WHAT HAPPENED TO THE OCIC?

Parts II and III: A Critique of the Ultra-leftism of the OCIC and Its Relationship to the Fusion Partybuilding Line.

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By Dave Forrest Vickie Kawakami Tyree Scott Beverly Sims

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#### INTRODUCTION

This paper is designed to sum-up both the partybuilding line of the OCIC and relate the OCIC experience to the original fusion line. We have combined what were to be the second and third papers in order to show more clearly how we view the OC experience in light of the original partybuilding lane and practice of the PWOC.

In the first paper, which summarized and critiqued the OC's Campaign Against White and Petit-Bourgeois Chauvinism, we argued that the Campaign while adressing a real problem in the communist movement, failed due to an ultra-left deviation. The Campaign incorrectly sepeated the ideological struggle among communists around problems of white chauvinist ideology from the more general struggle for a political line and mass work for the democratic rights of minorities. This detached ideological campaign continued without a clear anchor, line, and disconnected to communist practice. It produced idealist definitions of both white chauvinism, and capitualation to white chauvinism, as well as ultra-left and idealist methods for combatting the problem. During the Campaign the bulk of OCIC comrades left or ware driven out of the organization, it became the immediate cause of the OCIC degeneration.

In this paper we argue that the Campaign devloped in the idealist fashion that it did, because it took place in the context of an idealist partybuilding line which made a principal of the seperation of theory and practice. The OCIC's partybuilding line, embodied in the <u>Draft Plan for A Ledding Ideological Center</u>, called for the seperation of the Ideological Center from the Centers for guiding practice (cadre ogganizations). In addition, it gave primacy to the ideological center process throughout the whole period of partybuilding. As an effort to unite the broadest number of Marxist Leninists to strugle over and develop political line the OCIC was a failure. Though the original goals which the OCIC set out to accomplish reamain important goals, our summation of the OCIC experience is that we cannot develop political line, nor unite Marxist Leninists based on the sepration of communist theory from communist practice. We feel that the OCIC was essentially an ultra-left, and idealist attempt to take up these tasks.

Many comrades within our tendency, most notably the Line of March Editorial Board (LOM), have argued that the OCIC's failures stem from the right opportunist, or economist, fusion partybuilding line. They argued that the OCIC was guided by the fusion partybuilding line which downplays the struggle to develop political line and unification of Marxist Leninists, to communist work and in the trade unions and in efforts to win the advanced workers to communism. While there has been some recongition on the part of these commades that the form of the OC's errors were at

times "left", they maintain that the OCIC flowed directly out of a rightist fusion orientation.

The perspective of this paper is that this is not a correct analysis of either the OCIC or the fusion partybuilding line. In the first section we trade briefly the early development of the PWOC and the fusion line prior to the formation of the OCIC. We argue that while the fusion line did contain certain errors in both forumulation and practice, it generally was a correct principal for partybuilding. It correctly argued that the Vanguard Party must develop on the basis of the fusion of communist theory with the advanced workers. In the second section we trade the originas of the OCIC. Here we argue that the basic partybuilding line of the Draft Plan represented a fundamental departure from the earlier fusion strategy. The OCIC was based on an incorrect strategy which prioritiezed the uniting of Marxist Leninist into a single center. The original conception of the OCIC did not include either communist practice, nor the struggle to win the advanced workers. In fact it subordinated the takks of building practical organizations, and a pre-pafty, as well as efforts to win the advanced workers to secondary status.

In essence we argue that the founding of the OCIC meant the liquidation. and subordination of the PWOC's original partybullding line to a broad 'single enter conception.' While PWOC and other fusion forces that xinxfact falt the OCIC was consistent with war thusian, in reality the fusion forces more and more abandoned thier originals goals and strategy for partybullding. In our opinion, a more correct partybuilding line, consistent with fusion, would have meant that at the time of the founding of the OCIC the PWOC would have put out its partybuildinglines, and othr political lines in the tendency and struggled to unite all who could be united into a national pre-party. Such a pre-party would have been democratic centralist in character, and had as its goal the devlopment of political line and practical efforts to win the advanced workers to communism. While the POC would have also had to particiante in a broader, federated form, with other the hands M-Leninist forces to strange engage in theoretical struggle, this would have been subordinated to the pre-party's own efforts to devlop political line and 'fuse' with theclass.

The roots of this abandonment of the basi principalsof the fusion partybuilding line lay primarily ina 'left idealist' strategy for party formation. Therefor we try and critique the OCIC's partybuilding line and its various approaches to developing theory, developing a leading core, demogracy, and cadre formation. Organizational opportunism of the PWOC, and the NSC of the OCIC also played akey sole in how the OCIC developed, and eventually degenerated. Therefor we will look more closely how the left-idealist streategy, and the organizational opportunism lead to a partybuilding process which was yet again another ultra-left approach to partybuilding. In the last settion, we try to summarize what we feel are the most imporant lessons for Marxist Leninists that can be drawn out of the OC's expereince.

#### Part 1: The Fusion Line Prior to the OCIC

The fusion line was first presented publically in 1975 in the pages of the Organizer. The PWOC argued that the ultra-leftist had errored in believeing that a Party could be build simply by uniting all Markist Leninists around a correct theory, or party program. Instead the article stressed that the basis for a party must be layed. Key to laying the basic mixture foundations of th Party was the development of workers communism, or the 'development of Marxist thery applied to the US'. and the winning of the advanced workers to his theory. in the words of the Organizer, "Thus by mefging workers communism with the advanced workers we can lay the foundations for a real revolutionary party. We will have a tried and tested theory(workers communism) which has proven itself directly in class struggle. The advanced workers will have been won over to socialism and socialism will thus have roots in the working class movement, And finally, our years of struggle to bring about the union of communism with the workers movement will have provided us with experienced and hardened revolutionaries to make up the Party." (Jan-Feb. Vol. 1, No. !)

The PWOC implemented this partybuilding line throughout the early years. In 1971 PWOC was formed with the bulk of its members integrating themselves within the trade union struggles in Philadelphia.s Simultaneously with thsis integration was the development of the trade union position of the FWOC in order to guide their cadre's work. In 1973 the PWOC political committee fought for the importance of revolution ry thoe ry, by stressing that in the period of partybuilding the theoretical struggle, must be primary over the political and economic struggle. This lead the local collective toput thier most advanced eadre, and organizational resources inot the development of theoretical positions on the international question, black liberation and national question, and later on in areas of women's liberation, united front, nd Independent Political Action. In 1975 the PWOC launched the Organizer, a a vehicle to present this analysis to the advanced workrs. Even in its early period the PWOC also saw the imporatance of uniting with Marxist Leninists. In 1976, a year after their article on fusion, the PWOC printed their Resolution on Partybuilding. This article stressed the need to develop a movement in opposition with ultra-leftism, or 'dogmatism.' It highlighted the need for a center in order that, "the fevolutionary trend struggles to publish and distribute its contributions from isolated localities, while the dogmatists have established national networks." It also stressd that a center must be built with, 'several local organizations htat are united around a firm understanding of the main lines of battles. They must also be organizations which are rooted in the owkring class movement. Based on th s conception the PWOC committed itself to distributing its papers and positions to Marxist Leninst around the country. It was this effort that lead to PWOC members traveling and aiding in the formation of local democratic centralist organizatons around the coutnry.

The history of the PWOC has been distorted by the LOM. They have painted a picture of PWOC as an organization of militant trade unionists, as narrow economists, with no real grasp of the need for political line and the unification of Marxist Leninists. True enough the PWOC did see the need to integrate the bulk of its cadre into the trade unions, as a key arena for winning the advanced workrs to communism. But this was a generally correct and healthy policy given the sperattion of Marxists who grew up in the rate radical movements of the 60's from the working class movement, particulary the industrial proletariat.

The important point to stress is that integration of eadre into mass struggles does not equal economism, as long as their is a continual effort to simultaneously develop political line. Any concrete study of the PWOC history shows that this was the case.

As with any organizations, particularly a young organization, the PWOC made errors. In the early period the predominate errors were rightist in bharacter. For exa mple, the political committee of the PWOC identified that in its earliest period cadredownplayed the struggle against racism in the shops, and tendeds to elevate purely trade uninn issues. This was partly due to the predominately white compostion of PWOC cadre, their ideal ical weaknesses, but also a rightist political line. The rectification for this was the development of the Black Liberation Commission, the publishin of the agitational piece, Racism inthe Workers Movement, and a campaing within the PWOC to vigourously take up the is strugle in the shops. Later on in the history of the PWOC, they expanded their work into the women's movement, black liberation movement, and movement for independent political action. They saw devloping the political side of their work through campaign issues such as the Stop Rizzo Movement.

Through out the history of the PWOC their organization has stressedthe need to propaganda with the advanced workers. Though many cadre suffered from rigital weaknesses, called face hiding. The organization did make a systematic attempt to bring communism to the advanced workers through workers forums, Organizer Cirdles, and most importantly the distribution of the Organizer. While Economism dowmplays bringing advanced workers into the political struggle, and the need to take up Marxism-Leninism, the PWOC did stress the immorrance of these advanced tasks in consistentcy with their partybildingline of winning the advanced to communism.

Our point in reviewing some of this history is to emphasize that while rightism was a problem in the PWOC, and many economist erors were made, we cannot agree with the LOM that PWOC practced a rightist partybuilding line. A concrete hattirization of the PWOC as an organization shows that LOM must resort to awarded assertion, and dogmatism to establish their critique. This has been done most recenty inthe LOM article, Fusion and Its Preent Day Distortions. Here the LOM likesn PWOC and OC comrdes to the Economists of Lenin's day. They argue, whereas Lenin stressed the need forpolitical line and organization in What is To BE Done, the Economist tailed the narrow practial economis struggles of the Russian proletariat.

a consistent right deviation within the RussianSocial democratic movement. And yet LOM's economists', the PWOC were building their organization in the context of a relatively dephliticzied working class in a period of capital st stablization, a low degree of fusion between the workers and communist movement, and a legacy of ultra-leftism within the anti-revisionist forces. Clearly the takks, the pace of development, and the obstacles which an organizations faces in two such different conditions must be recognized. Leninux himmelf was very clear on the different stages of partybuilding in his own experience where at different period practical, theoretical, and organizatonal tasks must take differing relationship to one another. For example, in arging with the economists that the socialide democratic forces had sufficient forces to direct agitation and propaganda amon all classes in 1902, he argues with the economists by saying,

"Our economists, frequently inclined as they are to deny this, lose sight of the fact of the gigantic progress of our movement has made from 1894 to 1901. Like real 'tail enders' they frequently live inthe distant past, no the period when the moement was just beginning. At that time, indeed, we had astonishingly few wasken forces and it was perfectly natureal then to devote ourselves exclusively to activities among the workers, and severly condemn any deviation from this. The whole task then was to consolidate our position in the working class. At the present time, however, the gigantic forces that have been attracted to the movement... (whereas in 1894 you could count the social democrats on your fingers.) "What is To Be Done, pp. 107

Undoubtably the LOM would have criticized Lenin for his economism in going to the workers movement during the strike movements, and making this aspect of social democratic activity primary during a period in party building. And yet Lenin did not buld the bolshevik party according to the idealist recipe of the LOM, that Uniting Marxist Leninists around Correct Political Line, or Line Rectification is the essence of partybuilding. Nor did he winew view his seminal work on partybuili ng, What Is To Be Done, as a blueprint for other experiences. In 1908, in the preface to 10 Years after, he comments that in fact What IS To Be Bone must becker and not be seen assas universal set of principals but as a particular historical pièce, with particular aims in the context of the Russian experience. Lenin based hist partybuilding strategy on the need to fuse marxism with the emerging industrial proleatariat in Russian. And this involved both the devel opment of a party Program, but also extensive practical work among the advanced strata of the Russian population.

