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Contents

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INTRODUCTION

The material in the bulletin deals with a crisis which has arisen in the world movement between the majority chosen by the World Congress and the minority headed by Comrade Pablo. This crisis developed during sessions of the United Secretariat, beginning shortly after the World Congress.

These documents have been brought together to permit all of the comrades to become acquainted with the political and organizational problems involved in the differences.

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THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT -- IT IS TIME TO SEE CLEARLY

By Michel Pablo

As the Sino-Soviet conflict is prolonged and the documents, the accusations and denunciations have accumulated on the part of one or the other, the true intentions and motives of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies are clarified.

It is becoming more and more clear that the "ideological" aspect of the conflict is only the deformed expression of the struggle engaged in between two bonapartist apparatuses finding themselves at the head of two immense countries, and subjected to different and divergent social forces and interests.

The Khrushchevian bonapartist leadership follows an internal and external policy greatly influenced by the global dynamic of the new Soviet society of the Sixties, and which moves further and further from that of the Stalinist era.

The Chinese bureaucracy, on the contrary, is passing through its Stalinist-type crisis of growth, subjected more to the influence of economic and cultural backwardness of the country and the pressure of its international isolation.

The Khrushchevian bureaucracy must reconcile in its internal and external policy the aspirations, which are becoming irrepressible, of the new Soviet generations for material well-being and for democracy, with the maintenance of the privileged position of the bureaucracy, this bureaucracy constituting a vast social layer in the USSR; and in the international context characterised by the constant advance, under diverse forms, of the world revolution and the dangers of atomic war.

While multiplying and accelerating reforms internally, the policy of the Khrushchevian leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy combines externally resolution and flexibility with regard to Imperialism, and attempts to resolve each grave international crisis, inherent in the fundamental revolutionary process of our epoch, without the launching of atomic war.

The Soviet bureaucracy acts internally starting from a position of increased weakness in relation to the masses and the new ascending revolutionary forces of Soviet society.

Externally, on the contrary, it acts without complexes, starting from a position of strength, the USSR having attained a very high degree of military, material and moral power.

This retreat internally which is manifested by the process of "destalinisation" and which has by no means stopped but by and large advances, is a source of great moral force for its external policy concerning the defence of the world revolution and its more resolute attitude towards Imperialism.

Thus judged as a whole, "destalinisation" is not a rightist and

'revisionist' course as the Chinese bureaucracy affirms, but a course essentially revolutionary and to the left.

Certainly the Khrushchevian leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy is strongly limited in pursuing this course by its own bureaucratic nature, and will never achieve "destalinisation."

But its limitations do not prevent it from expressing in a deformed way the fundamental revolutionary process which is taking place at present in the USSR, and which expresses itself precisely in "destalinisation."

Before long it will become clear to the growing number of more far-seeing revolutionary elements -- and not "ultra-left" fossils petrified in a reactionary anti-Sovietism -- that since the death of Stalin immense changes have occurred in reality, in the attitude of the political leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy, both inside the USSR as well as towards the world revolution and Imperialism.

These changes reflect the objective changes occurring in the USSR and in the world.

There remains the constant dialogue which the Khrushchevian leadership keeps up with Imperialism, American Imperialism in particular, concerning "peaceful co-existence," and the anxiety to prevent atomic war.

This dialogue is inevitable and necessary.

This anxiety to prevent atomic war we share equally and completely.

In the present world a qualitative change has intervened for some time now, whatever the Chinese leaders may irresponsibly say about it.

The destructive power of atomic arms accumulated by both sides is such that a world atomic war would mean the veritable suicide of humanity.

In this situation one must not become panic-stricken and pursue a line of constantly capitulating before Imperialism; rather there is the urgent necessity of raising the level of understanding and imagination of mankind to a real comprehension of the possibilities of destruction in our time.

When the Chinese leaders continue to argue that it is men who always decide and not weapons, that atomic weapons are "a paper tiger," and do not introduce any "qualitative" change in the situation, and that in the event of the worst only half of humanity will be destroyed (sic!) (not counting the unknown effects of the immense "fall-out" for those who escape this holocaust), one does not know what to admire: the want of principle or the monstrosity of the reasoning.

A strategy for world revolution which accepts the eventuality of a nuclear war destroying half humanity and jeopardising posterity is to be resolutely rejected.

For the world revolution and socialism will be compromised by such a

perspective, which, though theoretically possible, would spell the historic defeat of Humanity.

The sole strategy to be elaborated in the present new conditions is one which attempts to combine the progress of the world revolution with the maneuvers and tactical compromises seeking to prevent the outbreak of atomic war.

The continued progress of the world revolution devolves upon the workers movement of the advanced capitalist countries, and the revolutionary movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The tactical maneuvers and compromises to prevent the outbreak of atomic war, which become clear during each international crisis, constitute the main weapon of the USSR and the other Workers States, which should combine resolution with flexibility, as in the example of the Caribbean crisis in 1962.

For some years now, it has not been true that the political leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy sacrifices everywhere the interests of the world revolution on the altar of "peaceful co-existence" and of compromise with Imperialism. In a number of very exposed positions of the world revolution as East Germany, Egypt, Iraq, Cuba, Indonesia, this leadership has not hesitated to resort to the threat of intervention of its military forces, including atomic, to prevent the direct intervention of Imperialism.

The Cuban Revolution, the most exposed of all the positions of the World Revolution, has developed till now thanks to the constant economic and military aid from the USSR, aid unthinkable in the time of Stalin.(1)

This same aid was promised by Castro on his return from the USSR to all the Latin-American countries, invited jointly by Khrushchev and Castro to follow the "Cuban road."(2)

The compromise concluded with American and British imperialism on the subject of atomic tests, does not prevent the USSR from promising its economic aid to British Guiana, or of according it to Algeria, engaged on the road of the Socialist Revolution.

These are some facts which contrast clearly with the previously capitulationist and traitorous attitude of the USSR in the time of Stalin; a period on which the Chinese leaders do not utter one word at present, striving on the contrary to embellish this period as an example of a "revolutionary" attitude.

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When we say that the Chinese political leadership is at present going through its Stalinist-type crisis of growth, we mean that no bureaucratic apparatus can raise itself above the level of the material historic conditions of the national context in which it governs.

Nothing in the global comportment of the Chinese leaders is a fortuitous, or isolated or secondary fact:

not their obvious underestimation of the character of atomic war, and of the proliferation of atomic arms;

nor their noisy alliance with the bloody Stalinist clique of Tirana, presented as an example of "Marxist-Leninist leadership";

nor their recent "theoretical" tirades fully apologetic for Stalin and his regime, which the Chinese leaders identify with the "dictatorship of the proletariat," in some way healthy, normal non-revisionist;

nor their call to Stalinist elements in the USSR to overthrow Khrushchev;

nor their gross, inadmissible denunciations of the Yugoslav regime as "restored capitalism" and "advanced detachment of Imperialism";

nor their profound aversion for the Self-Management and Workers Councils, recently praised by Khrushchev, which act the Chinese leaders construe as an effort to "denigrate" the Soviet economy;(3)

nor their outrageously slanderous way of attacking the Khrushchevian leadership, accusing it of betraying the USSR, China, East Germany, etc.;

nor their sectarian attitude towards the "Treaty of Moscow," supposedly directed against China;

nor their resurrection of the Theory of Socialism in One Country, etc.

We have listed the essential components of the political physiognomy of the Chinese current which attempts at present a sort of reconstruction of the ideology and comportment of Stalin, placed in a national context of an economic and cultural backwardness as well as an international isolation which resembles in some way the conditions which occasioned the birth of Stalinism in the USSR.

The "leftism" of the Chinese leaders in relation to the "peaceful roads" and the importance attached to the revolutionary movements of the "Third World" is not free of an opportunism as fundamental as the Khrushchevian opportunism towards the governments, parties, classes, considered as being or becoming favorable to China.

The Chinese leaders consider the documents of the two Conferences of 1957 and 1960 as defining the "Marxist-Leninist" line on which they demand the reconciliation of the international communist movement.

But these two documents which Khrushchev also signed, contain both the thesis on the "peaceful road or not," according to the circumstances, from Capitalism to Socialism, as well as all the opportunist ambiguity towards the key question for the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the "national bourgeoisie."

The Chinese leaders do not hide their friendship and approbation for the line of the Indonesian Communist Party, which advocates the United Front with Sukarno, under his aegis, and the completion of the "democratic bourgeois revolution" distinct from the Socialist Revolution.(4)

However, if there is a situation ripe for the Socialist Revolution in the Far East and a Communist Party capable of realising it, it is the very case of Indonesia.

This same opportunist policy is extended to Asia and Africa in which Peking attempts to dethrone Moscow in the good graces of the different "neutralist" governments and the alliances with the "national bourgeoisie."

With their characteristic facility for "theoretical" enormities, the Chinese leaders do not content themselves with extending the "anti-imperialist" front to the "national bourgeoisie" but, generously, include "patriotic kings, princes and nobles"!(5)

Their criticism of the aid accorded to India by the USSR does not prevent them from themselves giving economic and military aid to the feudal Pakistani regime, from recognising without hesitation the bloody regime of Aref in Iraq, taking sides against the Kurds, pampering Nasser, and not raising in all these areas the necessity for the "non-peaceful road" to Socialism.

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According to recent statements of the Chinese, their opposition to the leadership of the USSR dates from the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

This admission fits and is significant.

For in reality it demonstrates that this opposition concerns essentially "destalinisation"; since the theory and method of the transition from Capitalism to Socialism, including the "peaceful road," are the invention of Stalin himself, and not of Khrushchev.

It is the extent to which "destalinisation" has raised again the whole question of the conceptions and practices of Stalinism on the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and the construction of Socialism that the Chinese leaders are so relentlessly opposed to the Soviets and Yugoslavs.

For here are raised questions touching Chinese internal policy, the structures, the functioning and the ideology of the regime entangled in Stalinist practice and conceptions.

One may well ask why the Chinese leaders for some years now have unleashed a vicious attack against Yugoslavia.

For a whole period the explanation was that they saw through the Yugoslavs, Khrushchev himself.

But why in that case choose the Yugoslavs as the screen?

Because Yugoslavia is by far the most "destalinised" of the Workers States, whose example provokes to some degree the "destalinisation" in the USSR and therefore in the other Workers States.

When the Chinese leaders affirm that "Khrushchev considers Tito as his ideological tutor" and that he is engaged in reforming the Soviet economic structures which are becoming, in his own words, too "bureaucratic," by utilising as well the "positive" experience of the Yugoslav Workers Councils, they touch there an essential aspect of the question.

It is to the degree that the Yugoslav experience in the matter of the economic and political construction of Socialism, runs almost directly counter to Chinese practice and conceptions, that the Chinese leaders are opposed to this "revisionist" example whose incontestable success renders its force of contagion even more dangerous.

Workers Councils, Self-Management on the plane of enterprises, Self-Management on the plane of Communes, flexibility in planification, in collectivisation, the socialisation and not state-ownership of property, the progressive dying away of the role of the State, measures working towards the extension of the struggle against bureaucratisation, etc.; all these progressive acquisitions of the Yugoslav experience, which enrich Marxism, and which are theoretically codified in the Program elaborated by the Fifth Congress of the League of Yugoslav Communists and then in the new Constitution, are interpreted by the Chinese leaders as "revisionism," and fully supported by their "scientific" demonstrations, "facts and figures," to sustain their thesis that capitalism has been "restored in Yugoslavia."

All this gives not only a measure of the typically Stalinist manner of fighting on an ideological plane, but of much graver things -- the enormous ideological retardation of the Chinese leaders, a heritage of their Stalinist formation, on vital questions concerning the construction of socialism and the future of the Workers States.

That reasons other than "destalinisation" have tended to accentuate the opposition of the Chinese leaders to the political leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy, can no more be doubted.

These reasons flow principally from the antagonism between two powers having a different perspective regarding safeguarding their national interests, and the means to be employed to serve their external policy and to ensure their hegemony over the international workers movement.

Let us enumerate the most important among these reasons:

disagreements on the extent and conditions of economic aid accorded by the USSR to China;

disagreements on the economic aid which the USSR accords to countries such as India, Indonesia, Egypt, to prevent the total seizure by Imperialism of these countries, and which China considers as injuring its part of Soviet aid;

disagreements on the way to treat the endemic crisis in the Formosa

Straits, the USSR not sharing the Chinese viewpoint underestimating the danger of atomic war in the present period, and the power and reactions of American Imperialism;

disagreements on the usefulness of disseminating atomic arms among all the Workers States, China first of all, which would inevitably lead to the Americans granting atomic arms to the Germans and Japanese, both capable of producing these from the start on a scale immeasurably greater than China;

disagreements on frontier lines, if not territorial claims indirectly raised by China;

disagreements on the "Great Leap Forward" and "Peoples Communes" in which the Chinese leaders naively identify with the beginning of a kind of "short cut" to Communism;

etc.

Here are all the reasons which have led to the ripening of the conflict and carried it to the point of the present tension.

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The Sino-Soviet conflict has passed from an open ideological rupture to graver accusations and denunciations between the Governments of the USSR and China, and threatens to be transformed into a pure and simple rupture between these States.

This is a development which was foreseeable for a long time, yet for all that, has not failed to be spectacular and fraught with very serious consequences.

After the Russian-Yugoslav conflict in 1948, and after the Russian-Albanian conflict, the Sino-Soviet conflict confirms that the era of the construction of the world socialist system will also know its own antagonisms.

Certainly, the history of the workers international movement has been marked by deep ideological crises, which have left lasting organisational divisions.

Such was, for example, the split in the ranks of the 2nd International even before the First World War, between the revisionists of the period such as Bernstein, and the revolutionary wing led by Lenin, Rosa Luxembourg, and L. Trotsky.

Such was, likewise, the division which occurred next within the 3rd International between Stalin and Trotsky.

What distinguishes the present crisis from all those of the past, is above all the fact that it breaks out between Workers Parties which have

held power for some time and of whom certain lead great countries of world importance, with all the consequences which such a situation entails.

Equally important is the fact that the crisis is taking place in a world profoundly revolutionary, whose evolution has acquired the speed of a space-ship and the complexity of the transformations of the power-charged microcosm of the atom.

This does not fail to raise new questions every day, leaving far behind many theoretical schemas, and poses with extreme sharpness the necessity for the constant development of theoretical elaboration, so as to follow, in however little satisfying a manner, the extreme richness and complexity of the process of life, of contemporary reality.

All the past crises which have marked the history of the international workers movement have been definitely positive, for they have permitted a deepening of the theory and therefore of revolutionary practice. We have no doubt that the present crisis will be equally positively surmounted, and that the discussion which it has engendered already constitutes by far the most progressive aspect of the present situation.

The official international workers movement has for a long time lived within the framework of an ideological "monolithism," with bureaucratic commands, which has impressed on it a considerable retardation in relation to the evolution of reality.

This sterilising conformism has now been broken forever.

The re-establishment of ideological unity in the ranks of the international workers movement from now on passes through the reconstruction of a new type of democratic international, whose program must correspond to the new realities of our extraordinary century, and within which shall be admitted the rights of free discussion and of ideological tendencies.

Only a very high level of ideological education and socialist education could permit the rediscovery of the organic unity of the international workers movement, at present broken under the baton blows of the revolutionary reality of our times.

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It can be said that the present crisis will prove to be historically that which will prepare definitively the co-existence of all the currents of the international communist movement inside a single Communist Party in a country, with a democratic regime, recognising the right of tendencies.

For, in reality, the progress of the world revolution characteristic of our times, in which it is necessary to include the present new revolutionary development of the USSR, expressed globally in "destalinisation," tends towards a rapprochement of points of view on essential problems, and in posing the necessity for free discussion at a very high level, to reply effectively to new questions for the whole international communist move-

ment, posed by the realities of the revolutionary world in which we live.

It is important at the present stage to prevent the Chinese current crystallizing itself for a long time on Stalinist positions and practices.

For such an eventuality could aggravate the difficult internal position of China, lead to external adventures, and lead, on the plane of the international communist movement, not to the formation of genuine left currents, but to a selection of new-stalinist elements setting themselves above all against "destalinisation," and combining ultra-leftism and opportunism.

To prevent such an eventuality, it is necessary to fight with all means to give fraternal aid to China, to break its blockade, to take up its defence resolutely in all the conflicts which oppose it to Imperialism, and unceasingly to seek to limit divergences and to give them all the concessions and indulgence possible.

It is in the way the Khrushchevian USSR treats the Chinese that it will give supplementary proofs of the degree of maturity attained by "destalinisation," that is, the renovating revolutionary process of the first Workers State.

27th September, 1963.

(1) Estimated at one million dollars a day, against 250,000 dollars a day which the USA grants the regime of South Vietnam.

(2) See in this regard the joint Soviet-Cuban communiqué and the many declarations by Castro since his return from the USSR in which he underlines the aid which "the USSR and the other Workers States" are ready to grant to any Latin-American revolution which takes the same road as Cuba.

(3) See the Chinese commentaries in "Peking Information" No. 14.

(4) See the account of the policy of the Indonesian CP by its Secretary Aidit in "Peking Information" No. 15.

(5) Included in the "25 Points" of the Chinese.

A REPLY TO COMRADE PABLO'S ARTICLE ON THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

By the United Secretariat

To judge a problem as vast and complex as the Sino-Soviet conflict, it is obviously necessary to seek a view of the whole and take into account all the elements, at least the most important. Comrade Pablo himself says this. As he puts it, "Nothing in the global comportment of the Chinese leaders is a fortuitous, or isolated or secondary fact."

Yet, in analyzing the conflict, he chooses certain facts in an arbitrary way, isolating them from the over-all context, and passing by in silence other facts without demonstrating in the least that the former are more important than the latter.

He points to the Indonesian Communist party; and says not a word about the Khrushchevist majority of the Indian CP, which has formed a "sacred union" with its own bourgeoisie in an armed conflict in which the latter is opposed by a workers state, a crime worse than that of the social patriots of August 1914, and consequently not an insignificant detail in estimating the two camps.

He tells us about the Chinese leaders' "noisy alliance with the bloody Stalinist clique of Tirana," and says nothing about the no less "noisy" alliance of Khrushchev with the ultra-rightist and ultra-opportunist leaderships of the French and Italian CP's, who bear responsibility for the setback to the proletarian revolution in western Europe following the second world war, not to mention the American CP which is trying desperately to keep the American proletariat and Negroes tied to Kennedy's imperialist party even while Kennedy continues the witch-hunt against "Communism."

He offers us an entrancing picture of the "progressive acquisitions of the Yugoslav experience, which enrich Marxism" in the field of "the economic and political construction of Socialism," while passing by in complete silence the less entrancing aspect of the foreign policy of Yugoslavia, its compromises with imperialism in the question of Korea and the question of Cuba, and its more than revisionist theories which strongly advocate the most "multiple" roads to socialism.

He does not speak of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU except from the angle of de-Stalinization, passing by in silence its systematic codification of the most rightist theories of Stalinism on "peaceful roads."

Finally, Comrade Pablo does not offer a single word on the different lines which the "Chinese" and "Khrushchevists" advocate in most of the colonial and semicolonial countries -- a fact that is not without importance in building new revolutionary leaderships in these countries.

The least that can be said about such a method is that it scarcely permits us to reach a rounded view of the causes of the conflict and the positions taken by each side.

But something graver is involved.

Comrade Pablo seeks the origins of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the disagreements between the Chinese and Soviet leaders. But can one automatically identify political disagreements and an open conflict between workers states? Is the transition from one to the other "automatic," inevitable? We have never held this; we have always said the contrary. What should interest us above all is why the disagreements -- in themselves absolutely inevitable within the framework of the international workers movement -- degenerated into a conflict between states which has already brought grave injury to the anticapitalist forces in the world as a whole, and which threatens to bring them still graver injuries.

On this subject Comrade Pablo does not speak, and his silence is all the more significant because he spoke vehemently and not a little when the previous conflict between workers states -- the one between the USSR and Yugoslavia -- broke out.

Can it be seriously doubted that the disagreements between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships began to degenerate into a conflict between states from the time the Soviet bureaucracy began to apply impermissible economic, political and military pressure on the Chinese workers state, in order to compel its leadership to recognize and apply the line of the Kremlin?

Comrade Pablo says nothing about these typically Stalinist measures each of which constituted a unilateral rupture of the Sino-Soviet agreement: the violation of the promise to provide atomic secrets to China; the underhanded support given Nehru since 1959 in his conflict with the People's Republic of China; the abrupt halt of Soviet economic aid and the organization of a veritable economic blockade against China which was then suffering great domestic economic difficulties.

Did we condemn such methods, employed by Stalin against Yugoslavia, only because we believed that Stalin was wrong politically and Tito right? Even if Khrushchev were right and Mao wrong is it permissible to employ such methods between workers states? The fact that a bureaucracy also exists in China (as in Yugoslavia too) cannot in the least justify or provide an alibi for these methods of the Khrushchevist bureaucracy which threaten to pull apart and break up the camp of the workers states, and which could be employed tomorrow against other workers states or other countries engaged in making their revolution, including Cuba or Algeria, without mentioning the case where revolutionary Marxists are at the head of the state.

Does this involve a "minor" question or an essential aspect of the conflict? Can we remain indifferent about this, or stay "above the conflict," remaining "neutral," when it is a question of judging such methods? The whole principled character of our movement, above all its principles in regard to the organization of the workers movement and relations between workers states, would be placed in jeopardy by such an attitude.

We Are Not Neutral

We turn to other questions of principle, which some people could maintain are "minor," but to which Comrade Pablo attached great importance in

the past -- notably in relation to the Yugoslav question.

We are not neutral when it is a question of determining whether or not the line of the Kremlin must automatically become the line of the whole "socialist camp" and of all the Communist parties.

We are not neutral when it is a question of determining whether it is a crime or, on the contrary, perfectly normal for a Communist party like the Chinese CP -- and, certainly, any Communist party, any revolutionary party and any workers tendency -- to freely distribute its literature in the Soviet Union and in all the workers states, even if the line of this literature is "false" (who is to be the sovereign judge of that?)

