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From Revolutionary History, Vol.1 No.4, Winter 1988-89. Used by permission.
So, despite their recognition of these factors which hampered their cause, they maintained their belief in the coming German revolution. However, they could not give many concrete examples of their hopes. Regularly they pointed out the existence of a general war fatigue among the German population and so believed that, because of the hopeless military situation, the soldiers would become demoralised. The abortive coup against Hitler of 20 July 1944 was interpreted in this sense: ‘Coups among the possessing classes are the classical preludes to revolutions’.
Many people will think that the central place of the German workers’ movement in the political thinking of the CRM was utopian. In the CRM one reader formulated a criticism in two articles in Het Kompas at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, thus at the time of the battle of Stalingrad. He pointed out that there was a combination of iron discipline, servile obedience and a highly developed technology in Germany. That the revolution could come first in Germany was thought ‘very improbable’:
However hard it is, it is the duty of every revolutionist to say what is: the German governing class has found a very great part of the German people ready to play soldier, policeman or hangman.
According to the writer (presumably Theo Jansen) the German masses had to be liberated, and it was the task of the European revolution to purify Germany. A revolutionary perspective, differing from that of the CRM leadership, was sketched out:
Hitler cannot resist both the revolutions in the occupied territories and the “Allies”, who have allied with the heroic resistance of the Russian workers and peasants, the more so as such uprisings would reinforce the Russian resistance and from the revolutionary war of the Soviet Union develop into a European revolutionary war against the citadel of the counter-revolution; Hitler-Germany.
The leadership reacted in a very irritable manner to this article which, in their opinion, went in the direction of the despised policy of Social-Democracy and the Communist parties. A strengthening of nationalism in Europe would drive the German workers further towards Hitler. According to the leadership, what was decisive was not where the revolution would begin, but the fact that without the support of the German working class not a single revolutionary break-through was possible. According to the leadership, revolutionists had vehemently to resist a partition of Germany and a ‘second Versailles’, that is to say a peace at the expense of Germany. The writer of the article reacted with a new piece under the title: ‘Politicians who suffer from arteriosclerosis’. The danger of a new Versailles treaty imposed on Germany was posed, and a more active defence of the Soviet Union was advocated. The leadership replied to this second contribution still more vehemently; the writer was accused of ‘rudenesses, insinuations and distortions’. It was repeated that his conceptions were diametrically contrary to those of the RSAP and the MLL-Front.
In later issues of Het Kompas there appeared further contributions by members who were of the opinion that De Rode October was too optimistic about the developments in Italy and notably Germany. The editorial board, however, thought this testified to a ‘a superficial pessimism and impatience’. Finally Frits Zeggelink wrote to me that after 1933 he no longer believed in a German revolution. In all this it should not be forgotten how great the prestige of the German workers’ movement had been before 1933. In the words of Rein van der Horst: ‘We knew that history, it is not strange that we had hopes’. Sal Santen called the confidence in the German workers’ movement ‘a deeply rooted conviction’.
The CRM’s conception of the situation in the Netherlands was part of its general political analysis of the Second World War as an imperialist war. Small nations like the Netherlands were only the playthings of the big imperialist powers. Since the Netherlands were treated by the Nazis as a ‘colony’ the question of national oppression’ arose. The Dutch bourgeoisie in the war had chosen the side of England and the United States. However, they only wanted to create anew ‘freedom’ for their exploitation of the Dutch working class and the peoples in the Dutch colonies. Because the Dutch governing class was also the victim of the occupation and supported the struggle against the occupier, the struggle against their own bourgeoisie had to be carried on as an ideological struggle. In other words: the real war goals of the governing class had to be made clear.
According to the CRM national oppression had a radicalising effect on the workers:
It would be ridiculous to close one’s eyes to the enormous role played at this moment by national oppression in the political life of the Dutch workers. This problem occupies every worker at the moment, and because of this problem people start now to take an interest in political problems when formerly they thought of nothing.
Repeatedly it was stated that they appreciated the courage of the nationalist organisations. Any political collaboration with organisations which wanted an Allied victory was, however, sharply repudiated by the CRM:
The task of the proletariat in an oppressed country is to struggle both against every sort of social and national oppression and for the right of national self-determination in co-operation with the proletariat of the oppressing country ...
The real liberating force in the struggle against national oppression, and for the right of self-determination of the nations, can only be the revolutionary proletariat.
Naturally the CRM was conscious that this task was extremely difficult in view of the misery of the occupation:
Therefore the broad masses want first to get rid of Nazi oppression. Because their hatred is so great, every critical judgement about the Allies changes into fear that their enemy would profit, so their national feelings play a huge role here. Oppression by a foreign ruler is felt more severely than exploitation by their own bourgeoisie.
Around Dolle Dinsdag (Mad Tuesday – 5 September 1944) [9], when a swift liberation of the whole country seemed close, they had to conclude that they stood ‘powerless in the midst of an Orange sea’. According to the CRM a real breakthrough in the Netherlands would only come out of revolutionary developments in other European countries. In the Dutch situation two issues stood out as central in that respect.
In the first place economic reconstruction in ravaged Europe would only be possible at the expense of the working class; low wages and long working days would be inevitable. Because of their financial dependence on loans from England and the USA, food and household goods would be scarce. It was expected that because of this the state would play a greater role and assume a more centralised and authoritarian character. In view of the size of the economic problems after the occupation, any promises of a more just society were, for the CRM, worth nothing. The plans, discussed at the time, to annexe bits of Germany after the occupation were interpreted by the CRM as a means of capitalist reconstruction, and rejected. The strikes in the liberated part of the Netherlands (in Eindhoven and in the Limburg mines), in the ‘dark Catholic South’ gave the CRM great confidence. It also saw these strikes as part of the general proletarian wave of resistance that it observed in Europe.