We must conclude then, based on a concrete historical materialist methodlogy, that the PWOC did not simply integrate its cadre, but developed political line. It did not simply build the united front, but attempted propaganda an agitation with the advanced. It did not simply remain an amorphous collective but developed a leading core, and a democatica centralist organizational structure. It did cost dimply developes its local work, but extended its outreach and helped to build a national network of comunist collectives built on its model. In fact, it is based on the PWOC doing all of these communist tasks, which put it in the forfront of the emerging anti-revisionist, anti-left opportunist tendency. It is preciefly becasue it was not economist, because it hasd a broader vision and partybuilding strategy that was the leading force for a number of years. This is a valuable experince that must not be lost, based on shallow, dogmatist critiques. Our task must be to go much more in depth to summarizing both

the advanced experiences of the PWOC, and its shortcomings as well.

### Strenghts and Weaknesses of the Fusion Line:

As a general principalof partybuilding the fusion line remains a correct principal or orientation. The development of a revolutionary Vanguard Party must emerge based on the fusing of communism with the advanced workers. The task of fusing Marxism-Leninism includes both the tasks of elaborating Marxist theory to US conditions as well as winning over the advanced workers tom revolutionary program. These two tasks proceed in tandem, that is dialectically, so that revolutionary theory is tested, refined, and reelaborated in the social practice. A general line, or Party program, cannot be forged full blown simply through the summation of indirect expreince. "hile this is an important aspect in the development of theory, a correct theory must also be based on an extensive summation of direct social practice. Therefor, both direct and indirect summation of soc ial practice will be necessary to develop a corredct independent elaboration. The winning of the advanced workers to this theory is an important part of the partybuilding process. Those who are the most militant fighters for the working class and who are open to socialism: once won to communism provide a key element of the revolutionary Vanguard. They are the forces within an organization who make Marxism a concrete force within the besader workers and people's struggle. For all these reasons the emergence of a truly revolutionary "advanced detachment of the working class, dependes on the fusion of revolutionary theory with this strata of workers.

We say that this is a correct principal of partybuilding, particularly in the context of an incorrect, and ultra-left conception of partybuilding which has been dominant in the US anti-revisionist omevement. This partybuilding line sees the vanguard party being formed by the unification of Marxist-Leninists around a correct general line, It steesses that a vanguard party need not win the strata of advanced workers in order to constitute itself. It is for these reasons that the CWP, for example, can presently call istsame the Vanguard Party because it has a "correct pol tcal" line, and a national organization of Marxist Leninists, despite its own admittal that it does not broadly influence t e advanced workers. Or in a dimilar vein, the LOM while presently not comprising a Vanguard in its view, beliefes that it can do so once it has maint finsished elaborating the general line and won the honest Marxist Leninists to that line. Both variations negate the necessity for the present day Marxist Leninist movement to have won, or have a strong influence among the advanced workers.

First, ultra-left overestimation of their own forces have lead them to seriously downplay the development of revolutionary theory. In the earlier days of the anti-revisionist movement this meant that parties were formed on the basis of some very dogmatic, untested political lines adopted primarily from past correct policies of the communist international but not elaborated or applied to US conditions. More recently this has taken the form of groups, such as LOM, believing that the general line can be forged primarily through the study of indirect expreince, witout sufficient empahsis on the summation of social practice. Very general political lines can be united around by Marxist Leninists, mainly thrugh debate and theoretical struggle, without their refinement, testing, and relaboration thrugh social practice. The disdain, for "narrow" practical experience, or direct social practice leads to overestimating the correttness or strategic ability of a general analysis to provide a actual concrete guide for escial practice. The fusion lines envisions a more long term, and dialectical process of developing political line.

Secondly, the ultra-left partybuilding line leads to a sectarian policies towards other genuine marxist leninists who are not prepared to unite with a national organization that declares itself the vanguard. Premature partyburmation assumes that the party program has already been developed, and therefor assumes that those who disagree w h this program, or fail to join an such organizations are opportunists, either revisonists or ultra-leftists. Such a policy tends to overestmate the differences between Marxist Leninist forces making each political or tactical differences into a full blown ideological difference. Such an organization, such as the CWP at the time of its formation, or the CP-ML, RCP etc. inevetably cus itself off from other genuine marxist leninist who are capable of making real co tributions to a partybuilding effort.

Thrirdly, the ultra-lft partybuilding line is both based on and leads to the overestimation of Marxist Leinists to actually assess their real influence and leadership among the advanced wokrs and in the mass struggles of the class. Those who give somelip-service to building the Party among the class (RCP) have to manufacture real isolation from the class. Others who do not make winning over the advanced a criteria in them partybuilding strategy immutably bestow their 'correct general line' with the magical quality of assuring that their small but correct sect will inevitably be capable of winning over the advanced workers once their party is formed (eg. LOM).

The Fusion partybuilding line is consistent with the basis leninist definition of the Vanguard Party as being both 'advanced' as well as a detachment of the working class movement. Our ultra-left's may create 'advanced' organizations of revolutinary intellectuals, but this cannot substitue for the actual development of a detachment of the working class movement. Therefor, the advanced detachment can only be build based on the fusion of communism with the advanced www. From the present isolation of the communist movement from the workers movement. This remains the correct kernal of the fusion partybuilding line. It is a general principal of partybuildin that we should not easily forget, nor abandon especially gien our ultra-left legacy.

it is of t e utmost importance that during the partybuilding stage a national organizaton of Marxist Leninst, as yet unfused, builds itself so to more effetive take up these tasks. Such an organization is a national pre-party which the PWOC envisioned in its second stage of partybuiliding.

Thus whi e the PWOC did see the importa nce of this stage they did not sufficiently emphasize this point in their thdoretical work. They left many in local organizations around the courntry wit the impression that fusion was the process of winking the advanced on a one to one basis. This in turn left anti-theoretical, localist, and ultra-democratic prejudices in tact. A rightist orientation toward partybuilding, associated with the PSO, became associated with the fusion line because of this weakness. This rightigst orientation corresponded to the concrete condtions within the localities where very few circles had cadre who were theoretically developed, nor as integrated into mass work as the PWOC. This became the straw man which the Guardian forces chose to attack ax he fusion line. And while the PWOC never held such an evolutionist orientation to partybuilding tasks, its failure to really alaborate this point meant that many of the concret criticisms of the Guardian forces were corret int he context of localist, and anti-theoretical prejudes in the fusionist circles.

We have identified themain rightsit errrors of the fusion forces both in this and the previous setion. What has not as well been identified has been the history of 'left' conceptions which also enteredthe fusion partybuilding line. The first left error of the fusion strategy was the tendency to elevate the national center, or ideological center process above the development of the national pre-party. In the period between the 1976-1978 this MEXIMERY meant putting the development of a national center of all anti-lefts above, the development of a national pre-party in the second stage. Later on after 1978, when the Draft Plan became operative this meant putting the defveloment of practical centers and the pre-party subordinate to the development of the ideological center for the wholeperiod prior to the formatinn of the Vanguard. The essence of this deviation was putting the uniting of Marxist leninists abobe the develoment of a concrete political line and organizational forms necessary to win the advanced. It was this left deviation which inevitably developed into a full blown theory of the sepration of centers in the Draft Plan, and meant the actual abandonement of the fusion strategy.for

Before moving on to an analysis of how this left deviation from the fusion line lead to the evntual abandonment of t e fusion line during the OCIC period, we want to mention one more very important aspect of the 'left error' in the eraly period of the PWOC: This was the left idealist conception of how adwanced workers would be won to communism. While the rightist error of face hiding hindered much of their work, when propaganda was done it tendend to assume that advanced workers kwould be won thrugh good ideas along. In the early period this expressed itself in rather elaborate study plans which were geared to peti-bourgeois intellectuals and not workers. The PWOC had problesm getting workes to commistently attent worker circles, forums nd organizer circles. Very few advanced workers were adtually won to the organization. In the bulk of cases this was primarily due to the fact that PWOC cadre had been deeply involved in practical struggles with advanced workers, taken up xommunist agiatation, and gained the confidence of advanced forces through

this work. The affvanced workers were not mainly won thorugh the propagaation of advanced ideas, but the ability to see the strengthes of communists in the day to day work, and their willingness to fight. The social basis of the PWOC cadre often made tis a difficult process, since the cadre tendend to be better at propagdna than agitiatinn etc. And it was precisely tis left idealist korientatin toward the advaned workers which also lead later on to some very extreme cases of 'left idealism" in bring advanced workers to 18 point study groups during the OC process. We will discuss how this occured later in our analysis.

### Part 2: The Fusion Line and the OCIC

### Ultra-Left Errors At the Time of the Founding of the OCIC

In February, 1978, local collectives from around the country committed themselves toxx the process of forging a leading idealogical center. The purpose fof this ideological center would be to forge a party leadership and revolutionary theory necessary for a new anti-revisionist, anti-left opportunist Vanguard party. A leading ideological center, which was the ultimate goal of the OCIC process, would be preceded by a national center. This national center would begin to centralize debate around key quesionsof political lime. The first question taken up in this process was finishing the struggle over point 18 which saw US imperialism as the Main enemy of the world's people. It would go on to do an all sided critique of ultra-leftism, develop a deeper theory of partybuilding and other political line questions. Not only would the OCIC process centralize lideological debate and theoretical work, but it would also seek to be a single center designed to unify all forces within the anti-revisionst, anti-left opportunist tendency. For this reason the basis of unity was the 19 points, which were mainly designed to demarcate from the ultra-left trend, and only had very beginning political line. The center would not be built on thebasis amf of a particular organization's developed political line, or partybuiliding line.

