

PREDICTIONS - 1975

Over a year ago we predicted that the economic recession would be followed by a boom accompanied by high inflation. We predicted inflation to be 10 - 20%. We predicted that the capitalist class would be forced to take the offensive in order to defend its profit rate. We believed that the jolts in the economy (depression and unemployment, energy crisis and inflation, the return of the old boom and bust cycle, and the employers' offensive) would lead to greater militancy among workers, to a radicalization of the working class. Workers we thought would be fighting mad. And the labor bureaucrats would be caught between the employers offensive and the new worker militancy.

Our position was that this situation made it possible for socialists to play a leading role in building a rank and file movement through agitation against the offensive that the employers were taking. We also believed that, given this radicalization, we could carry out a campaign to recruit workers to the organization and to change the character of the IS. In order to carry out these campaigns--worker recruitment and agitation around the major contracts--we saw that we would have to have a more serious organization, a tight organization. We projected developing within the IS a larger, more collaborative leadership, and bringing workers into leadership positions.

ECONOMIC & LABOR SITUATION - 1976

Our predictions were somewhat off. The economic jolts were not as abrupt as we predicted: the boom was not as big; inflation did not run to 10 or 20%, but to 6%; unemployment has been much higher than we foresaw. The employers' offensive was not as strong and did not take the forms that we expected. The trucking industry employers were willing to give up more, and the bureaucrats able to "deliver" more than we would have expected--twice the monetary package of the 1973 contract. Consequently there has been less radicalization, less of the worker militancy than we projected. Workers were not, by and large, fighting mad. The Cleveland organizer described building TDC like "pulling teeth." In auto there is no "contract fever" such as we expected. Instead of being fighting mad, workers were very discontent, but cautious. To some extent the high unemployment has acted as a damper on worker militancy.

Despite the fact that our economic predictions were somewhat off, our rank and file strategy of agitational campaigns around the major industrial contracts worked out in the IBT. But again our expectations were somewhat exaggerated. Workers were less militant; there were few wildcats; the TDC movement left less organization and more fragile organization than we expected, though it was a broader movement than we had anticipated. And workers were more reluctant to work with or become part of a socialist group than we had hoped.

HOW THE IS STRATEGY WORKED

To the extent that our strategy worked, it was largely due to two advances in the way the IS worked. First to the campaigning strategy

which our leadership developed; second to the agitational method of mass action.

CAMPAIGNING In the worker recruitment campaign, the Portugal Revolution support work, in the Post Office campaign, our leadership developed a method of mobilizing the entire organization to work on one particular issue, and to coordinate WP, pamphlets, leaflets, local demonstrations and national press publicity. This method of moving the organization and the campaigning spirit that went with it were extremely important to the TDC. By throwing the entire weight of the organization into the IBT contract campaign, we were able to capitalize on every bit of discontent and militancy that did exist. That campaigning method and spirit were largely why the worker recruitment campaign and the Teamster rank and file contract movement were successful.

MASS WORK Our successes were also due to the turn to agitation which our leadership fought for at the last convention, and which developed into "mass work." Mass work involves mobilizing a significant proportion of the people affected by an issue around a limited program designed to deal with that issue.

In a contract campaign mass work has meant organizing thousands around a few key demands for a decent contract. At the shop floor level it may mean mobilizing a single department around a single issue of safety on the job. The method developed is, having chosen our agitational goal on a realistic basis, to mobilize the maximum number of people by limiting and focusing our demands as much as we can while still remaining effective. We developed the "mass work" approach to agitation because we were out to create united working class action. We have to organize and move those who do not yet understand the class struggle. Indeed we have to organize and move those who understand our view of class struggle and disagree with it. In TDC and UPSurge even anti-communists and racists were organized on the issue of the contract, organized and opposed, but organized. In USWA 1157 we will work with officers we would not support in an election for office on the issue of fighting a trusteeship. In TDC we applied this approach with good results.

EVALUATION OF OUR WORK

The errors we made in our predictions about the economic and political situation, combined by certain mistakes our organization made, require a serious evaluation of both the attempt to transform the IS into a workers group and the attempt to make our group a force in the working class.

WORKER MEMBERSHIP CAMPAIGN The worker membership campaign was a success. But not because it succeeded in turning the IS into a workers group-- because it did not, it only began that process. It was a success because it taught our members how to campaign, because it oriented us toward the working class. It built our self confidence. It raised our morale. It prepared for our next step, the TDC.