The second point concerned the future of Indonesia. Although leftist organisations like the CPN and De Vonk used Queen Wilhelmina’s promise of greater independence for Indonesia, within a sort of Dominion status, as a starting point of their policy, the CRM saw in this promise merely the announcement of a ‘new predatory expedition’ and of a colonial war, which would be an inevitable consequence of the Liberation of the Netherlands. The CRM stuck to the old motto of the revolutionary workers’ movement: ‘Free Indonesia from Holland! Now!’
After the invasion this problem was argued out in nearly every issue of De Rode October. Attention was given to the argument that the fight of the Dutch troops in Indonesia was for the liberation of Indonesia from Japanese Fascism, or for the prevention of its domination by US influence:
Suddenly everybody is moved to tears by the Japanese oppression of Indonesia, the country that, in the course of centuries, has been squeezed like a lemon, where every free national and cultural development was hindered by Dutch domination, and where the brave, who advocated the right of national self-determination, have perished of swamp fevers in the Dikgoel camp.
The CRM expected that the working class youth would not be enthusiastic about a colonial war, and in this they saw a great possibility for the recruitment of massive numbers of new members to the CRM. As far as is known the position of the CRM regarding Indonesia did not lead to any contacts with Indonesians living in the Netherlands during the occupation.
Because of the great importance of both these issues the CRM did not believe in an automatic, untroubled return to parliamentary democracy. They even thought that the era of parliamentary democracy was over for good, because capitalism had found itself in an epoch of structural decline. After the liberation the CRM did not expect freedom of organisation and the press for revolutionary organisations. At about the time of Mad Tuesday the leadership therefore called for the maintenance of total clandestinity.
The CRM was against the introduction of the state of siege and against every postponement of postwar elections. The practical arguments, supplied in that respect by minister-president Gerbrandy did not, according to the CRM, hold water; postponement was advocated in order to be able to start the reconstruction of the Netherlands and to prepare for the war in Indonesia. Because of the ‘enormous changes’, taking place among the masses, immediate elections would spoil the game of the governing class. Although the CRM was no champion of parliamentary democracy, they attached much importance to this question. At all times they demanded immediate general elections and freedom of organisation and the press.’ [10]
The dismissal of the Social Democratic ministers from the Dutch government in February 1945 and the formation of a new cabinet strengthened the CRM in this view: because of the political plans of the bourgeoisie there was no longer any room for Social Democracy in the government. According to the CRM the composition of the new government proved that there was a conscious move to reaction and ‘the hammer blow’ was of course the nomination of De Quay as Minister of War – since he had been the leader of the controversial Nederlandse Unie at the beginning of the occupation. In De Rode October of early January 1945 they spoke about a possible government of Social Democracy and the CPN: the CRM hoped that such a government would destroy the confidence of the workers in these parties.
From the above it will be clear that the whole idea of a ‘liberation’ for the CRM, had a limited meaning only: in the last issue of De Rode October that appeared during the occupation they wrote, though everyone naturally was relieved by the fact that the Nazi terror had come to an end, nevertheless attention must now be devoted to the political problems which we have mentioned above. [11]
A number of clear consequences in the field of the strategy and tactics followed from the principled internationalist stand advocated by the CRM. One of the most important was that they did not consider the German soldiers in the Netherlands as enemies, but as class companions with whom fraternisation had to be encouraged. The CRM did not succeed in creating organised contacts but did direct themselves in a propagandistic way to the ‘German workers in uniform: In The Hague strips of gummed paper, on which slogans were applied with the stamp box, were glued on the walls of barracks buildings. In Rotterdam special leaflets in German were made; they were, inter alia, placed on the staircases of the Maas Bridge by Piet and Cor van ’t Hart who, to that effect, applied the well-tried tactics of the courting couple. Afterwards Rein van der Horst called these activities ‘shots in the dark: In De Rode October there is no article about any expressedly anti-Fascist resistance within the German army; all that can be found is an attempt to establish the growth of desertions at the end of the occupation, and the notice taken of the often lenient attitude of soldiers during the great razzias of 1944: ‘It even happened that some people who came to report voluntarily were called idiots and driven back with rifle butts: In a development of its stand on German soldiers, there was the vehement denunciation of shaving the heads of ‘Kraut maidens’ at the liberation, which was called by the CRM a ‘nationalist pogrom’. To the CRM the only criterion was a Fascist or anti-Fascist conviction; they pointed to double standards, because men with lady friends in Germany had not had a hair on their heads touched: ‘This kind of thing can only occur in the head of a hypocritical petit-bourgeois who is pious in public and sins in secret’.
The CRM also directed its attacks on the destructive Allied mass bombing. The bombing of The Hague of March 1944, where there were more than 500 killed, could not be justified from a military standpoint according to the CRM; in The Hague the CRM publicised their standpoint in a pamphlet. The bombing of Dresden was described as a ‘horrible murdering party’: ‘There is silence in the Orange camp about Dresden ... Dresden, the burning heap of ruins, was the city of the most anti-Fascist part of Germany, Saxony.’ The majority of the Resistance supported the Allied bombings and, at best, criticised operations where the setbacks for the civil population outweighed the military gains; to the CRM the bombings were an integral part of the imperialist war. Repeatedly the CRM spoke out against political assassinations of important people. They considered these forms of individual terror as counter-productive; the victims were simply replaced, and the reprisals of the occupier would take many victims. The CRM thought, therefore, that individual terror was not conducive to mass resistance. This was distinct from killing traitors and agents of the German repressive apparatus which, to the CRM, was a simple question of self-protection. [12]
Neither was economic sabotage advocated by the CRM. They thought that this form of sabotage was similar to terrorist attacks; it was, however, admitted that economic sabotage in the form of working slowly ‘was, in a certain sense, mass action’. It differed from military sabotage of the food supply, because that would be part of the warfare of the Allies and would, in the first place, hurt the population of the occupied territories. Just as in the case of assassination, the CRM made an exception of sabotage as a defensive action, such as in the context of the defence of the Soviet Union:
Since 90 per cent of the German army has been thrown against the Soviet army, the workers (German and foreign) have the duty deliberately to weaken German war production, by means of so-called “economic sabotage” in the weapons and munitions factories and in the transports to the Russian front.