At the founding of the OCIC the bulk of organizations united on three main points: 1. the national process must lead the local process 2.the theoretical struggle must be primary over the practical work 3. the center should not be a federation of local groupings. The main desagreement with this perspective came from El Comite who was also a founding member of the Committee of 5, which was the predecessor of the OCIC process. MINP argued that the local organizations were not sufficiently developed, either thereax ideologically, or in terms of thier integration into the glass struggle, to move to a nationaly centralized process. Instead they argued that an attempt to make national theopetical work primary would lead to the development of an incorrect separation of theory from soial practice. It would leave the cadre of the lesser developed organizations ina flunkeyist relationship with the PWOC, or the more theoretically developed forces. In place of the proposal to forge a leading ideological center, they proposed centers for coordination, cooperation, and communication. They prioritized coordi tion between Marxist Leninists at a local level for both ltheoretical and practical tasks. They envisioned regional and national cent ers being established but not which lead the local processes. They emphasized the study of the fundamentals of Marxism, and the development of local mass work.

Much of the discussion centered around what the actual level of development of local organizations were. The PWOC in a preliminary paper to the February conference argued that local organizations were sufficiently rooted in mass wor k, and organizationally developed to make the movement to national. Using the criteria which Lenin used in locking at local circles at the time of the formation of the Iskra, PWOC similarly argued that local circles had sufficiently matured. This criteria was imporant the them given their earlier resolution on partybuilding which stressed that the center must be built with, "several magnificants local organizations that are united around a firm understanding of the main lines of battle. They must also be organizations rooted in the working class." (Resolution on Partybuilding, Jan. 1976)

The PWOC made a serious left error in their assessment of local OC forces, by overestimateing the actual level of theoretical understanind og the main line of battle, and the extent to which they were rooted in the working class. The bulk of organizations implicitly united with PWOC's position on partybuilding, and the trade union question. But on the whole t ese positins were understood in a very shallow fashion, and we a far lower of theoretical understanding. The development of political line among thee forces was almost non-existence, as groups hand almost universtally relied on the thoeretical work of t e PWOC poliitical committee. Secondly, nonce of these organizations could have been said to be very deeply realized roooted in the working class movement. A few years of trade union, and mass work does not really qualify as rooted. The PWOC iterationes iteelf, which was 7 years old by 1978, had not had much two sucess in winning the advanced workers. altough they wre developing as a political force in Philadelphia. If we were to compare the quant development of local circles in Russia at the time when Lenin was to form the Iskra, we would see that they had a far higher level of fusion with the workers movement, than any circle, including t e PWOC. <del>UnfurkanakalyoyxkoxkhaxookankxkhaxRVQQxxookixadxkhaxlaxxkualxafxdaxafapaan</del>t 

The PWOC did see the weaknesses of many of the circles, even though it really overestimated them in the context of the criteria that it was using as the basis for forming accenter. In fact items PWOC argued that key to overcoming localism, theoretical underdevelopment, and organizatonal amatruerism was the development of a national center. We must agree that PWOC was correct in seeing these weaknesses of the local circlwes. They were also correct in realizing that some more dveloped, national process was necessary to over come these conditions. They did not, however, correctly target what that national process should be and ended up making the database development of a national theoretical center primary, instead of a process to build a natonal pre-party which could compbine boty theory and pre-party practice.

This was their second left error. In addition, to overestimating local groupings, the PWOC proposed a <u>left ideal st</u> national center, to unite all the anti-lefts and to do theoretical work. In proposing a <u>single center</u>, they downplayed and liquidated their own political line development for a broad effort to unify all Marxist Leninsts. The rational for this was based in the OC, and PWOC's assessment of previous ultra-left partybuilding efforts. We argued that the RU, OL had moveed systematically to develop their own national D-C organizations, moved to consolidate ht their Parties, without an open, and broad struggle to unite Marxist Leninsts. The OC was viewed

as a corrective to this sectarian procedure. Yet in the PWOC proposing making the singel center concept primary, and established the bload 18 points of unity of this partybuilding formation, they were forced to pushe their ownparticular lines into the backround.

The first line to go was he fusion partybuilding line. Whereas the PWOC had been polemicizing against the volunatarist partybuilding line of Irwin Silber and the Guardian Clubs, instead has the polemic face shifted to the small circle mentality of the Guardian for not joining the OCIC or uniting twth theneed for the single center. Whereas the early debates had taken up to questions of the role of he advanced woker s in partybuilding, the role of practice in the development of theory and other concepts key to the fusion line, now the polemic focused on the Guardian's small circle stand in relationship to uniting marxist leninists. More and more the struggle over uniting marxist leninst took center stage, while the question of fusing with the advanced wax receded into the backround.

While the elevation of a national process for unit g marxist leninists, the OCIC, represented the main 'left error', the organizational opportunism of the PWOC played a role from the beginning as well. It is clear that the PWOC was confident that it would win all forces to its political lines, or isolate incorrect lines more easily in the context of the OC or single enter. Once it could insure the Guardian waxh and later the NNMLC were in the common process with forces which mainly hled a fusion line, it could maintain its hegemeny in the the oretical struggle. Thus the organizational hegemonism of the PWOC played an important role in whith the PWOC argued for a single organizational process, rather than a free whealing theoretical \*\*Examples\*\* struggle.

Thus even at the founding of the OCIC and soon after we want see the seeds of the ultra-lert line in the plan to emphasize uniting marxist leninists, downplaying above board theoretical sruggle and the drive for PWOC hegemonism. And yet the left tendencies were not yet dominant, especially since the OCIC played the very positive role of wind uniting the wast bulk of anti-ultrakextisiation ultra -leftists, pushing against some of the mosterightist and localist orenations of fusion forces. And most importantly, the OCIC was the focal point for finishing the demarcation with the left international line which was absolutiely essential to pave the future road for the development of an anti-left alternativel In addition, the OCIC was correct that it is postivie to try and have the whole Marxist Leninist movement systematically address questions of political 1 ne, although we will argue later that this need not happen the the OC's single center conception.

# Consolidation of the Ultzz-left Errors into a Left Partybuilding Line: The PWCC's Self Criticims and the Struggle Against Federationismm

Whereas the forces who founded the OCIC were somewhat confused as to what particular relationship pratice and mass work to hafe to the national theoretical struggle, this soon became clear. The struggle over point 18 was designed to demarcate withthe ultra-lfts, but did not attempt to deepen political line development ound the international question. For example, the PWOC did not advanced its more correct postion on the socialist character of the Soviet Union, in taking pp the three world's theory. One's postion

around the Soviet Union was not the issue, so as not to compromise the broade character of the center. In fact at the 2cd national conference, the charperson, Clay Newlin even argued the comrades who did not see the need to demarcate around point 18 could remain in the OCIC axea; as long astthey agreed with the content of point 18. This provided much disagreement, but was eventually united on based on the logic of not compromising the broad anti-sectzaian character of the center.

More importantly, dur g this period the NSC took a stand against the coordination of mass practice in the OCIC. For example, those who wanted to meet simultanously with the 18 points confernces around their internationaly solidarity practicexems were not incouraged to do so. Nor was the lessons of this work systematically incoporated except around Aggola somewhat.

practical centers became fully matured as the result of t e PWOC's self-criticism, and the OC struggle against federationism and to build local centers. The PWOC's self criticism stated that they were incorrect in their earliet views of the national pre-party caming after the ideological center. They argued that the ideological center must be made primary to any practical organizations during the whole period of partybuilding. This was to insure that all of the genuine marxist leninists could be united into the party/ Apre-party, necessarily being lmited in its political line, would always excluded somem genuine marxits and therefor could not be made mpimary during any stage of the partybuid ing process. Of course this also meant, the PWOC argued, that the pre-part would not have to wait until after the ideomogical center was forged but could begin at any time before. While making no public announcement that they were forming a pre-party, they did lay the whole rational for tis position b arguing that the OCIC and pre-parties could develop simultanenosly with the pre-party always remaing subordinate to the OC process.

The NSC then adopted a clearer and sharper forumulation around the correctness of the seperation of ideological and practical centers. The Draft Plan, and Draft Plan study gaide argued that the seperation of theoretical and practical centers would not necessarily mean the seperation of theory from practice. Themost advanced lines and experiences from terractical organizations would fing enhier xxxxx way into the OC process, swhere they would be scrutinized to the theoretical and ideological struggle among a much larger group of marxist leninist, thereby refining the theory, which could then be reapplied in the practical centers. In this best ob both world's approach, the theoretical struggle would be advanced along with the practial work of the organizations.

In order to insure that this seperation of centers was achieved the NSC called for te building of local centers seperate from the cadre organizations. This would insure that people, Marxist eninists, broader than members of cadre organizations would have equal weight i the teoretical struggle. It also stipulated that cadre organizational members must participate in the OCIC as individuals, and that all members must not be bound by their organization's demorcratid centralism. Key to the whoel perespective was that the local centers must be made primary over the practical ceners, cadre groups.

Some comrdes protested this idealist sepration of theoetical struggle from practical work. The SOC are refused to make the local centers primary.

They argued that the fusion line demanded practical centers, and mass work be primary. They refused to have the bulk of their members of be paticipating primarily in a process designed to unite Marxist leninists while neglecting their mass work tasks.

Looking back we must unite with those members of SOC who pin pointed this stage of the OCIC process as a deviation from the fusion partybuilidng line. Their final expulsion and docuemtn where SOC stands targets veru clearly the minx idealist abandonment of the fusion strategy for an effort to unite all markist leninist into a single center. Fusion forcew sho remained in he OCIC focused on the fact that we had never said we were an organization designed to take up fusion. At a deeper level, among fusionists. we argued that the OCIC was consistent with one aspect of fusion which as the need for the independent elaboration (workers communism) while not takin up rinning the advanced. We argued that SOC had an empricist bent, or a right fusionist bent because they liquidated the need for theory, and therefor the struggle to unite Marxist Leninsts in theoretical wor k. It is true that someof these comrades from the SOC held a more right opp ortunist interpretation of fusion which emphasized local mass work, and downplayed the development of political line. Nevertheless the arguments hich the fusion forces who remained within the OCIC, ere ultra-left. A rightist line canot be combatted with a leftist one. The primarcy of uniting marxist leninsts was absolutized, over the winning of theadvanced workers.

In practice, te OC's line of trying to forge a single theoretical center, seperated from practical organizations lead very quickly to the severing of theory from practice. First, and foremonst, the OCIC failed to prioritize those questions of pplitial lines which ere most necessary to win over the advanced workers. This had been the strenght of the PWOC's theoretical work on trade Union question, black liberation, united front, etc. Yet the OCIC demanded that these political lines be withdrawn, receded nto the backround for a general unity of the 18 points. We explained how this first happened with the fusion line, but also point 18 and international line. But beyond tht the OCIC failed to prioritize develping poltical line around trade union questions, black liberatinn, women's liberation, united front, the realationship between mass work and advanced tasks etc. None of the stategic line questions were adressed. Even the OC's critique of ultraleftism, although startd, was never finished and this was tolay the basis for political line work on other questions. This was an abandonment of the basic approach to theoretial work which the PWOC had begun. Whereas in the early period of the fusinn line, theoretial wok was developed directly to cadre's intervention in the mass wrork, and social practice was continually summed up to contribute to theory, in the OCIC these political quest ions were neither priotieized nor taken up.

