionary policy of the CPs of Western Europe and of the Far East colonial countries during this same period, of the maintenance of bourgeois remnants in Eastern Europe, and of the joint efforts of U.S. General Marshall and Stalin to set up a coalition government in China. Favoring this same tendency were: the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, the terrible devastations of the war, the extreme scarcities of consumer goods, the 1945-47 economic crisis of reconversion, the pillage of the buffer countries as a bureaucratic means for ameliorating this situation to some extent.

9. But the international revolutionary wave, above all the victory of the Chinese revolution, destroyed the possibility for the Soviet bureaucracy to come to an overall compromise with imperialism. Stifling within a living space far too narrow for its needs, and menaced by a terrible economic shock, imperialism had previously sought to pass to the offensive by restoring capitalist economy in Western Europe with the aim of loosening the Soviet Union's tight hold on the buffer zone (Marshall Plan). Thereafter, outflanked by the colonial revolution, imperialism passed on to armed action (the wars in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Korea), and set about preparing a final settlement of accounts with all the anti-capitalist forces (the Atlantic Pact, M.S.A., Balkan Pact, Middle East Pact, Pacific Pact, remilitarization of Japan and Germany, etc...). Caught between the imperialist threat and the Chinese revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy found itself obliged to ally itself with the People's Republic of China, which emerged from this revolution, against imperialism. This implied a *de facto* recognition of the autonomy and independence of the Chinese C. P. and of the People's Republic of China, and the Sino-Soviet co-leadership of the entire Communist movement in Asia. This marked the opening of a new phase in the world situation in which the Soviet bureaucracy finds itself, a situation characterized by the exacerbation of international class contradictions and by the evolution of the relationship of class forces in a manner more and more favorable to the revolution. This new situation limits more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary manoeuvres by the bureaucracy. It can no longer utilize the entire colonial revolution as small change in order to arrive at a general agreement with imperialism. Its efforts to utilize inter-imperialist contradictions continue, as do the efforts to gain the support of certain bourgeoisies in colonial and semi-colonial countries (India, Argentina, Indonesia) by damping down the *anti-capitalist* struggle of the masses in these countries, by attempts to mobilize all the

classes in these countries, including the « national bourgeoisie, » against imperialism. So also there continue to exist the efforts of the bureaucracy to arrive at temporary and partial agreements with imperialism as well as its role of brake on the unfolding of the colonial revolution (insufficient aid in the course of the Korean war). But the *practical effects* of these efforts become more and more limited and ephemeral in proportion as, on the one side, the upsurge of the masses, despite the attempts to curb them, and, on the other, the pressure and the march of Yankee imperialism towards war, become more accentuated.

10. A parallel evolution has been, in the meantime, produced inside the USSR itself.

The important successes of the Soviet economy since the reconversion crisis of 1945-47 (a crisis corroborated by Malenkov's report to the XIXth Congress) have profoundly altered the position of the country and of its population. If, in regard to the principal products, per capita production still lags behind that of the most advanced capitalist countries, it has already surpassed the level of those capitalist countries which remain stagnant, such as France and Italy. On the other hand, gross production has considerably surpassed the level of all capitalist countries except the USA and, in a number of basic products, has even outstripped the *total* production of two or three of the most important capitalist countries, such as Britain, Germany, Japan. The Soviet Union has become the second industrial power in the world, possessing the second largest stock of machines and increasing its productivity at a more rapid rate than any other country except the USA. If Soviet agriculture has not been able to advance at an equal pace and lags considerably behind, its progress has nevertheless sufficed to eliminate any phenomenon of famine or chronic undernourishment. For the population in the great industrial centres the supply of manufactured consumer goods, although still very inadequate, has been regularized and surpasses anything previously seen in the USSR.

11. As a result of these economic advances, an important social transformation is taking place which finds its expression in a modification of the composition and dynamism of the principal social strata of the country.

a) *The proletariat* has greatly increased in number and skills, the number of industrial workers continuing to increase at the rate of many millions with each Five-Year Plan. From the small minority in Soviet society that it was in 1917 and in 1927, it has become the most numerous social stratum. Illiteracy has disappeared from its ranks. The tremendous mechanization of the Soviet economy for the past seven years has entailed a considerable growth in the number and role of the skilled

workers. The unskilled laborer no longer typifies the Soviet worker but tends to become the exception. Because of this the differentiation of income among the proletariat, although greater than ever, no longer tends to crush the great majority of the working class down to a hunger level.

b) *The peasantry* has been the most shaken up. Year by year it is from its ranks that supplementary industrial labor is drawn. This is the stratum whose number and social weight tend constantly to diminish. Its upper layers are continually being drawn off and converted into the kolkhoz bureaucracy and aristocracy (directors, accountants, agronomists, tractor drivers). The peasantry has not been able to restore the relatively advantageous position it gained during the war and the immediate postwar period. The introduction of the system of labor brigades and the amalgamation of the collective farms have marked important steps along the line of a gradual industrialization of agriculture, but they have run up against passive resistance from the peasants and have not permitted a serious increase in agricultural production. The standard of living in the country has been raised much less than in the cities, and the disproportion between agriculture and industry is steadily accentuated.

c) *The bureaucracy* has increased in number and in weight, but at a less rapid rate than the proletariat. Two important modifications have taken place in the composition of the upper circles of the bureaucracy. First of all in respect to social origin, the number of former capitalists or bourgeois technicians and Nepmen on the one hand, the number of old revolutionary militants of the pre-1917 vintage (Thermidorians) has been more and more reduced; the great mass of the bureaucracy is recruited from privileged individuals who have become adults since the revolution. Second, in their mentality: the tops of the bureaucracy are in their majority no longer a young and rapacious social layer, tending to *conquer* privileges in the field of consumption in the midst of prevailing poverty; the majority constitute a layer of men of mature years or heading into old age, tending to *conserve* the best possible living standards.

12. Although the rise and the consolidation of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the USSR came as the products of a *political* counter-revolution, the bureaucracy has placed its special seal upon Soviet society in all the fields of social life:

a) *The economy*: The entire economy of the epoch of transition is characterized by the contradiction between the non-capitalist mode of production and the survival of bourgeois norms of distribution. But the Soviet bureaucracy has aggravated this contradiction by the enormous development of its privileges and of social inequality. The bureau-

cratic centralization of planning, the abolition of all workers' control over production, the omnipotence, the arbitrariness, and the greed for privileges of the factory bureaucrats provoke new contradictions and new disruptions of equilibrium within the very field of production, which become more and more accentuated to the degree that the economy achieves important progress.

b) *The state*: The abolition of the last vestiges of Soviet democracy together with the disappearance of internal party democracy has resulted, in fact, in an autocratic regime, in which the bulk of the bureaucracy, including its upper circles, is itself excluded from the exercise of political rights. The Bonapartist dictatorship rests essentially upon the apparatus of repression, upon the terror of periodic purges, and in addition controls a system of plebiscitary « elections. » Great Russian nationalism flourishes and the accusations of « bourgeois nationalism » are lodged against national minorities affirming their history and their own rights.

c) *The army*: The old Red Army which took the oath of loyalty to the Soviet constitution and to the Communist International has been replaced by a « patriotic » Soviet army narrowly controlled by the dictatorship, and within it have been introduced the selfsame manifestations of monstrous inequality, arbitrariness, and the omnipotence of the apparatus which prevail in society as a whole.

d) *Ideology*: Marxist theory has been transformed into a pragmatic ideology, tending to justify the practical requirements of the bureaucracy's policy. The history of the party, of the International, and of the country is systematically and periodically revised, rewritten, falsified. Scientific research and free theoretical discussions are suppressed in all the fields of the social sciences and are even beginning to be « oriented » in the field of certain natural sciences. From this suppression stems the necessity for an infallible and omniscient Pope who formulates, at each turn, the dogmas suitable to the then interests of the bureaucracy.

e) *Morals*: The liberation of women and of youth which the October Revolution had carried out during its years of ascendance has been reversed. The equality of women has become the equality in expending the super-human physical effort exacted from the workers and not the right freely to dispose of their own lives. Divorce legislation has become ever stricter; the right of abortion has been abolished. The prohibition of youth from participating in politics is consecrated in the statutes of the youth organization.

13. But the Soviet masses absorbed a great experience during the war (where the limits of the repressive capacity of the apparatus and the reality of the living standards of the Western workers were

simultaneously revealed to them). The Soviet masses, above all the advanced working class youth, are beginning to take more and more cognizance of the contradictions contained in Soviet society and the Bonapartist dictatorship. They are becoming aware above all of the economic contradictions, all the more so because they have transferred all their dynamism and their creative effort into this field. The discussions which preceded the XIXth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and those which have taken place during and after this congress, have revealed the following:

a) That to the mind of the vast majority of the Soviet people, the power acquired by Soviet economy more and more appears to come into greater contradiction with the still extremely low level of mass consumption. Above all, the housing crisis is felt by these masses as inexplicable and was universally criticized during the XIXth Congress.

b) That to the minds of the advanced strata of the working class, the lower layers of the party and trade-union functionaries, the Soviet bureaucracy more and more appears to be a brake upon the growth of the productive forces. Having attained for themselves a high level of privileges as consumers, the top circles of the bureaucracy no longer have a major interest in the maximum expansion of production. The greed for gain among the directors of industry, regarded as the principal motor force of accumulation, is turning into a factor limiting and impeding this accumulation. To the degree that the attainment of the goals of the plan continues to depend mainly on the interest of these strata of the bureaucracy, they introduce a further disorganizing force into planning (primacy given to attaining the financial plan at the expense of the production plan). The bureaucratically centralized elaboration of the plan comes into collision with the growing complexity of the economy.

14. In the ideological domain *the contradictions of the bureaucratic dictatorship* have culminated in a serious theoretical crisis which found its reflection not only in the discussion over political economy, but also in the discussion around the « transition toward communism, » and a number of other ideological problems.

a) The ruling strata of the Kremlin have been forced to affirm in the same breath both the disappearance of classes in the USSR, and the survival, even the sharpening, of the class struggle.

b) They have been forced to emphasize that to the degree that advance is made toward communism, social conflicts do not wither away but become accentuated.

c) They have been forced at one and the same time to insist upon the fact that the state, far from withering away, « will be reënforced » with the

transition toward communism, and to recall that the state will end up by withering away with « the triumph of socialism in the principal countries of the world. »

d) They have been forced to affirm at one and the same time that the socialist society has as its « fundamental law » the satisfaction of the *needs* of the population, and that the economy of this society continues to be regulated by « the primacy of the production of the means of production over the production of the means of consumption. »

e) They have been obliged at one and the same time to represent the tendency toward personal enrichment as the principal « vestige of bourgeois mentality » in Soviet society, and to preserve this same tendency as the principal lever of planning.

15. In this way the historically unstable character of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the Soviet Union clearly reveals itself. With the modification of the relationship of forces between the classes on the international scale, with the concurrent modification of this relationship of forces inside the Soviet Union itself, the objective foundations of the dictatorship are in process of rapidly disappearing. Traditionally, the historically transitional and passing character of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the USSR was analyzed correctly in the sense that this dictatorship could lead to two opposed paths of social development: either a reënforcement of the restorationist tendencies within the peasantry and the bureaucracy, which, with the aid of imperialism, would restore capitalism in the Soviet Union by means of a civil war; or, thanks to the extension of the world revolution and the aid brought by the world proletariat to the Soviet proletariat and to the left tendency of the bureaucracy which will rally to the side of the proletariat for the defense of the social bases of the USSR, the overthrow of the Bonapartist dictatorship and the re-establishment of Soviet democracy. But it is evident that the two variants of this alternative imply special dynamics in the class struggle on the world scale. The first appears as the end-product of the retreat of the world revolution, the second as the product of the international victories of the revolution. The present dynamics of the class struggle on the world scale indicates very clearly which is the more likely of these two variants. The entire domestic evolution of the Soviet Union also speaks in the same sense. There, faced by the upsurge of the productive forces, the small islands of petty commodity production which existed and constantly revive no longer possess more than a very reduced specific weight in the totality of economic life. The aggravation of social contradictions, the mounting pressure of imperialism, and the signs of proletarian awakening may provoke within very limited layers

of the bureaucracy reflexes of capitulation and desertion to the bourgeois camp; but that will be nothing more than a by-product of the evolution and not its dominant characteristic. It therefore follows that since in the USSR itself the relationship of forces tends to become modified in favor of the working class, parallel with an analogous modification on a world scale, *the coming decisive battle will not be waged between the restorationist forces launching an offensive to restore private property, and the forces defending the conquests of October. It will be, on the contrary, waged between the forces defending the privileges and administration of the bureaucracy against the assault of the revolutionary forces of the working class embarking on the struggle for the restoration of soviet democracy upon a higher level.*

16. Stalin's death has accentuated all the above-described tendencies and has given them a direct and dramatic manifestation. This is to be explained by the special role that Stalin played in the Soviet Union. Arbiter between the classes, arbiter between the classes and the bureaucracy, and between the different layers of the bureaucracy, Stalin represented in his person the link between the socialist foundation of the Soviet Union and its bureaucratic superstructure. He represented a major guarantee for the economic bureaucracy and the intelligentsia that they would continue to enjoy their privileges and at the same time a major guarantee for the lower levels of the bureaucracy (minor party and trade-union functionaries, Stakhanovists, rising cadres of the youth) that socialized ownership of the means of production would remain intact. His sudden disappearance has deprived the regime of one of its main elements of stability, all the more since the equilibrium of social forces had previously been gradually shaken. To this must be added the element of uncertainty and anxiety in the Bonapartist heights of the dictatorship, accustomed to follow the line laid down by the « Chief, » without personal prestige among the masses and incapable of predicting the effects of Stalin's death on the attitude of different strata of Soviet society. This uncertainty and even panic in the top circles have no doubt accentuated the tendencies which are challenging the absolutism of the dictatorship.

17. The bureaucracy is not a homogeneous social stratum. It consists of millions of individuals, with roots extended into the working class (Stakhanovists) and the peasantry (kolkhoz functionaries); it rises through numerous secondary functionaries of the government and the economy (auditors) toward the higher layers of technicians and engineers, celebrated artists and writers, the higher echelons of the army and the police, all the way up to the heights

of the economy (directors of big factories and trusts), of the army (generals and marshals), of the state and of the party (members of the central committees of the parties of the Soviet republics and of the USSR, ministers of the republics and the USSR, members of the central administrations of the state and of the party). The most conservative and at the same time the most privileged group is indubitably the stratum of directors of the factories and of the central administrations of the economy to whom can be added the chief engineers and principal technicians of the planning and the generals and marshals of the army.

18. Confronting the most privileged heights of the bureaucracy are *the Bonapartist summits of the bureaucracy*, who have wielded political power for more than two decades; who personify the Bonapartist dictatorship and represent the personal connection between the tops of the party and of the state. It is this stratum which been hardest hit by Stalin's death, which has been seized with panic before the sweep of the discontent of the entire population, and which took the initiative for dramatic measures to « liberalize » the regime (amnesty, announced revisions of the penal code, liberation of the doctors, attack against police arbitrariness and against national and racial discriminations, purge of the GPU and the attacks against it, the tendency to shove into the background the cult of the chief, the new tone introduced into the Soviet press, the modification of the Five-Year Plan increasing the weight of production of the means of consumption).

The measures pursue the following aims:

a) To establish the dictatorship *on a broader basis*, to associate broader sections of the bureaucracy more directly with the exercise of power by guaranteeing them against arbitrary purges.

b) To establish the dictatorship *on a more popular basis*, by taking measures favorably greeted by the entire population, by promising to restore easier and less tormented conditions, by tacitly disavowing the bloodiest phases of the terror of Stalin's epoch, by appearing to concede on the three principal points of this popular discontent: the low level of consumption, the police regime, and national oppression.

Historically, the Malenkov regime thus signalizes *the beginning of the decline of the power of the Bonapartist dictatorship*. The « liberalization » as well as the tightening of the regime only constitute alternative methods of self-defense by the bureaucracy which knows that its powers and privileges are threatened, and which will in any case try to use all the resources at its disposal to defend itself against the rising tide of the Soviet masses. But history has demonstrated that autocrats doomed

to disappear do not save themselves by either of these two methods, or by a combination of both. The Bonapartist dictatorship in the USSR already stands doomed by history. The masses will crush it and wipe out the power and privileges of the bureaucracy with their political revolution.

19. Until now there has been only one first sign that the proletariat has been able to pass to organized action under the new conditions created by Stalin's death (the Vorkuta strike). That is not surprising. For a quarter of a century the Soviet proletariat has been politically atomized and its advanced cadres wiped out by police terror. Though the advances of the international revolution since the end of World War II must have reawakened old hopes among the Soviet workers, the inflexibility of the dictatorship up to Stalin's death did not permit such sentiments to be voiced directly. At most the indirect expression of their concerns, demands, and aspirations could have been found in the lower layers of the petty functionaries of the party, of the trade unions, and of the youth. The « liberalization » of the regime announced by Malenkov cannot have immediate effects favoring political action by the working class, either. *But from now on molecular forces come into play within the Soviet proletariat.* Tests of strength are being prepared in the factories and the trade unions, which will no doubt begin over technical questions whereby the working class will strengthen its consciousness and confidence in its own strength without directly colliding with the Bonapartist dictatorship. To cope with this threat, the new regime, having weakened the GPU, has to lean more on the army, which probably helped liquidate Beria. At the same time within the party and especially within the youth, a spirit of criticism is advancing, questioning the theoretical « heritage » of the Stalinist era, venturing into the domain of political elaboration, winning its first spurs in an ideological struggle against the most petrified representatives of the Stalinist era. *Thus is announced the regroupment of the objective and subjective forces of the Soviet proletariat.*

20. Under the panic of the moment, the first defensive reflex of the directing nucleus, the Bonapartist tops, has not been exclusively the « liberalization » of the regime. Its first reflex has been also its own reorganization and its own extreme centralization. Momentarily the Bonapartist heights of the bureaucracy tried to regroup themselves without major conflict or division around the new chiefs, Malenkov - Beria - Molotov - Khrushchev, since they all felt threatened all together. But this phase of unity and regroupment could be only a fleeting one. *The centrifugal forces appearing in the dictatorship, that the « liberal » regime has*

accentuated, are beginning to get the upper hand over the monolithism of the ruling group itself. Herein is the significance of Beria's fall, of the weakening of the GPU apparatus by that of the state and the army. « Liberalism » was supposed to satisfy all layers of the population: the masses because they suffered the most from the police dictatorship; the tops of the bureaucracy because they feel themselves freed from the nightmare of a new wave of arbitrary purges; the lower layers of the bureaucracy, because they hope to be more closely associated with the wielding of power. But if the bureaucracy considered that these measures could consolidate its basis the better to defend its own privileges, the proletariat is trying to use them to challenge these privileges. After an initial phase of expectation, hope and joy, these two divergent tendencies have already begun to collide. The higher layers of the bureaucracy have been impelled to demand more and more legal guarantees to the degree that the popular pressure is deepening, and these demands and uneasinesses are finding their expression in the very midst of the directing nucleus through Beria's elimination and the important blow delivered to the GPU. At the same time the growing mass pressure, that the « liberalization » of the regime has already increased, will also find expression, even though indirect and deformed, at the top of the regime. This process of *differentiation within the party and its upper circles* has been influenced by the beginning of the revolutionary rise in the buffer zone. It will be still more deeply influenced by the evolution of the international situation. An accelerated outbreak of the war could delay this differentiation for an initial period. New victories of the international revolution, a sharpened differentiation within the Communist Parties abroad, would accelerate it.

On the other hand, if the new leading group seeks to gain time on an international scale by making concessions in form and tone to imperialism, it can less than ever before make substantial concessions that might result in a genuine compromise with Wall Street (liquidation of the colonial revolution, opening up of the « People's Democracies » to American goods and capital, etc.). In these conditions the arms race and the preparations for the imperialist war will remain basically the same as set down in the report of the XIIth Plenum of the IEC.

21. Events unfolding in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death considerably modify the world situation. They signalize the end of the relative stability of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. *Thus one of the principal forces of social conservatism in the world finds itself challenged. The development of the world revolution*

and the struggle for its conscious leadership by the Fourth International find themselves considerably facilitated. A series of conditions favorable for the development of our ideas and our organizations flows from this and it will be necessary to take full advantage of them with the aid of an appropriate tactic.

The most urgent tasks are posed for our movement in the Soviet Union itself. The first cracks in the Bonapartist dictatorship place on the order of the day the struggle for the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union. The programme of action put forward in this connection by the Transitional Programme and which the Second World Congress reaffirmed and concretized now takes on a burning timeliness (1).

(1) « A fresh upsurge of the revolution in the USSR will undoubtedly begin under the banner of the struggle against social inequality and political oppression. Down with the privileges of the bureaucracy. Down with Stakhanovism! Down with the Soviet aristocracy and its ranks and orders! Greater equality of wages for all forms of labor!

« The struggle for the freedom of the trade unions and the factory committees, for the right of assembly and freedom of the press, will unfold in the struggle for the regeneration and development of soviet democracy.

« The bureaucracy replaced the Soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal electoral rights—in the style of Hitler-Goebbels. It is necessary to return to the soviets not only their free democratic form but also their class content. As once the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter the soviets, so now it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy out of the soviets. In the soviets there is room only for the representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants and Red Army men.

« Democratization of the soviets is impossible without legalization of soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet parties.

« A revision of planned economy from top to bottom in the interests of producers and consumers! Factory committees should be returned their right to control production. A democratically organized consumer's cooperative should control the quality and price of products.

« Reorganization of the collective farms in accordance with the will and the interests of the workers engaged therein!

« The reactionary international policy of the bureaucracy should be replaced by the policy of proletarian internationalism. The complete diplomatic correspondence of the Kremlin to be published. Down with secret diplomacy!

« All political trials staged by the Thermidorian bureaucracy to be reviewed in the light of complete publicity and controversial openness and integrity. The organizers of the frame-ups must pay the proper penalty.

It is impossible to carry out this programme without the overthrow of the bureaucracy which maintains itself by violence and falsification. » (Extracts from the Transitional Programme.)

They will demand the application of the democratic right of self-determination, including that of secession, for all national minorities living in the USSR, struggling for the Ukrainian, White-Russian, Estonian, Lithuanian, independent socialist republics.

But the significance of this regeneration has been modified. Today the Soviet Union, because of its industry and its working class, is the second basis of support for socialism in the world. *The socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union, almost as much as the socialist revolution in the USA, would decide the world victory of socialism.* The fact that the hesitations, doubts, and retreats of the new ruling group in the dictatorship aid the struggle for this regeneration places our international movement in new historical conditions of which we must be deeply conscious. *The conditions are being created for the reconstitution and the upsurge of the Bolshevik-Leninist party in the Soviet Union (2).* It is not accidental that at the XIXth Congress Malenkov, after 15 years of silence, referred to the activity of « deviationist, anti-Leninist » groups in the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, on which the victory of the political revolution depends. It is no accident that the Malenkov amnesty expressly excludes political offenders! The International must look for and find the means to aid our Soviet brothers to benefit from conditions favorable for their regrouping; this will be a decisive stage in the world upsurge of our movement.

At the same time our sections ought resolutely to combat any tendency toward apology or justification for the present political regime in the Soviet Union, a tendency which will manifest itself in petty-bourgeois circles inclined to make their peace with the Malenkov power. Even though « liberalizing » itself, the Bonapartist dictatorship nonetheless remains the dictatorship. The proletariat remains politically expropriated in the Soviet Union. The new penal code, a genuine *habeus corpus*, will defend the bureaucratic privileges just as police arbitrariness has defended them up to now. The task of smashing the dictatorship and the privileges of the bureaucracy, the task of a new political revolution in the Soviet Union remains more burning than ever. The significance of the entire recent development is that the conditions which prepare and facilitate this revolution are ripening.

22. The coming war will coincide not with an ebb but a new leap forward of the international revolution. It can therefore act only fundamentally to accentuate still more the phenomena of the disintegration of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the Soviet Union, and the phenomena of revival and revolutionary rise of the Soviet proletariat. The

(2) That is also what the Transitional Programme means: « Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward socialism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection — the party of the Fourth International! »

(Excerpt from the Transitional Programme.)

extension of the revolution to Western European countries with their workers at a high level of culture, technical skill, and democratic traditions; the contact between the Soviet Army and populations accustomed to relatively higher living standards than those of the Soviet toilers; the victories over imperialism; the difficulties of all types as well as the bureaucracy's general behavior in the course of the war—all these factors will operate in the same direction. They will heighten the confidence of the Soviet masses in their own strength, undermine still more the prestige of any repressive apparatus, harden the will of the masses to acquire living conditions economically and politically much closer to the socialist ideal, weaken and disorganize the bureaucracy's capacity of resistance and of counteraction in the face of the masses, accentuate dissensions and centrifugal tendencies within the ranks of the bureaucracy. Whether the open, external manifestations of the rise will become accentuated and hastened even during the very first stage of the war, or whether these will begin by receding before the menace of imperialism only in order to reappear more powerfully than ever at a subsequent stage of the war, when this menace seems to have disappeared — this will depend upon the rapidity with which the revolution spreads, upon the capacity of the proletariat of the advanced countries to carry out this revolution under their own leadership, upon the maturity of political conditions inside the USSR itself, and upon the presence of a new revolutionary leadership. In any case, in the course of the final settlement of accounts with imperialism, the Soviet proletariat aided by the world proletariat will learn to settle accounts also with the Soviet bureaucracy and to overthrow its dictatorship. During the period as a whole running from 1943 to the end of the Third World War, a period which is just a chain of partial wars and temporary armed truces, will be confirmed the prediction of Leon Trotsky that the bureaucracy will be incapable of withstanding the test of a decisive battle with imperialism and the world revolution.

23. To understand that the Soviet bureaucracy is henceforth placed in new conditions which are fundamentally different from the conditions of the epoch of the bureaucracy's rise and growth, and are those of the bureaucracy's decline and ultimate downfall, does not in any way mean to modify the traditional Trotskyist evaluation of the objective and subjective role played by this bureaucracy in the Soviet Union and the world over. The upsurge of the Soviet productive forces has resulted not from the activity of the bureaucracy but despite it. The bureaucracy began by impeding industrialization for a period of five years; and then plunged into it in conditions that disorganized the entire national

economy, causing a terrible crisis in agriculture and popular consumption which required 20 years to overcome. To this day the bureaucracy prevents a complete and rational utilization of the huge productive apparatus with which the dynamics of planning endowed the country. Similarly, the upsurge of the world revolution did not in any respect come about thanks to the Soviet bureaucracy's leadership, but has taken place despite its interventions in the world labor movement. The bureaucracy began by causing the terrible historical defeats of the proletariat from 1923 to 1943. Subsequently it retarded and partially halted the revolutionary wave between 1943 and 1947. To this day it still prevents the complete and rational utilization of the colossal revolutionary potential of the masses on the five continents. Today it is more correct than ever to say that if the domination of imperialism subsists over half of the globe it is thanks to the role played by the bureaucracy and its agencies. In the principal country where this domination has been abolished — in China — this was due to the fact that the Chinese CP was able to shake itself loose from the orders of the Kremlin. What is new in the situation is that we have reached the stage, forecast in the Transitional Programme, where « the laws of history » reveal themselves « stronger than the bureaucratic apparatus. » Of the two factors determining the orientation of the masses — the death agony of capitalism which unlooses immense revolutionary forces on a world scale, and the policy of the reformist and Stalinist bureaucratic apparatuses which play the role of a brake upon the masses — it is the first that is coming more and more to the fore. The revolutionary tide which the Soviet bureaucracy is no longer capable of smashing and arresting is even being nourished by certain of the methods of self-defense applied by this bureaucracy and is preparing the conditions for the overthrow of the bureaucracy by the Soviet proletariat.

II

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF STALINISM IN OTHER NON-CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

24. Since the eruption of the revolutionary wave of 1943, new non-capitalist states have made their appearance in Europe and Asia. These states may be put in two categories:

a) States produced by the victory of the revolution in these countries, as in the case of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China.

b) States produced by the expansionism of the Soviet bureaucracy, the occupation of these countries

and their structural assimilation with the Soviet Union by military-bureaucratic means, supported in certain instances by a limited mobilization of the masses: this is the case in the European buffer zone and in the case of the People's Republic of North Korea (where, incidentally, the mobilization of the masses was on a larger scale).

To these countries it is necessary to add: a) the democratic state of Vietnam, produced by a revolutionary wave in Vietnam similar to that in China but which still continues the anti-imperialist war and the civil war in order to gain control of the entire national territory; b) Albania, where there has also been a strong revolutionary movement of the masses.

The appearance of these states represents a fundamental modification of the world situation, extending the global area withdrawn from the domination of capitalism from one-sixth to one-third on the geographical plane, and from one-twelfth to one-third as regards the world population.

25. The victory of the revolution in Yugoslavia and in China — the first revolutionary victories since 1917 — dealt a mortal blow to the direct hold of the Soviet bureaucracy upon the Communist Parties of these two countries and inaugurated the world crisis of Stalinism. In this way has been confirmed the prediction of Leon Trotsky to the effect that « the disintegration of the Comintern (i.e., of the apparatus of subordinating the CPs to the Kremlin) which has no *direct* support in the GPU, will precede the downfall of the Bonapartist clique and of the Thermidorian bureaucracy as a whole. » The blow dealt to Stalinism by the victory of the revolution in Yugoslavia and in China, although these revolutions were led by parties issuing from the Comintern, expresses itself in the fact that this victory resulted from their « breach of discipline » toward the Kremlin. Threatened with being overwhelmed by the revolutionary wave of the masses and faced with no alternative other than being crushed politically and physically by reaction, the Yugoslav CP, and later the Chinese CP, went beyond the orders of the Kremlin and marched to the conquest of power. From this they gained a genuine material independence in relation to the Soviet bureaucracy, and this has created the objective base for a political and ideological differentiation. The system of rigid subordination of the Communist Parties to the political directives of the Kremlin and of the automatic and servile repetition of each successive manifestation of Stalinist revisionism of Marxist-Leninist theory has thus been breached.

26. Neither in the case of Yugoslavia nor that of China, however, did the victorious CPs decide on their own initiative upon a public political break

with the policy of Stalinism. The explanation for this is to be found in

a) the Stalinist origin and traditions of these leaderships and of the majority of their cadres, who sought, for the most part, to excuse within their narrow circles the « errors » of Moscow and to hide them from their own party members and from the masses;

b) the objective support which these parties received after the revolutionary victory through their diplomatic, political, military, and economic alliance with the Soviet Union in the face of the *de facto* imperialist blockade; even though this Kremlin support was considered as insufficient or very onerous, it was worth more in their eyes than the abandonment of all aid;

c) the opportunist character of these leaderships who see no pole of attraction other than the Kremlin or imperialism, and who underestimate or ignore the upsurge of the world revolution and the international working-class movement.

27. In the case of Yugoslavia it was the Kremlin itself that took the initiative for the break with the CP, conscious that this party represented a mortal danger for the bureaucracy by introducing into its system of parties a Communist Party with an independent base, capable of reacting independently not only in relations between the states (Yugoslav policy in relation to mixed companies, Balkan federation, relations with Italy, etc.) but also as regards the policy of other Communist Parties (the attitude of the JCP toward the Greek partisan movement, toward the policy followed by the French and Italian CPs during the « liberation, » etc.). It preferred to push Yugoslavia into the embraces of imperialism and in this way to open up a dangerous breach in its line of defenses in the Balkans rather than incur the risk of having the Yugoslav example break up the Kremlin's entire grip on the glacis and on the Cominform. Toward this end it utilized every resource in its power: the break of diplomatic relations; the sudden economic blockade disorganizing the Yugoslav economy; provocation of border incidents; attempts at organizing a terrorist movement inside Yugoslavia itself; a permanent campaign of intimidation via press, radio, etc. But it was able originally to indulge in such a counter-revolutionary attitude first because the preparations for the imperialist war were still only in their preliminary stage, and then and above all because Yugoslavia is a small country which cannot basically alter the world relationship of economic and military forces. It was otherwise in the case of the Chinese revolution. The Kremlin could not permit a break of a coalition which represented the keystone of its military defense system and which in effect broke up the imperialist encirclement of

the USSR. That is why in the case of the Chinese CP, the Kremlin, despite apprehensions analogous to those it nursed toward the Yugoslav CP, was obliged to accept a collaboration on a basis of equality and even on the basis of co-leadership with the Chinese CP of the entire Asian Communist movement.

28. Both the Yugoslav state and the Chinese state, born of a victorious revolution resulting from the destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie and of its state, have moved at a rapid tempo toward the complete economic expropriation of that same bourgeoisie. After the first hesitations and compromises, to the extent that this tendency has been manifested more and more, the structure of these states has also been adjusted to its new social base, and the non-capitalist, working-class character of these states has clearly manifested itself. But, even though born of a victorious revolution, the Yugoslav state and the Chinese state bear the stigmata of an opportunist and bureaucratic workers' leadership. In the case of Yugoslavia these features were notably revealed between 1945 and 1948 in a servile imitation of Soviet practices, methods, and institutions, and in the suppression of all workers' democracy within the state and within the party. After an attempt at a genuine democratization of the regime from 1948 to 1950 the opportunist character of the JCP again found expression in the state structure as a result of the latest changes in the Constitution and in the party statutes which, far from guaranteeing workers' democracy, represent an attempt to eliminate the influence of advanced layers of the proletariat on the conduct of public affairs. This is the meaning of the dissolution of the JCP and of the utilization of the People's Front as the sole political instrument of power. In the case of China, the opportunist and bureaucratic character of the Chinese CP has equally left its mark upon the Constitution and upon the evolution of the state in the People's Republic of China. Its desire to collaborate with important fractions of the « national bourgeoisie » led it in the beginning to sabotage and impede revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat in the cities conjointly with the revolutionary uprising of the peasants in North China. The same desire then led it to take entire segments of the old Kuomintang state apparatus and incorporate them into the newly constructed state apparatus. And when, after the Chinese intervention in Korea, the offensive was opened up against the bourgeoisie and a certain mobilization of the masses of the poor took place (mobilization of the peasant masses in the South in order to achieve the agrarian reform; mobilization of the workers in the campaigns « Against Five Ways » and the campaign « Against Three Ways ») (3), the

(3) Campaigns against pillage, corruption, bureaucratism, etc.