We are not neutral when it is a question of determining whether it is permissible, under pretext that the Chinese hold an attitude underestimating the danger of nuclear arms, to grossly slander them as "belligerent" as does the Khrushchevist press, in the USSR and elsewhere, and of presenting them as "objective allies of de Gaulle, the French 'ultras' and reactionaries" in accordance with the well-known Stalinist technique of the amalgam.

On all these questions, Comrade Pablo says nothing. Worse, he does not even take them into account in his so-called "over-all" review of all aspects of the conflict. That is why his partial analysis can only end up in partial and subjective conclusions that correspond neither to the objective reality nor to the interests of the international workers movement with which our own movement is completely identified.

Only a Conflict Between Two Bureaucracies?

Comrade Pablo wishes to "correct" a position held by the overwhelming majority at the Seventh World Congress, the Reunification Congress and the international leadership they elected. Comrade Pablo insists strongly on the fact that the Sino-Soviet conflict is not essentially ideological but involves at bottom a conflict between two bureaucracies of workers states. We are not in disagreement with this way of looking at it since for us, as for every Marxist, any ideological conflict that assumes the scope of a social phenomenon reflects in the final analysis, of course, a conflict between social layers. In the same way, it could be said -- and various sectarian and ultra-left tendencies did not fail to say it -- that the Stalin-Tito conflict was likewise in the final analysis a conflict between two bureaucracies of workers states. But such a definition, first, is not complete, and, second, assumes a quite different meaning according to whether it is utilized simply as a scientific criterion in investigation or as a sectarian pretext for concluding that "we do not have to take a position in a conflict between two bureaucracies."

We say that it is not enough to say that the Sino-Soviet conflict is a conflict between two bureaucracies (any more than it was enough to say it in the case of the conflict between the USSR and Yugoslavia). Because it is evident that this conflict combines with the conflict between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Chinese workers state, the Chinese revolution (and in a certain measure, the whole colonial and world revolution as such). Exactly, it should be added, as was the case in the Stalin-Tito conflict.

Khrushchev does not content himself solely with discussing. He strikes. And when he strikes, it is not only the Chinese "bureaucracy" that is affected, but the whole Chinese revolution, and through it, the whole colonial revolution. When the Kremlin decrees a blockade of China, it is not only the Chinese bureaucrats (it would be better to say that it is not at all the bureaucrats) who suffer from it, but the whole Chinese people. When he supports Nehru against Mao, and makes the support felt through Dange, it is not only the Chinese bureaucracy but the whole Chinese revolution and the whole Indian revolution that receive harsh and bloody blows.

For this reason, if for no other, our over-all position in regard to the Sino-Soviet conflict would be justified already, just as was our over-all position in regard to the Stalin-Tito conflict.

It is true that the Chinese are badly mistaken on the question of Stalin, that they are badly mistaken on the question of the de-Stalinization of the USSR and other workers states of Europe; that they are badly mistaken on the class character of the Yugoslav state; that they are badly mistaken in their analysis of the domestic policies of Yugoslavia, which we, however, are far from approving one hundred per cent. We have said this many times and we have stressed the fact that the Chinese undoubtedly underestimate the disastrous effect of a nuclear world war, although they appear to be changing their views on this.

When the Chinese published the scandalous article "On the Question of Stalin," we were the first to submit this article to an implacable and detailed criticism. And we have never hidden our view that proletarian democracy does not exactly reign in China, either on the political level or among the communes and other bodies.

To understand concretely where the difference between Comrade Pablo and the majority of the International lies, we must bring into consideration -- in addition to questions where our criticisms primarily involve the Chinese -- those questions in which it is necessary to attack the Khrushchevist tendency: the Sino-Indian conflict; methods utilized to re-establish monolithism in the "socialist camp"; the general line proposed to most of the Communist CP's in the colonial and semicolonial countries as well as the imperialist countries. It is in relation to all these questions that we conclude that independently of our appreciation of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies, the line of the "Chinese" merits our critical support, above all in relation to how it objectively affects the progress of the world revolution within the workers international movement.

A "Stalinist-Type Crisis of Growth"?

Comrade Pablo's position is obscure. "When we say that the Chinese political leadership is at present going through its Stalinist-type crisis of growth," he says, "we mean that no bureaucratic apparatus can raise itself above the level of the material historic conditions of the national context in which it governs." To this he adds an "international" consideration: "We have listed the essential components of the political physiology of the Chinese current which attempts at present a sort of reconstruc-

tion of the ideology and comportment of Stalin, placed in a national context of an economic and cultural backwardness as well as an international isolation which resembles in some way the conditions which occasioned the birth of Stalinism in the USSR." (Our emphasis.)

This appears to reflect a mechanistic theory relating the degree of "Stalinism" of a bureaucratic group in power to the degree of development of the productive forces in the country. In accordance with this, the Khrushchevist leadership is moving farther and farther away from Stalinism because the economy is attaining a higher and higher level of development; the Chinese leadership, on the contrary, is passing through a grave crisis of growth of "Stalinist type" because the country is culturally and economically backward.

Trotsky's explanation for Stalinism is somewhat different. The Soviet Union did not begin with a Stalinism from which it might eventually free itself by a rise in the productive level which would find an automatic reflection in culture, including politics. The bureaucracy, inevitable at the beginning in all workers states, according to Trotsky, became converted into a hardened caste which eventually assumed an authoritarian political character. This was possible not only because of Russia's economic and cultural backwardness but because of defeats of the world revolution which left the first workers state isolated in a hostile capitalist world.

Do these conditions hold in the case of China? We can grant that the Chinese workers state, unlike the Soviet Union, began with a Stalinist heritage manifested above all in the mentality, training, outlook and practices of the Chinese Communist party leadership. We can add that the Chinese workers state also started with an extensive bureaucracy which is not lacking in rapacity or fear of proletarian democracy and which is nurtured by China's poverty and backwardness. One could label these characteristics as "Stalinist." But it would be a grave error to identify this with Stalinism as it existed in the Soviet Union, particularly in the worst epoch.

First of all, however far the bureaucracy in China may have developed, it has not consolidated its position by a counterrevolution. The bureaucracy remains -- even though through indirect means -- more responsive to popular pressures than the Soviet bureaucracy. The Chinese Revolution, which is much more recent than the Russian October, burns more brightly in the consciousness of the people.

Secondly -- and this is decisive from the Trotskyist point of view -- China exists in a completely different world context from that which made possible the victory, consolidation and deep entrenchment of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. It exists in the context of rising world revolution. This excludes a repetition of what happened in the Soviet Union.

Here, Comrade Pablo's reference to the "international isolation" of China is nothing less than extraordinary. In isolation from what? The world revolution?

It is our frank impression that the first workers state under Lenin

and Trotsky never had such contact with revolution abroad, mounting on a world scale, as China is experiencing today.

The isolation of China from -- imperialism? Is that a factor contributing to the rise of "Stalinism"? The role of imperialism, at least American imperialism, has been to drive the leaders of the Chinese Communist party in the direction of revolution whether they wished it or not.

The theory that Stalinism stands in direct ratio to the poverty and backwardness of a country, independently of the development of the world revolution, therefore constituting an inevitable stage in a workers state in any part of the world outside of an imperialist center puts in question the whole Trotskyist concept of the permanent revolution. The theory substitutes for the Trotskyist concept, a perspective of inevitable repetitions of the "Stalinist-type crisis of growth." But in China, however bad the bureaucratic practices, have we seen a fatalistic imitation of the NEP, forced collectivization, the massive deportation of "kulaks," etc.?

We do not need to flounder for an answer. Comrade Pablo himself has provided one. In April 1960, that is, after the worst crisis of the "communes," he concluded that Mao's domestic policy was fundamentally different from that of Stalin, constituting "a third model" for the construction of socialism:

"After ten years of groping in the general framework of the Soviet example," he wrote, "China has taken a really new 'road to socialism' by means of a network of basic organizations that are both economic and administrative in nature, the Communes, submitted to the control of the central organs of the state." (Quatrième Internationale, May 1960, p. 18.)

Nothing that has happened since May 1960 calls for "rectification" of this judgment and the announcement of the rebirth of Stalinism in China. Clearly, the backward conditions of China give birth and rebirth constantly to bureaucracy (as, it must be added, in Yugoslavia and even in Cuba), and the particular conceptions of the Chinese CP even encourage these tendencies in many fields. But we have always distinguished between the bureaucratic tendencies, and the extreme form of bureaucratic degeneration incarnated by Stalinism in the Soviet Union. Comrade Pablo now seems to forget this distinction in relation to China.

One of the most characteristic traits of Stalinism, which Trotsky many times used as synonymous with Stalinism was the complete subordination of the interests of the international proletariat and the international revolution to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy as expressed in the theory of socialism in one country. The Chinese have now broken openly, clearly and expressly with this theory (in the article "Apologists for Neocolonialism," in the People's Daily, October 22, 1963). This is a most important fact, permitting us to judge the relativity of their "Stalinism." That they do this while grotesquely affirming that Stalin also combated the theory of socialism in one country -- while the whole world knows that on the contrary he was its principal author -- hardly diminishes the relevancy of this ideological evolution to our attitude toward the two sides.

There remain finally the campaign for the "rehabilitation of Stalin" and the polemic against de-Stalinization. We condemn these two campaigns as reactionary, we are fighting them and will continue to fight them, and we are certain that in doing this we will establish an alliance with all the young, viable forces, the Communist tendencies of the "pro-Chinese" left. But this said, can we seriously make our position hinge on the fact that the Chinese defend Stalin as a person? This would be unworthy of the objective Marxist method which we must apply in studying all the phenomena of social life, including the phenomena of the workers movement. The essence of Stalinism, as understood by the revolutionary Marxists, was never the defense of Stalin as a person or the conception that "his positive sides were more important than his faults." To accept such a "definition of Stalinism," is at bottom to capitulate to the absurd Khrushchevist conception of the "personality cult."

Let us not forget that after their rupture with the Soviet bureaucracy, the Yugoslavs also continued to sing the praises of Stalin for a while. At the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav CP, at the end of Tito's political report, which was full of admiration for Stalin, and which affirmed that the Yugoslav Communists had conquered power because they had applied the teachings of Stalin, the party delegates rose to chant, "Stalin-Tito" -- not Tito-Stalin, but Stalin-Tito. During this same congress, the reporter on the organizational question, Rankovic, boasted of having hunted and eliminated, even physically eliminated, "the Trotskyists." That did not prevent us from giving critical support to the Yugoslavs at the time. For years the ultra lefts made fun of us because we were giving critical support to those who had "the unfortunate habit of praising Stalin and shooting Trotskyists." They made fun of us because we "supported a bureaucracy that had the illusion of constructing socialism in a country even more backward than the USSR." It is sad to find arguments of the same caliber used today by Pablo, who so firmly combatted them at the time.

An Alternative Explanation

In regard to Yugoslavia, Comrade Pablo advances, moreover, a theory for which he offers no proof; namely, the explanation for the attack "unleashed" by the Chinese against the Yugoslavs is that "Yugoslavia is by far the most 'de-Stalinized' of the workers states, whose example provokes to some degree the 'de-Stalinization' in the USSR and therefore in the other Workers States."

Why does he exclude another possible explanation; namely, that the Chinese violently attack Yugoslavia above all because of its "neutralist" foreign policy, its extreme rightist opportunism, which did not hesitate years before the Peking-Moscow rupture from grossly slandering the international Chinese policy and adding grist to the imperialist mill by talking constantly about the "belligerency" and the "aggressiveness of the Chinese." (See the attacks by Kardelj against the Chinese and the Trotskyists in his "Communism and War," written when he was not yet suspect.)

This possible explanation should come as no surprise to Comrade Pablo inasmuch as he himself was so indignant over the attitude of the Yugoslav Communists at the time of the Korean War -- at a time when they had, how-

ever, already instituted self-management and pushed "de-Stalinization" far -- that he expressed the opinion that it was preferable for a workers state to disappear rather than systematically betray the principles of proletarian internationalism. Since then, Yugoslav foreign policy has evolved toward the right and not toward the left. Is Comrade Pablo aware of some of the absolutely scandalous positions of the Yugoslavs with regard to the Cuban Revolution of Fidel Castro?(1) Is he aware of Tito's scandalous declaration, while visiting Bolivia, in which he joined with Paz Estenssoro to "note with satisfaction that the governments of Yugoslavia and Bolivia are inspired by analogous [!] objectives of liberty and of social justice. Attempting to translate these objectives into reality [!], each of them has carried out profound transformations of structure which correspond to the conditions and to the historic circumstances of their countries." What must the Bolivian revolutionaries and proletariat think of this pat on the back given by Tito to the bourgeois government of the MNR, after the big miners' strike, at a time when the financial reform carried out under the pressure of imperialism is draining the initial conquests of the revolution of a big part of their content?

In stating that the Chinese affirm that their differences with Khrushchev date from the Twentieth Congress, Comrade Pablo reduces the Twentieth Congress to de-Stalinization. Has he forgotten that the Twentieth Congress was marked by two fundamental traits, de-Stalinization on the domestic level and "codification" of an extreme-right, ultra-opportunist course on the level of the international Communist movement ("peaceful roads towards socialism," etc.)? Is it excluded that the Chinese might be revolted by the latter course above all -- since they at first saluted and approved "de-Stalinization" -- and that in view of what followed they arbitrarily identified the rightist course with de-Stalinization, extending to the latter the initial criticism of the former -- just as they arbitrarily extended to domestic Yugoslav policy the criticism initially developed against the ultra-opportunist foreign policy of Tito? In any case, this hypothesis appears just as reasonable as the one advanced by Comrade Pablo.

Finally, and above all, there is the context of the world situation today which makes absolutely impossible a renaissance of "Stalinism" whether on the international or Chinese scale. Stalinism was a product of twenty uninterrupted years of defeats of the world revolution. In a climate of permanent revolution, on a world scale as well as in China itself, there is no place for a deeply entrenched Stalinist bureaucracy in China, nor for the creation of a world Communist organization that would subordinate the interests of the revolution in each country to the interests of the Chinese bureaucracy.

There was a time when Comrade Pablo was hardly unaware of this, since he wrote in April 1960: -- "But one thing is certain: the rise of the New China acts likewise in this field, not as a stabilizing factor, but rather as a disintegrator of the Soviet bureaucracy. In the final analysis, such a process threatens to turn against the whole bureaucracy of the workers states, including China, the economic and cultural progress of these states, these proving to be more rapid and more decisive than the rule of a bureaucracy enmeshed, among other things, in the antagonisms of its different factions on the international and national level." (Quatrième Inter-

nationale, May 1960, p. 18). There is no reason today to change one's opinion on that.

Is Khrushchevism Relatively More Progressive?

Comrade Pablo begins his document by saying that we find ourselves facing a "struggle engaged in between two bonapartist apparatuses." This can seem to imply that we must not take a position for either one or the other of these two apparatuses. This was, it must be added, also the official position defended by the tendency of Comrade Pablo at the Seventh World Congress, in a brief resolution submitted for a vote at the last minute, after this same tendency had first submitted for international discussion documents taking a position more fully in favor of the Khrushchevist tendency ("On Four Major Problems of Our Times," "Draft Resolution on the New International Situation").

If Comrade Pablo does not openly defend this position of critical support (and even not so critical) to the Khrushchevists in his latest document, he suggests it nevertheless by the manifest partiality he displays toward the Kremlin in depicting the differences.

Thus, when it comes to making an over-all judgment of the antagonists, he depicts the Khrushchev faction in the following way:

"While multiplying and accelerating reforms internally, the policy of the Khrushchevian leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy combines externally resolution and flexibility [sic] with regard to Imperialism. . .

"This retreat internally [in relation to the masses] which is manifested by the process of 'destalinisation' and which has by no means stopped but by and large advances, is a source of great moral force for its external policy concerning the defense [sic] of the world revolution and its more resolute attitude towards Imperialism.

"Thus judged as a whole, 'destalinisation' is not a rightist and 'revisionist' course as the Chinese bureaucracy affirms, but a course essentially revolutionary and to the left."

From this quotation the conclusion flows inevitably that it is necessary to give critical support to Khrushchev. Because if he represents not only de-Stalinization in the USSR but also a left, revolutionary course on the international level, implying even the "defense of the world revolution," it is hard to see for what principled reasons he must be refused critical support against the Chinese -- adversaries of de-Stalinization, who, on the international level, support princes, nobles and kings in an ultra-opportunist way. . .

Comrade Pablo, it must be added, two years ago had already specified that "in case it [the Khrushchevist tendency] should maintain its new combativity toward imperialism, and the most positive support for the Colonial Revolution, while the Chinese bureaucracy -- for domestic reasons above all -- falls into a dogmatic Stalinist attitude, the Khrushchevist tendency could show itself as -- taken as a whole -- the more progressive of the

bureaucracies." ("Extracts from a Political Report." Internal Bulletin of the IS, November 1961.) It is clear that for Comrade Pablo these conditions have today been fulfilled, making the Khrushchevist tendency the most progressive tendency in the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Need much be said to demonstrate that this way of depicting the course of the Khrushchevist bureaucracy is in absolute contradiction to the reality?

Attitude toward Colonial Revolution

Comrade Pablo confounds the aid which the Soviet bureaucracy is led to grant a state resulting from the victory of the colonial revolution in a country, with its general attitude in regard to the colonial and world revolution, wherever it is developing and where it has not yet ended in victory.

He makes much of the aid granted by Khrushchev to the Cuban Revolution. He forgets that Khrushchev did not grant this aid to Fidel Castro until after the latter's victory, just as, it should be added, he did not really aid the Algerian Revolution until independence was on the very eve of being won.

On the contrary, the orientation of the Khrushchevist bureaucracy with respect to the colonial revolution in all the countries where it is still developing is such that Comrade Pablo himself still qualified it at the end of 1960 as ultra-opportunist and rightist.(2) How can one thus take for good coin, as Comrade Pablo does in his latest article ("the Latin-American countries, invited jointly by Khrushchev and Castro to follow the 'Cuban road'"), a purely verbal concession which Khrushchev made to Fidel Castro in the final communiqué of the Soviet-Cuban conversations in the USSR, while the daily practice in all the Latin-American countries (with the exception of Venezuela, where the CP has been won by the Fidelista current) puts the Khrushchevist line in opposition to the Fidelista line, supported by the Chinese?

If the Khrushchevist Nouvelle Revue Internationale attacks Hugo Blanco as a provocateur in the service of imperialism, it is not exactly to support "the Cuban road," but rather to prove that the line of the Khrushchevist CP's in Latin America remains oriented on the "peaceful and parliamentary road" toward "national liberation," led by the "national bourgeoisie" à la Paz Estenssoro, Goulart and Belaunde.

If Luis Carlos Prestes, the most authoritative mouthpiece of Khrushchevism in Latin America, proclaims that in that continent now is not the time for movements of the Castro type but only essentially peaceful action, we are not aware of any denials in La Nouvelle Revue Internationale, in Kommunist or in any representative organ whatever of the CP's directed by Moscow. And we will wait forever for a denial from Khrushchev.

If the Communist party of Paraguay attacks those who are slow in signing the Moscow Treaty (evidently the Cubans), and if Pravda complacently reproduces these attacks, this does not constitute a proof either that

Khrushchev agrees with the Fidelista line in Latin America. And if Ernesto "Che" Guevara publishes a long article on the philosophy of guerrilla tactics, in which he reaffirms the "Second Declaration of Havana"; namely, that this line is applicable to all countries of Latin America, he is consciously and deliberately opposing the Khrushchevist line, and this after the return of Fidel from the Soviet Union and after the famous Khrushchev-Fidel Castro communiqué which no one outside of Comrade Pablo seems to have taken seriously.

The interpretation of the Khrushchevist line as a line of "defense of the world revolution" is possible only if one abstracts from the daily reality of the revolutionary struggle in all the countries where the revolution has not yet triumphed and if one abandons in this regard the whole tradition of our movement.

The same remark applies to the tendentious, not to say scandalous, way in which Comrade Pablo characterizes the other differences between Peking and Moscow.

Attitude on War and Economic Aid

In regard to the question of war, the Chinese have clearly specified that it is slanderous to say that they want war; that they do not believe at all in the inevitability of nuclear war; that they believe that nuclear war can be prevented, and that their difference with Khrushchev bears on the question of how it can be prevented and not if it must be. They hold the position that the only means of preventing world nuclear war from breaking out is to support the movement for national liberation and the revolutionary movement of the peoples of all countries ("Commentary on the Declaration of the Soviet Government of August 21, 1963"). And when they say that in the event imperialism does unleash war despite everything, it will be destroyed, they are only repeating what Khrushchev has likewise said. The "Open Letter to the CC of the CPSU" of July 14, 1963, states:

"It is well established that if the imperialist madmen unleash war, the peoples will overthrow capitalism and bury it."

It could be held that this position taken by Khrushchev, like that of Mao, underestimates the devastating effects of a world nuclear war. But does one have the right to conclude that the Chinese have elaborated a strategy of world revolution that "takes into consideration the eventuality of an atomic war destroying half of humanity" when the Chinese clearly state that their strategy proposes to prevent this war?

Comrade Pablo has all the less reason for slandering the Chinese in this sense (while remaining silent on the analogous theses of Khrushchev!), since he himself wrote not so long ago the following:

"For us (as for that matter the Chinese) it is not a matter of wishing for war as a midwife of the Revolution. It is a matter of affirming that the existence of imperialism entails the preparation of war, and war itself; it is a matter of not minimizing the weight and the power that imperialism still contains; it is a matter of affirming that outside of

an efficacious revolutionary struggle for extending the Revolution, no other means exist (technical or otherwise) to avoid the threat of war."

This position seems to us broadly correct. It is the position which the Chinese still hold today. The least one can demand of Comrade Pablo is that before criticizing the Chinese on this question, he should make a serious self-criticism and explain to us how he came to adopt such a position some years after the creation of stockpiles of nuclear arms capable of destroying the whole human race.

