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I N T E R N A T I O N A L  
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WHAT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE ON THE  
FACTIONAL STRUGGLE INSIDE THE CCP

by  
Peng Shu-chi

In November 1965, when Mao Tse-tung launched the so-called Great Cultural Revolution, a tremendous struggle broke out between two major factions represented by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. During the subsequent two years, this struggle has intensified and made itself felt in every fiber of Chinese society. Not only the party and its youth, but also the trade unions and the government at all levels have been thrown into the greatest confusion. Deep going divisions have even developed in the People's Liberation Army. Bloody clashes have taken place throughout China, and the country as a whole still remains today under the threatening clouds of this great political storm.

In the last two years the International has not only found itself without any common position with which to intervene in the Chinese events, but also in a state of confusion and with serious conflicting political positions. To clarify this confusion in order to arrive at a correct and common position, let me first enumerate the three major political differences which have developed.

1. Comrade George Novack in his article, "The Political Crisis in China," (International Socialist Review, Fall 1966) after analyzing the Chinese events, stated in the name of the SWP:

"At the same time we have a responsibility to the revolutionary Communists, intellectuals, students and youth in China who are being unjustly victimized and slandered for demanding more freedom of thought and expression and the rectification of errors committed by the present leadership. We are on their side in the struggle for greater democracy and a more correct course." (p. 144)

2. The statement on the Chinese events adopted by the IEC plenum, March 1967, stated:

"But the information is not sufficiently clear to permit the International to identify itself with any of the tendencies or factions in the Chinese CP now contending with each other."

(World Outlook, May 19, 1967, p. 523)

3. The Argentinian comrades in their statement on the March 1967 IEC discussion resolution stated:

"The Maoist bonapartism has played, by launching the cultural revolution, a progressive role, leaving aside all its grotesque, bureaucratic aspects, because it initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy, which has its own dynamics, despite the bonapartist plans of Mao-Lin Piao.

"That this mobilization has to be supported, conditionally to make its anti-bureaucratic motive more precise and to criticize its terrible Maoist limitations, leadership and ideology;

"That this critical support must not limit our active intervention in the mobilization which provoked the cultural revolution, because only this intervention, united to that of the masses, will prove to be able to overcome in the facts the Maoist leadership;" (Internal Bulletin of the United Secretariat of the 4th International, Vol. 1967 No. 7, Oct. 1967. International Discussion Bulletin on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, No. 4)

These three positions are quite clearly in contradiction with each other, especially numbers 1 and 3. The task we are faced with now is to decide which of these interpretations conforms closest to the actual development of the Chinese events, in order that we might adopt it as a common basis for the International's work. To make this decision, we must begin by examining and analyzing each of the above interpretations.

#### Siding with those who are unjustly victimized

Comrade Novack's article, quoted above, was originally given as a speech on July 1, 1966; that is, over one year ago. At that time there was much less information available on the Chinese events than now. Nevertheless, even then Comrade Novack was able to say: "From the accusations against the dissident intellectuals and other sources, it is possible to discern the vague contours of their criticism and the trend of their thinking.

"1. They doubt the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung.

"2. They claim to be better Communists than the present leaders.

"3. They display 'sympathy' for the Krushchev revisionists; that is, they want to unite the 'socialist countries' in face of a possible attack by the United States, heal the breach, and renew the Russian alliance.

"4. They have criticized the excesses of the 'Great Leap Forward' and such wasteful efforts as attempting to produce steel in backyard furnaces.

"5. They seek changes in economic policy and agrarian reforms.

"6. They demand more intellectual liberty, freedom of expression and the right to dissent from the official line.

"7. They may even have dared to suggest that Mao step down on grounds of health or age.

"Taken together, these positions would constitute a serious oppositional program...." (p. 142)

The tumultuous events of the last year have proven, in general, the correctness of these points as well as Comrade Novack's view of their seriousness. These events have also proven correct Comrade Novack's insight that "The publicly assailed writers, experts and scholars may be surrogates for the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and the army, embracing those dissidents who are discontented with the results of the foreign and domestic policy in recent years..." The events have certainly shown that Wu Han, Teng To, Liao Mo-sha, Tien Han and others were the surrogates for

the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and army, such as, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-yi and others.

How is it that Comrade Novack was so accurate in his analysis? In my opinion, such accuracy was not accidental. Nor was it an accident that Comrade Novack's conclusion was similar to that of the Chinese section's, even though there was no collaboration between them. Comrade Novack as well as the Chinese section merely considered the objective facts and applied to them the method of Marxism.

### Neutrality

The body of the March 1967 IEC discussion resolution was taken from the draft prepared by Comrade Livio Maitan, and was published with corrections by the United Secretariat nine months after Comrade Novack's article. During that nine months, the struggle between Mao's and Liu's factions escalated to new heights, and the basis of the conflict became increasingly clear, especially from the information in the wall posters and articles published by the Maoists attacking their opponents. Nevertheless, the IEC document still maintained that the information was "not sufficiently clear." This would tend to show that either the author of the document was prejudiced or he had not grasped the essence of what was taking place.

Immediately following the above quote, the IEC document tries to justify its position of neutrality in the following way:

"The lack of information is largely due to the Stalinist methods employed by the Mao faction against its opponents, which we energetically condemn. As for Mao's opponents, such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who held and who still hold considerable means of making known their political line had they so desired, their silence on this subject compels us to be relatively cautious concerning the contents of their policies."

This justification is misleading in two ways:

1. In October 1966 during a work meeting of the central committee of the CCP, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were subjected to serious attacks by the Maoists and were forced to make self criticism. Since then, not only have they lost all "means of making known their political line," but also, they have been held in the custody of their residences under close supervision. Under these conditions, one can easily understand that they have no possibility, whatsoever, to put forward their political line nor to answer the many attacks and slanders levelled at them by the Maoists. If the IEC document's condemnation of Liu's and Teng's silence is not irony, then it can only reflect an absurd ignorance of the Chinese events.

2. We should of course, "energetically condemn" "the Stalinist methods employed by the Mao faction against its opponents." But this does not mean there is insufficient information. We should also examine and analyze the attacks of the Maoists in order to

determine "the contents of their (Liu's and Teng's) policies." This has been a traditional procedure in the Trotskyist movement when examining a struggle inside a Stalinist party since the days when Trotsky himself used it in making his analysis of the events inside the Soviet Union. But nowhere in the IEC document does one find even an attempt at such an analysis.

It seems the idea of the IEC document is to put off taking a position before Liu and Teng have formally put forth their position. If this is the case, then it will be necessary to wait until Liu and Teng have captured power and the struggle is ended. But as Marxists, it is our obligation to intervene in the present struggle in order to help determine its outcome. We must, therefore, examine the Maoist attacks and accusations. For example, let us consider the following points:

1. The fundamental difference between Mao and Liu developed in 1958, when Mao arbitrarily instituted and carried out the Great Leap Forward and People's Commune policies. Comrade Novack noted in his article cited above, the difference on these policies. I myself, noted it more concretely in my interviews with Comrade Antonio Farien, especially the last one, "The Relationship and Differences Between Mao Tse Tung and Liu Shao-chi" -- submitted to World Outlook last August -- in which I gave an accounting in some detail of this as well as the other major differences. (See W.O., August 12, 1966, and Feb. 10, 1967) The development of the events over the past six months has more than confirmed this judgment.

Mao's attack against Wu Han's drama, Hai Jui Dismissed which began the Cultural Revolution, was not by accident. Wu Han's drama of Hai Jui was really about Peng Teh-huai who Mao had purged in August 1959 at the Lushan meeting for opposing the Great Leap Forward and especially the People's Communes. Because of his opposition, Peng Teh-huai became a symbol for all those who were opposed to Mao's policies.