Chinese CP did everything possible to limit this mobilization and halt it and prevent it from giving birth to organs of self-administration of the working-class masses in the cities; and it even utilized this same occasion to employ terror against the vanguard revolutionary elements. As in the case of Yugoslavia so in the case of China the new workers' states are not based upon organs of self-administration (soviets, committees), and where such organs formally exist, they are void of their revolutionary content because of the lack of political freedom and freedom of expression for the various workers' currents. That is why in these two cases it is a question of *bureaucratically deformed workers' states*.

29. There is no contradiction between the fact that, on the one hand, the Yugoslav CP and the Chinese CP have been able to lead a revolution victoriously and independently of the Kremlin and have in these instances ceased to be Stalinist parties in the proper meaning of this term; and that, on the other hand, these parties have followed and continue to follow an opportunist orientation which restricts, disorganizes, and places in danger the conquests of the revolution — an opportunist line essentially derived from the Stalinist past of the leaderships of these parties. The Marxist theory of revolutions by no means implies that no revolution could ever triumph, no matter what the circumstances, without a 100 % Marxist leadership. The Yugoslav CP and the Chinese CP freed themselves from the tutelage of the Kremlin, but did so pragmatically, under the pressure of events, of the revolutionary movement of the masses which threatened to overwhelm them. Therein lies their merit, but therein also lies their weakness. What our period demands is not an opportunist leadership which permits itself to be dragged along in order somehow to accomplish the revolution as it were in spite of itself and without a clear vision of the overall tasks of the revolution and means for its accomplishment. Our period requires a revolutionary leadership conscious of its mission in its full scope, conscious of the enormous possibilities inherent in the colossal wave of international revolution, capable of coordinating the international revolutionary forces and of leading them to victory as quickly as possible. In this sense it may be said that the more the revolution progresses and touches advanced industrial countries, the more the existence of such a leadership will become necessary for victory. In the same sense, the experiences in Yugoslavia and China do not invalidate but on the contrary confirm the need for the Fourth International, not only on a world scale but also in these two countries themselves.

30. By the scope of the transformations which

the Chinese revolution has brought about in China itself and throughout the world, the People's Republic of China occupies a special place among the new non-capitalist states which have appeared since World War II. The Chinese revolution and the People's Republic of China are today the principal motor force of the colonial revolution, an essential element of the international revolutionary upsurge. This imposes upon the People's Republic of China special relations with American imperialism; it is upon the People's Republic of China that the U.S. concentrates its principal fire at the present stage. This is precisely the meaning of the Korean war, of the first rank occupied henceforth by Asian affairs in the diplomacy, policy, and military strategy of American imperialism. That is why it is a vital question for the People's Republic of China to assure itself of Soviet aid and alliance so long as the revolution has not triumphed in other advanced industrial countries. At the present stage and for the entire stage to come, it is not the Kremlin which « imposes » an alliance upon China, it is the People's Republic of China which demands guarantees that this alliance be maintained. The more the colonial revolution extends to other Asian countries, the stronger will grow the pressure that the People's Republic of China will be able to exert in this sense upon the Kremlin. But the maintenance and the consolidation of the Sino-Soviet military alliance are by themselves independent of the Kremlin's degree of influence upon the Chinese CP, that is to say, of the extent of the decline of Stalinism in China. The latter is a function of the relationship of forces between the Chinese CP and the Kremlin, fundamentally a function of the progress of the colonial revolution, of the economic reconstruction of China, and of the progress achieved by the proletariat in the rest of the world, including the Soviet Union itself.

31. From this flow the actual stages which have been traversed up to now by the relations between the Chinese CP and the Kremlin:

a) From the victory of Mao up to the American offensive toward the Yalu River: the Chinese CP affirmed its *de facto* independence, including its independence in the ideological field. The stress is placed upon equality between the two allies, and upon Mao's role as the guide of the revolution in all the colonial countries.

b) From the American offensive toward the Yalu up to the death of Stalin: the Chinese CP affirmed the vital character of its alliance with the Kremlin, the decisive aid which it obtains and must obtain from the Soviet Union in military, economic, technical, cultural, and other fields. The stress is placed on the great example and lesson of the Soviet

Union, on the role of Stalin as the guide of the world proletariat, including the Chinese proletariat.

c) Since Stalin's death: Mao's prestige has risen considerably throughout the entire non-capitalist world and among all the Communist Parties. Domestic economic difficulties impel China toward an armistice in Korea. Stress is once again being placed upon equality between the two allies. The Soviet Union's economic aid takes first place in propaganda.

One inescapable part of this entire evolution is inherent in the objective world situation; the other part derives from the opportunist policy of the Chinese CP, the lack of revolutionary audacity on the part of its leadership and its lack of confidence in the dynamism of the revolutionary forces in Asia.

32. Mao's victory has signified only the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution. The tasks of this revolution are only beginning to be solved. After the unification of the country, a unified national market for food products and for manufactured consumers' goods has been created; the conquest of national independence has been by and large achieved; the agrarian reform has been extended and achieved over the entire territory of China. Age-old social relations have been overthrown in the Chinese countryside (relations between peasants and landlords and merchant-usurers, between men and women, between parents and children), and this represents an enormous progress.

In this process the Chinese CP, after being first pushed into action by the peasant masses which overwhelmed it in the North, found itself later obliged itself to mobilize the peasant masses in the South in order to achieve the agrarian reform. This led it to attack for the first time in a massive way the positions and property of the bourgeoisie. But the bourgeoisie preserves to this day 20 % of heavy industry, 60 % of light industry, and the greater part of retail trade; its complete expropriation will be a long and arduous task, above all in the sector of trade, which is nourished by scores of millions of small private peasant enterprises. But holding in its hands the key sectors of the economy, the major part of heavy industry and of the transport system, the banks, foreign trade and wholesale trade, the People's Republic of China can and must begin the planned development of state industry even before the expropriation of the bourgeoisie has been achieved. To the extent that this process has begun and clearly indicates the future dynamic of the evolution, the working-class nature of the state becomes explicit. In the Soviet Union, too, the Left Opposition demanded the launching of large-scale industrialization without the suppression of all the measures of the NEP. But as long as the situation remains as it is, the Chinese CP will be able to limit its appeal to the masses and their

mobilization, as has been the case for the last two years. These appeals to the working masses, while they have not entailed an enormous upsurge of the workers' movement in the cities, have nevertheless obliged the government to modify its policy toward the workers, to ameliorate the workers' position by the new regime of social security, of forms of workers' participation in the administration of the enterprises, and improvements in living standards, thereby creating a more favorable climate for a new rise of the workers' movement. It is in connection with the outbreak of the war, with the aggravation of class contradictions, with the necessity of expropriating the bourgeoisie which will confront the Chinese CP, that such a rise will most likely occur in order to carry through the conquests of the Chinese revolution.

33. The tasks of the Fourth International in Yugoslavia and in China are determined by the particular nature of these states and of the Yugoslav and Chinese Communist Parties. Since workers' states are involved, we are obviously for their defense against any attempts to overthrow them and to alter the social bases created by the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions. Since both the Chinese CP and to a certain extent also the Yugoslav CP are in reality bureaucratic centrist parties, which however still find themselves under the pressure of the revolution in their countries, we do not call upon the proletariat of these countries to constitute new revolutionary parties or to prepare a political revolution in these countries. We are working toward the constitution of a left tendency within the JCP and within the Chinese CP, a tendency which will be able, in connection with the development of the world revolutionary rise, to assure and to lead a new stage forward in the revolution in these two countries. In China our forces will orient themselves particularly toward raising the level of consciousness and of organization of the proletariat and will use every opportunity offered by official government policy in order to prepare and accelerate the entry of the industrial proletariat into the revolution. In Yugoslavia, on the basis of unconditional defense of the conquests of the revolution against imperialism and against the Kremlin, including the conquests of the period from 1948 to 1950, our forces will attempt to constitute an opposition which will seek to replace the present leadership of the party, to break the military and diplomatic alliance of Yugoslavia with the imperialist bloc which is leading the revolution to ruin, to reconstitute officially the JCP, to establish a genuine socialist democracy with freedom of expression for all currents of working-class political opinion, to reorient it theoretically and politically toward revolutionary Marxism and toward the international revolutionary movement. Without a

doubt, the evolution of the situation in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death, and the approach of the revolutionary rise in that country and the beginning of its bursting out in the buffer-zone countries, will greatly favor such an orientation.

34. Unlike the new states of China, Yugoslavia and Vietnam, the non-capitalist states of the buffer zone in Eastern Europe were not the product of a revolutionary rise of the masses in these countries that swept beyond the policy and the organizational control of the Kremlin and obliged the Communist Parties of these countries to go forward on the road of revolution, independently of Moscow's orders and contrary to them. They are, on the contrary, the product of Soviet expansionism, of the tight hold which the Kremlin has succeeded in *maintaining* over the Communist Parties and over the masses of these countries, owing either to the absence or too limited character of the revolutionary rise which took place there at the end of World War II. The weakening of the bourgeoisie of these countries as a result of the war permitted the Soviet bureaucracy to assimilate these countries structurally without being obliged to mobilize the masses on a large scale, without being menaced by a mass movement sweeping over their heads. Wherever the bourgeoisie still remained too strong to be eliminated in this cold way, as in Finland and Austria, the attempts at structural assimilation miscarried and these countries returned to the capitalist orbit. From this basic difference between the origin of the non-capitalist states of the buffer zone and the origin of the People's Republic of China and of Yugoslavia flow important differences both as regards the reciprocal relations between these Communist Parties and the Kremlin, and between the CPs and the masses.

35. The attitude taken and the aims pursued by the Soviet bureaucracy in the buffer countries have passed through three phases:

a) From 1944 to 1947: The basic aim was that of immediate economic pillage of the buffer zone. Toward this end the Soviet bureaucracy utilized the existing capitalist relations of production, by introducing reparation treaties, the seizure of former German property, the creation of Soviet stock companies, of mixed companies, etc. Economic reforms remained limited to agrarian reform and to the nationalization of basic industries. In general, coalition governments with the bourgeoisie and with the petty-bourgeois parties were maintained, governments in which the Communist Parties, however, made sure of the commanding levers (army, police, justice, etc.).

b) From 1948 to 1950: Faced with the launching of the Marshall Plan and imperialism's attempt at the economic disintegration of the buffer zone, the bureaucracy replied by eliminating the bour-

geois parties from power, generalizing the nationalizations, projecting through two-year and three-year reconstruction plans the basis for overall planning of the economy, by beginning to develop peasant coöperatives, and by transforming the structure of the state.

c) From 1951 on: Five- and six-year plans developed the industry of the buffer zone, integrating and tying it more and more closely with that of the Soviet Union; collectivization of agriculture has been pursued at rates varying from country to country. The arms programme imposed considerable sacrifices upon the economy and upon the workers. The direct grip of the Soviet Union upon these countries, the « Russification » of the respective CPs became accentuated, indicating that social and economic contradictions were tending to become reflected inside these parties. To consolidate its hold upon these CPs has become task No. 1 and the most difficult task for the Soviet bureaucracy in the buffer countries.

36. The evolution of the workers' movement and of the masses' moods in the buffer zone differs from country to country. The essential criteria for judging this evolution are, on the one side, the extent to which the post-1948 industrialization has effectively overthrown the previously existing backward economic, cultural, and technological conditions, and, on the other side, the extent to which the CPs in the respective countries have been able to gain or preserve the confidence of important layers of the proletariat.

As regards Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Slovakia, and, in part, Hungary, industrialization is taking place at a relatively higher rate than in the Soviet Union itself, and in these countries has in tendency effects analogous to those which are being produced in the Soviet Union with regard to the social modification that they are bringing about there. Even though difficulties with restorationist layers among the peasantry, elements of national oppression introduced into the life of these countries, along with terror, and the still low living level of the masses, are delaying a new workers' rise in these countries, this will finally occur in these countries as the product of the same causes. The Yugoslav CP could have played a leading role in developing this revolutionary rise; today its capitulationist course plays instead the role of a brake.

As regards East Germany, Poland, western Czechoslovakia, and in part Hungary, industrialization — while swiftly developing the productive forces — has not basically modified the weight, the technical skills, and the culture of the working class which had already attained a relatively high level there. In these countries, during the first stage, the workers' resistance against the relative or absolute

decline of living standards, against the dictatorship and the arbitrariness of the Stalinist bureaucracy in formation, has not ceased to sharpen and is becoming an increasingly greater obstacle to the Soviet bureaucracy's carrying out its project. In Hungary and partly in Poland this resistance has been able to be limited because of the relative stability of the CP leadership. In Czechoslovakia and East Germany, where this resistance is combined with violent shocks within the leading apparatus, it is resulting in a very grave and prolonged crisis, marking the inception of the revolutionary rise (strikes and workers' demonstrations May to June, 1953). In these countries, as in the Soviet Union or even at a still faster pace, the struggle for the conquest of socialist democracy is maturing.

37. It is still too early to predict the precise organizational form which the revolutionary rise will assume in each of the buffer-zone countries. Two variants are possible:

a) The development of autonomous mass actions transmitting themselves to the native Communist Parties where there are developing leftist currents capable of giving leadership to the upsurge. This variant is the more probable for those CPs that have preserved a broad enough workers' base and possess old traditions: Hungary, Bulgaria, partially Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

b) The development of independent mass movements finding their coordination outside the legally existing organizations, through the appearance of new political currents or the revival of Social Democratic organizations. This variant is the more probable for those countries where the CP has only a feeble tradition or a narrow mass base: Albania, Rumania, Poland, and in part East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

A combination of these two organizational forms cannot be excluded, either. We must be prepared for these two possible organizational forms of the future upsurge so as always to be within the real movement of the masses when it will burst forth. It is naturally necessary carefully to distinguish genuine working-class resistance movements, no matter what confused forms they may take on initially, from restorationist movements instigated by the remnants of former possessing classes and by imperialism and led by them, movements which it is necessary to combat. Also, the more the outbreak of the revolutionary upsurge is delayed, and the young generation which has known no form of political organization other than the CP will awaken to political life, the more the CP will tend to become the natural forum in which the leadership of the new revolutionary upsurge will develop. That is why our forces will seek to carry out their tasks, which

are in general similar to those we have in the Soviet Union and whose solution demands the construction of Bolshevik-Leninist parties, through an entrust tactic toward the CPs, while remaining prepared to join quickly any other mass organization which might appear at the beginning of the upsurge. Our basic task within the buffer zone is to assure a Bolshevik leadership to this upsurge and to prevent its falling under the domination of reformist, semi-restorationist forces. This upsurge has to lead to the constitution of genuinely independent Polish, Czech, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and similar Socialist Republics, free to associate themselves voluntarily among themselves in a Balkan-Danubian Federation of Socialist Republics.

38. The general dynamic of the decline of Stalinism in the buffer-zone countries may be clearly outlined as follows:

a) In all these countries structural assimilation has not been able to be effected except through the turning over of political and economic power, in large measure, to the native Communist Parties. These parties thereby acquired a relatively independent base even in cases where, because of lack of mass support, this power remains precarious and depends upon support of the Kremlin.

b) In all these countries the national CP leadership has sought — first against the Kremlin, and since the death of Stalin perhaps partially with the Kremlin's encouragement — to avoid the most disastrous aspects of Stalinist policy in the Soviet Union, above all, forced collectivization.

c) In all these countries, after a transitional period of retreat, passivity, and confusion, the working class appears stronger and more active than before to fight for socialist democracy.

d) In all these countries the objective factors (the war devastations, the low level of the productive forces, etc.) and the subjective factors (absence of workers' organization, the onerous past of a fascist or military dictatorship, lack of revolutionary perspectives, intensification of national sentiments, etc.) which checked the upsurge in 1944 and aided its strict control by the Kremlin, are beginning to disappear and are only partially compensated for by the elements of demoralization produced by the dictatorship, national oppression, the relative reduction of living standards in the entire last period, etc.

39. In all these countries the changes occurring in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death have had considerable repercussions. These have affected simultaneously the internal regime of these parties, their ties with the Kremlin, and their ties with the masses.

Special economic conditions — the monetary reform in Czechoslovakia, the increase of norms in

East Germany — have caused the resistance of the masses to the bureaucratic dictatorship to culminate in an open revolt of the proletariat in these countries. This revolt, which is nothing other than the beginning of the political revolution by which the masses will overthrow the Stalinist dictatorship, brings the most striking confirmation of the predictions of our movement on this question. It also confirms — by the example of the S.E.D., which on June 17th 1953 was split from top to bottom by the pressure of the revolutionary uprising of the masses, and a part of which showed itself disposed to capitulate to the workers — the heterogeneous character of the bureaucracy and the effects of disintegration produced in it by such action of the masses.

This revolt has doubtless checked the application of the « new course » on the political plane, and in certain cases such as in Germany has been replaced by a regression in this field. But even in these cases the « new course » has been generally applied on the economic plane, and further strengthened in East Germany by the concessions that the Soviet bureaucracy made after June 17th (giving up reparations, turning over the SAG to the national Stalinist authorities).

This « new course, » the most complete example of which has been represented by the reorientation of the Hungarian government, includes these noteworthy features:

a) An improvement in economic conditions for all strata of the population; a slowing down in the development of heavy industry; a slowing down in agrarian collectivization; improvement in supplying the people with industrial goods; softening of the repressive legislation on « violations of labor discipline, » etc.

b) A softening of the atmosphere of extreme tension in the mass organizations; less rigid language, less « prefabricated » discussions, greater possibilities for the lower cadres to get a hearing for their concerns, etc.

This new course, very likely ordered by the Kremlin, is designed as a means of strengthening the grip of the Stalinist Parties on the buffer countries by making it more flexible, less rigid. But, through the social and political forces it will liberate, through the differentiation it will help bring about in the CPs and the youth organizations it will facilitate even more than in the USSR, the rise of the proletariat toward the political revolution.

It goes without saying that the accentuation of the revolutionary rise and its extension into Western Europe and into the USSR, before or during the war, will play a decisive role in the emancipation of the proletariat of the buffer zone from the bureaucratic straitjacket imprisoning it.

40. The programme of political revolution on the order of the day in all the buffer countries includes the following noteworthy points:

1. Freedom for working-class prisoners.
2. Abolition of repressive anti-labor legislation.
3. Democratization of the workers' parties and organizations.
4. Legalization of all workers' parties and organizations.
5. Election and democratic functioning of mass committees.
6. Independence of the trade unions in relation to the government.
7. Democratic elaboration of the economic plan by the masses, for the masses.
8. Effective right of self-determination for peoples.

III

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF STALINISM IN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD

41. The Communist parties were created above all under the impetus produced by the October Revolution within the Social Democratic parties and, subordinately, within other formations of the pre-1914 workers' movement. The victory of the Soviet bureaucracy in the USSR enabled it to exploit the prestige of the October Revolution among the world proletarian vanguard. That is the primary cause for the victory of Stalinism in the CPs. The inherent weaknesses of these parties facilitated this process. The lack of a left-wing organized on a clearcut program inside the pre-1914 Social Democracy resulted in the political and theoretical weakness of most of the CP leaderships in the early years of the Communist International. This led, on the one hand, to the crushing political preponderance of the Bolshevik Party inside the International and, on the other, to the lack of preparation of other party leaderships seriously to cope with the controversial issues beginning with 1923. Once the Bolshevik Party had been bureaucratized, Stalin's faction met with little serious organized opposition in transplanting bureaucratic centralism into the Communist International. The process of Stalinization of the Communist Parties was accentuated by the ebb of the workers' movement in the period from 1923 to 1943, the year when Stalin proceeded to dissolve the CI.

42. The CI and the Communist Parties were converted into instruments of Kremlin diplomacy for a bureaucratic defense of the Soviet Union. They abandoned the struggle for the world revolution and sought to exert pressure upon various national bourgeoisies so as to obtain from them a diplomatic orientation in conformity with the

Kremlin's views. These transformations of the CP objectives provoked swings from adventurism to opportunism, and led certain Communist Parties to take directly counter-revolutionary actions at certain periods (notably in Spain during the People's Front days).

The Stalinist policy resulted in numerous defeats of the working class, including the Nazi victory in Germany, fruit of the policies of both the German Communist Party and the German Social Democratic Party. Each of these defeats accentuated the ebb of the world revolution and reinforced the grip of the Soviet bureaucracy upon the USSR as well as upon the vanguard which remained attached to the Russian Revolution.

The bureaucratic regime within the CI and within the CPs entailed a theoretical decline. The CI became less and less a centre for the elaboration of an international political orientation. The CP leaderships were selected and changed from above, depending upon their aptitude in following orders from the Kremlin through all the multiple turns and zigzags. The CPs functioned under the aegis of empiricism, monolithism and historical falsification. Thus came about a selection in reverse of leaderships, which eliminated the most independent and the most politically capable elements. This regime, in fact, suppressed any possibility of collective political work by the national leaderships, transforming them instead into mere transmission belts for the Kremlin's orders.

43. Originally constituted in order to become the national sections of a world revolutionary party, the Communist Parties, under Stalinist leadership, became instead degenerated workers' parties. Their bureaucratic leaderships depended upon the Kremlin, above all because they lived politically upon exploiting the prestige of the October Revolution and of the Soviet Union among the masses. Nevertheless, unlike the CP of the Soviet Union, the leadership of the Stalinist Parties did not express the interests of a special social stratum with enormous material resources at its disposal. Because of this fact the dual nature of these parties is not identical with the dual nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. By their rank and file, which in contradistinction to the Social Democratic Parties, was generally composed of the most exploited and the most militant sectors of the working class, they were obliged to reflect, to a certain extent and however inadequately, the interests of the proletariat. By their leadership they were subjected to strict control by the Kremlin which sought to maintain the *status quo* of the revolution « in a single country, » precisely at the expense of the revolution in other countries.

By their bondage to Soviet diplomacy, the Communist Parties were led at various periods to practise an opportunist policy very close in its effects to that of the Social Democracy. Even in those periods the Communist Parties could never go so far as to fuse with the Socialist Parties because they were the instruments, not of their own national bourgeoisie, but of the Kremlin. All doubts on this score were dissipated by the decisive test of World War II: in their overwhelming majority the Communist Parties (the leadership as well as the rank and file) remained faithful to the policy of the Kremlin bureaucracy, notably during the period of the Soviet-German Pact.

44. In the pre-war period the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries experienced varied developments: some, like the French CP, have seen their influence over the masses grow; others, like the British CP, never experienced a genuine upsurge. But during this period all the numerous crises which shook the Communist Parties were surmounted by Stalinism in a way which strengthened its grip upon them.

The main reason for it was that during this period of ebb of the revolution, every great mass struggle ended in defeat, and what became detached from the Communist Parties was either a very small revolutionary vanguard on the programme of Trotskyism, or currents renouncing revolutionary struggle, while the Communist Parties retained militant worker cadres attached to the Soviet Union in an overall way without distinguishing between the state and its leadership.

Each turn was regarded by these militants as a mere tactical manoeuvre dictated by the need to save the first workers' state at all costs. It should however be noted that the role played by Stalinism in the Spanish Civil War, an openly counter-revolutionary role, while it did not turn against Stalinism the Communist militants who had come to fight in the International Brigades, did, nevertheless, for the first time, sow doubts among them, as was revealed much later — after the break with Yugoslavia.

As a consequence, almost everywhere, the Stalinist Parties remained face to face with the Social Democratic Parties as organizations revolutionary in appearance and numerically strongest, and it was toward them that the newly politicalized militant elements turned during each new workers' upsurge. This was the case especially during World War II, in the course of which the Communist Parties became strengthened thanks to their activity inside the Resistance Movements and thanks to the prestige of the Soviet victories.

But it was during this same war period that for the first time a Communist Party, the Yugoslav CP, ceased to act in accordance with the strict require-

ments of the Kremlin's policy. During the war, because of both the acuteness of the struggle against the armies of occupation and the tensions within Yugoslav society which prevented the CP from practising class collaboration in the name of the National Front, the CP was led to build a new army, mass organs of power, and to seize power at the head of the insurgent masses. For several years the Yugoslav leadership tried to adjust this situation to the Kremlin's demands, but finally the conflict erupted in 1948, demonstrating the profound incompatibility between the Soviet bureaucracy, the product of the ebb of the revolution, and a powerful revolutionary movement.

It was likewise after the end of the war that the Chinese CP, confronted with a mighty uprising which posed before it the alternative of either putting itself at its head or of disappearing from the political scene, engaged in a mortal combat with Chiang Kai-shek and conquered power through a struggle of Chinese Red Armies backed by a giant peasant uprising.

In the course of the war the Kremlin's relations with the Communist Parties were loosened. The leadership of the CI was isolated from many parties. It was this moment that was chosen by Stalin to dissolve the CI. In this same period, under pressure of the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge (France, Greece,...), differences within the CP leaderships having a mass base began to manifest themselves. Other leaderships went beyond the required limits of opportunism and were called to order by Moscow (the United States, Holland...). The unfolding post-war situation no longer permitted the Kremlin to reestablish the rigid control over the Communist parties which existed prior to the war. The formation of the Cominform was less intended to attain this than to take Yugoslavia and the buffer zone firmly in hand.

45. With the victory of the Chinese revolution over the Kuomintang regime, the period of the revolutionary upsurge, which began in 1943 with the downfall of fascism in Italy, entered a new stage, basically marked by a relationship of international forces favorable to the revolution and evolving on a global scale more and more favorably. The revolutionary wave is spreading from country to country, from continent to continent. It has recently reached the Soviet Union itself and the buffer zone.

The Communist Parties of the capitalist countries consequently find themselves placed in conditions absolutely different from those of the pre-war days.

In those countries where the Communist Parties are in the minority in the working class, the revolutionary upsurge has generally manifested itself through an influx of the masses into the majority parties, isolating the Communist Parties still fur-

ther, at the same time that leftist currents, such as Bevanism, are beginning to appear within these majority parties.

In countries where the working class has not yet formed its own mass parties, as is the case for the Latin-American countries, among others, the Communist Parties as a rule represented the strongest tendency in the existing political movement of the class. Their Stalinist degeneration, especially their treachery during and immediately after the war, has caused a permanent crisis in these parties, which is becoming accentuated with the rise of the mass movement in Latin America and their inability to offer it a revolutionary outcome. The crisis in these parties can lead the major part of the communist cadres to come close to the Fourth International and even join its ranks. This on condition that the Trotskyist organizations fulfill their task of revolutionary leadership of the masses and adopt a dynamic and flexible attitude toward the communist militants by seeking a common basis in action which would facilitate their transition to Trotskyism.

As for the mass Communist Parties, their relations with Moscow are being subjected to conditions drastically different from the past: the very power of the mass movement in their own countries, developing in the direction of revolutionary struggles, asserts itself increasingly. Relations with Moscow become loosened (during the war there were even prolonged disruptions in certain cases). Finally, it is in place to add, since the recent developments in the USSR, there has been an uncertainty on the part of the CP leaderships about the policy of the Kremlin and — on the part of the rank and file—there are possibilities of a critical attitude toward the regime in the Soviet Union and in the « People's Democracies. »

This international situation and its repercussions on the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries thus open up two ways for the decline of Stalinism in the workers' movement under its control:

In countries where the CPs are a minority in the workers' movement, the tendencies around which the masses tend to polarize themselves (whether it be the revolutionary party as in Bolivia or centrist tendencies as in England or Japan) have increasing chances of definitively eliminating Stalinist influence over the workers' movement provided they acquire a correct revolutionary leadership and orientation. These tendencies serve in effect as the pole of attraction for all the healthy workers' forces, causing the Stalinist influence to crumble, and subsequently promoting internal crises and even splits under the pressure of isolation. But an erroneous policy or acts of treachery by the centrist leaderships can at a later stage revive the chances of the CPs even in these countries.

In countries where the CPs are a majority in the working class, they can, in certain exceptional conditions (advanced disintegration of the possessing classes) and under the pressure of very powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses, be led to project a revolutionary orientation counter to the Kremlin's directives, without abandoning the political and theoretical baggage inherited from Stalinism. They will do this all the more so because the masses, who are still seeking, as they will continue to seek for a whole period to come, to make use of those parties to satisfy their aspirations, have acquired a more critical attitude toward their leaderships than in the past and are no longer prepared to follow no matter what turn of these parties. Under these conditions, the disintegration of Stalinism in these parties must not be understood in the next immediate stage as an organizational disintegration of these parties or as a public break with the Kremlin but as a gradual internal transformation, accompanied by a political differentiation within their midst. It is even possible that such a process of Stalinist disintegration may be accompanied in some Communist mass parties by a certain consolidation or an organizational strengthening, to the extent that, under the pressure of circumstances, they modify their policies to conform closer to the interests of the masses. This perspective—namely not an organizational disintegration of the mass Communist Parties, but rather a disintegration, molecular for an entire period, of the Stalinist ideas inside these parties, as well as of the bureaucratic relations which extend from the Kremlin down to the ranks of these parties — is essential for determining the forms of intervention by our movement in this process in order to make it evolve in a direction favorable to revolutionary Marxism.

46. The evolution of future relations between the Kremlin and the leaderships of the mass Communist Parties, and between these parties and the masses, depends on several factors:

In the first place on the scope and rate of the revolutionary upsurge the world over, notably in the industrialized countries of Western Europe.

On the reawakening of the proletarian masses in the USSR itself and its consequences upon the regime of Soviet society.

On how the war unfolds between imperialism and the anti-imperialist camp.

On the capacity to intervene evinced by a revolutionary leadership, so as to place itself at the head of the mass currents, notably those which appear either inside the mass Communist Parties or inside the mass Socialist Parties.

It is impossible to foresee exactly the action and interaction of these basic factors. In any case it is possible to indicate that the greater the scope of the revolutionary upsurge, and the closer it impin-

ges upon industrially advanced countries, then the more the political initiative will slip out of the Kremlin's hands, while centrist tendencies will become accentuated inside the mass Communist Parties affected by this upsurge. In the same way, the more that the revolutionary upsurge passes under a consistent revolutionary leadership, and the greater its tendency to have direct repercussions in the Soviet Union itself, then the more able will this leadership be to deal a mortal blow to Stalinism in its very heart, even before the majority of the communist militants in these countries have freed themselves from the Kremlin's control and influence.

This entire dynamic is neither unswerving nor uniform. It must be understood as a complex dialectical process with many contradictions and partial swings backward. It does not exclude but on the contrary implies: a) the possibility for the mass Communist Parties to carry out temporary turns to the right within given conditions, as long as mass pressure has not reached its culminating point; b) the possibility of expulsions or break-aways of numerically restricted groups of militants and cadres; c) the possibility, during the war, of open counter-revolutionary actions by the Kremlin against mass movements, especially those that will be still isolated.

But it is important to understand the *general direction* of the evolution in which these variants will occupy a less and less important place, in which the mass revolutionary movements will more and more succeed in liberating themselves from the Kremlin's control, whatever may be their initial form or their initial leadership.

This process of disintegration of Stalinism by no means signifies that for the mass Communist Parties there will take place a gradual transformation of these organizations into revolutionary Marxist parties. Crises and great transformations will be necessary and inevitable for revolutionary Marxist parties under the banner of the Fourth International to emerge from this. But these transformations which will mark the complete end of Stalinism will come as the culminating points of a process which at present begins by stages in the course of which the Communist Parties, compelled to seek to strengthen their ties with the masses, begin to shake off, often in scarcely perceptible ways, the rigid ties of Stalinist obedience:

IV

THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

47. The Fourth International issued from the Left Opposition of the S.U. Communist Party and from the Bolshevik-Leninist fraction of the Third International. It originated in the defense against Stalinist revisionism of Lenin's programme, of

Leninist strategy and tactics, of the principal lessons of October and of the revolutionary defeats in Europe and Asia. The Fourth International, and the Soviet Left Opposition and the International Left Opposition which preceded it, were in a large measure born from the struggle against the theory of « socialism in one country, » against the theory of the « bloc of the four classes, » against the conceptions of building socialism at a « tortoise pace » or « in giant strides, » against the opportunist tactics of unprincipled alliances with the reformist bureaucracy, with the peasant parties, with the national bourgeoisie in the colonies, and against the ultra-left tactic of « social-fascism. » This principled origin of the Trotskyist movement represents its great strength. For the first time in the history of the workers' movement, an international organization was constituted exclusively on the basis of agreement of the cadres with a precise programme, strategy, and tactics. But at the same time in this strength lay a sure danger of great weakness because of its being cut off from the workers' movement: that of the transformation of the Trotskyist organization into a discussion club and into an academic sect of Marxist critics of Stalinist policy. The founders of the Fourth International, especially Leon Trotsky, were to such a degree conscious of this danger that as early as 1933 they concentrated all their efforts upon rooting the Trotskyist nuclei in the mass movement, upon reestablishing ties with this movement wherever they had been broken, and upon selecting a new generation of Trotskyist workers' cadres. In some countries, such as the United States, this task had already made great progress prior to World War II. In Europe, in Asia, in the greater part of the Latin American countries, the blows dealt to our movement by Stalinist terror and by imperialist and fascist persecutions, by the lack of continuity of our leaderships and our principal cadres, but above all by the effects of the world-wide ebb of the workers' movement, prevented the solution of this task prior to and during the Second World War. It is only in the course of the new revolutionary upsurge, beginning with 1943, that the international movement became fully conscious of this new stage into which the Trotskyist organizations had to enter, the stage of the practical application of the Transitional Programme. It is beginning with the Third World Congress and with the Tenth Plenum of the IEC that the majority of the Trotskyist organizations acquired a concrete conception of the manner in which they must root themselves within the mass movement of their country and conquer leadership therein.

