From its inception to the threshold of the First World War, the belief in the international solidarity of the working class served the Second International as an important ideological force. With this came the assumption of a war of continental proportions being averted by the united action of the working class parties and their use of this situation for revolutionary purposes. From August, 1914 on, these ideas were shattered as the most influential sections of Social Democracy supported their respective ruling classes in the waging of the imperialist war.
Was twenty-five years of organizational experience insufficient to prepare for this challenge? Were the material circumstances of this conjuncture so unfavorable as to allow nothing more than the “defense of the fatherland” for most of Europe’s Socialists? Was the material base of opportunism so strong that any other outcome was unlikely? Irrespective of the answers to these questions, the Second International was incapable of using the turmoil of contradictions of which it was a part to advance the class struggle of the proletariat and lead the struggle in the manner appropriate to the demands of socialist practice. The consequence of years of theoretical indifference and eclecticism was revealed in a manner of days as nearly every party, regardless of its prestige, did not respond correctly to a situation it had expected for years. Unable to use Marxist science as a tool for understanding the world and changing it, most socialists capitulated to the “obvious” choice of supporting their bourgeoisie in its war. Faced with a crisis where their “doctrine” and historic practice could not substitute for theoretically sound Marxist practice, the Social Democratic parties relied on the spontaneously existing ideas that are closest at hand when science does not intervene – necessarily ideas appropriate to the reproduction of the antagonistic relations from which they sprang – that friendly menace “common sense”, or more precisely, bourgeois ideology.
This occurrence is so important because it exemplifies the logical result of practice unguided by theory. Where the Marxist science does not exist, bourgeois ideology fills the gap. From our studies of the practice of the US Communist movement and the contributions of Louis Althusser, we have seen how spurious notions such as the Black Belt Nation thesis and Marx’s supposed “humanism” penetrate this science and alter its revolutionary character. Since our movement is only in its initial period of growth, the tragic example of the Second International stands as an eloquent testimony to the errors we must avoid.
1. Discuss the material basis of opportunism as Lenin viewed it. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Lenin’s analysis? Is this the kind of analysis reflected in the US, and if so, how?
2. How and why does a crisis or revolutionary situation reveal the true nature of a socialist party?
3. How well did the German Social Democrats understand the requirements involved in the transition from a stable to a crisis conjuncture? What does Lenin oppose to these ideas?
4. How did the Social Democrats use Marxism as a cover for their positions and activities? What were the strengths and weaknesses of Marx’s and particularly Lenin’s approach to nationalism? How do these stand in contrast to those of the Second International in general and how might both have affected the outcome of the First World War? In what way can we use these analyses in our struggle with the national chauvinism of the US?
V.I. Lenin, “The Collapse of the Second International”, Collected Works, Volume 21, pp. 167-188, 202-221.
Horace B. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism, Chpt. 8, pp.185-214 (This reading by Horace Davis, an American Marxist and labor historian, is somewhat obscure, but it does provide some good information.)
Karl Kautsky, “Ultra-Imperialism” pp. 39-47. (This reading is supplementary, but recommended.)