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The Dialectics of Chicano Political Development: A Political Economy Perspective

Traditional social science has often viewed Chicano political organizations and social movements as reflecting a concensus about the most effective strategy for achieving political integration into the American political system.[1] This article will demonstrate that Chicanos have employed a variety of tactics and political orientations to acquire social equality for nearly fifteen million Spanish-speaking people who live in the United States. Currently, there are two dominant perspectives in Chicano political research and community organization: pluralism and Marxist political economy. Pluralism has traditionally been the most popular and influential of the two. However, its inability to lead to the attainment of community control and cultural integration into the present social structure has given rise to political economy— Marxism—as an alternative perspective for analyzing the nature of political power, economic inequality, and national discrimination in the United States.

This article will examine two schools of contemporary Chicano political research. According to the first, Chicano political leadership has during this century utilized three distinct forms of pluralism: assimilation, cultural democracy, and cultural nationalism. These three perspectives are generally perceived as having arisen spontaneously and in isolation from each other.

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In the past decade some Chicano scholars have disagreed with this assessment, instead correctly seeing the three apparently diverse approaches as definite stages in a systematic (although unconscious) political development.[2] The weakness of this approach is that, while understanding the logic of the progression, it sees it as being purely mechanical.

I shall discuss a second school of interpretation. According to this, the political goal of self-determination and cultural autonomy comprise a single historical process made up of distinct stages, each one escalating the political consciousness, cultural awareness, and social progress of Spanish-speaking peoples. The evolution from one stage to the next is not mechanical; it is a dynamic process reflecting the growing determination of the Chicano people to master their own political destiny. A clear understanding of this dynamic will reveal the interconnections between assimilation, cultural democracy, and cultural nationalism. The underlying basis of the evolution of political forms is the inability of each form or stage of awareness to resolve the basic contradiction in its strategy and ideology, a failure which results in a sharpening of social antagonisms. From this failure comes the political necessity of choosing alternative strategies to resolve the contradiction and the social conflicts stemming from it. This process in turn inevitably translates into a higher form of political consciousness and movement for social change. Here we see a political paradox: weakness and failure are the necessary preconditions for strength and progress.

The rest of the article, basing itself in this second school of historical interpretation, will address itself to political economy's being a viable substitute for pluralism, and its social applicability to the Chicano community. It will be shown that Marxist political economy is a "logical" outgrowth of pluralism insofar as the latter's inadequacies have provided the social conditions for the emergence of Marxism as a theory of social analysis. Marxism's growing popularity in the Chicano community has been met by a countercurrent, renewed support for pluralism in its old form of cultural democracy. The failure of cultural nationalist politics to achieve community control, then, has resulted in the forward thrust of Marxism, on the one hand, and a retrogression to a lower stage of Chicano development, on the other. The renewed interest in pluralism is a consequence of the political system's ability to

present at least the *appearance* of political and social integration of Chicanos into the institutional structures of our society. The key question remains as to how Marxists in the *barrios* can struggle against this backward development, and by doing so gather mass support for their philosophy and program.

Pluralism

Assimilation, cultural democracy, and cultural nationalism share several political traits which place them within the framework of pluralism. First, they all view American politics as encompassing a multitude of interest groups which interact, compete, and compromise among themselves for specific social privileges and economic rewards. Second, they all strongly believe that social equality can be attained within the bounds of the present political system, and that the ballot box is the primary means for achieving parity in the decision-making process. Third, they all share the common assumption that political visibility is a prerequisite for economic and social transition into the middle class. (The concept of "class" for the pluralist is defined by traditional social indicators including income, educational level, and occupation.) Fourth, they all perceive that pluralism has been an effective political strategy for other ethnic groups, including Jews and blacks. Lastly, all three approaches agree that national oppression is the primary obstacle which prevents Chicanos from obtaining political representation.