Here we must note the position taken by Liu Shao-chi during and after the Lushan Meeting. The Red Guard newspaper, Red Guards in the Capital had this to say about Liu Shao-chi:

"At a meeting called by the central committee, which was attended by 78 cadres in January 1962, he made a revisionist report. He violently attacked the Three Red Banners (The Three Red Banners are: 1. General Line, 2. Great Leap Forward, and 3. Peoples Communes), and exaggerated to the utmost errors and mistakes in our work. He felt that the temporary economic difficulties were due to these errors and mistakes -- 30% due to natural disasters, 70% due to artificial disasters'. He attacked the 1959 struggle against the Rightist (Peng Teh-huai) as being excessive, and even said, in an attempt to rehabilitate the Rightists, that the struggle itself was a mistake. He maliciously said that the party lacks democracy and that party life is a 'brutal struggle' and a 'pitiless fight', attacking Chairman Mao's correct leadership of the

central committee." (Feb. 22, 1967 -- "The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi")

This shows that Liu was not only against Mao's policies, but he was also for the rehabilitation of Peng Teh-huai and his followers and for more democratic measures in the party.

The People's Daily and Red Flag in August 1967 (see Peking Review, No. 34, 1967), published excerpts from a resolution on Peng Teh-huai's case adopted at the Lushan Meeting in 1959. This resolution condemned Peng Teh-huai for branding the Great Leap Forward and Peoples Communes policies as adventurism and "petty bourgeois fanaticism". These words clearly reveal Peng Teh-huai's position.

More important is the People's Daily editorial of August 16, 1967, which stated:

"It was this person (Liu Shao-chi) who at the Lushan Meeting put his utmost efforts into a counterrevolutionary double dealing tactic, and actively backed Peng Teh-huai's anti-party activities....After the Lushan Meeting he came out into the open, slandering the general line as having been put forward blindly, the Great Leap Forward as being 'brought about in a rush' causing 'disproportions in the economy', alleging that the 'people's communes were set up too early', and 'there is danger of disintegration.' He even made the absurd assertion that 'the Lushan Meeting made a mistake' and that 'it was wrong to oppose Right opportunism.'" (Peking Review, No. 35, 1967, p. 7)

If the above ideas expressed by Liu Shao-chi are not completely correct, they are, nonetheless, progressive and reflect the moods of the worker and peasant masses in China as well as the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the CCP's cadres.

2. De-Stalinization and opposition to Mao's own cult and personal dictatorship are the most uncompromising questions dividing the Mao-Lin and Liu-Peng factions.

During the discussion at the 8th Congress of the CCP in September 1956 on Krushchev's 20th Congress speech in which he denounced Stalin's personal cult and some of his crimes, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and many other leaders voiced their agreement with Krushchev's actions. It was for this reason that the 8th Congress acting on the initiative of Liu Shao-chi (see the Red Guard newspaper, Ching Kangshan, "See the Ugly Face of Liu-Shao chi," reprinted in Ming Bao, Jan. 18, 19, 1967) changed the CCP's statutes by omitting all references to Mao Tse-tung's thought. Teng Hsiao-ping gave the report motivating the change of the statutes in which he stated:

"The significance of opposing the personal cult was explained energetically at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This will

make a great impression on every communist party throughout the world." "The important contribution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is to inform us that regarding a person as a god has led to very criminal results." "The personal cult is an old, historical, and social phenomenon, and it is to a certain degree reflected in the life of our party and society. Our task is to carry out successfully, consistently, and with determination the directives of the central committee against individual prominence and personal glorification." (see Red Guard newspaper, The Red Flag Battle, "Teng Hsiao-ping Is One of the People in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road", reprinted in Ming Bao, Jan. 21, 1967)

The above is a reflection of the atmosphere inside the CCP on the question of de-Stalinization. Under the pressure of this atmosphere, Mao was forced to tolerate the de-Stalinization measures even though they meant severe personal blows. Nevertheless, it is clear from the history since the 8th Congress that Mao never accepted the de-Stalinization measures. He held Liu and Teng responsible for his personal loss and took every opportunity to retaliate against them and regain his old prestige. It is for this major reason that Mao's Cultural Revolution has singled out Liu and Teng as the major enemies, and exulted Mao's cult to unbelievable heights.

3. Mao's policies in the literature, art and educational fields are comparable to, if not stricter than, those put into practice in the Soviet Union by Zhdanov. Hence criticism continually arose among the cultural and educational workers. Often there were sharp antagonisms between Mao and leaders in the cultural and educational fields, and these antagonisms are the origin of Mao's accusation that these people were the Chinese version of the Hungarian "Petofi circles."

Basing herself on many reliable and varied sources, Chen Pi-lan in an interview has described in some detail a few of the most important struggles that have taken place on the questions related to literature, art, and education. (see W.O., July 14, 1967) I will not repeat here the rich and pertinent information contained in this interview, but will draw to the comrades' attention one important fact. In his political report to the 8th Congress of the CCP, Liu Shao-chi emphasized the point that the party should not interfere arbitrarily in the work of the scientists or artists. On the basis of Liu's report, the Congress adopted a resolution which stated:

"In order to assure the prosperity of the sciences and arts, we must firmly insist on the perspectives of 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom and Hundred Schools Contend' policy. It would be a mistake to use administrative methods to interfere arbitrarily in the sciences and arts."

The above shows that the ideas of Liu on the questions of literature, art and education are much different than those of Mao. Because of Liu's more tolerant position on these questions, most of the cadres in the cultural, educational, and scientific fields have sided with him against Mao. It was for this reason that Mao singled out the leading cadres in the cultural and educational fields as the first targets of attack in his Cultural Revolution.

4. Although there is much less information concerning the differences of foreign policy, one can generally agree with Comrade Novack's observation that "they (the opposition) want to unite the 'socialist countries' in face of possible attack by the United States, heal the breach and renew the Russian alliance." This has been confirmed by the exposure of the ideas of Lo Jui-ching, the ex chief of staff of the army. From the military point of view, Lo opposed the break with the Soviet Union.

After launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao pushed China's relations with the Soviet Union to a point just short of a complete break. At the same time he made clear his point of refusing to unite with other "socialist countries," especially the Soviet Union, for the defense of Vietnam against US imperialism. This shows, if only in the negative, that differences exist between Mao and Liu on foreign policy, especially in regards to the Soviet Union.

5. It seemed that the Shanghai events raised even new differences between Mao's and Liu's factions, mainly the question of the people's living standards. Yet this difference has existed for a long time.

Soon after the CCP took power, Mao put forward a program to build socialism by appealing to the revolutionary spirit of the masses in the name of his thought. Hence, he created the atmosphere of sacrifice, severely limiting the improvement of the masses' standard of living. Liu, on the other hand, felt it was impossible to build socialism by not improving the living standards of the masses, that is, to ask the masses to sacrifice without compensation. Therefore, Liu emphasized, as well, in his political report to the 8th Congress, the necessity of improving the living standards of the people. And in the same resolution based on Liu's report cited above, we find the following:

"If the state takes for itself too large a proportion of the national income and does not pay proper attention to improving the people's living standards not to their interests and personal needs, then harm will be done to raising the productivity of labor and to the activity of the masses in building socialism, i.e., harm to the interests of socialism."

From Mao's point of view, to improve the living standards of the people, is to promote material incentives, which is for him the revisionist road. Mao arbitrarily instituted the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes policies in order to exploit to the utmost the labor of the masses; they were forced to work longer hours than



before for less pay. The dissatisfaction and resentment this produced among the masses is still a major factor in Chinese life, and it was around these very feelings that the opposition to Mao was able to organize the masses to defend themselves from the attacks of Mao's Red Guards. By giving concessions to the workers and peasants such as increasing wages and other benefits, the opposition induced the workers and peasants to resist and even strike against Mao's policies. This culminated with the massive strikes last January (1967) in Shanghai, Nanking, Nanchang, Canton and many other places. After Mao took the power in Shanghai with the army and put down the strikes, he withdrew all the concessions and accused the opposition of corrupting the masses, i.e., "economism" and "revisionism". Since these events the question of the people's living standards has become a major difference between the two contending factions.

