

KAR INTERNATIONAL

The Monthly Selected Works of the Organization of
the Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG)

Vol. III No. 17

May 1983

25c

The Power Deadlock Part I

Prime Minister Mosavi's cabinet was not yet fifty days old when Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the Majles, attacked the cabinet itself in a speech before the Majles (the parliament). He said: "...such delays in implementing certain decisions is not for the government. Responsible people take this reminder seriously. They respect the majles' decisions so that we aren't forced to keep coming into ever-more serious conflicts."

Despite all the leadership's efforts, the more farsighted politicians like Khamenei, to conceal the internal contradictions of the regime and despite the vain efforts of these politicians to protect unity in word and put on a show of unanimity — and thus protect the stability of the ruling council — once again, the internal contradictions of the regime reach such a degree of severity that the bickering has been dragged into the open. In the June, 1982, issue of *Kar*, we wrote a survey of the regime's internal differences. We said then that the sharpening of the open struggle of the masses would enflame these contradictions and they would become manifest in a deep split. Now a deep split is an undeniable fact.

On May 17, 1982, Fouad Karimi, a majles representative, posed Rafsanjani's criticism of the government with greater clarity: "These clashes aren't a weakness of the Islamic Republic. These clashes happen because the government doesn't take the line of the Majles." With the sharpening of the regime's internal contradictions which find their most obvious expression in the contradiction of the cabinet and the majles, on July 20, 1982, Chief Prosecutor Mosavi Ardebili said, "Look at your priorities. To weaken the government is to weaken the revolution." These "priorities" forced Khomeini to take a stand. This time, the leader of the "Imam's Line" speaks out against the "Imam's Line." On 8/2/82, Khomeini made a speech to the clergy. In it, he said, "The state must keep its power. Today, the state is an Islamic state. ...The clergy should be above involvement in executive matters." But the split is so deep that Khomeini is unable to paper it over. Rafsanjani, while accepting the resignation of the Minister of Health and the Minister of Mines and Metals, asked them to stay on.

continued on page 2

In This Issue

Draft of Reactionary Labor Laws

page 3



A Report To Supporters

page 8



The Kurdish People's Resistance Movement

page 5

The Necessity of Forming Underground Resistance Committees

page 7

The Revolution Continues

The barbaric repression of the people by the Islamic regime implementing the most animalistic methods, certainly could not have resulted in not bringing about a setback in the struggle of the masses. The movement of the masses, considering the weak conditions of the revolutionary vanguards, primarily consisted of spontaneous forms. Hence, rendering a slow pace to an analysis of the experiences gained by the masses. The masses of the people, during the ferocious on-slaughter of the regime, putting into effect its utmost oppressive strength, could not (and were not able to) counter the regime with suitable and qualitatively improved forms of confrontation relative to the existing ones. The savage assaults of the regime directed at the revolutionary forces would not have created anything but a sharp decline in struggling of the masses. The masses who, under the heavy burdens of life, feel the pain circulating their blood vessels, need more time to better their combat tactics to stand up to the dictatorship — which is now being imposed more nakedly.

But how can one know whether this is not the end of the story. Heavy blows inflicted upon the revolutionary vanguards, followed by the disintegration of a few of the communist organizations; strikes sustained by the People's Mojahdeen of Iran as the most active opposition force — seemingly their petit-bourgeois wrath is somewhat curbed by explosions and consecutive shootings [re-reference to PMOI's armed tactics against the regime in Iran]; and when faced with frightened masses, ebbing working class and toilers movements, accompanied by behind-the-scene grumblings (is it truly so?), should one not account for the defeat of the revolution? Should one still prepare for a future uprising? Can one detect in the perspective the new rise of the masses? May one speak of revolutionary rise in the era of the darkest dictatorship and dominance of terror.

Marx regards the revolutionary period of 1848-1849 defeated, gives upon inviting the proletariat to organize the uprisings and become armed, and discards the idea of forming a more expanded battle readiness, only after he realized the prevalent industrial and commercial crisis had been held back in Europe and the reaction had gained a "reviving force." Marx could see clearly that "the world exchange crisis," and the economic crisis that had covered the entire Europe, were the roots of the 1848-1849 revolutions.

"The eruption of the general discontent was finally accelerated and the sentiment for revolt ripened by two economic world-events.

The potato blight and the bad harvest of 1845 and 1846 increased the general ferment among the people. The high cost of living of 1847 called forth bloody conflicts in France as well as on the rest of the Continent. As against the shameless orgies of the finance aristocracy, the struggle of the people for the first necessities of life! At Buzancais the hunger rioters executed; in Paris the over-satiated escrocs snatched from the courts by the Royal family.

The second great economic event which hastened the outbreak of the revolution, was a general commercial and industrial crisis in England. Already heralded in the autumn of 1845 by the wholesale reverses of the speculators in railway shares, delayed during 1846 by a number of incidents such as the impending abolition of the corn duties, in the autumn of 1847 the crisis finally burst forth with the bankruptcy of the London grocers, on the heels of which followed the insolvencies of the land banks and the closing of the factories in the English industrial districts. The after-effect of this crisis on the Continent had not yet spent itself when the February Revolution broke out."

(Class Struggles in France — Marx, 1850)

Hence, as long as the crisis lasted, despite all of the repressions and the onslaughts committed by the reaction, track-downs that led to the disintegration of the entire organization of "The Union of The Communists," and the defeat of the southern German uprisings, Marx advises the extenuation of the revolution, an every expanded aggression, and organization of the armed workers for the uprising.

In the spring of 1850, only after extensive studies, when he realizes the industrial and the world-wide exchange crisis are under control, only when he knows that those objective conditions that had caused the revolution did not exist any longer, did he declare the defeat of the revolution, and a slowed up period. And instead, he pays attention to re-organization and mild activities in order to re-establish a revolutionary political army. Engels, years after, and having summed up the 1848-1849 revolutions, writes around Marx's analysis of these revolutions:

In 1850 Marx once again found leisure for economic studies, and first
continued on page 4

continued from cover

The Power Deadlock

Meanwhile the Prime Minister, heedless to Rafsanjani's efforts, set about appointing a new minister, (*Keyhan*, 82/8/1), one day later, i.e. on 82/8/2, Gonabadi, Majles representative of the people of Ferdows, scathingly criticized minister of housing and urban construction, and even indirectly called for his trial by revolutionary courts. The fight was on. The ministers were one by one called to answer criticisms and questions of the representatives. The conflict between the cabinet and factions of the majles as the sharpest focal point of the regime's internal conflicts evolves into a new stage.

The basic differences between the different factions of the bourgeoisie in prescribing tactics for solving the profound crisis which was gripping the whole system emerged from behind the cloak of censorship and repression, and the phoney claim of the regime's stabilization and instituting law and order, which is based on nothing but the savage repression of the people, exposed. The clash of revolution and counter-revolution, the continuation of the fervent movement of the people, i.e., the continuation of the revolution, always found its reflection among the "ruling clique." And now, once again, the sharp conflict going on between those who draw up the laws and those who implement them, and also the myth of "the unity of the regime and the defeat of the revolution" has become a sick joke.

A superficial look this time shows how the current contradiction is different from those of the previous stages. If in the previous stages the rise of the contradictions at the top, found its expression in the contradiction between the liberals (concentrated in the Cabinet) and the united followers of the Imam's line (in the Majles) or expressed in the contradiction between the opposition to the "Viceregency of the Faqih", or the rule of jurisprudence, (in the executive branch) and the supporters of the "Viceregency of the Faqih," this time the expression of the contradiction once again is in its most basic form in the wrangling between the cabinet and the Majles, but this time, the conflict is between two factions of the "Imam's Line." This time, the formerly united spokesmen who beat their breasts under the Imam's banner have split into two factions, Rafsanjani's and the Hojjiyyeh. But this is nothing more than a superficial view. The regime's internal contradictions *in whatever form they take are always in their main aspect contradictions between representatives of relatively advanced capitalism and representatives of relatively backward capitalism who are in conflict over how to rebuild the capitalist system which has suffered real blows, and how to set up its political superstructure.*

The disintegration of the followers of the Imam's Line into its component parts and the confrontation with various factions (*KAR* No. 145) which resulted in the weakening of the sectarian currents and the strengthening of representatives of advanced capitalism in the government was the principle characteristic of this phase. It is the contradictions of the regime which is itself the unprecedented unity of social conflicts and their reflection in a high form. The purpose of this article is to set out this feature based on documents of media and reports which are extant and to point out the states' direction and tendency towards the centralization of the state repressive forces, in confronting the rising tide of the masses' revolution.