48. The origin of the Fourth International in a factional struggle inside the Third International against the Stalinist fraction of the international

communist movement has given rise to deviations in the Trotskyist movement which considered the struggle against the deviations and crimes of Stalinism as their main function. In reality the role of the Fourth International was and remains quite different. It was not by accident that at the very inception of the Trotskyist movement is to be found the struggle for the theory of the Permanent Revolution which is the most conscious expression of the social dynamic of our epoch. The Fourth International opposes all other workers' leaderships which represent only special, selfish, bureaucratically or nationally narrow interests, whether they are reformist, centrist, Stalinist, or of any other variety. The Fourth International opposes any attempt to limit the action of the workers to the defense of positions already conquered, whether these be bourgeois democracy, the Soviet state or the Yugoslav state. It represents the interests as a whole of the international proletariat and its historic goals, the world-wide realization of the socialist revolution, the world-wide construction of the communist society. It is because the socialist revolution is distinguished from every other revolution by the high degree of consciousness it requires from the vanguard of the class which carries it out, that this goal cannot be definitively achieved without the building of a workers' leadership that has assimilated the programme of the Fourth International. The Fourth International does not conceive of winning over the workers' vanguard and the masses to its programme and to its organization by opposing itself to the actual movement of the masses, but by integrating itself into it, by fusing itself with it, and by aiding through its political and practical intervention its advance and the selection of new leading cadres within its ranks.

49. The particular conditions in which the Fourth International was born — in contrast to the First, the Second, and the Third Internationals, it was born not in a period of rise but in a period of ebb of the working-class movement — determined in the last analysis the slow rate of growth of its organizations and their great weakness at the beginning of the upsurge in 1943. From this fact, as much as from the still limited character of this upsurge, above all in the countries of Western Europe, has flowed the impossibility for the Fourth International to become a leading force of this upsurge in most of the countries of the world. This in its turn has facilitated the manoeuvres of the Soviet bureaucracy to control, check, and stop this upsurge. But it is precisely during this same stage that in many important countries more solid Trotskyist leaderships and cadres have been selected. For this reason the Fourth International enters the next stage of the upsurge and especially will enter the Third World War with a solidity

infinitely superior to that of 1939 and with far more serious and tangible chances of asserting itself and of rallying round its programme a genuine revolutionary leadership of the masses in many countries.

50. The rise of Stalinism was inaugurated by a ferocious struggle against the Left Opposition in the Soviet Union and against the International Left Opposition because these incarnated, as against the conservative interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, the genuine interests of the international and the Soviet proletariat. Despite the attempts of the state apparatus, the most powerful in the world, to crush them, the handful of conscious revolutionaries who at this period formed the Trotskyist movement not only survived but also transmitted intact to the younger generations in most of the countries of the world the entire Leninist programmatic heritage as against the falsifications of the Kremlin. The decline of Stalinism opens up, in varying degrees, favorable conditions for an upsurge of the Trotskyist movement in the entire world. In all countries where the decline of Stalinism is the direct product of the power of the revolutionary upsurge, Trotskyism, Trotskyist ideas, and the Trotskyist programme are experiencing a striking confirmation, and it depends, at bottom, upon the tactical organizational flexibility of our organizations whether they profit to the full from this confirmation. In the USSR itself and in the buffer-zone countries, the existing stage, preliminary to or the beginning of the revolutionary upsurge and characterized by a process of differentiation, of uncertainty, of sharp turns, and even panic among the Stalinist leaders, is very favorable to the reappearance of our ideas and our organization within the working-class movement. Upon the capacity of the International to utilize the slightest fissures in the apparatus for the introduction of our ideas will depend whether this reappearance will take place in a conscious and organized form or whether it will begin by assuming more confused and more complicated forms. As for the countries which will be drawn into the revolutionary upsurge at the next stage, immediately on the eve or in the course of the war, the International has been specially armed to utilize to the maximum the opportunities offered for increasing the influence of our organizations and assuring their breaking through. The disorder and confusion which reign in the leading Stalinist circles, arising both from political problems they are unable to solve and from the latest events in the Soviet Union, will aid us greatly in this task. The significance of our intervention in the world crisis which is shaking Stalinism can be specified as follows: to regain the maximum of the cadres and honest revolutionary militants working for the communist cause in the ranks of the CPs that the crisis of Stalinism is shaking and will shake more and

more: to assure the new revolutionary leadership of the proletariat; to assure the proletarian victory with the least possible expense in regard to the defense of the already existing conquests of the revolution as well as the duration and convulsions of the revolutionary epoch. If we learn how to com-

bine intransigent principled firmness with an extreme tactical flexibility with regard to the integration of our forces in the real mass movement, we shall make the decline and downfall of Stalinism coincide with the triumph of the Fourth International and of the world revolution.

II

Decline and Fall of Stalinism

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS

PREAMBLE

The theses, « Rise and Decline of Stalinism, » adopted by the Fourth World Congress of the Fourth International, applied to the analysis of the dynamics of Soviet society the general conclusions that the Fourth International had drawn from the reevaluation of the world situation carried out at its Third World Congress.

The dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy, the political expropriation and atomization of the proletariat of the USSR, were the result of the worldwide retreat of the revolutionary forces before those of reaction. They resulted, furthermore, from the relationship of economic and social forces, highly unfavorable to the proletariat, within the USSR itself.

The fundamental change in the international situation and in the internal situation within the USSR, characterized on the one hand by the worldwide upsurge of the revolutionary forces since 1943 and especially since the victory of the Chinese revolution, and on the other hand by the spectacular successes of planification which made the USSR the second industrial power in the world, destroyed the objective bases for the full sway and power of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The evolution of the international correlation of forces in favor of the anticapitalist social strata was paralleled by an evolution of the correlation of forces inside the USSR in favor of the proletariat and at the cost of the bureaucracy. This evolution steadily increased the pressure of the masses on the bureaucratic dictatorship, obliging it to make important concessions to the masses, first only in the economic field, then also, and more and more, in the political field.

We thus considered the « new course » of the Kremlin not as a movement of self-reform by the bureaucracy, but as a movement of self-defense by it. While promoting and even hastening the awakening of the movement of the masses by its

objective consequences, especially by the divisions that it created from the top to the bottom of the bureaucratic ladder, the « new course » was not, we considered, a substitute for, but rather a preparatory phase of, the political revolution of the masses against the bureaucracy.

The more and more dramatic events that have followed one another in the USSR itself, in the « People's Democracies, » and in the CPs of the capitalist countries, since the Fourth World Congress, have confirmed the correctness of this analysis, which rendered our movement the only tendency in the international workers' movement capable of foreseeing and correctly interpreting the evolution of the world crisis of Stalinism.

The rehabilitation of Tito, the spectacular decisions of the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, the sensational revelations of the Khrushchev report, the outburst of « speeded-up democratization » in several « Peoples' Democracies, » the « critical » evolution of the Communist Parties of Italy, Great Britain, the USA, etc., the Poznan revolt, the political revolution in Poland and Hungary — these are so many stages in the steady decline of Stalinism and the beginning of its fall, they are so many leaps forward in a process that the theses « Rise and Decline of Stalinism » had fully analyzed.

The Fifth World Congress of the Fourth International — faced with the final phase of this process which has plainly begun in a whole sector still dominated only yesterday by the Soviet bureaucracy — is above all concerned with defining the precise conditions for the fall of Stalinism, the conditions for an upsurge and victory of the revolutionary proletariat on the ruins of the crumbling dictatorship.

That is why the present theses do not take up again either the historical expositions or the structural analyses and definitions of the theses « Rise and Decline of Stalinism, » of which they are neither a substitute nor a corrective, but a natural continuation and thus an integral part.

I — THE DECLINE AND FALL OF STALINISM IN THE USSR

1. — Since 1953 Soviet industry has grown at a rhythm far surpassing that of the growth of the most advanced capitalist countries. In many fields (fuels; petroleum, partially; machine construction; automation; industrial use of nuclear energy), the Soviet economy has succeeded in overcoming the backwardnesses and unevennesses of the end of the Stalin era, and achieving progress that surpasses everything that it had known in the past. The first partial reconversion of heavy industry, carried out in 1953 in favor of certain durable consumer goods (watches, bicycles, television sets, sewing machines, washing machines, etc.) permitted surpassing in a few years in this field too, formerly so neglected, the production of all capitalist countries except the USA, and perceptibly raising the living standards of the working masses.

At the same time the Soviet economy continues to suffer from two disproportions which represent the principal inheritance from the Stalin era: on one hand, the disproportion between heavy industry and light industry, and, on the other, the disproportion between industry and agriculture. These disproportions are the main cause of the fact that, despite the unquestionable successes in raising the living standards of the masses during the last years, consumption still remains very much below that in capitalist countries having an industrial proletariat proportionately comparable to that of the USSR. This is particularly true concerning high-grade food products (meat, dairy products, imported fruits), durable consumer goods (household articles, scooters, radios, automobiles, etc.), and the quality of semi-durable consumer goods (clothing and shoes). The crisis in housing continues to be more than ever the almost universal grounds for discontent among the working population.

The backwardness in agriculture compared to the general boom in the economy is the main worry of the present leaders of the bureaucracy. They tried to do away with it either by by-passing the kolkhoz peasantry (the so-called « virgin land » policy), or by stimulating the private interests of the peasantry (e. g. upward adjustment of the price of potatoes), or by threatening them with suppressing the last vestiges of private exploitation (attacks against private market-gardens and livestock). But in the absence of a correct and coherent overall policy, the fragmentary and often contradictory results of these different efforts did not permit the agricultural crisis as such to be solved.

The malpractices of excessive bureaucratic centralization continue to weigh upon the Soviet economy, despite the first timid measures of administrative decentralization in industry. They are sum-

marized in the officially admitted percentage of productive workers in the whole of Soviet manpower, which is not over 35 %.

The sum total of these contradictions and disproportions represents a strong brake on the development of the productive forces in the Soviet Union. The replacement of bureaucratic management by democratic workers' management, the preparation, adoption, and execution of the plan under the control of the masses, would permit a considerable increase in the productivity of labor, reducing overhead and waste, and guarantee a higher standard of living for the working class and the laboring peasants, without slowing down the rhythm at which the economy is advancing.

2. — With the improvement in the masses' living standards, which was particularly considerable in 1953 and 1954, the economic and social demands of the different social strata, far from diminishing, were manifested in a more and more clear and open fashion. They went beyond the stage of immediate demands — better food-supplies; better quality of industrial products; better workers' housing; higher prices for purchases by the State; more freedom of trade; cheaper industrial products for the peasants — to reach the stage of demands expressing the social logic of the different classes or strata composing Soviet society. Thus the policy of concessions under mass pressure, temporarily braked after the fall of Malenkov, started advancing again during the preparation, the holding, and the aftermath of the XXth Congress.

Two general currents, fundamentally opposed to each other, are showing themselves and having a parallel development in Soviet society; they are beginning to state their demands:

a) The current of the most active and conscious part of the working class, which tends more and more to raise the question of the *administration of the plants*. These workers obtained important concessions at the XXth Congress (raising of low salaries, equalization of pensions, etc.). Workers skilfully seized on the « struggle against the personality cult » to fight the principle of « single command » (i. e., the arbitrary omnipotence of the manager) within the plant. They also obtained the recognition in principle that the Labor Code — the severest in the world! — must be revised. The attempts to introduce a reform into the salary system which — on the pretext of a struggle against the excesses of Stakhanovism and against the system of graduated bonuses — in reality reduced the overall pay of the most skilled workers, were successfully combated. The proletarian current will take its inspiration from the example of the Polish and Hungarian trade-unions to demand a return of the unions to their genuine historical function: the

defense of the specific interests of the workers — if needs be, against the administration and the bureaucratically degenerated State.

b) The current of the most conscious representatives of the most privileged layers of the bureaucracy (managers of trusts and factories, chief engineers, army generals, etc.), who are seeking to obtain *additional legal guarantees* for their privileges, as these are more and more brought in question by the pressure of the masses and their beginning to take action. This current had scored points especially during the year 1955, at the Moscow industrial conference (the demand and obtention of a model status for managers; increase in the prerogatives of supervisory personnel within the plants), but workers' pressure aiming at revising the Labor Code threatens to destroy part of these advantages. The bureaucracy demanded and obtained at the XXth Congress the extension of the bonus system in favor of the administrative personnel. It is asking for a liberalization of the Penal Code in economic matters and is obtaining particularly the right for each industrial enterprise to sell certain production goods, which broadens (and legalizes) the grey market in these goods and introduces a disintegrating factor into planning.

As for the peasantry, it has scarcely had an opportunity to formulate in an articulate way any long-range social demands. It can be supposed, however, that above all it obstinately intends to hang on to its little bits of private land, on which a considerable part of its effort is concentrated and from which it derives a disproportionately high percentage of its income. The fact that it has just received from Khrushchev the right to sell freely the products of these little plots constitutes an important concession in its favor, and will induce it to increase the production of vegetables and stock-raising products.

Thus the continuance of the « new course » is inexorably preparing the big show-down between the proletariat and the more privileged layers of the bureaucracy, a show-down which will have as its main stake the administration of the plants and which will inevitably raise all the questions of the structure and control of the economy and of the workers' state.

3. — Since the period of preparation for the XXth Congress, it had become plain that a revolt was rumbling on the intellectual workers' front in the USSR. The virulent and well-justified criticism to which, one after another, the cinema, the theatre, literary, artistic, architectural, scientific, and philosophic productions were subjected, revealed both the lamentable failure of Jdanovism and the passionate desire of a new generation of artists, writers, and savants to free themselves from « directives » that were ignorant, and at variance with the genuine

exigencies of their work. The Soviet intellectual youth demanded freedom of criticism, thought, and creation, and it demanded it so loudly that certain serious concessions had to be made to it.

But to grant artists and savants a freedom of criticism in politics and economics, not enjoyed by citizens and above all by workers, is to make of artistic creation and scientific research an *inevitable instrument of social criticism*. The broad extent of this criticism, even from artists who were liegemen of the bureaucracy (Ehrenburg!), surprised and worried the bureaucratic tops — whence their efforts to check the current and even turn it backward, to return to a more « sincere » « socialist realism, » to tolerate only those critics who « respect the correct general line of the party. » The ups-and-downs of Soviet history-writing — clinging to most of the Stalinist legend up to the eve of the XXth Congress, then seeming to break free, only to fall back under the ferule of bureaucratic control, whether it be exercised by a Molotov or by even more narrow-minded functionaries — clearly characterize the zigzags of a bureaucracy faced with the demand for freedom of criticism by the intellectuals.

But despite the desperate resistance of this bureaucracy, despite the steps backward, the delays, and even the reactions shown in this or that field, the battle for freedom of thought in the USSR won at the XXth Congress tremendous victories whose effects cannot be wiped out. Filtering inexorably through all the cracks and crevices henceforth opened up in the shaking dictatorship, the spirit of criticism, the spirit of rebellion, will penetrate into the political field and will strike the spark of the political revolution.

4. — The XXth Congress marked a high point in the crisis which has been shaking the Bonapartist tops of the Soviet bureaucracy since Stalin's death, and which is itself the reflection of the basic change in the relationship of forces between the proletariat and the bureaucracy. Under the pressure of the masses and of a discontent that was beginning to take on a political aspect, the leading nucleus of the bureaucracy was torn into various tendencies: a tendency in favor of major concessions to the masses (Malenkov-Mikoyan?); a tendency for stiffening the dictatorship (Kaganovitch-Molotov?); a « centrist » tendency (Khrushchev-Bulganin). Faced by an open attempt of the « liberals » to capitalize on the hatred of the masses toward Stalin by openly attacking for the first time the authority of the defunct dictator, Khrushchev tried to neutralize this manoeuvre by himself launching a much more violent attack against Stalin in his secret report. Thus, having tried in vain to make Beria shoulder all its collective crimes, the bureaucracy made its own chief the main scapegoat, thus winning a short

respite before having to face a political opposition.

This colossal manoeuvre, of really historic scope, showed from the beginning the marks of the haste and even panic that engendered it. At no moment were the leaders of the bureaucracy able to control, or even to foresee, the forces that they were thus setting loose. While they perhaps delayed the appearance of an anti-Stalinist oppositional tendency within the CP of the USSR, and perhaps temporarily won back some sympathy in certain intellectual circles and lower layers of the bureaucracy, they at the same time set going a real snowballing movement which will end up by crushing them.

By destroying in so thorough a fashion the authority of Stalin, the incarnation of all bureaucratic autocracy, they definitively undermined the authority and spirit of bureaucratic command at every level. By cynically revealing the monstrous crimes of Stalin, with which they had nevertheless been associated, they definitively destroyed the blind obedience of Communist militants toward their leadership, while covering themselves with discredit. By explaining the thus revealed horrors by an inverted « personality cult, » they satisfied nobody, and opened the way to a critical Marxist analysis of Soviet society and its bureaucratic degeneration.

The XXth Congress thus raised to the pitch of paroxysm the crisis of Stalinism in several countries, especially in the « People's Democracies » where the masses were on the threshold of revolt. By unleashing a movement which speeded up the outbreak of the political revolution, it temporarily transferred the centre of gravity of the struggle between the proletariat and the bureaucracy to outside the borders of the USSR. Thrown into consternation by the breadth of the revolutionary force thus set free, the bureaucracy vainly tried to take a step backward and to check destalinization (Summer 1956). These backward steps ended by exasperating the masses even more, especially in Poland and Hungary, and finally faced the Kremlin with the necessity of repressing the mass revolutionary movements in these countries by force. Through the Soviet soldiers in contact with this powerful revolutionary movement, the wave of the political revolution will flow back from the « glaxis » into the USSR itself, thus signing the death-verdict for the bureaucracy at bay.

The first repercussions of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, furthermore, were the exacerbation of the fraction struggle in the very centre of the Kremlin leadership. Threatened by a temporary bloc made against him by the Malenkov and the Molotov-Kaganovitch tendencies, outvoted in the Political Bureau (Presidium), Khrushchev was able to stay in power only by making a direct appeal to

the Central Committee over the heads of the Political Bureau, and by eliminating his adversaries from the « collective leadership. » By using classic Stalinist methods (calumnies, amalgams, falsification of history) for this purpose, he diminished his credit still further among the more and more critical circles of the bureaucracy's lower layers and of the proletariat. By involving a part of the party cadres more directly in the solution of this dispute, he contributed, in his own way, to the politicization of the masses, and prepared the following stage during which those opposed to him may well carry an appeal against him to the Congress and to the party rank and file.

5. — Thus the objective and subjective preconditions for the revolution are rapidly ripening in the Soviet Union. After having lost the aureole of omniscience, the Kremlin has now lost that of omnipotence. Having abandoned the mantle of autocracy, the bureaucracy is now losing the mask of enlightened liberalism. With an unheard-of rapidity, history is forcing Stalin's heirs to throw down all their cards and to face empty-handed, so to speak, the assault of the masses.

The more that popular pressure grows, the more the divergences at the top will tend to be accentuated. The neo-Stalinist tendency will see in the concessions already granted the cause of the drive of the masses and will try to put a stop to « liberalization, » bringing into question even the concessions made since 1953. The « liberal » tendency, on the contrary, will understand that the drive from below will continue to grow if the dictatorship does not recognize, at least partially, the people's anxieties, and will prepare a new wave of « destalinization », perhaps even more sensational than that of the XXth Congress. Both, however, are trying only to preserve and defend the privileges of the bureaucracy as a whole. Both will be led more and more to appeal to the army, the only effective tool of repression remaining after the dismantling of the police, to arbitrate their conflicts.

The temporary elimination of Malenkov and of Molotov-Kaganovitch, far from putting an end to this faction struggle, will make it still more violent. Under present conditions, where the relationship of forces is evolving in a way that is unfavorable for the bureaucracy in the USSR, and where the antagonistic currents in society have a tendency to be indirectly reflected within the leading clique itself, it is impossible that the bureaucracy's Bonapartist tops accept once more the iron reign of a super-arbitrator. While the leading staff continues to tear at each other and to discredit itself collectively in the eyes of the masses by its repeated and rapid turnabouts, the rôle of arbitrator will more and more pass over into the hands of the army

leaders, while among the lower and middle cadres of the party, the trade-unions, and especially the youth, there will be produced the first crystallizations of semi-proletarian tendencies aiming at the reestablishment of soviet democracy. It is only at the moment when the masses enter directly into action that the great social currents will find their own political expression in mutually opposed political groupings.

This growing tension between the masses and the bureaucracy, between the different currents within the bureaucracy, and between the worries of the army soldiers and the function of repression assigned to them (Hungary!) — all these are drawing near a violent explosion. Let a group within the bureaucratic leadership be led to appeal to the masses; let the masses go into the streets to settle an economic, social, or political question which is close to their hearts; let vanguard currents within the youth, the working class, or even the army, begin spontaneously to formulate a programme of political demands, or let there be an interaction or combination among these different factors — and an open collision between the forces that want to keep the basic institutions of the dictatorship (single party with bureaucratic structure; trade-unions at the service of the state; omnipotence of the managers; formalistic character of representative institutions; great differences in income) and the masses who want to undertake a democratic administration of the state and the economy will be on the order of the day. The transformation of the *pressure* of the masses into *direct action* of the masses will in this way signalize the beginning of the political revolution in the USSR.

II — DECLINE AND FALL OF STALINISM IN THE « PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES »

6. — The economic, social, and political development of the « People's Democracies » has not in recent years been parallel to that of the USSR. Whereas in the Soviet Union production, productivity, real wages, and the living standards of the population have in the last eight years increased in a regular though uneven way, the development of the economy in the countries of the Soviet « glacis » has been much more contradictory. This is owing above all to the special forms of exploitation that the bureaucracy had introduced into these countries (reparations, Soviet corporations, mixed companies, trade treaties with one-sided preferential tariffs, etc.), an exploitation that has weighed heavily upon the economy of the « People's Democracies » and partly neutralized their unquestionable advances in industrialization. Though the crudest forms of this exploitation began to be suppressed after the 17 June

1953 revolt in Berlin, the after-effects of this policy have been kept up till today, especially in the matter of trade policy.

The attempt to apply to each of the countries called « People's Democracies » the Stalinist schema of industrialization (absolute priority of heavy industry, plus autarky) was to have the most unfortunate consequences, especially in countries like East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, which had formerly been deeply integrated in the world market, and partially remained so until the Korean War and the imperialist « blockade. » The attempts at coördination of the « glacis » economies as a whole, or even the development of a joint plan, were tardy, timid, and marked by the idea of « completing » the more or less autarkic national economies and not by a spirit of joint planning in the common interest of the peoples of the « glacis. »

The higher living standards to which the workers were accustomed, especially the Germans and Czechs and partially the Poles and Hungarians; the even fiercer attachment of the peasants to small property, whose tradition was more ancient; the existence of urban middle classes that were more numerous and had more solid political and social traditions than in Russia; lastly the power of the Catholic church, which served in practically all these countries as the main rallying point for the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois oppositions to the regime of « democracy » — all these factors have from the beginning given a greater social instability to the societies of the « People's Democracies » compared to the USSR.

If there is added to the foregoing the fact that it is scarcely seven or eight years since the opposition parties were eliminated, that the workers keep up a trade-union tradition that leads them to oppose any excessive raise in work-norms by passive resistance, slowdowns, or even outright strikes, that peasant property and private enterprise remain predominant in the agriculture of the whole « glacis, » then it is understandable that bureaucratic planning had to face up to much more dangerous tensions than in the USSR, and that it even broke down at times when faced with those difficulties that it had itself partly brought about.

Thus industrial production followed a jerky rhythm, some years being marked by stagnation or even recession in certain sectors. The real income of workers even went down at certain periods (Poland 1951-1952, Hungary and East Germany 1952-1953, Czechoslovakia 1953), and in numerous cases just stagnated. Poland and Hungary had in 1955 a standard of living scarcely superior to 1949, and doubtless inferior to 1938, at least for the workers. Czechoslovakia has raised its standard of living in the course of recent years, but it scarcely

exceeds that of 1947 and 1936. East Germany, also in great progress since 1949, remains below the level of 1936, and especially below that of West Germany. If in Rumania and Bulgaria the pre-war level has been largely surpassed, that has been brought about partly at the cost of difficulties in food supplies, difficulties which are furthermore common to all these countries; once the granary of Europe, demonstrating the complete bankruptcy of Stalinist agricultural policy.

7. — Based on objective conditions very different from those in the Soviet Union, the relationships between the toiling masses and the Stalinist parties in power, as well as the relationships between the masses and the state, are far more differentiated and far more contradictory than in the USSR. Thus, though the CP of the USSR can scarcely be considered any longer a workers' party in the sociological meaning of the term (it is to a large extent composed of bureaucrats, as is confirmed by the statistics published on the occasion of its XIXth and XXth Congresses), this is not the case with the CPs of the different countries of the «glacis,» in which the majority of the advanced workers continue to be active (especially Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and to a lesser degree until 1956, Poland and Hungary). The trade-unions of these countries are still of a contradictory nature, the bureaucracy considering them just extensions of their own arms, the workers often keeping up the hope — which proved justified, especially in East Germany on 17 June 1953, at Poznan, and in Hungary — of being able once more to use them for their own ends.

For all these reasons, tendency struggles can be launched more easily in these parties than in the CP of the USSR, and above all these tendency struggles can have a much wider echo among the rank-and-file and the most advanced layers of the working class. Since their objective living conditions are much worse than those of the Soviet working class, these tendency struggles become a preparatory stage of mass action. These overall objective conditions, as well as the relatively much greater weakness of the state and party bureaucratic apparatus, considerably reduce the time-lapse between the outbreak of these tendency struggles — under the pressure of all the social contradictions — and the beginning of the political revolution of the masses.

Furthermore, the isolation of the bureaucratic apparatus from society as a whole is much greater in the « People's Democracies » than in the Soviet Union. The apparatus installed from abroad finds itself faced with the still living autonomous class forces; it has not yet been able to surround itself with a broad layer of labor aristocrats; it has infinitely more limited material means at its disposal;

it has been crippled by the 1948-1953 series of purges. That is why such an apparatus, terrified by fear of a popular opposition, is without real means of defense apart from open repression, and hangs desperately on to « friendship with the Soviet Union » (i. e. subordination to the Kremlin) and to the « principle of the monolithic party, » unable to tolerate the slightest fissure without risking loss of power.

This is the explanation of the paradoxical fact that the *first impulse* toward « destalinization » came from the Soviet Union, where the position of the bureaucracy is relatively more solid, whereas the *most revolutionary effects* of this « destalinization » were felt in the « People's Democracies, » where it was the immediate starting-point for the political revolution.

Lastly there must be taken into account the increased violence with which the *national question* is showing itself in the countries of the « glacis. » The leaders of the Stalinist parties there appear generally as Quislings imposed by a foreign power. The opposition within the CPs capitalizes on national feeling. The struggle for the « national road toward socialism » thus takes on there a highly progressive and revolutionary value, contrary to that in the CPs of the West, where it generally covers up a turn toward codified rightist opportunism. Gomulka in Poland, Nagy in Hungary, tomorrow perhaps Herstedt or Ackermann in East Germany, by becoming in the eyes of the masses symbols of a struggle for national emancipation, are creating favorable conditions for a renewal of popularity for the CP (through its « national » tendency) and permitting the political revolution under oppositional communist leadership to mobilize national feeling in its favor. This has occurred especially in a classical form in Poland.

8. — The revolt of the Yugoslav CP against the Kremlin in 1948, which was the first stage of the international crisis of Stalinism and the remote origin of « destalinization, » has continued to influence the relations between the « glacis » countries and the USSR, as well as the internal evolution in these different countries. During this last period, however, this influence has also revealed its profoundly contradictory nature, itself an expression of the contradictory nature of the Yugoslav CP — a centrist party that stopped on an opportunist and pragmatic line halfway between Stalinism and revolutionary Marxism.

In the process of « destalinization » started by the Soviet bureaucracy as a movement of self-defense under the pressure of the masses, the CP leadership was obliged sooner or later to bring up again the case of the Yugoslav CP. Khrushchev's spectacular trip to Belgrade; the spectacular rehabilitation of Tito; the absurd explanation of the Soviet-Yugoslav

crisis by reference to the « machinations of the traitor Beria » — these were the first sledge-hammer blows that the new leadership of the bureaucracy had to give to Stalin's authority, and, on the rebound, to its own authority and to any bureaucratic authority within the communist movement. The Yugoslav communists themselves insisted that the genuine responsibilities for the break be sought not in Beria but in Stalin and in the whole political system in effect in the USSR during the Stalin era. They once more played a highly progressive role in the international communist movement, during the whole crucial period of preparation for the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR.

Simultaneously the rehabilitation of the « renegade Tito » — suddenly treated with infinitely more consideration than the lackeys Chervenkov, Rakosi, Bierut, Ulbricht, and C° — brought about, even before the XXth Congress, a profound crisis in the mutual relations among the CPs and the workers' states such as they had been conceived and set up in the Stalin era. The idea of a basic equality among all the communist parties and all the workers' states, the idea that the petty-bourgeois nationalist concept of the « leading role of the Soviet Union within the socialist camp » must be urgently revised, the idea that it was fatal in other workers' states to imitate the excesses and errors that the Soviet bureaucracy had committed in the USSR itself — made their way quickly through the CPs of the « glacis, » aiding the rapid development of « national » and « liberal » oppositions. The effects of the Khrushchev Report combined with those of Tito's rehabilitation — the two turns being furthermore inseparably linked up with each other — these tendencies played a highly progressive, and even objectively revolutionary, role within the respective CPs.

But as soon as these divergences at the top started more and more violent movements in the ranks and the masses themselves began to intervene in the political struggle, the leadership of the Yugoslav CP itself began to be afraid of the extent of popular reactions, and, from being the motor, it became the brake, of « destalinization, » trying to limit it to the replacement of one leading staff by another (Bulgaria), or even by a simple admission of the « errors committed » by the leadership in power (Rumania). The moment of this transformation of the role of the Yugoslav CP in the preparation of the political revolution in the « glacis » can be located between the first and second trip of Tito to the USSR.

It was not only subjectively but also objectively that the JCP became an obstacle on the path to the full and complete unfolding of the revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe. While the Yugoslav

experiment of worker's administration of the plants remains a progressive stimulant in all cases where a closed bureaucratic regime is maintained, the absence of adequate political democracy in the Yugoslav state and CP deeply disappointed the left oppositions in the CPs of the « glacis » who were seeking a total democratization of the workers' movement, especially in the Polish CP. Unquestionably the absence of a living and victorious example of a democratic workers' state delayed the ripening of the revolution and especially in the case of Hungary contributed to preventing a rapid revolutionary solution of the crisis created by the popular rising of 23 October. The scope and audacity of the revolution also frightened the leadership of the Yugoslav CP and produced its hesitant attitude during the decisive days in Budapest.

When, on the contrary, the Soviet bureaucracy started a big movement of pulling back from « destalinization » after the Hungarian events, and when it tried to condemn all the more or less independent currents in the CPs of Eastern Europe, the JCP, considering itself (and with good grounds) to be aimed at, felt obliged to specify and accentuate once more its opposition to Stalinism and the Soviet bureaucracy. The violent offensive launched against police terrorism making its reappearance in Hungary, Albania, Rumania, etc.; the defense, at first hesitant (Tito's speech at Pula), then clearer and more courageous (Kardelj's speech before the Yugoslav National Assembly), of the Hungarian revolution against Soviet intervention; the unconditional support given to the Polish revolution; the slogan « All power to the workers' councils » launched by the JCP for Hungary, even though after the event—these have great significance in this direction, and permit the positions taken by the JCP once again to play the role of an ideological motor in the differentiation within the CPs.

The progressive role played by the resistance of the Yugoslav CP to the Stalinist ukases is nowise brought into question again by the preceding analysis. This role already belongs to history. But history has also demonstrated by the Yugoslav example that a pragmatic opportunist policy which piles up passing « successes » on a day-by-day basis, can abruptly become a historically negative factor when the revolutionary upsurge of the masses requires decisions of another sort of audacity and in conformity with principles. That was demonstrated a first time at the moment of the Korean war. It was shown a second time during the crucial weeks of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions.

9. The political revolution in Poland dips its roots not only into the overall objective conditions of the bureaucratic dictatorship and into the

element of national oppression that the Kremlin introduced into this country, but also into the serious revolutionary traditions of the Polish workers' movement, that have shown themselves uninterrupted, so to speak, for half a century. By rapidly breaking the iron yoke of Stalinist ideas and dogmas that were never wholly assimilated by the Polish CP—dissolved for this reason by Stalin in 1938—the political revolution in Poland linked itself again to a tradition which had no equal save that of Bolshevism. Hence the exceptionally high level of consciousness of the old and new generation of workers in Poland, which enabled the political revolution, right from its first stage, to surpass the best writings and actions of the JCP, as far as the latter had surpassed Stalinism properly speaking.