\* \* \*

The above five points are thoroughly documented in the many Maoist articles attacking Liu, Teng, and other important figures in the Opposition. If these five points together with comrade Novack's seven points noted above and others outlined in my interviews are not enough to "constitute a serious oppositional program," they do show that the opposition represented by Liu and Teng is a reformist tendency within the CCP which reflects more or less the aspirations of the masses and is, therefore, progressive.

The IEC document did not examine or analyze the difference between the two factions. We must ask why? The main reason is the failure of the author to employ the Marxist method. On this point the Argentinian comrades have correctly criticized the IEC document in their "Statement on the March 1967 IEC Resolution." They stated:

"That this resolution contains omissions and dangerous methodological errors,...it does not say that all interbureaucratic differences, when they receive such a dramatic and grievous character, reflect in themselves deep class pressures and not the other way around; that merely political or tactical inner bureaucratic differences receive afterwards a class character;"

In the IEC document the method of Marxism was abandoned for that of impressionism. The struggle was only superficially analyzed, hence, the assertion that it was only an "interbureaucratic conflict." (see comrade Maitan's article, "Stormy Internal Conflicts in China --1," W.O., Oct. 7, 1966) With this abstract formula -- "interbureaucratic conflict" -- one is not obliged to analyze the differences separating the contending factions nor the social origins of those differences. This abstract formula presupposes that the two factions are essentially the same and therefore demands a position of neutralism, i.e., no support for either side. This was the theme of the United Secretariat's statement of November 1966.

Although the IEC document (March 1967) dropped all mention of the "interbureaucratic conflict" formula, it proceeded along the very

same lines as those of the U.S. statement of November. Describing different phases of the development of the Chinese events the IEC document never mentions what the struggle is about nor the different political positions involved.

The IEC's analysis is not only superficial, but in several places it distorts the facts. For example, it gives credit to the Maoists for having initiated the Shanghai strikes. It then states that the Maoists split in face of the strikes over the question of giving concessions to the masses. This idea was developed by both comrades Livio Maitan and Pierre Frank in several articles. (see W.O., March 10, 1967 and August 25, 1967) Comrade Maitan states in one of his articles:

"....the Shanghai leadership has been Mao's main support when the crisis was touched off and ... the city committee of the party decided unanimously to publish the famous article against Wu Han."

The fact is that the Shanghai leadership were not "Mao's main support." Their position can be described as neutralism. When Mao ordered Yao Wen-yuan's article attacking Wu Han's drama to be published in Wenhui Bao and Jiefang Ribao, the Shanghai leadership did not consider the matter that important, since it only involved the criticism of one individual. Therefore, they did not oppose Mao's order. However, the serious development of the events following Wu Han's disgrace, especially the dismissal of the entire Peking Municipal leadership and the Red Guards attacks on many high ranking officials of the party as well as on local party committees throughout the country, forced the Shanghai committee to adopt certain measures in order to protect themselves. Hence they began to organize the masses and to give them concessions. This resistance on the part of the Shanghai leadership forced Mao to utilize the loyalty of the army to suppress the strikes of the workers. Almost the entire leadership of the Shanghai Municipal party committee as well as the leading cadres of the party in the unions, factories, and other economic institutions, along with the editors and staffs of Wenhui Bao and Jiefang Ribao, were subsequently purged. The concessions which had been given to the workers were then rescinded by the Maoists. All of this resulted in an economic paralysis, which prompted Chou En-lai to criticize the exclusion of all the original cadres from the new leading committees. An alliance between the army, Red Guards, and certain original cadres -- the "triple alliance" -- was then put forward as the correct means of constituting the new leading bodies and carrying out the Cultural Revolution.

The description of the Shanghai events by comrades Maitan and Frank were not based upon the concrete events, but rather upon fictions of their imagination. Their claim that the Shanghai leadership supported Mao, that the Maoists split in the face of the workers' strike, are absolutely contrary to the facts.

When the Cultural Revolution was launched, many regional, provincial, and local leaderships took a neutral or wait and see attitude. It was only after the struggle had developed to the stage where their own positions were threatened, that they began to take a definite position of resisting Mao. The Shanghai leadership is a good example as well as the provincial leaderships in Kwangtung and Hupeh.

Many of the army leaders also took a neutralist position at the beginning. For example, Chen Tsai-tao, the commander in Wuhan, after witnessing the severe and slanderous attacks against people like Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu etc., and after seeing the Red Guard attacks in Wuhan, changed his original position of neutralism to that of resisting the attacks by the Red Guards and Maoists.

It is unfortunate that the authors of the IEC document did not take such important information into consideration.

### Critical Support to the Cultural Revolution

The demand by the Argentinian comrades to give critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution, is in reality, a demand that we support Mao's purge of the Liu-Teng faction. The "16 Points" resolution adopted by the 11th plenum of the CCP's central committee on August 8, 1966, pointed out that the main object of the Cultural Revolution was to "struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road." The subsequent events have clearly shown that this meant the purge of the leaders in Liu's faction, such as Liu himself, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu, Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching, as well as many regional and provincial leaders, such as the first secretary of the North bureau Li Hsueh-feng, the first secretary of the Northwest bureau Liu Lan-tao, the first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal committee Chen Pai-chen, the Mayor of Shanghai Tsao Ti-chiu, and almost all the leaders in the provincial committees of Kiangsi, Shansi, Heilungkiang, Shantung, Chinghai, and Kweichow.

The only reason the Argentinian comrades give to justify their demand for critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution is the following:

"--The Maoist bonapartism has played, by launching the cultural revolution, a progressive role, leaving aside all its grotesque, bureaucratic aspects, because it initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy..." (emphasis added)

The argument was advanced much earlier by comrade Frank in his article on the Shanghai events in which he said:

"...we cannot at all condemn an appeal to the masses against a bureaucratized party and apparatus, even if this appeal originates from a wing of the bureaucracy....We already noted

the possibility that certain appeals of the Maoists along the lines of equalitarian demands, even if they were demagogic, would not fail to have consequences." (W.O. March 10, 1967)  
If the Maoists actually appealed "to the masses against a bureaucratized party and apparatus ... along the lines of equalitarian demands," then one must admit that such appeals are progressive, and therefore, we should give critical support to those who voice them i.e. the Maoists.

The opinion clearly stated by comrade Frank above was also one of the themes of the statement issued by the United Secretariat in November 1966. I already made a short criticism of that statement in a letter to the March 1966 IEC plenum in which I stated:

"Moreover, if the ideas expressed in the statement that the struggle is only an 'interbureaucratic struggle' and that Mao faction has appealed to the masses against bureaucracy using equalitarian slogans, are really considered to be true, then, it is necessary to ask why the statement did not give critical support to Mao's faction rather than take a neutralist position? Why did the statement hold back from adopting clearly the logical conclusion of the ideas it put forward?"

The Secretariat's statement did not say that we should give critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution, nevertheless, the ideas it expressed definitely imply that we should or, at least, lead to that position, and now the Argentinians are only logically demanding that we adopt it.

The fundamental analysis advanced by the Argentinian comrades is essentially the same as Healy's group and not much different from Swaback's or Huberman's and Sweezy's of Monthly Review. They too, started from the assumption that Mao organized the student masses to fight bureaucracy. This assumption, however, raises two very important questions: How were the Red Guards organized and what means were employed in the fight against bureaucracy? These two aspects were dealt with by comrades Novack and Hansen in their answer to Monthly Review:

"Schools were shut down and millions of youth were turned loose. They were then offered a special privilege that would be attractive even in a wealthy capitalist country; namely, taking a trip at government expense to Peking. Transportation, free lodging and free meals were provided to a large proportion of these prospective candidates for the new organization.

"The policy was to line up these youth on the side of one of the contending factions by such means and inveigle them into adopting its factional platform without being informed of what was intended, without giving the opposition currents an opportunity to present their views in a fair debate, and, in fact, with the opposition smeared and branded from the beginning without a hearing as disloyal and even counterrevolutionary, a 'miserable handful' of monsters, demons, and ghosts."