The glorious uprising of February 11, 1979, dealt a mortal blow to the dependent capitalist state apparatus, and it disintegrated. The masses didn't place themselves under the banner of the aroused proletariat, but under the flag of illusions in Khomeini, and thus different factions of the bourgeoisie, by compromising with each other, seized power. Now the representatives of the backward layers of the bourgeoisie who for years were under pressure seized political power on the backs of the mass upsurge. Inevitably, the reconstruction of the beat-up capitalist system relied on organized forces of repression, which had been formed behind the state apparatus and repressive forces, and were thus relatively intact, in addition to demagoguery. The other faction of the bourgeoisie, under the pressure of the revolution, identified themselves as supporters of the political rule of the Imam's Line. The unity of factions of the bourgeoisie was around this point: preserving and rebuilding the system against the stormy waves of revolution.

Yet contradictions persisted regarding how to carry out this task of exercising political leadership and control over the state apparatus. The representatives of advanced capitalism (the liberals, etc.) always tried, while rebuilding and perfecting the liberal-bureaucratic state apparatus, to re-impose the rule of an appropriate political superstructure. The contradiction of factions of the bourgeoisie were centered here, bickering over exercising leadership and grabbing power, particularly executive power.

The liberals tried to use Imam's Line to "re-establish the economic relations of the past so that, using the existing social relations in the process of being established, re-establish the political forms appropriate to them." The axis of this movement was to absorb the counter-revolutionary fundamentalist institutions into the state apparatus and impose executive power over them. The Imam's Line entered into contradiction with its principle mission, the preservation and reconstruction of the shattered state apparatus against the revolution, and was trying to replace the official executive powers' organs of repression with their own unofficial organs of repression. This effort of the Followers of the Imam's Line entered into contradiction with the process of rebuilding the dependent capitalist system, and thus inflamed the existing contradictions. The Followers of the Imam's Line generates crises by their very nature. The advanced bourgeois, though, to protect the interests of the system as a whole and smash the revolution, had no choice but to give in to this mechanism and had to make due with opposing it on the sly. It gave in and united with it. Because of the increasing might of the revolution, emanating from the insurrection, the advanced bourgeoisie sought out a repressive force, but the only one available was controlled by the followers of the Imam's Line. To dilute the effects of the revolution, it needed a means of controlling the masses, but this was controlled by the Followers of the Imam's Line. But at the same time, it united against any efforts by the latter to consolidate their position because the Followers of the Imam's Line, because it doesn't fit into the socio-economic structure, breeds crises. This war and the evaporation of unity and the infighting from the very beginning sharpened the mutual antagonism in

the ruling council, despite their temporary confluence. The focus of these conflicts has always been the confrontation between the executive and legislative powers. This confrontation in the previous stages always had led to the victory of the parliamentary union of the Followers of the Imam's Line over the union of the liberals' cabinet and it was because of this that under those conditions the real executive power was simply the Imam's Line's repressive apparatus. The repressive organs were organized outside the battered state apparatus. It was for this reason that the executive power in fact didn't have the strength to implement or a club to repress except the battered organ left over from the Shah's time, the reconstruction of which was a long way off.

The fact is that as long as the Imam's Line hadn't accomplished its mission of minimizing the results of the revolution, as long as the executive power lacked the minimum necessary unity, as long as the material means for exercising power by the representatives of advanced capital hadn't been prepared, they hadn't been able to take power at the level of political rule. So therefore, the liberals' (the Bazargan cabinet and the Bani Sadr government) enthusiasm to repair the foundations of bourgeois relations became their gravediggers and turned against the liberals' leadership and thus their activity in the ruling council. But because of the liberal-bureaucratic composition of the ministries, army, and, on the whole, the "legal" institutions their exclusion didn't mean the exclusion of the liberals from the political equation and for this reason, the regime's "official" institutions and the bourgeoisie's state apparatus cultivated links with the new political representatives. Therefore, contradiction between the cabinet and the majles appeared once again as a reflection of the contradiction between different faction of the bourgeoisie.

June 20, 1982, was a turning point in the change of the balance of forces in the ruling council. The bourgeoisie once more was seriously menaced by the rise of the masses' struggles and so the Imam's line was able, with the support of all the factions of the bourgeoisie, to repress the insurrectionists. Killing the people and organizing a blood bath coincided with a temporary healing of the breach in the ruling council. The Rajai-Bahonar cabinet was a reflection of this stage. A unity cabinet, the progeny of the majles of the Followers of the Imam's Line. The bourgeois factions once more regrouped behind the Imam's Line to overcome the mass movement. The Imam's Line in this stage experienced a "glorious" period, its universal rule over every government institution helped them more than ever to carry out their mission, to "dilute as far as possible the results of the revolution." This process involved a period of complete negation of democratic freedoms and scattering and smashing the vanguard of the revolution.

The Imam's Line has accomplished its mission. It has outlived its usefulness. The unravelling of the temporary unity of the ruling council and the fall of the Rajai-Bahonar cabinet marked the decline of the control of the Imam's Line over the state apparatus.

To explain further: The Imam's Line, in carrying out its mission relies on institutions which are, on the one hand, outside the beat-up bourgeois state apparatus, and on the other hand, are centered around their claim on the mass adulation for Khomeini. The blood bath which was organized by the repressive, counter-revolutionary institutions following the Imam's Line gradually corroded the adulation of the masses, and so the Imam's Line in the process of repressing the people lost its raison d'etre as a point of support. We have said time and again that the Imam's Line's policies breed crisis, and can never overcome the crisis by protecting its class-caste interests, which are in contradiction with the existing system of imperialism and the stage of enveloping the Iranian dependent bourgeoisie. This contradiction cannot stay unresolved for very long; it can only be brought under control when the masses adulate them.

After June 20, in the course of the regime's killings, the masses' admiration for Khomeini was also shot down. The killings made manifest the existing tension in a brutal way. With the rise of the conflicts inside the Komitehs, the Corps, the Municipality, and the informer's network, the regime had no other option than a concentrated smashing of the revolution. As the social conflicts sharpened, and the economic crisis deepened, the counter-revolutions need for a center of counter revolution based on the bourgeois state apparatus grew, and the Imam's Line's role of "diluting the results of the revolution as much as possible" became superfluous. With the fall of the Rajai-Bahonar cabinet, the unity of the Followers of the Imam's Line fell apart and their points of difference became important.

The differences in the Imam's Line led to a split along its principle lines of differentiation. The Hojjiyyeh Faction (tied to the Hojjiyyeh League or the Anti-Bahaism League) and the Rafsanjani faction (the so-called Imam's Line) were dragged into an open and bitter split (we therefore refer to them in quotes, since, as we shall see, it is the only claimant to the name Followers of the Imam's Line!) In the meantime, a moderate faction, which crystallized politically around figures like the "Imam" and the General Secretary of the IRP (Khamenei) struggled in vain to reign in the confrontations.

The Majles changed from a bastion of unity into a bastion of contradiction. The "decisive" majority of the Majles, which until now had made a show of unity, fell apart. The relationship of forces shifted in favor of the Cabinet. The liberals, well-entrenched in the ministries and the state apparatus, set about extending their influence among the aides and managers, taking advantage of the factionalism between conflicting wings of the Imam's Line. Once more, the tide was turning in favor of the seizure of power by representatives of the advanced bourgeoisie.

This time, the liberals in a coalition with the Hojjiyyeh faction entered the fray as supporters of fundamentalism against fundamentalism. The basic form of this coalition was based on the pressing need of the whole system, i.e., to form a centralized and united repressive machine, limiting the role of religion in politics and the conformity of the political superstructure to the construction of the state apparatus, or, in a word, rebuilding the liber-bureaucratic state apparatus. Now the new coalition

continued on page 6

News Briefs □□□

● Highway Under OIPFG Control

On December 28, 1982 at 3:30pm a few groups of the OIPFG's Pishmargans took control of the Bukan—Miandoab. Road and waited for the mercenaries of the regime. The enemy who found out about the Pishmargans presence there did not show up and did not react. The Pishmargans inspected the automobiles which were traveling and talked to them about the regime's crisis in Kurdistan while giving them the OIPFG's organizational bulletins. The people's warm welcome with their financial help shows their tight and permanent link with the heroic freedom fighters. After controlling the road for 2 hours and creating a sense of horror within the mercenaries of the regime the Pishmargans returned to their base.