However there were real weaknesses. Unrealistic expectations were created in the minds of our members, partly because of illusions about

the breadth and depth of worker militancy, partly because of lack of experience. The leadership claimed that workers could be recruited in numbers right off the street, workers we'd never seen before. The leadership claimed that newly recruited workers would be more militant and more active than the IS was, that they'd immediately rush out organizing new members and branches, selling WP by the scores and hundreds. In fact this wasn't true. Workers did not rush in, or in the 2 or 3 cases where they did, they rushed out as easily.

The campaign lacked priorities and focus. We recruited workers from random backgrounds, from different industries and unions. There were different levels of political commitment and of political development. In some there was even a low level of interest in politics. Consequently loss and turnover were high.

So, while we made an important, a crucial step in the right direction, still we did not succeed in fundamentally changing the IS. The IS has not yet become a workers group.

TEAMSTER WORK TDC and UPSurge have been by far the biggest and most successful steps our organization has taken. In the trucking industry the employer offensive in the form of an attack on conditions, especially of road drivers, productivity drives, especially at UPS but also among dock workers had led to a good deal of militancy. Concentration and rationalization of the industry--mergers, buy-outs, bankruptcies, shifting of breakbulk terminals, satellites--while not a new offensive, were part of a continuing assault on job security and working conditions. This too was responsible for part of the militancy.

The worker militancy combined with a strong union reform sentiment that had been developing for a long period of time. There had been local movements and even some local groups demanding better representation, an end to the dictatorship of this or that local baron, and an end to Teamster-gangster unionism. It was the combination of this moderate militancy and the union reform spirit which made it possible to build TDC. A score of Teamster socialists with a clear organizational plan, with a contract program which spoke to the problems of the industry and the union were able to work with a couple hundred union activists and militants, most of them with a history of struggle in their company, barn or local, to build a rank and file movement which moved thousands.

IS SUCCESS IN TEAMSTER WORK We played the crucial role in organizing and giving leadership to a mass movement in the Teamsters. Because of the TDC there was the first national freight strike, a freight wildcat in Detroit, a real improvement in the wages and in certain conditions in the industry. And out of this work will come an on-going national rank and file caucus in the IBT. Because of the presence of the IS, we were able in some areas to win respect for revolutionaries and for revolutionary politics among a small but important segment of the IBT militants. Likewise UPSurge has built a real--an even more real--movement and organization among UPS workers. And it was UPSurge that forced and led a two-week strike in the Central States and continued a one-day wildcat. It was UPSurge that won the contract gains on money and conditions and casuals. TDC and UPSurge have been the result of the combined effort of every member and branch in the organization. Whatever the problems it was an immense success. Members' skills were developed; self-confidence grew.

IS FAILURE IN TEAMSTER WORK The most serious failing of the TDC was that it did not build a worker leadership. This was of course uneven. In some areas worker leaders did come forward and did develop, namely in those areas where there was a history and tradition of organization and struggle (Detroit, Los Angeles). However, in many other areas, the worker leaders did not come forward, and we failed to train and develop them. Despite our attempt to put workers forward on every possible occasion as travelers, spokespersons, organizers, etc., there resulted a kind of defacto substitutionism. This is, too often IS members with less base, less credibility, fewer years in the union were forced to shoulder all of the leadership responsibility, making virtually all of the decisions unilaterally. We are, of course, for putting our members forward as leaders, as examples of leadership in fact. But we often failed to hold in leadership bodies, working beside us, workers who did not share our socialist politics, or who were not convinced of every aspect of class struggle unionism. Consequently we were not able to deal with their politics and try to convince them of ours.

This sort of substitutionism wasn't intentional. It was forced upon us. In some areas and in certain moments in the ten-month history of the TDC it was necessary to have ISers keep the TDC alive, in areas where it would otherwise have died--both to keep the national scope of TDC and as an opening into which the workers might move.

But some of our members have made a virtue of necessity. They show a failure to understand the necessity of working with militants who don't share our politics, but who are loyal members of the rank and file movement, who build and support TDC or UPSurge for example. The attitude of some of our members is still a certain sectarianism--an approach which dictates that we smash or split with the opposition, capture ourselves or substitute ourselves for the movement; the upshot of which is isolation. There is a belief that the IS can by-pass the existing leaders and can create "the tradition."

