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THESES ON THE INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
AND THE ORIENTATION OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

I. Having failed in the many attempts it has made since the last war to arrest the disintegration of its world system and to restore its equilibrium, and finding itself threatened by a new crisis of over-production, imperialism has plunged anew into accelerated military and political preparation for a new world war.

II. This tendency to war, inherent in the capitalist system in its imperialist phase of decadence and decomposition, of course existed even since the conclusion of the second world war and the beginning of the "cold war." However, what essentially characterizes the course recently embarked upon in the policy of the imperialists is the passage from a primarily ideological preparation of the new war (by means of a general anti-soviet and anti-communist crusade) to more pronounced military and political preparations for war.

This turn is concretized by the essential orientation of the economies of the principal capitalist countries towards armament and war economies, and the subordination of the political character of all their "plans" and ideas ("Marshall Plan," "Schuman Plan," "Unification of Europe") to military needs.

III. To this development of imperialist policy the Soviet bureaucracy counterposes the acceleration of its own armaments program and military plans, the more complete integration of the satellite countries into its economic and political orbit, the efforts to prevent an autonomous development of the Chinese Revolution in order to utilize it for its own ends, and a policy of obstruction by the Communist Parties of the anti-Soviet plans of the bourgeoisie, a policy of harassment and pressure aimed at forcing them to a compromise which would postpone the outbreak of the war.

IV. For fundamental reasons which are inherent in its very nature, the Soviet bureaucracy, despite appearances, fears an abrupt rupture of the equilibrium, dreads the rise and the world triumph of the revolutionary forces even if, in the first period, they are led by the Communist Parties, and it pursues an essentially conservative and defensive policy concentrated above all on the economic, diplomatic and military strengthening of its bastion, the USSR.

From this point of view, the attempt to place the inherently aggressive and expansionist character of imperialist policy, of which war is only an inevitable consequence, on the same plane as that of the Soviet bureaucracy and to speak of the equal aspirations of the USA and of the USSR for world domination is to become mired in theoretical confusion from which flows a whole series of basically erroneous political conclusions.

V. Despite the now reinforced orientation of imperialism toward war, the perspective of temporary compromises between the USSR and the USA continues to remain open.

Imperialism is aware that the relationship of forces at the present stage is unfavorable for winning a war against the USSR, its European satellites and China, a war which by its very logic will be transformed from the beginning into an international civil war.

The imperialists cannot count upon any very effective resistance by any capitalist country in Western Europe which, in case of war, run the risk in their totality of coming rapidly under the control of the Soviet Armies, the Communist Parties or the revolutionary masses.

In an even briefer period, all of Asia can experience that same fate.

Consequently, in the event of a war unleashed in the present period by imperialism, it would have to envisage a situation where in practice, American imperialism, partially seconded by British imperialism, would have to face a coalition of all of Europe and Asia which had passed under the control of its adversaries.

With such a relationship of forces, the victory of world imperialism would become problematical in the face of a situation of universal chaos.

VI. For this reason, it is much more probable that imperialism will prolong the period of its preparation until it exhausts its ability to avert the economic crisis and to maintain its control over the American masses.

On the other hand, it will be all the more possible for it to pursue this course since the Soviet bureaucracy, also anxious for its own reasons to avert the outbreak of a general war, will lend itself to the conclusion of limited or even more extensive partial compromises and to the policy of the division of zones of influence and of mutual concessions.

VII. The progress that will be realized in the stabilization of the economy and class relationships in Western Europe, of several key positions in Asia and in the current armaments program will decide, in part, in the years to come the degree of preparation of imperialism for unleashing and winning a general war. If imperialism succeeds in the coming years in stabilizing and seriously rearming the "Atlantic community" (by integrating western Germany in it) and in establishing certain important bases in Asia (Japan, Philippines, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, Indonesia, Middle East) and in firmly maintaining its control over the American masses, one could then conclude that there would exist a relationship of forces which would permit American imperialism to envisage its victory in a world war as very probable.

VIII. However, these preparations of imperialism will inevitably run up against the resistance of the masses of Western Europe, the Asiatic countries and of the United States itself to a new deterioration of their standard of living, and to the destruction of their rights which the bourgeoisie will require to effect its armaments and war program.

IX. The orientation of capitalism toward a war and armaments economy could avert, for a certain period, a deepening of the crisis of overproduction which has already become a general threat, maintain economic activity at 1950 levels and even surpass them in some instances.

But at the same time, it will set into motion a new inflationary pressure and the debasement of the standard of living of the masses, an important part of their purchasing power being necessary to finance the armaments program of the bourgeoisie.

However, the margins of the unstable equilibrium, so painfully attained by the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries, are so narrow as to threaten their rapid disappearance in the new conjuncture.

American imperialism itself this time runs the risk of reaching the limits of its capacity to combine, as it has done up to now, a "Welfare State" policy at home with preparations for war and the support of other capitalist countries.

X. In reality, if the bourgeoisie persists in pursuing its colossal armaments program, which is necessary to temporarily avert the economic crisis, and if it confidently continues to envisage a general war, it will be forced to abandon all pretense of combining a policy of "social justice" with intense preparation for war and will be obliged to lower the standard of living of the masses everywhere, including in the United States.

It will only be able to succeed in this task by smashing the inevitable resistance of the masses in the course of a series of far-reaching struggles which will definitively decide what possibilities the bourgeoisie have of conducting the war.

Despite the Stalinist and reformist leaderships of the workers' movement in the countries of Western Europe, and despite the treacherous role of the trade union bureaucracy in the U.S., no section of the bourgeoisie is yet able to envisage its success in the years immediately ahead in inflicting a series of decisive defeats upon the proletariat and in establishing "authoritarian," dictatorial or fascist regimes which would be capable of conducting the war.