● Prisoners Released

Honoring the 12th anniversary of the "Siahkal Resurrection," the Organization of the Iranian Peoples Fedaii Guerillas Kurdistan Chapter, released 8 captives held by them in Kurdistan. The captives were working class families who were forced to go to war against the Kurdish people.

These prisoners of war completed an educational training program and became fully aware of the nature of crimes of the regime and were then released by OIPFG.

Their Names are released herewith:	Age
1—Noor Mohamed Fakhiri	21
2—Masud Sabieei	20
3—Ghasban Heydari	20
4—Amir Masturi	20
5—Manuchehr Baghaei	22
6—Hamid Reza Soheylaghshi	20
7—Aliasghar Kurvand	22
8—Mohamad Hadi Nocheh	20

Subsequent to our earlier news about the heroic operation of Pishmargans to honor the "Siahkal Resurrection" in Kurdistan we have learned that in confrontation with the government troops, 10 of the Pishmargans were martyred.

The names of these martyrs are listed below:

1—Masud Rahmati
2—Ali Nazari
3—Hassan Hassan Pour
4—Fraydoon Baneei
5—Mehrdad Mirzaeei
6—Behnam Ghassemzadeh
7—Hor Rezaei (He was the nephew of Khalkhali [Hanging Judge])
8—Assad
9—Esmail
10—Ebrahim

● Sardasht

In a successful attack on one of the government bases in Sardasht Kurdistan the Pishmargans have succeeded in smashing and burning one tank and 11 government vehicles.

The Pishmargans also expropriated a Kalishnikov, two G-3 and one Beno machine guns. This event left 250 casualties from the government side and two from the Pishmargans.

● Sanandaj—Kurdistan

On December 17th, 1982 an estimated 5,000 men of the Islamic government attacked the small villages of Ghajareh—Mirabad and Chenareh. The Pishmargans responded immediately. During this confrontation 120 troops and 4 Pishmargans were killed. The Pishmargans expropriated one Kalishnikov and six G-3 machine guns together with 560 bullets.

● Government Bases Under Attack

On November 19, 1982 Pishmargan members of the Kurdistan Democratic party together with the Kurdistan Revolutionary peasant organization "Komeleh" attacked one of the government bases called "Akhtetar" near Bukan. During the operation twenty government guards were killed and the following items were confiscated by the Pishmargans.

	Quantity
1—R.B.J. Machine Gun	1
2—G-3 Machine Gun	1
3—Kalishnikov Machine Gun	1
4—Walkie-Talkie	1
5—R.B.J. Bullets	6
6—Artillery Bullets	13
7—Medicine	1 box

Draft of Reactionary Labor Laws

Workers are informed of the draft of labor laws at a time when the regime of the Islamic Republic is attempting to resolve the problem of unemployment the capitalist way: by extending invitations to escaped capitalist and those still in the country, by guaranteeing the security of investments... by signing agreements with various imperialist countries based on a budget totally from the sale of oil and from taxes, and by arresting and executing workers and other toiling people.

The regime of the Islamic Republic, intending to establish the absolute rule and dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, has taken many a step forward but, facing the awareness of the masses, has backed off. Finally today when it has been able to achieve the negation of all freedoms and the establishment of an open dictatorship, it sees the conditions fit to announce the draft of labor laws, a draft far behind labor laws of the Shah's regime, a draft in which it openly talks about the selling of the labor force by the workers and which totally disregards all the gains of the workers' struggles.

Facing a crisis which is tightly squeezing its throat, the regime is attempting to tackle the growing movement of the masses in a new way: by imposing labor laws compiled by protectors of the capitalist order.

As we mentioned earlier, the draft of the new labor laws has been announced as a news item only. The text of the draft has not been published yet, and its contents have been kept secret to the workers. Why? The answer is clear. Due to the growing awareness of the masses and the continuity of their struggles, the regime has always tried to lay the necessary grounds for its anti-worker policies first, in order to be able to impose them upon the masses as unalterable "heavenly" laws later...

These policies are evident when officials of the regime speak of Islamic labor laws. Motamed Rezaii, deputy labor minister, in a meeting held to discuss labor laws declares, "In Islam there is no contradiction between wealth and poverty; the contradiction is between Islam and blasphemy," (Kayhan Newspaper, Nov. 9). Also Fazel Harandi, Imam's representative and the head of parliament's agriculture commission speaks of the necessity of accepting capitalist regulations by the workers, "While being on the side of the weak, we should not neglect to obey God's laws. Obeying the laws should be deemed important," (Etelat, Nov. 1). And Tavakoli, in order to further induce the idea, just like other officials of the regime promises a "desired future", "The Islamic labor laws will offer the workers many benefits in the long run," (Kayhan, July 29).

It is after such deceptive preparations that the workers are informed of the draft of the new labor laws. However, it is still too early to publish the text of the draft. The situation is not ripe yet. The militant actions of the spontaneous movement of the workers on one hand, and fear of exposure of the nature of the law by revolutionary organizations on the other hand still do not allow the publishing of the laws. The words of Nabavi, among other government officials clearly indicate the regime's fear, "This is still a draft... and it is not right to be disclosed yet... We should not allow counter-revolutionaries, especially leftist groups to take advantage of these discussions," (Nov. 24)...

It should be asked what the content of the draft is that has made the regime so secretive and fearful of its exposure to

the workers who should be carrying it out, a draft which, according to Tavakoli, if passed will solve all labor problems...

As Tavakoli put it, "This draft is made up of two parts: the first and major part consists of divine rules, and the second part covers items which can be debated. The former which is based upon divine rules is not determined by the worker's opinions, mine, or ministers', or any human beings opinions and votes. All we did was to reflect the rules as told by the religions' theologians, (Kayhan, Sept. 11).

Now let us see what Tavakoli has to say about the second part which can be debatable. After a meeting with Khomeini, he says, "In this meeting Imam emphasized the Islamic nature of the labor laws to be used in public and private recruitment. These laws were compiled based upon the framework of the current labor laws and had many problems as far as Islam is concerned. Since we cannot change the structure, we will, therefore, use its technical aspects," (Etelat, Aug. 1).

So part of the rules are "divine" and are only decided by religious experts, and the rest is technical and should follow the laws of the Shah's era, since the "structure" cannot be changed. Therefore, the only thing the workers should wait for would be laws made by the Islamic Republic in support of the capitalists. The workers are considered only to the extent of "wage slaves" for the owners who comprise "the human class." They should work like slaves and under the pressure of the wheels and machinery subsist on crumbs, enough to give them strength to return to work the next day...

To say that the Islamic Republic only considers capitalists as "human beings" and degrades the toiling masses to the level of animals and things is not an exaggeration. Suffice us to present a quote from Khomeini which has been used in the draft, "If a porter trips and his load is damaged, he is responsible. However, if an animal or a cart used to carry the load slips, he is not responsible," (Tahrir Ol Vasileh, by Khomeini, Pg. 22, used in the draft).

Also the words of Musavi, the Prime Minister, clearly indicate this, "Naturally, our support of peasants or workers or the weak should be within the framework of Islamic laws... We cannot tell an owner to insure the workers or determine the length of vacations or minimum wages," (Kayhan, Nov. 13).

After such words any mention of protection of the workers' rights by the laws is nothing but deceptive rhetoric. The employer hires anyone he desires at any rate he pleases, and the needy would have to submit...

The policies of the Islamic Republic have thus far clearly indicated that all its "Islamic regulations" are similar to the draft. Not only do they not protect the interests of the toiling masses, but they basically remove any restrictions that the workers have imposed upon the employers in the course of their struggles. It would be sufficient to take a look at a few of these regulations:

— Formation of a special force to regulate labor relations on May 28, 1979, just four months after the February insurrection, according to which, upon hearing of a strike or a sit in, the regime's agents would invade the factory to intimidate, imprison, and

continued on page 5

continued from cover

The Revolution Continues

of all took up the economic history of the last ten years. In this study, what he had earlier deduced, half a priori, from defective material, was made absolutely clear to him by the facts themselves, namely, that the world trade crisis of 1847 had been the true mother of the February and March Revolutions and that the industrial prosperity which had been returning gradually since the middle of 1848, and which attained full bloom in 1849 and 1850, was the revivifying force of the newly strengthened European reaction. That was decisive. Whereas in the three first articles (which appeared in the January, February and March number of the *N. Rh. Z., Politisch-Ökonomische Revue*, Hamburg, 1850) there was still the expectation of an imminent new upsurge of revolutionary energy, the historical review written by Marx and myself for the last number, which was published in the autumn of 1850 (a double number, May to October), breaks once and for all with these illusions."