Having received its first stimulus from the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, and aided by a crisis in the leadership coinciding with that XXth Congress (Bierut's death), the awakening of communist consciousness, nurtured by the exceptionally grave economic errors committed by the Stalinist staff in power, led rapidly to a struggle of tendencies for the leadership of the party, parallel to which there developed a struggle for the return of Gomulka to that leadership.

Freedom of thought and of criticism then burst out violently within workers' organizations, encouraging public manifestations of workers' discontent. If the pressure of the masses explains « democratization, » « democratization » prepared the ground for the transformation of pressure into direct action by the masses. It is thus that there occurred the Poznan strike, the proletariat's answer to a senseless economic and social policy that was violating the workers' most immediate interests.

Poznan raised straight away the question of the struggle for the leadership of the Party. The repression and above all the calumny used against the strikers unleashed a storm of popular opposition. While a Stalinist tendency considered the strike a product of limited « democratization, » and, with the help of the Kremlin, tried to limit the « excesses » of political liberty within the workers' movement, a left opposition crystallized, determined to remake contact and unity with the working class by resolutely taking the lead in a movement of democratization of all social life. The VIIth Plenum of the CC of the Polish CP (August 1956) adopted important reforms imposed under the pressure of this opposition, but Kremlin pressure sufficed to impose on the Polish CP a paritary leadership that paralyzed in practice the application of the line of the VIIth Plenum.

From August to October 1956, from the VIIth to the VIIIth Plenum of the CC, the tendency struggle became general throughout all workers' organiza-

tions and took on a more and more tumultuous and violent form, transforming it into a fraction struggle in the course of which each fraction tried to mobilize support in the proletariat. The Stalinist right appealed to the worst anti-semitic and chauvinist instincts and launched demands of pure demagoguery; the liberal left appealed to the workers' class consciousness and desire for emancipation. It began to mobilize them against the bureaucracy.

The mass movement then attained a new level for long unknown. Spontaneously the factory workers began to demand workers' administration of the plants. Worker and student youth put itself at the head of the movement of political democratization and a return to Lenin on the theoretical plane. When Gomulka joined the left fraction at the beginning of October, its victory seemed certain. As a last resource the Stalinist fraction called the Kremlin to its aid; the brutal intervention of the Stalinist delegation at the VIIIth Plenum brought about a general mobilization of the proletariat, which occupied the factories, armed itself, and set up councils. After four days of revolutionary fever, the opposition took over the leadership of the party. The political revolution in Poland had won a first decisive stage.

By its manifold connections with the proletariat in which it had deeply rooted itself during the six months of violent political struggle; by the clarity of its criticism of Stalinism, which came quite close to revolutionary Marxism; by its programme of mobilizing the workers taking over the leadership of the economy — the left tendency, which associated itself with the centrist tendency of Gomulka in overthrowing the Stalinist leadership of the Polish CP, can be considered, especially in its advanced wing, the youth, as a nucleus for the now forming revolutionary Marxist leadership of the Polish proletariat. The alliance of this tendency with Gomulka remains unstable, subject to the contradictory influences exercised on the centrist fraction by the pressure of the masses on the one hand, drawing it each time closer to the left, and by the pressure of the Polish bureaucratic apparatus and the Soviet bureaucracy on the other, periodically pulling it away. The relationship of social forces and especially the audacity and correct tactics of the Left will definitively decide this evolution. The workers' discontent (Lodj), and the way the students hold on to the liberties won in October threaten to break it up. The relationship of social forces and above all the Left's audacity and correct tactic will definitively determine developments. The degree to which the left tendency remains faithful to its programme, applies it in practice, and binds itself ever more closely to the proletariat, will determine its capacity to fulfil completely the

role of Leninist guide to the Polish working class.

10. The political revolution in Hungary burst out in far more unfavorable conditions than those that permitted the Polish revolution to win its first stage. Among these unfavorable conditions must be listed:

(a) The much more limited Marxist tradition of the workers' movement, the traditional weakness and internal divisions of the communist movement.

(b) The more police-ridden and odious character of the Stalinist dictatorship (the Rajk trial).

(c) The lack of an alternative leadership resulting from the lack of a broadly organized tendency in the whole party and the workers' movement.

This fact led a group of intellectuals and students, the « Petöfi Circle, » who were not all communists, to play the role of guide in the democratization, the Nagy-Rakosi (Gerö) tendency struggle being no longer reflected in the leading organisms of the party.

(d) The fact that the « liberal » elements, having once risen to power in 1953, had been driven out of it after the fall of Malenkov, which brought about a purge from the party of many left elements and a hardening of the Stalinist elements.

(e) The lack of an alarm signal of the Poznan sort, which delayed the formation of a broad Nagy fraction and allowed the Stalinist elements to refuse till the last minute any substantial concession to the masses (delays in Rakosi's resignation, interventions against the Petöfi Circle, etc.).

(f) The truly criminal provocations of which the Stalinists made themselves guilty when faced with a mass movement that was powerful but still peaceful and not breaking out of the framework of « people's democracy »: Gerö's 22 October speech, the 23 October shootings, the call for the intervention of Soviet troops.

These different factors explain why the rise of the mass movement — which, from the XXth Congress of the Soviet CP up to the fall of Rakosi and even up to the victory of the first stage of the revolution in Poland, had developed in parallel with the Polish upsurge — abruptly took a more violent turn and, beginning with 23 October 1956, overflowed into an insurrectional general strike against the bureaucratic dictatorship.

This more spontaneous character of the political revolution in Hungary gave a classic proletarian form to its means of struggle and organization: street demonstrations and factory occupations; the going over of the army to the side of the people; general arming of the workers; formation of workers', soldiers', and students' councils all over the country.

There were thus assembled all the *objective* elements for a rapid and brilliant revolutionary vic-

tory, capable of raising the whole world revolutionary movement to a higher level. It was essentially the danger of that victory, and not the counter-revolutionary danger, that incited the Kremlin — after hesitations and repeated reversals of policy — to engage in military intervention against the Hungarian revolution, which threatened to extend to the whole « glacis » and to the USSR itself.

But the essentially spontaneous character of the 23 October insurrection and the lack of a revolutionary leadership capable of quickly coördinating the proletarian forces and guiding them rapidly toward the constitution of a democratic and independent republic based on the councils, permitted free manifestations of all currents in the population, the reappearance of petty-bourgeois and bourgeois parties, and even a beginning of counter-revolutionary activity, which provided the Kremlin's intervention with a semblance of justification and an alibi seized on the wing.

The revolutionary people in arms, who had risen to wrench the factories and the power from the bureaucrats, would never have tolerated that they should be restored to their old capitalist masters and landlords. It was strong enough to prevent any victory of the counter-revolution. But the less it had at its disposal a revolutionary leadership at the level of its tasks, the more prolonged became a transitional period of confusion during which the reaction could organize and show itself. The longer the bureaucracy delayed withdrawing its troops from Hungary, and the more it intervened directly against the revolution, the more exacerbated national feelings were to become and to move into the foreground of the masses' concerns. Nagy and his friends, anxious above all to take the leadership of the movement in hand again, could only adapt themselves to this evolution of popular feelings, and enter into open collision with even the most « liberal » tendencies of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Soviet military interventions against the Hungarian revolution were crimes that struck an enormous blow against the Soviet Union and the international communist movement. They were a bad setback for the Hungarian Communist Party itself, now totally cut off from the proletariat of its country. They were unable, however, to break the magnificent combativity of the Hungarian workers. These lost only the first round of the political revolution, which will arise again, invincible, from the blood-letting imposed by the Kremlin. Already the Kadar regime is forced to keep part of the conquests of 23 October. Encouraged by a fierce passive resistance and an unremitting mass pressure, the revolution will again take up its march forward, and will reestablish, with

full and complete proletarian democracy, the honor of communism in Hungary.

11. The XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR, the Khrushchev Report, and the political revolution in Poland and Hungary, have had a profound influence on the CPs of all the workers' states—including that of China, where there was shown a certain delay in « destalinization, » explicable above all by the backward state of the country and the enormous objective economic difficulties that the leadership of the Chinese CP must face. But the pressure of the current of « destalinization » was sufficiently strong to impose important decisions on the Congress of the Chinese CP, especially in favor of the right to tendencies, the right of minorities to defend their ideas within the Communist Party even after majority decisions, and even the need of tolerating several « democratic » parties in a workers' state. These ideas, even if they are not put into practice in China, will help stir things up inside numerous Communist Parties, especially in Asia.

Subsequently, the contradictory pressures of social forces, revolutionary and conservative, on the international scale and even inside China, seem to have produced serious divergences within the leadership of the Chinese CP. While for one wing of this leadership the public support given to the repression of the Hungarian revolution seems to have been accompanied by an analysis of bureaucratic phenomena the public support given to the repression of the Hungarian revolution seems to have been accompanied by an analysis of bureaucratic phenomena going farther along the road of « destalinization » than any Kremlin tendency has done to date (oral report of Mao Tse-tung about the « rectification » movement and about the « contradictions » within the people), another wing, momentarily victorious, seems to have succeeded in backing up very fast (differences between Mao's speech and its publicly printed text, waves of repression, etc.). The social difficulties being met with in China itself, the strike waves, the peasant resistance to agrarian collectivization, the student rebellions, have doubtless convinced the majority of the leaders of the bureaucracy that any « Gomulkiist » course would within a short time provoke a mass uprising.

Stirrings have appeared even in the countries where the bureaucratic dictatorship was not immediately confronted by a mass movement (Harich group in East Germany, intellectuals' and students' movement in Czechoslovakia, purge in Bulgaria, etc.). The bureaucratic leaders have to make concessions, especially economic ones, to the masses, and have had to promise likewise democratic political reforms. Though the Hungarian events will inevitably delay the outbreak of mass movements in

these countries, by stimulating them to a greater conformism with the Stalinist apparatus as a whole, their long-range repercussions will render the inevitable explosions against the bureaucracy all the more violent and radical.

One of the most spectacular results of the Hungarian revolution was the Soviet declaration of 30 October. This statement attempted to establish relations between the « People's Democracies » and the USSR on a new basis, thus implicitly recognizing the element of national oppression that the Kremlin had introduced into the mutual contacts among workers' states.

Though the brutal intervention of the Kremlin in the Hungarian revolution opposes a scathing denial to the bureaucracy's protestations of good faith, its 30 October declaration will nevertheless be invoked against it every time that a tendency in a CP of the « Peoples' Democracies » will try to free itself effectively from Kremlin tutelage. It will thus become, without the bureaucracy's realizing it, a new time-bomb which will blow to bits the relationships of subordination among the communist parties and workers' states.

The immediate repercussions of the Hungarian revolution can stimulate a momentarily predominant fraction in the Kremlin to « harden » again its attitude toward the countries of the « glacis. » But the pressure of the masses cannot fail to continue to grow in these countries. The fermentation of national independence and the autonomy of the CPs toward the Soviet CP cannot fail to « break up » a large part of the youth and of the communist militants themselves. The process of the transformation of relations among workers' states, of relations of national oppression and economic exploitation, into relations of equality and fraternal collaboration, is irreversible. The more the bureaucracy grasps the importance of this process, the more it is obliged to substitute a policy of effective economic aid to the « glacis » countries for its old policy of exploitation, in order to try at least to establish an alliance, however fragile, with the leading bureaucratic groups in those countries. Any attempt to go back to the old relationship of flagrant subordination and economic exploitation of the « glacis » runs the risk of provoking uprisings there in a short time — what the Kremlin is trying at any price to avoid.

12. The theses on « The Rise and Decline of Stalinism » had characterized the period opened by Stalin's death and the acute crisis of the Soviet bureaucracy as a period in which there would rapidly ripen conditions favorable for the reconstitution of the Soviet section of the Fourth International. The experience of the Polish and Hungarian revolution has completely confirmed this prog-

nosis. Spontaneously, on the basis of their own experience and relinking up with the living Leninist tradition in the history of world communism, nuclei of left communists there reached programmatic positions close to those of the Fourth International. The formation of such nuclei is inevitable in the USSR as well, if it has not already occurred. By helping these nuclei to clarify completely their analysis of the bureaucratic dictatorship and their programme for the political revolution, by pointing out to them the way to the maintenance of living contacts with the masses and their integration in the broad currents of more or less centrist communist opposition that exist or are being formed in all the countries under the domination of the Kremlin, the Fourth International will try within the shortest possible time to achieve the constitution of genuine sections, of authentic Trotskyist organizations, in these countries. This will be the best guarantee that the new revolutionary leadership of the proletariat be rapidly forged in the fire of the revolution, and that there be reduced to a minimum the dangers of confusion and of the temporary taking over by counter-revolutionary forces in the course of mass uprisings.

III — THE PROGRAMME OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL FOR THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION

The development of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, the rapid ripening of both the objective conditions for a political revolution in the USSR itself, the appearance of oppositional currents in the Stalinist parties of the other « People's Democracies, » as well as the whole international discussion started by the present crisis of the bureaucratic dictatorship, make the formulation by the Fourth International of a more detailed and precise programme for that revolution an urgent necessity. It is not a question of immediate or transitional demands that might be able to lead to the first mass actions against the bureaucratic dictatorship. Such demands, following in general the line of the demands incorporated in the *Transitional Programme* for the USSR, must be worked up by the revolutionary Marxists of the Soviet Union and of the « People's Democracies » on the basis of the concrete conditions existing in those countries. The programme sketched out below is the one that revolutionary Marxists present to already awakened and politically active masses, on the eve of, during, and on the morrow of, the outbreak of the political revolution. It is the programme for the building of soviet democracy in the state and the economy, a crucial problem of the political revolution, around which the discussion among advanced

workers is concentrated, as the Polish and Hungarian examples have proved.

Such a programme can no longer be based merely on generalization of the experience of the democratic workers' state of the first years after the October revolution. It must at the same time base itself on the numerous experiences that the working class movement has accumulated since then: that of the degeneration of the Soviet bureaucratic state; that of the Third International and of the Communist Parties; that of the Spanish revolution; those, whether positive or negative, of the Yugoslav, Chinese, Polish, and Hungarian revolutions; those of the so-called « People's Democracies, » as well as the demands put forth by the proletarian vanguard and the revolutionary youth in struggle against the bureaucratic dictatorship, for the establishment of a true soviet power (in particular in the days of 16-17 June 1953 in East Berlin and throughout the whole of the DDR; at the end of May 1953 in Czechoslovakia; the revolts at Vorkuta and other forced labor camps in the USSR since the second half of 1953; those of the June 1956 strike at Poznan, etc.).

13. The organization of the workers' state must be reviewed in the light of classic Leninist theory on the subject, that is, the theory of soviet democracy conceived as the broadening and not the limiting of democratic rights and freedoms of which the whole of the toiling masses may partake, as compared to those they enjoy even in the most democratic bourgeois states. The dictatorship of the proletariat and soviet democracy are synonymous in that the granting of unlimited political freedom to the toiling masses can and must be accompanied by the limiting or even the denial of political freedom to all representatives of the hostile classes, to all those who aim at the overthrowing of the workers' state based on the suppression of the private ownership of the major means of production.

Practically speaking, the real exercise of power by the soviets, the freely elected councils of the manual and intellectual workers of the towns and country—organisms that are both legislative and executive and for this reason represent a higher form of democratic organization—is possible only if the following guarantees exist:

(a) The freedom to organize all parties that place themselves within the limits of Soviet legality and the framework of the Constitution of the workers' state.

(b) Genuine freedom of press and assembly, i.e., the right for each tendency supported by a legally established minimum of manual and intellectual workers, or by a decision of the soviets, to dispose of meeting halls, broadcasting time on the radio

and television, paper and printing presses proportional to existing available supplies.

(c) The election and periodical reëlection of the members of the central legislative organisms and of the principal central, provincial, and local functionaries, by secret ballot and with multiple candidates or lists, representing the various soviet parties; and the recall of those elected when those who elected them so wish.

(d) The limitation of the salaries of all functionaries in the administration, especially the state administration, to those of a skilled worker.

(e) The election and periodical reëlection of judges by secret ballot, thereby guaranteeing their complete independence with regard to the organisms of state administration. Open trial with full hearings, and with the defense's rights guaranteed in each case, and on the basis of written law.

(f) The disbanding of all permanent secret organisms of internal security. These must be replaced by public workers' militias that function, when necessary, with the help of auxiliary organisms constantly under the public control of the soviets.

(g) The generalized arming of workers and the setting up of arsenals of automatic arms in the plants and working-class quarters.

The Leninist principle held by the Fourth International is that, if violence is necessary in the relations between the proletariat and its class enemy, it must be eliminated from the relations which, within the working class, bring into conflict different tendencies in the labor movement, and from those among various currents, tendencies, or fractions within the revolutionary party. The dictatorship of the proletariat means the use of violence against the class enemy, according to the resistance of the enemy. Soviet democracy means the refusal to use violence within the workers' movement, and the use of only persuasion and experience by the revolutionary party in its relations with the working class and the other toiling strata of society.

Since in practice the boundaries between the toiling classes and their enemy are not sharply drawn, and since various objective conditions can lead the class enemy to seek support among the most conservative currents within the toiling classes, the revolutionary vanguard may sometimes be called upon to make a painful choice: either to accept the development of a dangerous situation within the workers' state, or, in order to overcome this danger, to use methods that may seriously undermine the workers' trust in this vanguard and in the state. Without wanting to emit absolute truths or dogmas, the Fourth International declares that, on the basis of past experience, it is absolutely clear that a workers' state must always face *two*

dangers as long as the world victory of socialism is not ensured: the return of a capitalist counter-revolution, and the development of bureaucratic degeneration. The weaker the state, the stronger the pressure exerted by the enemy, the more the trust and the political initiative of the great majority of the workers are lacking, then the more any coercion used against sections of the working class drains their confidence in the state and opens the gates to bureaucratic degeneration. That is why it is the duty of the revolutionary party to submit itself to the democratic verdict of the soviets, even when they make serious mistakes that the working masses by experience will recognize and right sooner or later. It is only in this spirit that the principle, **ALL POWER TO THE SOVIETS**, as the basis of organization of the workers' state, acquires its full meaning.

In developing the programme of the political revolution for the reëstablishment of workers' democracy in the workers' states, the Fourth International unshakably maintains the principle of the defense of all workers' states against imperialism. It will fight against every effort by imperialism to exploit the political revolution in its own counter-revolutionary interests. These efforts will become more accentuated as the political revolution goes forward. This renders that much the more urgent our task of permanent explanation of our traditional position on this matter to the masses and the communist cadres.

14. The bureaucratic degeneration of the USSR has proved that the roots of the power of the bureaucratic apparatus lie in its more or less arbitrary disposal of the state production machine. The relations among the state apparatus, the apparatus directing the economy, and the revolutionary party, are for this reason decisive in guaranteeing the increase in soviet socialist democracy. These relations must be governed by the following principles:

(a) A fundamental differentiation between the workers' state and the revolutionary party, one being quite distinct from and in no way subordinated to the other. This means in particular that under no condition can any state organism — and even less so any security organism — intervene in the discussions or the struggles of tendencies inside the party. This also means that no state organism elected by the masses (or the soviet) may be modified in its composition by a party decision.

(b) The election and democratic control over party leaders by the members of the party, by the strict observance of all rules of democratic centralism: congresses and conferences at fixed periods; the election of local, regional, and national leaders by secret ballot; the right to organize tendencies and even to print internal tendency bulletins; as

complete information and discussion as possible in the rank and file before important differences are settled by the central organisms; no sanctions against members without the agreement of the rank-and-file organisms to which they belong; etc.

(c) Democratic control of the state apparatus and that of the economy, respectively organized in local soviets and factory committees. The election and revocability of the principal members of this apparatus by these organisms. The active participation of the different existing political tendencies in the choice of leaders and of alternative action programmes.

(d) The lack of material privileges in connection with leadership activities, there being no exception other than in the case of technicians not belonging to the party; such cases must be subjected to the close control of the soviet rank-and-file organisms.

(e) The principle of maximum information on and publicity for all controversial issues within the party, the state organisms, or those of the economy. This is an indispensable condition if the proletariat is to direct the state effectively and acquire in the shortest possible time the necessary experience to govern with the maximum efficiency.

15. The organization of the socialist economy, during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, is the touchstone for either the extension of socialist democracy in the workers' state—until such a time as democracy itself withers away as the last form of state—or towards the various bureaucratic deformations of the state and the appearance of fresh social inequalities that can lead to a monstrous bureaucratic degeneration.

As Marxists, we know that the bureaucratic degeneration of the state can be only a transitional phase in the history of the struggle for world socialism, a phase rendered *possible* by the lack of a sufficient material basis in any workers' state (or group of workers' states) and by its (or their) isolation. But, while recognizing this basic cause of degeneration, Marxists nowise accept a mechanistic and automatic determinism, i.e., the inevitability of an extreme degeneration of the Soviet type. They recognize only that the poorer the material basis of the workers' state, the greater the risk of bureaucratic deformations of the Soviet Union that cost the Soviet and international proletariat *avoidable* slaughters, defeats, and sacrifices, they understand that it is an imperative necessity that the revolutionary vanguard oppose insofar as possible, as a subjective factor, the play of spontaneous objective forces determined by need, pressure of a hostile milieu, lack of culture and skills, etc.

In this respect it is essential to understand the necessity of a *division of economic functions and powers* so as to ensure a severe limitation of bureau-

cratic arbitrariness, and at the same time producing the best guarantees for the most harmonious possible development of the productive forces. This sharing out of powers should be schematically established according to the following plan:

(a) Central decisions (in a national Congress of the soviets or workers' councils) to be taken after democratic discussion of alternative plans, insofar as the main lines of distribution of the national product (investments policy, rate of progress, price-and-wage policy) are concerned. The Fourth International rejects as antidemocratic and anti-communist the anarcho-syndicalist myth of the complete autonomy of enterprises, that can end only in the competitive fight for a market, more or less free or more or less monopolized, with all the injustices that this brings about (the appropriation by the workers of the more modern factories of part of the product created by the workers of more backward enterprises, etc.), with the danger of dislocation of the planned economy.

(b) The running of enterprises by the workers' committees, within the framework of the general plan elaborated by the elected representatives of the whole of the proletariat. These councils must control and, if necessary, modify the plan during its execution, and they must defend the specific interests of the *producers* (working and wage norms in their concrete application, dismissal and hiring, organization of work, etc.). They must elect the director and at the same time become the great management school in which a growing number of workers will each in turn become familiar with the exercise of administrative functions.

(c) The trade unions' role of control must be mainly to defend the interests of the workers as *consumers and citizens* with given cultural needs, against the workers' councils (mainly representing the production point of view) and the central organisms of planifications. The unions must discuss general work and wage norms and their application to the various branches of industry and the factories within the framework of collective fixed-term contracts; they must watch over all forms of workers' social insurance, without playing an administrative part (this belongs to the state, i.e., to the local organisms of self-administration); they must try to reduce working hours, increase the possibilities of paid holidays and the participation of the workers in all aspects of cultural life, etc. They must be based, like the party, on the strict rule of voluntary membership, contrary to the workers' councils and the soviets in which every wage-earner of the enterprise or locality automatically has the right to vote.

The effective guarantee of the right to *strike* is at the same time an effective and not merely formal

guarantee of this division of economic powers.

By insisting on the importance of the dividing up of economic powers, the Fourth International also affirms that, however ideal any organizational structure may be, it remains but a framework void of content as long as *political working-class democracy* and effective participation in the political life of the country by an ever-increasing number of workers are not flourishing. In a planned economy, the decision as to how the national income is to be shared out in major proportions is a capital factor that sets up a more or less rigid framework to all administering organisms from which they cannot dissociate themselves without disrupting the whole system of planification. So long as the majority of the working class does not participate in taking this decision, either directly or indirectly (through its freely elected representatives) and does not itself — in full knowledge of the facts — establish the limits of the sacrifices it is willing to make in order to develop the productive forces, it is not possible to speak concretely of a genuine and fully developed soviet democracy. So long as different workers' currents are not allowed to present general or partial alternative plans for the choice of the workers themselves, this participation will remain more fictive than real.

16. Socialism is a form of social organization based on abundance. When the proletariat conquers power in any given country, including the most highly developed ones, the existing productive forces are not sufficient to ensure this abundance for all citizens, and even less to all the citizens of the globe. The period of transition between capitalism and socialism is therefore in any case a period during which the proletariat cannot be satisfied merely by a new and more equitable distribution of the *already existing wealth* of the earth. The proletariat will have to ensure a *considerable increase* in the current production of wealth, and in the stock of means of production that are at the disposal of society, in order to attain its goal: the organization of a society that ensures the full and complete satisfaction of the needs of one and all, without calculating this satisfaction according to the work that each has contributed in exchange.

In the light of this thesis one might suppose that there exists only a quantitative difference between the problems of developing production posed in a workers' state or a group of such states which have scarcely started industrialization, and for workers' states created in countries where capitalism had already ensured an important development of modern industry. This, however, is not the case: there are qualitative differences between these two types of countries, insofar as the problems set by the de-

velopment of a socialized industry are concerned:

(a) From the social point of view, in the first group of countries industrialization—even when it can avail itself of the help of an international socialist economy—develops in a *hostile* milieu (the majority of the population composed of small peasant producers). In the second group of countries, the workers' state can count on the *support of the majority* if not 2/3rds of the population for its economic policy.

(b) From the economic point of view, industrialization in the first group of countries must correspond to combined aims: the specific interests of the workers, the raising of their level of living and culture, etc., and the need to differentiate the peasantry (from which must be detached a stratum of poor peasants that can be freely integrated in a socialized economy, and a stratum of middle peasants that can be neutralized against the primitive accumulation of the rich peasants). In the second group of countries, the development of the economy can be fundamentally oriented towards the satisfaction of the growing needs of the mass of producers, while reserving an important segment of the national product, during a long transitional period, to help the less industrialized workers' states.

The Fourth International affirms not only the principle that it is impossible for a workers' state to impose on the workers a margin of sacrifices above that which they freely accept: it also affirms that any attempt systematically to increase the rate of accumulation over a long period of time has negative repercussions on the productivity of labor and on the self-discipline of the producers, and thus creates enormous losses and waste that to a great extent cancel the advantages thought to be gained by such an accumulation. Only a planification that establishes harmonious proportions in the development of the different sectors of the economy—industry, agriculture, and transport—and of the different branches of industry itself, pays off in the long run. The basis of such a system must be an increase in production together with a more or less equivalent raising of the standard of living of the producers. The easier it is for the producers to measure this parallel progress, the more conscious and enthusiastic their creative participation in a harmonious development will become. The requirements of such a harmonious development of all branches of the economy rule out from the start any policy of forced collectivization in agriculture, which is the source of stagnation if not of falling off in agricultural production, and of serious disruption in the cities' food supplies.

These requirements, on the other hand, are compatible with the creation of agricultural producers' cooperatives in all strata of the peasantry

that are socially and economically ready to accept such a means of production, on condition that such coöperatives bring them concrete material advantages.

Without excluding the necessity, which might arise even in the future, for a workers' state isolated on a given continent to start building up a socialist economy on its own, all experience has shown that international division of labor and mutual aid among workers' states on a basis of equality, constitute a factor that aids and stimulates the upsurge of the economy, a factor that is in any case indispensable to catching up with and surpassing the level of productivity reached in the most advanced capitalist countries, this being the only criterion of the final victory of a socialized economy over a capitalist economy. The idea of achieving the construction of an autarkic socialist economy in one country or in a small group of countries must be rejected as a reactionary myth.

17. Soviet democracy, goal of the political revolution in the degenerated workers' states and of the social revolution in the capitalist countries, is inconceivable without the free development of artistic creation, scientific work, and all the cultural activities of mankind. Such a development is more and more proving to be an indispensable condition for the full and complete exploitation of the tremendous reserves of the technical and productive creative forces that the revolution puts at the disposal of the new society. Such a free development does not mean that the party and the revolutionary vanguard refrain from expressing their own views with regard to the numerous controversies that may arise in theoretical fields. It means:

(a) that the revolutionary party engages in militant action through propaganda and persuasion in favor of the theses of Marxism and of dialectic and historical materialism; that it demands the widest possibility for teaching all these without the state's imposing the adoption or the exclusive presentation of these theses on the body of teachers or on the youth;

(b) that no scientific, artistic or cultural tendency that is not considered to be progressive, or the most progressive, by the revolutionary vanguard, can be repressed or sanctioned administratively or hindered in its productive and creative efforts;

(c) that the state does not give its official approval either in the form of material advantages or by distribution of hierarchic posts to any tendency in the fields of science, the arts, or cultural activities — fields which are the ripest for the integral application of the principle of self-administration;

(d) that the party establish clear distinctions between the choice of the social, economic, or cultural aims that have priority (for example the priority

of the solution of the housing problem over that of the needs of urbanist aesthetics and the need to defend on a theoretical level (that of planification, in the long run) the correct principles that appertain to these aims, even if it is not possible to implement them immediately.

Soviet democracy is equally inconceivable without a radical elimination of all the obstacles that today prevent a majority of citizens from enjoying the material and cultural gifts of civilization. It must guarantee completely free education at all levels, selection being made strictly according to individual capacity; it must guarantee every citizen the right to free medical care without social discrimination. It must ensure the full and autonomous participation of youth in political life. It must completely apply the principle of « equal pay for equal work, » give maximum encouragement to the emancipation of women from thousands of years of submission, and at the same time permit professional selection according to the physical peculiarities of women. It must revise the marriage laws in the spirit of the October Revolution, as well as the right to divorce and voluntary maternity (free distribution of the means of contraception, and the right to abortion), children's rights, the self-administration of schools, all of which must bring about the absolute equality of men and women, and a complete absence of coercion by one person over another.

18. The Soviet bureaucracy usurped power under the banner of « socialism in one country »; it is under the banner of true proletarian internationalism based on strict equality between all nations, that the political revolution against the bureaucracy will triumph. The bureaucracy has poisoned the relations among the various workers' states, as well as those among the various nationalities inside the USSR, by its brutal Great-Russian chauvinism and its narrow petty-bourgeois prejudices.

The Fourth International condemns the Stalinist conception of the subordination of the interests of the world proletariat to those of the Kremlin bureaucracy as a criterion of proletarian internationalism. It also rejects the centrist, anti-Leninist thesis according to which the chauvinism of a great oppressing nation should be condemned in the same way as the nationalism of the small nationalities. While raising the banner of international solidarity everywhere, it makes a clear distinction between Great-Russian (and Great-Han) chauvinism, which are unconditionally reactionary, and the nationalism of small nations oppressed by the bureaucracy, which is often only a deformation of the just revolt of the masses against the national oppression they suffered, and that can in no way modify the objectively progressive nature of their struggle for emancipation.

That is why the Fourth International defends the slogan of the independent and sovereign Soviet Socialist Republics of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, while at the same time advocating the confederation of all these workers' states on a strict basis of equality, in one or several democratic federations of workers' states.

A democratic workers' state will educate the workers and youth in a spirit of complete respect for the cultural personality of all peoples, for whom it will ensure an unlimited development. It will untiringly combat any manifestation of chauvinism, national or racial hatred, antisemitism, etc. It will try to increase whenever possible the solidarity, interest, and conscious participation of the workers of the workers' states in the struggles of every country throughout the world.

Any nationalistic tendency toward the subordination of the interests of the international revolution to the defense of the workers' state, however important and progressive be this state, is always a clear sign of bureaucratic deformation.

19. The Fourth International conceives the problem of the Workers' International in the same spirit as the revolutionary party. An International which includes one or several parties that hold power in workers' states can no more « dictate » policy to the citizens or the governments of these states than can the party to the workers organized in soviets. It can only bring weight to the conviction and prestige of the arguments it submits to the decision of the workers—and even this only insofar as experience has proved to the workers that it has systematically defended the collective interests of the proletariat against particular or nationalist deformations of these interests.

Conceived in this spirit, a revolutionary International, far from being outdated or losing importance due to the conquest of power by the proletariat in one or several countries, remains an absolutely indispensable instrument for resolving the tasks set by the building of world communism:

(a) Leaving aside the indispensable diplomatic manoeuvres that one or several workers' states may be obliged to make, the International coördinates the struggle of all the revolutionary parties, including those that have already conquered power, in order to achieve the victory of the world revolution in the shortest possible time.

(b) After the victory of the revolution, the International will make every effort to coördinate and encourage the best possible international economic planification, thus preceding the practical possibilities of federation or confederation of workers' states.

(c) The International will be an instrument for the coördinating and encouraging of all the activities of the revolutionary vanguard in the workers' states, in the process of permanent revolution, until world communism is brought about. This is all the more important since in these fields complete theoretical generalization has to be accomplished, and this cannot be done on the basis of fragmentary national experiences.

Given the disastrous experience many communist militants had with the Komintern, then with the Kominform, during the Stalinist era, these militants have become wary about the very idea of an International based on democratic centralism. This wariness is in no way justified, and to give in to this tendency is to abandon an essential element of revolutionary Marxism. It is not through the degeneration of the Communist International that the world crisis of Communism began. It was in a party, the Russian party, that the bureaucracy first destroyed democracy, thus departing from the Leninist road. The stronger the International, and the more it is out of reach of the predominating influence of one section or of a small group of sections, the easier becomes the struggle against the danger of bureaucratization in a party or a workers' state, by the transfer of the full weight of the healthiest sectors of the international workers' movement towards the country most in danger.

