



**The Working Class
and
the Iranian
Revolutionary
Movement**

Following
is
the introduction of
GHIAM-E-KARGAR
(Workers' Insurrection),
the
proletarian organ
of
the OMPI,
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The Working Class and the Iranian Revolutionary Movement

Worker Comrades,

The publication of the first issue of GHIAM-E-KARGAR (the proletarian organ of the OMPI), as one of the most important means of communication between the vanguard armed movement and the movement of the working class, signifies a new phase in the Iranian revolutionary movement, spearheaded by the new communist movement.

This new phase is, on the one hand, marked by those essential requirements that make it imperative for the armed Marxist organizations to address and orient themselves towards the toiling masses and to establish ties with the movement of the working class and, on the other hand, it is identified by the growth and advancement of the spontaneous movement of the working class and its ever-expanding political and revolutionary needs.

Such a publication (GHIAM-E-KARGAR), then, finds its strategic import within the context of the most fundamental goals of this phase - the necessity of a link between the vanguard armed movement and the most toiling classes of the society, here the working class.

About two and a half years ago, after eight years of underground political work and two years of under-

ground political-military activity, we summed up our activities and the general effects of the strategy of the vanguard armed struggle on different classes. This revealed to us certain important shortcomings with regard to establishing ties with the spontaneous movements of the toiling classes and the initially existing theories revolving around this strategy in this area.

In practice, we were able to see that although these theories correctly offered the necessity of vanguard armed struggle as the main link in the struggle of the people and for breaking the political-strategic deadlocks of the time, and although at a certain phase they had succeeded in offering an appropriate answer to the most general political-strategic needs of the people's movement, nevertheless, in the light of the conditions prevailing after 1973 and after two years of a head-on combat with the traitor Shah's puppet regime, they no longer could respond to many new problems with which the progress of the movement had confronted us.

The problems with which we were occupied at that time (though they neither do nor can present themselves today in the way they then did) all pointed to the fact that the goal of an armed action can no longer enjoy an organic, popular, and increasing growth without clear-cut ties with the different classes and strata of the people, and without being able to have a furthering effect on the spontaneous struggles of the toiling masses and all anti-imperialist forces of our people.

These conclusions indicated that the weak link of the effects of the vanguard armed movement was to be found in its relation with those classes for whom the more palpable economic demands, rather than primary and urgent political-democratic demands, characterize their spontaneous struggles. Therefore, our strategic studies were to be pending on our study of a concrete and specific problem, that is, the relation between the vanguard armed movement and the spontaneous struggles of the toiling masses, and foremost, the relation between the vanguard armed struggle and the

spontaneous struggle of the working class.

Here we regularly confronted a series of other questions that had to be initially tackled. These questions were: at what stage is the spontaneous movement of the working class now? And what is its character? How can this movement be elevated to the level of armed struggle? How shall the vanguard armed action relate to the everyday struggle of this class, and how can it politicize it more? And finally, what are the strategic slogans, and what are the slogans for different stages that have to be raised to achieve this task?

But how did we approach these problems? and what were the concrete actions we took to solve them?

a) We organized a nucleus of a worker group whose purpose was to familiarize itself with the questions and problems concerning workers, and to find out how bridgeheads could be established between our organization and the movement of the working class in the first stage, and to establish such bridgeheads in the next (1).

This nucleus was able to gradually create a worker group that was in constant and daily contact with workers (by both those comrades who directly worked in factories and those who were in contact with certain professional-political workers' circles) after two years of activity and going through different stages of practice and organizational ups and downs. In this same period, the group succeeded in preparing a series of reports dealing with the material living conditions of workers (their economic lives, political views, beliefs, and problems...). These reports were compiled into four volumes and distributed within the organization (2).

These reports which were the product of our comrades' direct encounters with the workers' problems and the result of their long and persistent work in factories and living with workers, produced positive results in providing a knowledge of, and organizational intimacy with, the questions and problems of the

workers.

b) Parallel with this move (organizing the worker group), we studied the character of a series of armed actions that could specifically support the daily struggles of the workers and contribute to a closer association between the vanguard armed movement and the spontaneous movement of the working class within such a context. We decided that these actions, while maintaining their armed agitational character, should specifically not be at a level too much higher than the content of the specific demands of the workers, for apart from the possibility of not earning the immediate support of the workers, we would not achieve the results we expected of them as experimental moves (3).

Our main purpose of such series of actions, more than being one of agitation (though it did practically have such a result), was an inter-organizational one in order to familiarize ourselves with the specific problems of the working class movement, and to shed light on laws of relations between this movement and the vanguard armed movement. Therefore we were looking for a suitable time and position for such actions.

In the early spring of 1974 a new wave of working class struggles, vigorous and even bloody resistance and strikes set in motion. These struggles, primarily influenced by the inflationary pressures due to the sudden influx of millions of dollars of extra oil revenues, swiftly engulfed large numbers of factories. The simultaneous strikes in Land Rover Jeep Factory, Irana Production Unit, Tehran Oil Refinery, Melli Shoe Factory, ... in late May, tremendously frightened the Shah's anti-worker regime. The suitable time had come. Availing ourselves of prior reconnaissance, we were almost immediately able to plan a series of explosions in a few successive days as these strikes hit a climax.