"The real 'crime' of the accused leaders is not that they have been plotting to bring back capitalism but that they have serious differences with the Mao-Lin faction. Their views are falsified to discredit them in the eyes of the masses and to destroy them politically, if not physically.

"These polemical methods which Mao and his men learned in the school of Stalinism, first applied against the Trotskyists. ... There are no innovations in the pattern beyond peculiarities of style in applying it and even these are not very novel." (See the pamphlet Behind China's "Great Cultural Revolution", Merit Publishers, p. 47-48 and 52)

This explains very well how "Maoist bonapartism ... initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy" and the methods that were used. If the Argentinian comrades have come to the conclusion that Mao's actions have been progressive, then, they are on the same path which has already been blazed by Monthly Review, Healy, and Swabeck.

The Argentinian comrades made a valuable contribution to the discussion when they criticized the IEC's "dangerous methodological errors." However, they themselves have failed to utilize the methodological procedures which they advocated. They failed to mention let alone describe and prove what "class pressures" are reflected by either the Mao-Lin faction or the Liu-Teng faction. It is only implied that the Liu-Teng faction represents the hardened bureaucratic elements who have been purged by the Maoists, the more progressive elements among the bureaucracy, and therefore, we are asked to give critical support to Mao. If the Argentinian comrades continue to insist on their position, using such methods and taking such light minded attitude, then, one cannot seriously discuss with them, and can only express regret.

### Political Revolution and Neutralism

The second paragraph in the IEC document of March 1967 reads:

"In the course of the violent struggle which resulted from this crisis of leadership, and in particular due to the forms taken by the "Great Cultural Revolution" the party, state, trade union, youth apparatuses, etc., were upset from top to bottom. For the same reasons, the relationships among the leaders, the apparatuses, and the masses also underwent fundamental changes. For the first time since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the masses, and in particular the proletarian masses of the large cities, were mobilized in a process the logical culmination of which is an anti-bureaucratic political revolution."

This description and perspective of the Chinese events should be emphasized, especially the perspective of the "anti-bureaucratic political revolution." This is the first time since reunification

that the International has formally taken a position in favor of political revolution in China. However, the IEC document in no way showed why political revolution was necessary. It did not characterize the CCP as a Stalinist party nor its regime as a bureaucratic dictatorship. If one does not illustrate these two points, then he has no theoretical basis for a demand of political revolution.

In the International there are several differing opinions as to the nature of the CCP and its regime. As far as I know, however, only the SWP and the Chinese section have extensively discussed the Chinese question and adopted a definite position -- for political revolution. (see the SWP resolution, The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath, Discussion Bulletin A-31, Oct. 1955; and On the Nature of the Chinese Communist Party and its Regime -- Political Revolution or Democratic Reform? by S.T. Peng, SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 4, March 1961) It seems as though the overwhelming majority of the other sections in the International have yet to seriously discuss and adopt a definite position.

The majority of the leading comrades in the International following the 1949 Chinese revolution, took the position that with the capture of power by the CCP it was no longer a Stalinist party, and the subsequent government established by it was not a bureaucratic dictatorship. This analysis, of course, ruled out any need for a political revolution. Now the IEC document puts forth the perspective of an "antibureaucratic political revolution." Therefore, if the nature of the CCP and its regime are not clarified in the present discussion, it is inevitable that only confusion and new contradictions will develop.

In addition and even more important, the IEC document put forth the perspective of political revolution without mentioning the social basis of the two contending factions. The lack of such an analysis cannot direct the masses onto the road of political revolution, but on the contrary, only confuse them and objectively help the more reactionary elements -- the Maoists.

What does the neutralism actually mean? In essence, it means that it is not necessary to intervene in the present struggle. In other words, it is not necessary to give critical support to one side against the other. In the light of such tumultuous and historical events which are taking place in China today, neutralism that is, standing by and regarding the events as a spectator -- can only be described as the most irresponsible position for revolutionaries. And any objection to the effect that we are not interested in the struggle between Mao's and Liu's factions, but rather interested in directing the masses onto the road of political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy as a whole, can only reflect either an ignorance of Marxism or a manifestation of sectarianism. It is not the nature of any mass movement to realize at the outset the nature of a bureaucratic regime and the necessity of a political revolution. Such a realization comes only through direct experiences. At the present the masses in China are only coming to realize which of the two contending factions is more in tune with their own interests.

The masses, at first, always support the reformist tendencies, and it is only after they have gone through certain experiences with them, will they realize that even the reformists are unable to solve the urgent problems at hand. In other words, the masses in China will come to realize the necessity of political revolution mainly through their own experiences and not from someone standing on the side lines propagating for political revolution.

The present differences between Mao and Liu are becoming very clear. On the one hand, Mao still maintains that the Great Leap Forward and Peoples Communes policies were correct; demands the utmost servility in the scientific, educational and cultural fields; absolutely refuses any concessions to improve the living standards of the masses; refuses to allow the masses any freedom of expression, but demands that they abide completely in accordance with his thought; and categorically rejects any united front with the other workers states, especially the Soviet Union with whom he had strained relations just short of a complete break. The opposition led by Liu, on the other hand, opposes the Great Leap Forward and People's Commune policies; energetically opposes Mao's policies in the fields of science, education, and culture; supports de-Stalinization and opposes Mao's personal cult and dictatorship, and thereby is in favor of freedom of expression; proposes to improve the living standards of the masses; and wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union in order to help the Vietnamese. These differences rule out any position of neutralism, i.e., being only bystanders. We, as Trotskyists, are forced to intervene by taking a definite position based on a transitional program, that is, we must give critical support to Liu's faction against Mao and his followers. Only by doing so, will it be possible to win the masses and those attacked by Mao to a revolutionary program. Only by supporting Liu's faction can we show the masses that Liu and his collaborators are incapable of solving China's fundamental problems. This is the only road to convincing the masses that it is necessary to overthrow the bureaucracy as a whole in order to build a democratic socialist China.

### Conclusion

The October revolution and Stalin's seizure of power have proved to be the acid test of many groups and individuals claiming to be revolutionaries. Historically as well as today the Chinese question is only second to that of the Soviet Union. Especially since the Chinese revolution in 1949, many groups and individuals have been tested by the Chinese events. In our movement we have seen the outstanding examples of Pablo and Swabeck. Therefore, I hope the International takes a serious attitude in adopting its position on China. I sincerely hope the comrades in each section will actively participate in the discussion in order to help the International arrive at a correct position to intervene in the Chinese events and put the Chinese political revolution on History's coming agenda.

November 19, 1967

LETTER OF COMRADE PENG SHU-TZI

To the International Executive Committee:

I regret not being able to attend the Plenum, especially since the Chinese question will undoubtedly be the most important question on the agenda. It is for this reason and my concern about the position to be taken in regard to China that I am writing this letter.

First of all I should like to make a few comments on the statement issued by the United Secretariat, November 6, 1966, "The Internal Crisis in China".

In general the statement seems to base itself only on a few documents and does not concern itself with the actual development of events. For example, the statement takes the slogan "Politics in Command" as one of its bases, but it does not try to analyse this slogan in the context of the actual situation. It merely accepts this slogan in the abstract and then attempts to generalize from there. The result does not only not correspond to the facts but is absolutely contrary to them.

The truth is that the conflict between the two factions--pro-Mao and anti-Mao--originally emerged from the failures resulting from the Great Leap Forward program which included such things as the People's Communes, the back-yard furnaces, etc. The conflict was then aggravated by Mao's policies on literature and art, education, and especially his attitude towards the USSR and the war in Vietnam and his foreign policy as a whole which has led to China's isolation and to the serious defeat in Indonesia. These are concrete developments on which there have been many articles in our press, but the statement in no way considers these developments. It ignores the facts and only considers the developments from the abstract point of view, and therefore, it draws the conclusions that the struggle in China has no social basis and is only a struggle between two sections of the bureaucracy, i.e. an "intrabureaucratic struggle".