That holds especially true for Western Germany, Italy, France and England. The reactions of the American masses would of course have a special importance and could produce deepgoing changes in the world situation, in the pace and preparations for war.

XI. For the movement of the Fourth International to fulfill its historic task, in the future as in the past, to successfully penetrate the mass movement and adopt a correct attitude on the perspectives of war, it must reaffirm and make more precise its programmatic positions on a series of questions, among others that of the USSR and of Stalinism.

The positions taken by anti-Stalinist tendencies in the workers' movement other than the Trotskyists, and the evolution of the policy of the Yugoslav government and the PCY on the Korean war, have once again demonstrated that, in the face of the evolution of the international situation and the perspectives of war, it is impossible to adopt a correct class attitude without a correct evaluation of the USSR and of Stalinism, of their character and of the perspectives of their development.

XII. Despite the extreme degeneration of the Soviet bureaucracy, the USSR has not become a capitalist country, and the structure of its

statified and planned economy has been maintained. This economic structure, made possible by the October Revolution and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, is not subject to the laws of finance capital as defined by the Leninist theory of imperialism. It is fundamentally, qualitatively different from capitalism, even the most developed capitalism; tendencies toward statification and economic planning exist in the capitalist system but they are never completely realized and they remain subordinated to the interests and antagonisms of private monopoly groups. On the other hand, these tendencies are constantly undermined by a multitude of small and medium entrepreneurs who daily reproduce private capitalism and prevent all real planning.

The statification of all the means of production and the planned economy which distinguishes the USSR and, to a lesser degree, the process begun in the "People's Democracies," are not the result of an organic evolution of the former capitalist regime into State capitalism but the specific product of a class struggle, however deformed in the case of the "People's Democracies" by the bureaucratic-military intervention of Stalinism, which has culminated in the overthrow of the possessing classes and of imperialism.

The changes in the social and economic structure of these countries come from abrupt changes in the relations of class forces following a struggle, and not as the climax of a general evolution of capitalism toward State capitalism.

Despite the extremely parasitic character of the Soviet bureaucracy, which has become a major brake on economic development, it cannot be said that the productive forces in the USSR are stagnating or have ceased to progress.

This is a supplementary proof of the possibilities of the statified and planned economy which the bureaucracy has not yet been able to destroy completely.

XIII. The Soviet bureaucracy has not become a capitalist class nor is it a new type of class. In its major section, it remains attached to the present economic structure of the USSR, of whose advantages it is aware and from which it derives its privileges. It is subject to pressures, struggles and differentiations in its ranks, produced by the social heterogeneity of its strata, the pressure of the Soviet masses and the pressures of the international proletariat and of imperialism. It continues to embody and to express in its policy the dual and contradictory elements in their dialectic unity of its present position as a privileged caste raised to power in a state that is a workers' state in its origin and anti-capitalist in its structure. It cannot surrender to imperialism without losing what it has in the USSR. On the one hand, it cannot rest on the proletariat and on the extension of the world revolution which would stimulate the struggle of the Soviet masses to overthrow it. This extension would on the other hand, by the organization and rapid development of the world productive forces, remove the objective reasons for the existence and especially for the omnipotence of any bureaucracy. The Kremlin pursues a policy of balancing itself between imperialism and the proletariat, utilizing one against the other in order above all to preserve its positions in the USSR.

XIV. The grip of the Soviet bureaucracy on the leaderships of the Communist Parties was accomplished through the degeneration of the Third International in which the rank and file remained profoundly attached to the October Revolution and the USSR.

Manipulating these leaderships as it wills, the Soviet bureaucracy utilizes the Communist Parties as instruments of its international policy. The leaderships of these parties lend themselves to this game because they are themselves composed of bureaucratized elements deriving their influence over the masses and their privileges above all from the fact that they appear to the masses as mandates designated by the October Revolution and the USSR, "the socialist fatherland."

However, wherever the Communist Parties remain mass organizations, still embracing, especially after the last war, the most revolutionary section of the working class and the poor peasants in numerous countries of Europe and of Asia, they cannot allow themselves to be reduced to being, in all conditions, mere agencies for the transmission and execution of the orders of the Soviet bureaucracy.

It will not be possible to adopt a correct policy toward them nor will it be possible to explain the case of the YCP and other analogous cases which have presented themselves and will inevitably present themselves in the future, particularly in the perspective of a war against the USSR, if the dialectic of the Communist Parties and their relations with the movement of the masses is not thoroughly understood.

XV. Neither in the leaderships bound to the Soviet bureaucracy, nor in their base, nor in their relations with the working class and the masses of the poor in general are the Communist Parties exactly reformist parties. They embody contradictory elements which have been clearly revealed since the German-Soviet Pact of 1939.

Between imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy they invariably line up -- without notable desertions -- on the side of the Soviet bureaucracy, even in the sharpest zigzags.

On the other hand, to the degree that they are tied to a real revolutionary movement of the masses, they are subject to its pressure and may, under certain favorable conditions, go beyond the aims set for them by the Soviet bureaucracy and outline a revolutionary orientation. This specifically means that parties placed in such favorable conditions may possibly see themselves obliged to undertake a struggle for power against the possessing classes and imperialism.

It would be anti-Marxist not to recognize this possibility, proved by the experience of the YCP and in part by that of the CP of China, and to affirm that the weight of the bureaucratic apparatus will prove more decisive under all conditions than the pressure of the movement of the masses.