Secondly, the whole draft plan strategy was apredicated upon the assumption that hocal cadre groups would contribute their independent political line work, and summations of practice to the theoretical struggle and ideological cener process. But the bulk of hocal circles in the OCIC, with the exception of the PWC and a few other circles, ere not theoretically, nor oranizationally capable of doing independent line development. As the OC moved to consolidate its members around the primacy of the OCIC, ever their local mass work, more and more resources were drained off of the local cadre organizations. The mest theoretically advanced cadre moved into postions of leadership within the OCIC.

Leading mass activists found their time split between OCIC responsibilities and their mass work. These once 'rooted' massagemizatic local d-c organizations which the OCIC had argued were the basis for the national process, in many cases became less rooted, more isolated from mass struggles and the advanced workers. In many cases, during the struggle againt federationism local organizations became split up, or incapacitated in ability to function. The seperation of centers line, thus moved to destroy the local organizations, while replacing them with a system OCIC local centers. This many localities could not possibly see how they could maintain thir local oranizations, and develop them, with the OCIC agenda primary, a handful of cadre organizations did develop. Thee organizations became the core of the PWOC's secretm effort to forge a national pre-party. We will discuss this next.

We must sum-up the OC's attempt to seperate theoretical and practical centers as a failure. El Comite had been correct in arguing that local organizations were not sufficiently developed to sustain a national effort, and reamain rooted and developing. They were also correct that such a process necessarily must lead to adeeping flunkeyistarelatinship between local organizations and the PWOC. In the absence of independent theoretical bearings, nor time to develop them, the bulk of organizations uncritically adopted PWOC's positions on a number of questions. And yet tere was never a national process for systematically studying, and strugglingover them, and hopefully deepening them. In addition, El Comite was correct in seeing that the OCIC would lad to an idealist partybuilding strategy, which would separate the development of theory, and sadre from social practice. The OCIC pursued the ultra-left policy which El Comite argued against in their pamphlet Partybuilding and thus Its Selationship to heMasses, by xxxxxxxxxx making the process of partybuilding something 'wholly external to the masses.' Thus while much of their critique remains correct and very insightful, its awakness was in its proposal of how to advance the communist movement. The El Comite' comrdes still tendend to dwonplay the need for political line as necessary to advanced, even local work. Local centers of coordination in our opinion wouldnot have been sufficient! Instead we feel that there was a basis for PWOC to movem to consoliate many of the local organizations to take up study and struggle around their particualr and more developed political lines. This would have to have been done in the context of presenting their political positions to the whole tendency fork theoretical struggle. Throu h a processof presenting these lines to the tendency for study and struggle, te PWOC could have consolidated those local organizations with bsic unity.

These groupings, in turn, could have layed the organizaonal basis for a national pre-party.

# The PWOC's Organizational Opporutnism Consolidated: the Secret Effort to Forge a National Pre-party

The PWCC put emphasis on the development of the OCIC, but at the same time it did try and develop national forms of organizations devoted to practical work. Thus once the basic local centers were consolidate in the localties, he PWCC along with a few other cadre organizations moved to establish national communist gractions in the areas of Augo, Health, Education, Phone etc. These national fractions sought to unify communist activists from particular industries into democaratic centralist fractions designed to carry out mass work and advanced tasks. Like the OCIC these Cormetions

were built on very broad unity of the 18 points. In addition, thy made as a point of unity the necessity of people to want to fuse communism with the advanced wore rs in their ndustry, although did not demand a adherence to the fusion partybuilng line generally. With the exception of the Augo Fraction that did some concrete analysis of the auto industry. and developed propaganda around the contract, most of the fractions never developed a concrete analysis, or poltical lie for their particular industry. In an effort to make the fractions non-sectarian, the fractions leadership once again downplayed the elments of political line. Also like tehe QCIC the fractions were based on an ultra-left overestimation of the actual development of the number and influence of the activist involved. BASOC. Bay Area Socialist Organizating Committee, correctly pointed out tht in many cases there were not really a national represenation of activists, nor was the leve 1 of practice necessariy very high. The fractions life were short lived, neverdeveloped a national political practice, and were eventually torn abart with the rest of the OCIC during the campaign against white chruvinism.

Simultaneously with the OCIC, and the national fractions, was a secrete effort of the PWCC to form a national pre-party. In 1979, beginning after the Labor Day conference, the PWCC circulated a Draft Program for a national pre-party. This was circulted secretely to SUB, BCC, and SWG ho were three other cadre organization with a high level of polical unity with the PWCC. Later in the process, individuals from other cities including Detroit, New Bedford, Bay Area were told about the process. Well after the process of opolical study and discussion had begun, membrs of the national steering committee were iformed, although not all mbmers were participating in the process.

In building the secret national pre-party the PWCC was forced to violate almost every principal which it had established within th OCIC process. First, it made the struggle for political line secret, rather than an open struggle among the whole tendency for political line. This was a basic violation of OC principal. Secondly, it opportunitically fooled OC quee as to the PWCC real intentions for pre-party formation. During a whole period of he struggle against federationism, many OC members and observeros had wondered if this type of organizton was in the workes. The PWCC consciously avoided honestly in putting its views forward. So too did it fail to address forthrightly the political criticisms of this form presented earlier by rectification comrades. While it justified this in the name of protrecting such an organization against utl ra-democracy and sectarianism, it was itself

a profoundly sectarian, haresereties extrative and organizat on ally hegemonist process. Thus while the PWOC, forces in the merious local groups, and members of the NSC subordinated the struggle for te pre-party to the OCIC process, they also systematically pursued thier plans for a national pre-party without political explanation or accountability to tendency comrades.

The national pre-partynever actually materialized, while the first program was discussed, and rewritten, the second draft was never adopted. The 4 organizatins who made up the planning committee for the process put the pre-party process secondary to their OCIC tasks, so to a certain extent it never flew due to lack of prirotization and interest. Finally, the political basis of unity was destroyed inevitably, along with the OCIC, fractions, etc. by the campaign aga st white chawvinism.

Finally, the PWOC's on effort to remain the center of thepartybuilding processes, including the OCIC, fractions, and pre-party lead them to violate the organizatonal requirements of the OCIC to build a local center. PWOC did not build a local center during the period when the other localities. Thus while all other localities were sacrificing thier pratical organizations, and mass tasks, the PWCC maintained its cdre form in tact. This was due to a federationist approach, but more pricipally due to its organizationa hegemonism. The NSC did not criticize the PWOC until very late int the game. This was due to theliberalism, flunkeyism, and the conspiratorial aspect which the NSC members maintained in their support of the PWOC's pre-party building effort. Thus even when the anti-racism task force took up the criticism of PWOC for maintaing their small circle, keeping other genuine Matxists in Philadelphai outside the OC etc. it failed to tartet the central reason for the PWOC's federationsism. This could haly have been done by an exposure of the secretepre-party effort, and the organizational oppotunism, andhegemonism that lay at the basis of the PWOC's actions. This was a criticisms that t e NSC was not prepared to make, given their own collaboratin inthis perspective.

These contradictions did surfact most openly, although still veiled, in the confernce on Organization held in Milwaukee. Tis confernce was organized by the mr members of the organizations involved in the secrete pre-party process. Its purpose was to spur on the development of local cadre organizations by discussing various aspects of organization building. During this confernce the PWOC was criticized for not building a local canter, an darticularly for the position which its cadreheld that it was correct to build OC fractions in local cadre groups. These fractions would supposedly organize the OD work within the cadre ogganizatons. This was immediately criticized for its federationism, espcially in the context of Philadelphai whre they haven't even established a local center, why ould they be talking about the develoment of an OC fraction. Critics argued that this could only serve to supplant the local center leadership, and would lead to cadre organizatiis' embers being held to Democratic centralism of their group. PWOC members split over the question, but later it was a concept whheld due to the influence of Clay Newlin and his ability to win the NSC to this position. In anay event the signifigance of the struggle was it more clearly exposed the contradiction between PWOC preferx leadership in the struggle to seperate senters, be anti-federationist, andyet maintain the hegemonism of their circle in the process.

It is important that we note a few points in ending the section on the secret pre-party plan that we adress a few points. First, is the question as to whether the PWOC really did see the pre-party as subordinate to the OCIC process. In our ppinion, the PWOC did actually see the pre-party as subordinate to the OCIC process. As far as we know based on the OC's chairpersons discussionin the NSC and the pre-party process, he always stressed that it must be build in seond priority to the OC process. Thus even though it was built secretely, in an unprincipaled fashiom, it was not seen as either supplanting the WMEX OCIC, or becoming primary to it. In the actual implentation, it was given second shrift to the OC developenths. As one participant put it, it never really developed partly due to lack of interest. Thus, while the pre-paty formatinn undoutbly would have recruited from the OCIC, it never would have become the OCIC, or become the main form according to the leading members of the process.

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In our opinion, the fusion forces had a rather vacillating view of the role of a national pre-party. While in its earlier history the FRM PWOC would have given more importance to it givenits role in winning the advanced, during the OCIC process the fusion forces really downplayed this strategy for its 'single center' conception. The failure to theoretically clarify this aspect of partybuilding became a key weakness in the fusion strategy and we would argue everntually lead to the abandonement of the lie altogether.

We say this in order to adress our second point, which is whether se disagree with the pre-party conception. \*\*EXEMBLY\*\* We do not, we feel that a national pre-party should be a key feature of the fusion strategy. We do however disgree that this should have been a secondary aspecti of the partybuilding strategy. In our opinion, the PWOC' desire to build a pre-party should have been put out, theoretically justified, and argued for in the context of their partybuilding line. It should of been debated openly with forces such as rectificatin who do not agree with it. On the basis of an open struggle in the partybuilding movement, the PWOC should have sought to unite those in agreement to work to dvelop such an organizatinal form. At the same time that fusion forces sought to organize thier own organization primarily to mit more ddeply elaborate their political line and win the advanced, they should have enetered into a national process of theoretical struggle with broader "arxist Leninist forces."

Ideally, a broader organization of all tendency activists could have been created for just this purpose of line struggle. Yet unlike the OCIC it would have to be a federated form in order to involve the various political lines incontention. It would have had the organizational responsibilty to organize theoretical struggle. In addition, fusion forces would not have made t is broader form, developed to uite marxist leninsts primary in relationship to the pre-party. Instead, it wouldhave been secondary to their own efforts to pursue the fusionists plitical line and winning the advanced. In Even if such an overarching form couldn't have been preated, which it proabably couldn't, the fusion forces could still have actively engaged in joint struggle and discussion with other partybuilding forces who were not fusionist.