For this very reason any idea of « polycentric » international organization or of purely « bilateral » relations between CPs must be rejected. Far from guaranteeing a healthy evolution to the workers' movement, the aim of such opportunistic formulas is to protect the national bureaucracy from the influence of the international revolution.

IV. — THE DECLINE AND FALL OF STALINISM IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

20. The crisis of the Communist Parties, that originated in the contradiction between the revolutionary aspirations of the militants therein and the function of instruments of Soviet foreign policy that the bureaucracy wanted to force upon them, has in the past few years been accentuated by two factors. On the one hand the progress of the revolutionary upsurge throughout the world has brought several parties face to face with pre-revolutionary (or revolutionary) situations, and caused the militants therein to express their dissatisfaction with the leadership's opportunist policy. In some cases, as in Algeria, the pressure of the workers or revolutionary movement of the masses has been such that it has forced the Stalinist leadership to make an important move to the left, away from a position that had originally placed it on the counterrevolutionary side.

On the other hand, the outbreak of the crisis of bureaucracy in the USSR itself and in the « People's Democracies » has acted as a powerful stimulus to the development of the crisis in the Communist Parties of all capitalist countries. This crisis exploded immediately after Stalin's death; it was greatly accentuated by the spectacular rehabilitation of Tito; it reached a first breaking-point with the XXth Congress in the USSR, only to reach very rapidly a second breaking-point and a real paroxysm with the Polish and Hungarian revolutions. It is not an exaggeration to say that the CPs today are divided into two currents, and that some of them (the Polish, Yugoslav, Norwegian, and American, and partly the Italian, Belgian, and Swedish Communist Parties, with strong opposition in Great Britain, Austria, Brazil, etc.) condemn the first Soviet intervention in Hungary and regret if not condemn the second, identifying themselves with the Polish Revolution; while others (the Soviet, Czech, East German, Rumanian, Bulgarian, Albanian, and French Communist Parties) servilely identify themselves with the Kremlin's policy. The Chinese CP, followed by the majority of the Asian CPs, seems to occupy a half-way place between the two tendencies, which is gradually evolving towards an arbiter's position in the international Communist movement, while associating its efforts with those of the Kremlin in order to limit the disintegrating effects of « destalinization » on the international Stalinist movement.

The origins of this spectacular development are evident: in the Polish and Hungarian revolutions there was a *convergence* of the two currents that are today feeding the Stalinist crisis, the objective revolutionary current and the subjective current of « destalinization. » Furthermore, in Hungary, for the first time since the Spanish civil war, the Soviet bureaucracy was forced to play an openly counter-revolutionary part—that is, itself to repress a revolutionary upsurge of the masses on a broad scale (the 1953 experience in Germany was far more limited). Though in certain parts of the world, the Hungarian events coincided with an objective situation that was not favorable to a mass revolutionary upsurge, this was not the case for the colonial and semi-colonial countries for which these events served as a direct lesson and an encouragement in their own struggles. Thus the « orthodox » Stalinist position became even more untenable in these countries.

21. The general characteristics of crisis in the CPs, which apply in varying degrees to the CPs of all capitalist countries, can be thus summarized:

(a) Since Stalin's death and especially since Khrushchev's revelations, the very basis of Stalinist thought, i.e., of faith in the infallibility of the

leader, of the Soviet government and the leaders of the Soviet CP, has received a mortal blow. All the fundamental questions of communism are once more brought into discussion. Henceforth, when on an important issue the actions of the Soviet government seem to come into conflict with the interests of a fraction or the whole of the world proletariat, the validity of such actions will be openly brought into question by an ever-increasing number of Communist militants.

(b) This loss of faith which was the basis of obedience is causing a real revolt against the rigid system of the bureaucratic CP leadership, against the absence of freedom of discussion, against the tyranny of the machine and the anti-democratic way in which it maintains its control at the head of the CP. More and more voices are being raised to demand a genuine and not formal application of democratic centralism (genuine discussions in the public organs of the parties before congresses; the periodical meeting of congresses; the election of leaders by secret ballot; the right to tendencies within the party or, at least, the right—as already established in the new statutes of the Chinese CP—of minorities to keep their opinions even after their defeat in congresses, etc.).

(c) Since, except for a few cases, the Stalinist leaders are not giving way to the democratic pressure of the rank and file or only partially doing so (in order to maintain their leadership in the party), the rank-and-file vanguard is forming more or less open or secret tendencies, according to the more or less bureaucratic atmosphere of their own party so as to force democratization and the revision of political activity on given platforms that are being on many sides elaborated, and compared, as open or secret discussion develops within the party.

(d) Inevitably these currents and opposition groups must revise on the basis of the experience revealed by the Khrushchev report their relations with the USSR, and analyze Soviet society and the Soviet state (or even more generally, as in the Yugoslav and Polish CPs, all the problems raised by the transition period from capitalism to socialism). The « Russian question » (such as was discussed in the international Trotskyist movement over a whole period) is now breaking out in an entire wing of the CPs.

(e) These opposition currents that are coming up against the satisfied conservatism and the ignorance of the bureaucratic apparatus in office soon find that they have to extend their platforms not only to the problems of the USSR but also to all the problems of communist doctrine: relations with the social-democracy, analysis of contemporary capitalism, position towards the colonial revolution, workers' councils, roads to socialism, International, etc., etc.

22. Experience has proved that according to the position they adopt towards these various problems of immediate interest and of doctrine, the opposition currents that crystallize within the Communist Parties may be classified in two categories: a right-wing and a left-wing opposition current.

The right-wing opposition current is the logical consequence of the rightist opportunism of important CPs for long periods of their life (and even recently following the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR) but an opportunism that loses, in its relations with the capitalist world, its main brake — that provided by the unconditional subordination of the Stalinist parties to the Soviet bureaucracy. Such currents (Hervé in France, Giolitti in Italy, the Gates tendency in the American CP, etc.) take as good coin Khrushchev's words on new roads to socialism, the conquest of power by peaceful and parliamentary means in capitalist countries, including the largest and most powerful among them, on closer contacts with the social-democrats. They are rapidly undergoing an evolution toward « social-democratization » to such a point that they question the legitimacy of the colonial revolution from the point of view of « peace » or, in a even more vulgar way, the « nation » (that of the imperialist bourgeoisie!) of the country where they happen to be.

The left-wing opposition current, on the other hand, rises up against the contradictions of the Khrushchev interpretations of the Stalinist phenomenon and the fundamentally opportunistic character (periodically associated with a childish sectarianism) of their own CP's policy. It reproaches the CP leadership with its incapacity to take advantage of many favorable opportunities to encourage or lead to victory the mass movement, or really to root itself in the native workers' movement of its country. It wants, not « peaceful coexistence » with the country's imperialist bourgeoisie, but a more forceful and efficient struggle against it. The « Marty » current in the French CP, the oppositional groups in the Austrian and Brazilian CPs, various oppositional groups in the Italian CP, are all typical of this tendency.

As long as these currents express themselves inside the CP or fight for the right to express themselves openly, the various sections of the Fourth International that practise a policy of *sui generis* entrism in the CPs, and those sympathizers who are either led by these sections or work in collaboration with them, will defend the right of speech and of democratic representation in the organisms of leadership of *all* tendencies inside the CP. After decades of bureaucratic strangulation, the critical state of mind of rank-and-file Communist militants needs a long period of reflection, discussion, and

confrontation of various ideas before it can again find the capacity to discover its own orientation in political life. The left-wing current has nothing to fear from a free confrontation of different tendencies, which will facilitate the crystallization of a true revolutionary vanguard in these countries. Moreover, it is impossible to assert as main demand the right to organise tendencies and to deny this right to a tendency with which one does not politically agree. For all these reasons, the Trotskyists will be in the vanguard of the struggle for inner democracy in the CPs for *all* members, without exception, while at the same time calling on the most advanced elements to form a left-wing oppositional current.

23. In the *mass Communist Parties* of the Western European countries (France and Italy), the « destalinization » problems that are under discussion are exasperated by the flagrant incapacity of the bureaucratic leadership of these parties to take advantage of the numerous pre-revolutionary and revolutionary situations favoring the development of the party. At the same time, however, within the general conjuncture that exists in these countries, the even greater bankruptcy of the social-democracy (Algerian war, Suez adventure in France, collaboration with the Christian-Democracy in Italy) has enabled the Communist Parties of these countries to continue to canalize the majority, and above all the most combative section, of the proletariat. In Italy, however, the more leftish line of Nenni's party offers a serious competition to the CP. For this reason, the most healthy and left currents will tend to stay within the CP, the expelled groups that tend towards « right-wing communism » rapidly degenerating to form right-wing centrist or even left social-democratic formations. The evolution of the Hungarian and Polish revolutions, and the attempts made by the Polish and Yugoslav CPs to influence ideologically other CPs, have a similar effect. This does not mean that our sections must, as a matter of principle, disdain to work within these formations, especially if they have a certain numerical importance and influence in sectors of the working class; but this work continues to be subordinated to the general *sui generis* entrism tactic that, more than ever before, is proving to be the only efficient tactic for the building of a revolutionary party in these countries.

The same thing cannot be said of the *small Stalinist sects* of Western Europe (German, British, Belgian, Dutch, Swiss, Austrian, Scandinavian CPs, etc.) where the Stalinist crisis is fed not only by the general repercussions of « destalinization » and the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, but by the catastrophic decline in the influence of the CP over the masses, its almost complete isolation from

the organized workers' movement, its incapacity — in spite of the periodic alternation of sectarian and right-wing opportunistic tactics — to operate a « rapprochement with the social-democratic rank-and-file. » The right-wing communist tendencies of these parties are particularly inclined to capitulate, and usually go so far as to propose nothing less than the complete dissolution of the CP. The left-wing communist tendencies, insofar as they are not paralyzed by a complete sectarianism towards the mass movement, soon evolve tactics near to those of our movement. While proposing that these elements continue their struggle within the CP for the triumph of a Leninist line, we must offer them, as an alternative to the right-wing policy, the prospect of working within the social-democratic organizations and the trade-unions on a revolutionary platform, within the framework of the sections of the Fourth International. The object of this work is not that they should adapt themselves to the opportunism of the reformist leaders, but to reduce in the shortest possible time the influence of the latter on the most combative layers of the workers, and to aid the creation later of new mass revolutionary parties. From such a platform (to which the positive results already obtained by different sections in this work give weight) the communist oppositional elements can be won over by our movement.

In the CPs of the *semi-colonial and colonial countries*, the crisis of Stalinism is more particularly nourished by the right-wing opportunistic policy that the XXth Congress of the CP of the USSR forced on the leaders of these parties: direct and servile subordination to the interests of the colonial bourgeoisie allied to the Soviet bureaucracy, or « neutralized » by it. In the general atmosphere of « destalinization, » such a policy can end in the developing of powerful left-wing currents within these parties. The pressure of the revolutionary movement of the masses, however, can in practice bring the leadership of these parties, or a part thereof, to sketch out a turn towards a revolutionary orientation and to suppress before its birth the development of an autonomous left-wing current within the party.

Whatever be the forms taken in the next phase of the crisis of Stalinism within the various CPs of the capitalist countries, the revolutionary movement that is developing in the « People's Democracies » and in the USSR already foreshadows its final issue: the disappearance of Stalinism as an ideological current of the international communist movement, the return of part of the cadres and the CP militants of today to social-democracy (or similar centrist or right-wing formations), and the regrouping of the healthiest part of the great majority of convinced communist militants in new

revolutionary parties that will emerge from the crisis.

V. — THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN THE USSR AND THE « PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES » AS A PHASE OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

24. The political revolution in the USSR and the so-called « People's Democracies » is in itself a process of the permanent revolution. Unleashed by the accumulation of grievances that the working masses hold against the bureaucracy, it develops, according to its own logic, from a popular revolution in which all the layers of the nation participate, towards a more and more rapid social differentiation that can end only in the victory of the most proletarian and conscious current: that which brings about socialist democracy by advocating and achieving the concentration of all power in the hands of the democratically elected workers' and poor peasants' councils. The permanent character of the revolution does not stop at the conquest of power by the workers' councils. On the contrary this opens up a revolutionary period of exceptional fertility in which, thanks to the spirit of audacity and creative initiative pushed to their highest pitch of expression under the spur of the revolution, all aspects of social life will be submitted to a merciless criticism and revision, in order to produce everywhere the highest forms of direct democracy, equality, and solidarity that are compatible with the material framework of society. The rapid broadening of this framework, due to a prodigious development of the productive forces, which will at last be freed of bureaucratic tutelage, and to the international extension of the revolution, will itself then become the object of the permanent revolution of which this precise stage will seek more and more consciously the following colossal objective: the triumph of soviet democracy throughout all the workers' states, for one third of mankind and over one quarter of the globe.

25. But the political revolution in the bureaucratically degenerated or deformed workers' states is not only a process of permanent revolution according to its own dynamics. It also represents an integral part of the world dynamics of the permanent revolution, of the world socialist revolution. It is in fact inconceivable that the victory of the political revolution in several of the existing workers' states can fail to return to the fundamental forms of proletarian internationalism. Far from having particular interests to defend that will force them to continue their efforts to keep under a tutelary control the international workers' movement, they will aid and stimulate insofar as

possible the emancipation movements of the workers in the capitalist states and of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples.

Also, both objectively and subjectively, the international working-class movement will receive from the reestablishment of soviet democracy in the USSR a stimulus comparable only to that of the October socialist revolution. The effect of bourgeois propaganda and of its social-democratic servants against communism, exclusively aimed at the bureaucracy's crimes, would disappear. The increase in the standard of living of the workers in the Soviet Union and in the « People's Democracies » which will rapidly become possible would increase the power of attraction of these states on the inhabitants of the capitalist world. The imperialist bourgeoisie of the last capitalist powers would soon become isolated in a world that is fundamentally its enemy, and the majority of the workers all over the world would soon join the side of the workers' states and of the colonial revolution. The internal reinforcement of the working-class movement in the greater part of these countries

would no doubt place on the order of the day the conquest of power within a short time.

The concrete march of the world revolution throughout the world after the Second World War has made of the Chinese and colonial revolutions the principal motor of the world revolution. In reaching the USSR and the countries dominated by the Soviet bureaucracy, the revolutionary wave makes of the political revolution against this bureaucracy the second powerful motor of the world revolution. In these countries the revolution finds itself faced with millions of qualified and highly cultivated workers who are today capable of resolving the problems set by the socialist reorganization of mankind, with the same consciousness as the German or French workers could have done so on the morrow of the First World War. The concrete prospect of the victory of the political revolution in the USSR is that of the direct exercise of power by the proletariat in the second most powerful industrial country in the world. It can be only a prelude to the final victory of the world revolution.

III

Prospects and Dynamics of the Political Revolution against the Bureaucracy

REPORT PRESENTED BY COMRADE ERNEST GERMAIN

Since Stalin's death, the domination of the Soviet bureaucracy over the Soviet Union, over the « Peoples' Democracies, » and over the Communist Parties of the whole world, has been deeply shaken.

The sensational suppression of the Stalin cult at the XXth Congress of the Soviet C.P. produced great agitation in the Communist Parties of the whole world. All the fundamental points of Communist policy began to be reexamined in a critical way by an ever greater number of the militants of these parties. The result is the formation of groups, tendencies, sometimes even organized fractions, in most of the C.P.s, all things unknown in the previous 30 years. The servile subordination of the fate of the international working class to the Kremlin's diplomatic manoeuvres is being questioned — at the very moment when critical communists within the U.S.S.R. are beginning to question the grounds of these manoeuvres from the point of view of interests of the Soviet state itself.

The struggles for economic demands, the strikes, the workers' uprisings which occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and partly also in the U.S.S.R., have dramatically stressed « destalinisation. » They have confirmed the Trotskyist opinion that all manoeuvres on the part of the leaders are only a pale reflection of the pressure, the indignation, and the spirit of revolt ripening in the popular

masses. The Hungarian revolution showed beyond all doubt that a political revolution is building up, and that it is absolutely necessary for the overthrow of the power of the bureaucratic clique.

This tumultuous development which has been taking place for the last four years did not catch us unawares. We were armed to understand it, for we had predicted it. Without exaggeration, but also without false modesty, we can state that we were the only tendency of the international workers' movement that accurately foresaw these events, at least in their main lines, and that prepared itself to face the historical tasks which might arise from these developments.

To analyze their meanings and laws, we have had to raise some of the most difficult problems of Marxist theory. Once more it has become clear that each step forward of the international revolution also gives rise to a progress of revolutionary thought. The assimilation of this progress by the whole revolutionary party is, in turn, necessary to the victory of the revolution.

POLITICAL REVOLUTION OR SOCIAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION

The traditional Trotskyist analysis of the U.S.S.R. as a degenerate workers' state confined the possible outcome of the historical evolution of the first workers' state to the following alternative: either restoration of capitalism or

reestablishment of soviet democracy guaranteeing the building of socialism. Either social counter-revolution, or political revolution.

The two terms of this alternative were conceived in close connection with the development of the relationship of forces on the world scale. Either international revolution would undergo another series of international defeats, fascism would slowly spread to a large part of the world, Trotsky wrote in 1935, and then the workers' state would be irremediably lost; we should see the victory of the social counter-revolution. Or else new advances of the revolution would reverse the predominant reactionary tendency of the years 1923-1939 and then political revolution would have a good chance of winning in the U.S.S.R.

Two terms of an alternative do not mean two possibilities of *simultaneous* solutions. When Trotsky formulated this perspective for the first time in a precise way, that is, after Hitler's victory in 1933, he was obliged to place a question mark over the future dynamics of the relationship of forces on the world scale. Would revolution advance again, or would it go on being defeated everywhere in the world? Noone could seriously answer this question in 1935. But, towards the end of the Second World War, with the victory of the Yugoslav revolution, the victory of the Chinese revolution, and the spread of the colonial revolution, with the enormous progress of the Soviet economy, it became clear that the relationship of forces was turning in favor of Revolution on the world scale.

Under these conditions, to hang on to an alternative prospect, at least for short- or medium-term forecasts, meant to substitute vulgar eclecticism for Marxist dialectics. To repeat in 1953 what had been true in 1933, i.e. that the U.S.S.R. could experience either the reestablishment of capitalism or political revolution, was to change Trotskyist theory from an instrument of analysis of reality into a collection of ritual formulæ. It meant refusing to settle a question which had already been settled for a whole historical period at Stalingrad, Belgrade, Peking, Dien-Bien-Phu, and on the Yalu, where capitalism had been dealt such powerful blows that its reestablishment in a short time in the U.S.S.R. was no longer a possibility.

A double change in the relationship of forces has favored the evolution towards political revolution in the U.S.S.R. It has done so objectively and subjectively.

Trotsky had always foreseen that the preservation of the production relations born of the October Revolution would finally create objective conditions which would facilitate the overthrow of the bureaucratic dictatorship. In his theses « The Fourth International and the U.S.S.R. » he wrote at the end of 1933:

« Though squandering an enormous part of the national income in an unproductive way, the bureaucracy has an interest in the economic and cultural upsurge of the country; the higher the national income, the richer the funds from which it drawn its privileges. But on the social bases of the Soviet state, the economic and cultural rise of the toiling masses will undermine the bases of bureaucratic domination itself. »

This is what has actually happened. Above all, it is the numerical strength and the specific weight of the proletariat in Soviet society, its high level of skills and its superior culture, the rise in its living conditions, its progressive liberation from the worst slavery of poverty, the widening of its political horizon, its needs growing faster than the amount of goods accorded to it by the bureaucracy—it is above all this overall result of the economic and cultural progress of the U.S.S.R. which tolls the knell of bureaucratic dictatorship.

But the change in the relationship of forces on the world scale creates the subjective conditions for the political revolution. In *The Revolution Betrayed*, analyzing the reasons for the apparent stability of the Stalinist dictatorship, Trotsky wrote:

« If in contrast to the peasants the workers have almost never come out on the road of open struggle, thus condemning the protesting villages to confusion and impotence, this is not only because of the repressions. The workers fear lest, in throwing out the bureaucracy, they will open the way for the capitalist restoration. [...] The workers are realists. Without deceiving themselves with regard to the ruling caste — at least with regard to its lower tiers which stand near to them — they see in it the watchman for the time being of a certain part of their own conquests. They will inevitably drive out the dishonest, impudent and unreliable watchman as soon as they see another possibility. For this it is necessary that in the West or the East another revolutionary dawn arise. » (U.S. edition, pp. 285-286.)

The revolutionary opening has come about in the East. Capitalism has been terribly weakened on the world scale. Because of this, the fear of restoration of capitalism has very much diminished in the U.S.S.R. The working class has giving up its passive attitude. It no longer « tolerates » the dishonest watchman. On the contrary, it hounds him more and more, waging war on the field of factories and on that of principles, forcing him to put aside his insolence, and preparing to overthrow his power.

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE BUREAUCRACY

The question of our revolutionary prospects in the U.S.S.R. and in the glaci is closely linked to that of our specific analysis of the bureaucracy. In the proletarian movement, if we leave out those who consider the bureaucracy a new class, there exist two false conceptions of the nature of the bureaucracy.

The first, the *subjective* conception, is most often developed by Stalinists or former Stalinists. For them, the bureaucracy is the result of psychological and moral phenomena, instead of social phenomena. It is a question of habits, manners, and customs: to prefer to sit in an office rather than move around where work is actually being done; to use a rough commanding tone with workers; to be « aloof from the aspirations of the people »; to show « scorn—for manual work, » etc... etc... The « theoreticians » of the Chinese Communist Party have prepared for us a whole catalogue of the sins which might be the basis of « bureaucratism. »

The opposite of this subjective conception is the *objective* deviation, of which the most typical representatives are the Brandlerites, some Communist currents in Eastern Europe such as the Gomulkists, and also Deutscher, at least in his first works. They say: Russia was a backward country; the proletariat was weak, lacking skills and culture. It was thus unable to manage industrialization. So it inevitably had to be managed by a bureaucracy.

But, as industrialization involved a considerable increase in the rate of investment, it also involved a very severe lowering of the standard of living. The workers did not want to accept this lowering of the standard of living. It therefore had to be forced upon them. Hence the objective necessity of the bureaucratic dictatorship, which disappears with the historical conditions which gave birth to it.

The Trotskyist, the Marxist, analysis of the phenomena of the bureaucracy is opposed to these two equally wrong conceptions.

Bureaucratism, in the form of habits of work and undemocratic customs, is an endemic phenomenon in mass organizations, where it is normally corrected by the free play of elections and of the democratic control of the rank and file. It becomes a serious evil only when *social advantages* are grafted on to personal shortcomings, in other words when we pass from the plane of psychology to that of sociology. In the capitalist regime, the development of bourgeois parliamentary democracy and of a reformist mass movement transforms persons with bureaucratic tendencies into members and profiteers of the bourgeois state apparatus

off which they live. In the workers' state, the ebb of the revolution and the defeat of the revolutionary opposition allowed the bureaucracy to seize the state and the economy, from which were derived enormous privileges. This is how parasitic bureaucratic castes are born, linked to particular social systems, from which they suck away part of the wealth.

We know, as Lenin did, that the complete disappearance of all functionarism and all bureaucracy, i.e. the carrying out of all the functions of leadership by all producers in turn is impossible in the first days after the revolution in any country in the world, and certainly in a poor country. Thus we know that there was already a certain bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. in 1918 and that there will be one in any country after the victory of the proletarian revolution. We also know that the poorer a country is, and the weaker and more backward its proletariat, the greater is the risk that this bureaucracy become powerful and accumulate new privileges.

But what separates us from the « objectivists » is that, like Lenin, who passionately defended this point of view during the last years of his life, like Trotsky, and like the best Soviet Bolsheviks, we are convinced that this ebb is not inevitable, and that the growth of bureaucratic degeneration can be stopped by *well-advised action on the part of the subjective factor*. Neither the national nor international relationship of forces is unalterable. After the defeat of 1923, there were possibilities of victory in China in 1927, in Germany in the beginning of the '30s, in Spain and in France in 1936. If the bureaucracy was triumphant, it is in large measure because the Bolshevik Party, instead of being aware of this danger right from the beginning, underestimated it; because it had itself become bureaucratic, and part of its cadres reacted too late, when they were already a minority in their own house, when the party, tool of the proletariat, had already become a tool of the bureaucracy.

This Trotskyist answer to the problem of the bureaucratic degeneration of the U.S.S.R. and of the Communist International corresponds exactly to the state of mind of the whole critical and oppositional mass appearing today in the C.P.s, including the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. All are asking the question: « How was this possible? » All are trying to find the link between the overall objective conditions unfavorable to the growth of soviet democracy in the U.S.S.R. and the particularly malignant, even catastrophic, form taken by the development of the bureaucracy. Only our Trotskyist conception of bureaucracy can explain this process to them, including in the analysis the great gains of the new economic and social basis of the first workers' state.

CURRENTS IN SOCIETY, TENDENCIES IN THE PARTY, DIVISIONS IN THE BUREAUCRACY

Our traditional conception of the Soviet bureaucracy enables us to answer also two questions of analysis which have been continually brought up by international working-class opinion since Stalin's death:

a) Are the divisions which have appeared in the Kremlin group explained essentially by a struggle for power, or are they a reflection of what is happening in the whole of Soviet society?

b) To what extent can the bureaucracy as a caste resist the final onset of the masses?

We know that, traditionally, in regimes based on a single party, all the social contradictions tend to be reflected inside this party. We said it in the past about the Bolshevik Party during the '20s. We say it today for the C.P. of the Soviet Union. In this sense, it is absolutely clear that the different tendencies which are already formed, or are in course of being formed, in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R., are not without relation to the great currents which are already beginning to manifest themselves in Soviet society.

But what relations does this mean? We distinguish two

phenomena. When the different fractions appeared in the Bolshevik Party, we defined the Left-Opposition fraction as the one which consciously expressed the interests of the proletariat. As for the rightist, Bukharinist, fraction, it was under the pressure of the peasantry in its way of stating tactical problems, and especially of solving them. But never did Trotsky describe Bukharin as the representative of a peasant current, or as an agent of the petty-bourgeoisie; or as a bourgeois politician. His being a communist, i.e. a militant of a revolutionary party of the proletariat, was never questioned.

It is the same distinction which we use as a starting point to explain the divisions which appeared in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. after Stalin's death. If we judge by a great number of the positions they took, especially in the economic and ideological field, it seems unquestionable that the Molotov-Kaganovitch group can be considered as the most conscious and direct representative of the most privileged strata of the bureaucracy, above all of the trust and factory directors. As for the other groups and intermediate groups, they have, to different degrees, undergone the pressure of the proletariat and of the peasantry, in the sense that they have been obliged to raise problems whose solutions the masses were more and more insistently demanding and that they have, to different degrees, undergone the pressure of the masses and have put forward certain reforms in the sense of these solutions.

But we have never said and we shall never say that either Malenkov, Mikoyan, or Khrushchev represents, even indirectly, a proletarian tendency in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. All of them are politicians of the bureaucracy who are trying, each in his own way and with his own character, to protect the interests, the power, and the privileges of the bureaucratic caste as such.

Because of their past, their complicity in many of Stalin's crimes, a complicity well known to the masses, and because of their very functions in society at present, all the members of the Presidium are identified in the eyes of the masses with an ever more hated power: the dictatorship of the « bonzes, » the bureaucrats, the bureaucracy. *It is excluded that any one of them should play the part which Tito, Gomulka, or Nagy played, that of popular and centrist leaders of one wing of the bureaucracy, channeling for their own benefit the masses' hostility against the bureaucracy as a whole.* All of them have more or less tried to do so: Beria, by declaring himself against police despotism and backing out of the « affair of the doctors »; Malenkov, by promising a forced-draught development of light industry; Mikoyan, by launching the decisive attack against the Stalin cult; Khrushchev, by promising abundance of bread, butter, and meat. None of them will succeed.

But for us, bureaucracy is not a new class; it is a caste which has its roots deep in the proletariat. If we examine the social composition of the C.P. of the U.S.S.R., we notice that one third of its members are still factory workers. Even if they are Stakhanovists or foremen, they are, because of their way of life, closer to the workers than to the big shots who roll around in automobiles and give their sons a thousand rubles a week for spending-money.

The trade-union cadres in the factories, the secretaries of the factory cells of the C.P., even leaders of districts, small towns, and sometimes even provincial cities, especially the Komsomols, can thus become true transmission belts of the proletarian currents which are crystalizing in society. And from their ranks there may appear future Nagys and Gomulkas, perhaps even future Bolshevik leaders. This dialectical and dual nature of the tendencies appearing in the C.P. of the U.S.S.R. in their relations to the proletariat, reflect the dual nature of Stalinism and of the bureaucracy itself, which have never definitively cut the umbilical cord which bound them to the proletariat.

It is by starting out from these same premises that we can solve the problem of the possible resistance of the bu-

raucocracy to the revolutionary onset of the masses. Trotsky had already solved this problem in advance. He wrote in 1933:

« The social roots of the bureaucracy, as we know, are to be found in the proletariat, if not in its active support, at least in the fact that it tolerates it. If the proletariat become active again, the Stalinist apparatus will find itself hanging in mid-air. If it tries to oppose it, repressive police measures will have to be taken, rather than civil-war measures. At any rate, it will not be an uprising against the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the removal of a malignant tumor from this dictatorship.

« There can be no real civil war between the Stalinist bureaucracy and the proletariat in uprising, but only between the proletariat and the active forces of counter-revolution. »

These predictions have been completely confirmed by the experience of the 16th and 17th of June 1953 in Eastern Germany and by the experience of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions. In all cases, before the Soviet military forces intervened, the « native » bureaucracy collapsed without seriously resisting the masses' action. Only small nuclei of the secret police defended themselves. The rest of the bureaucracy divided: on the one hand, those who went over bag and baggage to the camp of the political revolution (in hundreds of factories and dozens of towns, strikes and demonstrations were led by official trade-union, party, or youth leaders); and on the other, those who went into hiding or ran away (in the physical meaning of the word) from the revolution.

As in the U.S.S.R. no foreign army will be able to intervene, the problem will be solved by the behavior of the Soviet army itself. We shall examine this problem in a few moments. But we can already predict that Trotsky's analysis will probably be verified in the most striking way at the moment of the outbreak of the political revolution in the U.S.S.R. As there will also be confirmed the fact that real civil war can break out only between the proletariat and the counter-revolution. The Hungarian revolution was about to confirm this prediction when the criminal intervention of the Russian army changed the givens of the problem.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY

If we try to sum up what has been happening in the upper regions of the bureaucracy since Stalin's death, we can distinguish two different processes:

a) The falling apart of the « solid nucleus » of « Stalin's faithful lieutenants » into different groups fighting each other more and more violently, and successively eliminating series of leaders from the Presidium, each group quickly breaking down in face of the impossibility of reconciling its desire to maintain the privileges of the bureaucracy with the necessity of making concessions to the masses.

b) The swift rise of the importance of the army, personified by the rise of Marshal Zhukov, today a member of the Presidium and actually N° 2 or N° 3 man in the « collective leadership. » (1)

We have already explained the first process as the indirect reflection, through the prism of the bureaucracy, of the fundamental currents which run through the whole Soviet society in ferment. In this connection, we must stress a very characteristic phenomenon. In Stalin's time, the secretary-general alone made decisions. After his death, a small group of lieutenants (Malenkov, Molotov, Beria) really held the reins of power. After the fall of Beria, power passed into the hands of a Presidium, composed of a dozen persons. When Khrushchev was voted into minority within this Presidium, he appealed over its head to the C.C., composed of

more than one hundred persons. To give more authority to its decision, he was obliged to go and explain the matter to the workers, in the factories, and to the rank and file of the party. Tomorrow, a leader of a group within the C.C., if he is put in a minority within this organism, may be tempted to appeal over its head to the members of the party, to the workers in the factories. It will be a decisive event, a turning point in the post-Stalinist history of the U.S.S.R.

What does the rise of the army mean? Under Stalin, the real power of the secretary-general was exercised through the omnipotence of the secret police, which controlled all the spheres of Soviet society, beginning with the party, the government, and the army. The death of Stalin, the execution of Beria, the reestablishment of control over the secret police by the party, destroyed this system of power. Outside the operation of bureaucratic centralism, of the nomination of officials, the bureaucracy no longer has any instrument of power over the people other than the army. All the information that we have confirms the fact that the army, and more precisely the Moscow garrison, played a key role in the elimination of Beria, then in Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov on one side, and over Molotov-Kaganovitch on the other.

Does this mean that there is danger of a military dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.? Without wishing a priori to exclude the possibility of short intermediate phases in the process towards the victory of the political revolution, we think that the eventuality of military dictatorship is impossible as a stable form of government by the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Soviet army is today the true mirror of Soviet society. It is no longer a mainly peasant army. It has become an army of mechanics and drivers, reflecting the enormous technical and cultural progress of the workers' state. It is true that it includes a caste of extremely privileged and arrogant officers. Probably we shall soon see a Zhukov group appear in the Presidium, striving to represent the interests of this caste. But the great reckoning which is building up in Soviet society between the proletarian current and that of the most privileged strata of the bureaucracy will take place also in the army. The ideas of equality will penetrate there; the officers' caste has already been obliged to make concessions, especially by abolishing the separate officers' messes. Many signs suggest that the decisive phase before the political revolution will be that in which revolutionary ideas will penetrate the army and make it unable to play its part as a shield of the bureaucracy's privileges and power.