In the long run objective conditions determine the character and dynamics of the movement of the masses which, raised to a certain level, can overcome all the subjective obstacles on the road to the

revolution. This conception continues to be the basis of our revolutionary optimism and clarifies our attitude toward the Communist Parties.

In the event of powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses, like those which occurred during the war in Yugoslavia, in China, and recently in Korea, and like those which will inevitably occur in the perspective described above, it is not excluded that certain Communist Parties with the bulk of their forces can be pushed out of the strict orbit of the Soviet bureaucracy and can outline a revolutionary orientation.

From that moment on, they would cease to be strictly Stalinist Parties, mere instruments of the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy, and will lend themselves to a differentiation and to a politically autonomous course.

In the event of new revolutionary uprisings led by the Communist Parties, the Fourth International cannot permit itself a repetition of the errors of evaluation committed in the past regarding Yugoslavia or China. On the contrary, conscious of the gigantic struggle which will unfold under conditions of a general war -- so long as the relationship of forces in Europe and in Asia is not seriously altered in favor of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism -- and of the struggle already going on in several countries, it should give increased attention to the evolution of the Communist Parties of these countries and find the means of penetrating the mass movement and of influencing the ranks of these parties.

XVI. If one correctly understands the character of the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs, their interrelationships and their relations with the mass movement, one cannot conclude that Stalinism, i.e., the Soviet bureaucracy, has any historic future whatever. Those who speak of the possibility of a world expansion of Stalinism and of a possible era of the rule of "bureaucratic capitalism" or of Stalinist "bureaucratic collectivism" start from fundamentally erroneous theoretical considerations regarding the USSR and Stalinism. They deduce Soviet "expansionism" and its so-called tendency toward world domination either from a "capitalist, monopolist" structure of the USSR which, as in other countries dominated by big finance capital, impels it to an imperialist policy, or from the "totalitarian" character of this policy. On the other hand, they consider that the socio-economic premises for a bureaucracy like the one in the USSR already exist in the movement of the Communist Parties allowing for the establishment everywhere, if these parties are victorious, of a political power similar to the one in the USSR.

In reality the Soviet bureaucracy does not at all pursue a systematic policy of "expansion," and every enlargement of "Stalinist" power in the world introduces, on the contrary, along with a transitory strengthening of Stalinist prestige, the elements of the disintegration of this power.

XVII. The extension of the influence of the Soviet bureaucracy into the East European "buffer zone" is not a proof of the systematic policy of "expansion" to which the Soviet bureaucracy, just like imperialism, found itself driven. The Soviet bureaucracy took hold

of these countries only as a result of particularly favorable conditions created by the war; thanks to the agreement it was able to conclude with "democratic" imperialism and thanks to the extreme decomposition of the capitalist regime in these countries which did not require any large-scale revolutionary struggles for their overthrow.

Even under these extremely favorable conditions, the bureaucracy proceeded prudently in these countries, still showed itself ready at the outset to make concessions to imperialism, and consolidated its absolute control over the masses by stages before deciding to hasten the integration of these countries into its economic and political orbit.

In all other capitalist countries, which it considered in the imperialist sphere of influence, and even in countries like Yugoslavia, Greece and China where the movement of the masses had already progressively destroyed the direct power of the bourgeoisie, the Soviet bureaucracy sabotaged the revolutionary development and the seizure of power.

Afterwards, the integration now being effected by the bureaucracy in the "buffer states" required in several cases, especially where the CP represented a real force connected to a real mass movement (as in Bulgaria, in Czechoslovakia and in part in Poland), the destruction of the native apparatuses of the CP and their replacement by GPUist functionaries, directly managed from the Kremlin.

XVIII. By its very nature, the Soviet bureaucracy is fundamentally opposed to the development of the revolutionary forces in the world, and it is excluded, even in the case of a general war against the USSR, that the bureaucracy can impel the CPs to take power in areas of the world that it will not be able to control, among others, for example, the USA, which, however, is the citadel of imperialism.

It is only from such a profound understanding of the nature of the Soviet bureaucracy that one can get rid of the spectre of "Stalinist domination," expose the world counter-revolutionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy, grasp and exploit the concrete contradictory relationships which exist between the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs and the movement of the masses, and fundamentally support every revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement which still further restricts the base of imperialism in the world even if, in the first stages, this movement is led by a leadership of Stalinist persuasion.

It is on this basis and through this tactic that the revolutionary proletariat will overcome Stalinism.

XIX. Against the attempts of imperialism to re-establish an equilibrium and to temporarily resolve its crisis by re-introducing the markets of the USSR, the "Peoples' Democracies" of Europe, Yugoslavia, China, the Asiatic areas in revolt into its orbit, the Fourth International will counterpose the defense of all these countries and of the colonial revolutions. (This conception of defense does not apply to Eastern Germany and the Soviet occupation zone in Austria.) The task of overthrowing the Soviet bureaucracy and of

breaking its grip on the workers' movement cannot in any way be confided to imperialism.

On the other hand, the defense of these countries and the colonial revolutions in Asia, which are now out of direct control by imperialism, not only signifies working to maintain and aggravate the disequilibrium and the crisis of imperialism and, therefore, to strengthen the objective revolutionary potentialities. It signifies at the same time in the long run to undermine the power of the bureaucracy from within the revolutionary camp, for only the broadening and the strengthening of the world revolutionary crisis will weaken the power of the bureaucracy and will open perspectives for its elimination in a progressive manner.

XX. The choice for the proletarian masses is not limited to the mutilated and disfigured bourgeois "democracy" which still exists in several metropolitan countries, and the yoke of the Soviet bureaucracy.

