First Published: Frontline, Vol. 6, No. 1, June 20, 1988.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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Although perestroika flows out of the inner compulsions of Soviet society, its impact will inevitably be felt by communist parties and other left and progressive forces throughout the world. For in examining the underlying roots of the crisis which has made the revolutionary restructuring of their society an urgent political matter, Soviet leaders have undertaken a profoundly critical review not only of their own history but of the ideological principles which have informed it. A similar review would seem to be incumbent on revolutionary forces elsewhere who have shaped their outlook and organized their activity on those same principles.
It will not be easy to subject long-held views to serious questioning. Most of us are locked into concepts of socialism, Marxist theory, modes of political struggle and forms of organization which have assumed the character of “fundamental principles.” But such an undertaking belongs on our common agenda even if Gorbachev’s “new way of thinking” had not provoked it. For who can deny that the marginalization of the left in U.S. politics is a collective phenomenon – and that despite differences in size, outlook and history, no socialist-oriented party or organization enjoys what even remotely might be described as a “vanguard” relation to the U.S. working class?
Among the questions provoked by the current Soviet debate are the following:
Political Strategy: What the left holds in common – indeed, what makes it a “left” in the first place – is the view that capitalism is historically doomed and that socialism provides the basis for an equitable society capable of furthering progress and meeting human needs. But some of the sharpest differences on the left revolve around more precise visions of what socialism might look like and the political process for getting there.
Implicit in Gorbachev’s new way of thinking, however, is an assessment that capitalism – at least in the most economically developed countries where it holds sway – is not facing an imminent revolutionary challenge. Capitalism, says Anatoly Dobrynin, the former Soviet ambassador to the U.S. and currently a key Gorbachev advisor, “has shown a considerably larger reserve of durability than was previously imagined.” In addition, Dobrynin notes, “In conditions of the scientific and technological revolution and the profound social changes caused by it, the character of the mass base on which the communist movement has traditionally relied is changing.”
If these assessments are accurate – and that itself is something we must examine – they pose provocative questions for a left political strategy in the U.S. They suggest that what we must demand of ourselves is a perspective for addressing broad political questions and trends which go beyond the immediate possibilities of the class struggle and still fall short of a precise strategy for achieving socialism. And let’s be frank about it. Our political thinking on this point – what might be called the “intermediate tasks” of the U.S. revolution – is, at the very least, undeveloped.
The new way of thinking also challenges a longstanding view of most Marxists that many basic social questions will be impossible to resolve under capitalism. But if capitalism is a considerable ways from exhausting its potential for adaptation, some of these cannot be put off. Foremost among these is the question of nuclear war. In the past, the Marxists have argued that war is inherent in capitalism and that all schemes of world peace short of the destruction of imperialism were dangerous fantasies. Now Gorbachev is arguing that nuclear disarmament and the elimination of war as a means of resolving contradictions between nations has become an urgent political question which cannot be postponed until the worldwide triumph of socialism. His focus is particularly on nuclear war but includes the assessment that any war between the major powers must be prevented because of the overwhelming likelihood that such a conflict would quickly escalate to the nuclear level. (Gorbachev believes that there are other “universal” questions before humanity requiring a common approach rising above class interests. Among these are the limited resources of the planet, exploration of space, dangers of ecological catastrophe, etc.)
We have hardly begun to explore the implications of such a perspective on a left political strategy in the U.S. Finally, as Dobrynin’s second comment suggests, we need to take a new look at traditional notions concerning the “agents of social change.” More specifically, the question which must be posed is whether or not the clearly shrinking industrial sector of the U.S. working class provides the most reliable and stable social base for left politics both in the immediate and in the long run.
The Vanguard Party: At the heart of Marxism-Leninism is the concept of the “revolutionary vanguard” – a consciously constructed political force which undertakes to guide the efforts of the working class in the class struggle. Although the new way of thinking does not abandon this concept, it has called into question a body of ideas and practice long associated with the notion of the vanguard party.
Most importantly, the present Soviet leadership has reminded the communists themselves of a truism often obscured and distorted by existing parties: namely, that the vanguard character of a party stems from and describes an actual relationship to the working class and to the class struggle. Further, Gorbachev has noted that communist parties are not omniscient and have no monopoly on the truth. Although such assertions are almost painfully obvious, it can hardly be denied that Marxist-Leninist parties have not always conducted themselves as though this is the case.