THE POLARIZATION OF FORCES IN SOVIET SOCIETY

Beginning with 1953, we have been saying that three parallel currents are being polarized in Soviet society:

- a) the current of the privileged strata of the bureaucracy;
- b) the current of the peasantry, the least articulate of the three;
- c) the current of the proletariat.

We had added that these three currents would have not only an indirect expression, by the echo of their demands in the speeches and writings of authors and political leaders, but also a direct expression, on the level of openly stated demands and of action, first economic, then even political. The social aims which these three currents strive to reach are, in short, the following:

- a) the most privileged strata of the bureaucracy seek to enlarge the legal bases which guarantee their privileges; they seek to transform usurped powers into vested rights (especially in the factories);
- b) the peasants strive to defend their private bits of land and the rights to the total profits which they yield;
- c) the workers demand better living conditions, and more rights in the economy and in the state (basically they aim at the management of the factories).

In the very last discussion, preparing the great reform

(1) This report was presented before the « Zhukov affair » broke out. The passage in this report concerning the army precisely casts light on this affair. [Ed. Note]

introduced by Khrushchev in the management of the economy, these three currents appeared clearly:

a) As at the Moscow economic conference in 1955, the factory directors, taking advantage of the principle of « decentralization, » again insisted that their rights and those of the foremen be increased, especially the right to fire and punish workers. Khrushchev mentioned these demands in his report to the Supreme Soviet. The ideological reflection of this pressure of the most privileged bureaucrats is the new theory which appeared in the « Economic » section of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., a theory according to which the means of production in the U.S.S.R. should also be considered as merchandise! It is well known that the directors' illegal selling of certain pieces of equipment directly from one factory to another, without the authorization of the Plan, was confirmed as their right.

b) The peasants received from Khrushchev a quite sensational concession: starting from 1958, they will pay no taxes on the products of their private bits of land. This great « principled Bolshevik » has thus moved, in a few years' time, from the struggle for « agrovilles, » for the statification of the kolkhozes, and for strict limitation of private bits of land, to a policy of concessions to the powerful instinct of private appropriation which remains more predominant than ever in the kolkhozian peasantry.

c) The workers have increased their pressure in favor of an increase in real wages, against a revision of the wage system which would end up by reducing the over-all wage for the most skilled workers. They demand more equality and protest against the bureaucratic abuses of power. The strikes which broke out in the Donbas in October 1956 and which spread to Leningrad, the slow-down strikes which paralyzed the Ordjonikidze factories in Moscow as well as other large factories, had essentially the same aims.

The incident reported by the daily newspaper *Trud* and picked up by *Deutscher* is very significant. A worker on the Red Square in Moscow went up to a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet who was leaving the Kremlin. He took him by the lapel of his jacket and said: « That is good cloth. A worker could not buy cloth like that. » This anecdote shows exactly how much the relationship of forces has changed in favor of the proletariat since Stalin. But the worker, after having made this gesture, just disappeared into the crowd. That shows how far there still is to go.

THE LESSONS OF HUNGARY

What will be the concrete form of the proletariat's political revolution against the Soviet bureaucracy? Without going into fruitless speculations, we can bring out a few specific characteristics of the experiences of Hungary, Poland, and Eastern Germany.

First of all, the political revolution will have the *dynamics of permanent revolution*. All the strata of the population are mobilized against the dictatorship of the bureaucracy. In the beginning of the revolution, all these strata will participate in the movement. It is in the very course of the revolution that the proletariat and its conscious vanguard will conquer leadership and will bring the revolution to the victory of soviet democracy.

The relationship of forces between the classes will decide whether this victory can be won without an armed struggle against the organized forces of the counter-revolution (in Eastern Europe and China). In the U.S.S.R., this hypothesis is excluded because of the complete disappearance of those forces. This means that to forecast that from the very beginning of the revolution the forces will be divided into two clearly distinct camps, on the one side that of the Bolshevik-Leninists, and on the other that of the Stalinists, the confusionists, and the counter-revolutionaries, is absolutely contrary to reality. To have such an idea of the political revolution is to deny in practice the enormous discredit

and confusion that the Stalinist dictatorship has sown concerning the most elementary ideas of Leninism.

The duration and the rapid outcome of this process of permanent revolution will depend above all on the *organization* and the *leadership* of the proletarian vanguard. The working class itself will quickly find its own form of organization, that of workers' councils. The examples of Hungary and Poland have proved this beyond all doubt. This is the general precondition of soviet democracy, which is thus reestablished. But it is not enough that these councils should exist; they must also quickly aim towards *the exercise of all political power*. The mere existence of the councils is not a guarantee of the rapid victory of the political revolution. It can be combined, during a transitional period, with political compromise, the re-creation of petty-bourgeois parties, the attempt to give life again to bourgeois parliamentarism, etc... Only the presence in the councils of a conscious revolutionary leadership will make them become the centre around which the whole class will gather, reestablishing its revolutionary democratic power on the ruins of bureaucratic absolutism, and crushing any counter-revolutionary attempt.

The national question will play an important part in the political revolution. Here there is a very important difference between the countries of the « Soviet glacis » and the U.S.S.R. itself. In the countries of the glacis, » the national question, the feeling of oppression and exploitation undergone at the hands of the Kremlin, are a powerful stimulus to the revolution, increasing the desire of the masses for revolt and revenge. At a later stage, the national question could feed the prejudices of the more backward strata and of petty-bourgeois groups. But a clear and bold attitude on this question can channelize national feelings for the benefit of a workers' solution to the revolution, as is shown by the Yugoslav and Polish examples, even under the centrist leaderships of Tito and Gomulka.

It is not the same thing in the U.S.S.R. The national feeling, the feeling that the U.S.S.R. has become the second world power, is more a prop for the bureaucratic dictatorship. The sentiment of national oppression, felt by certain oppressed nationalities in Europe (Ukrainians, Balts, and to a certain extent the Caucasian nationalities), will introduce a dissociating and centrifugal element into the popular movement of which the bureaucracy is already taking advantage (e.g., stationing troops on other nationalities' territory). Finally, the Asian nationalities have in part a completely different attitude toward the bureaucracy from that of the European nationalities, because of the enormous progress accomplished in their territories, even during the Stalinist period. This fact is also skilfully exploited by the bureaucracy (mobilization of the authors of surrounding regions against the most oppositional authors of Moscow). For all these reasons, the national question threatens to slow down the outbreak of the political revolution and hinder its quick outcome in the victory of soviet democracy in the U.S.S.R.

But it must be made clear that these are not absolute obstacles. In any case, the faster the proletariat can regroup and go into action, the faster its vanguard can get organized and fight for the Bolshevik-Leninist programme, and the more all the transitional phases of inevitable confusion and compromise can be shortened, then the more quickly the revolution will appear in its purest aspect: that of the struggle for the *power of the workers' councils*.

THE PROGRAMME OF THE POLITICAL REVOLUTION

It is for this reason that the programme of the political revolution, which will be discussed with passion by the communist vanguard, both workers and intellectuals, beginning in the period of preparation of the revolution, takes on a decisive importance, and must be carefully prepared by this Congress. The theses which have been placed before

you strive to achieve, this preparation in the light of all the experiences of these last decades. We shall particularly stress two points.

Our theses state that soviet democracy cannot be achieved without the right for the masses to organize different soviet parties. It is on this point that Trotsky, and ourselves still more clearly, go one step further than the fundamental documents of the Third International and the Left Opposition. We believe that this step is justified by the Soviet experience. If the proletariat does not have the right to organize different parties, the tendency struggle inside the class party itself is inevitably stifled, for sooner or later this struggle threatens to end up by splitting the party. It is only if the revolutionary party honestly accepts the rule: all power to the workers' councils, if it acts within the framework of these councils as an organized vanguard fighting for the triumph of its ideas without repressing the minority or, if such be the case, the majority of the workers who do not accept these ideas, only then does the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat take on its true meaning, in opposition to the theories and still more the bureaucratic adventurist practices of the Stalinists. Any other solution ends up in bureaucratic arbitrariness, in which the party takes the place of the class, the Central Committee takes the place of the party, and the secretary-general of the Central Committee takes that of the Central Committee.

Our theses stress the real difficulties and contradictions, which live on into the transitional period, between the different economic functions of the workers' state: the administration of the economy and the distribution of the national income; the advancement of socialist accumulation and the increase of the masses' standard of living, etc. To guarantee the most progressive solution of these contradictions, they stand for a sharing out and autonomy of various powers: the sharing of power by the workers' councils administering the factories, the trade unions defending the workers' interests as consumers, and the soviets (territorial workers' councils) exercising the democratic political power of the proletariat; mutual autonomy of the soviets, the trade unions, and the party.

This solution is simultaneously opposed to the bureaucratic centralization of the Stalinists, and to the « Yugoslav decentralization » which maintains bureaucracy at the central level, but at the same time re-introduces into the economy, by the way of factory autonomy, the phenomena of waste that result from competition. For instance, the Yugoslav factories hide technical improvements, new ways of organizing work, even patents, from each other, to win this « socialist competition » of a new type.

NEO-CENTRISM

With the collapse of the Stalin cult, there also collapsed a whole way of political thinking, purely pragmatist and opportunist, among the leaders of the Communist Parties, purely schematic and mythological among the rank and file: the Vozjd, the leader (or the Central Committee of the C.P. of the U.S.S.R.), is always right... In the void left by the disappearance of these reflexes of obedience, and with the lack of truly revolutionary Marxist criteria of analysis, there are appearing all sorts of theories, of shadings of thoughts which lie between Stalinism and Marxism. The two most important varieties are the following:

a) *The semi-reformism* of the rightist opposition tendencies: Giolitti and Reale in Italy, Hervé-Lecœur in France, some oppositionals in Great Britain, some elements of Harich's ideas in East Germany, some « revisionists » of the Polish C.P., the Gates tendency in the American C.P., etc. Taking their inspiration from some of the ideas launched by Khrushchev at the XXth Congress (parliamentary road to socialism, etc.), these people are drawing near the Social-Democracy and throwing overboard essential elements of Leninist thought.

b) *The neo-centrism* of the former Stalinists who, under the pressure of the masses and of events, go farther and farther in the Marxist analysis of the phenomena of bureaucracy and of soviet democracy, including the real nature of Stalinism. Thus Gomulka stands for the right to strike; Mao also stressed it in his first report on the movement for rectification. Mao even analyzes the sources of bureaucratism, in the contradiction between the « manual workers » (producers) and the « intellectual workers » (administrators). All this goes much further than Khrushchev's scanty « theoretical » notions on the « personality cult. »

True, in most cases, these centrists' actions are not in conformity with their words. As representatives of a tendency of the bureaucracy, they are equally incapable of continuing the road all the way to Bolshevism. The numerical and cultural weakness of the Yugoslav proletariat, the real danger of counter-revolutionary uprisings in China, constitute additional subjective obstacles on the road to a victory of soviet democracy in these countries. Nevertheless, the importance of this « neo-centrism » is enormous, because it keeps up a ferment in the minds of all the Communist Party militants in the world (including those in the U.S.S.R.), and because it creates possibilities for a revolutionary vanguard to use it as a starting platform in its struggle for a return to Lenin.

The experience of the Polish revolution since October 1956 enables us to draw up an objective balance-sheet of the meaning of this neo-centrism. The revolution had achieved four great conquests: national independence; the workers' councils in the factories; the end of forced collectivization of agriculture; a certain freedom of the press and especially of speech in the workers' movement. The first and third of these conquests still exist and will probably not be abolished without a civil war. But the second and fourth are always being questioned and run the risk of being lost if the revolution continues to mark time as it has unquestionably been doing for a certain time.

Caught between the revolutionary pressure of the left and the conservative pressure of the Stalinist right, Gomulka and his centrist group are striving to consolidate the position by avoiding any new concession either to one side or the other. But each blow which they deal to the left strengthens not their own group but the right: this is the most important lesson of the IXth Plenum of the C.C. of the United Workers' Party of Poland. What warps this process is the perfect organization of the right, led by the Soviet embassy, and the lack of organization of the left, whose leaders are disoriented and demoralized. A revival of the left with the slogan « All power to the councils, » opening the way to a concrete programme of economic and political reorganization, would, however, enable the real relationship of forces to find expression, and would give a new start to the revolution, which is far from being defeated.

THE RETURN TO LENIN

Stalin's epigones have incautiously launched the struggle against the « personality cult » with the keynote of the « return to Lenin. » In so doing, they have lit the fire which will destroy them! Khrushchev strives to spread the story that the present leaders all sincerely believed in Stalin as long as he lived. But Communist militants and the mass of the workers' vanguard are discovering, and will discover more and more, that this is not true.

The Czechoslovakian Stalinist leader « on the cultural front, » Vladimir Dostal, gave the following answer in the organ of the Czechoslovakian Writers' Association, *Literarni Noviny*, to the objection by the Polish writer Jan Kott that Soviet literature had lived in the midst of lies, since it said nothing of the crimes of the Stalinist period:

« I can imagine that the tragic conflict between duty and conscience has tortured many writers. But I consider it a

natural and temporary surrender to historical necessity that they finally decided to keep silent and to wait, for by acting against the government, they would have weakened their own country in years of a growing threat of war... On one side, there was the fate of the country and of the revolution; on the other a few [!] human lives, the honor of a few, and the purity of principles. Between the two, there was no other course. »

This is what a Stalinist leader says in Czechoslovakia, the country where the C.P. has remained the most « Stalinist » in all Europe! But the new generation of Communists, which is rising with the keynote of the « return to Lenin » will answer the bureaucrats that in Lenin's mind *the defense of principles can never be opposed to the interests of the Revolution!*

It will denounce those who have trampled these principles underfoot, not for the interests of the Revolution, to which

they have done great injury, but for the interests of a caste of ravenous and blood-thirsty upstarts.

Drawing their inspiration from Lenin's faithfulness to principles, it will rediscover in the Oppositionals, and above all in the Left Oppositionals and in the Trotskyists, those who, without yielding to fear or temptation, have upheld the banner of communism, keeping it clean and unstained. It will build a granite monument to these thousands of nameless heroes who have, by their apparently hopeless resistance in the past, assured the perpetuity and the magnificent worldwide revival of Leninism which we are witnessing today. It will come to the conclusion that the Fourth International, heir to these traditions, is capable of reestablishing them fully in the entire world communist movement. And by overthrowing the dictatorship of the bureaucracy, by reestablishing soviet democracy, under the banner of Lenin, it will clear the way to the victory of the World October.

THE CRISIS OF STALINISM

Since the XXIst Congress of the C P of the U S S R

1. "Destalinization" was a series of empirical operations carried out by Stalin's successors to overcome the contradictions built up at the end of his reign, which had reached an explosive pitch in the U S S R itself and in the "people's democracies." The crisis became acute in 1956-57, not only in the U S S R and the other workers' states, but also in the C P s of the capitalist countries.

The Khrushchev leadership, which succeeded in consolidating itself in the leadership of the C P of the U S S R in July 1957, tried to overcome the crisis by a series of economic and political measures, and by defining a line of regroupment for the leaderships of the workers' states and the Communist Parties, in order to establish the framework and limits of a "destalinization" that could be carried out in a way controlled by itself. This line of regroupment is to be found in the declaration adopted in Moscow on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution by the leaders of the C P s, with the exception of those of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

This document, setting forth Stalin's "qualities and defects," limited explanation of the past to the "personality cult" of Stalin in the last period of his life, i.e., it fell short of the Khrushchev report to the XXth Congress, and disappointed of any attempt to enquire into social differentiations in the U S S R, which would have been detrimental to the bureaucratic power. This document also reasserted the policy of "peaceful coexistence," i.e., the policy of subordinating the Communist movement to the needs of Soviet diplomacy.

The line thus defined on the fortieth anniversary remained integrally within the limits of the bureaucratic regime for the U S S R and the other workers' states, and of a monolithic system for the Communist Parties throughout the world. It formed a line of defense, a barrier against workers' democracy, whether in the workers' states or in the Communist Parties.

The Khrushchev leadership attempted to stabilize the bureaucracy's power at a new level, liberal compared to that in Stalin's time, and to reestablish the authority of the leaderships of the Communist Parties.

These attempts have obtained certain results which culminated at the XXIst Congress of the C P of the U S S R (January 1959), concerning the reestablishment of bureaucratic domination and have caused considerable changes both concerning the structure of the governments of the workers' states and the relations inside the Communist Parties. These attempts of the bureaucratic leadership to adapt itself to the new situation have contributed to opening new roads to the development of the crisis of Stalinism and to the political revolution.

But there was thus set up only a very limited equilibrium, both among the leadership of the Soviet Union, the bureaucracy, and the masses, and among the various strata of the bureaucracy, and a no less relative equilibrium between the leadership of the U S S R and the leaderships of the other workers' states and the Communist Parties, if account is taken of the new relationship of forces, unfavorable to the Soviet bureaucracy, that exists in the "Communist world."

All the reforms undertaken have been made with the aim of self-defense of the power and the main bureaucratic privileges, and have not brought anything of even very slight value in the way of workers' democracy. This the Soviet workers will obtain only through their own action, through their struggles rising to the level of a *political revolution*. The whole evolution in the U S S R

since Stalin's death, however extensive it may have been, has never gone outside the frame of the bureaucratic regime. And so this extensiveness itself emphasizes the unavoidable necessity for a political revolution which will throw the bureaucracy out of power as a social stratum with interests distinct from those of the masses, and reestablish Soviet democracy at a level corresponding to the huge economic and cultural advances of Soviet society. During these three or four years of a certain stabilization, new contradictions have ripened, replacing or predominating over a part of the old contradictions. These new contradictions are generally located on a higher level than the old ones, and will tend to give the crisis of the bureaucratic regime the political forms that are indispensable for making concrete the way to the political revolution in the U S S R and the way to the creation of a new international revolutionary leadership of the proletariat.

2. Besides these internal contradictions in the Communist world itself, an absolutely new fact is now weighing on it. For the first time, there have been for several years now developing in the world strong rising revolutionary movements, the spearheads of revolutionary combat, which escape from the control of the Soviet bureaucracy, and which are driven to seek a socialist doctrine outside this control. The two most characteristic examples are precisely the two main present revolutionary movements: the Algerian revolution, where the Algerian C P no longer has any chance of developing, and the Cuban revolution, where the Stalinists play a role only because they are tailing the movement and publicly show no disposition to take control of it. This is also the case for various movements in Negro Africa.

Thus for the first time the Communists of the entire world see challenged — no longer by small vanguard groups of a predominantly ideological nature, but by mass revolutionary movements which are spearheads in the struggle against the capitalist world — Moscow's leading role, which was recognized even after the dissolution of first the Comintern, and then the Cominform. Thus powerful revolutionary movements are implicitly raising the question of a new international revolutionary leadership. This has been added to the fact that the Khrushchev leadership, after having practically condemned Stalin's action toward the Yugoslavs, did not succeed in bringing the leadership of the League of Communists back into the Moscow orbit, thus leaving a still open wound in the Communist world properly so called.

THE MAIN CONTRADICTIONS OF THE PRESENT COMMUNIST WORLD

3. Under the influence of the rise of the masses in the workers' states, of the rise of the colonial revolution, and of the new worldwide correlation of forces on the level of the masses and states, new contradictions are developing in the present Communist world, which are bringing into question the hegemony and the policy of the Soviet leadership over this world, and are thus preparing the terrain for a new stage toward the renewal of communism.

The Chinese-Soviet dispute, even in the forms in which it has been presented and developed up till now, is the most striking and serious manifestation of these contradictions, which have brought into question the essential problems of the Communist movement's policy on international relations, relations with world capitalism, with the national bourgeoisies of colonial and semi-colonial countries, on

the roads to the conquest of power, the paths to the building of socialism in the countries where capitalism has been overthrown, etc.

The Sino-Soviet dispute did not arise from a desire for theoretical clarification by the Chinese C P, but from the problems raised for it by the needs of transforming Chinese society and under the pressure of the colonial revolution. While the Soviet C P is the political instrument of a bureaucracy which crystalized long ago and is eminently conservative, the Chinese C P, in spite of important bureaucratic characteristics, is much more sensitive to pressure from the world revolution. Therefore, although the opposition between the Chinese C P and the Soviet C P is not that between a revolutionary party and a conservative one (in the workers' state), this opposition has considerable consequences for the revolutionary struggle in the world.

Now and henceforth the unity of views of the Communist Parties is either explicitly or implicitly brought into question on the following problems:

A) DANGERS OF WAR AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

On the question of international relations, since the end of the Second World War, the line of the Soviet leadership, under Khrushchev as under Stalin, both in moments of "détente" and in moments of the greatest tensions of the "cold war," has been invariable: to reach an agreement with world capitalism at any price, including the sacrifice of the revolutionary movements throughout the world, while the Communist Parties and the Peace Movement brought pressure in the capitalist states with a view to obtaining a twist of policy in a direction favorable to the propositions of Soviet diplomacy — whence the fundamental orientation of all the Communist Parties since the end of the war. The struggle for power by the overthrow of the bourgeois state has been replaced by the "struggle for peace," by an agreement with wings of the bourgeoisie, both in advanced capitalist and in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The differences between Stalin and Khrushchev arise only from the evolution of the correlation of forces in favor of the workers' states. In Stalin's time, when the USSR did not yet possess nuclear weapons, it was the Stockholm Appeal that was launched. With Khrushchev, propaganda is made for disarmament, presented as an attainable result, which is then to ensure a mere economic competition and ideological struggle between the two camps.

The opportunist, pacifist, petty-bourgeois orientation thus followed by the C Ps and their fellow-travelers had not been challenged by the various C Ps, especially not by the Yugoslavs. Because of the international and national conditions under which the permanent revolution has been developing in China, the Chinese leadership has brought the Soviet Union's fundamental orientation into question on the plane of international relations. The Chinese are in favor of peaceful coexistence among states and also of disarmament proposals. But they challenge — and quite rightly — Moscow's ideas about peaceful wings opposed to warlike wings in the bourgeoisie; they also dispute the possibility of disarmament under the capitalist regime. They recall that war is a phenomenon inherent in capitalism, that one must not be fooled by peaceful proposals by capitalist leaders, that illusions must not be sown among the masses on this subject, and that the rejection of disarmament proposals must be utilized to educate the masses in the direction of the struggle against capitalism.

Without drawing conclusions in an explicit way about the orientation of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, the Chinese are thus quite rightly opposed to Moscow's essential conceptions, although their own argumentation may have been defective or dangerous on certain points (American imperialism as a "paper tiger," under-

estimation of the dangers of a nuclear war for humanity). They afterwards made corrections on these subjects, in a more or less clear way.

B) ATTITUDE TOWARD COLONIAL REVOLUTIONS AND TOWARD THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIES OF COLONIAL AND SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRIES

The Soviet leadership is guided in this question only by diplomatic considerations, apart from any notion of anti-imperialist and class solidarity. Thus, confronted by the Algerian revolution, the Soviet government, in hopes of reaching an agreement with de Gaulle, has long considered the Algerian question as a "French affair." The Chinese government, on the contrary, has recognized the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

The Soviet leadership seeks out and backs up the national bourgeoisies or fractions thereof which are in favor of its line of "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism. It causes the Communist Parties to support these "allies" and to subordinate to them the struggles of the worker and peasant masses. The most striking examples are those of Kerala in India and the attitude imposed on the Iraqi C P toward the Kassem government. To justify this conduct, Khrushchev's "theoreticians" only repeat Stalin's about the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution in these countries and about the progressive role that the bourgeoisie might play in these revolutions.

Without formally repudiating what was the fundamental conception of their party for more than 20 years, that of the revolution by stages, the Chinese, both because of their own experience and because of their relations with bourgeois governments of colonial and semi-colonial countries, put forward a conception of "uninterrupted revolution" which tends to encourage the class action of the worker and peasant masses in these countries, independently of and against bourgeois leaderships. It is not a question of an absolutely clear and principled attitude, apart from any consideration of foreign policy by the Chinese state. But on this point also the orientation of the Chinese is headed toward the correct path.

C) PARLIAMENTARY AND PEACEFUL PATHS TO SOCIALISM

Beginning with the XXth Congress, Khrushchev had made explicit a conception underlying the activity of the Communist Parties in most capitalist countries, especially in France and Italy — that of the conquest of power by peaceful and parliamentary paths, with the question of the destruction of the bourgeois state blurred over. The reservation concerning the fact that these paths could prove to be blocked in case of a fierce resistance by capitalism or by certain of its fractions, was only a literary flourish, for the policy of the Communist Parties is based only on parliamentary and peaceful paths, and the C Ps, like the Social-Democratic Parties, are organized only for that perspective.

This conception, warmly accepted by the leaderships of the Communist Parties, had caused worries and resistance in their rank and file. The Chinese, on this question, pull these equivocal formulæ in the opposite direction to that adopted by Khrushchev. They insist on the inevitable resistance of capitalism, and on the reasons that render the bourgeois parliament an obstacle to the revolutionary transformation of society. They also insist on the need for the construction of a new state, that of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

D) "MODELS" FOR THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

Just after the war, and especially after the start of the "cold war," when the "people's democracies" were structurally assimilated, they began in a servile way to

copy the Soviet model, each setting out to build its "socialism in a single country" (extreme industrialization, forced collectivization of agriculture, etc).

The first resistance to this servile copying, in which all the Stalinist errors were renewed and amplified, came from the Yugoslavs, who worked out their own way. Other resistances were shown in 1956, especially in Hungary and Poland. And lastly the Chinese — especially owing to the "communes" — are following a different path for the building of socialism.

Thus three different "models" for the building of socialism exist and confront one another: the Soviet model, the Chinese model, and the Yugoslav model.

Each of these models, while containing characteristics inherent in the conditions of the countries where they are being developed, take as their starting-point different and even opposed conceptions about social relationships, and so the masses of the workers' states have the possibility of contrasting these conceptions and judging their results.

The Soviet model carries weight because of its seniority and the economic and technical results already achieved, which make the USSR the second most powerful state in the world. But, in spite of all the reforms carried out since Stalin's death, it is essentially marked by the weight of the bureaucracy in Soviet society, its omnipotence in every domain, its profoundly conservative nature, as well as by the tendencies to personal interest which are dominant among the bureaucracy. In addition, its Stalinist past (especially the forced collectivization of agriculture and the frightful purges) remains on the debit side for the workers' states of Eastern Europe and in the workers' movement of Western Europe.

The Chinese model is above all marked by the experiment of the communes. Despite a bureaucratic functioning that has its causes both in the conceptions of the leadership and in the conditions of China's economic and cultural backwardness, the experiment of the communes consists of an attempt to mobilize the masses on a collective basis, and not on the basis of strictly individual interest. The experiment of the communes is to permit this collective effort to bring the whole of Chinese society out of the extreme backwardness that characterized it. At the same time, it permits very considerable advances on the social plane, especially on the plane of the liberation of women from the state of extreme inferiority in which they were in China. The Chinese model exerts considerable attraction on countries throwing off the colonial yoke, which find therein valuable teachings for their own development through an appeal for the collective participation of the masses. On the contrary, the Chinese model is feared by the Khrushchev leadership, which sees in the example of the communes a potential danger in the long run for the authority of the bureaucracy, and which is seeking to discredit it by falsely identifying it with Stalin's forced collectivization.

The Yugoslav model is the first "model" which, despite its limits and inadequacies, is trying — on the level of the enterprises, and to a certain degree on the local and regional levels — to base itself on the initiative and free consent of the masses, both in urban and rural regions, to favor the control and administration of the workers in these fields, in order to fight consciously against bureaucratic tendencies. The limited character of this policy appears in the fact that in Yugoslavia there is no economic and political democracy on a national scale (maintenance of the regime of one single party, without tendencies). Nevertheless, it is above all to this reliance on the masses against bureaucratic tendencies that Yugoslavia's important advances are due. The experiment has also proved fruitful on the level of the agricultural economy, in the attempt to favor its gradual collectivization, with a regard for its technical possibilities and with the voluntary contribution of small peasant proprietors. It is especially as the begin-

ning of a practical example of the antibureaucratic struggle that the Yugoslav model and the leadership of the League of Yugoslav Communists are combated by the leaderships of the other workers' states and Communist Parties.

E) INSUFFICIENT COÖRDINATION OF PLANNING BY WORKERS' STATES

There are no longer to be found in the relations between the USSR and the other workers' states the abuses and roughnesses that stirred up the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict to the point of a break, and then the tensions, especially with Poland and Hungary. Contradictions and tensions, however, continue to exist, and were echoed by Gomulka recently in a session of the Central Committee of the Polish party.

The Comecon is not a global planning organism of the workers' states' economies; it only ensures a certain division of labor. The reason for this is that the ruling bureaucracy of each workers' state, and first of all the Soviet bureaucracy, have interests that are above all national, and are aiming at results that they consider the best for their own position in their own country — and this even to the detriment of the others. In Eastern Europe, it was the leadership that was put most at a disadvantage by this situation, the Polish, which pointed out the danger.

The development of the economy of all the workers' states will render more and more acute the contradiction between the predominantly "national" character of the planning by countries, and the need for these economies to have international planning. The development of this contradiction will be an important factor in bringing into question the hegemony of the Soviet Union over the workers' states of Eastern Europe, and as a result will also contribute to the development of the crisis of Stalinism.

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These new contradictions of Stalinism decisively finish off the monolithism of the apparatuses of the workers' states and Communist Parties. Except for the case of Yugoslavia, it is in the heart of the Communist world, where there have been no breaks for a whole period, that gigantic contradictions have appeared and are confronting each other. Taken as a whole, these contradictions are beginning to trace out a revolutionary policy as against the opportunist policy of the Soviet leaders, on both the international and national planes: workers' control and administration, progress of socialism in the rural regions, relations of equality and collaboration among workers' states, support of the colonial masses, including against their own national bourgeoisies, revolutionary paths to socialism, and the fight for peace through the revolutionary struggle against capitalism.

But none of the mass forces which today are in contradiction with the Soviet policy and leadership formulates its opposition in a wholly consistent way and brings together all of these contradictions in an overall and fundamental criticism of Stalinism. On the contrary, the confronting positions among the different leaderships of the Communist Parties and the workers' states are visibly tangled and intersecting. Thus, the Albanians are supporting the Chinese on account of some of their positions and methods which are very different from those on account of which the Brazilians, for instance, are supporting them. It is therefore necessary, in order to decide on a correct intervention of our movement, to avoid any overall simplified juxtaposition, which could lead to wrong estimates about the different currents which are showing themselves in the crisis of Stalinism, and it is important to know in each case how to distinguish exactly the characteristics of each current concerning the motives which are impelling it and the tendencies, methods, and positions which are peculiar to it.

In addition, none of these forces formally brings into question the monolithic conception of the parties, defends

the right to tendencies in the parties, not to speak of the right to a plurality of workers' parties in the workers' states.

In different fields we see the emergence of the opposition between the progress of the workers' states and the policy of "socialism in a single country," which remains the central point of the orientation and the thought of all the leaderships of the Communist Parties. Objectively, the situation, especially that of the Chinese revolution, raises for the first time before a party leadership the problem of the permanent revolution in its three combined aspects: setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat to solve in passing the bourgeois-democratic tasks, development by bounds (by "great bounds") in all domains of social life, and international expansion of the revolution already victorious on the national plane.

Thus the contradictions of Stalinism have arrived at a degree of political ripeness eminently favorable for raising in more concrete terms the question of the political revolution and the renewal of the Communist movement, as well as that of the new mass international revolutionary leadership.

The political positions of the Chinese CP are far from those of revolutionary Marxism but they demonstrate its huge possibilities and are opening a field of work such as Trotskyism has never had in the past. The condition for our movement to make the most of this exceptional field is fully to understand the progress marked by the Chinese positions in order to go forward in the building of consistent communist tendencies free from the present limitations of the Chinese CP leadership, offering a rounded prospect to the Communist militants of the entire world and to the other revolutionary forces which are outside the CP's influence.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF THE 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES

4. After two attempts (first in Moscow, then in Bucharest) which did not produce any lasting result, the Russians and Chinese endeavored at the Moscow Conference, held on occasion of the 43rd anniversary of October, to find a compromise putting an end to their dispute. They were obliged to associate in their efforts the leaderships of all the parties owing allegiance to Stalinism, given the fact that the problems at issue affected the whole Communist world.

Already by its very duration — more than three weeks — the Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties has borne witness to a considerable change compared to the Stalin period in which unanimity was automatically reached by following his "genius." Monolithism has been replaced by discussion. But this is not a sign of democratic renewal in these parties: the discussions went on in secret among leaderships anxious to avoid revealing their difficulties and their differences to the militants and workers, as was done in the time of Lenin and Trotsky.

Beside the Conference's duration, the document which it issued expressed the determination to find a compromise which might be lasting.

In a general way the agreement seems to have been reached on the essential positions of the Soviet bureaucracy: the text is centred around the fight for peace through "peaceful coexistence" and disarmament. The Chinese had fought these ideas, but not in a clear and straightforward manner. The text repeats the Soviet formulæ but introduces, concerning each position, each political affirmation, reservations and considerations taking into account the positions defended by the Chinese. In particular, it is no longer a question of a capitalism divided into war-mongering and peace-loving wings, and the aggressive character of American imperialism is vigorously emphasized, in words which have nothing to do with the Camp David state of mind and favor the Peking press.

The Chinese retreated on "uninterrupted revolution": we now see a new formulation appear — "the state of national democracy" — a state without a class nature, the definition of which would depend, not on the nature of production relations, but on the eminently changing nature of its policy. Behind this formula we in fact find again the old Stalinist theory of a revolution standing halfway between capitalist society and the dictatorship of the proletariat, a social stage which would be neither capitalist society nor a workers' state, a society which has never yet been seen in history.