This standpoint had been developed in the context of the war; economic sabotage was called for by the nationalist resistance. One may ask how well thought out the CRM conception was. In two articles in De Rode October, one dealing with foreign workers in Germany and the other dealing with workers who worked for the Wehrmacht at Rozenburg, passive resistance in the form of working slowly was proposed. Both cases fell within the criterion of the war production formulated by the CRM, but the argument for the defence of the Soviet Union was not mentioned in these articles. On the contrary, in the article on Rorenburg the (in my opinion correct) argument was used that under the terror of the occupation this form of workers’ resistance was the most effective possible.
As to armed killings and economic sabotage, there existed no significant differences of opinion. Dissension only arose about an article in De Rode October in which the participation of workers in demolitions was rejected when, in the autumn of 1944, large parts of the industrial apparatus were dismantled by the occupier. In Het Kompas a member wrote that this article conflicted with the CRM policy, since it called for an individual refusal to obey orders. The editorial board replied that there were certain limits to the forcing of workers to sell their labour power; on certain matters which directly touched vital interests (like removing furniture from the houses of deported Jews, the demolition of working class dwellings, the removal of foodstuffs and the demolition of factories) every worker should put up resistance. In the case of demolition of the means of production a conscious demolition was involved, which had to be distinguished from the work of workers in the war industry. It was admitted in De Rode October that this distinction was not sufficiently clear.
In comparison with the rest of occupied Europe, armed resistance in the Netherlands was relatively unimportant. Nevertheless and despite the standpoint of the leadership, it is difficult to answer the question as to whether armed resistance did not have some attraction for CRM members. Theo Jansen from The Hague, probably the one who advocated a more active defence of the Soviet Union in Het Kompas. wanted to carry on an armed struggle just as he had done during the Spanish Civil War. He left the Netherlands and, via Scandinavia. finally ended up in the Dutch army. Frits Zeggelink wrote to me:
During the war I was approached about three times by non-leftist groups. This Orange fuss and bustle was repugnant to me, but the armed resistance did tempt. For reasons of loyalty I kept off, and said that I was occupied already.
The position of the CRM as regards the sending of Dutch workers to Germany was closely connected with the concepts treated above. As to their own members, the CRM had a clear position: their place was with the workers. When one was called for work in Germany one had to go and try to build politically, in collaboration with German revolutionaries. In the eyes of the CRM the millions of foreign workers would play a key role in a revolutionary development in Germany. This stand was also put in De Rode October, though perhaps in a nuanced form; the article was directed towards workers already employed in Germany who were on leave in the Netherlands. But the CRM did support foursquare the April-May strike of 1943, which was a protest against the plan to convey 300 000 former Dutch prisoners of war to Germany; the CRM advocated massive evasion and refusal. This call was not restricted to former soldiers, for whom the element of compulsion was indeed strongly present. According to the CRM the workers between 18 and 35, who had to report for labour service, should also offer resistance.
However, in the following issues of De Rode October this topic was not touched on again. In February 1944 it seemed that they had returned to their former standpoint. In an article on the new conscription of workers it was stated that those sent out to Germany had to try to make contacts with anti-Fascist Germans. At the time of the razzias of 1944, which were a savage hunt for Dutch labour hands, the CRM called for evasion. Under such circumstances any other standpoint was hardly possible any longer.
A considerable number of CRM members did work in Germany. Of the Amsterdam members, three worked in Germany and one in Finland; a number of Rotterdam members, too, worked in Germany. In De Rode October regular information was given about the feeling among the foreign and German workers in Germany. After the war Piet van ’t Hart wrote that the CRM had had contacts with illegal German groups. About this no concrete evidence is available. Peter Drenth from Groningen was involved in a short strike in Bremerhaven. After the war Toon Kwarwgen told Cor van ’t Hart that he had had political contacts in Germany. The member working in Finland, together with a female cook, smuggled food to Russian prisoners of war, but he was not believed when he said that he was a Trotskyist; they had been all exterminated, hadn’t they ...?
In fact these directives on working in Germany were not always obeyed by everybody. In an article in Het Kompas it was stated that a number of members had backed out of going. The leadership was of the opinion that only members who were indispensable to the organisation should be allowed to go underground. An argument used in this connection was that members who evaded working in Germany had to go underground, which meant that they could not do political work. [13]
Towards the question of working in Germany the CRM advocated a classical revolutionary Socialist tactic, which was suitable for a small vanguard of revolutionaries. In my opinion, during the occupation this standpoint came into conflict with the needs of stimulating mass resistance. The occupation was characterised by a combination of national and social repression. To refuse to work in Germany was the most important means of resistance of the Dutch working class against Nazi super-exploitation.