(Introduction To "The Class Struggles in France" Engels.)

Lenin, by means of an accurate analysis of the world revolutions, and particularly the inquiries done by Marx and Engels regarding the 1848 revolutions, and at the top of the Russian proletariat movement, leads the 1905-1907 revolutions. Lenin, in the face of the oscillations that had appeared in the struggle of the masses, and notwithstanding all the short-termed calmnesses and the cease-fires, and so long as he had not discovered any indications relevant to a swift termination of the crisis, jogged the memories of the continuation of the revolution; he asked the proletariat to become armed, be organized and ever ready for uprising. In November 1905, Lenin, depicts the existing situation as: "The big battle in which the proletariat has engaged tsarism is over. The all-Russia political strike seems to have come to an end almost everywhere. The enemy has made the biggest withdrawal on one flank (Finland), but he has dug himself in on the other (martial law in Poland). In the centre, the enemy has fallen back very little, but holds a strong new position, and is preparing for an even more bloody and more decisive battle."

(Between Two Battles — Lenin).

And in response to the Mensheviks, who had considered the revolution — concluded, asking the masses back to their homes, Lenin said: "Down with all cant, all falseness, and all equivocation! War has been declared, fighting has flared up, and what we are now experiencing is but a lull between two battles."

(Between Two Battles — Lenin).

Lenin, regards the revolution overwhelmed, only when the Czarist regime, by imposing the Stolypin coup d'état, lays the last sparks of revolution into blood. The Stolypin coup as a ring amongst the chain of endeavours of the counter-revolution, drew the defeat of the revolution. The coup was able to declare the revolution's end, only from the days it had subdued the **sovereign-crisis** on a class-conciliation basis: "Stolypin vanquished you not only by physical force, but also by the fact that he correctly understood the most practical need of economic development; namely the forcible break-up of the old form of landownership."

(Political Notes — Lenin).

"It is now strengthening its power by forming an alliance with the Black-Hundred landowners and the Octobrist

industrialists."

(Lessons of the Revolution).

If Czarism was able to overcome the revolution, it was because: "Victorious tsardom is compelled to accelerate remnants of the pre-bourgeois, patriarchal mode of development along bourgeois lines progresses with remarkable speed." Upon controlling of the crisis, the objective basis for revolution was abolished. To speak of revolution, in an era which "the development of the Russian bourgeoisie was taking strides with extraordinary speed, "was no more than mere insanity."

Mitigation of the crisis. This is the key for solving the problem. The primary question is, just as Lenin had pointed out in the Social Democracy resolution (March-April 1907) and had stressed in the Party Conference resolution: "So long as there is no indication of an immediate abolition of the crisis, one may not speak a word of the defeat of the revolution."

When Lenin takes the Stolypin coup as his point of departure, it is not because Stolypin opened a new chapter of oppression and bloodshed, for the Czar had played many similar roles. And if Stolypin oppression and terror was able to overcome the movement of the masses, it should not imply that killings alone is adequate to lead revolutions into defeat: for "No persecutions, no reprisals can halt the movement once the masses have risen, once the millions have begun to bestir themselves. Persecutions only pour oil on the flames, draw ever-new contingents of fighters into the struggle."

(The beginning of The Strikes — Lenin).

And it was because Stolypin drove forward by relying on alleviation of the crisis, reconciliation of the landowners and the bourgeoisie and even the Cadets.

The meaning of "revolutionary rise" is always used antonymous to that of "political stagnation": Lenin, in relation to the governing circumstances reigning over the struggle of the masses and the political conditions predominating the society, always speak of two periods:

1) Political stagnation: the period when the masses are asleep; they are far from the scene of political life and are busy with normal everyday life routine. A period of inactivity of the masses, when no significant and noticeable changes is revealed within the political system.

2) The revolutionary rise: a period when millions of the masses are awoken; and the state of affairs, similar to life in general, goes through sudden changes. The spirit of political life awakes amongst the masses. Eventually, the masses come to understand the necessity to defy Autocracy. "A period when one year is equivalent to twenty years of stagnation and millions and tens of millions of the people, in a week's time, learn more than one normal, sluggish year." A period that the masses step into an "aggressive phase."

"In order to make this thought clear, let us take a glance at the change that has taken place in the concrete social and political situation during the past six years. We at once discern two three-year periods into which this six-year period falls, the one ending roughly with the summer of 1907, and the other with the summer of 1910. The first three-year period, regarded from the purely theoretical standpoint, is distinguished by rapid changes in the fundamental features of the state system in Russia. The course of these

changes was very uneven and the amplitude of oscillations in both directions was very great. The social and economic basis of these changes in the "superstructure" was the action of all classes of Russian society in the most varying fields (activity inside and outside the Duma, the press, unions, meetings, and so forth), so open and impressive and on such a mass scale as is not often to be observed in history.

The second three-year period, on the contrary, was distinguished — we repeat that we are here confining ourselves to the purely theoretical "sociological" standpoint — by an evolution so slow that it almost amounted to stagnation. There were no changes at all noticeable in the state system. There were no, or almost no open and variegated actions by the classes in the majority of the "arenas" in which these action were enacted in the preceding period."

(Certain Features of The Historical Development of Marxism — Lenin).

For an accurate assessment of the governing political conditions and the pathway of the struggle of the masses, Lenin always utilizes the thermometer of the workers movements and strikes. He explains the characteristics of the different phases of the revolution, by examining one year's rate of strikes and ultimately by drawing the curves of the workers struggles in each period.

When a continuous wave of mass strikes began in 1895 this was the beginning of the phase of preparation for the people's revolution. When in January 1905, the number of strikers in this one month exceeded 400,000, this was the beginning of the actual revolution. In all the three years of the revolution the number of strikers, though gradually declining (almost 3,000,000 in 1905, 1,000,000 in 1906, and three-fourths of a million in 1907), was higher than had ever been known in any other country.

When the number of strikers dropped abruptly (176,000) in 1908 and was followed by an even more marked decline in 1909 (64,000) this spelled the end of the first revolution, or rather, the first phase of the revolution.

And now, since the summer of this year, the tide is beginning to rise again. The number of participants in economic strikes is increasing very rapidly. The phase of the total domination of the Black-Hundred reaction has come to an end. The phase of a new upsurge is beginning.

(The beginning of The Strikes — Lenin, 1910).

The decisive defeat of the revolution is the end point of a period of a battle between revolution and counter-revolution over the destiny of the revolution. It is the point that the counter-revolution is enabled to impose its will upon the main aspects of economic and social life of a society and the toiling masses accommodate themselves to it. The era of "chaos" and "anarchy" is ended; and the era of "legal order", political supineness and the predominance of the reaction begins. The impetuous days with constant explosions and various happenings, and the days of swift, bewildering actions are over and things go back to normal; the political regime is stabilized and the changes within it is diminished appreciably; and there are not any signs of open uprisings any longer.

It must be said that during the skirmishes between revolution and counter-revolution many victories and defeats are attained. Many times cease-fires,

retreat and then intensification of war and new aggressions occur. As Lenin had said: the trend of the changes in the era of revolutionary rise is so disharmonious and the extent of its swinging to both sides is very wide. The end result of the dispute between revolution and counter-revolution is neither consecutive triumphs nor defeats. However, there should always be a distinction between unending defeats and those in one or a few fronts and the consequential back-offs, and the definite defeat of the revolution. The particularities of such rises and falls, the short-lived calmness and their differences with a positive defeat of the revolution must be found in the continuance of the revolutionary rise. The masses lose in one front and back-off, but make advances in other fronts; they are oppressed, but never leave the political scene; they are deceived, but never fall asleep and the crisis goes on at its climax. As long as the masses, for the sake of their basic demands, are willing to pursue overt revolutionary struggle, the defeat of the revolution is not procured. As long as the general economic crisis, which had caused the initiation of the revolution and dragging the masses of the people to the battlefields, is not subsided, they do not see any other choice but to join the movement, and to crush and stomp upon the laws. The day to day life itself, leads the masses to clash and confront the regime. For, to yield to the existing conditions — the conditions which are descended from the crisis — is equivalent to death.