In reality each of the factions have ideas which reflect different social bases. I have already described in my interviews to some degree the different ideologies of the two factions as well as has comrade George Novack in several of his articles. If the statement had based itself upon these facts, it would not have been possible for the statement to reach the above conclusion of "intrabureaucratic struggle" nor would it have been possible to take a position of neutralism.

It is stated in the statement, "that one of the most frequent ideological themes advanced by the ruling group is the one dealing with equalitarianism," but it must be asked, from where or in what documents can one find any appeals against Mao's opposition on the basis of equalitarianism?



The statement also fails to point out Mao's actions toward his opposition, such as the slandering of the opposition and not allowing them to state their ideas, the arrests, the imprisonments, the humiliations, the torture, etc. all of which has driven many to commit or attempt to commit suicide. Where do we stand in regard to the use of such methods? The statement does not only not clarify our position, but, on the contrary, it says that Mao has been "more inclined to bureaucratic paternalism than to measures of repression." Are these not similar actions as those Stalin used against all his opponents? Did not Stalin begin by slandering all oppositions by accusing them of being anti-party, anti-socialist and of being enemies of the people? Did not the Trotskyists criticize the methods Stalin used against Bukharin as well as the Left Opposition? What then is the position of the Fourth International in regard to Mao's action and methods--"bureaucratic paternalism"?

According to the statement the opposition to Mao is Khrushchevist. As I have clarified in an interview and in the Open Letter, there are two different aspects of Khrushchevism. However, this is in no way explained in the statement. In my opinion, the opposition to Mao agrees very strongly with the de-Stalinization measures carried out by Khrushchev, but I have never seen any evidence that they were in sympathy with Khrushchev's political revisionism or that they were opposed to the CCP's struggle against Khrushchev's political revisionism. It also seems to me to be the exact opposite in the case of Mao himself. He is especially against the de-Stalinization because of his own personal needs of maintaining his own personal dictatorship in the CCP.

The overall position taken by the statement is one of neutralism, and this was affirmed by comrade Livio and comrade Pierre in a meeting of the United Secretariat in March. When Mao uses Stalinist methods, is it possible to take a neutralist position on this question? I have made clear in my two interviews--one which was printed many months before the statement was written--the general positions and ideas of the opposition to Mao, and I showed clearly that it was, in general, more progressive. How is it possible, then, to ignore the facts and to take a position of neutralism?

It should be pointed out that this is not just a neutralist position based upon the acknowledgment of the lack of information and therefore demanding a neutralist position until more information is obtained or until the events make themselves clearer. The statement characterizes both major factions, analyses the struggle between them and then proceeds to take the neutralist position of not being able to support either side.

Moreover, if the ideas expressed in the statement that the struggle is only an "intrabureaucratic struggle" and that the Mao faction has appealed to the masses against bureaucracy using equalitarian slogans are really considered to be true, then it is necessary to ask why the statement did not give critical support

to Mao's faction rather than take a neutralist position? Why did the statement hold back from adopting clearly the logical conclusion of the ideas put forward? The same ideas as those in the statement have been further clarified in more recent articles by comrade Livio and especially by comrade Pierre (for Livio's articles see W.O. Feb. 3, and March 3, 1967; and for Pierre's see W.O. March 10, 1967). According to these comrades, the workers in Shanghai intervened as an autonomous social force by going on strike and demanding higher wages as well as other benefits, in response to Mao's appeals, in response to his equalitarian slogans and in response to the general ideas and goals of Mao's "cultural revolution". This, however, in no way corresponds to what actually took place. The Shanghai workers went into motion in response to the appeals by Mao's opposition, the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. It was they who organized the workers against Mao's faction and against Mao's cultural revolution. It was for this very reason that Mao's faction accused the Shanghai Municipal Party leaders of "economism," that is, of corrupting the workers and trying to turn the "cultural revolution" into a reactionary movement. The Maoist faction then proceeded to purge the entire Municipal Party leadership as well as many cadres and immediately brought to an end all the concessions which the opposition had given to the workers. This sequence of events is clearly documented by many articles. (If in the future it seems necessary, we will deal with this question in much greater length and in more detail).

In regard to the recent events, it is felt by some comrades that Mao and the bureaucracy as a whole is retreating in the face of the threat from the independent movement of the working class, and that Mao is searching for a compromise, a solution, to which the opposition itself might also be amenable. But as we have stated above, there has, as of yet, been no real independent movement of the workers.

What characterizes the present situation, if anything, is Mao's own weakness in relation to the opposition. Mao is very weak mainly because he has no cadres in the party. It was for this reason that he was forced to go outside the party in the first place in order to carry out his purge, and it is for this very same reason that he has depended so heavily on the army from the very beginning. The present situation can best be described by saying that Mao is making a tactical retreat--not a compromise--in order to consolidate his gains, regroup his forces and prepare for another attack. Mao has taken several cities and now he has to try and consolidate his victories. For this he needs cadres, and it is for this reason that he is trying to regroup under his wing some of those cadres represented by Chou En-lai (it must be remembered that I have characterized the group represented by Chou En-lai as a third tendency and not part of the real opposition). Mao's attitude toward the opposition, however, has in no way changed. The "handful taking the capitalist road" are still demounced with just as much vehemence as before, and the slogan "Seize Power" is still on the order of the day for the Maoist forces in those places where the opposition remains in power.

The struggle between the two factions is, then, in my opinion, one of life or death. The struggle has deep sociological roots, and it cannot be terminated or compromised so easily. It could take extraordinary circumstances before a compromise could actually become a possibility between the two factions, and this is not at all the present reality.

Finally, the proposals put forward by the statement were only those abstract principles which can be applied to almost all the workers states. It did not deal in any way with the concrete events in China nor advance any proposals concerning them. Such abstract proposals are of no use to the Chinese comrades as far as action is concerned during the present crisis. From the few comments I have made above, I would like to ask the IEC to reevaluate the position taken by the statement and to base themselves in the future on the actual development of the events and not on abstract possibilities, theories and ideas.

My position and ideas as well as those of the Chinese section have been made clear enough in my two interviews and in the Open Letter. It is, therefore, not necessary to repeat them here. We consider the position taken by the statement to be completely wrong and that such a position places the future of Chinese Trotskyism in great danger. Our conclusion is that we must take a position of critical support to the opposition against Mao's faction and his personal dictatorship.

March 1967

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE CCP AND CHINA'S SITUATION

(The following text is a resolution passed on Feb. 28, 1967, at a plenary session of the provisional National Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Party of China.)

I

The underlying basis of Mao Tse-tung's thought on China's socialist construction is that despite the poverty, backwardness and the isolation of the country, spiritual strength--leader's appeal, revolutionary agitation and examples--exertion of physical strains, and human wave tactics will make the country leap into the realm of the big powers, which will thus exert a dominating influence on the world situation. Mao's thought reflects the psychological state of the recklessness of building socialism in a single backward country after the leadership has triumphed in the revolution. This idea was even further strengthened when the Soviet Union withdrew her experts and cancelled all aid, this plunging China into a greater state of isolation.

Liu Shao-chi and other leaders within the CCP, however, after having followed Mao's line in the past, have tried to introduce some modifications in Mao's line after their illusions were shattered by the actual reality of some of Mao's policies. On the question of building socialism, they tried, to a certain extent, to take into account the objective laws in the economy, give up "the great empty talk", advance the welfare of the masses, put more emphasis on science and technology, and improve the relationship between China and other countries. This of course does not counter the idea of building socialism in a single country, but merely expresses the idea that it must be done in a more steady and cautious way.

The movement of the Cultural Revolution essentially reflects a "life and death" struggle between two major tendencies within the CCP which are represented by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi respectively. From 1952 to 1966 there have existed inside the CCP some differences of opinion over some of the major questions. Although the differences, under the bureaucratic party system, were not able to take the form of open debate, those who were dissatisfied with Mao's policies, gathered around Liu Shao-chi eventually leaving Mao virtually isolated within the party.