In order to survive, imperialism is obliged to constantly lower the standard of living of its own masses in the metropolitan countries and to steadily destroy their rights; it condemns the proletariat and the colonial masses of the countries it controls to a starvation regime and to open police dictatorship, like that of Franco, Tsaldaris, Chiang Kai-shek, Bao-Dai, Syngman Rhee.

Under such regimes, Stalinist propaganda will find a response, and in the absence of another force and a genuinely proletarian solution, the masses of these countries will continue to be influenced by the CPs.

XXI. To be effective and to really contribute to historic evolution, the policy of the revolutionary proletariat should begin not from what ought to be but from what is; it must know how to pass from one situation to a higher stage while preserving all the gains of past revolutionary struggles. It should be able to exploit the contradictory and transitory elements of a complex, devious development which has been made even more difficult by the degeneration of the USSR and by Stalinism.

The defense of the USSR, of the "Peoples' Democracies" of Europe, of Yugoslavia and of China does not mean the defense of the Soviet bureaucracy or of the policy of the Stalinist leaderships of the CPs. It no longer means the defense of "Workers' States" (except for Yugoslavia) in the sense of the norms defined by Marx and Lenin. The defense of the USSR constitutes the strategic line of the Fourth International. As in the past, its tactical applications remain subordinate to the free development of the movement of the masses against all attempts by the Soviet bureaucracy, the Russian army and the Stalinist leaders to strangle and to smash it.

Nowhere in the Soviet orbit does the proletariat govern directly and nowhere has the overthrow of the capitalist regime and of imperialism opened the road to a free development toward socialism and communism. The political expropriation of the proletariat by the bureaucracy constitutes a major brake on such a development and keeps the proletariat in conditions of growing inequality and heightened

bureaucratic and police oppression, more onerous than under certain "democratic" forms of the bourgeois regime.

However, in order to overcome this situation in which the overthrow of capitalism and of imperialism was followed by the political expropriation of the proletariat, it is necessary to combine the struggle against the bureaucracy with the preservation of these achievements: the overthrow of the capitalist regime, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, of feudalism, of imperialism, the statification and planning of the economy.

Only the revolutionary proletariat is capable of carrying on such a combined struggle imposed by the dialectic of evolution, while the victory of imperialism over the USSR, the "Peoples' Democracies," Yugoslavia, China and the colonial revolutions would signify a defeat of the world revolution, an historic step backward for the whole revolutionary process of our epoch.

XXII. The Fourth International does not and will not cease to combat and unmask the myths of the Soviet bureaucracy and of Stalinism in general concerning the "victory of socialism in the USSR" and "socialism on the road to realization" in the "Peoples' Democracies," and thus to work for the overthrow of these bureaucracies by the revolutionary proletariat.

These myths monstrously distort the reality of the conditions of the proletariat in these countries.

The Fourth International struggles so that the proletariat can lead the fight for power, and direct the revolution so that the conquest of power can take place effectively in the name of the entire class, by its direct class organs: party, trade unions and soviets, against all bureaucracy.

It declares that free socialist development is possible only on this basis.

On the other hand, the proletariat will succeed in this task and will completely avoid the bureaucratic deformation of its institutions and especially of its power, only to the degree that the revolutionary camp is broadened in the world and the revolution conquers more and more of the important domains of world economy.

"Socialism in one country" is not only a petty bourgeois utopia; it also implies an eventual bureaucratic and inevitable opportunist degeneration of the proletarian power.

XXIII. In the great struggles which will inevitably be induced by the concrete preparations of imperialism for war, resulting in new sacrifices for the masses and serious blows to their liberties, the task of our movement is to penetrate much deeper into the mass movement. It must do this in order to facilitate a revolutionary outcome and to occupy the best possible positions with a view to the role it will have to play especially in the gigantic revolutionary crisis which will arise in the event of a general war -- so long as the relationship of forces in Europe and in Asia is not profoundly changed in favor of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism.

In a series of countries where Stalinism and reformism do not constitute major obstacles, our movement will strive in the next years to become the principal revolutionary leadership.

In countries where the reformist parties by far outdistance all other working class formations and are the polar force for the great majority of the proletariat (England, Belgium, Australia) our movement should attempt to integrate itself in these organizations, to organize within them and to develop within them a conscious left wing.

In countries where the majority of the working class still follows the CP, our organizations, necessarily independent, should orient toward more systematic work among the ranks of these parties and the masses they influence.

In the countries of the "Peoples' Democracies," our elements who are not known should try to take cover in the CPs and to remain there, as well as in every proletarian mass organization, in order to take advantage of the revolutionary possibilities which will develop above all in the event of war.

In China, our forces, wherever possible, should try to enter into the CP and to elaborate a concrete program which can favor a proletarian and anti-bureaucratic orientation of this party, or at least the formation of a broad tendency along this line within the party and among the masses it influences.

In all other Asiatic countries in revolt where the CP heads the mass movement, our movement should also be oriented toward work in the CPs and the organizations which they influence, so as not to cut ourselves off from the movement of the masses and to be able better to exploit the events of the war.

Intermediary forms, imposed by the peculiarities of the workers' movement in each country, will naturally be necessary here and there. However, the general line remains that of penetrating with our forces wherever the general movement of the class exists at the time.

XXIV. The inevitable aspect of civil war which a war unleashed against the USSR will acquire, at least in Europe and Asia under the conditions described above, emphasizes the special interest work among the CPs should have for us, as well as the need of a clear and unequivocal position on the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs, the defense of the USSR, of the "Peoples' Democracies," of China and of the colonial revolutions against imperialism.