In regard to attitudes toward colonial bourgeoisie in power, Comrade Pablo depicts the disagreements between Moscow and Peking in the following way:

"Disagreements on the economic aid which the USSR accords to countries such as India, Indonesia, Egypt, to prevent the total [!] seizure by Imperialism of these countries, and which China considers as injuring its part of Soviet aid."

The formulation is truly incredible coming from the pen of a Trotskyist leader inasmuch as it leaves out completely the class point of view! What would Comrade Pablo say if the USSR sent massive aid to Morocco at the moment of its armed conflict with Algeria, under pretext of "preventing the total seizure by imperialism of this country"? What then is the difference between the Sino-Indian conflict on the one hand and the Algerian-Moroccan conflict on the other, unless it is that Comrade Pablo himself has not yet defined the Algerian state as a workers state and he has likewise not placed in question the nature of the Chinese state as a workers state?

Aid to a government of the colonial bourgeoisie not only prevents "the total seizure by imperialism of the country"; it also risks reinforcing this government against the worker and peasant masses of the country. And when it is affirmed that Moscow does not "dispose of sufficient means" to aid a workers state threatened by famine, while at the same time disposing of sufficient means to aid a Kasseem or a Nasser, when the prisons of these two gentlemen are filled with Communists, the Chinese Communists have a right to find the argumentation at least specious.

On Atomic Arms

Comrade Pablo speaks next of "disagreements on the usefulness [!] of disseminating atomic arms among all [!] the Workers States, China first of all, which would inevitably lead [!] to the Americans granting atomic arms to the Germans and Japanese, both capable of producing these from the start on a scale immeasurably greater than China."

It is necessary to say that on this question the position of Comrade Pablo has changed a lot in a short time. Khrushchev in 1959 broke the treaty by which he was committed to furnish atomic secrets to China (and not to "all the workers states," an absurd position that no one maintains). In October 1962 Comrade Pablo wrote (in "On Four Major Political Problems of Our Times"):

"The existence alone of China, effectively liberated from imperialism, and soon to be equipped with a powerful atomic armament, disrupts to a point still insufficiently grasped, the whole strategy of imperialism. To the extent that China progresses, is reinforced and becomes a military power, including atomic, the effort of imperialism, concentrated up to now principally against the USSR, is checked."

In the same article, Comrade Pablo wrote that the "dissemination in progress of the fabrication of atomic arms [has become a] now irreversible process." But in September 1963 Comrade Pablo justified a posteriori Khrushchev's decision of 1959 to not give atomic secrets to China, affirming that this would be the "present" that would lead to the dissemination of atomic arms in the imperialist camp. As if imperialism had not already decided on this dissemination, notably in granting nuclear arms to Canada immediately after signing the Moscow Treaty! As if imperialism had not already decided a long time ago to grant nuclear arms to the Germany of Bonn, under cover of a "multilateral NATO striking force."

To crown the confusion, in October 1962 Comrade Pablo judged that the nuclear armament of China would be a factor for nuclear peace in the sense that it would oblige imperialism to disperse its forces more and thus render more hazardous their utilization; a year later he judged to the contrary that this same armament had suddenly become a factor of nuclear war, "facilitating" the dissemination of nuclear arms among other imperialist powers.

In fact it is evidently the 1962 thesis that is correct. The absence of nuclear armament in China constitutes a veritable "invitation" to American imperialism to utilize tactical nuclear arms; for example, in south east Asia, without the USSR being able to reply otherwise than by unleashing a world nuclear war and the self-destruction of humanity, which it was seeking to avoid. . .

To conclude this point, Comrade Pablo asks us to publish at the same time what he wrote in 1962 and what he wrote in 1963, which should certainly convince the readers of our press of the perfect confusion of his line. . .

The Frontier Dispute and the Communes

Again, Comrade Pablo speaks of the Sino-Soviet disagreements on the "multiple [!] frontier frictions, if not territorial claims indirectly raised by China." Why the strange circumspection of such a formula? The "frontier frictions" between China and Burma, Pakistan, etc., were resolved peacefully by drawing up treaties. There remains the only known "frontier friction," the one with India, on which Comrade Pablo in the past had a particularly clear-cut opinion. If he has now changed, forgetting completely the class nature of the camps involved, he should at least call things by their right name, and tell us that he finds it a normal fact -- a particular manifestation of the support granted by Khrushchev to the "world revolution" -- that the Soviet government supports; first underhandedly and then more and more openly, including supplying arms (without doubt to "prevent" Nehru from buying his arms solely from the imperialist

countries), the Indian bourgeois state against the Chinese workers state. . .

Finally, Comrade Pablo mentions the "disagreements on the 'Great Leap Forward' and 'Peoples Communes,'" a disagreement which he now reduces to the sole question of whether or not it involves a "'short cut' to Communism," when the disagreement involves in reality, as he himself explained in the past, different models of constructing socialism. Comrade Pablo does not explain at all whether it is preferable for colonial countries to remain for a long period on the basis of purely private agriculture or to proceed to forced collectivization (the two Stalinist variants), or if the "popular communes," purged of their bureaucratic formations and excesses (which the Chinese leaders themselves have acknowledged), does not constitute a valuable contribution (like the Yugoslav contribution) to solving the agrarian problem in a backward country engaged on the road to constructing socialism. Here again, Comrade Pablo should make a serious self-criticism if he suddenly revises the thesis he maintained in this regard in 1958-60.

Is a Wealthier Bureaucracy More Progressive?

Let us summarize. Comrade Pablo's thesis is in fact a thesis of "critical support" to the Khrushchevist tendency on the argument that the USSR being a more advanced country than China, this tendency is under greater pressure from the Soviet proletariat. It comes to this: between two bureaucracies, the one of the more advanced country will be the more "progressive." Or, worse still: between two bureaucracies, it is necessary to support the wealthier against the poorer! It goes without saying that the International, which clearly stated in its documents at the Reunification Congress that it was not a matter of supporting any wing of the bureaucracy against the other, will never accept a position so mechanistic and so liberal as that! All the more so, since the International has understood for a long time that if Khrushchev is actually under the pressure of the proletariat of the workers states, the Chinese leaders are more sensitive to the pressure of the masses of the colonial countries, a fact which Comrade Pablo does not take into account at all.

The International rejected this thesis of Comrade Pablo by an overwhelming majority at the Seventh World Congress. The Reunification Congress registered a still bigger majority for the thesis which, without granting support to a bureaucracy, granted critical support to one of the tendencies in the international Communist movement, because it held that the objective results of the Sino-Soviet conflict would operate to regroup around this tendency in the capitalist countries the most valuable elements for constructing a new revolutionary leadership to the degree that the Fourth International succeeds in influencing them and bringing them progressively to its own positions.

Comrade Pablo cannot cite any new fact that would warrant reconsideration of this position. All the facts on which he stands (except the Moscow Treaty, which he mentions, it must be said, only in passing) were known to the delegates at the World Congress who took a position with full knowledge of what is involved. Comrade Pablo's attempt to reopen the

discussion on the subject of the Sino-Soviet conflict is simply an attempt to place in question the decisions of the World Reunification Congress, barely a few months after it was held. This we cannot accept.

November 10, 1963

(1) The Yugoslav organ Revue de la Politique Internationale (No. 326) thus has just taken a strictly "neutral" position in the Algerian-Moroccan conflict, not specifying in any way any difference whatever in the social nature of the two governments involved.

(2) Here is what Comrade Pablo wrote in his letter sent to the Sixth World Congress, under date of December 4, 1960:

"It is quite naturally the Chinese bureaucracy, the closest to its own revolution and to the colonial revolution in particular, which has taken the lead in resisting the rightist course of Khrushchev's foreign policy. . .

"The rupture between the wing properly called opportunist and rightist of the bureaucracy and the wing of centrist inclination, is profound and durable. . .

"What is now in question in the interbureaucratic struggle, is not whether it is necessary to be for or against war, but the fundamental problems of revolutionary politics in our epoch: the nature of imperialism, relation of forces, attitude toward the colonial bourgeoisie and the colonial revolution; passage from capitalism to socialism, socialist reconstruction of society, etc. . . .

"Our golden rule in face of these two variants [Yugoslav and Chinese] will be as in the past to follow critically but with objectivity, sympathy and proficiency their evolution, to encourage all the steps forward and try to link ourselves with the most advanced elements of these two currents." (Our emphasis.)

Comrade Pablo appears to have abandoned his "golden rule" of yester year. . .

LETTER FROM COMRADE PABLO

To the International Executive Committee,
To the United Secretariat,
To the Leaderships of Sections.

Comrades,

I have just learned of the reply made by the majority of the United Secretariat to my repeated requests to publish all the documents of the minority presented for vote at the Seventh World Congress, as well as to cease acting like the leadership of a faction, instead of the International as a whole, which considers it scarcely necessary to consult the minority members of the U.S. on the important political questions involving the whole International.

That does not amount to a reply.

This is the least one can say.

Publication of the documents of the minority:

The cleverness of the editor of the reply consisted in mixing financial reasons with reasons concerning a so-called "right" of the majority to select what minority documents should be published!

The majority found the financial means to publish an issue of "Quatrième Internationale" in which it took 67 pages out of a total of 72 pages, devoting in all 5 pages to the minority.

What generosity!

They hope in this way to attain their factional aim of presenting the minority which raised the essential questions of the debate in the International and which provoked the replies of the majority, as ideologically poverty-stricken.

If financial questions prevented the majority from displaying its generosity through some additional pages in our theoretical organs devoted to the documents of the minority, why do they still refuse to publish these documents in the current number of these same publications?

In reality, the reply rests on the other "argument" of the majority setting up the natural "right" of the majority to select for itself the documents of the minority that are to be published.

This is a factional conception of democratic centralism that was never part of the traditions and practices of our International.

Let this majority name a single example where the International, confronted by the explicit request of any minority tendency whatsoever, has refused publication of the documents of such a tendency.

Not to mention the fact that at no time in the history of the

International has a minority of such extent and importance as the present minority existed within it.

The majority wants to keep up the myth of an opposition formed only by Comrade Pablo, "isolated" within the International.

They carefully avoid letting the International know that the revolutionary Marxist tendency of the Fourth International which we represent, includes a large number of organizations and leading cadres of the International which is growing more and more.

The revolutionary Marxist tendency of the Fourth International was created on the basis of a political platform of decisive importance for the future of the Fourth International.

That the majority finds the means to show generosity toward all kinds of currents going from the "Chinese," the "Khrushchevists," the "Castroists," etc., clear to Healy, opening the columns of the organs of the International which it controls (as is the case most especially with World Outlook) to the prose of these currents or to "ideological discussions" with these currents, but that it strictly refuses to present the positions of the minority of the International, this is the singular conception of "democratic centralism" which says a lot about the mentality of the leaders of this tendency and what can happen to the unity of the International.

Never will the revolutionary Marxist tendency of the Fourth International accept continuation of such a state of things.

Consultation with all the members of the U.S.

"It is not possible for the Secretariat to make all the positions it takes dependent on prior reception of the opinion of nonresident members of the Secretariat," declares the reply of the United Secretariat, letting it be understood that we formulated such a demand.

But our request dealt and deals with the necessity of consulting the members of the U.S. as a whole, particularly its minority for "all important texts" involving the policy of the Fourth International on questions as crucial for example as the Sino-Soviet Conflict.

All the communiqués of the U.S., issued since the Congress of the International, on reunification, on the Sino-Soviet conflict, on the atomic treaty, on Algeria, were published without the texts being communicated beforehand.

The same procedure for the editorials of the "Quatrième Internationale" and for its principal articles.

The minority is practically excluded from all consultation on political questions as well as on the organizational life of the International.

In traveling and meeting, the members of the majority utilize for themselves alone all the financial resources at the disposition of the

International without consulting the members of the minority and without helping them in traveling so that they could attend the meetings of the U.S.

Making a pretext of the lack of financial resources, the majority places the members of the minority under necessity of covering all their own expenses of travel to the places of U.S. meetings, chosen at the most distant points in relation to the bases of the minority.

But to think of traveling, if only for once to A., for example, the center of a revolution and one of the very important concentration points of cadres of the International becomes impossible.

To justify this factional manner of leading the International, without effective political and organizational collaboration with the minority, without even effective consultation, the majority takes cover under the "argument" that we have just come out of a World Congress, "democratically" prepared, which decided on all the questions and which permits it to now act as it pleases.

But the truth is quite otherwise on all these aspects of the "argument."

I leave aside the fact that several of the documents of the minority were never even discussed in a large number of sections and were not even known, as for example the English translation of the text: "On Four Major Problems of Our Time."

But let us take, for example, the question of the Sino-Soviet conflict. What was the long "democratic" discussion on this question? In reality, there was no discussion on this question, very limited, moreover, even at the World Congress, due to the fact that the majority chose precisely this question to carry on its principal political battle against the minority.

No one expected that this grave question, scarcely discussed in the International, was to become the principal basis of delimitation between majority and minority at the time of the Seventh World Congress.

The majority believed it had found for its tactic of dominating the Congress, the golden subject it was seeking in order to divert the discussion and delimitation on the colonial revolution, on entryism, on the war, on de-Stalinization, on the new composition, the functioning and location of the International leadership, cardinal questions of the platform of the minority, and to center them on the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Because it had banked on the attraction that the "leftist," "anti-Khrushchevist" positions of the Chinese could exercise on the Trotskyist milieu, favorable in principle to such an opening on the part of the Chinese. Incapable of grasping the profound nature of the Chinese tendency of the bureaucracy, the outcome of its over-all positions, the majority thought it possible to restore its fortunes as a tendency that is at bottom rightist, routinist and practically

cut off from the two essential revolutionary sources of the present stage in which the immediate future of the Fourth International rests; namely, the Colonial Revolution and de-Stalinization, by declaring their "critical support" of the Chinese tendency of the bureaucracy, so-called renovator of revolutionary Marxism and generator of genuine left currents.

But, scarcely having formulated this "profound" and comforting analysis, events were precipitated that placed our majority, triumphantly emerging from the World Congress, in the saddest embarrassment.

The Chinese tendency of the bureaucracy openly unmasked itself as resolutely set against de-Stalinization and profoundly imbued with Stalinist conceptions and practices (also within the domain of the colonial revolution and the struggle against the bourgeoisie in the advanced capitalist countries).

To such a point that the theoreticians of the majority, overwhelmed and panicked by the incredible Stalinist tirades of the Chinese, ended up with the conclusions -- in the articles which they were obliged to devote to them -- that on this line (Stalinist) of the Chinese, any creation of a left current in common with the Chinese had become practically impossible.

Moreover, the Chinese who glorified the struggle conducted by Stalin "against the Trotskyists and other agents of the Bourgeoisie" did not give them any time to breathe within these "currents."

They took the initiative everywhere of expelling the few Trotskyists wandering among their "left currents."

To say under these conditions that the discussion on the Sino-Soviet conflict is "closed" for the moment caps everything. The truth is that the discussion on the Sino-Soviet conflict never took place in the International, that this discussion through a tactical ruse and surprise became the major political question at the time of the World Congress and that following it events of crushing weight occurred, placing everything under a completely different light from that which the majority sought to show things at the World Congress.

When Germain, Livio and other authors see themselves forced to reopen the debate with the Chinese on the Stalinist positions of the latter, why haven't those who warned the International in time on the inevitability of such a development of the Chinese tendency of the bureaucracy the right to intervene?

To permit the majority to reduce its "support" of the Chinese more and more to the "critical" part and thus get out of the impasse in which they placed themselves?

We will never accept such an attitude, all the more so since the Sino-Soviet conflict raises a series of capital questions for the international workers movement demanding a new thought-out reply.

A new discussion in the International has become inevitable; six

months after a World Congress it is even in complete accordance with the statutes.

It is in addition demanded by a very considerable part of the International which includes a series of sections, of important minorities and cadres of the International.

This discussion will prove to be the most important in the history of the Fourth International.

Because it will bear on the essential questions of our time and allow completion of the ideological rearmament by the revolutionary Marxist tendency of the International to whom the future of the latter belongs.

With my Communist greetings,

M. PABLO

20/11/1963

LETTER FROM MINORITY

14/12/63

To the C.E.I.
To the U.S.

Comrades,

We have just learned of the decision of the U.S. to not permit the opening of the discussion in the International on the Sino-Soviet conflict, and of maintaining the ban imposed on the documents of our tendency.

"Quatrième Internationale" has again appeared without publishing the document of our tendency presented for vote at the 7th W.C. "On Four Major Problems of Our Time," and without publishing the article on the Sino-Soviet conflict by Comrade Pablo "It Is Time to See Clearly."

We leave aside the fact that another document by Comrade Pablo, which has nothing to do with the present discussion in the International, of purely theoretical character, dealing with Freudism, and sent almost a year ago for publication, still remains in the drawers of the editors of this organ of the I.E.C.

Another recent document of the African Commission, issued at the time of the Algerian-Moroccan conflict, transmitted immediately to the Algerian Government, in which the engagement was made by the members of the African Commission to be considered as mobilized in the same way as the Algerian combatants for any task in defense of the Algerian Revolution, did not have the honor of publication in either "World Outlook" nor in "Quatrième Internationale."

Thus is confirmed the ostracism of which our tendency has been made victim by the present factional majority of the International.

The article "It Is Time to See Clearly," designed for outside publication, has just been published, accompanied by a reply from the "U.S.," in a kind of internal mimeographed publication, for members of the I.E.C. only, not having even the form or title of an internal bulletin of the U.S.

The factional majority of this body, which includes moreover four members of the minority (two full members and two alternates) arrogates to itself the right to monopolize the name of the U.S. and to prevent for example the documents of a member of the I.E.C., of the U.S., and of the leadership of a whole tendency of the International becoming known to even the leaderships of the sections!

But this same factional majority does not scruple at all to publish in "World Outlook" an interview of Comrade Ross Dowson, likewise a member of the I.E.C., taking a position in favor of the Moscow Atomic Treaty, which he moreover considers to be consistent with the line advocated for a long time in this matter by the USSR (and not at all as an essentially anti-Chinese operation as our factional majority continues to maintain).

The request for an immediate reopening of the debate in the International on the Sino-Soviet conflict, six months after the W.C. and in fact of the new indisputable developments, is now supported by a whole series of sections, of minorities of sections and cadres of the International.

The U.S. knows it and must make it known to the I.E.C. as well as the whole International.

Besides, the discussion has in reality already been opened in a number of sections, such as the Australian Section, the Austrian Section, the Dutch Section, the Danish Section, the Peruvian Section and others, as well as at the level of the I.E.C.

The French Section has just decided to immediately reopen discussion in its ranks, the tendency of Comrade Pierre Frank having been placed in the minority.

Under these conditions to still oppose the discussion as does the majority of the U.S. becomes purely meaningless.

This is the first time in the history of the International that such a stubborn refusal to open a political discussion has been manifested.

This is the first time that such bureaucratic arbitrariness prevailed in the leading bodies of the International, without consideration for the extreme tension that such an attitude maintains in the International.

In the name of the revolutionary Marxist tendency of the Fourth

International we demand once more: that the discussion on the Sino-Soviet conflict be immediately opened; that our public writings be published in the public organs of the International; that our discussion documents be published in the regular Internal Bulletin of the U.S. which must appear; that consultation of the majority of the U.S. with the minority of the U.S. be established on all the major political questions and texts (declarations of the U.S., editorials of "Quatrième Internationale").

With our internationalist-communist greetings.

For the Australian Section: Nic.
For the Dutch Section: Maurice
For the Peruvian Section: Julio
For the P.B. of the Danish Section: Preben
For the P.B. of the French Section: Michard
For the African Commission: Simonne
For the Austrian Minority: Lerse
For the Greek Minority: Dennis
M. Pablo, Member of the I.E.C. and of the U.S.
Sal Santen, Member of the I.E.C. and of the U.S.
Ismael Frias, Member of the I.E.C. and of the U.S. (Alternate)
Anderson, Member of the I.E.C. and of the U.S. (Alternate)
Lenoir, Member of the I.E.C. and of the U.S. (Alternate)
Hellonc, Member of the African Commission
Privas, Member of the African Commission
Pierre, Member of the African Commission

P.S. The editorial in the number of "Quatrième Internationale" just out, "Mystifications et réalités," oriented exclusively on the Moscow Atomic Treaty, is an additional proof of the sectarian impasse in which the majority of the U.S. has strayed in accordance with its "pro-Chinese" position.

On the other hand, the artificial character and bad faith of a number of arguments employed to combat the Treaty brings grave injury to the prestige of the International and will not fail to arouse a certain prejudice in our real mass work. We will return to this question as well as to a certain number of other positions taken by the majority of the U.S. which have appeared in organs it controls.

THE ISSUE IS DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

By the United Secretariat

After the full replies made by the United Secretariat to his letter of October 8 and his article of September 27, Comrade Pablo feels it necessary to continue the polemic in a new lengthy letter dated November 20, 1963, as well as in a letter of his tendency dated December 14, 1963.

We sincerely regret this polemic which is essentially sterile and contrary to the spirit of democratic centralism. The latter requires that after a Congress, the majority should carry out its line for a certain period so that concrete experience can be gained. The discussion that is then reopened, in preparation for the following Congress, will in this way be constructive insofar as experience brings out elements that are new to one side or the other. Otherwise, a discussion after a Congress will repeat essentially the same arguments as the discussion before and during the Congress, which would signify objectively that the minority did not recognize the verdict of the Congress.

This traditional custom of our movement is all the more applicable in relation to a Congress of Unification, which should open a new stage in the construction of the International and start afresh, largely in abstraction from the polemics of the past. After such a Congress, the activity of the International ought to be oriented toward external work and not toward internal discussion. We are conscious, so far as we are concerned, of having done and of wanting to do everything possible so that Comrade Pablo personally, and all the members of his tendency, could integrate themselves in the new leadership of the united International and occupy there the place due them in accordance with both their numerical weight and their personal qualities and the activities in which they are engaged.