By combing int the effots to build a national pre-party, with copn struggle with the rest of the left the fusion forces could have been consistent with thier partybuilding line which emphasized the developmnt of political line an order to win the advanced to communism. Antifederatinast principals could have been applied to the struggle within the communist movement, allowing members of pre-parties to individually argue their positions, while not sacrificing democratic dentralism in implementing organizatinal policy. Most importantly, by unifying at the hisghest possible levels with other marxist leninists that shared a similar political orieintation, and not liquiat ing this organization to the broader organizatin of Marxist leninists with a lower political unity, the fusion forces could advanced their particular partybuilding lineina non-sectarian fashipn.

## The Ultra left Aspects to the OCIC Partybuilding Strategy

The MC's Idealist Conception of Forging A Leading Party Core:

In the past settions we spoke to the central aspect of the CC's idealist strategy for partybuilding: the separation of ideological and practical centers. Linked closely with this error, was the idealist notion that a leading Party core could emerge primarily through the ideological conter process. The Draft Plan argued that no leading party core existed, but that it could be forged through the process of ideological struggle and the struggle to develop revolutionary theory. Thus while the NSC in no way represented a leading core, it was believed that through the process of developing the national center, elaborating and struggling over line, that eventually such an organizational leadership could mature into a leading core. Part of this process would be the advancement of some comrades from the ranks, and the fall of others according to the test of the ideological struggle.

The main problem of this conception was that it dropped out thekey roll of social practice in the development and testing of leading cadre. The Draft Plan made the incorrect assumption that a leadership could develop in a process that was not designed, nor proved sapable, of systematically tackling questions of political line, and summing up social practice involved in implementing those lines. This is a necessary aspect of deceloping leading cadre, particularly within our revolutionary process, where communist cadre have selatively little in depth experience in the mass struggle, and have not really been leaders iithin the trade union or progressive movement. Even to the extent that some cadrd have had expersinces of this nature, they have very often not provided their leadership in the context of putting forward a communist vision or strategy to the masses.

Since the OCIC was based on the seperattion os centers it used criteria for melecting leadership which bypassed key qualities associated with the fusion paetybuilding lne. For example, the NSC was shosen based on its genedal grasp of the 18 points, its consolidation around the singele center conception, it willingness to strugglea against opportunism particularly racism etc. It did not, however, use the criteria which a practical organization would of choosing those comrades who are the most advanced both theoretically and practically in the key areas of mass work: trade munion questions, antiracist struggle, women's liberation movement, anti-war movement etc. One may argue that this many critieria for leadership might have changed as the

OCIC process, more and mor took up the process of the elaboration ofline. And yet, we ould argue that as long as the OCIC made a process of seperating off the ideological and practical centers, there would be no organizational, nor materialist criteriaum by which to really judge the leading character of comrades. Leadership would be determined primarily by one's ability to be 'advanced' in the context of ideological struggle at meetings with other marxist leninsts, but not in the context of the advanced workers, the mass struggle, and amidgt the practical cadre organizations carrying out this work.

Cadre untested in this aspect of social practice cannot form a stable basis for a revolutionary core, who must be capable of leading the class struggle through its various twissts and turns. This is notto say that everyleadership person in a party must be an advanced mass activist, or heading up an area of mass work, people with key theoretical skills will also be included. But a party core must have a stable grouping of such cadre familiar, and leading the Party's areasof mass work as well.

The actual attempts to choose and devel op leadership in the OCIC shold illustrate our point. The OCIC was never able to develop a stable leadership grouping. First, because the theoretical and ideological leadership did not develop primarily within the NSC, but the PWOC. Secondly, because the OCIC did not have a good process of cadre developent which systematically advanced their leading people. Thirdly, because the idealist political line which lead the process was note context to develop stable grouping of cadre rotted both in p9ltical line and mass work. Forth, the campaign against whiste chauvinism later on, reduced people's 'leadig qualities' to their ideological purity and their agreement with the campaign.

These errors lead to the growht of farious forms of opportunism within the leadership, including indidualism, careerism, dishonesty, flunkeyism etc. During the campaign, NSC members scrambeled to maintain their positions, engaged in unprincipled attacks on cadre and dishonest manuevering among themselves. These were not 'leadig comrades' forgid in the class struggle, tested leaders with independent bearings. They were comrades corrupted by an ultra-left campaign, and an idealist partybuilding line which tried to developes its leaders, almost solely in the 'head of ideological struggle among the communists', without sufficient deveelopment and testing in the class struggle the working class.

## Lack of Internal Democracy and Incorrect Approach to Cadre Formation In the OCIC:

The partybuilding line of the OCIC did not encourage the devlopment of cadre or demogratic theoretical struggle in the OCIC process. Intially the OCIC had been based on a conception of centralizing the broadest number of Marxist Beninist Forces to debate key questions of political line. This perspective was implemented farily well in t e early period of the OCIC during the debates a round point 18. After this period, however, the OCIC never developed a healthy process of interal struggle and debate. The reasons for this were an incorrect approach to cadre formation and a sensi-demogratic approach to lane struggle within the organization.

Theoretically developed cadre are necessary to have good interanal line struggle. The continual advancement of a mmembership of an organization is necessry to isure that the psotions of leadershp are critically analyzed, and other members may clearly put forward alternative views. The OCIC did not give sufficient attention to this type of work. The first reasons is that the OCIC did not develop itself around more advanced psitions of political line but a broad 18 points. Cadre who already united with the 18 points, but also the particular political lines of the PWOC were not developed to contribute to these other areas of political line. The pulling back of the PWOC's particular lines to the broad unity of the center meant that OC cadre with a fusion perspective, never formally studied, developed and debated the political lines that they were functioning mm.under. Line unity became implicit without training mm and struggle. Thus the downplaying the theoretical formation of cadre was directly realted to the development of the OCIC and the liquidation of deeper political line inherent in the process.

A more correct approach to cadre work would have been for the PWOC to circulate its political positions on various questions, both among fusion cadre and the broader movement. These lines should have been studied, and further elaborated. The OCIC did not make any attempt to draw cadre into the further ealbaration of these lines. They began with he PWOC poolitical committee, but never were developed beyoned this. Even within the context of the OCIC's own publicable theoretical agenda, the NSD did not attempt to establish regional and local theoretical teams. Task forces that were established beyone the national steering committee, were not designed primarily to deepen the line deg elopment.

The main cadre work that the OCIC did take up was the 18 points study. This study suffered from a number of cross perposed. For many it was too rudimentary because it didn't advanced people theoetical devlopment, but rather tied it to questions that people had already studied or wre familiar with. For others, particularly the advanced workers comrades who were brought in during the campaing, the 18 phint study failed to give t the necessaryattmtion to Marxist Leninist fundamentals. For example, the NSC incorrectly cut out any sessions on dialectical and historical materialism, polirial economy, or a more indepth dreatment of some of Lenin's basic writings. Many of these comrades criticized the study for skipping over a study of the building blocks of Marxism Leninism which are necessary for the development of political lie. A any rate, while the 18 point study had value for people, itxfailed the CCIC did fial in really establishing a caere policy which was geared to the particular level of development of the particular comrades.

There were a number of roots to their problem. In the case of the more advanced cadre, there was a failure to try to consolidate people around themost advanced line which they mk held: in this case the PWCC's pestions. In the case of the 18 point study, these was an incorrect collapsing between the relationship of Marximt Leinistst which the campaign promoted. These had also been a hisorical weaknesses of the PWCC to deal with cadre devlopment within their own organization, and many of these weaknesses bezmame reproduced in the NSC's approach to the question.

In addition, to weaknesses in theoetical training, the OCIC could not develop cadre in an all rounded way, give n the separation of centers. This meant that the OC could study and discuss, but not really practice. Cadre practical formation was left to local mircles, or individual intiative. This cut off the materia at component of formation wheer a cadre must test his/her ideas in changing reality. Sucy a left approach to cadre wok will never produced tested cadre.

The OCIC had a serious problem with defloping healthy political line struggle within the organization. As we said the best effort was initially with the the struggle over point 18. The main problem afterthat was heat the NSC did nor rezlly practice the stand that lines differences should be debated out from the point of view of unity being primary. In the struggles around federationism, National Minerity Marx? draft Plan, and later around racism, the NSC always treated opposition lines as if the basid disunit of these comrades with the OC process was primary. An atmosphere was not really created in which people could clearly develop and struggle over differences. Inevitably, in such a sectarian atmosphere everyline struggle ended in a split, as was the case with SOC, TMLC, BAWOC minority, and heen in othe case with the bulk of cadre during he campaign.

There were imporant formal and organizational weaknesses in the line struggle, such as the continual error on thepart of leaderhsip bodies to mux fail to get out position papers soon enough ahead of time for conferences, weaknesses in really circulating infomation to different localities particularly the NSC manutes which were continually late. But thes organizational weaknesses must be seen primarilyas symptoms, and not the cause of this lack of democarcy. One key weakness was theoretical sloppiness, or dishonesty on the part of

The xmain xmaxmaximax the NSC's approach to theoerical struggle. This was most evident for example in strugle over the draft plan. Here for example, the NSC changed its conception a number of times, particulary has during the campaign, yet failed to really expalin how the line had changed and the reasons for this. For example, OC cadre were not given sufficient theoretical explanation why we had changed form an organization primarily geared to unitig the existin left, to an organization primarily devoted to reachin out to the advanced or potential tendency. Such key changes in line, were reachly explain, and often not admitted, c reating the impression that the NSC was always right, but others just hadn't understood.

Another key weakness was to corrup the theoretical struggle by reducing line debate to the most crude forms of ideological struggle. This came out most clearly during the campaign, where too often theoretical arguments against the campaign were dismissed do to the particular racist ideological weaknesses of cadre. While it is perfectly correct to draw out the ideological underpinnings of any line, theoretical struggle cannot be reduced to an attempt to discridit the opposition through picking on particular ideological weaknesses. For example, one ex-NSCmember argued that the campaign was ultra-left and drew out the theoretical reasons for this. The response of other NAME NSC members was to dismiss these arguments onthier own metits and to lambast the individual for his capitualition to petit-bourgeois chauvinism. Such was the general trend during the campaign.