The counter-revolution would be able to draw the revolution into a fiasco only when it can, on the one hand, knock off the masses in a face to face combat — and this by itself will not suffice — and on the other hand, win and ease the crisis. This is a rule proven in every historical and revolutionary event. The 1848-1849 German revolution, the 1905 Russian revolution, the Chilean revolution of 1973, and the revolution of 1953 along with the suppression of 1963 in Iran clearly demonstrate that repression, only ensued by reforms and curtailment of the crisis, may pull the revolution into a halt. This is the essence of a Marxist-Leninist analysis to the question of revolution.

(Will be continued in the next issue of KAR International).

(KAR No. 153, July 19, 1982)

Report

continued from page 5

This report on the recent developments facing the organization, more than ever, clarifies our current situation and the vital duties of the supporters. The premature split was imposed on us immediately after the assault which culminated in the martyrdom or arrest of many of our valuable comrades. Despite the existence of an intense atmosphere during this time, and despite the necessity for alterations and extensive preparation, and besides the advancement of open ideological struggle, the organization was able to reconstruct itself during this period. The organization's organ is once again being published and therefore our contact with the supporter comrades is being established.

(KAR NO. 154, July 17, 1982)



The National Democratic Movement of the Kurdish People and Our Positions

The heroic Kurdish people have suffered for years under the oppression of the imperialists and reactionaries. In this era, not only have the Kurdish people shared this same situation with the other peoples of Iran, but they have also suffered under the oppression of Persian bourgeois nationalism. In order to understand this double oppression, it is necessary to look at the situation in years past.

While the Kurdish people are not allowed to speak in their own language, schools are not allowed to teach in their native tongue, and people are not allowed to make decisions about problems within their own borders or be in control of their own destiny; while they are forbidden even to wear their traditional clothes according to their custom and culture, they suffer as well from the backwardness of their historical way of life. While there has been national chauvinist oppression by the central government for years, could it be imagined that these oppressed people would not care about their own destiny? Or that the working class could be neutral on this issue? Or that the revolutionary classes of other nationalities could be neutral? Of course not; as it is said, people who oppress other people cannot be free.

The peoples of Iran who are fighting for their freedom cannot tolerate the double oppression of the Kurdish people. In this way, the national democratic movement of the Kurdish people is a revolutionary and just struggle, and especially under the present conditions which tie it to the anti-imperialist, democratic struggle of the peoples of Iran to overthrow the Islamic Republic regime, is especially important.

Presently in Kurdistan, narrow-minded extremist nationalism is so weak that even the most backward people talk about ties between the Kurdish people's national struggle and the larger struggle, and the determining importance of the larger struggle to overthrow the regime. This is possibly one of the most important victories of the Kurdish people, and shows the depth of their struggle. The democratic national movement of the Kurdish people is a struggle for self-determination, a struggle that is revolutionary and democratic. Therefore support for the movement is important, especially from our organization which supports all revolutionary struggles.

In our organization's program of action, we wrote of the oppressed peoples of Iran:

"Iran's society is composed of different nationalities. These nationalities have been oppressed; the Islamic Republic regime, just like the Shah's regime, has continued the suppression of nationalities, and has unmercifully crushed the national rights of the Kurdish, Turkish, Turkmen, Arab and Baluchi

peoples.

"The right to self-determination, including the right of separation and establishment of an independent government, must be recognized for all the oppressed nationalities of Iran. The oppressed nationalities must freely decide their own destinies.

"The interests of the working class of Iran and of the toilers of the oppressed nationalities of Iran lie in the joint establishment of a strong central state. But this union must be free and voluntary, and the People's Democratic Republic will be based upon the free and voluntary union of nationalities.

"All the nationalities that, of their own volition, freely and voluntarily choose to live within the People's Democratic Republic will have equal and complete economic, social, political, and cultural rights. Any oppression or granting of special privileges on the basis of language, culture, race, nationality, or ethnicity will be illegal."

Our clear and consistent position on the national question shows clearly that we actively support the national democratic movement of the Kurdish people. Here, too, we have shown the two aspects of the problem. First we have said that all the nationalities of Iran have the right to self-determination, and secondly, that the important position in this regard is the free and voluntary unity of the peoples of Iran within the framework of the People's Democratic Republic. We also believe that the Kurdish nation will enjoy their rights only in the People's Democratic Republic.

Here we should also consider the specifics of this problem, since the Kurdish people have consistently stated in demonstrations, leaflets, discussions, etc., that their struggle is not separate from the larger anti-imperialist democratic struggle of the peoples of Iran. Here the specifics of self-determination are in the form of autonomy. Presently the objective of the Kurdish people's struggle is autonomy within the framework of revolutionary Iran. However, since this struggle alone, without the struggle against imperialism and reaction, is unable to bring freedom to the Kurdish people, it is thus tied to the larger anti-imperialist democratic struggle.

The November statement of the Kurdistan chapter of our organization has given considerable attention to this struggle, especially now that imperialism and reaction have stepped up their aggression in the region. Of course, in this struggle, we actively support all anti-imperialist revolutionary forces, and we emphasize unity of action among these forces to strengthen the Kurdish people's front. Our support for the national democratic movement of the Kurdish people is the support given by communists to a revolutionary movement against oppression. Our determination in this struggle, and our taking a clear position, without any "ifs" or "buts", shows our belief that ultimately, with the unity of workers, toilers and all peoples of Iran, imperialism and internal reaction will fall and the People's Democratic Republic will be established. (From Rigay Gehle -2, OIPFG's Organ, Kurdistan Branch)

Report To

continued from page 8

tions in Iran and believes in the establishment of one-class dictatorship — the proletariat — in the current stage of the revolution. The "Mj" tendency, on the contrary, appraises the revolution to be a people's Democratic one, and believes in the necessity of establishment of the workers — peasants democratic dictatorship, which is itself a prelude for transition to one-class dictatorship, meaning the proletarian dictatorship.

On the Maximum and Minimum Programs of the Proletariat: While the "Mj" tendency holds that it is necessary to differentiate between the maximum and the minimum programs and to mobilize the proletariat's allies, the "Mn" tendency defends the transitional program for socialist revolution.

On the Socialist Camp: The "Mj" despite its clear cut line on revisionist deviations in the socialist camp, considers its socialist camp as an international ally of Iran's proletariat. But the "Mn" omits the socialist camp from the ranks of the proletariat's allies.

On the Potential of the Proletariat in the Current Stage of the Revolution: The "Mn" tendency propounds many slogans about the proletariat, but since it separates the proletariat from its allies, it practically eliminates the role of the proletariat from the revolution. "Mn" claims that it is not mandatory for the proletariat to unite with the petit-bourgeois strata and the toiling masses in order to carry out a victorious revolution and to seize power. Rather, "Mn" asserts, in case this task is not accomplished, the proletariat should carry out the revolu-

tion by itself and unite with these strata following the victory of the revolution. But, since the Iranian proletariat has not reached the required level of organization and consciousness, the "Mn" asserts: "Let the liberal-democrats seize power. The proletariat will take advantage of the legal atmosphere to organize and educate itself to overthrow the liberal-democrats." This way, the "Mn" practically eliminates the role of proletariat and waits for the "National Council of Resistance" to seize power, so that it would use the "period of legal atmosphere" to educate and organize the proletariat. The "Mj" tendency believes that despite the low level of consciousness and organization among the workers, they must be instigated to broad and active participation in the revolution and that the decisive victory

of the revolution must be planned for.

Clearly, these two trends, one of which is a defender of Trotskyism and one that is based on Leninism, can not be together in the same organization for a long time. However, we strive to expose the view's of the "Mn" tendency, the bankruptcy of which has been internationally declared, among the supporters through open ideological struggle and to prevent the "Mn" comrades numbers from exceeding the number of fingers on a hand. But the "Mn" did not tolerate this struggle and declared their split by publication of the aforementioned leaflets. Hence, four of the "Mn" comrades have no longer any responsibilities in the organization.

continued on page 4

DRAFT OF REACTIONARY LABOR LAWS

continued from page 3

break up the protest actions of the workers.

— Repeal of the profit-sharing law in the factories on March 21, 1980. Even though this was such a deceptive law according to which such a negligible percentage was paid to the workers, nevertheless, it was a law imposed upon the employers by the workers.

— The law of liquidation in industrial and agricultural units and services to prohibit unproductiveness.

— And finally the repeal of courts settling labor disputes which has been referenced in the draft under the section "mutual agreements"... Before the repeal of these courts, employers were responsible for paying damages to workers in case of "unreasonable" expulsion, even though they would always resort to various methods to reduce the amount of damages to minimum. Today,

however, these courts cannot make a judgement, but should only try to bring about a compromise, this being at a time when the employers right to expulsion is preserved under section 33 of the labor statute. It is natural that a worker who is threatened with expulsion will compromise. Why, then, should they pay him damages?!