But integration such as that requires loyal application of the decisions of the Reunification Congress which are binding for the whole organization and not just one tendency, and it demands actual collaboration on the leadership level and not the immediate unleashing of a new polemic. But Comrade Pablo sought to reopen the discussion as soon as the World Congress of Reunification ended, just as he said he intended to at the Congress itself.(1)

(1) The argument used in the letter of December 14, 1963, according to which it is normal to reopen discussion six months after a Congress, has an odd ring, since the Pablo tendency formally demanded the reopening of discussion not six months but two months after the Congress. As for us, we have stated that the next IEC could reopen an internal discussion and we maintain this position. Even stranger is the argument contained in the same letter of December 14, 1963, according to which "the discussion has in reality already been opened" by some sections and therefore to oppose it becomes "purely meaningless." In other words: since the minority comrades have opened discussion in violation of discipline, the majority should bow to the accomplished fact. . . .

Thus the new accusations launched by Comrade Pablo and his tendency against the leadership of the International, according to which it is acting as "the leadership of a faction," appears to us both incomprehensible and contradictory.

On the one hand, Comrade Pablo accuses us of wanting "to keep up the myth of an opposition formed only by Comrade Pablo, 'isolated' within the International." But on the other hand, since all the decisions that have been made, since the Reunification Congress, within the leadership body set up by this Congress according to norm, namely, the United Secretariat to whose meetings the representatives of the Pablo tendency have regularly attended (except the meeting of November 9-10 from which they voluntarily abstained), Comrade Pablo, in pretending that we are acting without consulting his tendency, is really saying that we are acting without consulting him.

It is clear that following a Congress, a democratically elected leadership has not only the right but the duty to apply the mandate it received from this Congress.

The minority has the right to be consulted on its decisions and to try to influence them within the regular leading bodies. But to demand that the leadership should halt its work and subordinate the publication of resolutions to prior consultation with a single comrade of the minority who cannot participate in these leadership bodies means to substitute for democratic centralism the conception of a federation of tendencies, a conception completely contrary to the tradition of our movement, which Comrade Pablo never applied or accepted when he was secretary of the I.S., and which we for our part will never accept either.

The strange organizational conceptions of Comrade Pablo -- based on arbitrariness and the rejection of all norms that do not fit his factional struggle -- are observable in the very contents of the letter of December 14. The majority of the United Secretariat "arrogates to itself the right to monopolize the name of the U.S." -- despite the fact that all its proposals are made within the United Secretariat, where the minority has two votes out of ten, in accordance with the vote at the Congress. But Comrade Pablo finds it perfectly normal that his tendency document should be signed, for example, by "the P.B. of the French Section" although it was never submitted to that body, while in the Central Committee of this section the proposal to open public discussion was passed by only seven votes against six(2); he

(2) To indicate the situation in the French section, we note that at the Central Committee meeting of October which discussed the report of the delegates to the World Congress the political votes were as follows:

(a) Maurel-Michard resolution approving the general line of the minority of Comrade Pablo: For, 6; against, 7; abstention, 1.

(b) Frank resolution approving the general line adopted by the Congress: For, 7; against, 7.

finds it normal that his factional document should be signed by the "Australian Section" although in the Australian section there is a very important minority that is opposed to this unprincipled factional struggle with its violations of the rules of democratic centralism. And he finds it normal to have the document even signed by "the P.B. of the Danish Section," while the leadership of this section rejected the demand to reopen discussion by three votes against two!

It is clear that in the public organs of the International, the leadership engages in public debate with tendencies of the workers movement outside our movement. But to utilize the fact that we discuss publicly with the Khrushchevists, the Chinese, the Castroists, the Yugoslavs, as a pretext for demanding for a minority in our organization the same right to debate publicly, signifies in reality to wipe out the fundamental differences between members of the movement who must be bound by discipline in facing outwardly and the adversaries of our movement, towards whom a revolutionary Marxist organization clearly cannot impose any discipline.

For all these reasons we cannot accept the accusation that we have acted as the leadership of a faction. We have submitted all political texts of the United Secretariat beforehand to the minority represented within this body. It is therefore false to declare that the minority is "practically excluded from all consultation on political questions as well as on the organizational life of the International." All the decisions regarding the travel of majority members of the United Secretariat are made at meetings of the United Secretariat to which all correspondence is submitted in addition. Does Comrade Pablo propose a different procedure with regard to this?

Unfortunately one cannot say as much for the activities of comrades of the minority, who do not submit their activities to any control by the international organization. Neither the Dutch section nor the Australian section send any reports to the United Secretariat. The same remark applies to the "African Commission" from which we have not received any report on activities during the six months that have passed since the World Congress. Comrade Pablo himself chose of his own will to change the composition of this commission by "co-opting" Comrade Privas without asking anyone's opinion although the members of all commissions were designated by the I.E.C. following the World Congress.

It is incorrect to declare that the members of the majority "utilize for themselves alone all the financial resources at the disposition of the International." Aside from paying the debts of the Reunification Congress, the financial resources of the International are absorbed exclusively by the publications of the United Secretariat and the International Executive Committee, which are more costly than before, and by running expenses. No member, either majority or minority, receives the slightest reimbursement for traveling to meetings of the United Secretariat. These meetings are held at places that are centrally located for seven of the ten comrades of the United Secretariat, or for eight if the alternates of the Pablo tendency are included. In view of the financial situation, does Comrade Pablo consider it reasonable that eight members should travel regularly where

the ninth is located? The places chosen are equally central for alternate members of the minority and likewise for Comrade Santen. Again, Comrade Pablo appears to identify himself personally with the minority when he speaks of places chosen "at the most distant points in relation to the bases of the minority," something that applies only to him.

It is not accurate to accuse the majority of considering it "impossible" to "think of traveling, if only for once to A." Comrade Pablo knows very well that the majority of the United Secretariat itself proposed that the meeting of the United Secretariat for November should be held in A.; if this did not occur, it was not its fault.

Nor is it accurate to declare that the minority is the victim of "ostracism" by the majority and that it is denied collaboration in the public organs of the International. To the contrary, the majority has not ceased to appeal to the minority, and especially the African Commission and Comrade Pablo to write regularly for "World Outlook," to write an article for the latest number of "Quatrième Internationale," to prepare for publication the report by Comrade Pablo at the World Congress on Algeria, which was scheduled to appear at the same time as the political report by Comrade Germain. None of these requests met with any response.

What is true is that the majority has not asked the comrades of the minority to write articles on subjects on which these comrades have differences with the majority. This procedure is normal and in accordance with democratic centralism which calls for application in public of the line of the majority. Consequently we have asked the comrades of the minority to write on subjects on which no differences exist among us as on the Algerian question.

Here again the conception that Comrade Pablo advances (when he is in the minority) on the subject of democratic centralism is most bizarre. Before the World Congress, he demanded internal and public parity of expression for the two tendencies (we were in agreement on parity in the internal organs); during the Congress, he again demanded parity (which is normal); after the Congress, he continues to demand parity of expression both internally and publicly. Under these conditions, of what purpose was the Congress? We should like Comrade Pablo, after having demanded his "rights" and having hurled accusations broadside of "bureaucratism," to tell us what he considers the duties of a minority after a Congress to be. In practice, it seems that he does not recognize any. . .

On the political questions again raised in the new letter from Comrade Pablo we will say only a few words, since these questions were already fully commented on in our reply to the preceding letter from Comrade Pablo (appended to the minutes of the United Secretariat meeting of November 9-10 -- United Secretariat minutes, incidentally, contrary to Comrade Pablo's affirmation, are sent to all leaderships of sections and not just to members of the I.E.C.).

Comrade Pablo makes out that the majority did not "discover" the necessity for criticizing the Chinese on the question of Stalin until

after the World Congress, and that the pro-Stalinist documents of the Chinese placed the majority "in the saddest embarrassment."

But the comrades of the International know very well that the documents adopted by the Reunification Congress declared:

"Our appreciation of the significance of the ideological and political evolution of the Chinese Communists does not prevent us in the least from expressing our criticisms on a whole series of questions where their positions are erroneous and dangerous. . . .

"In the second place we criticize the backwardness of the Chinese Communists on the problems of de-Stalinization, to which, however, at an earlier stage they seemed to wish to contribute. Especially bad is their attitude toward the Albanian Stalinists and even toward old Stalinist groups in the USSR, their reticence in face of the Soviet condemnation of Stalin and his 'cult.' This attitude can have only negative consequences. . . ." (Fourth International, No. 17, 1963, p. 52.)

The majority of the United Secretariat consequently was not in the least "embarrassed" at having to criticize the article of the Chinese defending Stalin, since the necessity for such criticism had been stated at the World Congress. What the majority refused to do was to imitate Comrade Pablo in his hasty and light-minded identification of the Chinese tendency with "Stalinism," which would in practice have paralyzed any intervention by Trotskyism in the Sino-Soviet conflict in most of the countries of Latin America, Asia, Africa and certain European countries in accordance with the aim of constructing a new revolutionary leadership instead of the simple aim of "advising" the bureaucratic, opportunistic Khrushchevist factions.

Comrade Pablo is also mistaken when he declares that the "Chinese" have everywhere expelled the "Trotskyists" from the "left currents" which they inspired and that any collaboration is impossible with these currents from now on. Practical experience has shown to the contrary that within these tendencies differentiation inevitably appears around the problem of Stalin -- on condition that we approach them from a position of critical support without "condemning" them as a whole in sectarian fashion as "Stalinists."

On the subject of publishing the World Congress documents of the minority and similarly the organization of a new public discussion between the majority and the minority, Comrade Pablo found a genuinely "new" argument: "Let this majority name a single example where the International, confronted by the explicit request of any minority tendency whatsoever, has refused publication of the documents of such a tendency." (Our emphasis.) We could easily reply: "Let Comrade Pablo name a single example where a minority tendency in the International has demanded, immediately following a Congress, the complete publication of all its documents and theses, rejected by the Congress, in the public press of the International," a demand absolutely contrary to the spirit of democratic centralism. Neither immediately following the Second World Congress, when the minority was numerically larger than the Pablo tendency is today, nor immediately following the

Third World Congress, when it was less numerous than the Pablo tendency, but still not insignificant (it had the majority of two sections in its ranks) did the press of the I.E.C. -- Comrade Pablo was then secretary of the I.S. -- publish a single document of the minority tendencies.(3)

The attempt to cast doubt -- a posteriori -- on the democratic preparation of the World Congress, is not serious. Comrade Pablo knows very well that this Congress was preceded by eighteen months of discussion, involving more than thirty internal bulletins. Never before has the International had such an ample discussion (out of the thirty bulletins, the bulk of them were moreover filled with articles by the Pablo tendency). That this or that article was insufficiently discussed in this or that part of the International was inevitable and could not be held to be the fault of the majority of the outgoing leadership. We can cite an example where this played in favor of the Pablo tendency: The national conference of the Dutch section which adopted the theses of Comrade Pablo was not acquainted with even a single document of the majority, none of them having been translated, as the leaders of the section admitted at the time. The articles of Comrade Frank and Comrade Germain were not then and have not yet been translated. We have never converted into grievances organizational incidents of this kind which are due to organizational weakness. But no one can doubt that this Congress was prepared by one of the most democratic discussions we have ever had and that this discussion had already involved the problems of the Sino-Soviet conflict a year before the Congress (as is attested by numerous articles, particularly "The Four Major Problems of Our Time" by Comrade Pablo himself, which has an entire heading on this question and which dates a year before the World Congress!)

It is therefore a fact that a Congress decided after a long, democratic discussion, by a vote that left no doubt whatsoever on the relative size of the majority and minority. To demand under these conditions the reopening of a discussion, and still more a public discussion, immediately after this Congress, is contrary to the tradition of our movement.

But Comrade Pablo is very bold in challenging us to name "a single example" in our movement where such a demand on the part of a minority has been refused. The demand was made by the Shachtman-Burnham tendency during the 1939-40 discussion in the Socialist Workers party. It was made during the discussion, and here is how Comrade Trotsky replied:

"The New International and Socialist Appeal are not instruments of the discussion under the control of a special discussion committee, but rather instruments of the Party and of its National Committee. In the discussion bulletin, the opposition can ask for equal rights with the majority, but the official party publications have the duty

(3) It must be recalled that at the Seventh World Congress, the Pablo tendency represented fifteen per cent of the mandates, a proportion that was considerably reduced following reunification.

to defend the point of view of the Party and the Fourth International until they are changed. A discussion in the pages of the official party publications can be considered only within the limits established by the majority of the National Committee. It is so self-evident that arguments are not necessary." (Our emphasis.) (In Defense of Marxism, p. 65.)

That was the point of view of Comrade Trotsky and of the International with regard to a demand for a public discussion with "equal rights" between majority and minority before a Congress. And when the Shachtman-Burnham tendency repeated the same demand after the Congress where it had been placed in a minority (having obtained forty per cent of the votes however), Comrade Trotsky characterized the demand as a "monstrous pretension." (In Defense of Marxism, p. 166.)

As Trotsky said, this position is so evident, within the framework of democratic centralism, that it does not even require argument. Comrade Pablo has known it for eighteen years. He has never previously challenged it. He himself applied it numerous times when he held a majority in the International. He himself has written that genuine attachment to democratic centralism is demonstrated when one is in a minority and in disagreement with the majority. This is the position in which he finds himself now. It is up to him to show his genuine attachment to democratic centralism by ceasing to demand a public discussion and by collaborating loyally with the majority in applying the line adopted by the World Reunification Congress.

The United Secretariat

December 22, 1963

LETTER FROM COMRADE FRIAS

December 30, 1963

TO THE U.S., I.E.C., AND TO THE
LEADERSHIPS OF THE SECTIONS

Dear Comrades,

I protest in the most energetic way against the note on Venezuela, published in "l'Internationale" (No. 17, p. 5).

The said note is a classical condensation of sectarianism, dogmatism and lack of understanding of the Colonial Revolution, which if it were to prevail would ineluctably bring to ruin any Section and the International as a whole.

If it reflects the positions of our Venezuelan comrades, the International must tell them that they are moving toward their doom, isolating themselves from the real Revolution of their own country, and that they are discrediting and compromising Trotskyism in the eyes of the leadership of the Cuban Revolution and all the revolutionaries of Latin America.

Unfortunately no confidence can be placed in the present majority of the U.S. to carry out this duty. The publication of such a note demonstrates that they, too, do not understand the problem. They manifest in this case the same incapacity to understand the concrete march of a Revolution such as they exhibited during the crisis of the G.P.R.A. in 1962.

Because of this, I appeal, through this letter, to the entire International in order to bring about a radical change on this question, putting it within the framework of the struggle of the revolutionary Marxist tendency led by Comrade Pablo, in order to reorient the Fourth.

THE ELECTIONS A "SETBACK" FOR THE F.A.L.N.?

Adopting the same attitude as Elena de la Souchere in the opportunistic "France Observateur," the note of "l'Internationale" states that "the presidential elections in Venezuela are a setback for the F.A.L.N. which called for abstention (5%)."

Can the fact be characterized as a "setback" that 70% of the voters abstained in the capital, Caracas, according to the figures given by the government itself (of which "l'Internationale" is not unaware, since it mentions them)?

Is it perhaps a "setback" when the candidates voted for by a sector of the masses, who, sympathizing with the F.A.L.N., were forced to go to the ballot boxes, received the same percentage of votes as the official "triumphant" candidate (32%)?

The fact is that all the opposition parties and independent observers have denounced the fraudulent manipulation carried out by the Betancourt government with the votes of the illiterates in the interior zones of the country. As for the high vote received by the rightist candidate Uslar Pietri and the Social Christian party COPEI, this signifies that even big sectors of the well-off petty bourgeoisie, running into the bourgeoisie, are against the repressive policy of the A.D. (both of them came out for a "legal" attitude against the arbitrariness of Betancourt).

The official figures, which hide and dissimulate the abstention, can surprise no one, after experiences like those of the "elections" and "referendums" organized by the French imperialists in Algeria. This is not to deny that abstention is actually a very difficult slogan to apply, even when it is entirely correct and necessary.

What is important and decisive is that the F.A.L.N. has rejected, justifiably, the electoral road, thus clarifying the consciousness of the masses, not only the Venezuelan but of all Latin America.

The "triumph" of government candidate, Leoni, likewise has nothing surprising about it, if it is recalled that even in Cuba, in 1958, a few months before the victory of Fidel Castro, the Batista dictatorship had its candidate, Agüero, "win" the elections. There were also those at that time who considered these comitia as a "setback" for the 26 of July.

THE PROGRAM OF THE F.A.L.N. DOES NOT HAVE "A REVOLUTIONARY CONTENT"?

"L'Internationale" dares to write that the declarations of the F.A.L.N. "echo too much those of Betancourt when he sabotaged the agrarian reform." Brilliant example of what Trotsky called the incapacity to distinguish the face of the revolution from its rump, or worse still, the revolution from the counterrevolution! I don't recall anything similar since the epoch when Comrade Peng (today firm supporter of the majority of the U.S.) declared that there had been no Revolution in China, after the rise to power of Mao Tse-tung.

In the purest style of the unrestrained and sectarian "old Trotskyism," the authors of the unfortunate note explain the lesson to the F.A.L.N.:

"The setback for the F.A.L.N. is not accidental. The policy it is developing is essentially democratic:

"--Formation of a civil and military government of national unity with the participation of all the parties.

"--Respect for the properties of the big merchants, industrialists and farmers who are not accomplices in the crimes of Betancourt.

"The leadership of the F.A.L.N. does not give its program a revolutionary content. It seeks to ally itself with the 'good Venezuelans' and in particular the 'good militarists' and thus loses its chances to mobilize the peasant mass."

It is evident that the program of the F.A.L.N. suffers from big deficiencies. And, naturally, the opportunist influence of the opportunistic Communist party of Venezuela can be felt in it.

Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that the F.A.L.N. is not a revolutionary Marxist party but a united front of combat -- and of combat with arms in hand -- against imperialism and its native agents (among them the national bourgeoisie). The program of the F.A.L.N., consequently, cannot be the integral program of Trotskyism (it would have to be like that even if we were leading it).

In addition, it is undeniable that the F.A.L.N. must pose and solve the problem of isolating to the maximum the government of Betancourt and of gaining to its side a sector of the young officialdom.

The formulations and, in general, the language of the F.A.L.N. are, and cannot cease to be, different from the particular terminology of Marxism. How can they otherwise speak to the masses? Masses whose elementary political experience and whose prejudices must be taken into account.

But, with regards to the agrarian reform and anti-imperialism, the

program of the F.A.L.N. is unequivocal. It is a Fidelista program, that means Marxist-Leninist in the concrete conditions of Latin America and, in particular, of Venezuela. This is what is decisive.

This said, there is no doubt that this program must be completed and polished, in the direction of the most precise possible socialist definition. Without forgetting, either, the necessity to incorporate in it the antibureaucratic norms which have been elaborated through the experience of the Workers States and the most recent experiences in Yugoslavia and Algeria (self-management, etc.). Here is a task that only the Venezuelan Trotskyists can carry out!

Why is it that the present leadership of the International does not see and does not tell our comrades in Venezuela that, to accomplish this role, they must integrate themselves precisely in the ranks of the F.A.L.N. and participate personally in all its activities?

If not, what authority and what hearing can they hope for?

"SCHEMAS" AND "CASTROIST ROAD"

"It does not suffice, unfortunately, to reject the Stalinist schemas of peaceful roads and to transform into a schema the Castroist road for taking power," pretentiously continues the learned author of the note.

And, exhibiting his entire lack of understanding of the concrete form of the Permanent Revolution in our epoch, that is, the role played in it by the guerrillas based in the specific peasantry of the "Third World," he pursues his lesson: "Castro was able to content himself with a simple appeal for democracy and the promise of an agrarian reform in order to draw the peasantry against Batista. This was because Batista held the island down with a bloody dictatorship."

There could be no more superficial, confused and false appreciation of the Castroist road.

Because this did not consist of an "appeal for democracy" and a "promise for agrarian reform." And the peasantry did not follow Castro because of his "appeals" and his "promises."

The Castroist road is, simply, the effective organization of an armed struggle based on peasants without land. And if the peasantry mobilized behind Castro it was because he organized guerrillas who took more or less wide zones of the country away from the rule of the pro-landlord government.

The armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, has its own dynamic, and even when it begins around a very limited program (purely national, for independence, as in the case of the F.L.N. of Algeria), it tends inevitably to transform itself into a socialist revolution. The only requisite for this to happen is for the guerrilla fighters to succeed in planting themselves, rooting themselves, in the peasantry, who, then, mobilize themselves in mass behind them, more or less rapidly.

Hence the historic significance of the decision of the F.A.L.N. to resort to armed struggle (which they organized in the cities as well as in the countryside). And the effectiveness demonstrated for more than a year

by the peasant and urban guerrilla fighters of the F.A.L.N. proves that they have already satisfactorily realized their phase of implantation.*

To try to explain the success of Fidel Castro solely by the "bloody dictatorship" of Batista, is to forget that Latin America has suffered and is still suffering from many dictatorships as bad or worse, without these automatically producing the same results.

On the other hand, is the author of the note perhaps unaware that in all the Latin-American countries (with the single exception of Argentina) the peasants suffer permanently from a bloody dictatorship of the landlords, which manifests itself in the most absolute arbitrariness and periodic massacres? It is precisely to this that Fidel Castro refers when he says that the objective conditions for armed struggle exist in the great majority of the republics of Latin America.

The indispensable catalyzing factor of the Latin-American revolution is the guerrilla fighter. His appearance or his absence determines whether a country continues to vegetate in a vicious circle from "democracy" to "dictatorship" and vice versa, or whether it marches toward an outcome "a la Cubana" yesterday, "a la Venezolana" today, etc.

This does not mean, naturally, that every guerrilla action is necessarily opportune, or well placed, nor that each one of them has its triumph assured in advance. Many errors and failures have occurred already and there will still be many more. It is necessary to try to avoid them through adequate preparation. But, through them, the forces of the revolution become skilled and tempered. No other road exists.