What separates these three perspectives from each other is disagreement over the degree of cultural assimilation each is willing to accept as a trade-off for structural integration into the political mainstream. The initial version of pluralism was complete assimilation. The early assimilationists, who became active during the first part of the century, were convinced that total cultural immersion was key to social acceptance into the decision-making process. They felt very strongly that as long as an ethnic minority maintained the culture and language of the "old country," it would alienate itself from the dominant groups who distributed social and economic rewards to those jumping into the "melting pot." One of the organizations which first espoused this philosophy was the League of United Latin American Citizens

(LULAC), at present still the largest Spanish-speaking membership association in the United States. In 1929, the preamble of LULAC's constitution stated its goal:

> To develop within the members of our race, the best, purest, and most perfect type of true and loyal citizen of the United States of America. The acquisition of the English language, which is the official language of our country, being necessary for the enjoyment of our rights and privileges . . . we pledge ourselves to learn and speak and teach the same to our children.[3]

LULAC and other assimilative Mexican-American groups have been responsible for challenging the exclusion of Chicanos from juries, the segregation of Chicano children in public schools, police brutality in the *barrios*, and Spanish-speaking people's lack of voting rights. But the philosophy of assimilation lacked the capacity to guarantee the achievement of these demands for social equality, and this reality led to its gradual decline. Thirty years of cultural assimilation between the 1920's and 1950's resulted in neither concrete social reforms nor the election and appointment of Chicanos to places within the political system. Being the lowest stage of pluralism, the philosophy of assimilation lacked a clear understanding of the nature of ethnic discrimination. First, while there were certain dominant cultural traits which Chicanos could adopt in order to assimilate (food, religion, language, and values), they could not possibly change their physical characteristics (color of skin, eyes, hair, size); therefore complete integration was impossible. More important, the visible existence of poverty among many Anglo-Americans, especially during the Great Depression, was a social clue that poverty and lack of political power were not entirely a result of racial discrimination or lack of cultural assimilation.

As a consequence of the limitations of assimilationism, certain liberal Chicano groups during the 1950's offered cultural democracy as a possible strategy for social change. The essence of cultural democracy is its attempt to integrate the positive qualities of both the Anglo-American and Mexican cultures in order to create a bilingual, bicultural American citizen whose loyalty is to the United States. Organizations favoring this perspective have included the Mexican-American Political Association, the U.S. Hispanic Congressional Caucus, and the "Viva Kennedy and Johnson" Clubs of the early 1960's. These groups reject the assimilationist doctrine that ethnic

minorities have to sacrifice their cultures as a means of acquiring social equality, arguing that, on the contrary, ethnic diversity and organizations based on it have been instrumental in the distribution of tangible rewards. The cultural democrats agree with the assimilationists that, despite institutional discrimination, political justice is attainable in the existing system:

> It has been proven time and time again that minority people in our country have suffered indignities at the hands of the majority; however, it is also true that the system provides the means of correcting these inequalities. Indeed, one needs merely to note the progress in this country of the Irish, the Italians and other people who migrated to this land seeking freedom, a better life. . . . Only recently have we seen a coalescence of two cultures where Hispano-Americans have taken the best of each background and welded them together to form an American.[4]

The cultural democrats point to the rapid political integration of Mexican-Americans as being a direct result of their own particular political style. This process includes the elections of Congressmen Henry Gonzales (Texas, 1961), Edward Roybal (California, 1962) Eligio de la Garza (Texas, 1964), Manuel Lujan (New Mexico, 1966), as well as the late United States Senator Joseph Montoya and state Governors Raul Castro (Arizona, 1974) and Jerry Apodaca (New Mexico, 1974). In addition, there has been an increase in state and federal appointments to advisory boards and commissions.[5] This expansion of political positions has been accompanied by certain reforms in the areas of affirmative action, bilingual education, voting rights, health care, and rights for farmworkers.

The strategy of cultural democracy proved that total cultural assimilation was not necessary to elect and appoint Chicanos and to achieve certain social reforms. It was an advance over assimilationism toward the goal of cultural autonomy and self-determination. But cultural democracy could not resolve a major contradiction which prevented it from advancing any further, namely, that the flow of Chicanos into the political system did not result in social and economic equality for the majority of poor Chicanos. In fact, the increase in the political visibility of some Chicanos has been paralleled by a downward trend in the social conditions of Spanish-speaking people as a whole.[6] In addition, many of the reforms and much of the progress of the past two decades has been slowly undermined by means of attacks on affirmative

action, cutbacks in social services, and an increase in national discrimination against Chicanos by the media (distorted reports on "illegal aliens," Chicano youth gangs, the "Mexican Mafia," and attacks on Chicano public officials). Finally, there are fewer Chicanos in the United States Congress today than there were in 1970; there has not been a Chicano from either major party elected to that body in the past ten years.