The CRM attached little importance to advocating this form of resistance, as may appear from the fact that no article can be found in De Rode October about the great resistance among students against their dispatch to Germany in 1942 and 1943. [14] Under the influence of the mass action of the April-May strike the CRM made an important exception to its general rule. The argument that, for the working class, running away was not a possibility does not seem convincing, because after an Allied victory seemed likely, very large groups of workers succeeded in evading labour conscription. [15] The consistent line of the CPN in this respect during the whole occupation certainly played an important role in the growth of the popularity of that party. One must remember that, unlike the CPN, the CRM did not take a high moral attitude towards workers who left for Germany. Neither do these critical remarks mean that revolutionaries could not do any useful political work in Germany, although that work was certainly not easy. [16]
In March 1944 Piet van ’t Hart took up the question of the black market in De Rode October. He rejected it principally because the living standards of the workers were worsened by it. Van’t Hart was annoyed by the fact that some of the workers were infected by the black market, which meant preying on the misery of the proletariat and their degradation to the level of lumpenprolerariat. In Het Kompas there was a reaction to this article; the writer talked about the importance of the black market and its effects on social inequality. Class measures against the big traders were advocated. Van ‘t Hart’s line was called moralistic, and it was said that its application would lead to starvation for those who did not participate in it. Van ‘t Hart replied under the heading: ‘We have to be irreconcilable towards the black market’, in which he said that perhaps revolutionaries had to starve in the struggle. He rejected posing concrete demands because these would not be feasible; in his eyes providing useful information about available goods was useless, since such information should be available to all. Van ‘t Hart wrote that his article had been misunderstood, as he had been concerned with class morality. He was not concerned with incidental buying or selling in the black market, but with black marketeers and notably with those workers who, by becoming black market traders, changed their class position.
During the winter of famine the CRM time and again described its horrors. At various times it was stated that class differences had been sharpened by hunger; the better-off would manage and the worst hit were, above all, the children, sick people and the elderly. Some criticism was made of a call in Het Oranje Bulletin, a paper of several resistance groups, not to go to the countryside for food; to the CRM it was madness to expect workers to accept starvation:
Our password for the workers has, however, to be, comradely relations and solidarity towards your less favoured comrades, and expose all those who trade in potatoes at black market prices.
One of the effects of the famine that the CRM pointed out was that many more reported to the Nazis for work; hunger appeared to be a more effective weapon than terror and intimidation. The arrival of the food parcels of the Red Cross was welcomed, but the CRM denied that the Red Cross was a neutral agency and emphasised the one-off nature of the deliveries of the parcels: ‘Fortunately we also met numerous working class women (and they really could use the bread well!) who spoke of a tip, a comforter thrown to us: According to De Rode October the bourgeois underground played on the famine; the CRM saw in the misery of the winter famine an illustration of the barbaric character of the imperialist world war and that those who ameliorate the worst horrors are, by doing just that, no real benefactors.
What attention did the CRM devote to the mass deportations of the Jews and to their fate in the camps? In De Rode October of November 1942 the Nazi’s racial concepts were appraised and demolished. A review of 1942 noted the massive deportations of that year. After that the paper was silent on the issue for a long time. In October 1944, in an aside, it was ventured that the deported Jews would return from their ‘misery and tortures’. In February 1945 there was a reaction to the report that in Poland three million Jews had been murdered:
We shudder when reading this. And we, who have almost all got Jewish friends, or perhaps Jewish family connections, deceive ourselves with the vague hope that maybe it is not that bad, and that more have been saved, or that it is propaganda.
This, then, clearly showed what had been the reasoning behind the remark of October 1944. The CRM interpreted the genocide as a proof of the barbarism of decaying capitalism and pointed out the hypocrisy of the Nazi propaganda about ‘plutocrats: It was further pointed out in the article that:
The destruction of the Jews in Europe will be one of the blackest pages of world history. It is amazing how, even after all this sorrow, a sly, businesslike anti-Semitism catches on here too ... but we swear that we, who see in the German proletariat, as well as in the Jews, the dupes and victims of Nazi barbarism, will hate and fight the assassins of our friends, family members and comrades until our last breath.
According to De Jong, help to Jewish escapers was notably the work of Socialists, Communists and, in a somewhat later period, Christians of the Reformed Church. The CRM, too, contributed their modest part. From the foregoing it will be clear that in the CRM publications little attention was devoted to the fate of the Jews. Although earlier some illegal papers already had published information about the holocaust, the process of repression that the CRM noted themselves was nearly general in the resistance, although they were rather more conscious of the grim fate of the deported Jews than was the mass of the population. In the illegal press little was written about the deportees. The CRM was not a positive exception in that respect.
On 30 April and 1 May 1943 there was for the first time since the February Strike, massive open workers’ resistance in the Netherlands. On Thursday 29 April it was announced that former Dutch prisoners of war (300,000 people) would be despatched to work in Germany. With this announcement the occupier made a big tactical mistake; no categories of exception were mentioned and the suggestion was made that all would be despatched simultaneously. The two days’ strike originated spontaneously in Twente and assumed a general character in many parts of the country. In the Randstad (roughly the territory between Amsterdam and Rotterdam) there was much less strike activity. The strike was broken by savage terror; 80 people were executed after summary trials, 95 people were shot in the streets, 400 people were badly wounded and 900 of those arrested were sent to concentration camps. In De Rode October the strike was called a ‘magnificent reaction to the repressive measures of German imperialism...never has such a strike wave, which has swept for some days over the Low Countries, been known in the Netherlands.’
There was extensive discussion as to why there had been strikes in the countryside and in the small towns but not in the big cities. According to the CRM, the main factor was that in the big cities the repression and terror were much greater. Yet the big cities would have been dragged along if there had not been a subsequent announcement that workers in factories producing for the German army were exempt from deportation. Also the railway personnel had not gone on strike. It was concluded that during February the countryside had left the cities to stand alone, but that now a fresh wind had come into the big cities from the countryside and the small towns:
The new coalition between the city dweller and the peasant will rebuild the political leadership of the big cities. A resistance movement without the big cities is doomed to fail.