In addition, it is absolutely essential to understand that guerrilla warfare in Latin America is not a phenomenon isolated to each country but forms part of a single continental movement, which combines the traits of the democratic revolution (antifeudal and for the agrarian reform) with those of the anti-imperialist war of liberation and national unification (for the Socialist Federation of Latin America) and those of the construction of Workers States with nationalized and planned economic footpaths which will become co-ordinated until they are integrated into a single market of Latin America.

Within this perspective it is evident that no Trotskyist can oppose or stand aside from the struggle of the F.A.L.N. in Venezuela.

Which, of course, does not mean that he cannot criticize its tactics and its program (without sectarianism or ultraleftism).

But to have the right to do this and if he wishes to be heard, it is necessary to have previously taken a post in their ranks.

We are not mistaken: The Venezuelan Revolution is on the march and

*The activity of the F.A.L.N. includes at present: economic sabotage of Yankee enterprises, especially oil installations; attacks on barracks and police posts, in order to obtain arms; capture of ships and planes, as well as kidnapping of personalities (including North American officers) for propaganda purposes; temporary seizure of radio and television stations for revolutionary broadcasts; and, above all, the action of peasant guerrillas on five "fronts" extending through various States.

the F.A.L.N. is its organization. The Section of the Fourth International in Venezuela must recognize it and act accordingly. To do otherwise will be to liquidate itself, not without the severest damage to the reputation of Trotskyism as a whole.

The majority of the U.S. by not understanding and by not making our Venezuelan comrades understand, does nothing but confirm its political bankruptcy, already evident in its "neutrality" at the time of the crisis between Ben Bella and the G.P.R.A., in its "critical support" of the pro-Stalinist Chinese leaders and, in general, in its resistance to integrating the Fourth International in the Colonial Revolution.

Fraternally,

Ismael Frias

RESOLUTION ON FRIAS' LETTER ABOUT AN ARTICLE IN "L'INTERNATIONALE"

The United Secretariat has studied the letter addressed by Comrade Frias December 30, 1963, "To the U.S., I.E.C., and to the leaderships of the sections."

In this letter, Comrade Frias violently attacks the majority of the United Secretariat for a note on the elections in Venezuela which appeared in No. 17 of l'Internationale, organ of the French section. It happens that not only is no member of the United Secretariat responsible for publishing this note, or for its appearance, but the editorship of l'Internationale is held by two members of the tendency to which Comrade Frias belongs, with whom he recently signed a document, that is, Comrades Maurel and Michard, and it is to them that he should have addressed himself on the subject of the note on Venezuela.

Comrade Frias' attack, consequently, is completely mistaken in the addressee; and if one cared to follow him on the terrain where he has launched an engagement with such maladroitness, he could be invited to open a struggle first of all in his own tendency before it succeeds in "reorienting" the Fourth International.

But, without entering into the political merits or demerits of the note which appeared in the Internationale, the United Secretariat -- one of whose tasks is to follow the press of our movement but not to intervene like a gendarme over no matter what small bit that appears -- is forced to condemn without reserve the way in which Comrade Frias polemicizes in the circumstances.

Normally he should have written to the editors of l'Internationale to tell them that they had published an erroneous article to his way of thinking.

Contrary to this, he addresses himself "To the U.S., I.E.C., and to the leaderships of the sections," without making any preliminary effort to check the facts, and amalgamates in such a letter France Observateur, the Cuban Revolution, the 1962 crisis of the Provisional Government of the

Algerian Republic, Comrade Peng, self-management, critical support of the Chinese, etc. This is reminiscent -- it must be said, unfortunately -- of the methods of Posadas in an embryonic way. Of these methods Comrade Frias was a victim in his time, methods which consist of seizing for factional aims anything that looks good and of throwing all questions into the same pot in order to dish out major excommunications. By replacing objective analysis with maneuvers and factional invective, a blow is struck at the serious construction of revolutionary Marxist parties, including such parties in Latin America.

The letter of Comrade Frias attacking the majority of the International for some lines published by members of his own tendency is, in reality, ridiculous. But it does have the merit of standing as an example showing where factionalism can lead.

MOTION ON CEYLON SUBMITTED BY ANDERSON

The Minority tendency members of the United Secretariat consider the actions, letters and documents of the Majority of the United Secretariat on the ULF in Ceylon as contrary in essence to the Open Letter of the 7th World Congress of the 4th International to the LSSP. We therefore:

- (1) Censure the non-publication, internally or externally, of the letter of the 7th World Congress, and demand its immediate publication, internally and in the next publications of FI, QI and CI,
- (2) Protest at the alterations made by the Bureau of the United Secretariat in the letter approved by the 7th World Congress, which softens its criticisms of the LSSP Majority,
- (3) Protest at the scandalous support given to the ULF in the Resolution sent on the occasion of the establishment of the ULF, which is contrary to the line of the 7th World Congress, and also particularly protest at its publication in the last QI before the publication of the letter of the Congress,
- (4) Demand the rapid publication of a dossier of all documents on the ULF, as agreed unanimously at the September meeting of the Un. Sec., and which has so far not been published.

STATEMENT BY UNITED SECRETARIAT ON ANDERSON'S MOTION CONCERNING CEYLON

The motion on Ceylon submitted by Comrade Anderson on behalf of the Minority at the December 22 meeting of the United Secretariat, which was postponed by the Majority for consideration at the next meeting, includes the following charges: (1) that the Majority has softened the criticisms made by the Seventh World Congress of positions taken by the LSSP majority; (2) that the Majority of the United Secretariat is not publishing in the

internal bulletin certain documents concerning this question, the implication being that this is willful and in violation of a unanimous decision of the United Secretariat itself; (3) that the Majority has taken a public position on the United Left Front in violation of the line of the Seventh World Congress. Finally, Comrade Anderson makes two demands: (1) that the documents referred to above, concerning the Ceylonese question, be given "rapid publication" internally; (2) that the letter of the Seventh World Congress to the LSSP be given "immediate publication" both in the internal bulletin and in Fourth International, Quatrième Internationale and Cuarta Internacional.

On the charge of administrative dereliction, the fact is that the documents which were unanimously approved for internal publication by the United Secretariat were placed at once on the work list and have now appeared.

As for the more or less political charges involved in the motion submitted by Comrade Anderson, a glaring omission should be noted. He cites the Seventh World Congress but leaves out the following Reunification Congress in which he nonetheless participated and approved.

The Reunification Congress placed with the united new leadership the responsibility of doing everything in its power to cement the ties re-established after a long split and to work for fresh cohesion and stability in the world Trotskyist movement. This required a certain organizational relaxation for a period and a serious effort to ameliorate internal disputes in the various sections and in the components of the united movement -- especially disputes inherited from the past -- in order to help every area in the common problem of making a fresh start. All this was explained and agreed upon unanimously by the delegates who participated in the Reunification Congress.

The attitude of the United Secretariat toward the situation in Ceylon, as elsewhere in the movement, has been governed by these broad considerations laid down by the Reunification Congress.

The United Secretariat "in essence," as Comrade Anderson puts it, has not modified in the least the criticisms of the LSSP made by the Seventh World Congress. What it has done is to place confidence in the capacity of the leadership of the LSSP to prove responsive to these criticisms. The letter addressed to the LSSP was not intended as some kind of public pillorying or as a challenge to pitch into a factional brawl, as Comrade Anderson appears to believe. The criticisms which it contained were made with complete goodwill by the assembled representatives of the world Trotskyist movement and in full confidence that they would be given thoughtful consideration by the LSSP. The United Secretariat has sought to maintain this loyal and comradely attitude toward the Ceylonese section, while frankly acknowledging that its members tend to sympathize politically with the left wing of the LSSP.

The same responsible attitude has been taken toward the connection of the LSSP leadership with the United Left Front. In and of itself the formation of the United Left Front cannot be condemned; under certain conditions it could prove to be the opening of new developments fraught with revolutionary possibilities. What is decisive is the real aims of the LSSP leadership in participating in the United Left Front, especially as revealed in the way it seeks to develop the inherent possibilities along

the road of action and mobilization of the masses. These aims are in debate in the LSSP, the left-wing tendency having taken the view that the majority of the leadership are engaging in reality in an unprincipled electoral bloc. The majority, however, dispute this.

While welcoming per se the creation of the United Left Front, the United Secretariat has consistently made clear its own political views with regard to the perspectives of the Front and its disagreement with the concessions made by the LSSP in the final draft. Prior to the Reunification Congress, when the Central Committee of the LSSP was engaged in an internal discussion on the draft program for the setting up of the Front, the former IS intervened with a document to the party's leadership in which it stated its views on the necessary conditions for a principled United Left Front and sought to bring before the party the dangers inherent in the line proposed by the CP and MEP. The Seventh World Congress expressed its views on the final draft of the United Left Front program, and the letter forwarded to the LSSP on behalf of the Congress by the Bureau of the United Secretariat clearly stated these views -- whatever interpretations Comrade Anderson now seeks to place upon it. After the United Left Front had come into being, while welcoming its de facto formation, the United Secretariat wrote a further letter to the LSSP leadership inquiring about the steps that were being taken to rectify some of the concessions that had been made and to use the ULF as a means for mobilizing the masses in the anticapitalist struggle. Thus, at every stage in the development of the United Left Front the United Secretariat has consistently intervened to pose before the LSSP leadership its own political views with regard to the line adopted by the party's majority.

However, the United Secretariat feels that it would be wrong for it as a body representing the movement as a whole to brush aside the declarations of the majority of the LSSP leadership and refuse to grant them the time needed to prove in action the sincerity of their stand in relation to the United Left Front and the good faith of their assurances.

We feel, moreover, that this attitude on the part of the United Secretariat will facilitate free and democratic discussion inside the LSSP on the problems it faces in relation to the United Left Front, and other developments, and will help foster the kind of atmosphere that will best lead to a favorable solution of all the issues at stake.

The course implied in Comrade Anderson's motion is in complete contradiction to the one laid down by the Reunification Congress. Its consequence would be the creation of conditions the precise opposite of those required to consolidate and stabilize the reunification.

It would mean first of all to deliberately heat up the atmosphere in the LSSP by injecting the sharpest kind of factionalism; secondly, to exacerbate matters still further by transferring the dispute to the public arena. A divisive policy of this kind would put in jeopardy, if not destroy, fraternal relations between the United Secretariat and the leadership of the LSSP. The end result could be highly injurious to the Fourth International and to the LSSP, including its left wing which has absolutely no interest to put in question the unity of the party through the creation of undue internal friction and tension from any source. As for the United Secretariat, the least that would happen were it to stumble into the path indicated by Comrade Anderson would be to place a grave question mark over its capacities as a responsible international leadership entrusted

to uphold and observe the principles and practices of democratic centralism.

In view of these considerations, the United Secretariat rejects the motion proposed by Comrade Anderson.

THE INTERNAL SITUATION

Statement by Majority of the United Secretariat

As a whole, the internal situation in the Fourth International has developed very favorably since the Reunification Congress. The leadership of the two sides that prepared the Congress have established the foundation of a smooth-working team and have already demonstrated in various ways the benefits that were foreseen by both sides would follow the merging of forces. We think that most comrades are aware of the encouraging results of this collaboration and that it is not necessary to stress them at this point. They testify to the sound principled basis of the reunification, and the thoroughness of the preparations as well as the goodwill that exists on both sides. In some local areas, particularly England and South America, the unification process has proceeded slowly but we expect that under the impetus of successful reunification on an international scale we will be able to report solid progress in these places, too, before long.

The one sector where this general knitting together has not occurred, unfortunately, is in the relations with one of the minority groupings inherited from the old formations. It is this problem on which we wish to report our experience and observations. You have undoubtedly already gathered from reading the minutes of the past few sessions of the United Secretariat something of the nature of the problem and the issues that have come up. The situation has now reached a disturbing point. The tendency headed by Comrade Pablo, utilizing the formal label of "African Commission of the Fourth International" has published a public organ which presents a different line from that adopted by the majority at the World Congress on the Sino-Soviet conflict and more generally on "de-Stalinization" in the USSR.

(1) The "African Commission" -- A Formal Label

According to the statutes, the African Commission which was elected by the International Executive Committee following the World Reunification Congress, is a body completely under the jurisdiction of the I.E.C. and the United Secretariat.* Since the World Congress, the United Secretariat has

*Here is how article 15 appears in the statutes of the International:
"Article 15. The I.E.C. may organize in different parts of the world, such sub-secretariats, technical bureaux or other auxiliary bodies as it may deem necessary. These are completely subordinate to the I.E.C. and the International Secretariat. ["Le C.E.I. peut organiser dans différentes parties du monde des sous-secrétariats, bureaux techniques ou autres organismes supplémentaires qu'il considère nécessaire et qui lui seront entièrement subordonnés ainsi qu'au Secretariat International."]

not received, with the exception of a declaration on the Algerian-Moroccan conflict, a single letter, a single report, a single set of minutes, a single bit of information from this commission, not a single piece of news on the numerous events that have happened in Africa in general or in Algeria in particular. The only correspondence received has consisted of letters relating to the factional struggle conducted by the Pablo tendency against the leadership of the International.

The African Commission, had it wished to publish an organ that might have served the work of the International instead of a factional organ, would have addressed the United Secretariat to let it know about the need for such an organ, the conditions under which it could be launched, as well as asking for the collaboration and help of the whole International, beginning with the members of the international leadership. If it had acted in this way no one would have felt any misgivings about the project. But the commission did not do that.

The name "African Commission" is only the formal label for a public faction organ published in violation of the statutes of the International. Since we are offering a separate resolution on this question, it is sufficient to note here that four full or alternate members of the United Secretariat participated in publishing the first issue of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, only one of whom, Comrade Pablo, is a member of the African Commission. In a recent letter (see minutes of the United Secretariat meeting of December 22-23, 1963) the leadership of this tendency complained without justification (as we demonstrated) that they were not consulted in the work of the United Secretariat. But at the very meeting of December 22-23 where this letter was discussed, they did not even place this point on the agenda but kept the top executive body in the complete dark on what they were doing.

It was only after the United Secretariat meeting -- and by accident -- that a member of the majority learned at the printshop that such a publication was in preparation. After this, before the magazine was actually distributed, some of the members of the minority mentioned what was being done, one of them inquiring in passing if a letter had not been received about it from Comrade Pablo. Meanwhile, as soon as the discovery had been made about this factional move, Comrade Frank on behalf of the Bureau immediately wrote Comrade Pablo as a member of the United Secretariat, calling attention to the gravity of the minority action, and asking him to use his influence with the "African Commission" to hold up the project. No attention was paid to this beyond an evasive reply -- not from Comrade Pablo but from Comrade Simone who is not a member of the United Secretariat.

After the minority organ was being distributed publicly, Comrade Pablo expressed "indignation" that the United Secretariat was not mobilizing aid for the "African Commission" in promoting its activities around Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme. The nature of this "indignation" scarcely needs to be pointed out under the circumstances. The truth is that no one in the world Trotskyist movement would be against any initiative of the African Commission undertaken in collaboration with and under the control of the United Secretariat in order to advance the line adopted by the majority at the World Congress.

(2) The Pablo Tendency Since the World Congress

At the World Congress, there was a lively political struggle, but all those present recognized the validity and authority of the Congress (the report of the credentials committee was adopted unanimously). The numerical relationship established at the Seventh World Congress by the voting showed that the majority was supported by 85% of the delegates, the minority 15%. With the Reunification Congress and the fusion with the majority of the International Committee, this relationship was altered still more heavily in favor of the majority position on the issues in dispute, the minority becoming reduced to very small proportions.

All those who attended the World Congress were likewise able to see that the struggle against atomic war and the Sino-Soviet conflict were the two most sharply debated questions. The most representative cadres of our movement were present; it cannot be plausibly maintained that they voted in political ignorance after discussions that lasted some thirty hours on these questions.

During the Congress, Comrade Pablo did announce -- it is true -- that he intended to continue a relentless opposition. This could be taken as something said in the heat of the discussion and that after the Congress he would adopt a reasonable attitude without, of course, giving up his positions.

But immediately after the World Reunification Congress the comrades who favored the positions of Comrade Pablo gave evidence of depreciation of the reunification and the majority position adopted by the Congress.

First of all, the leadership of the Australian section, whose publication had not appeared for months, put out an issue right after the Congress which said nothing about the Congress, nothing about the reunification, but which reproduced in the main article entire passages from the minority document at the World Congress.

The leadership of the Dutch section did not mention the World Congress for two issues. After receiving a letter about this from the United Secretariat, it rectified the gap in the following issue but at the same time published an article by Comrade Pablo opposed to the line adopted by the World Congress, and this organ even explicitly attacked the line adopted by the Congress.

In Austria Comrade Lerse (who is in the minority in his section) published, under the name of the Austrian section, an organ carrying an article expressing the minority line, provoking a grave crisis in this section. It took the good offices of a representative of the United Secretariat to help the section avoid a split.

None of these violations of the most elementary rules of democratic centralism have been condemned by Comrade Pablo and his tendency. On the contrary, they have defended these actions while trying to throw responsibility for them on the majority under pretext that they were provoked by the "bureaucratism" of the latter.

Almost parallel with these violations of discipline -- less than two months after the World Congress -- Comrade Pablo began to send a succession of letters "to the United Secretariat, to the I.E.C., to the leader-

ships of sections," never written to attain collaboration, but couched in violent, at times insulting, language.

The United Secretariat has received practically no correspondence from bodies led by members of the Pablo tendency on their work and activities (the Dutch and Australian sections, for example, in addition to the African Commission).

We have no choice but to conclude from the evidence that since the World Congress, Comrade Pablo has done his utmost to organize the comrades of his tendency in such a way as to constitute a hardened and highly disciplined faction.

The tendency thus fostered in this grouping to indulge in factional excesses can be judged from the letter of Comrade Frias attacking the United Secretariat in violent language for an article in l'Internationale which he assumed to have appeared under the responsibility of the majority. The article in question was published solely under the responsibility of members of his own faction who are in charge of l'Internationale.

Comrade Pablo even went so far in his own letters to the United Secretariat (see minutes of previous meetings) as to threaten that the unity of the International would be placed in question if his demand were not granted to permit him to give public expression to his differences with the majority. That this is meant seriously can be judged from the attitude, which we have just indicated, of the members of his grouping in various sections,

Taken in the context of these internal developments, the publication of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, it is evident, is not something in the normal development of the work of the African Commission, but the beginning of the practical realization of the threat which Comrade Pablo has held over the leadership of the International since shortly after the Reunification Congress.

(3) Democratic Centralism

What is involved is democratic centralism. To bow to the threats and ultimatums of the Pablo faction or the "fait accompli" of the appearance of a public minority organ would mean establishing a precedent which every minority could invoke. It would mean giving up the organizational structure of the Fourth International.

When the leadership of the International points out that the line adopted by the majority of the Congress holds for the whole movement, this elementary rule of democratic centralism is characterized by the leaders of the Pablo faction as a "bureaucratic" concept. It is in any case a concept alien to democratic centralism that a minority should flout the decisions of a Congress and publicly defend its own positions.

Among the arguments invoked by the Pablo faction for a public discussion is the claim that it involves problems discussed in numerous organizations of the workers' movement and that they are therefore justified in demanding the same right.

First of all, it is false that these problems are being democratically discussed in the Communist parties. They are only being discussed between leaderships. It is only in the Fourth International that tendency struggles exist. In addition, and this is very grave, by advancing in our

organization a demand which we support in other organizations (whom we oppose), the leaders of the Pablo faction place the Fourth International -- which despite all its weaknesses is the revolutionary Marxist International -- on the same plane as all the centrist, Stalinist or post-Stalinist organizations. This is one of the worst blows ever aimed at its internal structure.

It is not without point to recall that the question of democratic centralism on the international level occupied, correctly, an important place in the discussion on the proposed basis of reunification. Comrade Pablo was one of the most insistent on this point, and he was right. Who would have thought that precisely he would have to be reminded of the rules immediately after the Reunification Congress?

To provide a semblance of justification for these multiple infractions of the rules of democratic centralism, Comrade Pablo has suggested in his documents that the positions of the majority on the Sino-Soviet conflict will lead to or are the equivalent of a "betrayal" of Trotskyism.

Aside from the fact that one must not light-mindedly employ the term "betrayal" in our internal discussions, and that one must not act in the same way in face of the possibility -- at least doubtful -- of a betrayal and an actual betrayal, the great majority of the International (including, we hope, a certain number of Comrade Pablo's adherents) remember that these positions of "betrayal" were still defended by Comrade Pablo only a little more than two years ago. Comrade Pablo has the right to change his positions; but instead of launching grave accusations against those who do not follow him in this, with all that this can imply for the organization, he should undertake real self-criticism for the benefit of the Fourth International. What would he himself have thought if, at that time, the comrades opposed to him and the leadership then in charge had demanded the right to express their views publicly in the organs of the International or had taken the liberty of publishing a public bulletin under pretext of safeguarding the International against a betrayal?

(4) Where Is Comrade Pablo Headed? What Does He Want?

We are obliged to pose these questions squarely. If Comrade Pablo wants to change the orientation of the Fourth International -- which is his incontestable right -- he must first of all show his confidence in the organization, recognize its right to possible errors and seek to convince it through a struggle that observes the rules of democratic centralism.

It is not serious on his part to speak about a vague bureaucratism and vague misdeeds on the part of the majority. There is no more of an apparatus in our movement today than yesterday; the documents circulate very widely; the positions of each one are well known. The leaders of our sections know each other personally for the most part. No one has any means of exercising any constraint on anybody. Comrade Pablo had great authority in our movement. If he now finds himself in a minority, it is only because the political positions he defends do not have the approval of the majority of the International.

But we must say that his attitude, his virulent struggle, in the course of which he ignores or depreciates everything that has not been done by him in the International, his constant search for differences, and above all his insistence on wanting at any cost to express his political

differences publicly; that is, to appeal to a different audience against the views of the majority of the Fourth International -- all this arouses uneasiness in the United Secretariat and among many other leaders of our movement because we detect there a lack of confidence in our movement.

