

November 27, 1974

To the Leninist Trotskyist Faction Coordinators

Dear Comrades,

Enclosed are the following items:

1. The rejoinder by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction to be attached to the world congress minutes. This statement is in answer to the "IEC Majority Tendency's Reply to the Statement by the Minority Faction," which was included in the September 12, 1974, mailing to the LTF coordinators.

2. A document entitled "How We Failed To Take Advantage of the Elections to Build the IMG and Prepare for the Coming Struggles -- What We Must Do Now," which was submitted to the Nov. 2-3 meeting of the National Committee of the British Section by the steering committee of the Tendency.

Comradely,

Ed Shaw

Rejoinder by the LTF

Concerning the points made in the IEC Majority Tendency's Reply to the Statement by the Minority Faction, we make the following observations.

1. The IMT claims that the membership figures presented by the Argentine PST was not verified by the mandates commission. This is true, but the lack of verification was not limited to the PST. The mandates commission did not verify any membership figures. Under the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International" it was agreed to accept the membership figures and consequent number of voting delegates as presented by each section or sympathizing group.

But the arithmetic of the IMT is faulty, even using their own figures. The IMT claims that if a "verified" figure -- "verified" by the IMT -- of the membership of the PST is used, "the votes supposedly obtained by the IEC minority faction are reduced to the proportion of 40 to 60 which we used in our original statement." The IMT says this "verified" figure for the membership of the PST is "almost one-third lower" than that claimed by the representatives of the PST. Since the PST claimed 3,589 members who voted for the LTF, the "verified" figure would be more than 2,393 and the total number voting for the positions of the LTF would be at least 4,467. The proportion between the IMT and the LTF -- leaving aside the third tendencies, those who did not or could not vote -- would be 54 to 46, not 60 to 40. This, we repeat, is according to the IMT's "verified" figure.

If we accept as correct the figures of a 60 to 40 ratio for those who voted for the positions of the IMT as against those of the LTF, we are led to the conclusion that the figure for those voting for the positions of the LTF must have been 3,518, since 5,277 voted for the IMT. In this case, the PST must have only 1,444 "verified" members, since 2,074 voted for the LTF outside Argentina.

Either way, it appears that the IMT leaders take the view that one IMT supporter is worth two or three Argentine Trotskyists.

In any case, if there are to be belated challenges to the mandates claimed by any sections or sympathizing groups, in violation of the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International, the challenges cannot be limited to the case of the PST. Grossly inflated figures were presented by the Red Faction and the Bolshevik Faction in Argentina, by the POR in Bolivia, and the PSR in Chile. But if -- as was stipulated in the "Agreement on Measures to Help Maintain the Unity of the Fourth International" -- we accept the mandates and membership figures presented by the sections and sympathizing groups, we find the following: of the total membership of the sections and sympathizing groups, 40 percent (5,277) voted for the positions of the IMT, 43 percent (5,663) for those of the LTF, 2 percent (245) for other tendencies, and 15 percent could not or did not vote. The actual mandated votes at the world congress, which were accepted unanimously, would remain unchanged.

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2. The IMT notes that almost all members of the PST voted for the positions of the LTF, and questions the validity of the vote in the PST on this basis. The IMT argument leaves out of account that in every country where a split in the Trotskyist forces has occurred, each side in such splits has voted in its overwhelming majority for one or another of the major groupings in the international. This is not surprising, because the issues in dispute in the international have been reflected in every case in the political issues that have led to splits in these countries. Thus, in the Argentine Red Faction and Bolshevik Faction, in the Canadian RMG, the Mexican GCI, the Peruvian FIR (Combate), the Spanish LCR-ETA(VI), the Australian Communist League -- not a single vote was cast for the LTF while there were unanimous votes for the IMT. We should also note that there was not a single vote for the platform of the LTF in the following sections or sympathizing groups according to the information supplied to the mandates commission: Italian, Swiss, Japanese, Austrian, Luxembourgian, Bolivian, Irish, Dutch, Lebanese, Israeli, Iraqi, and Ceylonese. Most were unanimous for the IMT -- the Swiss, for example, one of the larger sections in Europe. This says a great deal more about the "nature of the organizations, the discussion and the vote" in these groups than in those countries where the forces of Trotskyism are split.