Within a framework that assumes the necessity for a conscious vanguard, certain conclusions about the U.S. left flow inescapably from this approach. Let me suggest three: one, no presently existing party or organization on the left can be characterized as a vanguard; two, there is nothing preordained suggesting that any particular party or organization will achieve a vanguard role; and three, the possibility that a vanguard will emerge not simply as a single political form but through – and even in the form of – a coalition or alliance of political forces cannot be ruled out.
Needless to say, such propositions seem relatively abstract under present conditions. The unfortunate truth – not always faced – is that debates about vanguards in the U.S. at the present time bear little relation to real political processes. But this is precisely what makes the questions posed by the new way of thinking so timely for us. For if we do not expect socialism to be a historically mature question of U.S. politics in the foreseeable future, then we have the possibility of overcoming a legacy of sectarianism which has traditionally been justified by ideological differences on the nature of socialism and the path to it. And if there is the will to acknowledge that no existing force either has all the answers or is predestined to become a vanguard, we can eliminate many existing barriers to closer relations of both dialogue and united action among those who share a common outlook on the most pressing political questions before us.
Democratic Centralism: A critical feature of Marxist-Leninist parties is their democratic centralist form of organization. This principle, which accords a wide range of authority to a democratically elected centralized leadership and insists on the unity in action of all its members, derives from the function of such parties as strategic agencies of revolutionary struggle.
But despite protestations to the contrary, it has long been an open secret that most Marxist-Leninist parties have tended to emphasize centralism at the expense of democracy. As the outpouring of historical review in the Soviet Union indicates, democratic procedures in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) have tended to be formalistic rituals bearing little resemblance to a real decision- making process.
Justified by the exigencies of the class struggle, the system of democratic centralism as actually practiced by most Marxist-Leninist parties has proven vulnerable to various forms of ideological corruption which have actually undermined their capacity to fulfill the political functions it was designed to promote.
The challenge posed by the new way of thinking is to restore and enhance the democratic underpinnings of democratic centralism without weakening a party’s ability to move quickly and decisively in response to the demands of the class struggle. This call for democratization implies not only an inner-party structure for electing leadership, but a system of real accountability and a climate of openness to contending ideas without fear of political retaliation. Experience indicates that there is not a single democratic centralist organization on the U.S. left which can afford to assert that it has been immune from the distortions targeted by the Soviet party.
“Official Socialism”: One already achieved major ideological accomplishment of perestroika is the demise of “official socialism” – that is, the sanitized version of Soviet society dutifully promulgated by its own representatives and faithfully repeated by many pro-Soviet parties elsewhere in the world. Aside from what are probably his own inclinations in the matter, Gorbachev really had little choice but to blow the whistle on the legacy of one-sided assessments and rosy platitudes which were used to describe existing socialist societies. For these self-serving pronouncements had become a profound material force blocking all efforts at radical reform of an increasingly imperiled system.
In doing so, Gorbachev has taken a major step toward removing an onerous intellectual burden from defenders of socialism and the Soviet Union. The rationale underlying the traditionally idyllic portrayal of Soviet society by its supporters was that acknowledging defects and shortcomings would lend ammunition to socialism’s detractors. In fact, that approach did little but weaken the political credibility of those who advanced it.
And in an odd way, the absolutist supporters of the Soviet Union have always been the mirror image of its ultra-left critics. Both are locked into an idealist mindset which, in effect, holds that major flaws and significant contradictions cannot exist in a genuine socialist society. While the former therefore deny (or trivialize) such problems, the latter see in each the “proof” that socialism does not actually exist. Gorbachev has broken out of this ideological cul-de-sac and restored historical materialism to the, analysis of socialism. This approach has evoked anxiety, not only in the Soviet Union but among others who fear anything but safe platitudes in their depictions of Soviet society.
Clearly the new way of thinking has already improved prospects for combating anti-Sovietism in the U.S. – on the left as well as in society at large. In great measure, this speaks to the actual policies projected by the CPSU regarding all the outstanding international issues of the day. But a new image of Soviet society and socialism has also begun to emerge – one in which exaggeration and hyperbole have given way to openness and the projection of serious and complex ideas.
On the left, the openness and materialism now emerging in Soviet society seems likely to foster a climate in which defenders of socialism will be held accountable to a similar standard. Perhaps in the wake of such a development we may at last find paths leading toward more civil relations and ultimately forms of unity for a movement which up until now has not been able to work its way out of the sectarian frustrations of our common history.