However, our movement, despite its weaknesses, now finds itself in a period that offers more favorable perspectives than ever. Objectively, nothing demonstrates this better than the place recently accorded it in the Soviet press. On the other hand, the reunification makes possible a concentration of Trotskyist forces and a power of attraction which neither Posadas nor Healy can undo by the spectacle they offer. If Comrade Pablo believes that the International is mistaken, he must at the same time admit that the present period is altogether favorable to its development; that is, for rapidly correcting possible errors, on condition that the organization is not disrupted.

Comrade Pablo and his tendency have issued a publication defending a line opposed to that of the International. We cannot do anything consequently except publicly disclaim any political responsibility for this publication and its content. Such a public disavowal is, in our opinion, a grave censure.

But what is most disquieting of all is the course followed by Comrade Pablo and his tendency taken as a whole. Up to this point in this statement and in the minutes of previous meetings, we have considered each of the moves of the Minority separate and apart and on its own merits. For instance, in responding to the demand for immediate reopening of the discussion on the Sino-Soviet conflict, including the demand to extend the discussion to the public organs of the movement, we sought to weigh with the greatest possible objectivity the arguments advanced in favor of our acquiescing. Was the discussion before and at the Congress really insufficient? Had new facts of decisive importance occurred since then? How would a public discussion affect the cohesiveness of the movement? After considerable thought we reached the conclusion that there was no imperious urgency and it should be referred to the International Executive Committee. However, the Minority did not accept this decision. They sought to controvert it by violations of democratic centralism as we have indicated above. Then -- and this was extremely significant -- they began pushing other issues (Ceylon, Venezuela, a public minority organ). The tone adopted by the minority was not less significant. The provocativeness of the language can be assessed by studying the communications and motions directed at the United Secretariat.

Comrade Pablo cannot be unaware of the consequences which this whole course could have. He scarcely acts by impulse. He has definite objectives in mind. We do not profess to guess them, but some things have become obvious.

First of all, it is clear that Comrade Pablo took an ambiguous attitude toward the reunification. He accepted it in words but not in deeds. In place of participating in the construction of a new collective leadership, he built a faction and sought to harden it. In place of giving the majority full opportunity to consolidate the reunification through a period of relaxation and comradely co-operation as was agreed on at the World Congress, he immediately launched a factional struggle. Despite this we continued to seek to establish friendly and comradely collaboration with the minority, refusing to be provoked and giving them every opportunity to

Meet us half way. These efforts were not appreciated by their representatives in the United Secretariat. On the contrary, it became clear that they had adopted a factional line of such rigidity as not to permit of even tactical variations. Thus, instead of helping in trying to heal the old wounds and turning the whole movement outwardly, Comrade Pablo, through the artificial injection of one issue after another and the adoption of an unbridled factional tone, initiated something that, logically developed, could divert the Fourth International from the objective possibilities and tasks, depriving it of the advantages of a reunification that took so much effort and raised such high hopes, and plunging it into a sterile and bizarre factional struggle.

The majority does not intend to follow the logic set by the minority. The relationship of forces inside the movement is such that success in this is assured. We repeat here what we have told the minority representatives in the United Secretariat: Your talk about the "tension being aggravated" and the "unity of the movement being threatened" if we do not concede to the arbitrary demands of the minority, does not impress us. You will not be able to prevent us from carrying out the mandate of the Reunification Congress.

In calling the attention of the leaders of our movement to the internal situation that has developed, we also appeal once more to the minority to reconsider their course. We are sure that we are correctly interpreting the sentiments of the great majority of the Fourth International in inviting Comrade Pablo and his tendency not to persist along the road they have taken, but to accept the decisions of the Reunification Congress, particularly the reaffirmation that was made at that Congress of the importance of democratic centralism in the construction of the world party of the socialist revolution.

January 26, 1964

LETTER FROM COMRADE PABLO

January 22, 1964

To the I.E.C.
To the U.S.

Dear Comrades,

The new reply of the U.S. dated 22-12-63 and entitled "The Issue Is Democratic Centralism" has just come to my attention. It is one more indication of the mentality of the present leading faction of the U.S. which pretends not to know in what way its interpretation of "democratic centralism" is abusive and factional, and which is "astonished" at our persistence in standing for a healthy regime in the International, guaranteeing its unity and development.

What is the Minority complaining about, our Majority asks with noble indignation, not hesitating even to distort the real history of the International and to resort to quotations from Trotsky to make us "shut up."

In the question of "democratic centralism" everything can be dissolved in a formalistic, scholastic and sterile interpretation of the norms and the quotations if one abstracts from the concrete political character of each situation.

The history of Bolshevism as well as of Trotskyism and the Fourth International teaches that the primary preoccupation of a genuinely revolutionary policy is to resolve a question not formally but really by adapting the form to the content and not the latter to the form.

Each time there was a genuine political crisis, genuine major political questions to debate, Leninism sought the solution of the problems posed by the inevitable creation, under these conditions, of tendencies and even of factions, through the real widening of democracy and discussion and not by recourse in the Zinovievist or Stalinist manner to the "strictness" of a formal "democratic centralism."

A whole tendency of the International in which sections and cadres are participating whose contribution in the development of the ideas and the organization of the Fourth International was decisive, holds that it is vital for the International to rectify in a whole series of major political and organizational questions a line which it judges to be false and disastrous.

It is futile and unworthy to seek to reduce the importance of this tendency to the "15%" of the votes cast at the time of the Seventh W.C. First of all because the importance of a tendency in our movement is not judged by its numerical strength at a given moment, but by the importance of its political ideas and the cadres which it represents. A minority can be right even if it is reduced for a long time to a single person.

Next because this tendency represents among the rank and file of

the International a much stronger current than its distorted reflection at the time of the Seventh W.C. in view of the conditions in which the preparation and the holding of this Congress took place. This tendency in addition has not ceased to grow since the Seventh W.C.

But let's take up the formal aspect of the question, too.

Is it in accordance even with a formalist interpretation of "democratic centralism" that the main political leader of a tendency is not consulted as a member of the I.E.C. and the U.S. on the main decisions and declarations made in the name of the U.S. and that it should be thought sufficient to simply reply: ". . . to demand that the leadership should halt its work and subordinate the publication of resolutions to prior consultation with a single comrade of the minority who cannot participate in these leadership bodies means to substitute for democratic centralism the conception of a federation of tendencies, a conception completely contrary to the tradition of our movement. . . ."?(1)

If this "single comrade of the minority," main political leader of a tendency, is not participating in the meetings of the U.S., it is because he is working in the most important field of all the work of the International at the present time, in a place where the U.S. has never been able to meet(2) and because the U.S. does not assume at least a part of the costs of the possible travel of this comrade to the place where the U.S. meetings are ordinarily held.(3)

You see, for our responsible majority of the U.S. to assure in one way or another consultation and collaboration with the main leader of a tendency, former secretary of the International for 15 years and at present integrated in the most important sector of work for the whole International, is a secondary question!

- As for the assertion that ". . . since all the decisions that have been made, since the Reunification Congress, within the leadership body set up by this Congress according to norm, namely, the United Secretariat to whose meetings the representatives of the Pablo tendency have regularly attended (except the meeting of November 9-10 from which they voluntarily abstained), comrade Pablo, in pretending that we are acting without consulting his tendency, is really saying that we are acting without consulting him",(4) this is purely formal reasoning.

The comrades representing the minority tendency in the U.S. have no possibility of knowing in advance the decisions and texts which the majority faction of the U.S. has already prepared and discussed and practically have no other "right" except to approve or to reject these decisions or texts, sometimes even without any discussion!

Thus the "democratic centralism" dear to the Bolshevik comrades of our Majority functions marvelously and still more so the ideological development and internal consolidation of the International!

Someone wanting in reality to undermine both the one and the other would not act differently in practice.

Are they consciously or unconsciously preparing the conditions first for the isolation and then the expulsion from the International of Comrade Pablo and other comrades, thus granting the long-ago formulated and always cherished wishes held by all the sectarians, opportunists and notorious bankrupts rabid with "anti-Pabloism"?

The question is posed when one sees a political crisis and discussion constantly diverted toward organizational issues, and when one reads for example the following utterance of a Healy, champion of the ex-International Committee, and always well informed: ". . . behind this recent conversion of Cannon to the idea that it is possible to live in a democratic centralist organisation with Frank and Germain lies a new theory, that since these men have differences with Pablo and he is at present in a minority, it will be possible to contain and perhaps later expel him as was done to Cochran. . . ." (International Information Bulletin, S.W.P., July 1963, p.4).(5)

We very responsibly warn all those who may have the unfortunate tendency to undertake within the International practices of the Zinovievist type, and who dream perhaps of wreaking "sweet revenge" on "Pabloism," which they do not forgive for having been at the head of all the decisive turns in the ideological rearmament of the International, that they would thereby commit an act equivalent to their own definitive political suicide.

We are no longer in the epoch when discussions could be confined among a number of small "Trotskyist" groups.

At present the international revolutionary vanguard is immense and the dialogue between living Revolutionary Trotskyism and that vanguard is much more important and decisive than the arbitrariness and the irresponsibility of this or that body arrogating to itself the right to reduce to silence, to mistreat, to expel, the vanguard tendency par excellence of Trotskyism and the Fourth International.

Having said this, are we really against "democratic centralism" conceived in the Leninist and not Zinovievist way, and for transforming the Fourth International into a vague confederation of tendencies and a club of eternal and sterile discussions?

Those who devote themselves to the barren work of rewriting the real history of the International by deforming it, of propagating all kinds of gossip and slanders, and of deliberately distorting the real positions of the Marxist-revolutionary tendency, will not hesitate to answer in the affirmative.

-But naturally such is not our intention.

We do not at all deny the right of the Majority to support its position in the public organs of the International, nor do we ask it

to reopen a public and internal discussion on all the questions which separate us from this Majority.

We have asked and continue to ask for things absolutely compatible with a Leninist and not Zinovievist interpretation of "democratic centralism" in face of a concrete internal and external political situation.

Namely: That the public position of the Minority be established on the basis of documents chosen by it and not by the Majority; that the debate on the Sino-Soviet conflict be: (a) reopened in the International, in view of the fact that it was never thorough and that in any case new developments of capital importance have occurred since the Seventh W.C.; (b) that in view of the capital importance of this question for the whole international revolutionary vanguard the possibility be given to the Minority to express itself also publicly on this question, without attacking the Majority; that the majority of the U.S. consult with the leaders of the minority and collaborate with them on all the major political documents and actions of the International instead of systematically placing them before the fait accompli.

None of these demands is incompatible with Leninist "democratic centralism."

A possible objection could arise on the subject of the right of the Minority to participate in the public ideological clarification of the major political questions, interesting to the highest degree to the international vanguard as a whole, arising from the Sino-Soviet conflict.

We have carefully avoided up to now from publicly attacking or even criticizing the positions of the Majority, despite the extremely grave way in which these positions compromise the International and despite their provocative character with regard to the Minority!

Because the Majority is not satisfied with defending its positions, in reality it is constantly polemicizing publicly with our tendency, without us having the right to reply.

Read for example the editorial in the last number of "Quatrième Internationale," the article by Comrade Livio, the report by Comrade Germain, or the successive issues of "World Outlook." They are constantly polemicizing against the arguments advanced or supposed to have been advanced by our tendency.

Still worse. They permit themselves in these publications to take positions with extreme light-mindedness and irresponsibility on political questions which have never been collectively debated, for the sole pleasure of polemicizing against our tendency and of combatting its work of enormous importance now being done in a number of vital sectors of the Colonial Revolution.

The most recent examples of this irresponsible factional activity are on the one hand the "theoretical" article by Comrade Germain, pub-

lished in "World Outlook" attacking Self-management, and the article by one Cabral published in the same organ attacking the United Portuguese Opposition at the very moment when it is advocating and even beginning the armed struggle against the fascist regime of Salazar, on the basis of a program indisputably very much to the left.

Comrade Germain found a way to transform an article written as a so-called contribution of a Marxist economist to a debate in Cuba into a knock-down attack, as superficial and confusionist as it is pernicious, against Self-management and the Yugoslav experience.

Yet the question of Self-management, as it has developed in Yugoslavia and Algeria, is, in reality, a new experience for the whole Communist movement of very high theoretical and practical interest, which demands not only deep general understanding but likewise a real experience in the way in which this question has been posed theoretically and practically in Yugoslavia and at present in Algeria.

On the other hand it is known that it is through Self-management that the socialist opening took place in the Algerian Revolution, and it is likewise through this question that the struggle against the bureaucracy has been and is posed in Algeria.

But here our Comrade Germain, whose knowledge and experience in this question should arouse in him the greatest prudence so that he might avoid publicly expressing the enormities which he just published (and to which he will receive the reply that he merits), was not able to resist the factional temptation of diminishing the value of Self-management, of denigrating the Yugoslav experience (and by implication the Algerian), and of indirectly extending a helping hand to his Chinese friends, ferocious demolishers of Yugoslav "neocapitalism."

As for "Cabral" writing from Algiers, an unrestrained slanderer of the United Portuguese Opposition, and ardent defender of Roberto Holden whose pro-American sympathies (that's the least one can say on this subject) are not at all a secret for all the political observers competent in this question, he was able to display his prose in an organ of the International at the very moment when the United Portuguese Opposition (which includes the participation of the Communist Party), adopting a clear Castroist line, is passing to the most decided form of revolutionary action.

With this Opposition, as well as with the "Castroist" Spanish Opposition, as well as with the M.P.L.A., the left tendency par excellence of the Angolese Revolution, the African Commission entertains the most friendly relations.

Yet here the anonymous Cabrals, the identity and existence of whom have never been communicated by the U.S. to the African Commission, are permitted to continue a shady work, compromising and hostile towards the African Commission, with the benediction of the U.S. and even in the columns of an organ of the International!

As for the slanderous accusation contained in the reply of the U.S. which attributes to us the role of "counselors" of the Khrushchevists, coming from the apologists and "critical" supporters of the Stalinists of Peking and Tirana, this hardly astonishes us.

The events as they unfold confirm each day the fundamental correctness of our evaluation concerning the two tendencies of the bureaucracy.

Our independence with regard to these two tendencies is complete.

We have never advocated "critical support" to the Khrushchevist tendency, and we have not disavowed our criticisms and positions of the past concerning this tendency. Our texts are perfectly clear on all these questions.

Certainly this position has not prevented us from underlining the positive or correct character of this or that act of the Khrushchevist leadership which is charged with leadership of the USSR, Workers State.

It was never Trotsky's conception that all the acts of the leadership of the bureaucracy are to be condemned, or that this leadership systematically and consciously betrays the World Revolution. That concept is a caricature of Trotskyism.

From this point of view, on the crisis in the Caribbean in 1962 we defended a position that coincides with that for example of Comrade Cannon(6), in face of the sectarians and confusionists, "pro-Chinese" and otherwise, of all stamps.

We have on the other hand given our "critical support" to signing the Moscow Atomic Treaty, in face of the confusionist and slanderous criticisms of the Chinese and "pro-Chinese" on this question.

Above everything we consider the "de-Stalinization" as an irreversible process of democratic and revolutionary renovation of the First Workers State, which has definitively broken the circle of its economic and cultural backwardness and its international isolation.

Far from interpreting the "de-Stalinization" in a restrictive sectarian sense as a "maneuver of the bureaucracy" to perpetuate its rule "by means of concessions," we conceive "de-Stalinization" as a dialectical process of constant interaction between the "concessions" and the multiform pressure of the masses, synonym of the process of the Political Revolution, in which the violent, insurrectional, phase is only a moment.

As to the relation of forces between the bureaucracy and the masses at this moment, which determines the weight of the layer of the bureaucracy which offers resistance, and thus the forms and amplitude of its ultimate resistance, we can say no more at present than this: this relation is evolving on the average constantly to the dis-

advantage of the bureaucracy which is differentiating not less constantly under its pressure.

"De-Stalinization" in its over-all causes and effect is thus synonymous in this sense with the process of the Political Revolution in the USSR and in the other Workers States.

From this evaluation flows the capital importance which we accord it in face of those who have tried or are at present trying to minimize it, as well as our resolute opposition to the retrograde tendencies of the bureaucracy which condemn the "de-Stalinization" and try to revive the cult of Stalin and the methods and conceptions of Stalinism in many fields.

Nothing good, nothing truly progressive can come from such an attitude.

It is our "pro-Chinese" Majority that has become the apologist and the "counselor" of the Chinese, presenting this tendency of the bureaucracy as a left centrist current evolving toward revolutionary Marxism and whose "Stalinism" is after all only a secondary and superficial trait!

Juggling with the term "Stalinism" which signifies for the Trotskyists the most general phenomenon of bureaucratization and the bureaucracy within the framework of a Workers State, and not simply and exclusively the extreme form of this phenomenon taken at a certain period under Stalin in the USSR and elsewhere, our Majority has in reality placed the greatest hopes on the evolution of the Chinese tendency and the "left currents" which the latter ought to foster.

It has in addition systematically evaded bringing to the knowledge of the International the Stalinist positions of the Chinese bureaucracy, and has centered its fire only against the Khrushchevist tendency at the very moment when the de-Stalinization is deepening in the USSR and the other Workers States and when the policy of the USSR in defense of the Colonial Revolution, in Cuba, Algeria and elsewhere, is becoming firmer.

What became of the Chinese or pro-Chinese "left currents" in Europe, in Belgium and Italy in particular? What fate did they reserve for the Trotskyists who tried to work in them?

Is it true or not that Tirana, seat of the bloody Stalinist clique of Enver Hodja has become, with the revolting but highly significant blessing of Peking, the Mecca of "pure Marxism-Leninism" for all the neo-Stalinists, confusionists and rabid anti-Trotskyists?

What lessons has our Majority drawn from the African junket of Chou En-lai and his trip to Albania?

Why not indicate his "chameleon" attitude (the expression is from "The Economist") toward all the "nationalist" governments of

Africa, including Morocco and Tunisia, whom he warmly praised for their "anti-imperialist" and "anticolonialist" struggle and his inadmissible attacks in Albania against Yugoslavia, "special detachment of American imperialism"?

And what should be said about his total fraternization with the leaders of the Stalinist clique of Tirana, and the immoderate, ridiculous praise which he gave them, presenting them, they and their Party, as the example to imitate of "pure Marxism-Leninism"?

In reality our Majority knows that the Chinese press is increasing its campaign for the rehabilitation of Stalin and his political work as a leader, along with Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, of "revolutionary Marxism."

To believe that this systematic campaign is due to ignorance of the historic facts, and that it is sufficient for our Majority to pathetically exhort the "Chinese comrades" to "change" their line on this question so as to make their "cause become invincible" (!), is indicative of the totally erroneous evaluation which our Majority makes of the nature of the Chinese tendency.

* * *

"The issue is democratic centralism," declares the Majority.

No, the genuine issue is the ideological clarification, the ideological rectification of the International, on which depends its development and its unity.

It is useless when at bottom a problem, a crisis, is political to reply to us by resorting to organizational formalism or to celebrated quotations.

We know the importance which revolutionary tendencies, most often minorities, have granted to these "arguments" in the course of the history of the workers international movement.

As for "quotations" more particularly, it is easy to bring out the most "appropriate" for each case.

The one brandished at us by the U.S. refers to simple things after all -- that the Majority has the right to publicly defend its line, that the public organs cannot be transformed into organs of permanent discussion between tendencies all placed on the same plane of equality in this area.

I have never liked personally to resolve concrete political questions by recourse to quotations isolated from their precise context, from no matter which of our masters of revolutionary Marxism.

This is a formalist, scholastic, impoverished method.

The truth is always concrete for Marxists, and each case must be taken first of all in its particularity.

Trotsky often spoke during his life about "democratic centralism" and above all gave concrete examples of the absolute primacy to be accorded to the defense of a correct political line in the face of restrictions and obstacles of all kinds.

I leave aside all that he wrote on this subject among others in the "New Course."

It was Trotsky in any case, if I am not mistaken, who likewise wrote this, in a letter concerning a tendency (that of Shachtman) which had nothing in common with the revolutionary Marxist tendency which we represent: "We don't have immutable rules. We are dialecticians also in the organizational field. If we have in the party an important minority which is dissatisfied with the decisions of the convention, it is incomparably more preferable to legalize the discussion after the convention than to have a split.

"We can go, if necessary, even further and propose to them to publish, under the supervision of the new National Committee, special discussion symposiums not only for party members, but for the public in general.

"For my part I believe that the prolongation of the discussion, if it is channelized by the good will of both sides, can only serve in the present conditions the education of the party." (Letter of 18-1-1940 to J.H.).(7)

I hope that the majority as a whole will ponder the content of this letter and act in the present case, infinitely more important and vital for the whole International, in at least an analogous manner.

With my Communist internationalist greetings,

Michel Pablo

(1)" . . . exiger que la direction arrête son travail et subordonne la publication de résolutions à des consultations préalables avec un seul camarade de la Minorité qui ne peut pas participer à ces organismes directeurs signifie substituer au centralisme démocratique la conception d'une fédération de tendances, une conception complètement contraire à la tradition de notre mouvement. . . "

(2)Unless -- they tell us -- if their traveling expenses are paid. This was the meaning of a pretended proposal on the part of the U.S. to meet last November in A. The condition was that the traveling expenses of the U.S. be paid by friends!

(3)In their last reply the majority of the U.S. pretend that no member

of the U.S. benefits from any help in traveling. They affirmed previously that the U.S. contributed only partially to these costs. In any case it is inadmissible to hide behind the lack of finances to make it impossible for the main leaders of a minority tendency to attend the meetings of the U.S. and the I.E.C.

This pretext is characteristic of the mentality of the factional majority of the U.S. with regard to the Minority and the capital question of the unity of the International.

On the other hand, how long are we still going to have to suffer the lamentations of the Majority over the lack of money, a pretext for reducing the activity of the International to a minimum?