They have failed to learn the lesson that we should have learned from our most successful industrial work--TDC, UPSurge, Local 51 UAW--which is that it is based upon an alliance between ourselves and worker activists on the shop floor. It is that alliance with the worker activists who are the bearers of the traditions of struggle in the industry which is key. Certainly all of the worker activists won't be recruited to the IS, relatively few in fact at this time. And at times we will be in for splits. But the key to a successful rank and file movement--the alliance between ourselves and the worker activists--is threatened by sectarian attitudes.

THE IS IN THE TDC One aspect of this question has been dealt with in other evaluations and documents as the "role of the IS in the rank and file movement," "the use of Workers Power," and "red baiting." In many areas we have dealt with these problems successfully. Pittsburg provided the model for dealing with red baiting, and Cleveland and Los Angeles used the same method successfully. Having a healthy rank and file organization, a working relationship with the non-socialist leaders of it who are aware of our political convictions and organizational affiliations we come up front and hit back. A socialist rank and filer put out a leaflet explaining both why he was a socialist and why he was a TDC'er.

Other leading militants in the area put out a statement against red-baiting and in support of the socialist. The employers and union bureaucrats are attacked for using red-baiting to side-step the real issues. A few are lost, but the majority are neutralized or won to our side because of the standing we already had and because of our honesty and forthrightness in taking on our critics.

However there was a certain tendency toward a mechanical application of the formula "put the IS forward and use Workers Power." On at least one occasion this could have led to a national leader advising or approving of inexperienced members circulating Workers Power with Convoy. On other occasions it could have led to conflicts between organizers and fraction leaders over the question of distributing WP or Conspiracy at IBT and TDC functions. On other occasions members announced their socialist convictions or organizational affiliations before we had a solid rank and file organization and a working relationship to rank and file leaders.

EVALUATION OF OUR ORGANIZATION

The problems we have had in our work, the mistakes we made in the worker membership campaign and in the Teamster campaign, have been paralleled by certain problems in the internal life of the organization. Our organization has become tighter, more serious, more disciplined and professional. We proved ourselves able to lead a workers' movement. But again there are problems.

LACK OF COMMUNICATIONS The disorganization of the fractions contributes toward this problem. There is no connection between Detroit and Chicago auto work. There is no steel fraction, no center, no perspective, no communication. The Teamster fraction, by far the strongest, is still organizationally weak. There has been no functioning fraction dealing with black work. The functioning of the women's commission has been uneven. This disorganization of our members who are in touch with the life of the class, who carry out our line in day to day work, who lead the working class to the extent that we are able at this point, makes their external work less effective and weakens their influence within the organization.

Because of these problems, the IS membership and sometimes even the fraction leadership do not feel that they can influence the line. At times they feel they do not understand the politics behind the line because they have had no role in discussing or determining it, even on a local level.

An example of this problem was the IBT recruitment campaign which was organized after the worker membership campaign. The EC decided to do it and decided all of its details. Then it simply informed the fraction leadership (steering committee) and the local fractions of its decision (through the organizers). Local fractions played no part in developing this campaign. The plan was unworkable. We did not in the first place have a large number of close Teamster contacts. We were in the midst of a national campaign which was straining all of our resources--and yet the plan was to bring our Teamster leaders and contacts to Detroit (yet another long trip killing another precious weekend of organizing time)

and to organize local recruitment meetings (on top of TDC meetings, union meetings, IS fraction meetings, TDC steering committee meetings). The EC set a target of 30. No one was recruited as part of that campaign. It collapsed. Then EC members and organizers told fraction leaders of their "conservatism" for not succeeding with this unworkable plan. Yet another example of poor relations would be two teamster supplements put out without consulting the leadership of the Teamster fraction. Yet another is the fact that IBT members complained that WP and other IS publications must deal with Stalinism, socialism, socialism and democracy. But the brief section dealing with Stalinism in the Conspiracy pamphlet was cut out. The WP was very weak on those questions.

The lack of organization in fact means a weakening of internal democracy, a difficulty of correcting and controlling the line by feedback from the rank and file in the class, and failure to politically motivate members to carry out the line.

These problems of a lack of organization and communication in the fractions have been aggravated by a lack of sound information about what is happening in the organization and a low level of political discussion.