Only our movement, thanks to its positions and to its entire preparation, is able to envisage the realization of its junction with the revolutionary forces which will arise in the CPs and with the masses they influence in this crisis, to press them into a resolute struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and, at the same time against the Soviet bureaucracy.

For the same reasons, only our movement will be able from now on to exploit the crisis of Stalinism in a manner favorable for the building of a new revolutionary leadership.

XXV. Between the Second and the Third World Congress, the aim set by the Second Congress of penetrating the real movement of the masses has in large part been realized.

Because of this, the whole physiognomy of our movement has been transformed: the maturing of the leaderships, the proletarianization of the organizations, a real knowledge of and effective exploitation of the peculiarities of the workers' movement in each country.

The new course of Trotskyism is a reality and the best pledge of its future as the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat and as the conscious expression of the communist movement of our epoch.

The problem now is to consolidate and to amplify this process with the aim of successfully participating in the decisive battles to come and of aiding to the best of our ability with maximum effect the objective revolutionary process in a crumbling world.

December, 1950.

RESOLUTION ON THE YUGOSLAV REVOLUTION AND
THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

1. The victorious proletarian revolution in Yugoslavia is fundamentally the product of two historic factors: the revolutionary upsurge of the toiling masses expressing itself in the movement of the armed partisans, and the specific policy followed by the YCP in the important turns of the objective revolutionary process.

The movement of the masses of workers and poor peasants against the imperialist occupants, in conditions of extreme sharpening of social contradictions, swelled the cadres fighting for national emancipation, broadened it into a struggle against the Yugoslav exploiters, took the first steps toward their expropriation and, in the very course of this struggle, destroyed the old state apparatus on the largest part of Yugoslav territory. The specific policy of the YCP, distinguishing itself from that of all the other Communist Parties of Europe, primarily under the pressure of the masses, successively accepted, then took over the leadership in the destruction of the old bourgeois state apparatus, legalized, then generalized the construction of a new proletarian state apparatus, consolidated, then broadened the conquests of the proletarian revolution, by refusing to capitulate before the Soviet bureaucracy and by engaging in a resolute struggle against the bureaucratic deformations of the Yugoslav workers' state.

2. (a) The first decisive stage of the Yugoslav revolution was crossed on November 29, 1943 at the meeting of the second session of the AVNOJ (Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation) at Jayce. On this occasion a provisional government was constituted which exercised its authority over all the territories occupied by the partisans which soon embraced the major part of Yugoslavia. The constitution of this government, basing itself on peoples' committees of national liberation, which came into existence in 1941, signified that the dual power, which had existed in Yugoslavia from the beginning of the partisan insurrection, was being overcome. From this time on, there can be no further question of the existence of a centralized bourgeois state apparatus in Yugoslavia; there remained only the ruins of bourgeois power, just as the successive measures of expropriation and confiscation left only the ruins of bourgeois property. The new centralized state apparatus, based on the peoples' committees, which the AVNOJ began to construct, was a preponderantly proletarian state apparatus. The YCP having in fact conquered power in the liberated territories, this part of Yugoslavia ceased to be a bourgeois state; under a workers' and peasants' government it advanced toward the final accomplishment of the proletarian revolution.

(b) The second decisive stage of the Yugoslav revolution was crossed in October 1945 with the withdrawal of the two last bourgeois ministers from the central provisional government. The very constitution of this government in 1944 was only an episode in the unfolding of the Yugoslav revolution and was instituted by the joint pressure of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy. While retarding the complete victory of the proletarian revolution, this episode, however, did not interrupt its course. During the very period of the coalition government, the new state apparatus based on the peoples' committees was

extended over the whole of Yugoslav territory. During this period all the remnants of bourgeois political power were eliminated. The withdrawal of the two bourgeois ministers from the central government was only the final expression of the fact that the bourgeoisie as a class had lost power and that the new state apparatus was of a socially different character than that of prewar Yugoslavia. Beginning with this time, the transition between the workers' and peasants' government and the dictatorship of the proletariat was consummated and Yugoslavia became a workers' state. That was manifested by the fact that the conquests of the Yugoslav proletarian revolution were generalized and legally consolidated in 1945-46 by the law on the peoples' committees, the law of nationalization of the means of industrial production, the mines and the banks and by the law on the confiscation of property, the law on agrarian reform and the annulment of peasant debts, etc.

(c) The third decisive stage of the Yugoslav revolution was crossed on June 28, 1948 by the split which occurred between the Kremlin and the YCP. After the consolidation of the conquests of the Yugoslav revolution, the YCP proceeded to their extension by the nationalization of wholesale trade and of a considerable part of retail trade; the establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade; the beginning of the collectivization of agriculture and the five-year plan of industrialization and electrification of the country. At the same time bureaucratic deformations of the proletarian power developed in Yugoslavia both as a result of the backward character of the country and of the Stalinist policy of the leadership of the YCP, imitating the institutions of the bureaucratized USSR. The split between the Kremlin and the YCP, the expression of the refusal of the YCP to subordinate the interests of the Yugoslav revolution to those of the Soviet bureaucracy, opened the road to the struggle against these bureaucratic deformations. The principal measures taken within the framework of this struggle were: the constitution of workers' councils and the beginning of workers' management of the enterprises; the democratization of the cooperatives; the abolition of the privileges of the functionaries of the party and the state; the decentralization of the directing apparatus of the economy; the beginning of the democratization of cultural and ideological life, etc.