Increased financial resources can be found if the international leadership decides to implant itself where the Revolution is living and progressing. But if on the contrary it persists in its superb "European" isolation, the financial and general crisis which more and more marks its work as a whole naturally risks becoming aggravated and led into an impasse. We warned them about this a long time ago in insisting on transferring the center of the International for this (financial) reason, too.

(4)" . . . puisque toutes les decisions qui ont été prises, depuis le Congres de Reunification au sein de l'organisme dirigeant institué par ce Congres conformément aux normes, c'est à dire, le secretariat Unifié, aux reunions duquel les représentants de la tendance Pablo ont assisté (excepté la reunion du 9-10 Novembre où ils se sont volontairement abstenus), le camarade Pablo, en pretendant que nous agissons sans consulter sa tendance, dit en realité que nous agissons sans le consulter."

(5)" . . . derriere cette récent conversion de Cannon à l'idée qu'il est possible de cohabiter dans une organisation centraliste démocratique avec Frank et Germain, se cache une nouvelle théorie, que puisque ces hommes ont des differences avec Pablo et qu'il est à présent en minorité, il sera possible de le contenir et peut être plus tard de l'exclure comme cela a été fait avec Cochran. . . ." (Bulletin International d'Information du S.W.P., juillet 1963, p. 4).

(6) Here are the terms in which Comrade Cannon expressed himself on the action of Khrushchev at the time of the Caribbean crisis, the defense of Cuba assumed by the USSR and the danger of atomic war, terms contained in a letter to F. Dobbs dated October 31, 1962, and published in the "International Information Bulletin" of the S.W.P. (July 1963), a bulletin which did not come to my attention until very recently:

"Now that the crest of the Cuban crisis seems to have passed, everyone is assessing its outcome. This is the trend of our thinking in informal discussions here.

"We must keep our eyes on the main issues and not get sidetracked by subsidiary considerations. What was the situation?"

"1. The U.S. naval blockade was set for a clash with Soviet ships which could escalate into nuclear war. Kennedy gave clear notice that the U.S. would not stop at the use of the most forceful measures.

"2. The Pentagon was ready to bomb and invade Cuba and crush its revolution. Newspaper accounts report that this was one of the alternative moves considered even for the start, and it was to be put into effect if Moscow did not yield on missile bases.

"In the face of these direct and immediate threats to world peace and the Cuban revolution, Khrushchev drew back, agreed to pull out the missiles, and dismantle the bases under U.N. supervision. He received in return a suspension of the blockade and public assurances that Cuba would not be invaded.

"What else could he have done under the given circumstances? It would have been foolhardy to risk setting off a thermonuclear war and daring the U.S. to come and wipe out the Cuban bases in view of Washington's evident determination to go the limit if necessary.

"In our opinion Khrushchev sensibly backed away from such a showdown, thus saving the world from war and the Cuban revolution from attack by overwhelming forces for a time. But this time is of decisive importance!

"The retreat was unavoidable and the concessions, as we know about them, did not give up anything essential. Those who judge otherwise should tell us what alternative course the Kremlin should have followed on the military and diplomatic fronts at that exorciating point of decision. Should Khrushchev have defied the embargo or refused outright to withdraw the missile bases?

"The crisis over Cuba is of immense importance. But we should not forget it is only one sector in a world-wide conflict between imperialism and the workers states which has witnessed in the past, and will see again, advances and retreats by one side or the other. As revolutionary realists, we have not criticized or condemned heads of workers states or union leaders for retreating and making concessions when the balance of forces was unfavorable. Lenin traded space for time at Brest-Litovsk. As we know from our Minneapolis experiences, even the most militant leadership which is up against the gun may have to give ground before the insuperable power of the employer in order to save the existence of the union and fight another day.

"The grim fact was that both the Soviet Union and Cuba not only had guns, but even more fearsome weapons, poised over their heads and ready to be used.

"For this reason we do not believe that Khrushchev's course was incorrect on the level of military affairs and state relations. To condemn it and cry 'betrayal' would only help the Stalinists to get off the hook where they are really vulnerable. That is their policy

of supporting Kennedy, Stevenson and other 'peace-loving' Democratic capitalist politicians. This attitude, flowing from the Kremlin's doctrine of peaceful co-existence, has again been exposed as criminal.

"Although we should carefully watch their development, we should be cautious and not jump to conclusions about the relations between Castro and Khrushchev. The latter's unilateral decisions and divergent aims may have created friction between them but it would be unwise to substitute speculations for solid facts. Khrushchev's declarations have not indicated any abandonment of Cuba, and it would be difficult for him to do so with the eyes of China, the colonial peoples and the Soviet militants upon him. On the other hand, Castro deeply needs Soviet aid.

"The principal point -- and you make it in the editorial -- is that the world, the socialist movement and the Cuban revolution have gained time. The bombs are still there. But they were not dropped anywhere. And we are heartily in favor of that!

"Despite gleeful claims by the American press that Kennedy's strong stand has given a stern lesson and severe setback to 'Soviet aggression,' people unaffected by imperialist propaganda have, I believe, breathed relief over the settlement and thank Khrushchev for his sanity. Bertrand Russell and Nehru expressed themselves along that line.

"We must remember that nuclear war would mean the greatest defeat for humanity and socialism. We must avert that terrible eventuality, not, to be sure, by stopping the class struggle against imperialism, but by utilizing every means that will give the workers time enough to wake up and organize themselves for that purpose.

"Jim Cannon."

9&)"Nous n'avons pas des règles immuables. Nous sommes des dialecticiens également sur le plan organisationnel. Si nous avons dans le parti une minorité importante qui est mécontente avec les décisions du congrès il est incomparablement préférable de légaliser la discussion après le congrès que d'avoir une scission.

"Nous pouvons aller, si c'est nécessaire, beaucoup plus loin et leur proposer de publier sous la surveillance du nouveau Comité Central des organes de discussion spéciaux non seulement pour les membres du parti mais aussi pour le public en général.

"Pour ma part, je suis convaincu que la prolongation de la discussion, si elle est canalisée par la bonne volonté des deux parties, ne pourra que servir dans les conditions présents à l'éducation du parti." (Lettre de 18-1-40 à J.H.)

RESOLUTION OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Addressed:

To the International Executive Committee, to the U.S., to the Leadership of the Sections

1 -- The African Commission of the Fourth International expressed indignant astonishment at the resolutions taken at the last session of the U.S. concerning its organ Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme. These resolutions place in immediate peril the unity of the International.

2 -- The African Commission rejects the allegations according to which Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme is a factional organ of the Revolutionary Marxist tendency of the International. It is indignant over the persistence of the majority of the U.S. in employing offensive terms in designating this tendency as "the Pablo faction" and Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme as "the bulletin of Pablo."

The African Commission declares that Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme is its organ, absolutely indispensable for its growing work within the most important sector at the present moment of all the work of the International: the Algerian and African Revolution.

3 -- If the members of the African Commission belong ideologically to the Revolutionary Marxist tendency, the African Commission recalls that they were elected by the International Executive Committee and that it was certainly not the fault of the African Commission if practically the totality of the militants of the International integrated in the Algerian and African Revolution belong to this tendency.

4 -- The African Commission also recalls that Comrade Pablo and the Revolutionary Marxist tendency of the International posed, before as well as during and after the World Congress, the necessity for the International Leadership to establish its center in A., as well as meeting at least from time to time in A.

5 -- The African Commission is always ready to collaborate with no matter which member of the I.E.C. or the U.S. belonging to the Majority tendency and of including him in the Editorship of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, which would permit the Majority of the U.S. to participate fully in an essential sector of the work of the International and to exercise its responsibilities.

6 -- The African Commission holds that any attack or measure against it and its organ affects not only the Revolutionary Marxist tendency but beyond that the entire Fourth International in the most vital sector of its present activity.

7 -- The African Commission is ready to discuss with the U.S. the concrete modalities for the collaboration of the latter in Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme:

The African Commission of the Fourth International
January 29, 1964

"THE MOST FRIENDLY RELATIONS" -- WITH WHOM?

A Statement by the Majority of the United Secretariat

In his letter of January 22, Comrade Pablo vehemently protests against an article in World Outlook "attacking the United Portuguese Opposition at the very moment when it is advocating and even beginning the armed struggle against the fascist regime of Salazar, on the basis of a program indisputably very much to the left."

Without reserve or criticism, the second issue of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme sings the praises of this same "United Portuguese Opposition," speaking of it as a "Castroist and Algerian [!] tendency of the workers and democratic movement," "revalorizing the struggle, including an armed one. . . against the fascist reaction."

This article, it should be noted in passing, constitutes one more proof that Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme is not an organ for work in Africa but a public organ of the Pablo faction. It cannot reasonably be argued that the jurisdiction of the "African Commission," after being stretched in the first issue to include China, the USSR and Venezuela should be widened still further to include Portugal and Spain. It is even more difficult to contend that the "needs of the work in the African revolution" require and justify an absolutely scandalous, opportunist and neo-Stalinist revision of the traditional position of the Fourth International with regard to the struggle of the workers movement against fascist regimes.

So that comrades can judge this in the light of the facts, we cite from the political program adopted by the "Conference of Anti-fascist Portuguese Forces" to which Comrade Pablo refers (Bulletin d'Information du Front Patriotique de Libération Nationale, January 1, 1964, page 4):

"1. The Conference reaffirmed that the objective of the Patriotic Front is the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship and the placing in power of a provisional government to establish democratic freedoms, particularly free thought and the organization of political parties, and after a brief delay to hold free elections for a Constituent Assembly.

"2. The Conference stated the common objectives of all the democratic forces, among others the following:

"--Destruction of the fascist State apparatus and construction of a democratic State;

"--Transformation of Portugal into a country with an advanced national industry;

"--Reform of the agrarian structure;

"--Utilization [!] of the national riches for the benefit of the

widest layers of the population;

"--Nonrecognition of foreign loans when [!] they are applied to nonproductive investments, especially those destined for colonial wars;

"--Protection of the economic and social interests of the workers and middle classes;

"--Wide democratic policy of medical assistance and social insurance;

"--Elimination of illiteracy and wide diffusion and democratization of culture;

"--A foreign policy of co-operation with all peoples and non-alignment with blocs;

"--Recognition of the right to self-determination and independence of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies.

"3. All the participants reaffirmed their aim not only to strengthen the unity of the fight for the overthrow of the dictatorship but also the maintenance of unity for the construction of the democratic Portugal of tomorrow."

This masterpiece of Stalinist-Khrushchevist literature should be read and re-read most attentively. It is nothing but a vulgar rehash of the traditional programs of the Communist parties of the so-called "resistance" epoch in Western Europe (class collaboration and "anti-fascist unity" between bosses and proletarians), without a single anticapitalist demand! Even the final point in the program is not a demand for the immediate independence of the colonies, but simply their right to independence (a "right" which hardly any Portuguese can dispute when the peoples of these colonies are in process of conquering it, arms in hand).

In reality, this program is to the right of the one advocated by the Popular Front and the National Council of the Resistance in France and Italy, since these implied nationalizations at least which are not even suggested here. It is even to the right of the minimum program set forth for a bourgeois revolution more than a century ago by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto. The aim of this program is to "unite" the workers movement, the liberal bourgeoisie, disillusioned Salazarists and even a part of the reactionary officer caste, and in a way that will not frighten London and Washington too much.

To support without any criticism or distinctions a program and practical policy based on such a program, which in the best of cases will repeat the betrayals of the French and Italian Communist parties in 1944 and the Spanish Communist party in 1936-39 signifies breaking with the tradition and principles of revolutionary Marxism going back to Trotsky's struggle against the practice of the Popular Front in

France and Spain, including the whole battle of our movement in the period of the Resistance (which, we should not forget, likewise "revalorized the struggle, including an armed one. . . against fascism").

If this is "living Trotskyism," one can be sure that Trotsky would turn in his grave to exclaim, "Then I am not a Trotskyist."

Moreover, to speak in Spain and Portugal of a "Castroist and Algerian tendency of the workers and [!] democratic movement" reveals the worst confusion.

First of all, to what "Castroism" does Comrade Pablo refer here -- to the initial Castroism criticized and overcome today by Fidel himself, which was limited to a petty-bourgeois democratic platform, or to the Castroism which has conquered the hearts and minds of the Latin-American masses in the Second Declaration of Havana which proclaims that there is no other road to freedom but the road of the socialist revolution (which the "United Portuguese Opposition" carefully refrains from mentioning)?

Next, to believe that socialism can triumph in countries like Portugal and Spain on the basis of such a petty-bourgeois or bourgeois democratic platform, on condition that it engages in armed struggle, is to disregard all the fundamental sociological conditions of these countries. Spain and Portugal are not colonial but imperialist countries. The imperialist bourgeoisie there is not foreign but native. The native bourgeoisie there is not something scarcely-constituted, without parties, without a mass base, without economic force, without its own traditions and ideologies (excepting the servants of foreign imperialism); it has been organized as a class for centuries, with real economic and social forces, with its own parties, its own traditions and its own ideology, with the experience of civil wars waged against the proletariat. To believe that it can be brought imperceptibly, by small changes and without anyone noticing it, toward the socialist revolution (without calling the thing by its name) is truly preposterous. As Trotsky said many times, the only ones who are fooled by such an enterprise are the workers. "Fascism is an instrument of finance capital, not of feudal landlords."

In any case, this was the line of the Fourth International on the problem of the struggle against fascist regimes, maintained from the Transition Program up to the recent documents of 1962. For the Fourth International, a double demarcation is drawn between the revolutionary and reformist or neoreformist tendencies in the Iberian peninsula: a mass struggle, including an armed one, against "the peaceful overturn of Franco and Salazar" on the one hand; and on the other, socialist revolution against the democratic revolution. The Portuguese antifascist opposition, and the Portuguese Communist party, have taken a step forward on the first question; this must be greeted and encouraged. But they maintain a deeply erroneous, opportunist position on the second question and they must be mercilessly criticized and condemned for this. (Which does not mean, of course, that they should be denied technical aid to facilitate the armed struggle

of the masses -- not a military putsch -- against Salazar.) It is an absolute duty of our movement to distinguish itself from, and to politically criticize, the opportunist line of "democratic revolution," of a "democratic State" and other formulas that risk bringing the Iberian proletariat a new defeat tomorrow. And Comrade Pablo revealed perhaps more than he intended when he offered in defense of his revisionism the single political argument that with this Opposition "the African Commission entertains the most friendly relations."

THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF COMRADE PABLO

A Statement by the Majority of the United Secretariat

Comrade Pablo, who has come to consider the most elementary organizational norms as bureaucratic fetters, does not cease to send letters and documents seeking to force the United Secretariat, despite its firm decision not to displace the axis of its present activity -- aimed at consolidating and widening the achievement of unification -- into an endless, sterile struggle of tendencies.

Our previous documents being completely clear, there is no need to again take up the series of arguments in Comrade Pablo's latest epistle. Nor do we intend to answer the epithets and so-called "political" or "ideological" characterizations (bureaucrats, Zinovievists, pro-Chinese, etc.) which he deems it necessary to use in place of arguments related to facts and concrete attitudes. Nor do we intend to waste our time denouncing the "revolutionary Marxist tendency," the "vanguard tendency par excellence" -- as if revolutionary Marxism in the Fourth International were the prerogative of one man or a narrow faction, as if "revolutionary Marxist" were not synonymous as before with "Trotskyist"!

We shall confine our attention, therefore, only to some essential points.

Comrade Pablo accuses us of introducing a formalist concept of democratic centralism, of forgetting that the form must be adapted to the content and that "primacy" must be "accorded to the defense of a correct political line."

We recall first of all that the Leninist concept was never inspired by disdain for organizational forms, which are not static by-laws but indispensable elements in the functioning of the party as an instrument of struggle. Not to tolerate the party becoming the scene of uninterrupted factional struggles after the sovereign verdict of a congress, with minorities continuing to talk and to act as they please, perpetuating the debate, does not at all indicate a formalist concept. It means struggling against paralysis of the organization and demanding that the policy adopted be effectively applied.

It was not from Comrade Pablo's latest letter that we came to know that it can at times be necessary to open a discussion before the time limit set in the statutes and to even adopt exceptional measures (something that might well occur in the future, above all in such an explosive period of world politics). However, the problem is not to reaffirm elementary truths, but to judge the actions and claims of Comrade Pablo in a specific context. As we have emphasized many times, the specific context is characterized by the recent holding of a highly representative congress and the Reunification Congress, the legitimacy of which no one contested, and by an extremely clear political outcome; namely, the adoption of documents not only by the

movement as a whole, but also by its various sectors.

If we wish, moreover, to utilize the political criterion invoked by Comrade Pablo, it is clear that necessity No. 1 after the congress was to consolidate and expand the reunification which remains a process to be completed. It was in fact of fundamental importance to definitively counteract any defeatist centrifugal tendency, to create a more powerful pole of attraction, to increase in this way the prestige of our movement, to project more than ever effective multiple actions in the new revolutionary sectors where we have enormous opportunities. The formation of a new, larger international leadership, enjoying indisputable political authority, was one of the conditions for our succeeding. The movement as a whole, including the minority, had an interest in applying such an orientation and everybody should have understood, therefore, what the essential political priority was at this stage.

Comrade Pablo ignored or forgot all this, starting up war a month after the congress, constantly renewing indiscriminate and insulting attacks, undertaking even -- through quotations from Healy at this juncture! -- to reopen the old quarrels and to stir up the old grudges which the International considered ended once and for all after the Reunification Congress.

An Extraordinary Demand

Comrade Pablo made the extraordinary demand that his differences with the majority should be discussed publicly, and when this proposal to depart from the traditional practices of democratic centralism was referred to the International Executive Committee, he did not wait for this body to consider the request and to act on it. He went ahead, in flagrant violation of the rules and principles of democratic centralism, and launched Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, without even putting the question on the agenda of the United Secretariat. When the United Secretariat accidentally learned about the project and appealed to Comrade Pablo to hold it up, he brushed the appeal aside.

He claims that this magazine is not a public minority organ, presenting views in opposition to those adopted by the last World Congress, but a publication of the African Commission, concerned solely with advancing Trotskyism in Africa. However, this did not prevent him from arguing at the same time, to those who see this publication for what it really is, that his faction has a right to its own public organ in which it can present views rejected by the World Congress. To bolster this contention, he cites what he claims is the instructive precedent of Trotsky's suggestion that the majority in the 1939-40 struggle should propose to the Burnham-Shachtman-Abern petty-bourgeois opposition "to publish, under the supervision of the new National Committee, special discussion symposiums, not only for party members, but for the public in general."

In citing Trotsky's proposal of January 18, 1940, Comrade Pablo leaves out a rather essential sentence in the very middle of the

quotation without indicating the omission in any way. The sentence in question follows the one we have just quoted. It reads: "We should go as far as possible in this respect in order to disarm their at least premature complaints and handicap them in provoking a split." No comment is required on the reasons for the sudden failure of Comrade Pablo's typewriter when it came to this sentence.

There are some other trifles which Comrade Pablo leaves out, perhaps because he was not fully acquainted with this episode in the history of our movement. Comrade Cannon was against Trotsky's proposal; and, in the light of the considerations advanced by Cannon, Trotsky changed his mind, admitting that he had taken too abstract a view. As he wrote Farrell Dobbs soon after, "Under such conditions for the opposition to have their own public paper or magazine is a means not to convince the Party but to appeal against the Party to the external world."

On one point, we can agree with Comrade Pablo -- the analogy between his demand to carry the dispute to the public and the one made by the Burnham-Shachtman-Abern petty-bourgeois opposition is almost perfect.

Do Minorities Have Duties?

We repeat once more. It is easy, much too easy, to speak of a formalist conception of democratic centralism, of Zinovievism, etc. Comrade Pablo, however, should specify -- this is not the first time we have put this question to him -- what is his conception of the duties which democratic centralism implies above all for a minority?

Does his conception of adapting the so-called "form to the content" mean that when the "vanguard tendency par excellence" is in the minority it need not accept any limitation and when the others are in the minority they must be constantly held to the strictest centralist discipline? Is the "content," then, Comrade Pablo's views to which the "form" of democratic centralism must always be tailored?

In reality the violations of discipline by some members of the Pablo tendency have become so numerous and so open that any leadership would have been warranted in a normal situation to take elementary statutory measures. If we have not done so, if we have limited ourselves to pointing out the violations and to making appeals, it is precisely because we decided to apply to the end our concept of what must be done to construct the movement at this stage. Under these conditions, it is incredible that Comrade Pablo, perhaps mistaking our attitude for weakness, should denounce as an act endangering the unity of the movement -- not the fact that he published a magazine without the knowledge or permission of the International and against its line -- but our invitation to refer the question to the International Executive Committee and our pointing out that we have the right and the duty to make known that his article on the Sino-Soviet conflict does not represent the line of the World Congress. Decidedly, Comrade Pablo does not make the least concession to "formalism"!

A Pertinent Question

Things have gone so far that leaders and militants of the International have been led to ask the question: Where is Comrade Pablo headed? Comrade Pablo is reputed to weigh his words and still more his acts. Why then did he unleash this struggle? Why is he seeking to discredit the leadership of the International by shooting at literally everything and discovering at each step new crimes involving the majority as a whole or some of its individual members? Why did he commit violations of discipline, making the situation still graver?

It is clear to everyone that if it were Comrade Pablo's real aim to change the relationship of forces in the movement -- a legitimate aim, of course, provided that it is sought within the framework of democratic centralism -- he would not have acted as he has. An action like his can only either crystallize the proportions existing at the World Congress, which were completely unfavorable to him, or reduce his possible future influence still further because of the fact that cadres educated in our organizational concepts will react to his flagrant breaches of the statutes with severe condemnation. In addition, if Comrade Pablo wanted primarily to convince the members of the International, why has he insisted so much on a public debate? Why has he made it understood that he considers it prejudicial to his work to be identified with the positions of the World Congress, particularly on the Sino-Soviet conflict? In the eyes of whom is he so highly interested in distinguishing himself from the line of the International? It would be difficult for him to demonstrate that the position of critical support for the Chinese positions, as formulated by the Congress, could entail any serious discredit in the eyes of African revolutionists of whom the least that can be said is that they are not burning with sympathy for Khrushchevism. . . .