Let us compare the draft to certain definitions in the bill of "the extent and methods of productive activities of the private sectors" passed by the supreme council on economics and the cabinet to further witness the extent of the Islamic Republic's guarantees for the exploitation of the working class:

"Definition of productive activities of the private sector — section 1:...

This portion of economic activities is accomplished by an individual's capital or labor power... The worker's manpower deserves only wages or products according to the agreement made. He

has no share of the profit or loss or the product itself in a production center... The management of the production unit is the duty of the employer... The similarities of the draft of the labor laws and the above bill are quite evident. Thus the officials of the Islamic Republic are openly answering the question of an Etelaat reporter put to Nabavi on Oct. 2. "How can we restore capitalists and factory owners who had been sucking the people's blood?" By passing such bills and attempting to legalize further exploitation of the workers.

However, such attempts will prove futile. Capitalist solutions to the economic crisis, increasing commercial activities by increasing the production and sale of oil, increasing taxes, and passing anti-labor laws can only bring the Islamic Republic closer to collapse.

Men of power of the regime resemble one drowning now. They desparately

resort to anything and do not see the reality of their drowning. They cannot see the reality of the growing struggles of the masses. They do not see that, every day, larger strata of the people join the ranks of revolution. That is why they see the conditions right to announce the draft of the reactionary labor laws. They cannot see the overwhelming waves of the revolution, the start of a storm which even forced certain mercenaries of the regime to warn that the draft cannot be corrected, completed, or implemented.

The destruction of the regime is certain. Deception and suppression will not find it a safe passage out of the crisis. The current crisis is a revolutionary one and requires a revolutionary solution: The revolution of the workers and all toiling masses under the red flag of the proletariat.

(Kar No. 160, Dec. 7, 1982)

The Power Deadlock continued from page 2

tion, or, in the Imam's Line's word, the new line, to stabilize the ministerial system and seize the executive organ one after another. To do this, they had to bring the "non-legal/fundamentalist" institutions under the control of the executive organs. They should be absorbed into the bourgeois state so that the "dilution of the results of the revolution" could be done more decisively and make the defeat of the revolution official.

This is why the fact that the "state doesn't accept the Majles' line" makes Fowad Karimi or Rafsanjani so upset, and why *University of the Revolution*, in an editorial in a special issue (August) asked humbly about the state of their nation, about just what had changed socially, politically, or culturally, and what is different from when the Imam issued his order mandating the formation of the Cultural Revolutionary Corps, complaining that the council of the Revolution has been turned into a Council of Compulsion.

Since the "new coalition" (between the liberals the Hojjiyyeh) was formed on the basis of the development of the contradiction between the two factions of the Imam's Line, i.e., the Hojjiyyeh faction and the "Imam's Line" (the Rafsanjani-ites), it would be better, to specify the issues, to review the basic categories of the differences between the factions.

The "Imam's Line" is a faction which represents middle backward capital and which, while crushing the masses and trying to protect the system in order to resolve the crisis and thereby advance its own caste interests (that of the middle backward bourgeoisie), wants to implement some reactionary-bureaucratic reforms to limit big capital (on those reforms and their reactionary character, we will have occasion to speak later). This faction defends some agrarian reforms, limited control over production, distribution, and consumption, and especially control over big trade by the state. The temporary union with the reformists of the Majority faction of the Organization of Peoples Fedayan and the Tudeh Party, and establishing relations with the socialist countries to overcome the crisis. But the most important characteristic of the "Imam's Line's" political positions is its effort to stabilize a politico-religious superstructure based on the Viceregency of the Faqih. It is a superstructure whose executive organs are the counter-revolutionary institutions and their legislative organ, the Viceregent of the Faqih and the Majles. Therefore the political representatives of this cuffeng unanimously favor completely establishing these institutions against the ministries and broadening the margin of control and independence of the Majles.

In December, 1981, Majles representatives, in a letter to Khomeini, requested an increase in their ability to decide on and ratify secondary rulings which until then was left up to the Guardian Council [an organ that consists of a number of top clergymen charged with the responsibility of overseeing the proper implementation of The Islamic Constitution]. Khomeini, by authorizing the execution of Viceregency to the Majles, accepted this request. (We will show, in a continuation of this article, how on the one hand, this authorization was opposed by the Hojjiyyah faction, and how on the other hand, at the level of implementation of laws, the majles' legislation is checkmated.) In August, 1982, plans for peasant city and province were presented to the Majles. According to this plan, at the head of the council would be the provincial councils led in turn by what would be a Higher Council, the Majles of Islamic councils. On August 3, at a public meeting of the Majles, 29 Majles representatives moved to table this plan. Mahalati, one of the opponents of the plan, said, "...This plan presents the best chance under the current circumstances for intervention into duties and creating differences. In this proposal, executive tasks are given to councils which would be an intervention into a the executive branch. According to points 12 and 13, if what a Council decides on isn't implemented, the higher Council can implement it. But that council is the Majles, and *this constitutes intervention into executive affairs*. The motion to table is correct. (Our emphasis; Ettelaat, August 4, 1982) Hashemi Rafsanjani strongly opposed the motion to table, saying, "...This involvement between the Islamic Leagues and the authorities is very great, because these very Councils don't exist... Our organs are weak, and still behave as they did under the Phalavi regime. The presence of Councils alongside these organs would be an official and legal supervision and which would prevent illegality and indifference by these organs..."

"The motion to table was rejected and the plan ratified, but not exactly the way the "Imam's Line" wanted. Mohammad Yazdi, a Hojjiyyah representative, proposed to drop clause one of section 19, saying, "Councils must be an arm for the apparati, and not give them difficulties or want to act independently. This is just what the respected representatives are worried about. Clause one of section 19 was deleted.

"If what the Council decides isn't implemented, the Higher Council can implement it, this council being the Majles. It was this which aroused the "Imam's Line" to the defense of the executive power of the Councils an executive power which would be under the control of the Majles and would be a tool in the hands of the Majles in the quarrel between the Majles and the executive power.

By making the counter-revolutionary institutions independent, the Imam's Line is trying to make them into tools of the Viceregency of the Faqih's power under the leadership of the Viceregent of the Faqih, against the power of the ministries. The Islamic Students in the August issue of their monthly, *University of the Revolution*, proposed the independence of the "revolutionary" institutions, like the Cultural Revolution Corps, which clearly illustrate the form of independence envisioned. "In our opinion, the cultural revolution could be successful insofar as:...1) It is under the direct supervision of the Viceregent of the Faqih...2) if it takes the form of a coordinated revolutionary institution with tripartite powers nationally (NOTE: coordination with tripartite powers, not tied to any one of them)...3) having an independent budget not under the discipline of general accounts...(supplement number 14 to *University of the Revolution*). In another part of this supplement, it says "for a Council to have a sound relationship with the figure of the Imam, a representative of the Imam must be present in person in the council, with the right to veto that council's decisions."

In ratifying the consitions statement of the (Revolutionary Corps Guard's) in the Majles, the "Imam's Line" agreed that this plan be more or less advanced. Various currents opposed to the ministries defended the Corps. According to the Minister of the Corps', decision, the Corps has the right to one vote in the Supreme Council of the Corps. Whether the Ministry of the Corps would merely acts in a co-ordinating capacity or would impose its control by force would have to be examined in the political equation.

The leadership of this faction is in the hands of part of the IRP leadership, the most characteristic representatives of its policy are Rafsanjani and Montazeri. In the official organs, especially the executive in the Ministries and state institutions, they are a minority; in the fundamentalist insitutions ('unofficial') and the majles, they have a majority. This faction considers the war to be central, and advances its foreign policy along the axis of Pan Islamism.

The Hojjiyyah is connected with the Anti-Bahaim League of the Hojjiyyah. This League was formed 25 years ago by someone named Halabi, supposedly to combat Bahaim but in fact to serve the interests of imperialism. They believe that until the Hidden Imam appears, there can be no Islamic government, and are therefore opposed to the direct rule of religion, and the "separation of religion from politics" is one of their principles. This faction doesn't accept Khomeini as "Viceregent of the Faqih" or "Imam", but for the time being defends his limited Viceregency over the *Leadership Council*. The sources acceptable to the Hojjiyyah are Kho'i and Golpaygani. The Hojjiyyah faction are based on the principle of the unlimited right to ownership and don't accept any kind of review of property rights, and so are opposed to any kind of review of property rights, and so are opposed to any kind of reform or, for example, tactical reapproachment with the socialist countries or temporary unity with the reformists..and give priority to the war question.