3. The question under this point is avoided by the IMT. The fact is that candidate members in many sections cannot vote, and did not vote on the questions in dispute, yet they were counted as full members for purposes of deciding the number of mandated votes from each section. This grossly inflated the number of mandated IMT delegates to the world congress. Consider the Walloon section, for example, which cast 34 percent of the votes for the IMT at the world congress. In Wallonie only about 42 percent of the membership voted for the positions of the IMT, while 38 percent were candidate members who could not vote, more than 15 percent abstained or did not vote, and the rest voted for a third tendency (the LTF received a very small number). The upshot was that the number of voting delegates supporting the IMT from the Walloon section at the world congress was more than double what it would have been if those who voted for the IMT in the section were represented by the ratio of one delegate to every 50 supporters -- the basis for representation at the congress.

4. "Groups of young people in France" are not the same as functioning independent Trotskyist youth organizations. The "groups of young people in France" did not have access to the discussion, and expressed no opinion on it. Of those youth organizations whose members did discuss the issues and took positions, a large majority of their members supported the LTF.

November 13, 1974

HOW WE FAILED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ELECTIONS TO
BUILD THE IMG AND PREPARE FOR THE COMING STRUGGLES ---
WHAT WE MUST NOW DO

Submitted by the Steering
Committee of the Tendency
to the November 2-3 meeting
of the National Committee

In the September 3rd Notes to Organisers the membership was informed of a decision of the Political Committee not to run IMG candidates in the October general election on account of our lack of funds.

Comrade Jones spelt out the reasons for the Political Committee's decision in the September 12th issue of Red Weekly. The IMG, he said, had failed in a bid to convince the WRP and the IS to join a "united front of the revolutionary left" to contest the elections -- and the IMG was too weak and impoverished to run our own candidates.

"The important campaigns on Chile and the National Front which we have run during the summer have cost a lot of money," he argued. "To produce a 12 page newspaper will require a further £2,000 within a few weeks. Running candidates is a great expense -- around £600 for an effective campaign.

"Given our limited resources we were faced with the choice of producing a 12 page paper or running candidates in the election. As we could not achieve a united front of the revolutionary left and as we consider that the decisive struggles, for expanding our intervention in which a 12 page paper is key, will come after the election the IMG has very reluctantly decided that it will not run candidates in the election."

It is our opinion that this decision was wrong and that the reasons advanced for it false. It lost us many opportunities to expand our political influence, relate to the struggles occurring during the election period, and prepare for the struggles now breaking out after the election. Above all, the decision was taken without any discussion by the National Committee, the elected leadership body of the IMG.

Running candidates is not a question of principle. But at the present time there are big tactical advantages in doing so. Lenin advised the early Communist parties to stand candidates in bourgeois elections to take advantage of the electoral arena to reach the mass of workers with a revolutionary socialist programme of solutions to the problems facing working people and to chart out a strategy of mass action outside Parliament to fight for these solutions.

The IMG had an excellent opportunity to do that in October. An organisation of our size -- with more than 500 members -- should have little difficulty in standing a few candidates in safe seats where we would not jeopardise Labour's chances of winning. Indeed, our standing three candidates in the February election showed what can be done. According to Comrade Jones we sold nearly 12,000 copies of our election manifesto, distributed over 50,000 election addresses and in one constituency alone,

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Newham North East, sold over 1,100 copies of Red Weekly in the three weeks prior to the February 28th election. Why did we not take advantage of the opportunities created by the October election to achieve equally great -- or greater -- successes?

Even a sectarian group like the WRP was more attune to the openings given by the election than we were. They ran several candidates in both February and October -- albeit on a dead-end political line -- and reached large numbers of workers and young people with their propaganda, using their paper as a campaign paper by addressing it to their election activities and the campaign issues.

The continuation of the military occupation of Northern Ireland, the runaway inflation now approaching 20% a year, unemployment climbing to perhaps a million in the coming months: were not these issues raised in the election which concern millions of people in Britain today and to which we have answers? Are not hundreds of thousands of traditional Labour supporters disillusioned with the right-wing policies of the Labour government and looking for a revolutionary class-struggle alternative? Why did we forfeit our opportunities to reach these people with our programme and campaigns?