But the ultra-left approach to theoretical struggle which hadxitxxxxxxx im emerged full blown in the campaign, also had its roots in earlier OC line struggles. For example, the NSC incorrettly took u the struggle with SOC around federatennism. While the NSC did make sincese attempts to really have SOC comrdes devlop their position which they were reluctant to do, onee this began to happen the NSC expalled them for a violation of an organizatonal rule. The use of organizational rules to block theline struggle also became a hall marek of the OC steering committee. Thus BAWOC minority was expalled for failure to make speak to a criticism. Soc for failure to build local centers. And while these expulsions all had a certain logic in the context of the type of organization tht the OCIC was trying to build, a single center bsed on the sepearation of centers, such a conedpgion eventually lead to a bureacratic centralist approach to line struggle. Too often organizational measure became substituted for the political line struggle. Today those who want to continue to struggle against thecampaign and the Draft Plan within the OCIC. cannot get a national conference alkady called because the NSC refused to do so. Even though we made a rule that 2 regions can call a natinal confernce, the NSC now argues that they can set when it will bee They have donthis arguing we can't meet until next year. The point is that one can make rules to govern the lines struggle, but a bureacratic leadership can also change them to suit therex thir own needs. Unfortunately this is exactly what the NSC continues to do.

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## The Left Sectarian Conception of the Single Canter

The OCIC was built to be a broad non-sectarian partybuilding formation. Its founders hoped to avoid the sectarian legacy of previous partybuilding attempts by involveing all forces ina common organizational process of line struggle. It was correct to see that the best form of joint work and theosetical struggle could occur wit in the confines of a common organization, deboted to a common theoretial agends. While this was ideal, it was not realizable at the time of the OC foundations. This was dum primarily to differences inpartybuilding line which lead varous forces to pursue particular theoretical, practical and organizational grands agenda (Guardian, El COmite etc.)

The Guardian had emphasized this point, int its decision note to join the OCIC. And while we can agree with them that different partybuilding lines will lead to different theoetical and practial agendas, we do feel that their arguments downplayed the necessity of a common process for Marxist Leninists, and reflected a small cifcle approach to our partybuilding tasks. The problem is that the OCIC did not correct conceptualize what such an organization might look liek.

In our opinion it would have been correct topropase a single organizat nal center to coordinate the line devlopment and struggle among Marxist Leninists. This would necessarily have had to be a federation, with a planning group representint the various organizations and partybuilding lines. Secondly, it would have had to be secondary in character to the primary empahsis wich organizations would place on the devlopment of their on lines and organizations.

Thirdly, it would have only be able to centralize line devlopment and struggle over a <u>limited agenda</u>, which would have been a compromise between various partybuilding forces. Through discussion forces would have to come up with a limited agenda that forces had agreed to work on. Finally, whilethe organizational form would have been a fede ation of various gropings, it could have implemented a policy of individual participation in the line struggle. Such an organization could have taken responsibility for developing theoretial teams, journal, forums, conferences onkey questions of line debate and devlopment.

But such an organizationwould have been different that the OCIC who made its single center primary, was not federationist, had a leading body united a ound a single line. Instead we have argued that the Fusion forces should have put their primary emphais on the development of the political lines and organizatonal forms necessary to forma anational pre-party. This other broader organizaton, would have been secondary to the pre-party but an improtant arean for line struggle among Marxist Leninists.

As conceptualized and practiced the OCIC versionnof a single center was sectarian. While it was correct for the OCIC to struggle with other forces in the movement to moin in this process, pace this struggle was taken up the OCIC decided to effectively demarcate with forces who refused to join. By making people's willingness to adhere to the OC's conception primary the OCIC repeated the ultra-left practice of elevating its own form, and writing off many of the otheres genuine Marxist Leninst in themme movement. This took different forms with different graps groups.

Originally the OCIC realized that El Comite did not have the political basis to jointhe OCIC given its different emphasis on partybuilding line to local development, and its mopposition to a national center. But after this intial recongition the OCIC leadership did not agressively pursue line struggle and joint work with MINP forces evern though they disagreed. The first year of t e OCIC meant mainly ignoring this ogganization. These was also problems on MINP's end, once the OCIC did get mround to contacting given them since MINP did not prioritize discussion with the OCIC or national work given their localist oreintation. But for our own party we tended to read forces such as MINP out of t epartybuilding movement because they didn; t share our massessment of themsed for the single center.

In the dx case of the Guardian and the NNMLC the OCIC emphasized struggle over the small circle character of these organizations, in relationship to the need for a common Marxist Leninist process. In this case the criticism did have validity that there was a 'go it alone' oreintation of these forces in the context of the OC's effort to build a singel center. We can say that both real political difference, as well as organizational opportunism (eg. small circle mantality) played a role in why they didn't unite with the OCIC. But a more serious error came with the OC's response to this situation. Rather than accepting that these forces would remain outise the OCIC for some time at least, the OCIC moved to effectively demarcate from them though its polmenic around the 'small circle 'character of these groups. This was a particularly sectarian act in the context of the Guardian's and NNMLC's willingness to take up theoretical struggle around the fusion partybuilding line.

The Guardianux NNMLC forces we e willing to organizational seperate on the basis of deeper partybuilding differences, fusion vs. rectifiation. Yet our forces submerged a more princpled line struggle, for the struggle a ainst small circleism. The struggle against ax small circlism was emphasized do to the NSC's Mec and PWOC's shift famount toward builking the OCIC nd uniting Maxist leninists. But the polemic was also fine followed by a fairly systematic effort to pull back in terms of joint work and priests. Even if the OCIC steering committee had wanted to pursue thisdebate, or polemic, it should have done so in the conext of maintaing joint work and struggle in varius areas. It should have exx realized that if you amcan't hve a single center immediately you have to do as much joint work as possible, to hopefully lay the basis for unification down the road.

But the NSC made the typically ultra-left error in approach to theoretical struggle by takin the differences with rectification ofer partybuiling line, and exagerating these diffferences into a full blown demarcation. Their stand became one of struggling to expose, rather than struggling to unite. But this 'left sectarian' approach to polemics is not unique to the OCIC it has a longhistory in the anti-revisionist movement. Thoroughgoing and principled struggle was often bypased by the ultra-left in the hegemonist efforts of one organization over another. Every differences was elevated to a strugle between full blown opportunism and Marxism leninism. The OCIC continued this tradition of the ultra-leftsm, and is not alone today in the Tendency with such an approach to the pretical struggle.

the view that the whole communist movement, with the exception of a handful of comrades still in the OCIC, are essentially racist and petit-bourgeois. In this opinion the whole prtybuilding movemenths been build primaryly on these ideological deviations, and therefor sand fundamentally compromised in their partybuilding efforts. In this sense the demarcation has become complete. In the NSC's conception we have the large and dominant racists and peti-bourgeois chauvi ists represented organizationally by the LOM, TMLC, and Ex-OC comrades, and the small but proleatarian 'core' of present OCIC members.

Unfortunatly the OC steering committee carries themantel of ultra-leftism of its earliest formation, who as they became more and more isoldated from the bulk of communists, and more and more exposed for thier sectarian and immature posturing, seem to yell louder and louder about the bankruptcy of other forces while heralding themselves as the 'true bolsheviks', proeltarian 'core' or the genuine communists. In the exterme subjectivism of thexes a lay Newlin sees himself as he the lone voice of 'anti-racism' swamped in a sea of chauvinism. Such is the recoad to the dustbins of history unfortunately a nubmer of comrades from the QCIC are now traveling.

The OC's Campaign Against White and Petit Bourgeois Chauvnism as a Shift in the OC's Partybuiding line: the Complete degeration of the OCIC.

The OCIC was founded as an organization designed to Unite Marxist Leninists in an effort to develop political line. It was not, as some have argued, designed to take up work to win the advanced workers to communism. In the period between 1978-1980 the OCIC moved fairlys six systematically in this direction by focusing first on the struggle within the communist movement over point 18, secondly to construct 'tendency' wide local centers based on these single center conception. The Draft Plan and the Founding Statement werer instantables both documents which emphasized this general direction. We have argued that this partybuilding line devloped into a a fairly consistent 'left' idealist strategy, making as its coner stone the seperation of theory and practice.

During 1980 while the NSC was developing its Campaign Against White Chauvinism. the OCIC began to go through a shift in partybuilding line. The shift was a move away from uniting the existing stock of Morxist-Leninists towards what wre called members of the potential tendency, advanced workers and fighters from the class that were not yet Marxist Leninsts. The Steering Committee, whihe had previously identified members of the organized and argan unorganized tendency, now introduced this new grouping that the OCIC would do outreach to. The reasons for these changes in partybuilding line was never consistently elaborated. In general members of the National Steering Committee Selt that in fact, the OCIC had been practicing a rectification partybuilding line by emphasizing uniting the existing stock of Marxist Leninists, but failing to grasp that advanced workers were capable of takingup partybuilding. The ideological roots of this partybuilding line defiation, in the eyes of the NSC, was the racism and petitbourgeois chauvinism of the OC cadre. Thus, whereas previously the OCIC had focused on struggle with Organized tendency forces (cadre organizations LOM, etc.), then later the unorganized tendency (individual Marxist Leninists organizationally unafffiliated, now the 18 point studies, anddraft Plan confernces wre to include members of the potential tendency.

The advanced experience which gave rise to be this line shift was the National Minority Marxist Leninist Conference, which had successfully united a number of national minority marxistals advanced fighters with the partybuilding movemment. The onference had emphasized outreach to comrades who wre not just Marxist Leninsts, and made the central focus of speeches and discussions the need for partybuilding and the single center.

For many of us the shift was very postive, because it fundamentally brought back a key aspect of ap partybuidding, winning te advanced workers to communism, which we had always felt was important as fusionists. In many localities, the postive process of contacting these comrades and strugglin over partybuilding took place. In many cases local centers brought these comrades into the local centers, or 18 point study processes.

While the NSC recognizing the <u>rectificationist</u> type approach of the OCIC and its new efforts towards the advanced were generally a postive corrective to the old line, it really failed to deal with the main problem of the OCIC partybuilding line: the seperation of ideological and practical centers.

Thus the socalled step term back toward 'fusion', never was capable of really thory and practica back together. Instead it lead to an ever more consolidated left idealt appraish to partybuididing which further liquidated the rest role of social practice. This was because the NSC argued the advanced workers could be won to the OCIC's partybuilding process, in the abasence of cadre organizatins and social practice. Uniting with the advanced became mainly a question of ideological struggle with the advanced over 1. the OC partybuilding line 2. the 18 points 3. their ideological weaknesses around capitualtion to racism and repetit-bourgeois chauvnism. Thus, the propagation of communist ideas became the basis for uniting with the advanced, and the element of winning the advanced in the context of common mass work, agitation, and political line development was dropped out completely.