The main objections to Mao's policies are as follows:

1. On the collectivisation of agriculture--the opposition has taken issue with Mao over the intensiveness of agricultural collectivisation.
2. On the policy of the Three Red Banners--the opposition has objected to the Great Leap Forward, to the tempering of steel on an all-people basis, to the practice of Satellite Field and to the People's Communes movement.

3. On the policy of literature and art--the opposition opposes the extremely tight control on the intellectuals, the party jargon, and the modern operas taking the place of traditional operas.

4. On the cult of the personality--the opposition while maintaining the formula of "Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Tse-tung's thought," nevertheless, objects to the intensification of the cult of Mao.

Among all these differences, the most serious is over the policy of the Three Red Banners. The Great Leap Forward movement embodying Mao's recklessness, fantasies and childishness--particularly the tempering of steel on an all-people's basis and the practice of Satellite Fields--and the policy of the people's communes have virtually ruined China's economy. These policies have not only failed in making the country catch up with Britain within "15 years," but have on the contrary, plunged the whole economic construction of the country into a chaotic situation and set it back several years. As a result of this reckless economic policy, China suffered a severe famine which lasted for a period of three years.

All the above decisions were not fully deliberated on by the leadership of the CCP. Mao Tse-tung was the only person responsible for making the above policy decisions--decisions of impulse. Mao's personal dictatorship has developed to such an extent that he frequently ignores the Central Committee and even the Politbureau of the CCP. The Politbureau and Central Committee then has to accept Mao's decisions after the fact and bear the responsibility for all the disastrous consequences brought about by what Mao has decided.

During the Stalin era, the personal dictatorship was tolerated, but today after de-Stalinization, many leaders of the CCP, who have devoted themselves to the Chinese revolution find it difficult to bear it. The situation compelled Teng Hsiao-ping, the party's General Secretary, and Liu Shao-chi, President of the People's Republic, as well as a majority of other leaders such as Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Chou Yang, Lo Jui-ching, etc., to group themselves together in order to resist Mao's fantasies and to lessen his outlandish policies detrimental to the bureaucracy. That Mao Tse-tung was forced to step down from the Presidency of the Republic in Dec. 1958, was symbolic, indicating that Liu-Teng and Co. had planned to curtail Mao's overgrown power. The further development of the curtailment resulted in the weakening of Mao's leading role in the party. The way Mao has complained about certain people having treated him like a deceased parent vividly describes this situation.

From the viewpoint of the Liu-Teng faction as opposed to Mao, it is not a pure struggle for personal power. Objectively this faction reflects the widespread dissatisfaction that has existed in the CCP for some time, In other words, the Liu faction is an

echo within the CCP of the deep contradictions between the bureaucracy and the masses. That is not to say, however, that the Liu-Teng faction is really struggling for the interests of the broad masses, but only, that the Liu-Teng faction is prudent enough to realise the approaching explosion of the contradictions in society as a whole. In order to maintain the bureaucracy, they prefer reforms with the aim of rectifying the blunders that could have been avoided in the first place, even under the bureaucratic regime, so as to alleviate the contradictions that exist between the bureaucracy and the masses. This has been a common trait of all reformists in history.

The control of the whole party and most of the state apparatuses was achieved by the Liu-Teng faction peacefully and gradually. At the time when they were in power, they broke up a great number of the people's communes into production teams, slackened the control on free markets and small private holdings, placed agriculture as the foundation of economic construction, slowed down the speed of economic development, loosened the grip on the intellectuals, and lessened the tense relationship between China and the USSR, etc. As a result, the economic condition which had been deteriorating, gradually began to recover.

Peking, under the Mayor Peng Chen, became an anti-Maoist center; the propaganda department and the Ministry of Culture which controlled the nation-wide propaganda and cultural work, also stood on the side of the Liu-Teng faction, giving the intellectuals an opportunity to level critical attacks against Mao Tse-tung's blunders. "Evening Chats at Yenshan" and Notes from the Three Family Village" are the most outstanding examples.

In the face of weakening power and the critical attacks, Mao found it difficult to sway the realm in Peking, therefore, he went to Shanghai where he planned his counter-attack, thus opening the curtain to the most unrelenting party struggle.

## II

In comparison with Mao and Co., the opposition controlled the party and Youth League apparatuses, the trade unions and the majority of the Central Committee, the Standing Committee and the Politbureau, all sided with the opposition. Along with the Central Committee and local party organizations, the opposition also controlled most of the state apparatuses, thus leaving Mao Tse-tung in a very isolated position. Therefore, Mao could not hope to change the whole situation through the normal procedures. The only way out for him was to depend on the armed forces of Lin Piao attempting to regain his power.

Mao first launched his attack on "The Three Family Village" in the "Liberation Army Daily" and the "Shanghai Wenhui Bao", and then, he returned to Peking in order to remove Peng Chen with the support of Lin Piao's armed forces. With Lin's backing, Mao

also ousted a number of the Central Committee members, and then, convened the 11th plenary session of the Central Committee. He reshuffled the Politbureau and the Standing Committee to pave the way for reestablishing his power in the Central Committee. Despite these drastic measures, Mao was still unable to control the whole party, the Youth League organizations or the state apparatus.

After Mao had "seized power" in Peking, he hesitated to continue taking power with only military forces for fear that if he depended too much on Lin's army, he would lose some of his own personal power to Lin Piao. Mao as well, hoped he could regain his power under the cloak of the mass movement. At the same time, Mao wanted to take this opportunity to breed a score of new bureaucrats to take the place of the old ones.

Therefore, Mao agitated through the medium of propaganda for the youngsters to form the Red Guards. Taking advantage of his personal prestige and the rebellious impulse of the young people, Mao urged the Red Guards to launch struggles against the opposition elements.

Although the Red Guard movement is a kind of mass movement - in which a majority of participants are students - the movement was organized in a hurry and is essentially a loyalist movement, the central task of which is to protect Mao's personal power and the absolute dominating position of his thought. The Red Guard movement is in the main led by Mao's personal henchman, Chen Po-ta, and his wife, Chiang Ching. The Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee is in fact the temporary headquarters of the Maoists. The childish programs which are aimed at reforming the traditional customs and are carried out by the burgeoning Red Guards have only created an atmosphere of rebellion for the purpose of setting the stage for the purge of the Liu-Teng faction and the many other dissidents. In practice, the Red Guards have worked hand in hand with Lin Piao's army in an effort to overthrow the reformists who occupy many different positions in the local governments as well as all the other opposition elements who are in positions of authority.

In short, Mao's purpose is to reestablish his personal dictatorship and to cut short any reform measures. To achieve this, he has deliberately intensified the propaganda of his own personality cult, pushing it to the utmost extreme, and he has desperately made his own thought the only orthodoxy of China's 700 million people. Mao's cult of personality has even gone beyond that of Stalin's during the period of the thirties and forties. Mao Tse-tung is firmly holding on to the most conservative fortress of Stalinism in spite of the fact that he dresses himself up in the most attractive and glittering terms, such as, "revolution", "anti-revisionism," "mass movement," "the Paris Commune", "Great democracy", etc. Mao is fighting against the world-wide currents of de-Stalinization in a desperate effort to maintain the gone-by "glory" which was bestowed upon Stalin. From this

point of view, Mao's Cultural Revolution, Red Guard movement, power-seizing movement, etc., are reactionary in character.