The highest and final stage of pluralism is cultural nationalism. By the mid-1960's, several progressive Chicano groups had begun to criticize the legitimacy of cultural democracy as a strategy for concrete social change. They viewed assimilation and cultural democracy as reflecting individual rather than collective social mobility. Cultural nationalism as expressed in the last decade rejects Anglo-American culture and social institutions and instead embraces the culture and traditions of Mexico and other Latin American countries. It views the inequality of Chicanos as directly tied to the Anglo-American political and economic system in which Chicanos formulate and carry out their political and social activities, and advocates a separatist philosophy for achieving social equality. Cultural nationalist groups have engaged in various activities including marches, demonstrations, arrests, sit-ins, and school boycotts.

The early stages of cultural nationalism tended to be socially spontaneous and lacking clear political objectives and tactics. But soon political goals began to be defined, as in *El Plan de la Raza Unida* (1967) and *El Plan de Aztlán* (1969), two manifestos proclaiming the political independence and cultural autonomy of the Chicano people. The former stated:

> We accept the framework of constitutional democracy and freedom within which to establish our own independent organizations among our people in pursuit of justice and equality and redress of grievances. La Raza Unida pledges to join with all our courageous people organizing in the fields and in the *barrios*. We commit ourselves to La Raza, at whatever cost.[7]

El Plan de Aztlán noted:

> We are free and sovereign to determine those tasks which are justly called for by our house, our land, the sweat of our brows, and by our hearts.... With our heart in our hand and our hands in the soil, we declare the independence of our

> mestizo Nation. We are a bronze people with a bronze culture. Before the world, before all of North America, before all our brothers in the Bronze Continent, we are a Nation. We are a union of free pueblos. We are Aztlan.[8]

"Aztlan" denotes the legendary homeland of the ancient Aztec Indians, historically located in northern Mexico, and presently the southwest part of the United States, where the majority of Chicano people reside. By establishing a Chicano Nation the cultural nationalists further advanced the concept of political, economic, and cultural independence for the Spanish-speaking population. Since the nationalists refused to work within the Anglo-American two-party system, it was inevitable that they would organize their own political arm, El Partido de La Raza Unida, a Chicano third party.[9]

The first success of La Raza Unida took place in south Texas in April, 1970, when fifteen of its candidates were elected to local and county offices. This was further evidence that community control and cultural autonomy could be achieved without either assimilation or the compromise of working within the two-party system. These victories had a profound effect on the Chicano struggle throughout the United States. Soon, La Raza Unida chapters were organized in various states, and at its first national convention (El Paso, Texas, 1972), over 18 state chapters were represented. The political takeover of Crystal City, Texas was viewed as the crucial link between theory and the concrete application of *El Plan de La Raza Unida* and *El Plan de Aztlán*.

The victory of La Raza Unida led directly to the modification or elimination of election laws and codes which discriminated against the Chicano voter and candidate. An indirect result was increased pressure on both major parties, especially the Democrats, to support Mexican-American candidates and issues in order to maintain a certain degree of credibility in the *barrios*. Further, La Raza Unida afforded Chicanos the opportunity to develop organizational skills in campaigning, voter registration drives, and conferences, thus lessening their dependence on outside political groups. Finally, the *partido* was the first attempt to organize a *national* Chicano political party; previous pluralist models had been regional and had worked within the structure of the two-party system.

Why, then, did La Raza Unida Party—and cultural nationalism as a trend—fall short of its goal of self-determination and cultural freedom?

There are a number of reasons. First, government documents and other official information reveal that the United States government weakened and fragmented La Raza Unida and the Chicano movement generally through a wide variety of "dirty tricks," arrests, surveillance, undercover agents, and other clandestine activities. Second, the *partido* was plagued from the outset by internal problems—lack of a strong national leadership, regionalism, lack of money, male supremacy, personality conflicts, and a lack of clear goals and political program.