According to the CRM, England and the USA had sabotaged the strike because no attention had been devoted to the strike on the radio transmitters; this proved that the Allies were afraid of independent action by the workers and peasants, and simply wanted a general uprising in the framework of the Second Front. [17] It was predicted that the deportation plans would be put into action gradually; massive evasion was called for to prevent the registration for employment of men between 18 and 35. The CRM was of the opinion, however, that evasion and hiding on such a scale were impossible. They advocated massive passive resistance and particularly called on the civil servants to sabotage the execution of the measure. This view was put forward not only in De Rode October, but also in a leaflet. According to the issue of De Rode October in which the leaflet was also included, this was the third leaflet of the CRM on the strike. The first two leaflets have, as far as is known, not been preserved.
It was asserted that many members of the CRM had participated in the strike: ‘by persuading the strikers and encouraging the struggle. Others passed on leaflets calling for the strike.’ The only known examples are from The Hague, of the three big cities, the one where the strike was most widespread. In view of the great concentration of the CRM in the three big cities it seems to be probable that the direct contribution of the CRM was limited to The Hague. Rein van der Horst was involved in a work stoppage in the Registrar’s office. More important was the strike at the Post Cheque and Giro Service where the (mainly female) personnel struck for two days. The CRM members Antoine Dolleman and Fritz Zeggelink worked there and had contacts there. An initiative was quickly taken to produce a leaflet which was typed at his work by Wout Tieleman and printed by Antoine Dolleman at his home. Thus the CRM was the first illegal group that reacted to the strike at the Giro Service. After the strike Antoine Dolleman was amongst those who were arrested; but in that case men only were dealt with, for the striking women were, according to the German authorities ‘laecherliche Jungfrauen’ (ridiculous young ladies). A week after the strike Dolleman was called for by the management and interrogated by the SD men Schmidt and Bark; on 27 May, when in fact the CRM no longer counted in it, he was arrested. Dolleman was kept prisoner in Scheveningen for ten weeks.
On the eve of the first strike day Antoine Dolleman took the leaflet, which had been distributed in The Hague by bicycle, to Piet van’t Hart in Rotterdam. Van ‘t Hart was overjoyed, as he had hoped for action from The Hague members. The effect of the strike on the CRM is apparent from his reaction. The contribution of the CRM to the strike was very small, but the fact that some members had participated in the strike and that they had been able to react to some extent with leaflets was an important matter to the CRM themselves. The issue of De Rode October appearing after the strike is characterised by an inspired tone. The CRM were convinced that they had proven themselves, and there was a call to reinforce the ranks of the organisation. The resoluteness and the self-confidence of the CRM had grown considerably, and the passivity during the strike of large parts of the prewar revolutionary milieu strengthened the CRM rather than weakened it. A slanging match was directed at these circles in the issue of De Rode October mentioned which makes clear what psychological mechanism was active here. [18]
On Sunday 17 September 1944 the Dutch government, under pressure from the Allies, called on the Dutch railway personnel to strike in support of the Allied military offensive. The railway management who, in close collaboration with the pre-war trade union leaders, had struggled against the authorities during the occupation only when the narrow interests of the enterprise were concerned, agreed; they saw the strike as a means that could only be used in the framework of rapidly approaching liberation. They also hoped by leading the strike explicitly to limit the influence of leftist tendencies among the workforce. The strike became a success but, because of the failure of the Allied offensive, it became a double-edged sword; as a reprisal, Seyss-Inquart decided to stop all food transport to the western part of the country. The railway personnel, however, could not go back and the strike lasted until the liberation. With this unexpected development the grip of the railway management on the strike lessened; in a number of places there was a political vacuum as far as financial support and help for the strikers was concerned, and that was filled by various illegal organisations.
Because the strike was directly linked with the Allied war plans the CRM placed themselves behind the strike only with hesitation. That the workers, notwithstanding the great risks, had followed the call indicated that they possessed an enormous strength; they had to understand, however, that in future this weapon had to be applied to their own bourgeoisie, and they should not let the government and the Allies use the strike. The conclusion in the first article on the strike was sufficiently vague: ‘The CRM does not therefore oppose the strike, insofar as it is directed against German imperialism’.
In the next issues of De Rode October this view was elaborated. In the first place the strike was not a consequence of the government’s call but of the hatred against the German repression; it was a proletarian action that was exploited by the western Allies. The CRM called for the formation of an Independent strike leadership, without bosses and managers. In case the Allied offensive succeeded the following demands had to be posed: the right to strike, which the railway personnel had not possessed since the 1903 strike, material improvements, freedom of organisation and an immediate end to the war. Early in November it was learnt that the occupier was making use of economic pressure to break the strike. The German workers who were running the railway traffic in the Netherlands should not be seen as scabs, because it was dangerous for them to stop work. The slogan of an immediate end of the war was brought forward as a means to unify a common struggle of German and Dutch workers.
From Het Kompas it appears that in the CRM the line on the railway strike was not undisputed. Several members advocated a more critical approach. Swartenberg was of the opinion that one could not speak of a proletarian action; the strike had to be converted into such. The leadership replied that they had also had problems in defining their standpoint, but they remained of the opinion that the protest against German rule was the central aspect of the strike. To this reply De Vries reacted: ‘This vision would indeed have been correct if the Dutch bourgeoisie did not, in the shape of the Allied armies, march beyond the Dutch boundaries:
According to De Vries the class character of the leadership determined the class character of the strike itself. De Vries called this the most difficult problem since the birth of the CRM, and expressed the hope that the editorial board would reconsider their standpoint. Piet van ’t Hart reacted and wrote that he enjoyed the businesslike tone of De Vries’ criticism. He pointed to the fact that all the members of the CRM were young and inexperienced where such tactical problems were concerned; the leadership, too, had only come to an agreement after much discussion. Van ‘t Hart again explained his conception. During the occupation the working class had been enslaved in a manner previously unknown, and each act of resistance with class methods against that enslavement was progressive. The precise moment when the strike broke out did not matter:
If we want to formulate things correctly we must say: the strike is a predominantly proletarian action called for and directed by the bourgeoisie, who try to use the anti-imperialist feeling of the masses for their own aims.