3. The dynamics of the Yugoslav revolution confirms the theory of the permanent revolution on all points:

(a) It confirms the point that the struggle of the toiling masses for national liberation against imperialism can only be victorious if it is transmuted into a proletarian revolution. This transmutation in Yugoslavia was not due to particular or conjunctural factors but constituted the application of the general strategy formulated by the Fourth International for all countries occupied by imperialism in Europe during the Second World War. If this strategy was successfully applied only in Yugoslavia, that is due to the specific character of the YCP which headed the movement of the masses.

(b) It confirms the point that a backward country can resolve the historic tasks of the bourgeois revolution (solution of the agrarian question, elimination of semi-feudal survivals in the state power, conquest of genuine national independence, etc.) only by the conquest of power by the proletariat which, in such conditions, finds itself

compelled to grapple simultaneously with the solution of the historic tasks of the proletarian revolution.

(c) It confirms the point that the development and broadening of proletarian democracy after the consolidation of proletarian power is both possible and necessary to effectively combat the anti-socialist and bureaucratic tendencies which exist and develop in the workers' state. In this fact, it represents a confirmation and a positive historical justification of the entire struggle of Leon Trotsky and the Left Opposition in the USSR between 1923 and 1927, just as the degeneration of the USSR constituted a justification along negative lines.

(d) It confirms the point that a victorious proletarian revolution in a backward country, in the midst of a hostile world, necessarily develops through growing difficulties and contradictions which are reflected in economic crises and successive social tensions within the workers' state. Only an international extension of the revolution and the aid given to the Yugoslav revolution by the victorious proletariat of several advanced countries can assure a real and harmonious solution of the problems posed by industrialization and the voluntary collectivization of agriculture.

At the same time the dynamics of the Yugoslav revolution confirms the analysis made by the Fourth International of the questions of the USSR and of Stalinism. It confirms the character of the Stalinist parties as degenerated workers' parties, an indispensable explanation in understanding the new course taken by the Yugoslav revolution since the break between the YCP and the Kremlin. It especially confirms the fundamental thesis of the Trotskyist movement which holds that Stalinism is a phenomenon characteristic of a period of ebb in the revolutionary struggles of the masses, and that it can be overcome only by a new rise of revolutionary struggles. In Yugoslavia, the first country where the proletariat took power since the degeneration of the USSR, Stalinism no longer exists today as an effective factor in the workers' movement, which however does not exclude its possible reemergence under certain conditions.

4. The perspectives of the Yugoslav revolution are fundamentally determined by the relationship of forces between the classes on the national and international arena.

In Yugoslavia, the workers' state is confronted with growing pressure from the peasant proprietors who seek to pass from simple commodity production to capitalist accumulation by the private appropriation of the means of production. This tendency develops automatically and necessarily on the basis of the present economic and technical development of the country and coincides with the tendency of the "kulaks" to effect their fusion with the international capitalist market.

At present this is being held in check:

(a) By the slow modification of the relationship of social forces resulting from the industrialization of the country, from the numerical increase of the proletariat, of its cohesion, its political consciousness and its growing cultural progress, thanks to the beginning of the development of proletarian democracy, etc.

(b) By the differentiation within the peasantry itself, resulting from the support given by the workers' state to the poor peasants and to the development of agricultural cooperatives.

(c) By measures of coercion taken by the workers' state hindering the development of this automatic economic process: prohibition of the sale and purchase of land over 30 hectares; dual price sector; progressive quotas of forced deliveries of farm products (tax in kind) etc.

Nevertheless, so long as the industrial production of objects of consumption does not assure to the peasants a real growing return parallel to the growth of agricultural production, and as long as the mechanization of agriculture is not able to create a healthy economic base for the collectivization of agriculture, industrialization will be carried on amidst the hostility and resistance of a section of the peasantry. Only the conscious participation of the proletariat in the exercise of power can under these conditions protect the conquests of the revolution in the immediate period. Only the considerable extension of the present measures of democratization and struggle against bureaucratism can assure for the workers' state the conscious support of the proletarian masses.

5. On the international plane, a growing pressure is being brought to bear upon the Yugoslav revolution by its two mortal enemies—world imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy:

(a) World imperialism seeks to destroy the conquests of the Yugoslav revolution, the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the collectivized property in the means of production in industry and in the mines. It reckons on succeeding by stages in this game: first by the utilization of political and economic pressure, then by an open or masked armed intervention. Its objectives at the present stage are: the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the imperialist diplomatic front and in its Mediterranean military alignments. With that beginning, it seeks to obtain at a later stage a right to supervise Yugoslav economy, the right of investment in the mines and industry, the legalization of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties, the virtual destruction of the monopoly of foreign trade, etc.

(b) The Soviet bureaucracy seeks by all means to bring about the destruction of a regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat independent of the Kremlin, a mortal threat for the influence of Stalinism over the international workers' movement, and in the long run also for the power of the bureaucracy in Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself. The destruction by imperialism of the conquests of the Yugoslav proletarian revolution represents a lesser evil to the Kremlin than the independent development of proletarian Yugoslavia. Up to now, the entire policy of the Kremlin toward Yugoslavia (economic blockade, provocative military demonstrations, propaganda campaigns, etc.) have as their aim to force this country into the imperialist camp. This policy, however, is only a preparation for another stage of the counter-revolutionary strategy of Stalinism toward Yugoslavia which would consist in an attempt to include Yugoslavia into the sphere of influence of the Soviet bureaucracy by means of military intervention.