More important, it had a misconception of American politics. While cultural nationalism was able to resolve certain previous contradictions of pluralism, it could not resolve the fact that it was reformist in nature. Cultural nationalists believed they were revolutionary, but in fact their activities legitimized and supported the American political system by engaging in voter registration drives, election of candidates, political conventions, and other acceptable electoral practices *as a strategy*. As Professor Armando Navarro notes:

> Chicanos who espoused radical politics of various sorts were divided over ideology, program and strategy. Some militants and radicals who use revolutionary rhetoric actually proposed not revolution but militant integration into Anglo society. Many of their demands were directed not toward revolution but toward reform and social change, i.e., better housing, increased job opportunities, better education and equality and justice within the system . . . . [10]

Other general weaknesses of cultural nationalism were, one, a romanticization of Mexico and an ignoring of the root causes of poverty and oppression in that nation; and, second, a failure to distinguish between Anglo-American capitalists and Anglo-American workers.[11]

The final contradiction of cultural nationalism, and the most paradoxical, is that Chicanos are demanding local self-government and independence within a system (capitalism) which is based on the centralization of power and the dependence of the working class upon the corporate structure. In 1850 there were only eleven joint programs between the federal and local governments. At the present time there are over three hundred. During the Eisenhower administration an advisory commission on inter-governmental relations was developed to coordinate federal funding to the cities. Since then there have been thirty-four national advisory commissions established to investigate local and

state issues such as civil rights, urban renewal, transportation, population control, crime, racism, and urban rebellions. The federal government, including the United States Supreme Court, has injected itself into the mainstream of American life on the local level in areas as diverse as free lunches and school integration. The federal revenue sharing program begun by the Nixon administration increased the growing dependence of local and state governments upon the federal bureaucracy. We are currently witnessing cities pleading for federal assistance in order to function.

Thus local control, and particularly Chicano community control, becomes less of a political reality as the federal superstructure acquires more influence. Local governments administered by Chicanos must rely on state and federal funds to operate and provide social services. Ironically, La Raza Unida Party control of Crystal City, Texas has *furthered* rather than lessened the dependence of that area on outside assistance. Other situations show the same pattern: the more "community control" you have, particularly in poor, minority communities, the more you become dependent on federal handouts, and the more open you become to economic penetration and domination by outside forces. The reason is not far to seek. Inflation and unemployment and their effects are national and international issues, and cannot be resolved in a political vacuum at the local level.

Presently, the failure of the politics of cultural nationalism to secure community control has resulted in two divergent directions in Chicano political behavior. On one side, there has been a renewed interest in the tactics of cultural democracy and with it a return to the fold of the two-party system. However, this return has not meant a simple return to the way things were. Whereas in the 1950's and 1960's cultural democrats were concentrated primarily in the Democratic Party, in the 1970's many Chicano organizations increased their support for the Republican Party. In the 1978 general election, nearly 40 per cent of the Hispanic electorate voted for Republican candidates, many of whom were themselves Hispanic.

Political Economy (Marxism)

On the other side, however, other forces within the Chicano community have introduced Marxism as a method for understanding and doing

something about Spanish-speaking people's lack of political and economic self-determination. Marxist political economy states that Chicanos cannot acquire political, economic, or cultural equality within the framework of capitalism, since capitalism by its very nature is an unequal system. Our society, says political economy, is stratified by class, sex, and nationality. The result of this stratification, among other things, is unevenness in education, health care, justice, housing, and political input into the decision-making process. So long as these social distinctions and relations exist, the Chicano community can neither control nor determine public policy for itself, something which is not true for the upper class. This fact is relevant since the majority of the Spanish-speaking population are wage-laborers within the capitalist mode of production.[12]

In the past five years a number of publications have appeared attempting to integrate the philosophy of Marxism with the Chicano experience in the United States.[13] While they disagree on certain issues pertaining to the "national question,"[14] they share certain common characteristics which distinguish them from the Chicano pluralist models. First, the Marxist political economist does not negate the necessity for social reforms and running minority candidates at all levels of government. However, the political system is not divorced from the economic base; both structures influence one another. As Marx says in his *Critique of Political Economy*:

> The production of the immediate material of subsistence and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art and even the ideas of religion of the people concerned have evolved . . . . The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.[15]

Second, the political economist makes a clear distinction between liberal reforms and the revolutionary struggle, although the latter might involve reform issues. Liberal reforms are viewed by the pluralist as legislative acts which can remedy the social ills of our society within the present political system. The Marxist disagrees, and supports progressive reforms and candidates in order to prepare the ground for transforming the present social order into socialism.

Third, whereas the pluralist places priority on controlling the political system, the political economist emphasizes taking control of

the economic base and transforming *it*. By doing so the working class in general and Chicano workers in particular can determine what is produced, how it is produced, and how the profits are distributed to those who labor. To insure this, a democratic decision-making process must be implemented to secure a level of social and economic well-being for all working people.