Early national reports were worthless. Recent reports omit essential information and distort other information. Too often the reports are used to boost morale by giving a misleading picture rather than a useful evaluation.

As a national organization, our members have a responsibility for their fraction and branch activities, and also for the organization as a whole. An honest evaluation will help us correct mistakes so that we can make the IS a force in the class, a real part of the labor movement.

But instead we have developed an unwholesome method of discussing our branches and our comrades. It is the method of model branches and the shit-list, of heroes and heroines and whipping-boys and -girls. It works this way. This week Louisville is the model branch, several workers were recruited. Next week Louisville is on the shit-list because those workers couldn't be held. But Pittsburg is the model branch because of the recruitment of a group of postal workers. But next week the postal workers are gone, Pittsburg is on the shit-list and Detroit . . . etc. Likewise, this week XX is a model Comrade, a leader of the work, a real hero, but next week the work runs into problems and XX is a petty-bourgeois, conservative--a whipping-boy. But now YY is a heroine, she led . . . etc.

In addition problems are too often discussed via the rumor mill behind people's backs, rather than having face-to-face, up front political criticism and discussion. At its worst this develops into a public official line and a gossip line which may originate from the same sources and contradict the official public position. Official line: the work is going as well as can be expected under the circumstances. Gossip line: the work is a disaster and so-and-so is to blame.

We need an honest evaluation of our work and a comradely spirit in handling mistakes, failure and problems. There are political problems and differences for which we need a political discussion and debate.

Moralism, voluntarism, guilt-tripping, high-pressure techniques, gossip and rumors are totally unacceptable.

Concrete steps can be taken to begin to solve these problems:

1) The monthly national report can give members information about the actual state of our branches, fraction and national organization. (In so far as questions of security or extremely sensitive personnel questions are not involved.) We need factual reports, hard information. And together with that an evaluation of our success and failures without heroes, stars, whippingboys, scapegoats or shit lists. Without bluff, bravado or demagogery.

2) The Internal Bulletin (which has not appeared in one year) can be used to organize political discussion within the organization.

Over the past year our emphasis has been: turn to agitation and professionalize our organization. In large measure we are succeeding, and we will continue to succeed. Within this same general perspective, our slogans for this year are BUILD A WORKER LEADERSHIP and MAKE THE IS A FORCE IN THE CLASS. It is around these two interrelated goals that our organization will focus.

ROLE OF FRACTIONS IN IS

There are two crucial elements in this focus. The first is to strengthen our fractions, IBT, UAW, USW, CWA, Black Commission (and Gary Tyler Fractions). Our fractions are where we are going to be able to recruit, hold and train workers, and bring them into the IS leadership. Our goal is the convergence of these newly recruited workers with our present fraction leadership to form a broader working-class leadership for our organization. This is the only way to hold masses of workers recruited through our agitation.

NATIONALLY A first step must be to base our national committees (NC) on the fraction leadership. The NC must be made into a more functional, serious leadership body. By making our leaders in the class take responsibility for the group as a whole, and by making the central leadership, EC, collaborate with our collective industrial leadership, we will make the fractions central to the IS.

We must also promote the organization of functioning national fractions. There must be clearly established centers. There must be a concerted effort to spread our fractions into more branches (eg. UAW especially). There must be more organizational resources placed into building the fractions. This includes money. For example for fraction meetings on a regional or even national (delegated) scale, at least quarterly. It means more staff at the disposal of the fractions to produce regular bulletins, to help with writing and editing popular literature, etc.

It is in the fractions that the training of members must take place, and the fraction leadership must develop a training program. Our present approach to this problem is confused.

There are a number of ideas which are constantly floating about in the IS and achieve some popularity every year at convention time. These

ideas include more classes, better branch discussion, one-on-one tutoring, theoretical journal, etc. These notions would be useful if they were related to the central problem of training the new members who are active in our industrial and black fractions. But instead they are seen as educational in a more abstract and general sense.

The training of new comrades should not be viewed as education. In the worst sense education is a process in which the wise may bestow their knowledge on the ignorant. It is the natural method of capitalism for turning human beings into servants. Revolutionary fighters are trained in struggle by learning to draw lessons from their own experience.