We could have used our candidates' election campaigns to win support for independent working class struggles before, during and after the election. Our candidates could have championed the struggle of the Ford workers, of the airport ground staffs, of the miners who opposed the National Coal Board's productivity deal, taking up these issues, using our campaign as a platform to argue support before a wide audience for these struggles, winning respect from the workers involved, explaining our class-struggle concepts against the class-collaborationism of the social contract, and preparing trade union militants and ourselves for the struggles which we expect to arise after the election.

We could have used an IMG election campaign as a way of building the Troops Out Movement and the October 27th Troops Out demonstration, our candidates arguing out the need for a mass, ongoing, united front-type campaign for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of the troops. Our campaign could have popularised and won support for the struggles of black people against discrimination on the job and for repeal of the racist legislation; the struggles of students for higher grants and against the educational cutbacks; and the struggles of women for equal pay, nurseries, free contraception and abortion on demand, and an end to all forms of discrimination.

The September 12th Red Weekly justified our not putting up candidates by saying that the decisive struggles will come after the election. We agree that the class struggle is on the rise and that there is every reason to predict that major class battles will break out after the election. But the fact that major struggles are likely to follow an election is not a reason for not running candidates. Quite the opposite. It is an added reason for running candidates. It makes it doubly important to stand candidates to put us in the best possible position to intervene in these struggles.

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If we seriously think that major class conflict is on the agenda in the period following the election, it is tactically foolish to turn down the opportunity to run IMG candidates and so gain publicity for our ideas in the media, get out our programme to a wide audience, force the other candidates into debates, recruit and broaden our political influence and weight. The majority argument really amounts to advice to sit back and wait for struggles to break out after the election. Our view is that we should use election periods at this time to run candidates and prepare for the struggles on the horizon.

One way in which we could have prepared for the struggles coming after the election would have been to have used our election campaign to support those struggles taking place during the election period. The Ford strike, the airport dispute, the Scottish strikes -- which were just beginning -- could have been taken up. So could the build-up to the October 27th demonstration for the withdrawal of the troops from Ireland.

Given the size of the IMG we are frankly amazed by the conservative attitude expressed in the judgment that we did not have the resources to run our own candidates, that this would have cut across our plans to launch the 12 page Red Weekly and that we had practically run out of money on the Chile and National Front campaigns.

It is simply not true that running candidates would have taken resources away from expanding the size of Red Weekly to 12 pages. To the contrary, a well-organised, dynamic election campaign could have helped build Red Weekly -- as was amply proved by the figures of Red Weekly sales before the February election. We should have learned from these successes and coupled running our own candidates and a major sales drive for Red Weekly. We should have used Red Weekly as a campaign paper, reporting our election activities and taking up the main issues of the campaign. That is the way in which we could have both widened the readership of the paper, so laying a more solid foundation for its increased size, and extended our political influence.

The solution to the financial problems of expanding the size of Red Weekly is a political one. It is a problem of expanding the street sales of the paper, building up its subscription base, and broadening its political influence. An election campaign which takes advantage of the heightened interest in socialist answers to the mounting crises of capitalism, can play a major part in extending Red Weekly's readership and strength.

It is equally not the case that an election campaign would have been a big drain on our resources. Properly planned election campaigns can raise a lot of money from our close sympathisers and potential supporters. Running a serious election campaign can have a big political impact and inspire large numbers of non-members to contribute financially -- and in some cases quite generously.

The decision of the Political Committee not to run candidates on account of the financial state of the organisation and in particular the expenses it incurred during the Chile and National Front campaigns bears further comment. First, this confirms the

Tendency's view that the National Front campaign was pursued with an emphasis totally out of proportion with the overall tasks of the IMG in this period. Secondly, it reveals that we have not understood how mass campaigns should be financed by much broader forces than ourselves, by ensuring that we build real united front campaigns which build fund-raising into their activity as a political task.

It is ironical that the National Front, by contrast to the IMG, emerged sufficiently strengthened from the summer confrontations to mount a large and quite effective election campaign. They ran 90 candidates -- 36 more than in February -- and received over 112,000 votes, scarcely the signs of the "severe blow" received at the hands of our "anti-fascist campaign." The October 17th issue of Red Weekly gave a somewhat more sober estimate of the effects of our anti-NF campaign than previous ecstatic issues when it reported the NF's election results: "In working class constituencies, the Front did well. It held its traditional base: Rochdale, Newham South, Leyton, Wolverhampton, Leicester. But worse than this, many of those working class areas where the Front stood for the first time returned a very large vote for the fascists. In Bethnal Green and Bow, Wood Green, Hackney and Shoreditch, Walthamstow, and Newham North East, the Front averaged over 2,000 votes." Our anti-fascist campaign was a strange success indeed!