### III

The major short-comings of the Liu-Teng faction are:

1. Although Liu, Teng and their followers are dissatisfied with Mao's policies, they are still not actually placing themselves outside of the category of Mao's thought. Since they have been showing respect for Mao's supreme position, they remain, in effect, Mao's adorers and his stewards, and thus, they are more bound to fail in vying for leadership in opposition to Mao.
2. The Liu-Teng faction has never launched any open attack on Mao's erroneous policies either within or outside the party, nor has it put forth any clear or comprehensive political program in opposition to Mao. In the course of the struggle, therefore, they are forced "to oppose red banners with red banners." As a result, they are not in a position to show their true political colors in order to win over the masses and wage an effective struggle for power.
3. The Liu-Teng faction does not trust the masses, and they do not depend upon them. They merely carry on the struggle in the uppermost levels of both the party and Youth League. Therefore, when they encounter the attacks and are humiliated by the Maoists, they cannot gain the dynamic support of the masses.
4. The Liu-Teng faction lacks in revolutionary temperament, gratifying themselves by remaining within the bounds of the traditional ways and legal procedures (possibly hoping to avoid a civil war). When Mao Tse-tung employs extra-legal methods of struggle against them, they are caught in a bind. In addition, Mao's prestige is so great that they could not or dare not unite themselves in open opposition to Mao using the state apparatus. Consequently, they have no alternative but to submit to the attacks.

The methods used by Mao Tse-tung to struggle against the opposition faction are to knit, by hook and by crook, a tissue of crimes and a web of lies which he uses to discredit and humiliate his opponents. There is no chance for the opposition to speak out and defend themselves. Whosoever opposes Mao is dubbed as a "revisionist" and "taking the capitalist road". The Liu-Teng faction who have worked with Mao for a number of years and who have themselves used these very same methods, understand very well what these methods really mean. While Mao launches the Cultural Revolution, Liu-Teng organize "work-teams"; while Mao organizes his Red Guards, they also organize their own Red Guards and even workers' Red Guard groups; while Mao stages the mass touring, they also follow suit; while Mao calls for the great alliance, they too appeal for great unity; while Mao decides to carry out the seizure of power, they too pursue the same line except that they occasionally are put on the defensive by the anti-seizing of power. They seem to be under the shadow of Mao, the Almighty. There is no doubt, however, that clashes between the Red Guards supporting Mao and those supporting Liu-Teng, and clashes between the workers in favor of the reformists and the students "loyal" to Mao have been taking place everywhere.



All the bureaucrats whose experience of the process of decomposition and unity, re-decomposition and re-unity, a process which has still not reached a decisive stage, are forced to take a stand on one side or the other.

Many of the elder generation of the CCP, such as Chu Teh, have been purged due to their dissatisfaction over the purge of their fellow comrades.

The new leader Tao Chu who has in these turmoils been promoted from the Secretary of the Central-south Bureau to the number four position in the Politbureau, the position of the propaganda chief and to the Cultural Revolution group, was himself recently purged, though at first, he seemed to be occupying a buffer position between the Maoist faction and the Liu-Teng faction.

The members of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution group as well as the members of the People's Liberation Army's Cultural Revolution group, are constantly changing. New clashes are developing between Chiang Ching and the new leaders, causing new cleavages within the Mao-Lin faction. It is evident that the turmoil is still developing. The question of who will actually triumph is not yet known, and there is still a rather long way to go before either side will be able to claim a decisive victory.

As for the future development of the situation, we can venture to make the following assessment:

In spite of the fact that the Mao-Lin faction has gained the upper hand in the current round of struggles, putting under house arrest many of the oppositions most important leaders, seizing power in some of the larger cities and provinces, the present situation indicates that the pro-Liu-Teng elements are spreading all over the country, are in control of several big administrative districts (in area they are much bigger than those controlled by the Mao-Lin faction) and have the support of a portion of the armed forces. To purge and outcast these tremendous forces of opposition, to pull them down from power, remains, indeed, a very difficult task for Mao and his faction.

The Red Guards and the Rebel Organizations on which Mao depends to seize power consist of well-nigh undisciplined mobs, lacking in experience and training. If we say that the Red Guards showed their childish impulse of rebellion in the initial stages, they cannot help but quarrel over bureaucratic privileges when they undertake the task of real power. New clashes which are constantly taking place, have forced Mao to attack what is termed as "individualism", "gangsterism", "cliquism", etc., in an effort to avoid the contradictions within his own faction. It is very dubious whether the Red Guard organizations will be able to maintain the power after taking it, and advance economic production when the opposition has been crushed.

Whether Mao will be able to triumph over the opposition or not, he, nevertheless, seems to have shattered in a very short time the well disciplined and unified party which has gone through a variety of stages in its forty year history.

The purging and the ousting by Mao of the most capable and experienced comrades who emerged from the generations of the twenties and forties, amounts to the destruction of the backbone of the CCP, and thus, the lowering of the CCP into its grave. It is certain that from now on there will be no stable or solid foundation for bureaucratic rule. Stalin's ruthless rule over Russia was brought to light after he was dead, but Mao's bureaucratic rule has shown itself to be disintegrating while he is still alive. This obviously indicates that history is accelerating its steps towards socialist democracy. Socialist democratization is a world-wide trend which a single Mao Tse-tung will never be able to counter.

The only real way the knot of the Chinese situation can be untied is by an upheaval of the masses. Due to all of the pro-Liu-Teng ruling apparatuses being under fire while at the same time the new pro-Mao apparatuses are still in the process of being set up, the whole political shackle has been loosened, even to the point that there exists a state of semi-anarchy in some places. Appeals to the masses to struggle against any of the top bureaucrats other than Mao himself and other selected leaders will objectively pave the way for the criticism of the CCP by the masses by making use of the "decreed" democracy.

These people in power in the local governments always appeal to workers and peasants to defend them when they are being attacked by the Red Guards. Therefore, the workers and the peasants will have the opportunity to stand up and take action. Those who were forced to transfer to the countryside in the past are returning in large numbers to the cities. Those who were put into the labor camps are participating in the struggles. The workers have emerged in the struggle demanding a change in the unreasonable living standards and working conditions set by the regime, and are asking for economic benefits, and have gone on strikes which have paralyzed the country's economic and social life as a whole. The big strikes in Shanghai last January were such dramatic events. In the countryside, the members of the people's communes have taken action and have divided among themselves the accumulating funds and stocks of foodstuffs. In the initial stages, the worker-peasant movements always appear to be tinted by economic demands.

The people in power adopted an attitude of non-responsibility towards the mass movement while Mao and his followers accuse the mass movement of being a counter-attack in the form of "economism" instigated by the persons in power. Mao and his supporters are not prepared to yield to the economic demands of the masses. On the contrary, the Maoists ask them to give up what they have already gained in the struggle. The pro-Maoist elements regard

such economic demands as "capitalist tendencies", and call for the workers to show their "devotion", and to eliminate the "selfishness" that obsesses their minds. Mao repeatedly indicates that the living conditions of the workers and the peasants cannot be improved, which makes clear that the Maoist line runs counter to the interests of the working masses. This line will undoubtedly be cast away by the masses.

It is a matter of fact that the current mass movement is only the first step of intervention by the masses in the political events. The masses still lack a clear orientation and a correct leadership, however. Under these circumstances, the mass movement is not yet in a position to play a decisive role in the present situation. Therefore, the situation may in the near future follow the line of several possible alternatives mentioned below:

1. During the process of Mao's nationwide seizure of power, some large administrative districts or provinces under the influence of the Liu-Teng faction may take an independent position of defying Mao, and resist the Maoist seizures of power, thus creating a local or regional civil war (in fact, there has already existed a local civil war in some places).
2. The opposing forces now being attacked in the border areas, such as Siankiang, Tibet, etc., may retreat to mountainous areas in armed groups in preparation for guerilla war. Mao's past experience of launching guerillas may be used to attack Mao himself. The August 1st Army event has indicated this tendency. The guerillas may have gotten the support of the Soviet Union, and formed an irresistible force.
3. In the process of the mass movement, a new tendency that could cast off the reformist leadership now opposing Mao, will be just as likely to develop as the revolutionary ideas that developed during the Hundred Flowers Blossom movement, thus leading to a political revolution.

#### IV

In the struggles inside the CCP, we are against the triumph of the Mao-Lin faction, because their victory will block all reformist roads, revive adventurism, and intensify the frenzied cult of the personality and personal dictatorship. On the international level, Mao's victory will strengthen the Stalinist current and ruin the possibility of a socialist united front against imperialism, which will objectively benefit the warlike policy of imperialism.