Rank and file conferences, and conferences on the struggle for black liberation or revolutionary feminism, where new members participate in the work of bringing our politics to contacts, have never failed to be better learning experiences than our schools. Fractions responsibility for WP coverage and the creation of pamphlets (both single issue Multi-industry and single industry Multi-issue) will do far more to raise the political level of works in the organization than better columns by staff writers and a political magazine aimed at the membership. In short, it is the fractions where workers' experiences are turned into policies for the organization and that must be our program to train workers.

Promoting the fractions also means promoting the black commission. The black commission must have equal weight with any of the industrial fractions. In fact, since we have failed to recruit blacks as rapidly as necessary, even a limited campaign like Gary Tyler deserves virtually the same priority as our industrial work. We must find a way to the black masses.

It is critical now that we have finally begun to do some black work that the Gary Tyler work push us to bring the fight against racism to the point of production. We must not let self-congratulation lull us into substituting a community strategy against racism for a class strategy.

Our fraction leadership together with the black commission must develop a perspective for black work which relates to our industrial work; and the struggle for black liberation must become an integral part of our labor work.

The development of broad based collaborative leaderships in the black and industrial fractions is another aspect of this focus, with weight on the groups that reflect weight in the class. The fraction leadership has to take responsibility for this move. The EC must take co-responsibility. Seeing this job not just as influencing policies, or advancing members who agree with particular policies, or organizationally shaping up the fraction. The EC must see its job as developing national fraction leaderships, which are centered in one city (Gary, Cleveland, Detroit) but which are national in scope. Our fractions and our fraction leaders must be prepared now to lead a workers organization and to integrate new workers into the leadership.

RECRUITMENT

The second key element for this year will be to recruit worker activists who can be integrated and trained to lead the working class, our fractions, the IS. Our recruitment policy must center on this goal. We must continue our policy of wide open recruitment of workers and blacks. But we must focus our efforts. We cannot hope to recruit and hold workers in numbers or to transform the organization, or to make it a material force in the class while recruiting on the level of agitation. Our past year's policies--recruitment aimed at people who come only to one meeting, recruitment aimed at "we are the best fighters, join us"--is insufficient. This is due to two factors: a slower pace of the crisis (and therefore the slower pace of class struggle) than we projected and, secondly, that the IS is not yet a workers organization that had the capability of holding the mass of workers and blacks who may be brought around.

FOCUSSED RECRUITMENT In order to make the IS a group that can hold masses of blacks and workers, our emphasis at this time must be on focussed recruitment. Focussed through the fractions and focussed on worker activists. By worker activists we mean those who have a base, who represent more than themselves. People who are fighters, or who have influence over their fellow workers on the job or within the union.

This is not a homogeneous layer of people. It means a Teamster dock worker who never attends union meetings, but leads job actions in the terminal, or speaks up to the boss for his crew. It means a telephone operator who takes no interest in the union but defends her black sisters. It means black auto workers who bring to a caucus we initiated not just themselves but support from their department, and who can stand for committee person (steward) and with our help beat the machine. It means a teamster with 25 years seniority who never thought of himself as a leader but who has authority because of his role in past wildcats. In the mines it means the layer of miners, mostly young, who are the backbone of the unorganized "movement" that leads the frequent wildcats. We are not talking about "union activist" or older workers. Most of our recruitment will come from the younger workers. Does this mean we ignore workers with no base or who are isolated? Of course not. Every member we recruit adds to our numbers, our strength, our self-confidence to win more people.

What this does mean for us is a different recruitment approach; we must recruit at the level of strategy. When we speak of raising the paper and the pamphlets to the level of strategy, we are speaking of more than simply defining a political position. Our political position in a particular industry may be that we are for black and white unity and for whites taking up the struggle for black special demands concerning black oppression. This is not much more than moralism unless we can show why this is the only strategy that can satisfy the needs of (for example) both white skilled tradesmen and black production workers.

In the IBT we call for an end to sexual and racial discrimination and for bringing the wages, hours and conditions of manufacturing and food processing workers up to those of the freight industry. We must explain this in strategic terms--to the freight workers, dominated by

white men we explain that they are only a third or less of the union and that they will be defeated if they let the employers and bureaucrats keep them isolated from the other two-thirds. They must champion the cause of blacks, Latins, and women if they are to win. And likewise we explain to the manufacturing and food processing workers that they need the economic and political power of the freight section.