Van ‘t Hart further asked himself from whence the reservations against the strike derived; according to him, they were due to the isolation of the CRM, and to the lack of contact with broad layers of the workers:
It is, however, our duty to search for ways to obtain influence with this group of workers in future and to speak among them of our perspectives, if we don’t do that we are just academic know-alls.
Swartenberg, too, in his contribution, advocated a more active approach, for example the distribution of leaflets. As far as is known such activities did not, or scarcely, happened. In theory there existed, as has been said, some possibilities of playing such a role in the support of the strike, but one should keep in mind that the extremely difficult circumstances of the last year of the occupation limited those possibilities for a small group like the CRM. Nevertheless, it is clear that van ’t Hart put his finger on a weak spot of the CRM.
The CRM mainly consisted of members of the MLL-Front who had opposed the policy of Sneevliet. Besides these the CRM had some members from the pre-war GBL, the section of the Fourth International, of whom Santen was the most important individual. In addition, from July 1944 until January 1945 the independent group around Barend Luteraan, a colourful veteran from the workers’ movement, worked with the CRM in Amsterdam. During the war the CRM as a whole increasingly began to turn to the Fourth International, and Santen in particular worked for this.
In the autumn of 1942 the question arose as to whether the CRM considered itself as a continuation of the opposition in the MLL-Front. In the internal paper Over en Weer (To and Fro), which was in fact the first issue of Het Kompas, there was an article in which it was stated that the opening article in the first issue of De Rode October had been too positive towards Sneevliet and the MLL-Front. Sneevliet and his comrades had ‘in a brave way offered their lives for the cause of the workers’, but one could not recognise them as revolutionary Marxists’ in the best sense of the word’. Of the CRM more political clarity was demanded: ‘In a new paper of a new grouping one expects at least a declaration as why one is there and what one wants:
This criticism was sharply rejected in a reply by the editorial board; they referred to the opposition in the MLL-Front and explained that the first issue of De Rode October had appeared before the founding of the CRM and the break with Spartacus. The reply ended as follows:
If the writer of the article was a bit more willing to collaborate in a positive way instead of producing petty criticism then this would undoubtedly mean a strengthening of the revolutionary Marxist camp, at a time like the present when every revolutionary has the job of exerting all his efforts.
In view of the contents of the criticism it is plausible that it came from the side of the GBL; from the reply by the editorial board it can further be gathered that the person in question was not yet a member of the CRM, and that they wanted that to change.
In April 1943 the fallen leaders of the MLL-Front were commemorated in De Rode October. In this article vehement criticism of Sneevliet’s policy was expressed, notably regarding his orientation on the NAS, and his dropping of the defence of the Soviet Union. One went even so far as to say that political confusion and the underestimation of the dangers of illegality had led to the catastrophe that had struck the MLL-Front. Again they identified themselves with the tendency around Dolleman in the MLL-Front. About the GBL it was said that they had taken the correct standpoints, but that their tactics, leaving the RSAP, had led to isolation. These appreciations of the MLL-Front and the GBL were regularly repeated. Evolving political events strengthened the CRM in this judgement, as did information about foreign organisations with which the RSAP had collaborated before the war; parties like the English Independent Labour Party (ILP) had admitted such during the war.
In the Political Declaration of August 1943 the CRM came out clearly for the Fourth International. [19] On 25 June 1944 the leadership went one step further by adopting a resolution in which they said that, notwithstanding the breaking of contact, they considered themselves the Dutch section of the Fourth International. According to the leadership this decision was not to be seen as just a symbolic act, but as the expression of a consistent internationalism. They called on the cells to vote on the resolution, and it was noted that in a situation of legality a national conference would have been organised. In the following issue of Het Kompas it was reported that every member was in favour of the resolution.
One of the local groups also proposed to change the name of the organisation into that of the Revolutionary Marxist Party; the term ‘committee’ obviously suggested the lack of a concrete political programme. Small size was of no importance as far as calling themselves a party, since the Fourth International, too, called itself a world party. The leadership opposed this proposal, as the number of members would be of importance. ‘It would mean that we would make use of our secret underground nature to make propaganda by bluff’. [20]
It was admitted that the term ‘committee’ did not fully correspond with the existing situation, but also in view of familiarity the name CRM had to be maintained. The comparison with the Fourth International as a whole did not, according to the leadership, hold water; several sections did have a party basis, others had not. They wrote that they hoped to develop into a party as soon as possible. In the following issue of Het Kompas it was reported that all cells had expressed themselves against the proposal of changing the group name, although one district did not reply because communications had been severed.
A difference of opinion about the arguments for joining the Fourth International arose with some ex-members of the GBL inside the CRM, who thought that the leadership was too negative about the GBL. In particular they protested that the GBL had been attacked for a ‘shameful capitulation’ during the occupation. The leadership said that they were ready to withdraw this formulation, but stuck to their criticism of the GBL. Piet van ’t Hart wrote that the ex-GBL members, as well as the leadership, were of the opinion that a conflict over this matter did not make any sense:
We found each other on a common basis, we collaborated closely in the CRM, and there are, at present, practically no political differences anymore. From now on we are all CRMers...
Let us act closely and not degrade our organisation into a sect which starts discussing third rate problems at the most critical moments, while the most important things are neglected.