The NSC moved quickly to consolidate this 'left idealist' conception of uniting the attacking an amendment from Louiseville which stressed the need for the devlopment of a national pre-party. The amendment argued that while the OCIC should be primary, it was cruical to build a national pre-party which would be fapable of developing a deeper level of political line, national agitation and propganda necessary for fusion. Te main thrust of the amendment was that national minorities and wo rking class people will be won to communism primarily by being attractingx to a fighting organization in class struggle, which leads with a revolutionaryline. The NSC branded this approach as thoroughly racist and petit-bourgeiois chauvinist. We argued that what underlay this argument was the chauvinist conceptions that advanced workers were only capable of practical work, and not capable of bing in a primarily theoretical partybuilding process. The logic was that we could win the advanced through the propagation of the 18 points, and single center alone, as long as we dealt that wit our individual ideological weaknesse which kept us from talking to thes comraddex, or forced them out of the process.

Looking aback we can say that this is a thoroughly idealist conception of how the advanced will be won to communism. It will not be primarily through the propagation of a general 18 points, and partybuilding line, although this will play a role. Mainly the advaced will be won, through being attracting to a fighting organization, capable of leading struggles, whose political line has the ability to make correct assessments and win victories. This had always been the enception of the winning of the advanced which the earlier fusion line envisioned.

In fact, many of the advanced orkers who joined the CCIC did so based on the previous contact thaey had had with CC cadre inmass work. By building respect in struggle, and beig attracted to the ideas of Ma5xistmm Leninism, based on seeing its ability to analyze and develop strategy for concrete work. This is not to say that these forces were simply won on the basis of practice, or couldn't take up the devlopment of theory. They could, and kake have, but this cannot be the basis to drop out the materialist commonent of wheex he showing the advanced character of Marxism Leninism.

The NSC's attack onthe Louiseville, whatever the particular weaknesss of its authors aside, represented a complete distortion of the fusinnist strategy for winningthe advanced. Invadditionxis that it took the previous ultra-left weaknesses in the fusinn organization prior to the OCIC, and raised them to a consistent left idealist line.

Whereas, groups such as the PWOC had made the idealist error of thinking that advanced workers could be won primarily thorugh thepropagation of advanced ideas, and dwonplayed united front and afitational work as part of this process, now the OCIC streering committee made a principal of winning people on the basis of themost general and abstract principals of communism (18 points), and argued against those who manifester sa a national pre-part as key to this process. The result of this line was that many advanced forces did not join because they felt that the OCIC wasn't taking up the practical work, and was only a study and discussion group. Many advanced forces who did join out of a growing committeent to Marxism Leninism became discouraged due to the lack of focus on practice. The bulk of advanced commades who entered the process were eventually driven out or left by an ultra-left camapign, in which every weakness was exagerated into a full scale capitulationist trend to petit-beurgeiis chauvinism. Interieslipsynthexaterials

Ironically, the step toward "fusion" which did lead to the participation of some advanced fighters from the class, also lead to them being driven out. In the context, of an ultra-left campaign which seperated the struggle against racism from mass work and political line, and foused almost exclusivelyon the weaknesses of the cadre, no real winningof the advanced could take place. It was in the campaign, that te left idealist partybuilding line and the left idealist ideological campaign came together. Toghether they marched hand in hand, destroying cadre organizations, driving out both the advanced and petit bourgeois comrades, and eventually destroying the OCIC. The lesson is that the NSC dould not go back to fusion, away from a process which emphasizeduniting marxist Leninsts around political line, without summing up its original errors in seperating the centers, and abandoing the full development of the fusion partybuilding lie: the nationa pre-party. Thus, minning the xadvanced xin x has context x of x that 96 To x was a full party building l ne review and change would have been necessary in order to rectify the errors. Sadly enough, the fusonists, in the mame of purifying the white cadre in order to unite with the advanced workers, did some of the most racist and anti-working class things. As we said in our previous paper, never has so much racism been earried outing in the name of anti-racism, nor so much anti-worker actions in the name of workers. But the exageration of the existing ideological weakness of cadre, must bee seen primarily

A final note should be made on the organizational opportunism, of the NSC and PWCC in attacking the Louisevill amendment. In the context of the efforts to forge a national pre-party secretely, whose purpose was generally the same as the Louiseville amendment, it was complete hypocricy and organizational opportunism. OCIC cadre did not have bee benefit of being able to openly politically analyzie and criticize the pre-party intitiative for any of thes weaknesses which the NSC so vehmently attacked the Louiseville amendment for. What was Morse the Main thrust of the louiseville amendment contained nothing that the members of the secrete pre-part intitiative did not agree with. This illustrates how deeply the leadership of the OCIC Nd the PWCC were into their organizational opportunism, as well as an unprincipled approach to be theoetical struggle.

as the result of an ultra-left partybuilding line, and sampaign in the struggle

against racism.

## The Roots of the OCIC Degeneration: Ultra-Leftism Once Again

The OC's ultra-left campaign against white and petit bourgeois chauvinism ripped apart the OCIC. Comrade after comrade left or was driven out of the OCIC process due to the ûnpricipled characeter of the campaign, and due to political disagrements. Today the OCIC is almost totally demolished, with only a few remaining comrades left in cities which once had large groppings of OCIC cadre. The NSC has been completely demolished with only one original member still remaining, Clay Newlin. Clay along with Michael Simmons make up the OCIC steering committee, although it is not clear that they are really leading anyone. The pratical organizations in many cases have also been demolished. The PWOC once a large organization with over 60 members is now down to less than 10 people. Other cadre organizatons hve been similarly depleted, and even those whose members have broken with the campaign, stand basically immobilized and divided due to the after and effects of the OCIC process.

In the context of previous partybuilding efforts, the OCIC was a relatively short partybuilding effort: with both a meteoric rise and decline in a period slightlylonger than 3 years. The OCIC represents yet another ultra-left attempt to fogge a vanguard party. What is distinct from previous anti-revisionist attempts is that it took place inthe context of an anti-revisionist, anti-left tendency which had professed to demarcate from previous ultra-leftism. This highlights what a persistent problem the 'left' life is, even for those who seek to break from it. Although the OCIC has its particularities, realtive to other an experiences, we can highlight some key aspects of its work which are consistent with the ultra-left partybuilding line in previous experiences. Thee include:

- 1. A <u>voluntaristic</u> approach to developing revolutionary theory and a leading core which was based on the <u>xaperationary</u> seperation of revolutionary theory from practice.
- 2. An <u>idealistic</u> deviation in the devlopment of theory which focused on downplaying the role of social practice, and cadre organizations, in the development and testing or practice.
- 3. A decomplaying of the winning of the advanced workers in the actual struggle for political line **Industrial political**, and an elevation of a the strategy of party formation which stresses uniting marxist leninists around political line.
- 4. To the extent, winning t e advnced was taken up, a 'left' approach to doing propaganda of ideas, at the expense of developing correct social practice and a fighting organizations.
- 5. A anti-democratic, and bureacratic approach to line struggle within the organization which forced oppostion lines out of organization.
- 6. An organizational <u>hegemonist</u> practice on the part of the PAOC, and all those involved in the secret pre-party formating process, which involved closed struggle over line.
- 7. A sectarian stand towards forces outside of the OCIC, and the tltra-left tendency to demarcate completely over differences.

- 8. An overestimation of the actual development of llocal organizations and their cadre, and a subsequent downplaying of the need for cadre training, systematic study in cadre work.
- 9. Organizational opportunism inxkhexlinexetraggle, and theoretical dishonsty in the struggle for political line.

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- 10. Ultra-left ideological campaigns which functioned on the basis of idealist definitions of white and petit-bourgeois chauvinism, and ultra-left methods for combatting them.
- 11. Overestimation of present members of OCIC in relationship to their actual role in the class struggle, and to other forces on the left. Therefor 'left dillusions' over the struck actual role of the NSC and OC in the context of the revoutionary process.

These are some of the main forms that the ultra-left partybuilding line has taken in t e communiment movement historically, as well as in the OCIC. An important particularity of the OCIC experience was the intial decision on the part of the fusion forces, to withdraw theri political lines from strugger in the interests of a broader 18 points, and a broader unity. hile organizational opportunism of th PWOC played a certain role in this decision which is consistent with previous leading anti-revisionist circles, in general the strategy that the OC parsued in this reagrard was unique to the OCIC. Nevertheless, this particularity of the OCIC strategy does not fundamentally alter the fact that the main, or essential weaknesses of the OCIC line was a ultra-left approach to forging the revoluti ry vanguard.

The Line Of March comrades would agree with some of the phenomienon that e hve listed, andyet would argue that all of this was the result of an essentially trightexx rightist strategy for partybuiling. In their view the OCIC represented the fusion partybuilding line. The fusion partybuildingline necessarily 'loweres the vision of communists' by farkingx focusing on the winnin of the advanced workers to communism. This in turns to an empricist approach to theory by downplaying the summarizing of indirect experience and worshipping practical struggles and spontaneity. Politically, LOM argues this EXCEEX leads to rightist political practice and organizationally leads to amaturish methods of work and localism. In EXEMPEX summation the LOM believes that the OCIC fell apart because of the implementation of thefusion strategy and its inability to unite marxist leninists around poltical line. which they giew as the essence of partybuilding. Thus they would argue that problems of sectarianism, organizatinal hegemonism, are all problems that are equally applicable to rightist formations, such as the CP, and therefor do no necessarily concetite cmm ponents of an ultra-left partybuilding. In fact, the LOM does not feel that there has been a consistent ultra-left approach to partybuididng by the anti-revisionist movement, solely an neft opportunist political line. Let us deal with each of their arguments one by one.

First, thexkomxassammaxthatxainmaxthaxcoloxmasximadxbyxfasinistaxthamefor thexcoloxmatxhamaxmadexitxxmainxamphasisxemxninningxthexxadeanmedx First, we must address what has been historically correct about the LOM critique of the CCIC. The LOM commades were correct in their critique that the DCIC could not forge a leading center without a leading political line. They correctly argued that it was incorrect for the PWOC to put the line struggles over fusion, andother political lines in the backround and raise to the priamary the struggle for a single organizational center. They therefor were able to se the contradictions that the OCIC would run into in tryin to call for a single center, yet an undederated center, which did not hav higher level of unity on line.

Secondly, the LOM were correct in various criticism softhe OCIC campaign againt white and petit-bourgeois chauvinimm. They correctly targeted the OCIC's failure to link the ideological campaign with te development of political line and mass work for the democratic rights of minorities.

Thirdly, they correctly targeded much of the PWOC hegemonism, and organizational oppobrounism that became a hall mark of the OCIC's internal process as well as relationship ith broader partybuiding forces.

The weaknesses of the LOM's critique is that it didn't really target so many of the essential weaknesses of the overall line. First, and formeost the LOM never took on sharply the problems of the OCIC seperation of centers, particulary the tendency to downplay the cadre organizations and social practice in the development of theory. S condly it never targeded the voluntaristic concepti of the OCIC wich emphasized uniting marxist leninists over winning he advanced wrkers to communism. In this light, it didn't even recognize the more postive work that occured in the OCIC during the campaign which actually brought a number of acvnced forces to communism, since it viewed this as a diversion from partybuiding. Thirdly, it incorrectly assessed that the pre-party was the primary and determing element in the OC's strategy, when in fact this was the secondary and subordinate aspect of what the fusionists had in mind. And finally, it completely failed to grasp the actual historial development of the OC's abandonment of t e fusion strategy as it unfolded, but instead maintained the a historical assertion that all developments inthe OCIC could be expalined by the failur of the fusion line.