By failing to run IMG candidates we lost one important way of fighting the racists. We could have used our election campaign as tribunes for the rights of blacks, by demanding the immediate repeal of the Immigration Act and the Pakistan Act, by supporting the struggles of black workers like those at Imperial Typewriters, and by challenging the Labour candidates to break with the racialist record of the Labour and Tory governments.

How did these errors arise?

We think that a major responsibility for these errors lies with the Political Committee and the Executive Committee and the Executive Bureau, which never prepared a discussion of the tasks of our organisation in the election period in the National Committee, the leadership body between national conferences. The PC and EB failed to present a balance sheet of the February campaign to the NC and to organise a discussion in the NC of the importance of the election in the present stage of the class struggle in Britain and the election tasks of the IMG. This failure was all the more inexcusable in the light of the virtual certainty that an election would be held in the autumn given the failure of the Labour Party to win an overall majority in February. The NC should have discussed this major question some months before the autumn to prepare in a serious way for the opportunities that the election would give us.

At the National Committee meeting held on August 4th, just two months before the election, there was no discussion of the election. The NC met for only one day, a second day originally set aside for the NC meeting having been given over for a meeting of the International Majority Tendency. The meeting had already been postponed for two weeks. Although the agenda sent to NC members in advance of the meeting indicated that the election

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would be discussed, no such discussion occurred. A new agenda was presented to NC members at the door and the meeting only had time to take up a series of organisational questions, involving charges and counter-charges between members of the IMT, and a discussion on Ireland which seemed to be at the root of these organisational disputes.

The meeting voted down a motion to convene a further NC meeting to discuss the election. This meant that the NC had no opportunity to consider this important question at any point prior to the election.

The Political Committee on August 10th and 11th discussed and adopted a paper presented by Comrade Smith entitled "A Review of the Political Framework and Tactics Necessary in the Coming Period," which was later circulated to the membership. The PC at this time took a position to run candidates. But within a matter of 2 to 3 weeks it reversed this decision, and the resolution reported in the September 3rd Notes to Organisers, referring to our financial inability to run candidates, was adopted.

From the facts cited above it is evident that the National Committee never discussed our orientation to the autumn election and that the IMT leaders in the PC and EB never presented a balance-sheet of our February campaign to the NC. The Political Committee adopted a balance-sheet of the February campaign, but members of the National Committee who are not members of the PC are still waiting to see that document.

This can only reflect that the EB or the PC do not consider these questions of sufficient importance to warrant a national leadership discussion -- or that they do not consider that the NC, the organisation's national leadership, to be important in the process of determining our view of the general election in the context of the current stage of the class struggle and the best way to make gains for the IMG in the election period.

Critical Support for Labour

In our "Programme for the Election," published in Red Weekly, and in other material published during the election, we clearly and prominently called for a vote for the Labour candidates, while counterposing our own programme to that of the Labour leadership. In our opinion, this was a positive step forward by the majority.

The majority leaders of our movement have corrected the wrong or ambiguous positions which they took during the 1970 general election. At that time, they allowed Red Mole to publish a major feature article by Comrade Robin Blackburn, at that time not a member of the IMG, which called for an abstention in the election. This article revised the Marxist approach to the Labour Party as explained in Lenin's book, Left-Wing Communism. Lenin's view, which holds true today, was that the Labour Party had a dual, contradictory character. On the one hand it was -- and is today -- a party which was created and built by the trade unions as a class alternative to the bourgeois parties; and on the other hand it was -- and also is today -- a party led by a procapitalist, privileged and bureaucratic leadership.

Lenin explained that revolutionaries could not by-pass this

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mass organisation of the British labour movement. Their job was to seek to fight within it to build a class-struggle left-wing against the class-collaborationist leaders. This was an essential component of the Leninist strategy to win the mass of workers away from this reformist mis-leaders and build a mass revolutionary workers party.