In De Rode October of August 1944 the decision to join the Fourth International was reported, and it was stated that they considered themselves as a part of the new International; in the issue of the middle of April 1945 the June 1944 resolution was also explicitly mentioned. During the occupation, however, no contacts with the Fourth International were made, notwithstanding a plan of Tieleman and an attempt by Piet and Cor van ’t Hart. [21] In the summer of 1943 they wrote that they did not have a single report about activities of the sections of the Fourth International, but that nevertheless they had full confidence in it. When in 1944 and 1945 reports came in about the role of the English Trotskyists in strikes and about the French Trotskyists in the Resistance, these were applauded.
They reacted with indignation to remarks from Spartacus that Trotskyists elsewhere in Europe would choose the Allied side; according to the CRM this could only concern individuals, because the programme of the Fourth International did not allow for capitulation. Immediately after the war the CRM made contact with the Fourth International, and a manifesto was published in De Rode October. It is remarkable how much the main features of the political line of the CRM agree with those of the Fourth International during the war. [22]
From its foundation Spartacus developed in a Council Communist direction. In the second half of 1944 this led to the affiliation of Spartacus to the greater part of the Groep van Internationale Communisten (Group of International Communists), a pre-war Council Communist group. Hardly anything is known of its numerical size and geographical distribution, whilst the circulation figures of its publications also give no definite answer about the significance of Spartacus in comparison with the CRM. My impression is that both groups were of equal size, but that the CRM made itself more conspicuous as an organisation. [23] But then in Trotskyism a much bigger role is attached to the construction of a revolutionary organisation than in Council Communism.
After taking into account the story of the birth of both groupings, it is not surprising that the CRM and Spartacus did not treat each other in a friendly way. The CRM constantly reproached Spartacus for its passivity, ‘helplessness’, ‘confusion’ and ‘dilettantism’:
Those who think they continue Sneevliet’s policy can, politically speaking, not even be named in his shadow, and have fallen into helpless repetitions of phrases and childlike bungling.
To the CRM Spartacus was a ‘worthy result of the degenerative process of the RSAP’ and activity with the objective of a merger was no longer deemed desirable:
We would, in that case, be obliged to accept also all those elements who, by their often criminal stupidities and total ineptitude for illegal work, present great dangers.
Notwithstanding the common characterisation of the war as imperialist, on nearly all important issues there existed great differences of opinion between the groups. We may mention here the attitude concerning left Social Democrats, the character of the Soviet Union, and according to the CRM, an inadequate raising by Spartacus of the Indonesian question and the lack of interest by Spartacus in championing the restoration of democratic rights. [24] However, the most important complex of issues involved the relationship between the revolutionary party, trade unions and workers’ councils. Spartacus had sharply broken with any form of trade unionism; their starting point was that workers councils had to be prepared by means of nuclei in the enterprises, basing this on the fact that the key to the power of the working class was in the workplace. The CRM considered this an ultra-leftist conception. One should try to build a leftist tendency in the mass trade unions, since nuclei would not automatically change into workers’ councils, for the latter could only come into existence in a revolutionary situation. To overestimate the importance of the level of activity in the workplace would, according to the CRM, lead to an underestimation of the problem of state power, and through that, an underestimation of the importance of the revolutionary party.
The CRM also argued against the proposition that, tactically, workers’ nuclei in the workplaces were the only possible form of organisation during the occupation; this argument was judged as understandable but nevertheless wrong. This work would be too dangerous and ineffective in circumstances such as the social chaos of 1944-45. Their own standpoint was sharply formulated thus:
‘In these rigid illegal circumstances the revolutionaries can, as long as this situation does not change in a revolutionary sense, such as proletarian resistance in Germany, take no other stand than to safeguard their own organisation as much as possible and make the greatest possible revolutionary propaganda against the imperialist war as well as exposing nationalist propaganda. (Such revolutionary propaganda was more important than the propaganda in the workplaces for cells, for such activity would be aimless and without real tasks.) Revolutionaries should work with all their strength for the construction of the revolutionary party which will be able to supply political leadership to the proletariat in the coming struggle.’
When judging this opinion various aspects have to be clarified. One may ask: what was the sense of the nuclei which Spartacus tried to build with other far left people if they were isolated from the overwhelming majority of the workers? [25] The argument of social disruption, used by the CRM, was realistic too. But in contrast to the MLL-Front the CRM did not call for an organisation in the enterprises in the form of nuclei or committees in any sense. The CRM stand, as rendered in the above quotation, seems to be a theoretical justification for their own isolation.
The same article in De Rode October was the only one in which attention was given to the formation of a unified trade union movement; they wrote that they acclaimed such a trade union federation, on the basis of one organisation per branch of industry. From the article it appears that the CRM itself was not involved in the initiative to form a unitary trade union federation. [26] After the war the CRM tried to build an opposition in the Eenheidsvakcentrale EVC (Unitarian Trade Union Central), but in that arena one could not build on the position held during the occupation.
It must be clear that the breach between both heirs of the Sneevliet movement could not be healed. Apart from the matter-of-fact aspect of the differences of opinion, the split had led to bitterness in both groups. The quotations of the CRM above speak for themselves. It has been mentioned before that Poppe explained the split in terms of a Trotskyist plot. In his conversation with Vereeken in 1944 Poppe complained above all about the discussion and the ‘organisational methods’ of the CRM, and he belittled the political differences of opinion. So the CRM, contrary to their co-thinkers in Belgium and France, had, in his eyes, not gone on to support the nationalist movement. How much this conversation can be believed is a very moot question. Vereeken was a dissident Trotskyist and no admirer of the Spartacus’ Council Communism; it seems that in this conversation Poppe took this properly into account.
