First Published: Frontline, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 19, 1989.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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Poland’s national vote gave a decisive majority to the opposition for the seats they were contesting in Poland’s legislature. Solidarity, which had previously been silenced by martial law and illegality, displayed its ability to outdo Poland’s communists in attracting the popular vote. In a major setback for the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP), its candidates failed to gain majorities for most seats reserved for them and their allies.
Though it is not clear yet what the results will mean for the governance of Poland, the election has brought to the fore the fundamental political question facing the nation – national reconciliation. An accord between the opposition and the ruling PUWP appears at least one step closer to realization. This would mean fulfillment of the promise that Poland will be able to settle its internal differences peacefully and democratically.
But national reconciliation is now a more complicated process than ever, because both the communists and opposition have ceased to function as monolithic entities. In the aftermath of the elections, what appears to be taking shape is a realignment of political forces, an expression of Poland’s experiment with socialist pluralism. In this process, advocates of reform on both sides appear to be converging, while the more entrenched on both sides seek to undermine any working coalition or power sharing.
Even before official returns were announced, the government acknowledged that the non-communist opposition candidates loosely gathered around the banner of Solidarity had swept the elections. The opposition won 92 of 100 seats in the Polish Senate, and 160 of 161 seats in the Sejm, or lower house of Parliament.
Only a handful of the 299 PUWP-backed candidates for the Sejm won the necessary 50% majority. PUWP-backed candidates even failed to win majorities for 33 of the 35 uncontested Sejm seats. Among the losers were top PUWP officials, including seven members of the Politburo. The PUWP ran its own candidates along with candidates of the Peasant Party, the Democratic Association and three Christian organizations. These parties have shared power with the PUWP since the founding of socialist Poland.
A runoff election scheduled for June 15 will decide among at least two PUWP-endorsed candidates for the untilled seats in the Sejm.
In a formula hammered out after lengthy negotiations between the PUWP, the Solidarity opposition and the Catholic Church, the opposition was for the first time able to present candidates for Parliament independently of the three PUWP-backed parties. All fully expected that the contested seats would go to the opposition, thereby giving them a voice in decision-making that all agreed was warranted by their political weight in society. Voters therefore confirmed the negotiated agreement which for the first time brought opposition forces into the national legislature. In effect, therefore, the vote amounted to a plebiscite on the new pluralist system.
The relatively low voter turnout (for Poland) was an indication of the sentiment that the results of the balloting were a foregone conclusion and would not change the, terms of the new political arrangement. Everyone expected that the opposition and the communists would each win the seats allocated to them through the negotiations. This may have also contributed to some complacency on the part of PUWP supporters, who figured the party’s dominant role was secured no matter what. This sense of a preordained outcome may also explain the lackluster reaction to the vote results on both sides.
However, many in the opposition who oppose any power sharing with the PUWP are afraid that their electoral sweep will only reinforce calls for cooperation with the communists. Even before the balloting, Lech Walesa stated, “I think that too big a percentage of our people getting through would be disturbing and might force a fight on us.” (New York Times, June 5)
Walesa’s anxiety that a victory would increase pressures for his participation in the government turned out to be justified. Since the vote, the opposition has been openly divided over whether to accept cabinet positions in the government. The more militant supporters of Solidarity want nothing less than the removal of the PUWP from government. From the start, many of them saw participation in elections as equivalent to co-optation. On the other hand, the opposition’s political realists, including many independents, want to take advantage of the opportunity and stake out a foothold in government.
Lech Walesa, who has become one of the main interlocutors for the opposition since he emerged from relative obscurity only a year ago, appears to have thrown his weight behind the more militant position. Walesa is counseling Solidarity’s followers not to accept PUWP invitations to join the government. This appears to be based on the fear that the opposition will be too closely associated with government reforms, and be held responsible if they fail. But it also corresponds with Solidarity’s long run strategy of holding out until PUWP attempts to solve the deep economic crisis fail, after which the opposition would be able to fill the political void.
Walesa would prefer to see the opposition build a base for the future in Parliament instead of taking responsibility for the austerity measures everyone knows are required in the present (and there is even some indication he is personally headed back to trade union work instead of Parliament). In its June 7 editorial, the New York Times posed Walesa’s dilemma directly: “Solidarity is a fledgling opposition in a half-free society and cannot be expected to restrict its independence [by joining a governing coalition]. The more realistic question is whether Solidarity will give parliamentary support to unpopular but vital economic reforms.”
As Lech Walesa and other opposition leaders negotiate with the PUWP leadership over runoff elections and the immediate future, the political landscape is marked by new alignments and diversity.
Once Solidarity was the sole voice of dissent and the PUWP a monolithic ruling party. Today Lech Walesa and the Solidarity leadership is struggling to achieve a leading role in the opposition. It faces a militant core of trade union activists and a continuing crop of anti-establishment protestors who are suspicious of Walesa’s dealing with the communists. There are also the remnants of the underground Solidarity movement, who reject any cooperation with the government. The opposition’s hard-liners oppose any economic reforms that would raise prices and limit wage increases, and the closing of old smokestack industries. But these are the economic policies which the PUWP hopes to agree on with the opposition as necessary steps in decentralization, restructuring and development of the market.
The PUWP, on the other hand, is also experiencing a new diversity in its ranks. Its hard-liners are unable to come to grips with the depth of discontent and cynicism among Polish workers that leads them into the opposition camp. A large segment of the party, including the trade union leadership, opposed the accord with Walesa: Their reaction to the election results was a classical case of denying reality. For example, government spokesperson Zbyslaw Rykowski claimed the vote failed to reflect “the real collective will of society.”
The reformers in the PUWP, who appear to have a slight edge, are willing to make substantial concessions to the opposition in order to make a breakthrough in the political impasse that has blocked reforms over the past several years. They also view economic restructuring, not old-fashioned orthodoxy, as the only way out of the chronic economic crisis the country has experienced since the late 1970s.
Whatever new agreements arise from the new dialogue going on among political forces, Poland’s 1989 elections were clearly a crucial step in the democratization process. The vote confirmed some level of popular support for this process, but also signaled its complexity and difficulty.