Fourth, the political economist defines *class* as a group of people who share the same role in the process of social production. There are several classes, but the two major groups are the owners of the means of production (capitalists), and their wage workers (proletarians). There exists an inherent conflict of political, social, and economic interests between these two groups. In addition, whereas the pluralist seeks to advance into the middle class and possibly into the upper class—"Brown Capitalism"[16]—the advocates of Marxism work toward the abolition of all class distinctions.

Lastly, the political economist examines the inequality of Chicanos from a multidimensional perspective encompassing class, sex, and nationality, not merely ethnicity. Chicanos are participants in three distinct conflicts or contradictions. First, they hold the position of being primarily a wage-earning group. This places them alongside the mass of U.S. workers in opposition to the elite corporate class which owns and controls the instruments of production. Note that this concentration of productive wealth (mines, factories, harbors, transportation, and agriculture) is *critical because it is the source of political and economic self-determination*. Productive wealth is becoming more centralized in the hands of a few transnational corporations, while the ever-expanding Chicano population owns less and less productive wealth.[17] This translates into a continuous decrease in political and economic community control by Spanish-speaking people.

The second contradiction is that although most Chicanos are part of the United States working class, they are separated because of their historical national oppression. As members of an oppressed national group, Chicanos confront discrimination based on their national characteristics (language, appearance, and culture), whereas even workers of Anglo-American nationality claim social privileges in these areas.

The third contradiction is that the oppression of Chicanos is further manifested in sex discrimination. Chicana women earn on the average less money than Chicano men and confront certain social barriers which Chicano men do not, and which prohibit them from running for political office, getting certain jobs, and achieving leadership in the Chicano struggle. As a result of living in a male supremacist society, there exist sexual stereotypes believed by Chicano men about Chicana women.[18] Thus, while Chicanos demand the end of inequality, they in turn have been socialized into perpetuating the inequality of women.

These three contradictions are intrinsic to the corporate structure and can be alleviated only with the transformation of our present social institutions into a collective and democratic decision-making process.

Chicanos are, in sum, a distinct cultural group within the U.S. working class, but are at the same time united with non-Chicanos and Chicana workers suffering from the same oppression of capitalism. Thus, as far as their distinct characteristics and legacy of national and sex oppression are concerned, Chicanos are a people with an inherent right—one which they must exercise—to determine their proportionate representation in society's schools and government without outside intrusion. But as to the overall, and primary, class oppression, Chicanos and Chicanas, Anglo-Americans, blacks and other nationalities of the working class are parts of the same group and must jointly determine their destiny apart from the ruling class which now controls all of them. It is unreasonable, for example, to demand that Chicano workers control the political and educational systems when they do not control the economic system which determines them. Chicanos will be able to achieve neither political self-determination nor cultural and territorial autonomy as long as they do not have control over the utilization and products of their own labor. This alienation of labor can be observed, for example, when Chicana garment workers cannot purchase the expensive clothes they make; when Chicano auto workers cannot buy the luxury cars they produce; and when Chicano construction workers cannot afford to live in the expensive homes they build. The most blatant example is that of the farmworkers, who feed the nation and the world while going hungry themselves.

Summary

The integration of Chicanos into the American political and economic system was the direct consequence of conflict between the United States and Mexico during the nineteenth century, culminating in the Mexican-American War of 1846. The principal cause of this war was the growing need of expanding U.S. capitalism for new markets and raw materials. Since the time of this conquest, the conquered Mexican national minority has continued to struggle for self-determination and cultural freedom. The target has been, objectively, the initial and basic cause of their forced submission—United States capitalism. In the course of their struggle they have utilized several tactics, including assimilation, cultural democracy, and cultural nationalism. Each stage has contributed its share of political reforms and progress; each has transcended the political consciousness of the previous stage. But the politics of pluralism have not been able to resolve the issues of class, national, and sexual discrimination, and as a result Marxist political economy has emerged as a theory and method of social analysis.

Chicano political visibility within the political institutions of capitalist society does not guarantee social and economic democracy. All attempts to equalize inequality in a stratified society are doomed to fail. In fact, by its own definition, pluralism implies economic and social competition, which in turn reflects the ideology of capitalism. Rather than competition, Chicanos and other working-class people must seek cooperation and collectivism.

Several Chicano organizations, leaders, and scholars have advocated continuing down the pluralist path in the conviction that it will lead to equality. I have raised what I believe to be several serious limitations of pluralism. I hope that further research into the Chicano political experience will continue to address the issues and concerns I have outlined here.