After Vietnam, Watergate, the revelations concerning the FBI and the CIA, and the recession of the past two years, workers have many fewer illusions about the system. Workers have been disillusioned and disabused of much of their faith in capitalism. It is cynicism among all sections of the class (even the younger workers who haven't suffered defeats) which is the obstacle. With the cynical attitude, all political positions are suspect. What is needed is a winning strategy. And obviously at the same time we must fight beside our fellow workers in mass actions to win some immediate victories with that strategy.

RECRUITMENT STRATEGY This cynicism affects the whole class, we cannot hope to avoid it by looking for workers unaffected. We have to address it head on.

This fall we should hold a second recruitment campaign of the following character:

1) It should be run through the fractions nationally and locally. It should be targeted in terms of people and priorities. Specific approaches should be developed for specific people.

2) We should produce strategy pamphlets for our various areas of work, that relate on-going caucus work, rank and file papers, contract fights, etc., to a class struggle strategy in the industry and union. That deals with overcoming racism and sexism, building a national movement, political strategy and ties into the fight for socialism. A black perspective, a strategy for black liberation pamphlet is also a must to educate our own membership and for use with people brought around us through Gary Tyler work and other work.

3) This literature should be the basis of beginning to train and educate our fractions as well as contacts. A serious program of education so that our members can deal in depth with workers' questions, doubts and disagreements must be begun.

4) Our actual events in this campaign must correspond to this strategy. These will include discussion groups, one-on-one, educationals, developing slide shows, and other aids to discussion, etc. The campaign shall not end in rallies but in regional conferences organized by each fraction. Our first worker recruitment campaign was important in re-gearing our organization: more outward, more self-confident. Our next one must orient us toward developing a worker leadership and weight in the class.

WORKERS POWER

Workers Power is a main asset of our organization. It is our public face and an excellent one. However, WP has lapsed into reporting on strikes, movements and struggles in the same way that rank and file papers do. The more political articles are too often restricted to international coverage which is usually very abstract, or to expos articles. The

paper must maintain its agitational style, but an important element is lacking--material that conveys our strategy for advancing the movements that we are involved in and articles that make the employer offensive and class struggle unionism more than abstract slogans. For example, more and more employers are breaking or weakening strikes by operating the plants with supervisors or scabs. (Budweiser) We should run articles on such strikes that pose sit down strikes as the answer. Injunctions are also on the increase. Articles that discuss labor political action in this context should be run. Over time, articles on important areas of work should convey our whole strategy, but looking over the IBT coverage for the past year shows how deficient we have been. Little was done to explain the power and weaknesses of the IBT. Kim's column provided some on the employers' offensive in trucking, but it was removed from struggle. Little has been carried on our strategy, and alternatives such as PROD.

An increased use of the paper in our fractions work is crucial. Talking to contacts about the papers contents, getting feedback, finding out which articles are effective.

THE WAY FORWARD

The transformation of our organization is not only desirable but essential to avoid defeat. For example, in the IBT our members are out on a limb. They have put themselves forward as rank and file leaders and revolutionaries, a combination the bosses and bureaucrats don't care for. Fitzsimmons, in ranting at the recent IBT convention, gave the green light to local bureaucrats and goons to get our asses. We need a solid base of support, real weight in the class for our organization and our politics, to avoid being attacked and possibly even driven out.

If we succeed in BUILDING A WORKER LEADERSHIP and MAKING THE IS A FORCE IN THE CLASS, then as the crisis deepens and workers become more militant and open to socialism, we will be in a position to recruit; and the power and influence of our group will grow many times over. The prospects for growth of the revolutionary workers movement are the best they've been in our lifetime. We must make the most of it.

We accept the sections on Black Liberation, Working Women and the Red Tide from the EC DISCUSSION DOCUMENT for the 1976 Convention, "STEPS TOWARD BUILDING THE PARTY" as part of this document.

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| KP IBT Cleveland | DL CTDU Chicago | LH IBT Chicago |
| SG Organizer Oakland | MP IBT Pittsburg | JF W.Va. |
| C UAW Indianapolis | RD IBT Pittsburg | P USWA Gary |
| BF UAW Indianapolis | SK IBT Cleveland | K USWA Gary |
| AT Indianapolis | MF IBT Cleveland | S USWA Gary |
| PK Indianapolis | CK IBT Cleveland | WH Chicago |
| SP AFT Madison | S Pittsburg | ZLF Chicago |
| JJ IBT Oakland | | |