These were:

1- An explosion in Karvansara Sangui gendarmerie post

at 3:15 on June 19. This post had played an active role in suppressing workers.

2- Simultaneous explosions of three bombs in the showroom and the central offices of the Israeli-owned Irana Co. on Nadershah avenue at 12:30 on June 25.

3- An explosion in the power facilities of the Israeli-owned Irana factory on Karaj road at 4:30 in the morning.

4- The explosion and complete destruction of the power facilities of Land Rover Jeep factory on Karaj road at the same hour.

Though these actions so clearly proclaimed, with the highest political content, the vanguard armed support for the working class movement at the most delicate moments possible, and though it was immediately welcomed and enjoyed a positive response from the conscious and advanced workers, nevertheless we refrained from making any immediate conclusions as to its political results until after direct investigations were made. Therefore, contrary to our previous practice (4), we went only so far as issuing a military communique with a minimum of explanation. Such a method would allow us to realistically study the effects of these actions without any fleeting enthusiasm and probably meaningless, impractical, and emotional slogans which are unfortunately exceedingly legion in the agitations of the struggles of this class. Of course we understood that by no means we could expect to obtain the broadest political-strategic results from such a limited experience. But once this experience, no matter how small, was juxtaposed with other small and numerous experiences and conjoined with our own observations in other areas (living and working amidst the workers), and when it was judged in view of the tremendous inexperience which was the product of the vacuum between the vanguard (its thought and practice...) and the movement of this class, then it would provide the necessary raw material for objective and responsible thinking and practice in such a direction (connection with the movement of the class).

But what were those results and how did we confront them? We shall discuss this in more length in this same publication at another opportunity. However, the first conclusions we drew showed that: without the existence of a concrete political-organizational connection with the working class movement, vanguard armed agitation cannot achieve its more essential political goals.

This conclusion was supported from another direction and by another method through the experience and objective observations of our worker group. In its first conclusions drawn from its experience, this group emphasized the huge gap between the economic-professional content of the working class struggle and the political content of the vanguard armed struggle, while at the same time pointing to some concrete potential readiness in the movement of this class, depending on a conscious approach on the part of the vanguard to further politicize this movement.

Thus our role was clear.

Our armed agitation in connection with the movement of this class not only should rest on the existence of a worker organization that can establish direct organizational contact with the advanced and conscious proletarian elements and groups (a duty the first steps of which we took by organizing a worker group), but it should also possess the kind of means and capabilities that would enable it to establish the most direct and expansive connection with the movement of this class.

This function has now been taken up by GHIAM-E-KARGAR.

GHIAM-E-KARGAR is in fact the very necessary background and the means that is able to, on the one hand, bring about an accelerating effect on the growing spontaneous movement of the working class by studying the working class struggles, summing up the experiences and elevating them to the level of guiding theory, and, on the other hand, raise the consciousness of the workers and provide the necessary

subjective background for elevating the spontaneous movement of the working class to the level of the people's armed movement by explaining the political-revolutionary goals of the vanguard armed movement, and also by educating them in Marxism-Leninism - this only weapon of the toiling masses against the exploiters.

In our next issue we shall discuss other aspects of this problem.

Long live the unity between the workers and the people's Mojahed fighters

Down with the anti-worker regime of the Shah - the regime of the bandits and robbers of the Iranian toiling masses

FOOTNOTES

(1) The first such group was organized in 1969, headed by martyr Mohamad Bazargan. Since the group was not equipped with a correct viewpoint, it was not able to achieve much, and, after the August ('71 police - tr.) attack, nothing in the way of a put-together and usable experience was left of this group.

(2) We shall publish these reports in due succession and after making the necessary decisions. The report on the strike at Irana factory in this issue is one of them.

(3) It is obvious that the duty of a vanguard organization is not to reduce the political content of its struggle to the level of the spontaneous struggles and to the lower economic or political demands, rather it is to elevate these struggles to the highest level of political struggle, namely, armed strug-

gle. It is also clear that essentially the most principal interests of the workers and all the toiling strata of society can be secured in connection with the most acute form of political struggle which has set its goal the destruction of the political-economic machine of comprador capitalism. So when we talk about establishing a connection between armed actions and the daily interests and struggles of the workers it does not in any way mean bowing to their spontaneous struggles (the content of the armed struggle shows this very well too), rather it is precisely to elevate it to a higher level of political consciousness, but from a starting point that would make this connection link possible, and that it would head so far ahead so as to remain completely separated from its class.

(4) For instance, for the explosion in the security quarters of the Industrial University (April 1974) that had been carried out in accordance with the line of armed support of the movements of different classes of people, not only did we carry out a comprehensive political exposure, but we were also able to determine the most principal tasks of the student movement and its slogans for this stage by virtue of our very clear and comprehensive knowledge of the problems and the stage of the Iranian student movement, and through concrete analysis of the class nature of this movement and its duties. The welcome response from the students as to the propounded goals, and the acceptance of this line by other militant groups and organizations attested to the correctness of our analysis. Today, one and a half years after we propounded this line, the Iranian students' struggle is explainable within the context of these very goals and tasks.