The reasons for the LOM's ommissions on htese points are clear, it is becasue in many ways the OCIC developed accorxing to a number of theidealist and ultra-left principals which are also the basis for the LOM effort.

Many of the basic principals of the OCIC including: the separation of centers, the emphasis on uniting marxist linenist to devlop political line, the subordination of cadre organizations and winning the advanced, an idealist conception of forging a leading core, were the numerous aspects of downplaying soical practice, and even certain elements of sectarianism which were all part of the OCIC, are part of the LOM partybuilding strategy as well. Thesefor let us look more closely at LOM's critique that it was the moderate fusion line and address each one of their arguments.

First, we disagree that the OCIC's downplaying of theory stemmed primarily of from an empricist, or economist deviation. As we have said empricist errors were prevalent in the fusion forces before the OCIC, and undoubtably existing throughoutt the process of the OCIC. Yet despite

the continuance of pragmatic and empricist errorts, the leading line of the OCIC damphage liquidated theory primarily in an effort to unite marxist leninsts. We we sat in the actual development of the OCIC, the PWOC withdrew its leading lines, including fusion in order to create a 'broadmaingleque center' for the Marxist Leninist Tendency. In Thus during the period of the fusion lines earlier development these was much more theoretical emphasis given in the devlopment of political line (1971-1978), this theoretical development slowed qualitatively as the OCIC formed and emphasized a lower and broader 'nonsectarian' basis of unity.

This EMERKED actual reality of the OC's development cuts againt the main mak assertion of the LOM that the fusion line inevitably lowered the visions of communists inthe theoretical realm, because it workshipped the summation of direct experince and therefore was an empricist deviation. Quite the contraby the PWOC's emphasis on winnin g theadvance d lead to a much more vigouras line development, while the birth of the OCIC as an effort to unite markist leninist retarded line development. We emphasize this point to highlight that the development of political line can be liqudiated either feom the 'left' or from the right'. An economist orientation, hich fails to study the general lessons of te communist movement, and indiret experience because it is mired in the practical struggle and given insufficient priroty to theretocal study. Yet our ultra-leftist al ays do nplayed theory from the 'left'. That is they retarded line development because they ere satisfied for themost dogmatic recapitulations of old lines, and failed to study the conrete conditions and sum-up atual social practice as part of line development. We ould argue that the founding of the OCIC, represented a liquidation of theory from the left, andwas an at idealist rather than primarily empricist error methodalgically. By focusing on loweringthe level of line development and struggle, in order to unite the broadest number of marxist leinist in the single center as the main source for the liquidation of theory, paticularly in the context of the theoretical emphasis that PWOC had given to this obk previously. Thexaveration

Thus other phenomienon in the OCIC, such as the do nplaying of dadre development, do not flow primarily from empricism, but leftism in the failure of the OCIC to be build on the most advance d lines as ould hve been the case impartant and the national pre-party taken precedence.

Similarly the LOM argues that the fusion line necessarily leads to the rightist padtical practice. This is harder to evaluate. In the first too years ee ould argue that the main process of the OCIC as to downplay the importance of mas s mk ork, and to pull cadre away from this ork. Thus rather than being 'buried' inmass rok hich as alsowas LOM's characterization of the fusion forces, on the contraby the OCIC lead fusion cadre to ithem from mass work. Undoubtably the failure of the OCIC to elaborate political line for massi ork, meant that existing rightist deviatons remained in tact. Yet e can see by looking at OCIC forces in the lst year, that many cadre moved decisevly to the 'left' i their mass work as a result of the OCIC process.

This occurred, first, it the tendency of the OCIC to pull advanced orkers tosrd the 18 point study groups in the absence of deepening themass work. We have noted the OC's shift toward 'left propaganda' wit him the advanced. Secondly, the impact of the campaign as to have OCIC cadre move left ard in their approach to mass struggles. For example, the PWOC's position on feminism. Which emphasized the ideological weaknesses of the primarily hite peti-bourgeois members of this movement, lead to a 'left critique' and attacking of the omen's movement. This is not to say tht the basic problems hich the PwOC were aftedorrect, they were. But, like the campa ign against OCIC cadre, the PWOC tendedcto elevate these ideological excex eaknesses over the strategic political questions lead to their isolation in the various omen's movements. Their standing in the united front disintegrating as they dook upa 'left' approach to tackling these real eakneses. Similarly in trade union ork many OC cadre began to judge orkers primariah by the ideological weakneses, rather than their political stands. This lead members of the OCIC in Seattle to refuse to mk ork with various hie workers, or white marxist Leninists in the Seattle building trade movements becaue of takir 'racism'. This was a claerly ultra-left stand, given these same people could support the basid political demands of the black construction workers. Thust the line of the OC in both partybuilding and racism lead mass work primarily to the left and not the right as LOM would assert.

Thrdrdly, the LOM critique distorts the actual OCIC process by saying that downplaying line development, and pightist practical ork flow prima rily out of the fusionlines's efforts to in the advanced mk zerkers to communism. First, we say this is a distorition because, with the exception of te period of the campain, the MCIC did not make one of tis tasks winnning the advanced workers. The LOM leadership is aware of this, although many rank andfile comrades inthe rectifidation movement are still confused on this point. Many people oustide the OCIC dtill believe tht the OCIC did practical work and dint' understand that the prectical centered was were sepeate. The reality was that the founding of the OCIC represented a clear shift of the fusion forces by making primar y the unification of Marxist Lninsts in the struggle for political line. Whatever the weaknesss in this line, it remained the central focus of te fraft Plan. This is also represented in the PWOC self-criticism and the subsequent argument that the development of a pre-party would remain subordinate to the ideological center. This is clear evidence that winningxthexxdexxdexxdexxdextixex the fusion forces had downplayed the role of practical organitt ns nd therefor te struggle to win the dvnced.

The central problem with the LOM critique is that it strts from dogmatist premise that the PWWXxxxxxkamadaxxxxdxxxxxxxx fusion line is a rightist line, much like the economsts of Lenin's day. Then with out conrete analysis of the actual development of the PWOC, the birth and development of the OCIC, it argues that everything that happned must inevatably come back to to the 'rightist' fusion line, This is not helpful in identifying the actual deviations that took place.

In addition, the LOM is limit ed due to ist own 'left' volutarist conceptions of partybuilding which keep it from forecefully tritique the inevitable distoritions that occur in a process wich seeks to unite marxist leminsts without an anchor in social practice, and asx cadre organiations. They see only the differences, but not te unity of the OCIC wity their onw process. What compounds their failure to see the rampant 'leftism' and volutraism of the OC process is their own summation of the partybuilding lines of thenew communist movement. Essentially, they argue that you dannot The x 600 TO x Abandon ment x of x the x Rusium x Stratum x for x Rurty building identify a consistent left time partybuildlingline, wth posibly a few minor exceptions. They tend to trade the development of lines as pure ideas, rather than the c actual practice of the anti-revisionists organizations. For these reasons the RU is branded as having an essentially rightist bartybuilding line for its earliest formulations that the parkackeithex essence of partybuilding was forging the united front. These were clearly rightist lines put out at a time when the RU was not agressively seeing theneed for partybuilding. And yet leas than two years later. RU flipped from this rightist approach to a Wikexmarxistxkainsksxarpexapproack Unite Marxist Lenmits approach in the form of the National Camin Liaon Committee. The process was destroyed by RU organizational maneuvering and hegemonism, but it hardly formed the RCP based on the actual 'fogging of a united front.' Thus despite the rak rhetoric of any of the utlraleft formations, thier approach to partybuilding has neiterh emphasied fusion, nor actualy alkx using the qualitiative change in the relatinship between communists and the advanced workers as the criteria for party formation. Whatever rightist theories have been intially wandeveloped. tagy have quicklygiven way to an actual process of trying to 'uniting marxist leniniste around political line, in the absence of any real change in the level of fusion. To the LOM we must insist that the OCIC follows in this tradition ultra-left tradition, as does, unfortunately, their own organiation.

# OC Epitaph: Fusion Abandoned, Ultra leftism Firmly in Control

For those of us who lived the OC experience, saw the local organiatations ripped apart by the Natonal OC process, felt ourselves torn from masswork, and isolated from the rest of the partybuilding movement, degraded as a result of vulgarieed ideological stru ggle, it is hard to feel that we traveled mainly down the road of economism, a la Rbochey Dyelo. Perhaps many of us whim which wish that the OC had never developed and we had remained 'buried in our practical work', our 'visions lowered.' But this is not the right response either. We must gain clarity on our experience, realise our errors, and how quickly a revolutinary movement ideolated from the the worksers' movement, theoretically underdevloped, and inexperinced practically can degenerate into withultra-leftism. We have not been the first, but we can illafford to go through this again.

The starting point for our rectification is to raffirm what was correct in the fusion partybuilding line, and to reject the various ultra-left ways that the OCIC ignored some basic truths. First this means that a party ban only built, and here we mean a vanguard party, as a result of fusion of communism wit the advanced workers. This means

that there must occurr a qualitativel? different relationship between the present communist and wrking class movements. The REER road to this goal will be long, and it will involve developing theory, uniting marxist leninists, as well as winning the advanced workers. But at the center of our strategy must remain the importance of Marxist Leninstse developing their theory, developing themselves, and unitint with other marxst leninist in the conrete struggle to change the society: <a href="social practice">social practice</a>. We can no longer accept the seperation of centers, theory from practice, propaganda from united front work, <a href="https://www.arganiation.organi

At the same time that we are clair the the OCIC's clearly abandoned the fusion strategy in the context fof how teory will be developed, how leadership will be forged, how cadre should devlop etc. we must also realie that the fusion strategy was never a fully devloped line on partybuilding. It remains more a pricipal whichmust by correctly elaborated and applied to US reality. Therefor we must be critical of our earlier understandings and articulation of the line, and be willing to rectify any weaknesses. Most importantly is the secognition that any real strategy must begin with a concrete analysis of the working class movement, the present period of US imperialism, and the state of theleft. Without this analysis no correct principal for partybuidding can kmax create a real strategy for building a revolutionary vangaurd in the US.

We will begin our efforts to reelaborate the fusinn partybuilding line, look at the workers movement, and the left, and try to outline what we feel are the main kanker tasks for Marxist Leninists in our final paper. For it is mainly though a discussion of what are concrete takks as communsts that we will rebuild our unity, and hopefully move forward together.