In elections, Lenin advised the young British Communist Party to call for a vote for the Labour candidates as a class vote against the parties of the ruling class. He urged that at the same time the right-wing Labour leaders be subjected to merciless criticism. A Labour government, Lenin explained, would be a school of experience for the workers who would be able to witness the failures of their present leaders to solve their problems.

In 1974 the majority leaders of the IMG have moved from their 1970 position of condoning an abstentionist line in the Red Mole to a clear position in favour of the return of a Labour government. In many parts of the country we went to Labour Party meetings, challenging the Labour leaders and candidates on the social contract and Ireland. This was a considerable advance.

But how much more effective our interventions at Labour Party meetings could have been if we had been building a mass-action oriented Troops Out Movement for the past 4 to 5 years! How much more effective we could have made Ireland an issue in these meetings and brought the Irish people's just demand for self-determination to thousands of new people if we had been fighting to build such an ongoing, united-front type campaign for the immediate unconditional withdrawal of the troops! The majority has turned its back on this perspective, preferring for three years to build a now-failed sectarian movement for "Victory to the IRA" and since then doing very little at all. Since the rise of the Troops Out Movement some months ago, the majority have opposed our going into that positive movement to build it, counterposing their concept of the conjunctural united front, a recipe for inconsistent, one-off actions.

If we had been building a Troops Out Movement for the past 4 to 5 years since the troops were first sent to Ireland in 1969, we could have steered that movement towards a strategy of extra-parliamentary mass action designed to win the labour movement to action for the immediate withdrawal of the troops. A Troops Out Movement with this orientation would, under our guidance, have itself made maximum use of the elections, to make propaganda, win new support, and challenge the Labour leaders and candidates to support the movement and break from their bipartisan policies.

We consider that the Red Weekly "Programme for the Election" was a step forward in its attempt to put across a series of transitional, democratic and immediate demands. This is an improvement over the failure of the European Perspectives Document and the United Secretariat Theses on Britain to indicate the main outlines of a programme of demands. But what is lacking is a strategy to get our demands adopted and fought for by the mass of the labour movement. In what way were militants to concretise the programme? Before, during and after the election. It is not enough, for example, to call in the abstract for the withdrawal of the troops from Ireland. A campaign to build the

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Troops Out Movement around concrete action is required. By refusing to support and build the TOM, the majority leadership has failed to indicate a clear way of fighting for mass labour movement support for our demand for a withdrawal of the troops.

Another weakness of our intervention in the Labour Party's election rallies was very evident. How effective can we expect to be when we get up and challenge the Labour candidates at Labour campaign meetings when we have been totally outside the Labour Party and the LPYS? Why have we not made any attempt to take advantage of the openings in the LPYS, which has been left in the hands of the RSL without any challenge from us? Would we not have had much greater respect and support for our criticisms of the Labour leadership if we had been seen to have been actively working for a Labour victory in the election?

A consistent record of activity in the Labour Party and the LPYS, a record of fighting for the Labour Party to support the mass struggles and campaigns which we support, would have put us in a much stronger position to win support from Labour Party members at these election rallies and meetings. It would have greatly enhanced our ability to challenge the Labour candidates and put forward our own programme and campaigns.

We consider that in this period of rising class struggle the leadership should assign a number of comrades to work as a fraction in the Labour party and, particularly, the LPYS. It is a necessary part of our objective to win the widest possible support within the mass organisations of the British working class for independent, mass actions and struggles. It is a way in which we could help win wider Labour movement endorsement and support for the Troops Out Movement, for the campaigns of the womens liberation movement, for the Chile campaign, for actions around South Africa and Portugal, for the NUS campaigns for higher grants and against the cutbacks, for the campaigns in the Black community against racist legislation and discrimination in the factories, and for the struggles of workers against the social contract and for protection against the rising inflation. It is a way in which we can fight for support of all these struggles, simultaneously challenging the Labour leaders to break with the class-collaborationist policies of the past Labour governments. An ongoing, consistent orientation along these lines would have put us in a far more powerful position to challenge the Labour leaders in the election period.

We recommend that some comrades be assigned to work in the LPYS. Last Easter the LPYS held a national conference attended by over 1,000 young people, an indication of the opportunities for us to get in there and fight for our ideas, programme and campaigns and win some of the best militants to our ranks.