The Chinese have offsettingly obtained very serious concessions on the question which they certainly had most at heart, i.e., the attitude towards the national bourgeoisie of colonial and semicolonial countries. The "dual role" of these bourgeoisies, opposed — but in a very unequal way — both to imperialism and to the worker and peasant masses, is denounced. The document is far from being correct on this point but it contains formulæ which the Chinese can utilize to good effect in the question of their relations with the underdeveloped states, still economically dependent on imperialism, in which the national bourgeoisie is seeking, not the improvement of the masses' conditions, but a more important share of the surplus-value produced in these countries. Given the place which is now occupied by the colonial revolution in the world revolution, it is evident that this is not only an important concession thus made to the Chinese, but also a leftward step — however timorous and contradictory it may be — in relations with imperialism on the scale of world policy. In practice, this concession to the Chinese could prove of very great importance by the consequences it may involve.

The text repeats more or less what was said at the XXth Congress about the ways toward socialism, which was interpreted in one way by the Russians and in another by the Chinese. On this point there have been no new developments: and nothing will prevent the discussion from being renewed on the first occasion, just as in the past.

On the question of the Communes, to which the Chinese accord a preponderant place as a form of development of society toward socialism, the silence of the text shows that the divergences persist. The most the Chinese obtained was that it is a question of a "correct" application of the general laws for the building of socialism, taking into account the national peculiarities of each country and the interests of the socialist system as a whole. This is little enough if it is remembered that, for them, the system of the Communes was rather for generalized application.

The resolution denounces, but in a different and unequal way, revisionism and dogmatism. The latter is presented as a secondary and anonymous danger. The Yugoslavs, on the contrary, are violently attacked as revisionists and, what is more, they are falsely accused of having proclaimed that Marxism-Leninism was "obsolete" and of committing "subversive actions" against the socialist camp and the world communist movement. The excess of these attacks testifies to how much the bureaucrats are afraid of the Yugoslav attitude — however limited it may appear — faced by the contradictions of the parties and states represented in Moscow.

On a point raised by the Poles concerning closer planning among the workers' states, they obtained satisfaction.

The text seems to show that no change has occurred on the point of the "guiding party": the Soviet CP keeps its title as the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement, etc.... This formulation has never bothered the Chinese when they wanted to fight the Soviet leaders' policy.

In the official communiqué announcing the holding of the conference and the list of participants, it may be noticed that the Soviet CP is no longer put first but is

named in alphabetical order between the Turkish and Uruguayan. In so hierarchical and bureaucratic a world as this, this tiny indication has a symbolic value.

The document adopted by the conference shows that in fact the differences have not been resolved and that there is rather "an agreement to be in disagreement," provided it be sufficiently discreet. During the conference, the Chinese, although in the minority, received the support of several Communist Party leaderships. Other leaderships, moreover, intervened in a conciliatory role.

The international situation and the general conditions which gave birth to the Sino-Soviet differences, far from having a pacifying effect, will nurture them and tend to make them still more acute than in the past. We must consequently direct our action with the prospect of a renewal of the conflict, a rebounding of the differences, more and more important signs of tensions and crises inside the Communist world, without its being possible now to determine exactly the moment, the precise forms, and the parties from which the crisis will start again.

The Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties has shown that the spread of the revolution in the world and the strengthening of the productive forces in the workers' states have not ceased, since the Second World War's end, to stimulate the crisis of Stalinism and that no solution can be found within the framework of bureaucratic power through agreements among bureaucratic leaderships. These only manoeuvre against the requirements raised by the situation itself, namely the reestablishment of workers' democracy and the reestablishment of a Communist International basing itself on democratic centralism.

PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF SOVIET SOCIETY

5. The general tendency shown by the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death in the direction of raising living standards has been kept up and developed. The leadership has had to take into account the egalitarian tendencies which had been ferociously repressed in Stalin's time. It has had to raise very low wages, though the inequalities still remain very great. The improvement in the living conditions of the masses puts an end to or tones down the most elementary demands, but they give place to new demands. The toilers are more and more conscious of the enormous contradiction between the economic power of the Soviet state and the still modest level of their own lives (observe the various remarks at the time of discussions about the sputniks). This explains the insistence with which Khrushchev promises to surpass US living standards, and also his campaign for a "détente," in order to transfer part of the heavy military expenditures over into the domain of mass needs.

Buyers are showing themselves to be more and more demanding and exacting about the quality of consumers' goods, which was heretofore neglected, for quality was directed toward heavy industry, military needs and objectives connected therewith (space missiles, etc).

It must be pointed out that, in the movements that took place in Kazakhstan, the workers accorded great importance to demands of a social nature: crèches, theatres, cinemas, sports fields, etc.

In the field of life in the enterprises, the authorities have taken various measures which could in themselves be considered liberal (powers of certain trade-union organisms in the enterprise, transfer of the administration of certain institutions to the enterprises or the trade unions). Whatever use that the workers may make of these measures in a still indeterminate future, they have generally been dictated above all by the needs of better administration, which remains of a bureaucratic type. They are parallel to the measures of decentralization taken in the economy in

general, in planning, for the old forms of extreme centralization were incompatible with extremely developed and extensive organisms.

The bureaucracy is the object of numerous criticisms on grounds of its forms and methods of leadership, and not — at least in an openly expressed way — as a social category. The Soviet working class, so strong numerically and spread over a large number of urban centres, has not up till now expressed demands for democratization in the enterprises, which would normally form the bridge toward more general demands of a political nature aiming at the reestablishment of soviet democracy in the workers' state.

Since the agricultural economy is still the weak point of the Soviet economy, the leadership has sought both to improve the conditions of the peasantry by stimulating the personal interest of the kolkhoz members, and to bring pressure on them by production obtained by utilization of the "virgin lands." The results obtained by these two means have been mediocre, and it cannot be otherwise so long as the peasantry is dealing with bureaucratic authorities.

The intelligentsia, even though its income has been reduced, remains a very privileged social stratum, but always on condition that it shows itself conformist toward the authorities. In the field of artistic and literary production, after a period of "thaw," the Khrushchev leadership, while parading an appearance of liberalism and giving up certain absurdities specific to Stalin, has gone on to tightening up control over the intellectuals. It fears that, through them, political criticism of the bureaucratic regime may make its way. The notions of "party literature," "party art," are maintained, although with broader limits than in Stalin's time. The important fact is that there is a resistance in the intelligentsia to the reestablishment of controls. In addition, besides official literary and artistic production, there exists a non-conformist production that circulates in a semi-clandestine fashion.

In the youth, especially the university youth, new currents, new absolutely non-conformist tendencies, are already ripening. It is from them that there will arise the revolutionary forces that will fight for a genuine "return to Lenin." The existence of such tendencies has been demonstrated in various forms and under varying circumstances, but for the moment still in a rather embryonic stage (studies to rediscover the genuine history of the Russian Revolution, hostility to the intervention in Hungary, etc).

Various strata of the bureaucracy, especially the highest ones, have both undergone a limitation of the most outrageous and exorbitant of their privileges, and obtained some stability, a guarantee of being alive tomorrow, unknown in Stalin's day. There are no longer mass purges. The question of being "in the line" has a more and more formal character. The most important consideration is "efficiency" in one's post, under pain of being sent down to a lower rung of the ladder.

The present liberalism does not mean that the bureaucracy as a whole has a voice in policy. Only a few very high functionaries are associated with the discussions which take place in the party's Central Committee. Only this organism has recovered, compared to the Presidium (ex-Politburo), some rights that it had completely lost; it was thanks to the C C that Khrushchev was able to put an end to the "anti-party" tendency which had put him in a minority in the Presidium. The state apparatus, including the Supreme Soviet, is only an instrument for carrying out the decisions of the C C.

The new conditions of easing social relationships cause the party apparatus — which is the only political cement of Soviet society — to be more isolated than ever from the various strata of society. Nevertheless, since this apparatus, more specifically the C C, is the only really political organism in the country, it is probable that it is within it that, at the beginning, a great political crisis of Soviet society

will find expression. The present C.C., with rare exceptions, is made up of new figures, without political pasts and without genuine political attachments.

The importance accorded and the insistence shown by the Soviet leaders in combating in the party press the conceptions advocated by the Chinese, the warnings on this subject spread through the party organisms, permit thinking that there are in the C.P. of the USSR currents that share the viewpoint of the Chinese or are turning in the same direction in regard to the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and its results. Nothing justifies the assertion that this was a matter of ex-Stalinists, partisans of the old so-called "anti-party" tendency. It seems rather to be a matter of manifestations coming from new layers, thus proving that since the XXIst Congress an evolution has taken place, the ripening of a new phase in the crisis of Stalinism in the first workers' state.

The political atomization of the masses which is the basis upon which the absolute domination of the bureaucracy is based is now beginning to be replaced by some tendencies among the masses to make demands and by the creation of some study and discussion centres among the vanguard. The growth by leaps and bounds of the Soviet economy is preventing any stabilization of the administrative apparatus and is forcing it to adapt itself; by doing this, it lays itself open to criticism.

Administrative problems are continuously and openly discussed by the Soviet press. The dynamism of Soviet society is constantly jarring bureaucratic conservatism. The colonial revolution is having a strong effect on Soviet society.

SITUATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

6. Pretty much everywhere in these parties, the 1956-57 crisis had taken spectacular forms, and in certain cases it had even been necessary to proceed to changes of leaders or of leading staffs. Afterwards the beginning of a tendency struggle appeared. Then, in a general way, the leaderships of the parties recovered their control over the Communist organizations. But since the 1956-57 crisis a deepening of the crisis in the C.P.s could be observed everywhere, within parties of greater or lesser importance, even if the aspects of this crisis were no longer spectacular.

Where Communist Parties are mass parties, there was nowhere a profound deterioration of the party ties with the working masses as a consequence of the discussions linked with the "personality cult." But there is a constant crisis characterized by a weakening of the leaderships' authority, the expression of doubts among more or less important strata in these parties concerning the policy followed by these leaderships, and sporadic demonstrations of opposition arising up to now in rank-and-file organisms when some circumstances in the country contribute thereto.

Concerning smaller Communist Parties whose influence among the masses was weak, the 1956-57 crisis expressed itself almost everywhere through walk-outs and an appreciable loss of influence. Since then contradictory developments could nevertheless be observed. Thus, as was the case in Great Britain and Australia, due to a certain radicalization among the working class, and in relation with the Labour Party, certain Communist Parties could win new elements and recover the ground they had lost. On the contrary, it has been seen how in Denmark the former main leader of the party, Axel Larsen, built a centrist party, the PSP, and succeeded in winning an election victory mainly at the expense of the Danish C.P.

Several factors are from now on tending to deepen the international crisis of Stalinism and the crisis within each Communist Party, i.e., the crisis of capitalism which raises problems which the Moscow policy does not answer,

the mass movements, the Sino-Soviet dispute and more generally the internal fights of the bureaucracies resulting from the progress of events and the movements of the masses.

Those elements are now weighing most heavily on the parties of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. In some cases, the development of the colonial revolution has eliminated the Communist Party from political life. The most striking example is that of Algeria where the Algerian C.P. has literally paid with its own existence the fact of having been an instrument of the French C.P. and of its "national" policy even on the Algerian problem. In most cases the Communist Parties of the colonial and semi-colonial countries are undergoing with more or less intensity the pressure of the mass movement of their own country while they simultaneously undergo pressure either from Moscow or from Peking. This has caused the formation in these parties of diverging currents, opposed tendencies (India, Brazil) and sometimes splits (Iraq).

The Communist Parties of advanced capitalist countries, especially the big parties, are much more influenced by their alignment with Kremlin policy, by the rightist and opportunist character of their policy. A new and broad development of the crisis in these parties can result either from the spur they could receive from a new important crisis, especially a crisis in the USSR itself, or from a new rise of the working-class movement and its effects on the medium and rank-and-file cadres of these parties who can make up their minds to express an opposition only in case that mass pressure offers them a real prospect for a militant policy, a left-opposition policy.

As a result of the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the Communist Parties, we are now more and more confronted by parties whose policies will differ from one country to another and which will consequently need an appropriate orientation in each case. In the case of parties in which the Moscow influence is predominant, it will be against a rightist and opportunist policy that the fight must be made, by setting up in opposition thereto first of all the action programme dictated by a policy of left opposition. In the case of parties or tendencies in the parties influenced especially by Peking, we shall be faced by a left centrism of a new type which could, if we did not adopt a correct attitude towards it, become an obstacle to our own development during a certain period. In such cases, we must take as starting point the progressive positions reached by these parties, to put forward the necessity for the militants and currents following such an orientation to conduct a consistent theoretical and political fight, that is to say, go beyond the positions already reached to arrive at the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

In any case, we must start from the general consideration that contradictions will continue to grow in the Communist world, that national and international problems will reciprocally act within it and that *all* Communist Parties, whatever their present policy may be, will constitute a more and more favorable field for the growth of the revolutionary Marxist ideas of the Fourth International.

Among the important Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, there can be observed the fan-like extent of all these different manifestations of the crisis of Stalinism:

The French Communist Party, which has the most Stalinist leadership and the strongest apparatus, presents a very fallacious appearance of unity of views. A heavy uneasiness is rife in its ranks and among its cadres. The leadership is aware of the existence of oppositionals who "are waiting for their hour" (Thorez dixit). The exacerbation of the political situation in France or a new manifestation of open crisis in international Stalinism would not fail to stir up a big crisis in this party.

The Italian Communist Party is the one that follows a systematically right-wing policy (with, in case of need,

left turns), while yet showing a certain liberalism concerning internal political life.

The Indian Communist Party has never ceased to be ideologically divided, and the failure at Kerala and the Chinese-Soviet dispute cannot fail to aggravate its divisions.

The Brazilian Communist Party, which has experienced several very serious crises in the past, is again divided by a big tendency fight, in which divergences created by Brazilian politics are combined with problems stirred up by the Chinese-Soviet dispute.

The Indonesian Communist Party, which has also experienced serious crises in the past, has in the last period gone through abrupt variations (within the general limits of a policy of support to Sukarno), variations that are probably explicable as a reflection of divergences among the party tops.

Even if the visible effects of the Chinese-Soviet dispute in the form of an open crisis are at present limited to the Brazilian CP and to a few other parties in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is inevitable that in the long run this dispute — which the Chinese and Soviet leaderships have not succeeded in smoothing out — will nurture all the contradictions that exist in the Communist Parties, and will tend to make big crises emerge. First, because it raises problems concerning the general policy of the Communist Parties on the national and international scale. And second, because of the immense weight of China on the world stage.

THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AND THE NEW PHASE IN THE CRISIS OF STALINISM

7. The new phase in the crisis of Stalinism which is now ripening confirms the fundamental analyses of the preceding World Congresses and their main perspectives. It renders more imperious the task of our movement to exploit this new phase in order to bring about — in the Stalinist circles which, in both the capitalist and the workers' states, form the richest reserve of worker militants close to revolutionary Marxism — the advance of our ideas, to hasten the formation of sections of the Fourth International in the workers' states, of mass revolutionary Marxist parties, and thus to prepare the political revolution in the workers' states and the revival of an international leadership of the mass movement.

a) *In the Soviet Union and the Workers' States.* Most of the points formulated in the 1938 Programme of the Fourth International and in the Theses of the Vth World Congress remain on the agenda for a programme of action in the workers' states:

The struggle against social inequalities, for only a few too flagrant abuses have disappeared. In this field, the "return to Lenin" more than ever requires the limitation of salaries to the wage of a skilled worker.

The struggle against political oppression, which has not disappeared with the suppression of the omnipotence of the secret police. All the organizations and institutions in the USSR are not free organisms, independent of the state power. The restoration of workers' democracy remains the principal task of the political revolution: the reestablishment of essential freedoms (of meeting, of association, of the press), the autonomy of the trade-union organizations, and the right to a plurality of soviet parties. Without the existence of these rights, there cannot be genuine soviets and a genuine soviet democracy.

Without soviet democracy there cannot be a reorganization of the Soviet economy that puts it under the effective administration of the producers.

The reestablishment of truth about the history of the USSR, the Bolshevik party, and the Communist International, is not simply an exigence of scientific honesty, but an indispensable political necessity in order to allow the Soviet masses and the Communists of the entire world to

rediscover an orientation which really ties up with Leninist policy of the first years of the October Revolution.

Without questioning the need for the Soviet power to negotiate with the capitalist states and to work with a view to avoiding a new world conflict, the Chinese-Soviet dispute renders of intense present interest the demands of the 1938 Programme for a revolutionary international policy, for unconditional support to the workers' movements and the movements of the colonial masses, against any attempt, by the procedures of secret diplomacy, to reach a global agreement with imperialism at the expense of the interests of the masses in any country whatever.

b) *In the Mass Communist Parties.* The orientation of work defined as a result of the Third World Congress (entrism sui generis) has proved justified both by the forms in which the crisis of Stalinism has developed, within existing organizations and not by massive splits in them, and by the results which were shown in the crisis years of 1956-57, i.e., of oppositional formations tending to organize themselves to carry out a tendency struggle inside the Communist Parties. The paths to the formation and organization of tendencies inside the Communist Parties are entirely different from those inside the Social-Democratic Parties, for they require as a precondition a long period of clandestine, illegal, work.

The more and more evident manifestations of conflicts among the leaderships of Communist Parties of different countries cannot fail to contribute to aiding the formation of tendencies within any given Communist Party, for every member of a party is or should be a communist before being French, Italian, Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav, etc. One of the first demands on this subject is that there be placed at the disposal of party members a complete and honest documentation on the questions in dispute, by the publication of texts even of leaderships that are opposed. That is the first condition for the party members being able themselves to discuss and to judge for themselves, and not to follow, by an abusive interpretation of discipline, the viewpoints of their national leadership.

Such a conception cannot fail to lead to the need for an international organization of the Communist movement and to clarify the idea of a world party of the socialist revolution based on democratic centralism. The evolution of the relations among the Communist Parties since the dissolution of the Third International has been marked by a series of failures of the Soviet bureaucracy (formation of the Kominform, bilateral relations, and now occasional conferences among a greater or lesser number of leaderships). All these failures testify to the growing and ever more difficult necessity for the bureaucracy to dodge the objective requirement of a new international leadership of the communist vanguard. The Moscow Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties is, in its own way, an involuntary homage paid to the need for a world party based on democratic centralism, which at present only the Fourth International represents, not only theoretically but practically, in the international working-class movement.

Honest information, democratic discussion among the rank and file, international confrontation of divergences — these are the general demands in the Communist Parties, at the same time that we put forward our essential positions for bringing together a left current on a large scale in the mass Communist Parties. The general lines of such a programme are rendered more and more specific by the great problems of the international situation and by the divergences that it has already aroused between the Soviets and the Chinese: the struggle for peace through a struggle to disarm capitalism by driving it out of power; unconditional support for colonial revolutions and help to the revolutionaries of the colonial countries for the creation of independent workers' and peasants' organizations carrying

out specific class action; denunciation of the concept of the peaceful and parliamentary paths, return to the conceptions advocated by Lenin in *State and Revolution*; struggle for power in the capitalist countries on the basis of a transitional programme and by means of the tactic of the united front of all the workers' organizations.

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In conclusion, the events since the end of the Second World War have more and more confirmed the Trotskyist thesis that Stalinism, i.e., the subordination of the Communist movement to the Soviet bureaucracy, was a phenomenon incompatible with any great revolutionary development. The Yugoslav revolution very quickly found itself breaking with Stalinism. Then, in the USSR and in the other workers' states of Eastern Europe, a series of contradictions appeared about the masses' immediate demands, which caused explosions (the Polish and Hungarian Octo-

ber). Despite all the Khrushchev leadership's attempts to reabsorb the crisis by a "reformism" not lacking in dynamism and based on the Soviet Union's immense economic and technical advances, new contradictions ripened, especially because of the development of the Chinese revolution.

Up till then, each of these crises was accompanied by limited demands which were contained in the general programme of the Fourth International or which went in the direction of these demands. At present the new phase of the international crisis of Stalinism raises a constellation of problems which are those of the world revolution and of the international transition toward socialism, and, behind them, that of the new mass international leadership. The new phase in the crisis of Stalinism that is ripening will thus be eminently favorable to the progress of Trotskyism and its organization, the Fourth International.

THE SINO—SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE SITUATION IN THE USSR AND THE OTHER WORKERS' STATES

(Adopted by the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International, June 1963.)

THE rise in the world revolution, the liberation of powerful revolutionary forces in the economically underdeveloped countries and the workers states, together with their repercussions in the workers movement as a whole, have considerably heightened a process that began before the death of Stalin and finally dealt a mortal blow to Stalinism; that is, to the exclusive hegemony of the Moscow bureaucracy over the Communist mass movement, Soviet society and the workers states. In place of this hegemony, of undisputed command, the Communist parties and workers states for some years have recognized the CP of the USSR as the "leading party" and the USSR as the "leading state" and lined up accordingly. In Soviet society, in all the workers states, the bureaucracy, no longer able to wield uncontrolled domination and maintain an all-powerful police regime, has been making concessions to the masses. In the recent period, the process of decomposition of the bureaucratic system has spread more extensively than ever. Among the Communist parties, the old monolithism no longer exists, the Soviet leadership is no longer capable of guiding them as a whole, although its authority is still dominant; differences which were kept internal for some years have become public; violent polemics have flared into full view and even the possibility of split has arisen. Among the workers states and parties in these countries the relationship is no longer one of dependence on the Kremlin; in certain cases the disputes are public. The two principal anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist revolutionary struggles of recent years (Cuba, Algeria) have been conducted by leaderships and formations in independence from the Communist parties in these countries and from the bureaucracy of the workers states—a fact that has extremely weakened the prestige and the authority of the Stalinist or post-Stalinist leaderships. Within the workers states, especially in the USSR, "de-Stalinization"; that is, the course of liberalization to which the directing bureaucracy resorted in order to safeguard its

domination, resolved none of the contradictions of Soviet society—they are breaking out in multiple forms which can pave the way for the vigorous appearance of a tendency toward genuine democratization of life in the workers states.

The most spectacular aspect of the current phase of crisis in the system of workers states and of Communist parties is the Sino-Soviet conflict which—above all after the crisis in the Caribbean and the Sino-Indian frontier incidents in the fall of 1962—took the form of an open theoretical and political conflict on key questions of international politics affecting the workers movement (war and peace, uninterrupted revolution, the revolutionary or parliamentary road to socialism, etc.). This conflict tends to polarize the left currents of the Communist movement around the problems of the world revolution. On the other hand, the existence of the Fidel Castro leadership polarizes the unorganized currents, above all the youth of the economically underdeveloped countries, and is beginning to polarize the organized tendencies in Latin America. The Yugoslav experience, however limited the level of application of workers management because of the absence of workers political democracy, exercises an attraction among the most advanced layers in the USSR and in the workers states of eastern Europe.

To the extent that this crisis develops—on a par, moreover, with the economic, social and political conflicts which have not ceased to characterise the internal life of the USSR and the other workers states—it offers testimony to the validity of the Trotskyist program in a striking way: in all the progressive manifestations of the crisis, segments of the Trotskyist program become projected, be it the question of world revolution in the colonial countries or imperialist capitals, of the struggle against the bureaucracy and for workers democracy in the workers states.

However, despite the already considerable scope which the crisis of the bureaucratic system has reached, all the tendencies which have appeared up to now within the former Stalinist framework have remained subordinated to the bureaucracies of the workers states, not one having cut itself from the bureaucratic interests and perspectives to rise to the level of the interests and perspectives of the socialist world revolution. This limitation is expressed among other ways by the fact that these tendencies reciprocally accuse each other of "Trotskyism," universally denounce "Trotskyism," and carry the discussion to the ranks only with the greatest reluctance. The Fidel Castro leadership for its part, centers its activities in Latin America and participates only partially and in a restricted way in the debates of the international Communist movement.

The forces determining the crisis allow the polemics to be interrupted by only brief truces at the most. No bureaucratic manoeuvre can dam the crisis of the bureaucratic system in all the CP's and workers states. The possibilities are constantly growing for the Fourth International to intervene in the process in order to assure a renewal of revolutionary Marxism on the political and organizational levels.

THE END OF MONOLITHISM IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

(A)

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

In the open since 1957 and extended in a big way since the "Camp David" meeting (1959), resumed again after the passing compromise made at the Moscow Conference in 1960, aggravated following the affair of the Caribbean and the Sino-Indian frontier incidents in the fall of 1962, the Sino-Soviet conflict shows once more that the extension and victory of the socialist revolution are incompatible with Stalinism and with the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy whether in the form they took under Stalin or under the leadership of Khrushchev, even when the revolutionary movement is controlled by a bureaucratic leadership.

Just as in the period before the war when the relation of forces in the world were

unfavourable to the socialist revolution, the international policy of the Soviet bureaucracy since the victory of the Chinese Revolution, which altered the over-all relation of forces in favor of the world socialist revolution, has been marked by constant effort to maintain a *status quo* which always shows itself to be nonexistent. In the postwar period, the *status quo* signified an over-all equilibrium with imperialism which must not be disturbed by big revolutionary movements and in which the key positions of imperialism must not be brought into question.

To the degree that the relation of forces has been reinforced by the economic successes of the workers states and the strength of the armaments of the USSR, the Soviet bureaucracy under the leadership of Khrushchev, while occasionally engaging in adventurist moves, has more often very strongly accentuated its opportunist course on the plane of international relations. The Soviet bureaucracy has exploited for its own aims the feelings normally existing among the Soviet masses; that is, their apprehension of a new war and their hope for material benefits after the sacrifices they made over many years to defend the Soviet regime and create a modern economy. The bureaucracy has systematized a whole series of rightist tendencies and positions which were already formulated in Stalin's time, notably in the periods when an understanding was sought with the imperialist democracies.

The important differences on this point between Khrushchev and Stalin do not relate to the perspectives and intentions of the bureaucracy but to the different conditions under which they operate and the different consequences this leads to. Stalin was able to deliver revolutions to the butchers openly and cynically (among others, the Second Chinese Revolution of 1925-27, the Spanish Revolution, the struggle of the Greek partisans). Khrushchev has been obliged to grant aid to revolutionary movements, but he has done so in an insufficient, timorous fashion while seeking agreements with imperialism or with the bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries, or after the revolution has already won a decisive victory,

In this same period, the Chinese leaders, having triumphed after more than twenty years of vicissitudes, had to begin from a low level of productive forces and found themselves the constant target of imperialist assaults, primarily from American imperialism which views the People's Republic of China as a new revolutionary center blocking its ambitions in the Pacific. Without raising objections in principle to seeking agreements with the capitalist states, the Chinese leaders nevertheless found in experience that for them the perspective was scarcely realistic and, still worse, that the risk existed that agreements could be concluded between Moscow and Washington at the expense of some of the interests of the People's Republic of China. They were led to orient their policy much less toward seeking agreements with imperialism than toward pursuing a policy aimed at weakening it. It must be added that the leadership of the Chinese CP feels the pressure of a living revolution which triumphed thirteen years ago while the leaders of the Soviet CP represent a bureaucracy consolidated in power for some forty years.

The fundamental cause of the Sino-Soviet conflict lies in the different needs of the bureaucracies headed by the two leaderships: the one expressing the needs of a bureaucracy feasting at the head of an economically developed country, the other at the head of a society that is still poor, unable to count on major aid from the USSR. The search for agreements and above all an over-all agreement with imperialism on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy contradicts the search by the Chinese leaders for more aid and for better defenses against the heavy pressure of imperialism. From these divergent material needs flow the differences that have appeared between the Chinese and Soviet leaders on some of the key questions of current international politics which have led the Chinese to vigorously denounce Khrushchev's orientation as well as that of his partisans throughout the world (Togliatti, Thorez, the Indian CP, the American CP).

These differences can be summarized essentially as follows:

1.

While the Soviet leaders insist on the possibility of guaranteeing peace even if capitalism continues to exist, and stress the necessity of seeking collaboration with bourgeois tendencies, including American imperialist circles, the Chinese never cease underlining the fact that the nature of imperialism has not changed, that in the struggle to safeguard the peace one must have no illusions about this or that tendency of the bourgeoisie, this or that imperialist leader. They recall quite correctly that the only definitive means to avoid a new world war is by overturning capitalism on a world scale and that the only method of working in this direction is to develop the revolutionary struggle of the masses. For the Soviet leaders the motor force of socialism consists mainly of the economic development of the USSR and the other workers states. According to this view the passage to socialism on a world scale will be assured above all by a Soviet victory in economic competition, the forces of the revolutionary masses throughout the world playing no more than a supporting role, even having to be restrained from "provoking" major conflicts with capitalism in particularly sensitive places. The Chinese maintain that it is the world-wide revolutionary forces that must play the fundamental role. On this main point, the position stated by the Chinese comes close, therefore, to the basic orientation of the revolutionary Marxists.

Finally, the Chinese reproach the Soviet leadership with not exploiting to the end the generally favourable objective situation that exists in the world today and with overestimating, because of opportunistic aims, the strength of American imperialism.

Khrushchev's accusations, Tito's even more, according to which the Chinese favor unleashing a world war, are evident polemical distortions. The Chinese, despite grave weaknesses which we will take up later, have never expressed such an orientation nor have they opposed any temporary compromise with imperialism. In fact, at the time of the international crisis of October 1962, they criticized Khrushchev not only for his opportunism and for trampling under foot the elementary rights of the Cuban Revolution, but also for the adventurism which led him to mount rockets on Cuban soil

2.

The Soviet government, advocating essentially "peaceful" competition with capitalism, seeks to establish agreements with the national bourgeoisies of the underdeveloped countries, placing in subordination to them the policies of the indigenous CP's, and, as much as possible the movements of the masses. The Chinese leaders, while displaying certain similar attitudes—notably in the case of Indonesia—express much more critical views about the national bourgeoisies, insisting on the leading role of the proletariat and on the uninterrupted character of the revolution (which puts them in opposition to the Menshevik concepts of Stalin on revolution by stages and brings them close to the Trotskyist concept of the permanent revolution). As a result, the Chinese in general have a tendency to support the most revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries, without being bound by the same hesitations that characterize the Soviet attitude (note, for example, their different attitudes toward the Algerian Revolution).

Khrushchev's attitude at the time of the border conflict between China and India, his support in fact of the Nehru government against the Chinese workers state, constituted the extreme expression of this difference of orientation on such an important question.

3.

The criticisms made by the Chinese of the neo-reformist concepts of Khrushchev and his partisans throughout the world on the "peaceful," democratic, even parliamentary road to socialism have been progressively sharpened and made more specific. The polemic against Togliatti, in particular, rising above the level of generalities to examine very closely the formulas of the secretary of the Italian CP, bellweather of Khrushchevism in the Communist parties of the capitalist countries, signified in actuality a defense of the Marxist Leninist concept of the state, which is flouted by Togliatti and his kind despite their verbal protestations to the contrary.

This Chinese criticism, moreover, has a wider bearing since the Khrushchevist thesis on the peaceful road to socialism is promulgated by Communist parties in a series of colonial and semicolonial countries where a revolutionary crisis already exists or can rapidly be precipitated, and where any "democratic," "peaceful" perspective could have only catastrophic consequences at the first serious test.

* * *

It is then on three of the major questions of our period—the question of the struggle against war, the question of the nature of the colonial revolution and the orientation of the revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries, and the question of the road to socialism above all in the advanced capitalist countries—that the Chinese concepts prove to be on the whole more progressive than the Khrushchevist concepts, being analogous to certain theses of revolutionary Marxism. Hence the favourable echo given them above all among the sectors and currents of the left in the international Communist movements, for whom the Chinese attitude represents a stimulus of major importance.

Our appreciation of the significance of the ideological and political evolution of the Chinese Communists does not prevent us in the least from expressing our criticisms on a whole series of questions where their positions are erroneous and dangerous:

In the first place, their conception of the ultimate consequences of a nuclear war appear very summary; in fact, they underestimate these consequences. In addition, the Chinese at times seem to underestimate the forces still at the disposal of imperialism. Above all they fail to envisage the problem of the qualitatively new character which a nuclear war would have in relation to wars of the past, of the fact that according to a big sector of the scientific world the destruction of humanity would be threatened.

In the second place we criticize the backwardness of the Chinese Communists on the problems of de-Stalinization to which, however, at an earlier stage they seemed to wish to contribute. Especially bad is their

attitude toward the Albanian Stalinists and even toward old Stalinist groups in the USSR, their reticence in face of the Soviet condemnation of Stalin and his "cult." This attitude can have only negative consequences; first of all, it blocks the development of a tendency that would be favourable to them in the USSR and in the workers states of eastern Europe. The left tendencies in this part of the world, if they are favourable to an international revolutionary policy, can only condemn all the old Stalinists and their nostalgia for the Stalinist epoch. Analogous considerations apply to the Communist parties in the capitalist countries, above all those which enjoy big mass influence (for example, the Italian CP).

Revolutionary Marxists, in addition, can only condemn the polemic of the Chinese against the Yugoslav Communists. This polemic, often reminiscent of the old Stalinist style, is based on evident distortion of the Yugoslav reality and the concepts expressed by the Yugoslav Communist League. Certain rightist deviations of the Yugoslavs on a whole series of problems (international political orientation, the road to socialism, attitude toward the national bourgeoisies of the "Third World," etc.) the very dangerous tendencies which flow from certain economic conceptions and which have already produced signs of unquestionable bureaucratic degeneration, must be denounced; however, they in no way justify the accusation that capitalism has been restored nor the excommunication of Tito and his partisans. Such accusations in reality injure those who launch them.