Notwithstanding the split, personal contacts continued to exist in various towns. In Arnhem there was somebody who could not accept the split, and who distributed material for both groups. When Willy Dolleman had gone into hiding in Enschede, and had no more contact with the CRM, he distributed the publications of Spartacus. In Rotterdam the CRM obtained practical assistance from Spartacus members. We have mentioned already the collaboration between Andries Dolleman with Leen Molenaar, by means of which the CRM got its ration cards.
9. British readers will note that Dolle Dinsdag occurred because of the attempt by the British to seize the Rhine crossings at Arnhem. The British defeat here condemned two-thirds of the Dutch civilian population, who were still under German occupation, to a winter of dreadful misery. [Note by Editor]
10. De Jong, too, mentions that the expectation of a general radicalisation was a reason for ‘non-Communist circles’ advocating the postponement of elections.
11. Even at the end of the occupation the CRM did not have a Programme of Action. In Het Kompas a proposal for such a programme was made by Barend Luteraan, writing under the pseudonym C.H. Bonebrakker. Another member writing under the pseudonym A. Schepers reacted positively to this initiative, but criticised the content of the proposal. There was no further discussion of this subject in Het Kompas.
12. Concerning the attempt on Rauter’s life they wrote: ‘Nobody can doubt that we do not mourn the fate of the bloodhound, who is co-responsible for the death of countless Socialist workers, including close comrades of ours. But exactly for this reason we deem ourselves justified in raising our voices against these kinds of acts of individual terror which time and again signify the death of numerous prisoners. De Rode October no 41.
13. Het Kompas made an exception for Jewish members.
14. Herman Drenth’s argument that the students’ resistance was outside the CRM’s sphere of interest is not convincing. It is true that the CRM consisted of workers and not of students, but that does not mean that the students’ resistance should have been disregarded. The MLL-Front was interested in those struggles in the autumn of 1940.
15. In the third year of the occupation about 160,000 were sent to Germany, in the fourth year, after the April-May strikes, the number was, and in spite of increased German pressure, only 107,000 and of these 97,000 were told to go in the first half of the year and barely 14,000 in the second half. The labour deportation had come to a standstill. According to the German tax records there were another 80,000 workers in breach of contract at the beginning of 1944.
16. Quoting the CPN’s paper De Waarhreid. 10 May 1942: ‘The crime is to go to work in the German war factories. There is no greater crime against the Fatherland and Humanity possible.’ However, working in Germany does seem to have been a discussion issue in the CPN and De Waarhreid often published letters from workers working in Germany.
17. According to de Jong the Dutch government in London was, for want of sufficient contact, not, or hardly, acquainted with the strike. When on Sunday 2 May they got more information, the Minister-President Gerbrandy asked for Allied military assistance. Churchill, however, replied that this was out of the question.
18. ‘That offers have to be made, that one has to risk one’s life, that everything is grey and unromantic and not as beautiful and sunny as in Gorter’s poems, yes that our “leftist” “Council Communist”, “Anarchist” and eternally being “with the masses” friends, these “resting” class warriors, did not foresee. All these heroic “fighters” of legal times, these petit-bourgeois, waiting for the return of satiated Dutch imperialism with its “democracy” so that they can quietly write down their phrases in their little papers, without risking their learned heads all these “leaders”, capitulators, liquidators from ultra-left to right, from “Anarchists”, “Council Communists”, to former NAS bureaucrats and runaway RSAP and BRS men, proclaim that ones propaganda, that it is not the time for that, that one should save the “vanguard” for the coming “struggle” and if then the struggle is here and it is dangerous, why one should again save the “vanguard” for the coming “struggle”, etc, until eternity, and meanwhile one hopes deep in one’s heart for the Second Front!!! ... every honest revolutionary worker who followed our doings will have to recognise that no single other revolutionary group, or organisation did anything during this mass action.’ De Rode October, no.10, May 1943.
19. ‘The great significance which the Fourth International will have in present and future developments, makes it necessary explicitly to pronounce for it as a revolutionary movement.’ De Rode October, no.14, August/September 1943.
20. Shortly after the end of the occupation the leadership changed their opinion and at the Christmas Congress, 1945, the CRM decided, from then on, to call themselves the Revolutionair Communistische Partij (RCP).
21. ‘Although under the occupation we succeeded in making contact with foreign comrades we met, among others, a Viennese soldier, a member of the Fourth International the very difficult situation in the last year was such that it meant that every contact was broken off.’ De Rode October no.48, July 1945.
22. For the viewpoint of the Fourth International see Les Congres de la IVe Internationale, 1940-1946 and the additions to that in the Cahiers Leon Trotsky 23 (1985) pp.87-116. The basis for this convergence was laid in the ’thirties by the positions taken by Trotsky.
23. As from the summer of 1942 Spartacus published a duplicated bulletin which became monthly in December 1944. At that time it had a circulation of 500. From October 1944 they also had a weekly news bulletin with a circulation of 5,000. Spartacus was especially active in the western and eastern parts of the country. During his interview with Vereeken. Poppe claimed that Spartacus was active in 14 towns, but gave no information about their numbers. The monthly bulletin of Spartacus was characterised by a higher level of abstraction than the CRM publications current political issues were hardly touched upon.
24. In an aside the CRM also unjustifiably suggested that Spartacus would take the side of the Allies in the war.
25. Spartacus was inter alia involved with the paper Arbeiders-Eenheid (Workers’ Unity) in which it participated with syndicalists and Anarchists. The collaboration with De Vonk was shortlived.
26. In the Netherlands, as in other continental nations of Europe, the trade union movement is split into different federations affiliated to different political parties. The movement for a unified TU federation was clearly a very important development. [Note by Editor]
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