The fact is that the attitude of Comrade Pablo is actually determined by increasingly dangerous political positions, a growing lack of confidence in the movement, a tendency, more or less open and conscious, of wanting to play a role of his own, independent of the Fourth International as an organization.

It is above all on this political level that the latest letter of Comrade Pablo merits examination.

In the Khrushchevist Direction

We leave aside his indignant questions on the crimes of Tirana, the judgments of the Chinese on Stalin, etc. We have always made timely criticisms of what had to be criticized and we have no need of any pressure to again indicate our independent attitude in relation to any bureaucratic current whenever circumstances demand it. Under appropriate conditions, moreover, Comrade Pablo can obtain the information he obviously lacks on the pro-Chinese tendencies and groups in certain countries and our attitude on this subject. At the same time he should explain to us why, in correctly calling attention to the anti-Trotskyism of Tirana, he does not whisper a

single word about the anti-Trotskyist campaign mounted in recent months in a big way in the Soviet and general Khrushchevist press.

What is of concern to us is the series of formulas utilized in his letter confirming in a clear and alarming fashion the accentuation of Comrade Pablo's political evolution, particularly under the impulse of developments in the Sino-Soviet conflict. It is an evolution that has been concretized in various political evaluations, above all a completely false evaluation of Khrushchevism, which is leading him more and more to blur our concept of the bureaucracy. All this is in consonance with a method that replaces close, profound analysis by hasty conclusions, impressionistic formulas and the utilization of superficial, secondary and even purely emotional elements. This is likewise reflected in the terminology he resorts to more and more, forgetting the rigorousness proper to our movement.

We already explained at the World Congress as well as in later documents that far from having an equidistant attitude in relation to the two main bureaucratic currents -- which would amount, in the concrete context, to a sectarian position -- Comrade Pablo expresses in reality an evaluation altogether favorable to Khrushchevism, which he in fact supports in a less and less critical way. Let us consider briefly some of the most significant questions.

Was Hungary an "Exception"?

Comrade Pablo dwelt many times on the question of the rate of economic growth of the United States and the USSR, accusing certain comrades of the International of underestimating Soviet potentialities and overestimating those of the United States. But, if it was only a question of the outcome of the rates, the insistence and the vehemence of Comrade Pablo would be inexplicable. His attitude becomes understandable if in reality, behind this discussion, lurks another by far more important problem; namely, whether or not economic competition and the victory of the USSR on this terrain will prove to be the decisive factor in settling the fate of capitalism and socialism on a world scale. Khrushchev has stressed many times that he puts economic competition in first place.

We have criticized this conception, the Chinese likewise, in a whole series of documents. In an article printed in Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme Comrade Pablo speaks of the differences between the Chinese and the Soviets in this field as if it were only a question of determining which sector has priority at this stage (more particularly the place of the colonial revolution), forgetting to denounce the essence itself of the Khrushchevist conception; namely, the idea that economic competition will be the determining factor, the struggles of the colonial peoples and the working masses of the capitalist countries making up the difference.

In the text submitted to the World Congress, Comrade Pablo affirmed moreover that Khrushchevism "had evolved since its appearance continually -- on the average -- toward the left" and that the

Hungarian affair, after all, was only an exception.

This signified forgetting with astonishing ease everything that our movement, including Comrade Pablo, had written on the multiple rightist aspects of Khrushchevism on the domestic as well as the international plane, and giving de-Stalinization, certainly a complex phenomenon, but clear in its essential thrust, a simplistic and at bottom apologetic analysis. Is it necessary to repeat once again that the reaction of the bureaucracy in the Hungarian case, aside from the specific aspects of the circumstances, was a normal reaction for a bureaucracy under conditions where the mass movement that went beyond it placed in question its very existence? How then can one obscure the fact that by his intervention in Hungary Khrushchev did no more than demonstrate that as authorized representative of the bureaucracy, despite his de-Stalinizing tendencies, he remained ready to defend the survival of his caste by no matter what means?

Other Indications

After the World Congress, we were struck not so much by the defense in itself which Comrade Pablo made of the Moscow Treaty as by the arguments he utilized. In reality his arguments are almost the same as those employed, for example, by the leaders of the Italian CP, and analogous considerations are implied by Comrade Pablo's timorous attitude on the Sino-Soviet conflict. We have already criticized the argument according to which we must be concerned about avoiding "the total seizure" of India by imperialism. We refer to it here because such an argument could not be advanced in fact without accepting in the main the official view on diplomatic and political necessities. Yet, without disregarding these necessities, it is nevertheless clear that it is not the role of the Fourth International to identify itself with any official view.

Another argument dear to Comrade Pablo is that of the role of the Khrushchevist leadership in face of the Cuban Revolution. For him, Khrushchev's Cuban policy is without reproach and he has many times cited the Soviet-Cuban declaration of May 1963 which is supposed to demonstrate that Khrushchev is for a revolutionary Castroist orientation in Latin America. It is ridiculous, as we have said before, to make a judgment on the basis of a document -- one, moreover, that is sufficiently equivocal -- while ignoring the reality; that is, the real line of the Communist parties and Khrushchevists of Latin America. No one, naturally, denies the importance of Soviet economic and military aid for Cuba -- in fact we have been in the forefront emphasizing it -- but to place the emphasis constantly on this aid, wipes out in practice the dual character of the bureaucracy. What is forgotten is the baneful role of the Soviet bureaucracy in Cuba, as elsewhere, in the phase, decisive after all, for the victory of the Revolution.

Moreover, Trotskyists should be the last to minimize or to pass by in silence, as Comrade Pablo does, the pressure which Peking's challenge places on Khrushchev to give a more favorable response to

an independent revolutionary government like the one in Cuba than he might otherwise have done. In his dealings with the imperialist powers in the West, Khrushchev must now continually look over his shoulder in fear of possible criticism from China, including the criticism of a better example in helping freedom movements. Castro thus gains in weight in Moscow because behind him stand two-thirds of a billion Chinese and their official leaders in addition to the peoples of Latin America, the Soviet Union and the other workers states. Credit for the aid which the Soviet government is giving Cuba also belongs in big part to the Chinese People's Republic.

One-Sided Emphasis

But it is his present attitude toward de-Stalinization and the bureaucracy in its Khrushchevist phase which more precisely shows and, so to speak, crowns the evolution of Comrade Pablo. In the series of writings and documents submitted before and after the Reunification Congress, the emphasis is always placed on the progressive acquisitions and tendencies, on the irreversible character and revolutionary nature of the process, on the growing support accorded the world revolution by the leadership of the USSR, etc.

Aside from other sketchy simplifications, how can Comrade Pablo forget the various consequences which de-Stalinization either touched off or stimulated on the domestic level -- where wide layers of the most conservative sectors of the bureaucracy profited from the "thaw" -- as well as on the international plane where all kinds of rightist tendencies developed or became accentuated?

In addition, what does it mean to insist solely on the irreversible character of de-Stalinization? If it is plain, in short, that reappearance of the worst period of Stalinism is impossible due to the radical change in objective conditions, it is not less evident that de-Stalinization as a policy of the bureaucracy has undergone and will again undergo many vicissitudes, zigzags, even steps backward; as we have stressed in the past. Once again, the proper role of revolutionary Marxists is to never lose sight of all this and to avoid any formulations the consequence of which might be to create illusions in the nature of de-Stalinization itself; in the final analysis, in the possibility of the self-reform of the bureaucracy.

An example of Comrade Pablo's present tendency to offer apologetic interpretations for Khrushchevist policies is provided by the note "Tournant économique décisif" [decisive economic turn] (in Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, No. 1), in which, among other things, one reads:

"The meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU in December 1963 can prove to be of capital importance in the economic history of the USSR. . . .

"It is almost certain that Khrushchev is always exposed to the stubborn resistance of a whole wing of the Soviet bureaucracy, going

from Molotov to Suslov, which is powerfully supported by the 'ideological' attacks of the Chinese seeking to overthrow the reformers of the Kremlin."

The least that can be said is that Comrade Pablo judges the plenum in an impressionistic way, ignores the enormous complications that Khrushchev's new abrupt turn provoked, and does not consider that the new orientation of investments can injure agriculture in the final analysis, at least in part on other levels (because of the fact, for example, that the construction of certain tractor plants has been suspended). Moreover, to present the situation in the USSR as if all that is involved is a conflict between the Khrushchevists and those dreaming of the Stalinist era is a grave error. Elements and groups already exist in the party, perhaps also at the level of the Central Committee, not to speak of Soviet society in general, who are critical of the timorous character of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization and who would like to go much further (for example, in the cultural field, in questions of economic structure, etc.)

Khrushchev's Advice to the Algerians

We turn to another note in the same issue of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme which pretends to present the principal passages of a "programmatic" interview granted by Khrushchev to two Algerian newspapers. In such a note an effort should certainly be made to indicate possibly new elements, but at the same time central points should be underlined which a revolutionary Marxist cannot pass by in silence under any pretext. Yet Comrade Pablo not only did not deem it advisable -- in an organ claiming to give an orientation for Africa! -- to express our criticism of the Khrushchevist line on fundamental problems of the colonial revolution in our epoch, he even went so far as to leave out a statement, replacing it with dots, the one statement which more than all the rest bares the real Khrushchevist orientation; namely, the following:

"The revolutionary democratic leaders of certain liberated countries are looking for methods and forms of passage onto the noncapitalist road of development. In the opinion of Marxist-Leninists, a national democratic state could well serve as the form for such a passage. This state would support itself on an anti-imperialist united front of all the social forces ready to struggle for the independent democratic development. It would open wide perspectives for bringing the masses into the political field, in the national construction of a new life on democratic bases. It goes without saying that this does not exclude other forms of development along the road of national liberation and social progress.

"Life will bring many new forms of the passage to socialism as well as rates of social transformations. It is beyond doubt, in any case, that life demands moving forward, but you can't advance without moving toward socialism. But you can't build socialism through a decree, you can't jump over the stage of democratic transformations, nor undertake measures for which the indispensable social and economic

conditions are not ripe, for which the support of the popular masses is not assured. The accomplishment of the tasks of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal and democratic revolution creates the best conditions for the passage to socialism. For several countries the essential task consists today in unfurling this revolution, of drawing the wide popular masses into creative revolutionary activity in the course of which they will directly approach the new aim -- that of the socialist transformation. Thus, it is in resolving the general democratic tasks not having, in themselves, a socialist character that the conditions for the passage to socialism are created."

Has Comrade Pablo then joined the school that juggles quotations? Does he believe that in view of Khrushchev's new "programmatic" performance that it is necessary from now on to forget the basic criteria of the theory of the permanent revolution and even give currency to the very vague "people's state," which is obviously nothing but the famous independent national democratic state? (Comrade Pablo uses the expression "people's state" in relation to Algeria in this same number of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme.) Every cadre in the movement should study the two key paragraphs in Khrushchev's advice to the Algerians which Comrade Pablo decided it was prudent to omit. These paragraphs offer treacherous Stalinist formulas in place of Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution. If Comrade Pablo had quoted them, he could scarcely have evaded commenting on their character. And to do that from the Trotskyist point of view would have ruined the bland tone which Comrade Pablo evidently felt it was most politic to use in presenting Khrushchev to his African audience.

Does De-Stalinization = Political Revolution?

A few months ago, some Australian comrades who are partisans of Comrade Pablo described de-Stalinization as the political revolution. Comrade Pablo now affirms this himself, thus proving that it was not an isolated extreme formulation but a position of his tendency.

No one in our ranks interprets de-Stalinization as simply a maneuver, more or less Machiavellian, and no one denies that it has strong roots in Soviet society. In this sense, it is clearly a process that goes beyond the interests and the will of the bureaucracy. But this does not mean that for the bureaucracy and its present leadership the political course known as de-Stalinization is anything but an orientation which seeks to perpetuate their rule through concessions, changes, turns, etc. Far from being synonymous with political revolution, de-Stalinization aims precisely at avoiding conflicts between the bureaucracy and the masses that might provoke a political revolution. This is what we have been explaining for ten years, above all in arguing with certain currents in the Communist parties and certain Marxist or semi-Marxist intellectuals. What is involved here in reality is a central point in our conception of the bureaucracy as a privileged ruling layer which must be broken up and overturned by the revolutionary proletariat.

It is true that Comrade Pablo speaks of "a dialectical process

of constant interaction," etc., and even a "violent, insurrectional phase" of the political revolution. This, of course, is an essential aspect, but it is not sufficient in itself. Everything depends in fact on the more general context of the concept as a whole. If one tends to conceive de-Stalinization as more or less rectilinear, if one views the Hungarian variant as exceptional, if one judges Khrushchevism as in general evolving to the left, if one reduces the present internal dialectics in the USSR essentially to a conflict between the Khrushchevists and the conservatives, if one supposes that Khrushchev is leading and will continue to lead a substantially revolutionary process up to the eve of its outcome, or almost, it is evident that the notion of a "violent, insurrectional phase" loses its genuine significance and could even be strictly interpreted as a struggle against the resistance of a conservative Vendée of unreconstructed Stalinists.

The formulations used by Comrade Pablo do not help to clear things up. On the contrary, they sow confusion to the highest degree. For us it is essential to emphasize that the objective socio-economic process in the USSR is one thing, the political course of the bureaucracy, its reformist operation of self-defense, something else again. There is a qualitative difference between them which cannot be rubbed out without rubbing out, deforming, castrating our concept of the bureaucracy. In this concept the political revolution constitutes a qualitative leap even in relation to the most advanced de-Stalinization -- de-Stalinization being in the last analysis only a phase, certainly of historic significance, of the system of bureaucratic hegemony. Comrade Pablo seems to have become convinced that such a concept is nothing but an expression of the "miasma of outright reactionary-anti-Sovietism," of which he accuses the leadership of the Fourth International, picking up one of the traditional refrains of the bureaucracy against Trotsky and the Trotskyist movement.

Where Is "Living Trotskyism" To Be Found?

Comrade Pablo's letter contains another paragraph which says much about his conceptions and perhaps also his present intentions: "At present the international revolutionary vanguard is immense and the dialogue between living Revolutionary Trotskyism and that vanguard is much more important and decisive than the arbitrariness and the irresponsibility of this or that body arrogating to itself the right to reduce to silence, to mistreat, to expel, the vanguard tendency par excellence of Trotskyism and the Fourth International."

What is the significance of this paragraph? Is it possible to conceive revolutionary Marxism exclusively as an ideological current, abstracting it from its organized form? Does he wish to reduce Trotskyism to an instrument of analysis and interpretation, thus emptying it of all the practical revolutionary content which we have defended for years against all the slanderers of our movement?

We leave aside Comrade Pablo's exaggerations, his illusions concerning the "immense" revolutionary vanguard which is his audience and

his modest words about the "vanguard tendency par excellence" which he claims to represent. What we are interested in is to understand the substance of his ideas and to see clearly. In reading this paragraph we were reminded of one of his declarations at the World Congress in which he said that he refused to make a fetish out of the Fourth International.

The majority reporter replied that the problem did not involve the principle that Marxists make no fetish of anything, nor did it involve recalling that Marx at one time considered the First International outworn; Lenin, the Second International; and Trotsky, the Third; but that the problem was to reaffirm, in the present concrete context, that we are convinced more than ever, in a completely rational and realistic way, that the Fourth International is the only organization genuinely practicing revolutionary Marxism on a world scale despite all its weaknesses and the errors which it might have committed or will still commit. We are more than ever convinced that there is no "living Trotskyism" or "living Trotskyists" outside the Fourth International, a conviction which Comrade Pablo once shared with fierce energy and which he now appears to question in the paragraph quoted above. Outside of our ranks, men and women who are, or consider themselves to be, Trotskyists, face the choice of political capitulation sooner or later or complete neutralization and sterilization, or retreat to an intellectual tower as a historian, economist, or something similar, which may be more or less of a personal solution for a demoralized militant, but which can by no means be a solution for the problems of revolutionary struggle for which our movement exists.

For us this is self-evident. That is why we cannot accept Comrade Pablo's raising the suggestion of a "living Trotskyism" placed in actuality outside the Fourth International.

That is why we once more ask him to reflect on all the implications of his present attitude and to turn back from a course that would spell political catastrophe for him. No one denies him the right to continue to struggle for an orientation which he considers to be correct; but it is only within the International, within the framework of its democratic centralism, that he can do so in a fruitful way.

UNITED SECRETARIAT RESOLUTION

on

SOUS LE DRAPEAU DU SOCIALISME

The United Secretariat states:

(1) That it has been placed before the accomplished fact once again, a second issue of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme having been brought to the attention of its members during the course of the meeting itself.

(2) That this involves a violation of the decision taken at the previous meeting.

(3) That Comrade Pablo has made it known that he intends, no matter what, to continue its publication without waiting for the IEC to meet.

The United Secretariat condemns this new violation of discipline by the minority.

The United Secretariat instructs the bureau to make a public declaration in the name of the Secretariat indicating that Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme is not an organ authorized by the leadership of the International and does not represent the orientation of the World Reunification Congress.

The United Secretariat refers the matter to the IEC for any further decision it may deem necessary.

The United Secretariat instructs the Bureau to publish an Information Bulletin on the internal situation for the information of all the members of the movement.

STATEMENT BY THE MINORITY

The undersigned representatives of the Revolutionary Marxist tendency at the meeting of the United Secretariat of February 14, 1964, regret that the Majority of the United Secretariat maintains its ultimatums concerning "Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme," demanding as a preliminary that this organ of the African Commission be disavowed and stopped at once.

They regret that this Majority refuses to discuss concrete steps to be taken to normalize the situation in the International to prevent regrettable incidents from one side or the other, and to contain the ideological struggle within limits preserving the unity of the International and its democratic-centralist regime.

They declare that the conception of democratic centralism held by the tendency they represent does not imply negating the rights of the Majority and the duties of the Minority, nor more particularly a so-called demand for perpetual discussion on all subjects in the International.

The Revolutionary Marxist tendency's conception on the matter of democratic centralism and its application in the present concrete conditions have been expressed in a number of documents of the tendency and more particularly in the reply of Comrade Pablo submitted to the United Secretariat during its meeting of 26-27th January, 1964, and still not published.

They declare once more that they are ready to examine with the Majority of the United Secretariat all the necessary measures to improve the internal situation of the movement and to participate with the Majority in the political elaboration of the publication "Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme," in the framework of the well-understood rights of the Majority.

Faced with the refusal of the Majority to discuss on this basis, they ask: (1) that the IEC should take up this grave question which threatens the unity of the International at present; (2) that the IEC should be convoked at the end of April or beginning of May so that the representatives of the Minority can be present (for reasons explained by them orally) and in a place determined by common agreement; (3) that all the documents pertaining to this question be brought to the attention of the leaderships and members of all the sections.

Michel Pablo, member of the U.S.
Lenoir, alternate member of the U.S.

February 14, 1964

P.S. Having seen at the last minute the decision of the Majority of the United Secretariat to publish before the IEC meets a communiqué declaring that "Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme" is not an organ of the

Fourth International, the representatives of the Minority declare that this act seeks to perpetrate a split in the Fourth International before the IEC can take up this question. They make an appeal in extremis to the Majority to reconsider all the consequences of such a possible act.

STATEMENT BY THE MAJORITY

(1) Despite repeated requests, the comrades of the minority have refused to recognize the duty of the minority to function as a tendency within the framework of the elected bodies and normal rules of the International. They have refused to accept the normal discipline of the World Congress and the United Secretariat. They have insisted on constituting, around the "African Commission," a certain parallel leadership center, with its own finances and its own public organ, shifting members of the United Secretariat and of the International Executive Committee to this "center" without asking the prior opinion of the United Secretariat and even without informing it beforehand. They have refused to modify their federalist conception of the International, according to which a regional bureau or commission can "elaborate" and publicly defend a line independently of the international leadership and in opposition to the line of the World Congress. They have refused to apply the decision of the United Secretariat of January 25-26 to suspend, if only temporarily until the plenum of the International Executive Committee, the publication of their public tendency organ Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, thus demonstrating that they recognize and apply in practice only the discipline of their own tendency. The fact that they submitted a declaration today, stating that their concept "does not imply negating the rights of the majority and the duties of the minority," while at the same time they place on the table issue number two of Sous le Drapeau du Socialisme, in flagrant violation of a decision of the United Secretariat, confirms the purely demagogic and maneuverist character of this declaration.

(2) The majority of the United Secretariat has always accorded the representatives of the minority in the United Secretariat all the rights and all the possibilities of consultation and collaboration. It has shifted dates and places of meetings over and over again to make possible the presence of representatives of the minority. It has remained ready to consider any proposal envisaging publication of a genuine organ for the work of the Fourth International in Africa, but it is not prepared to grant this label to a public organ of the minority. In any case, all these questions can be resolved only within a precise framework and with specific prior guarantees with respect to this framework: the minority, following the World Congress, must publicly apply its decisions and its line, and collaborate loyally with the majority in the sense that the majority elected at the World Congress decides the political line of the United Secretariat and all the regional bureaus and commissions of the International Executive Committee and United Secretariat. Because of their refusal to accept these elementary rules and their systematic violation of them, the minority bears responsibility for the present crisis.

As for the three proposals advanced by the minority with regard to the next meeting of the International Executive Committee, they correspond to decisions already taken by the United Secretariat.

(3) The majority records the fact that Comrade Pablo's tendency,

after multiple violations of discipline and successive threats and ultimatums, has now faced our movement with the gravest attempt at blackmail -- if the unprincipled demands of the minority are not accepted, he has said that a split will be inevitable and the majority will bear responsibility.

The majority will defend the program and the organizational rules of Trotskyism against all these attempts, and will not retreat before any threat or attempted blackmail. Principles are at stake. We appeal to the minority comrades once more to draw back from the path which is leading them to a political and organizational break with the Fourth International.

February 14, 1964