It is necessary finally to point out that the Chinese continue to refer to the 1960 Declaration of the 81 which, being mostly a text reached by compromises of eclectic nature, cannot effectively clarify the fundamental questions in discussion, remaining in fact considerably behind the positions of many Chinese documents of recent months.

(B)

OTHER DIFFERENTIATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

If the Sino-Soviet conflict is at the present stage the major one within the Communist movement, this does not exhaust the dif-

ferentiations and contradictions. Not only is there the Yugoslav current, which maintains wide autonomy and its own characteristics despite the rapprochement with Khrushchev, but in each of the two "camps" themselves there is a variegated range of differentiations and particular formations.

This holds for the Chinese and Albanians, whose concepts should not be considered to be identical, but it is especially true of the Khrushchevist grouping which, in reality, combines parties and leaderships of very different orientation, often on very important problems. Thus Gomulka's line, especially in relation to agricultural questions, attitude towards the intellectuals, de-Stalinization, etc., is very far from the example of the line of the Bulgarian CP. Thus the attitude of the leadership of the Italian CP on the question of de-Stalinization is far from that of the French Communist party which has avoided up to now any relaxation of the old style bureaucratic grip. In relation to the orientation of internal policy, if Thorez formally declares himself more faithful to Marxist concepts but tramples on them in practice, leaving out among other things any idea of a transition program, Togliatti prides himself on being a more "audacious" innovator, openly questioning the validity of certain essential aspects of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state, and insisting on a transition program conceived, however, in a complete reformist fashion.

Up to now, the break up of the Stalinist monolith has been characterized by the fact that it has followed national lines; that is, the public differences have occurred between national leaderships while each of the parties appears to maintain its unity. But the depth of the divisions and especially the depth of the Sino-Soviet conflict—which cannot really be surmounted by the always possible new attempts at compromise—shakes the authority of the bureaucratic leaderships and consequently the existing regimes of the parties. Even if no party has re-established a genuine democratic regime with the right of tendencies and if the intentional distortion of opposing positions remains a favourite method, the bureaucratic leaderships, in certain cases at least, begin to be obliged to let members of their party

hold positions divergent from the official line, while barring them from holding leading posts. The considerable differences and rather wide possibility of criticism which already exist in the Italian CP constitute the indication of a tendency which is destined to grow stronger and to become general, despite the zigzags and temporary retreats which are always possible and even probable.

(C)

THE FIDELISTA CURRENT

In the present context of the Communist movement, a completely specific place is occupied by the Fidelista leadership which will more and more play a genuinely international role, above all, of course, in Latin America. This leadership is distinguished from other leaderships of the workers states not only from the point of view of its origins but also in relation to its positions on international and internal problems.

If some of its members individually reached Marxist positions before participating in the July 26 Movement, the Cuban leadership as such had no precise theoretical formation and it expressed even up to the taking of power confused and equivocal ideological concepts. But, thanks to profound links with the masses, especially with the most disinherited layers of Cuban society, it was more and more able to understand the genuine logic of the revolutionary process and, despite its ideological limitations, it worked in practice along a line of permanent revolution, assuring the creation of the first workers state in the Americas. Thus Cuba became the first example in our epoch of a revolution in which the leadership through its own experiences in the very course of struggle came over to the concepts of Marxism-Leninism.

Subsequent experience has proved that this is a profound conversion. In brief,

(a) The Cuban leadership is the first leadership of a workers state since Lenin and Trotsky that has addressed the exploited masses—on a continental scale—to call them to revolutionary struggle for the conquest of power. (See the Second Declaration of Havana.)

(b) Through their speeches and declarations, Fidel Castro and his comrades have shown that they envisage the problems of the Latin-American revolution under an essentially revolutionary angle, rejecting the Khrushchevist concepts of the majority of the Latin-American Communists. The speech of Fidel Castro to the Congress of American Women (January 1963) marked another decisive step forward on this level.

(c) Nationally, the Fidelista leadership, keenly sensing the bureaucratic dangers which were threatening and can still threaten the Revolution, intervened in conscious fashion, as the Left Opposition sought to do in the USSR and in the Bolshevik party, in order to appeal openly to the masses to struggle against bureaucratization and to assure a series of concrete organizational measures (following the elimination of Escalante).

Thus, the Fidelista leadership appears at this stage as the most advanced political leadership by far of all the workers states. Even if it engages only very discreetly in the current international debates, due to the fact that while its revolutionary line is without doubt closer to the Chinese line it requires Soviet economic and military aid, still it will be in a position to exercise growing international influence, above all in Latin America, but also in other colonial and semicolonial countries and even among the youth of the capitalist countries and the workers states.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORKERS STATES

(A)

IN THE SOVIET UNION

In Soviet society, the tensions and conflicts have had a tendency to manifest themselves in new forms against the backdrop of interests and basic tendencies long ago analysed by the Trotskyist movement.

De-Stalinization had very profound economic, social and political roots; it corresponded essentially to the need to defend and maintain the bureaucratic regime in conditions where Stalin's methods and concepts risked producing explosions. It consisted even of an attempted partial

solution of problems which were and still are objectively posed in Soviet society through its own intrinsic necessities, the international necessities of confronting imperialism, and its relations with the other workers' states.

On the economic level, the Soviet leaders face problems flowing from the consequences of bureaucratic management involving the development of the productive forces themselves.

Thanks to the dynamism inherent in the relations of collective property instituted by the October Revolution and also, especially in the postwar period, to the development of technology from which the USSR likewise benefitted, the rate of growth of production has been relatively high. But this does not signify that all the possibilities have been really exploited. On the contrary, vast productive potentialities are still not utilized due to the fact that on the one hand the democratic initiative of the masses is brought to bear in only the most limited way, and on the other hand, bureaucratic management provokes the phenomenon of underutilization of equipment, disequilibrium in production, quite considerable waste, etc.

Towards the end of Stalin's time, such things had reached a peak. The very meaning of Khrushchevism was to find a way out of this situation without disturbing the domination of the bureaucracy.

One of the solutions envisaged was decentralization; a whole current of the Communist movement, inspired by the Yugoslav experiment, was in favor of this measure. This was the meaning of the recasting of the industrial structure of 1957. While this reform yielded certain results by reducing some of the most monstrous difficulties, it could not avoid the reproduction of bureaucratism in the new economic structures (regional, etc.) nor the appearance of local fiefs every bit as bad as the old ones. This is why, following the results of that reform, a new shuffling of the leadership took place involving a new reconstruction of the zones and of the economic management. In the recent period tendencies toward renewed centralization have been uppermost.

This is the explanation for certain discussions and polemics among the economists and Soviet leaders. One tendency, against decentralization, seeks to return to formulations of a more centralized management, while another tendency, holding that the new difficulties that have arisen are due to insufficient decentralization, wants to extend decentralization. This is also the explanation for the growth in the functioning of the market and certain tendencies toward greater autonomy for local management (visible here, too, is the influence of Yugoslav experience).

Finally, this is the explanation for certain polemics over objective economic laws, and over the necessity of establishing new indexes and criteria of economic accounting designed to furnish more precise and more comparable data on production, norms, etc.

In addition to the reforms of the organizational structure of industry, the Khrushchevist bureaucracy recently envisaged a change even in the structure of the party and the introduction of certain means for workers participation in the management of enterprises. The real aim of the reform of the party announced by Khrushchev in November 1962, is to utilize the party more and more as an instrument integrated in the apparatus of bureaucratic control of the economy. This could achieve only very partial results (limitation of waste, economic crimes, etc.) but could not possibly resolve the problem of stimulation essential to the productivity of labour, of equilibrium among the various branches of the economy, etc., and could even give rise to political dangers. The project of creating consultative committees, following similar experiments (production meetings), eloquently testifies to the fact that the bureaucracy itself perceives where the key to a genuine solution is to be found, but it demonstrates at the same time that on this level the bureaucracy cannot go very far and that it acts with extreme caution in what it does try. Even if such committees were established, they would have no real powers but only a consultative voice; they could not therefore constitute the stimulating force of which the Soviet economy is in need.

Thus it is clear that the bureaucracy is incapable of resolving the contradictions of Soviet economy in this phase of transition, since it is incapable on the one hand of understanding economic laws in all their depth and of adapting itself to them, and on the other hand of mobilizing the main force of a socialist economy, that is the creative power of the masses. It can only continue to seek palliatives, outlining "technocratic" solutions, introducing still new forms of bureaucratic control, and leaving to the working class a completely subordinate role.

The current difficulties of the Soviet economy manifest themselves in a particularly acute and evident form in the agricultural sector which despite numerous reforms, remains backward, its rate of growth remaining very limited if it exists at all on a per capita basis. The still backward character of Soviet agriculture can be gauged by the primary fact that the population active in this domain still stands at around fifty per cent of the total active population, a percentage that cannot possibly compare favourably with that of the most advanced capitalist countries. On the other hand, the integration of the agricultural sector into the planned economy runs into major obstacles due to the fact that non-collectivist relations of production still predominate in the countryside.

The increase in autonomy for the kolkhozes the creation of more favourable exchange relations for members of the kolkhozes, for the peasants etc., made it possible to avoid the catastrophe inherent in continuing Stalin's way of squeezing the peasantry. These measures have nevertheless not made possible the rate of growth fixed many times in planning to meet the growing needs of consumption. Nor have they made it possible to progressively limit the interests of the kolkhoze members in their own small plots. Thus the kolkhozes cannot count on full utilization of the labour power at their disposal. Finally the virgin lands experiment proved to be precarious and uncertain primarily because the results are subject to great fluctuations and because problems of a social nature are posed in the sovkhoses of the virgin lands themselves.

Khrushchev's experimentation likewise has not been able to find a genuine solution in the agricultural domain due to the fact that it has not touched the most profound roots of the problem. The difficulties in the agricultural domain cannot be surmounted without a massive increase in investments in the countryside, and this in turn would not be possible without a radical change in economic orientation, above all a reduction of investments in the sector of heavy industry. Moreover an orientation aiming at more harmonious economic development also implies democratic participation of the masses; that is democratic management of the kolkhozes and sovkhoses. It is only when the kolkhoze members see concrete possibilities for considerable development of the kolkhozes, thus of their own kolkhoze revenues; only when they feel that the kolkhozes are democratic communities which they themselves effectively guide, will their interest in their own private plots progressively decrease and make it possible finally to envisage a transition without tension and resistance from the kolkhoze form to perfected forms of collective management.

The difficulties of economic development and above all the persistent backwardness of the agricultural sector seriously hamper the realization of substantial progress on the level of increased consumption. The measures sharply increasing the prices of food products (meat milk etc.) taken in 1962 constitute the most apparent evidence of this.

It has been stressed that Khrushchev is attempting above all to take Soviet Society in the direction of a "welfare state" and that for him Communist society amounts to a society of "well being." His failures in this field are all the more serious. If it is true that the Soviet standard of living has not ceased to rise, it is equally true that in 1962 the rate of growth of the standard of living was weaker and in absolute terms it remains insufficient in relation to the growing needs of the Soviet masses, who hope to obtain on the level of consumption and of comfort a translation of the great economic and technical progress of the Soviet Union about which the bureaucracy itself constantly boasts.

On the cultural level, the Soviet bureaucracy has felt the need for a change in relation to Stalinist practices, first of all because dogmatism and administrative methods constitute a sterile block on scientific progress and consequently on the development of the productive forces; secondly because such an attitude bears the danger of an open rupture between the intellectuals and the regime. Hence the movement for liberalization which has developed in well-known forms and which has at times attained a rather high level. It was under these conditions that the idea was advanced of competition between different scientific schools and that artistic currents other than the official "socialist realism" appeared. The recent polemics on literature, painting, etc., are extremely significant. They demonstrate, on the one hand, the powerful ferment among layers of young intellectuals who want Soviet culture to progress to a much higher level than that of the preceding period. They have, on the other hand, singularly exposed the main limitations of Khrushchevism which have been expressed in a certain form of neo-Zdanovism in the cultural domain, above all at the beginning of 1963. It is clear that what is at stake in the conflict between Khrushchev and the young intellectuals goes much beyond the intrinsic merits of abstract painting and twelve-tone music. Khrushchev knows very well that in a society where the forms of democratic expression do not exist or are extremely limited, the most general political conflicts can find a partial or distorted reflection in artistic conflicts. The wide audience enjoyed by poets like Yevtushenko and Voznessenski testifies not only to a certain intellectual interest among the Soviet youth but also to the political significance of these manifestations. On the other hand, it is clear that if the bureaucracy admitted the idea of a plurality of scientific and cultural tendencies and of free debate among them, it would objectively facilitate differentiations on the political level, making possible even a certain crystallization around political problems that would be but a prelude to the affirmation of the right to a plurality of Soviet parties.

The political significance of the recent dispute on the cultural level was underlined all the more by the fact that in the course of debate the question was posed once more

of Stalin and the crimes of his period, including the question of the concentration camps. In reality, in the discussion of cultural questions and of the responsibilities of certain Soviet intellectuals in the Stalinist period, the question is posed more generally of the responsibility, in this same period, of numerous Soviet leaders. From this flows an extreme danger for the Khrushchev leadership itself which finds it necessary to seal up the breaches as quickly as possible.

The contradiction of Khrushchevism is once again put in the spotlight. To win the support of the masses, Khrushchev is compelled to present himself as the liquidator of the "cult of the personality," as the denouncer of the worst crimes of Stalin. In fact, each time he finds himself in difficulty in different fields, and faced by attacks from his adversaries, he resorts to a new denunciation of the "cult of the personality," seeking to give the impression that the evil might return and that he constitutes the guarantee against this. But, on the other hand, each move Khrushchev makes toward de-Stalinization incites certain layers to pose new problems, to express new necessities, to demand a more sweeping de-Stalinization. In so far as this constitutes a danger for the bureaucratic system itself, and consequently for Khrushchev, too, he must either beat a retreat or fail to carry out promises he had made.

The nature of Khrushchevism itself explains this alternation of advances and retreats in de-Stalinization, which will probably still continue even in the near future.

In recent years, the bureaucracy has had to face new problems relating to the integrated economic development of the workers states. In the wake of the development of the productive forces in the Soviet Union as well as in the other workers states, and parallel with the attempts at the economic integration of capitalism in western Europe, the necessity of economic co-ordination of the workers states was considerably increased. Above all in the second half of 1962 important measures were outlined, including the creation of a "bank for the socialist countries," which will have a long-range influence on the economic structure of the workers states composing the COMECON.

A common planning organism for all these countries is likewise envisaged. Thus the bureaucracy itself must interpret and express, although in a distorted way, the objective necessities of the economic development of the workers states. Even leaving aside certain conjunctural resistances in this or that country, the realization of this economic integration will be hampered by the existence of the bureaucracy for reasons analogous to those occurring in the various national frameworks, national bureaucratic selfishness being added to the bureaucratic interests. Without democratic economic planning on a national scale, without harmonious development within the different countries, it is impossible to carry out democratic planning and a harmonious development on the international level. The tensions and conflicts produced within the different economies under bureaucratic management will not be lessened, but multiplied within an international context. In addition it is necessary to emphasize strongly that the political needs and methods of the bureaucracy, which does not hesitate at recourse to economic sanctions, hinder the accomplishment of economic tasks. Thus a real co-ordination of the economy of the workers states cannot succeed if certain of these states are excluded; more concretely, it could be only very partial if China finds itself obliged to remain at the margin of this system. Far from accepting such an orientation, it is necessary on the contrary to demand that this economic co-ordination of the workers states should be open to substantial participation by certain underdeveloped countries where the revolution is advancing toward socialist solutions (for example Algeria at the current stage).

The bureaucratic leadership continues to come under a whole range of various social and political pressures. We have underlined many times that conflicts of interests and of orientation exist even within the bureaucracy. In recent years the most evident pressures have been those of the economic bureaucracy. It is known that it has been the pressure of managers of industry and of the agricultural sector which contributed greatly to the adoption of certain Khrushchevist reforms. But at the present stage, in the discussions on the laws of the market, on economic accounting, on

the power of managers, on the role of the market, certain managers of industry play a quite considerable role. Another reflection of these tendencies is visible in the fact that among the Soviet leaders, the number of those with a technical education and background is increasing. As for the peasant layers, their relations with the bureaucracy, even if better than in the time of Stalin, continue to remain difficult and complex. In reality the resistance and the conflicts are expressed above all on the economic level by the very great interest which the peasants maintain in their own plots, by the question of contractual deliveries in which the kolkhoz members seek to obtain the highest possible price, and by their preference for the kolkhoz market.

But it is above all in the relations of the bureaucracy with the working class, the specific weight of which has not ceased to increase, and the intellectuals that the most significant conflicts are to be found. It certainly cannot be said that wide mass action exists against the bureaucracy and that the workers express their own economic and political demands in a conscious and precise form. Yet, in recent years, demonstrations and conflicts of local and regional scope indicate the tendencies operating in depth. It is sufficient to recall the strikes of Odessa and Novocherkass, etc., in which the workers advanced economic demands and also posed questions relating to management methods. On the other hand, in certain official documents or reports of Khrushchev himself, the hostility of the workers in regard to the methods of bureaucratic control in the factory is mentioned. All this powerfully confirms the actuality of the problem of workers management.

As for the intellectuals, we have already mentioned above the quite recent significant conflicts which have occurred, and in which the implications go beyond the cultural problems. In reality the young intellectuals and even certain survivors of older generations pose more and more the problem of critical re-examination of the epoch of Stalin. Among certain layers there is quite a pronounced interest in problems such as those concerning workers councils. The

resistance of a series of intellectuals following the last relaxation carried out by Khrushchev demonstrates that, whatever may be the temporary vicissitudes, the period when the bureaucracy regulated problems by administrative measures and by forcing degrading self-criticisms is gone.

All this ferment in contemporary Soviet society is destined to become more intense and to multiply under the pressure of internal problems as well as international contradictions (the present Sino-Soviet conflict has not had notable repercussions up to now, but it most certainly will have them as it continues; in addition one should note the symptoms of the interest among the younger generation over the Cuban experience). The bureaucratic leadership will attempt to meet this situation by diverse methods, resorting sometimes to constraint and to retreats, sometimes making new concessions in the sense of de-Stalinization. The Khrushchev leadership will try most especially to safeguard its power by playing the Bonapartist game to the end. But, in general, neither one of these policies will succeed in smothering the tendencies toward renovation which have profound roots in Soviet society. Thus each step toward de-Stalinization will open new breaches, and the tendencies will move forward with the aim of obtaining new concessions, while every attempt to move backward will run into stiffer and stiffer resistance, stimulating critical awareness of the nature of the bureaucratic system on the part of vanguard layers of the working class and the intellectuals.

(B)

IN CHINA AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

The last five years of the development of China have been characterized by events of great importance, which have cast light on the contradictory aspects of this giant-scale revolutionary experiment as well as its current limits. These limits derive from the fact that the Chinese workers state itself has a bureaucratic administration and that international economic aid has been altogether insufficient (this would be true in an absolute sense even if the Soviet government had not exerted pressure which, of course, aggravated the situation).

The years 1958-59 were characterized by the "leap forward" and the installation of communes. These two measures achieved results which must not be denied or minimized because of subsequent setbacks in the following years. The full utilization of agricultural labor remains a very valuable indication for a whole series of underdeveloped countries in which analogous problems are posed. But when the Chinese leadership sought on the one hand to transfer this experiment to the cities, and, on the other hand, convert it into a boundless "leap forward," it ran into an inevitable setback. The mobilization of agricultural labour power was pursued by means of bureaucratic methods, almost under military forms, by excessive prolongation of the work day, by irrational suppression of the necessary days of rest, something that is possible only in exceptional periods and for specific aims, but which in the long run exhausts labour power and ends in a lowering of productivity, if not to passive resistance and to camouflaged sabotage. All this was bound to have its repercussions on the industrial level where very grave errors were likewise committed (the greater part of the production of the "backyard furnaces" turned out to be useless and thus cost useless effort, ending in waste). To this must be added natural calamities of which the effects, according to the official reports, were quite disastrous.

Thus is explained the setback and the economic difficulties of recent years. These were aggravated, let us repeat, by the bureaucratic Soviet attitude which, instead of making the maximum effort to aid the Chinese workers state in an exceptionally difficult situation, withdrew the technicians, demanded the payment of debts without deferments, and substantially reduced commercial relations with China.

The attitude of the Chinese leadership, in the face of these economic setbacks, showed that it was an empirical leadership but one that did not conduct itself on the Stalinist model at the time of the forced collectivization. The movement of the communes was certainly developed at an excessive rate, without taking into account the necessary preliminary technical conditions; on the other hand, the presentation

of the conditions of collective life in the communes as an almost immediate prelude to communist society was an actual theoretical error and a propagandistic hoax. But the Chinese Communists never resorted to violence to force the peasants into the communes; they did not resort to the methods of Stalin at the time of the forced collectivization, a conclusion that is confirmed by the fact that there were no butcheries such as bloodied the Soviet fields, nor the desperate reaction of peasants such as a massive slaughter of cattle.

Likewise significant is the fact that when the consequences of the errors became clear the leadership managed after heavy internal struggles, to make a turn which gradually ended in a radical reorientation on the level of the communes as well as that of the economic line in general.

They understood the necessity of some years of readjustment, the necessity of not pushing heavy industry and more, of concentrating efforts on the level of industrial consumers goods and good products, going even so far as to affirm the priority of agriculture.

In addition, the specific character of the Chinese leadership is manifested in the concept of their relations with the masses. If it always involves bureaucratic paternalism, the emphasis remains on the necessity of convincing rather than exercising constraint. This characteristic is likewise confirmed by their intervention in the discussion within the international Communist movement where, as we have already indicated, they defend a whole series of ideas opposed to Stalinist ideas and dealing a mortal blow to Stalinist monolithism.

However, the objectively backward base of China and the political formation of the present leadership caused grave bureaucratic deformations in the Chinese workers state. As we have already emphasized, the administration of the Chinese workers state remains bureaucratic; the errors committed in the period of the "great leap forward" and of the feverish time of the communes testifies once more to this.

It is necessary again to underline the bureaucratic attitude of the Chinese leadership toward de-Stalinization. In 1956-57 it seemed to favor a development toward de-Stalinization. Mao Tse-tung wrote his theses on contradictions among the people and admitted the right to strike; on the cultural level, he proclaimed the doctrine of the "hundred flowers." But when the relaxation opened the way to the development of a whole series of tendencies, including open conflicts, the Chinese leadership turned back and has not ceased since then to be found at the rear guard in this field.

China's economic situation is objectively difficult. A considerable step forward cannot be realized unless important economic aid is granted by the other workers states and democratic mobilization of the masses is undertaken in production. These are the circumstances in which the Chinese placed the problem on an international level. For them it is in any case very difficult to conceive of a solution based on "peaceful coexistence" and long-term economic competition. But immediate pressure can be placed on imperialism through the revolutionary struggle of the masses which would create a more favorable international context for them. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that they want to draw the attention of the Chinese masses more to these international problems, underlining the responsibility of the Soviet leadership in restricting aid, posing the problems of the international extension of the revolution and by contrast dissimulating the other aspect of the Chinese situation, that is the necessity of real democratization of the economic and political life. Democratization of this kind would in reality bring about total utilization of the creative potentialities of the masses, a lessening of the tensions which unquestionably exist today and of the obstacles which bureaucratic administration by its very nature raises against the development of the productive forces.

At the present stage, real democratic tendencies exist only on a local scale and in probably quite limited cases. Fundamental political questions and basic orientation are always decided by the summit, by narrow bureaucratic layers.

The people's democracies have experienced an unequal development due to a series of factors: (a) the beginning level; (b) the rhythm of economic development; (c) specific political factors; (d) accidental international factors.

Certain countries like Czechoslovakia were able to exploit an existing economic structure, at least in part of the country; others like Albania had only limited productive forces. In some countries, de-Stalinization led to historic conflicts such as the Hungarian Revolution and the Polish October, while in other countries de-Stalinization has been openly rejected (Albania), or passively accepted with only a show of being applied (Bulgaria, Rumania). The internal development of some countries has had no international repercussions, while others (East Germany), have been greatly influenced by the international situation.

In a general way, the following tendencies and problems can be noted

— The necessity of international planning and integration of the workers states is becoming increasingly clear in the light of certain difficulties and imbalances. This tendency, however, is counteracted by specific national necessities or situations, by a certain "national bureaucratic selfishness."

— The development of industrialization has posed a whole series of problems (rationalization, economic accounting, struggle against waste, etc.) which in some countries (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) are analogous to those presented in the Soviet Union, while in other countries (East Germany, partly in Poland) the need is posed of assuring a higher and more regular rate of growth.

— In the countryside, the setbacks due to bureaucratic leadership are evident. Collectivizations developed at a very rapid pace, without taking into account the necessary technical preconditions, have ended in veritable crises, for example in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, the opposite line adopted by the Gomulkiist leadership, if it has avoided the

tensions and the setbacks of rapid collectivization, has been incapable of assuring the necessary drive to the productive forces in the countryside and the effective integration of the agricultural sector in the economic planning; in brief, a pilot socialist sector is badly needed.

— As to the standard of living, in many countries improvements continue to be limited while in others, even if they are at a higher level, crises of supply occur from time to time due as much to the insufficient development of agriculture as to the disorganization resulting from bureaucratic management.

— On the cultural level, in certain countries (East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia), the bureaucratic grip remains enormously strong, and certain timid moves have been crushed in the egg. By contrast, in other countries (Poland and even Hungary) the intellectuals enjoy a certain liberal atmosphere which, in the case of Poland, is more advanced than in the USSR itself.

After the new line was adopted by the USSR in 1956-57 in its relations with the people's democracies, the national factor, so important in the postwar period up to and including the Hungarian affair, played a decreasing role. To the degree that the vestiges of the former ruling classes disappear and the people's democracies acquire a structure analogous to that of the Soviet Union, the conflicts and problems peculiar to it tend to be reproduced likewise in the people's democracies, although in their own specific forms.

In the most recent period, the situations most susceptible to an important development are those of Poland and Hungary. In Poland symptoms exist which point to a new rise of critical left forces. In Hungary, the last elections revealed the existence of differentiated currents which managed to utilize the very limited legal possibilities to manifest themselves. In Czechoslovakia tensions have been building that could give rise to sharp conflicts, even at a not distant date. The symptoms of this have been provided by such episodes as the Barak affair, student demonstrations and workers conflicts.

(C)

IN YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslavia represents a particular case in the development of the workers states. Despite certain conjunctural retardations, the general growth of production has been very important. Even in the countryside, the leadership seems to have outlined an orientation much more correct and efficacious than that of the leaderships of the other workers states of eastern Europe. It is evident that the existence of workers councils has played a very positive role, despite the limitation of the powers of these councils and certain signs of degeneration that have even been denounced officially.

The elaboration of the new Constitution which is to be adopted shows that on the level of problems relating to the structure of a workers state in the phase of transition, the Yugoslav Communists have made a very positive contribution and are ahead of the other leaderships of the workers states, even those most favourable to de-Stalinization. It must not be forgotten that a whole series of problems posed by the Khrushchevist wing were already advanced by the Yugoslavs (decentralization, necessity of economic stimulants, etc.).

Nevertheless, a whole series of aspects of the Yugoslav political economy cannot be accepted without criticism by the revolutionary Marxists. The tendencies toward decentralization were pushed to the extreme, and above all the acceptance of the free play of the market could not but carry very grave dangers which actually took on body as the leaders themselves were obliged to recognize.

In addition, decentralization did not prevent bureaucratism from reproducing itself on a local scale and favoring the development of particularist tendencies.

In reality, even in the case of Yugoslavia, it has been proved that the genuine solution resides in the real and complete democratization of the economic and political life. This cannot be realized through the establishment of workers councils whose powers are completely limited while there are no organisms of proletarian democracy in position to really determine the fundamental questions of political orientation.

III.

THE TASKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MARXISTS

It is the duty of revolutionary Marxists above all to tirelessly develop their revolutionary criticism of the bureaucracy and its regime, no matter what their current forms may be. The Fourth International does not hide the fact that its strategic aim in the USSR and the people's democracies of eastern Europe remains the antibureaucratic revolution in order to carry out the program laid down in the Transitional Program (1938) and in subsequent documents of our international movement. In addition, the revolutionary Marxists of these countries have the task of working out, with the aid of the International, transition programs for the different countries, starting from the current level of the mass movement and the specific context of each country.

More generally, revolutionary Marxists must seek points of support in the present crisis of the bureaucratic system in order to offer their solutions to the problems in dispute which reflect, even in an often distorted form, the problems of the transitional phase. They must seek in particular to express themselves in a language accessible above all to the younger generation, who, if they have not undergone the worst deformations of a Stalinist education, have still not had the possibility of knowing the best traditions of critical Leninist thought.

In the Sino-Soviet conflict and, more generally in the current polemics within the Communist parties, the Fourth International condemns in the most energetic way the use of state power to resolve theoretical and political questions. It especially condemns the economic measures taken by the Khrushchevist leadership in relation to China and Albania. It again underlines the necessity of a separation between the policies of a workers state and those of the Communist party. It condemns the fact that the differences and the conflicts between leaderships of parties are met by reprisals and ruptures on the level of states.

Within the framework of the world Communist movement, the Fourth International reaffirms its critical support to the Chinese Communists in their struggle against the neoreformism of the Khrushchev leadership and of a big part of the other Communist leaderships, because it holds that the Chinese line on the fundamental problems of the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggles (methods of struggle against the war, conception of the colonial revolution, "uninterrupted" revolution, the road to socialism in the advanced capitalist countries) is on the whole more progressive than that of the Khrushchevists and is more capable of polarizing the currents of the left in the Communist movement.

Nevertheless, the Fourth International remains critical of the Chinese leadership on other questions of great importance (appreciation of the possible consequences of a nuclear war, attitude toward certain national bourgeoisies of underdeveloped countries, characterization of the Yugoslav workers state, attitude on the problem of de-Stalinization, etc.).

The Fourth International supports the need for an international conference of the Communist movement, prepared through an ample, democratic discussion with the participation of all revolutionary Marxist tendencies. The Fourth International should have the opportunity to participate in such a conference.

In the Soviet Union, the revolutionary Marxists must struggle at the present stage above all to extend and deepen the process of de-Stalinization and compel the bureaucracy to make the most substantial concessions to the masses and to the intellectuals. It is necessary especially to insist on the evil consequences of bureaucratic management in the economy and to advance the necessity for organisms of workers control and management in the plants.

The right of workers to defend their demands through strikes must be supported, not in an abstract way, but beginning with efforts and movements that actually occur.

On the cultural level, the revolutionary Marxists struggle against every Zdanovist

or neo-Zdanovist concept and fight for the full freedom of all the scientific schools and all the artistic currents.

They also struggle for freedom of information and especially for the right of Soviet citizens to know directly and completely the different positions which now exist or come forward in the party and state organisms. The same holds for the different existing positions in the Communist parties.

On the level of political economy, the revolutionary Marxists support the necessity to substantially increase investments in the agricultural sector and in the sector of consumers goods, even at the expense of investments in the sector of heavy industry. Such an orientation would assure a more balanced more harmonious economic development, and at the same time make possible an increase in the productivity of labour, of which the consequences will become manifest in all domains, including that of heavy industry.

The revolutionary Marxists also favour increasingly greater economic integration of the workers states to assure a more rational division of labour. Parallel with economic integration, it is necessary to develop closer and closer political and cultural relations, a free circulation of people among the workers states to facilitate the exchange of experiences and growth of homogeneity.

In China, the revolutionary Marxists emphasize that despite its positive role in the international conflicts of the Communist movement, the Chinese leadership remains a bureaucratic leadership at the head of a state marked by profound bureaucratic deformations. The struggle against the bureaucracy and its regime, for proletarian democracy, that is, for workers and peasants councils having real powers, for a genuine Soviet structure, for the right of free expression of tendencies and of parties that stand within the framework of the society that issued from the revolution, representing the interests of the workers and peasants, for the independence of the trade unions in relation to the state, for the freedom of all the scientific schools and all

the artistic currents, etc., holds also for the People's Republic of China. These conquests cannot be won except through an antibureaucratic struggle on a scale massive enough to bring about a qualitative change in the political form of government.

At the present stage, more especially, the revolutionary Marxists will struggle for:

- (a) Real democratic management of the communes.
- (b) The installation of workers control and eventually workers management in the plants.
- (c) The right of criticism within the Communist party and for the application in China of the minority rights demanded by the leadership itself on the international level.
- (d) The resumption and development of the orientation of 1956-57 on de-Stalinization, an orientation expressed in the speeches of Mao on "contradictions among the people" and in the so-called "one hundred flowers" campaign.

In the people's democracies of eastern Europe, the program of current struggle of the revolutionary Marxists must be elaborated on the basis of criteria analogous to those which are valid for the Soviet Union but starting from the very different conditions underlined above.

In Yugoslavia, the revolutionary Marxists will struggle against the centrifugal tendencies of the present economic structure, for a greater role and greater powers of the workers councils, for the extension of their powers on the political level, for an effective application of the most progressive new constitutional rules, for the right of tendencies in the party and the right of free expression, of criticism and of opposition, and for the right of plurality of parties of a soviet type. On the level of international policy they will struggle against the rightist and opportunist orientation of the leadership on the questions of war, "peaceful coexistence," relations with the national bourgeoisies, and the "road to socialism."