In the long run, this hostile, twofold pressure brought to bear on the Yugoslav revolution can only be successfully counteracted by the conscious support of the world proletariat and the international victory of the socialist revolution. For the present, the situation of unstable equilibrium between imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy accords a certain respite to the Yugoslav revolution. But this respite occurs, especially since the outbreak of the war in Korea, within the framework of an increased parallel pressure brought to bear upon Yugoslavia, a pressure which is not neutralized by a sufficiently extensive international proletarian action for the aid of Yugoslavia. In these conditions the Yugoslav state has found itself constrained to make a series of concessions to its enemies on the international plane. It has led to an opportunist deviation in its foreign policy and especially that of the YCP (idealization of the UN, neutralism, petty-bourgeois concept of aggression, pacifist conception of class collaboration in the struggle against war, etc.).

Without a radical alteration of the relationship of forces between the classes on international arena, this tendency threatens to deepen and to hurtle the Yugoslav revolution to its doom. The contradiction between the progressive evolution of the Yugoslav state itself and the rightward evolution of its foreign policy which, at the present stage, is the expression of the crisis of isolation of the Yugoslav revolution will find a solution at a later stage in one of two ways: either the Yugoslav socialist revolution will fuse with the revolutionary movement and with the international revolution, or international concessions to imperialism will be followed by concessions within Yugoslavia itself.

6. It is impossible to determine the dynamics and the perspectives of the Yugoslav revolution without at the same time defining the character of the YCP. If Stalinism can be defined as the subordination of the interests of the workers of every country to those of the Soviet bureaucracy, the YCP, beginning with 1941, outlined an orientation which was to lead to the break of 1948 and, because of this fact, it ceased to be a Stalinist party in the full meaning of the word. The difference in orientation between the YCP and that followed by the other CPs of Europe was effected in the first place under the pressure of the masses. But that does not suffice to explain the evolution of Yugoslavia. In other countries, where the revolutionary upsurge, at least at the beginning, was as powerful as in Yugoslavia (Spain 1936, Greece 1944) the CP took a diametrically opposite course to that of the YCP. The difference in orientation between the YCP and those of the other CPs of Europe, could result only from an interaction between the revolutionary pressure of the masses and the changes of strategic conceptions which they produced in the leadership of the YCP under favorable conditions, to which should be added the absence of a Kremlin control apparatus operating on the scene.

In the first stage, these changes expressed themselves by an attempt of the leadership of the YCP to conciliate the interests of the Yugoslav revolution with those of the Soviet bureaucracy (1941-beginning of 1948). For this reason, while remaining within the international framework of Stalinist policy and while publicly and unreservedly accepting the internal and external policy of the Soviet

bureaucracy, the YCP nevertheless differentiated itself at the time from Stalinist policy on the following points:

- (a) The foundation, 1941, of "peoples' committees of national liberation" and of "proletarian brigades" in the partisan movement.
- (b) The refusal to collaborate, in 1942, with Mihailovich's Chetniks and with the bourgeois government-in-exile.
- (c) The orientation, in 1943, towards the effective seizure of power by the YCP and the constitution of an apparatus of a new state, of a proletarian type.
- (d) Elimination, in 1945, despite the agreements of "the Big Three," of the last vestiges of bourgeois power in the country and the completion of the proletarian revolution.
- (e) The pursuit of a foreign policy and an economic orientation more independent from the Kremlin than that of the other countries of the buffer zone.

The accumulation of all these actions, accompanied by an initial private criticism of the whole of Stalinist policy (notably: criticism of the more exorbitant privileges of the top functionaries of the USSR; criticism of the relations of economic plunder imposed on the buffer zone countries by the bureaucracy, criticism of the policy of the French, Italian and Greek CPs at the time of the "liberation," etc.), led the Kremlin to the preventive split with the YCP. This split was inevitable because of the irreconcilability of interests between the Yugoslav revolution and the Soviet bureaucracy.

Beginning with this split there opened a second stage of differentiation between the YCP and Stalinism. Progressing in a purely empirical fashion, the YCP has successively emphasized:

- (a) The subordination of the international communist movement to the interests of the Kremlin and the defeats to the workers' movements of several countries caused by this subordination.
- (b) The total political, economic, military, cultural grip of the Soviet bureaucracy on the countries of the buffer zone and the horrible consequences which flow from this for the toiling masses of these countries.
- (c) The fundamental orientation of the Soviet bureaucracy toward a division of the world through the establishment of a modus vivendi with imperialism and the utilization of the workers' movement as barter for this purpose.
- (d) The degeneration of the USSR as a result of the isolation of the first workers' state and of its backward character and the formation of a privileged bureaucratic caste which has usurped all power in the USSR.
- (e) The danger of bureaucratism in every proletarian revolution, a danger which can be combatted only by increasing proletarian democracy.

(f) The necessity of reconstructing the workers' movement in several countries.

Beginning with this time, the YCP ceased to be a semi-Stalinist party and evolved as a left-centrist party, carried to power by the revolutionary masses and further characterized by right-opportunist deviations. Its most important deviations are:

(a) The empirical character of its ideological development which has still not grasped the full Leninist conception of the nature of our epoch.

(b) The pragmatic and unprincipled character of the foreign policy of the YCP, tending to justify the diplomatic maneuvers of the Yugoslav state.

(c) The under-estimation of the international workers' movement and the lack of understanding of the theory of the permanent revolution as a whole.

(d) The absence of the right to form tendencies within the YCP.

(e) An opportunist conception of the construction of revolutionary parties in the world (generalization of the Yugoslav experience, under-estimation of the importance of program, etc.).

Only a modification of the international relationship of forces between the classes, a rise of the world revolutionary movement, assistance and fraternal criticism from this movement and a growing understanding on the part of the leaders and cadres of the YCP, will enable it to avoid crystallizing on false positions which would lead to the liquidation of the progressive effects of the Yugoslav affair.