While we should severely criticize the un-thorough nature of Liu-Teng's reformism, some of their reform measures such as giving up the priority of developing heavy industries, doing away with the Great Leap Forward, de-centralizing the people's communes, the maintaining of some private plots, loosening the grip on the

free markets to a certain extent, liberalizing the atmosphere for the intellectuals by advocating that the workers in the cultural and art fields take their own initiative, opposing Mao's cult of personality, and vindicating those purged in the Peng Teh-huai events, etc. Undoubtedly these reforms reflect the demands and dissatisfaction of the broad masses, and are better than the die-hard policies of Mao Tse-tung, and will benefit China's socialist development. However, these reformist measures remain confined in the category of Stalinism, and are comparable to what has been done, or is being done in the Soviet Union and in some East European countries. We should put before the masses all the tantalizing reform measures, so that we are able to push the masses forward onto the road of true Marxism-Leninism.

Nevertheless, even if the struggles of the masses against the Mao-Lin faction are initiated and led by the reformists in the CCP, our attitude towards these struggles should be: while maintaining our own independent policy, we shall lose no chance to stand on their side, giving them our support in the struggles against the common enemy. Only by so doing, will we be able to push the struggles to a stage of wider and more thorough development, providing the masses themselves with an opportunity of advancing forward and leaving behind the reformists who may, by then, have desperately set limits to the revolutionary activities of the masses.

Furthermore then, as for our general attitude towards the struggle within the CCP against the Mao-Lin faction, we should give the opposition our critical support, because, what the opposition of the CCP has been doing reflects the progressive demands of the masses. We must admit that the triumph of the Mao-Lin faction will inevitably bring to China a worse situation than has ever existed.

On the one hand, we will direct our attack together with the opposition of the CCP on the most conservative layer of the bureaucracy so as to create favorable conditions for the political revolution in which the whole conglomeration of bureaucrats will be buried. In actual class struggle, on the other hand, we will certainly be able to win over the revolutionaries to our side through our genuine Marxist program, thus further strengthening our movement in wiping out the bureaucracy and building democratic socialism in China.

Class struggle is a merciless reality. A genuine revolutionary is in no case allowed to sit on the fence in the class struggle.

As we have mentioned before, we should always be vigilant against the compromising nature of the reformists of the CCP and against their opportunist ideology impregnated with Stalinism. In actual struggles, we should not hesitate to expose the opportunism of the opposition of CCP while we stand side by side with

them to fight the most decadent stratum of the bureaucracy. We advance with the reformists in launching attacks on the Mao-Lin faction, but we should draw a definite and clear line of demarcation between our position and that of the reformists. The class consciousness of the masses is developed from stage to stage until the masses really understand that the only way to build a democratic socialist society in China is to overthrow the bureaucracy - a fact which is proved to the utmost by the past 17 years' experience - which has become a stumbling block to the harmonious development of China's socialism.

That is the real meaning of our critical support to be given to the opposition in the CCP.

In order to advance the movement towards democratic socialism and towards the orientation of organizing the broad masses, we put forth the following basic demands:

1. Publish immediately all conditions and information concerning the struggles, and the differences of opinions in CCP, so that the masses, nationwide, will understand what has happened and can judge what is right and wrong.
2. Give freedom to the opposition in the CCP to voice their opinions and to defend themselves: at the same time, give freedom to all revolutionary workers and peasants, intellectuals, and revolutionary parties to speak out and criticize the opinions of others.
3. Stop immediately the forced self-humiliation and secret trials of dissidents.
4. Grant those who support the cause of the proletarian revolution and socialism freedom to think, to speak, to write, to publish, to associate, to demonstrate, to strike, to bear arms, to oppose the cult of personality and personal dictatorship.

On the above basis, a nationwide debate among the masses on the future policy should be held.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is practiced over all class enemies such as the imperialists, the capitalists, the landlords, and the rich peasants. It should, however, provide ample freedom for workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals. Capitalist democracy is only for the few -- it is a false democracy. Proletarian democracy is for the majority -- it is a real democracy. The democracy of the proletariat should be much broader and more thorough. Unfortunately, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union has proceeded along the bureaucratic road ever since Stalin betrayed Lenin and persecuted Leon Trotsky. From that time, the countries of the proletarian dictatorship the world over, have followed in the mould of Stalinism, with a bureaucratic system. Due to the ruthless rule of the

bureaucratic hierarchy, a great number of people who fought for the cause of revolution have lost their confidence in Marxism-Leninism and socialism. Those who have lost faith in Marxism-Leninism will inevitably bow to capitalist democracy. As a result, the development of the true socialist democracy will be hampered and objectively will pave the way for the consolidation of Stalinism. This is an historical tragedy. Under these circumstances, we should uphold high the banners of true Marxism-Leninism and proletarian democracy so as to push forward all revolutionary forces toward democratic socialism.

We believe that in the CCP and in the Youth League there are a great number of members who cherish hopes of reforming society and possess revolutionary enthusiasm. Although they are growing up in Mao's era, they have opportunity to approach Marxism-Leninism. In their daily life and social struggles, they are developing independent thinking, trying to find the correct road for China's socialist construction. We sincerely hope that they will unite themselves inside their party or outside of it to form an independent nucleus that will eventually lead to the formation of a new leadership which will in turn lead to the rational development of socialism in China. We wish to establish a comrade-like relationship with those revolutionaries or revolutionary organizations in an effort to work out the correct line for constructing socialism in China and struggling for socialist democracy.

In order to deal with the current situation, our basic proposals are the following:

1. To maintain the state ownership of property and all achievements so far gained; destroy all the plots of the imperialists, the capitalists, the landlords and the rich peasants in their attempt to restore the overthrown private ownership of property and capitalism.
2. To let proletarian democracy prevail. The workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals should be granted the freedom of setting up political parties, of printing, putting forth manifestos, publishing books, newspapers and magazines, of organizing the masses, staging demonstrations and strikes, and of participating in elections.
3. To abolish the right of all party committee members to control the state apparatus, educational institutions and social organizations.
4. To let the workers, the peasants, experts, scientists, experimental workers, etc., form themselves into a national economic construction committee to make an overall plan for economic development in China's socialist construction.

5. To observe the principle of having the peasants' agreement in carrying out agricultural collectivization and communization. The state should help the peasants advance toward collectivization with mechanical and scientific technology, and consolidate the collectivization by using the influence of its economic capabilities. To let the peasants have the right to join or to withdraw from the commune.

6. All factories and production organizations in the countryside should be run by committees democratically elected by the workers and peasants themselves. On this solid principle, production can be supervised and supplies smoothly delivered.

7. On the basis of proletarian democracy, elect worker-peasant-soldier committees, at different levels, as the countrywide and local apparatus of authority. Different committees should be by-elected once a year (the duration of office for a committee member should not last for more than 3 years). The voters reserve the right to dismiss those elected to offices.

8. To abolish all the privileges of the bureaucrats. Their remunerations should not exceed those of the ordinary working man.

9. To oppose the opportunist principles of Bandung, and to give selfless aid to the revolutionary struggles of the workers and the peasants in other countries so as to advance the world revolution.

10. To establish a united anti-imperialist front among all workers' states, so that an effective struggle against the imperialists and their aggressive war will be waged and true peace in the world will be achieved.

We firmly believe that only the forces of socialist democracy both in the economic and political fields will put an end to the ruthless, barbarian and dictatorial rule and that democratic socialism is necessary in order to correctly orientate the construction of socialism in China into a harmonious and reasoned direction, to improve the living conditions of the people, to provide an outlet for the creativeness and enthusiasm of the people, to regain confidence in socialism, and to exert once again China's revolutionary influence on the oppressed and the exploited people all over the world as well as upon the future development of all the workers' states. All these positive factors will eventually help advance China's socialist construction, shattering China's backward state, and the building of a harmonious alliance of world socialism.