Another difference between the Hojjiyyah and the Imam's Line is based on their respective *religious viewpoints*. The root of their other differences is their appreciation of Islamic Law. Islamic judgements are twofold: Primary Judgements, which are properly related to Islamic principles as such, and secondary judgements, which are extrapolated logically to present circumstances. The Hojjiyyah vehemently defends Primary Judgements, and only accepts Secondary Judgements under exceptional circumstances and even then *for only a limited time*. The sectarianism of this faction is inflamed from this perspective; while it accepts the principle of separating religion from politics, it has become synonymous with expanding religion's cultural field of activity, and so the Hojjiyyah faction, in matters like the Hejab (Islamic cover for women) and so on is very sectarian. The "Imam's Line" tends to favor the greatest possible implementation of Secondary Judgements. Heydari, representative from Hamadan, said in the Majles, "...One of those ways (to overcome obstacles to executing Secondary Judgements) is the Secondary Judgement and implementation of the Viceregency of the Faqih. Perhaps, God forbid, by clutching at Secondary Judgements and executing the Viceregency, we will ignore the other ways, and consider that Secondary Judgements are always able to be implemented and, God forbid, we might doubt that Secondary Judgements are implicit in Primary Judgements and consider Secondary Judgement eternally valid for implementation, and for ever out of necessity run the country by Secondary Judgements and implementing the Viceregency. The talk of such people is like the fleeing man (i.e., Bani Sadr or Rajavi) who said, "Implementing some of the judgements of Islam is neither possible nor laudable. Now we believe that implementing all the judgements of Islam is today possible, laudable and useful. In conclusion, the basis for this must be laid out." (May 11, 1982; our emphasis.)

Until late 1981, when the Followers of the Imam's Line were still united, their differences about property rights were covered up. The laws which related to this were either tabled, or, despite ratification, rejected by the Guardian Council. The agrarian reform plan and the bill concerning urban land were in the latter category. Late in 1981, when differences between the two factions became most important. In connection with the way the issue of property rights were handled, executing the Viceregency of the Faqih became critical. Since the majles hadn't the right to implement the Viceregency, it was unable to limit ownership. Khomeini himself withdrew from the fray and authorized the majles to execute the Viceregency. (We analyzed this at length in *Kar* Number 132).

These differences are not results of the different class character of the currents inside the ruling council, but a reflection of the social crisis which refuses to be ignored, a unity of contradictions. The existing differences express the two tactics and two solutions to alleviate the crisis, and besides this, enmity towards the people and opposition to the revolution is hidden in every policy. But it must be seen where Khomeini stands on these differences. For the most part, he is a man of "unity." Our research has confirmed that Khomeini, joined by some of the heads of the IRP like Khameni, has made links with both factions, taking the role of conciliator and coordinator of their policies. Therefore, he never expresses his ideas directly on the chief differences between the two factions. Khomeini, by stepping back from the struggle, tries to preserve unity and solidarity. Khomeini's three-year silence on land reform and similar issues is of this nature.

For all this, Khomeini in practice, and his utterances on specific and decisive issues, generally takes the Hojjiyyah's side. For the most part, his silence and refusal to take sides gives the Hojjiyyah a free hand to advance their policies. Khomeini, on November 11, 1981, in the letter authorized the Majles to execute the Viceregency of the Faqih, according to Primary judgements in today's circumstances. This act of Khomeini's was a face-saving measure for the "Imam's Line" and its bootlicking servants, for it "strengthened the Majles against the Guardian Council and the "Imam's Line" against the "Hojjiyyah." But on the other hand, as we showed before the Hojjiyyah current considers Viceregency of the Faqih, limited when certain issues like property are considered, considers the Majles' control useless in this regard and defends unlimited property rights. On the other hand, Khomeini *in practice* defends property from every side, and on January 7, 1981, in a message to the Superior Juridical Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Court, called for the punishment of

continued on page 7

The Power Deadlock continued from page 6

people not in authority, groups, and "officials in authority," who "appropriate the money and property of the honorable people in a way contrary to Islamic norms and laws and willfully divide the property and seize the money of individuals."

On February 10, 1982, Khamenei, in a speech to the members of the Central Council and authorities in the offices of the Jihad for Construction specifically explained the Imam's position: "Dear brothers of the Jihad, be careful not to be more revolutionary than the Imam in decisions about land. In the matter of land reform, you must see that you say whatever the Imam says. "The current led by Khomeini and Khamenei, which we will call the "Moderate Current" or the "Moderate Imam's Line Faction," has had to take its own position by passing over the effects of the sharpening contradictions, but it has so far labored in vain against the sharpening of the two factions' differences.

Khamenei, in an interview in the issue of Ettelaat, said about the Hojjatiyyah: "...It seems to me that among those who are in the Hojjatiyyah League are revolutionary elements, believers in the Imam and the Viceregency of the Faqih, just as there are negative and unreliable elements. From the viewpoint of political thought and revolutionary movement, this League represents a broad spectrum... I condemn negating the existence of this problem as well as exaggerating the problems concerning this League in society." Khamenei, like Khomeini, has tried to unite these two factions to no effect, but in practice has been drawn to the Hojjatiyyah, and so has, with the sharpening of the internal differences in the regime, the contradictions between the "Moderate Faction" and the "Imam's Line" have been exposed.

The impasse which these two factions have reached, which has its clearest expression in tabling issues of disputed regarding property, is an impasse of power in the government. Will Khomeini clearly express his own views? Will Khomeini, by expressing his own views, break the deadlock? Every problem related to the impasse of power in the leadership has roots in the insoluble social contradictions, and opinion from this or that clergy supporting the solution of this or that particular outlook won't solve the social crisis, and so Khomeini, by announcing his particular outlook, won't either. In *Kar*, we wrote, "In general, Khomeini would prefer not to say what he thinks about property, including land and industrial property... Khomeini, in the bind of favoring the basic interests of the capitalists and property owners and the interests of "Islam" favors the views of the other Ayatollahs who have expressed their opposition to limiting property, some more clearly than others, favoring their view of retaining power and getting ride of the masses' struggle, has, with particular cunning given the job of limiting property ownership to the Majles. Khomeini is caught in the bind of deepening social contradictions, Khomeini is the embodied expression of the power impasse of the ruling council and social contradictions. Every step which he takes wanting to resolve this crisis of necessity would result in fresh conflicts and a sharpening of the existing contradictions and deepen the already existing split within the ruling council. If Khomeini according to his own nature, announces an opinion against the "Imam's Line," and publicly defends the sanctification of private property, the "Imam's Line" utopia would smash to pieces and the remnants of the adulation which some traditional and backward layers have for him, would fall apart, while a deep split would be precipitated in the unofficial institutions and the life of the regime, which still requires the use of these institutions against the revolution, would be threatened with chaos.

As we explained in the introduction to these articles, things have reached the point since 20 June where those on top of things have negated the task of the Followers of the Imam's Line, with Khomeini at the center, and the need for a centralized and unanimous liberal bureaucratic repressive machine, which doesn't devote itself to the "leadership" of this or that Ayatollah, but to the "leadership" of the majority of the bourgeoisie, to the leadership of the interests of the system as a whole, and the leadership arising from the need to organize to solve the crisis. These people are a force which has for some time taken the prerogatives of repressing the people and advancing and implementing laws one after the other from Khomeini and his friends, and will continue until they are dispossessed of any kind of power. In the introduction, we have called this force the new coalition, a coalition which is based on negating the power of the "Imam's Line" by absorbing the Imam's Line's armed and intelligence extensions in the executive power and is based on and relies on the Higher Councils of the economy, distribution, etc., the Supervisory Council, and finally the Leadership Council, and we said this coalition has taken over the mission of the Imam's Line in abolishing decisively the results of the revolution. This coalition, whose "most leftist" faction is that of the Moslems Following the Imam's Line and whose most rightist faction is the Hojjatiyyah is a liberal-bureaucratic coalition whose leaders, like Mosavi Ardebili, Rabani Amlashi, AsgarOuladi, Mosavi, and U.S.-educated people like Banki and Najafi, are representatives of these policies. Leaders like Khamenei, Kani, and the Imam, although they vacillate, are part of this coalition, but still try to lighten the contradictions between the "Imam's Line" and this coalition. This coalition dominates organs like the Guardian Council, the Superior Judicial Council, the executive power, but are very much a minority in parliament. Since the existing coalition can advance its economic, cultural, etc., policies only through total control over the repressive apparatus, it is mainly trying to stabilize its control over the repressive apparatus and centralize the ministerial system. This problem has resulted in confrontations centered on absorbing the unofficial institutions into the state becoming the central axis now, and gives the appropriate criterion for knowing who is a representative of the "new coalition." On the one hand, we have by this criterion noted the consolidation of this coalition's control over organs like the Guardian Council, Superior Juridicial Council, the Executive Power, and the higher councils, and on the other hand, by reviewing three laws under discussion and expanding the urban land bill and agrarian reform plan, and the foreign trade bill and the owners hip and tenancy bill, showed his coalition's role in different stages of ratifying and implementing this bill to analyze different points regarding the different factions of the coalition.