Already, the positions taken as a result of the war in Korea have in part vitiated the effects of the Yugoslav affair on the international crisis of Stalinism; in these conditions and in the absence of a sufficiently strong revolutionary international leadership, it is not excluded that Stalinism can regain a foothold in the ranks of the YCP.

In this connection, the positions and the attitude the YCP takes toward Trotskyism -- whether openly or by attempting to ignore it -- acquires considerable political importance. What is involved is not merely a historic rectification of the past; it is the test of whether a workers' current which has emerged from Stalinism has succeeded in linking itself with the tradition and program of Bolshevism, and thereby in definitively and decisively surmounting Stalinism.

7. The tasks of the Fourth International toward the Yugoslav revolution are established within the framework of its general strategy, conforming to this analysis of the character of the Yugoslav State and the YCP:

(a) The Fourth International unconditionally defends the conquests of the Yugoslav revolution against world imperialism and against the Soviet bureaucracy. It conceives of this defense both as a strategic task -- the junction of the international revolution with

the Yugoslav revolution -- and as an immediate tactical task: mobilization of the international revolutionary vanguard and of the proletarian masses of all countries for concrete actions in defense of the conquests of the Yugoslav proletarian revolution.

This defense cannot enter into collision with the interests of the world revolution of which the conquests of October form part. The Fourth International will likewise assure the defense against any attempt by internal forces to utilize Yugoslavia against the interests of the world revolution.

(b) In the event of war by the Soviet bureaucracy against Yugoslavia, the Fourth International will be for the defense of Yugoslavia against the counter-revolutionary action of the Kremlin. This policy, based on the interests of the world revolution, will be independent of all material aid Yugoslavia may eventually receive from capitalist countries. In event of an extension of this conflict this position will be reexamined in each specific case.

(c) The Fourth International follows a policy of critical support of the YCP and of the Yugoslav government. It attempts to participate with the YCP in united front actions for precise objectives, both for a campaign of aid to Yugoslavia and for the regroupment of the revolutionary forces on an international scale. Each of these actions presupposes our principled agreement regarding the objective to be attained, and cannot in any case eliminate the right of the international revolutionary movement to criticize the policy of the Yugoslav government and the YCP.

(d) The Fourth International believes that one of its principal contributions to the consolidation of the Yugoslav revolution consists in a frank but fraternal criticism of all the political errors and opportunist deviations on the part of the Yugoslav communists. These criticisms should take as their point of departure the concrete experiences of the international workers' movement which must be made clear to the YCP, and also the special experience of the Yugoslav revolution; they should tend to aid the YCP and its leadership to alter those aspects of its policy which do not conform to the interests of the international proletariat.

8. It is the duty of the Fourth International to critically re-examine, in the light of the events which have occurred since 1948, its past analysis of the Yugoslav revolution and the dynamics of this revolution which events have placed in a new light.

From 1942 on, the Fourth International had in general correctly estimated the movement of the Yugoslav partisans and the civil war which unfolded as a consequence. This analysis was correctly maintained up to the beginning of 1946. From that time and up to June 28, 1948, the International committed serious errors of evaluation regarding the Yugoslav revolution; they consisted notably in an identification of the Yugoslav developments with those of the other buffer zone countries; in confounding the YCP with the Stalinist parties in the buffer states; in the erroneous hypothesis that the revolutionary movement of the masses had been arrested by the YCP and that the new centralized state apparatus constructed by the YCP was a bourgeois state apparatus in its structure, despite the elimination of the

bourgeoisie from the political and economic life of the country which had been noted by the International.

After the break of the Kremlin with the YCP, the Fourth International was the only tendency of the international workers' movement to immediately understand the progressive significance and the historic import of this event and to undertake an international campaign for the defense of Yugoslavia; it tied to the analysis it made of the causes of the break, the analysis it had made before 1946 of the depth of the revolutionary mass movement in Yugoslavia. The campaign for the defense of Yugoslavia was, however, partly hindered by the delay of the International in recognizing the character of Yugoslavia as a workers' state. This delay was due fundamentally to a false appraisal of the nature of the centralized state apparatus set up in Yugoslavia in 1945.

These various errors of evaluation were caused by:

(a) The absence of precise information on Yugoslav events and institutions beginning with the years 1945-46.

(b) The absence of all public differentiation by the YCP in relation to the Soviet bureaucracy and to Stalinism before June 28, 1948.

(c) The fact that the correct general analysis of the primarily counter-revolutionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy in the buffer zone led the International to identify a priori, without separate analysis of each case, the policy of the CPs with those of the bureaucracy (which was not only wrong for Yugoslavia, but also for China).

The lesson to be drawn from these errors of evaluation is the imperious necessity for concrete and precise analyses of the national peculiarities in the development of the workers' movement of every country. However important in our epoch are the laws of development for sectors of the world or for the entire world, these laws can never be substituted for the particular analysis of each country in the determination of a correct day-to-day revolutionary policy.

The rapidity and the unanimity with which the Fourth International was able, on the morrow of June 28, 1948, to make a turn for the defense of Yugoslavia, as well as the concrete manner in which it has followed and appraised the evolution of the YCP since then, proves that these errors of evaluation were not at all due to an erroneous general conception, but rather occurred despite the correct evaluation made by the Fourth International of the nature of Stalinism and its dialectical relationships with the mass movement. It is only in the light of this appraisal that the Yugoslav revolution becomes comprehensible and assumes its full significance as an important stage in the world crisis of Stalinism.

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