A record of activity inside the LPYS, fighting for support for the Troops Out Movement, strike actions and other mass struggles, would have put us in a position to launch a nationwide youth campaign inside the labour movement for a Labour victory in the election. We could have proposed that such a campaign be based on our key demand. This campaign could have held election rallies and meetings, inviting the official Labour candidates to speak, perhaps even alongside our own IMG speakers. Such a

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campaign, built by public meetings, press conferences and literature distribution, could have won widespread support for our ideas from Labour supporters looking for a left-wing alternative to the bankrupt election programme of the Labour leadership. Linked to this strategy is the fight for democracy within the labour movement. It is not enough to issue vague calls for the Labour government to be "responsible to the organisations of the working class." We do not disagree in the abstract with that demand. But is it concrete? No. Without a strategy to make this demand a reality it is completely abstract.

A struggle within the labour movement is required, a struggle which counterposes our class-struggle programme to the programme of the leadership, linked to a struggle for democracy within the labour movement. That means raising concrete demands for the accountability of the Labour government to conference decisions; for the removal of any MP who repeatedly fails to carry out major conference decisions; and for an end to all bans and proscriptions, so allowing all pro-Labour organised groupings to freely air their views inside the party.

This struggle should have been carried into the election itself, challenging the Labour candidates on why the Labour government had, for example, failed to abide by its conference decision to halt all aid for Chile.

Why we should not have called for a vote for the WRP

Another error was expressed in Red Weekly on October 3rd. A box announcement, "The Elections: Where We Stand," informed our readers that "where candidates of the revolutionary left (such as the Workers Revolutionary Party) are standing, we call for a vote for them against Labour."

In our opinion, to call for a vote for any grouping that claims to be "revolutionary" like the WRP cuts across our primary goal in the election of achieving political clarity.

The Trotskyist movement has in the past used two criteria for determining whether or not to support the candidates of another political group than our own. One has been class composition. While the Labour Party remains the mass party of the British Labour movement we will call on workers to vote for it in elections in order to draw a class line in the elections, by calling on workers to vote for the party of their class against the parties of the bosses. A second criterion is programme. If a party or a candidate is putting forward a programme that helps advance political understanding and projects a course of mass, independent struggle by the working class against all forms of class-collaboration, then we might well decide to give electoral support.

But the WRP satisfies neither of these criteria. On every key political issue in Britain today the WRP stands opposed to mass action forms of struggle, counterposing its own sectarian brand of politics. On one decisive question, Ireland, the WRP stands opposed to the formation of a mass, united front action campaign for the withdrawal of the troops and reflects in its hostile attitude to the struggle of the Irish people for self-

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determination the chauvinist traditions of the British labour movement.

On that score alone the WRP candidates contribute towards programmatic confusion and disqualify themselves from our support.

"Labour's Left Turn"

The August 10th/11th PC document "A Review of the Political Framework and Tactics Necessary in the Coming Period" contributed to further confusion in our movement by its failure to outline the key features of the current stage in the class struggle in Britain, a political analysis of the context in which the election arose. The document was schematic, abstract and vague. It barely even mentioned the social contract, which lies right at the heart of the Labour government's strategy.

The document reiterated the majority's view that the Labour Party has made a "left-turn" since the 1970 election. The document qualifies its old view by stating that the "left-turn" has not been consolidated and is only a partial turn. In some respects, however, the majority seem to think that the Labour Party has moved to the left. No facts are produced to back up this theory.

Would it not be much more correct to say that the Labour leaders have maintained their right-wing stance on every major question. Has there been a turn to the left on Ireland? Hasn't the Labour leadership refused to break from its bi-partisan policy with the Tories? Hasn't it remained firm to its old policies of internment and military suppression of the Irish freedom struggle? Hasn't the very centre-piece of the Labour bureaucrats' programme been the social contract, that most brazen policy of class-collaboration, designed to force down workers' real wages and living standards?

How can this -- for all Benn's demagogy -- be described as a "left-turn," consolidated or unconsolidated?

Conclusion

We propose the following measures to correct these errors and prepare our organisation to reap the maximum possible gains in the future:

1. That the National Committee draw up a full, written balance sheet of our election activity in both the February and the October elections.

2. That a number of comrades be assigned to work in the Labour Party and the LPYS.

3. That the policy of supporting WRP candidates against Labour candidates be discontinued.

4. That we recognise that the Labour leadership remains committed to its right-wing, class-collaborationist course.