Footnotes

[1] Salvador Alvarez, "Mexican-American Community Organizations" in *El Grito* (Vol. 4, No. 3, Spring, 1971).

[2] Miguel David Tirado, "Mexican-American Community Political Organizations" in *Aztlan* (Vol. 1 No. 1, Spring, 1970); Alfredo Cuéllar, "Perspectives on Politics" in *Mexican-Americans* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970) and Armando Navarro, "The Evolution of Chicano Politics" in *Aztlan* (Vol. 5 No. 1, Spring and Fall 1974).

[3] *Ibid*. Tirado, pp. 57-58.

[4] News item in *El Republicano* (Vol. 1 No. 1, 24 October 1974, p. 2).

[5] Frank C. Lemus, "National Roster of Spanish Surnamed Elected Officials 1973" in *Aztlan* (Vol. 4 No. 1 and 2, Spring and Fall, 1974) and Arthur D. Martinez, *Who's Who Chicano Officeholders 1977-78* (Western New Mexico University, 1978).

[6] United States Commission on Civil Rights, *Social Indicators For Minorities and Women*, August, 1978.

[7] Armando B. Rendon, *Chicano Manifesto: The History and Aspirations of the Second Largest Minority in America* (New York: Collier Books, 1971), p. 331.

[8] *Ibid*. pp. 336-337.

[9] John Stamples Shockley, *Chicano Revolt In A Texas Town* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1974); Tony Castro, *Chicano Power: The Emergence of Mexican America* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1974); Alberto Juarez, "The Emergence of El Partido de La Raza Unida: California's New Chicano Party" in *Aztlan* (Vol. 3 No. 2, Fall, 1972); and Richard Santillan *La Raza Unida* (Los Angeles: Tlaquilo Publications, 1973).

[10] Navarro, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[11] Interviews with La Raza Unida Party organizers in the State of California. See Richard Santillan, *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism: El Partido De La Raza Unida in Southern California 1969-1978* (Dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1978).

[12] Laura E. Arroyo, "Industrial and Occupational Distributions of Chicana Workers" in *Aztlan* (Vol. 4 No. 2, Fall, 1973); Tim D. Kane, "Structural Change and Chicano Employment in the Southwest, 1950-1970" in *Aztlán* (Vol. 4 No. 2, Fall, 1973); Roberta V. McKay, "Americans of Spanish Origin in the Labor Force: An Update" in *Agenda* (Vol. 7 No. 1, January/February, 1977.)

[13] Communist League, *Regional Autonomy for the Southwest* (1974); Revolutionary Union, *The Chicano Struggle and the Struggle for Socialism*; October League, "Chicano Liberation" in *Class Struggle: Journal of Communist Thought* (Summer, 1975, No. 2); Communist Party U.S.A., *Toward Chicano Liberation: The Communist Party Position* (New York: New Outlook Publishers, 1972); August Twenty-Ninth Movement, *Fan the Flames: A Revolutionary Position on the Chicano National Question* (1975); Socialist Workers Party and Miguel Pendas, *Chicano Liberation and Socialism* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976); Mario Barrera, "The Study

of Politics and the Chicano" in *Aztlán* (Vol. 5 No. 1 and 2, Spring and Fall, 1974). In the same issue see Tomas Almaguer, "Historical Notes on Chicano Oppression: The Dialectics of Racial and Class Domination in North America," and Carlos Munoz, "The Politics of Protest and Chicano Liberation: A Case Study of Repression and Cooptation."

[14] Antonio Rios Bustamante, *Mexicans in the United States and the National Question: Current Polemics and Organizational Positions* (Santa Barbara: La Causa Publications, 1978).

[15] Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), preface.

[16] "The Top 100 Latino Companies" in *Nuestro* (Vol. 3 No. 1, January/February, 1979).

[17] See G. William Domhoff, *Who Rules America?* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); David N. Smith, *Who Rules the Universities?* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966); Felix Greene, *The Enemy: What Every American Should Know About Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Press, 1972); George Thayer, *Who Shakes the Money Tree?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973); Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Norton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohn, *America Inc.: Who Owns and Operates the United States* (New York: Dell Books, 1971); and Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

[18] Special Issue on Chicanas in *Regeneración* (Vol. 2 No. 4, 1975).