(KAR NO. 156—Sept. 11, 1982)

The Necessity of Forming

Facing the increasing movement of the masses, since June 20, 1981, the reactionary Islamic Republic regime of Iran has begun a series of fascist attacks to suppress the spread of the revolutionary movement, to take back what the masses had gained during the uprising, and to destroy the revolutionary organizations.

If until now the regime and Khomeini in person had relied upon people's ignorance, and had used tactics of deceit, now open dictatorship is being used, and every opposing voice and every movement on the part of the masses is answered with bullets. The killing of workers and toilers is being carried out in order to strengthen the trembling base of the government.

In this new situation, we need a new form of organization with a new structure for building for an armed uprising to overthrow the anti-people Islamic Republic regime, as the previous forms of struggle have lost their effectiveness.

In this connection, one form of organization is underground resistance committees and cells.

The Organization of Iranian People's Fedayee Guerillas has explained this in their program of action:

"In order to gain and lead the day-to-day struggle of the masses, and to prepare for and guide the armed uprising, secret resistance committees must be formed and the masses organized in these committees. Underground resistance committees must be formed in neighborhoods, garrisons, villages, schools and anywhere the masses are, and they must guide and lead the masses' struggle."

The underground resistance committees are democratic in nature, which means they are not cells of this organization or any others. These committees form around their own specific tasks and programs, and it is certain that their rules, as democratic organizations, are different from those of a class organization.

Therefore, every revolutionary, either independent or belonging to one of the revolutionary groups, can become a member if he or she accepts the program of that committee. According to the program of action of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedayee Guerillas, "the resistance committees must publicize the aims and goals of the movement," not the goals of a specific political group. The supporters of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedayee Guerillas in these committees should propagandize the organization's positions in addition to advancing the committees on a practical level. They should show the other members that the only program of revolutionary action in the present situation is the program of action of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedayee Guerillas, and so the masses should be organized under this program of action.

But how is it possible to organize the underground resistance committees? The manner of forming these committees will differ slightly in regard to the local situation (schools, neighborhoods, offices, villages, etc.), but generally these committees will consist of individual militants that have understood the necessity of struggling against the Islamic Republic regime, are willing to work toward this goal, and are trustworthy from the standpoint of security.

The underground resistance committee should contain from three to five persons, depending on the situation. With less than three members, it will not have the capacity necessary for organizing and achieving its goals. More than five members is not good because of security

risks, and the probability of being uncovered.

The Kurdish situation and the need for the formation of underground resistance committees

In the over-all war process of Kurdistan, the organization of underground resistance committees in areas that are under occupation by the regime has been very important, and has been one kind of organized struggle against the anti-people Islamic Republic regime. However, there is a need for more of these committees, for in the current situation the regime has begun new and increased attacks in order to suppress the Kurdish people's revolutionary movement, a movement which serves as a barricade for the defense of the freedom of the masses.

The regime is using all its forces to carry out its reactionary plans. The regime tries to regain control of the liberated areas and to establish its reactionary rule there, and to achieve this aim, its forces stop at nothing in their killings and massacres. In the cities and villages occupied by the regime, the utmost pressure and oppression is employed to defeat the masses and to create a situation where the masses would give up supporting the revolutionary forces. The tactics of exiling Pishmargh families is one of these tactics. It is clear in such a situation where one can say that the existence of the Kurdish people's revolutionary movement is in danger, that the formation of underground resistance committees in occupied areas that the regime thinks are safe bases is of such importance. The activity of the Underground resistance committees in these areas frightens the regime and badly weakens the morale of its forces.

The duties of the underground resistance committees are:

- 1- Leading the masses everyday struggle against the regime, propagandizing the goals of the revolutionary movement, and spreading the news of the victories of the revolutionary Pishmargh of the Kurdish people among the masses.
- 2- Taking care of the logistics for the committee's activities, and for the Pishmargh.
- 3- Collecting information about the bases, movements and plans of the regime's forces, and sending it to the revolutionary forces.
- 4- Identifying the undercover agents of the regime, and exposing them to the people and revolutionary forces.
- 5- Carrying out the revolutionary execution of the mercenaries hanged by the masses.
- 6- Where it is possible, requisitioning activities.
- 7- Cooperating with the Pishmargh when they attack the mercenaries and forces of oppression in the towns and villages.
- 8- Increasing the military education of the committee.
- 9- Contacting other resistance committees, and coordinating and uniting activities.

While these are not all the duties of the committee, they are the important responsibilities which exist at the formation of every underground resistance committee.

(From *Rigay Gehle* No.2, OIPFG's Organ, Kurdistan Branch)

Report To Supporters

Comrades:

It has been 3 months since the last issues of *KAR* were looted by the hated agents of the regime, and therefore, we are once again publishing the organizational organ. During this time, our contact with our comrades, the broad supportive forces and consequently with the broad vanguard masses was cut off, although the organizations "program of action", the first edition of which — *KAR* no.150 — was confiscated by the regime, was distributed. The supporters and different chapters of the organization strived to overcome this deficiency and published many local leaflets and newsletters, however, the red cord that was to connect all these activities was missing. Meanwhile, we published as many tracts and leaflets as we could. But since we should have acted according to the priorities, we employed all our power to compensate the organization. The reason is that, although the other aspects of action would have had some instantaneous and insignificant impacts, the publication of the organizational organ would have been delayed and this did not seem principled. Now in the first issue after the gap, it is our duty to report the developments faced by the organization, to the supporters:

1. How the assault took place:

The assault was started on Saturday March 12, and was ended on Tuesday, March 16. According to our information, Ahmad Ataollahy — in charge of printing and advisor to the central committee — was arrested on Saturday night. On the same night comrade Hamid Azadi — from the printing center and in charge of distribution of the paper — was martyred due to the regimes' assault on his house. The organization's printing center was captured by the regime on the same night. On Sunday night, the counting center was the subject of the assault. Comrades Abbas, Amir and Javad were martyred after killing the head of the local committee of the "revolutionary guard" and two regime's agents. On the same day, comrade Nezam — central committee member, in charge of workers committee and Tehran organization — was martyred while he had gone to check one of the distribution centers. On Monday morning, comrades Kazem — central committee member and in charge of the security committee — and Khashayar who had been informed of the assault were martyred while confronting the lackies of the regime. Before they left their home, they had both said: "Should Ahmad answer the phone, I will go to his home." On Tuesday, comrade Hadi — central committee member and in charge of military committee, supply department and financial affairs — received a message from Ahmad and went to the meeting place and was martyred. This concluded the assault.

It is obvious that Ahmad has chosen the road of betrayal and has become a regime's disciple. Our investigations have confirmed this. Ahmad was arrested about a month before the assault by the police in a street and gave his father's address and phone number. After that, he was rescued by one of the police comrades, working secretly in the police force. The police created a task force for the arrest of Ahmad and the aforementioned comrades. Ahmad, disregarding the leadership's direction to avoid contact with the families during the holidays, contacted his family and set a meeting with his mother. The police,

being informed of this, chased Ahmad and found access to the printing and distribution centers.

It is clear that Ahmad cooperated with the police immediately after he was arrested. It was only through Ahmad's cooperation that the fall of the printing center into the hands of the police could have been possible. The information that the regime had, could have only been obtained from Ahmad. Besides, comrades Hadi, Kazem and Khashayar went to their meetings as a result of contact with Ahmad.

2. The Road to Reconstruction The Organization, and the Existing Lines:

After the March assault, the organization succeeded in presenting the perpetuation of the assault. The organization also tried to analyze the assault, simultaneously with planning the future moves. Regarding this, the comrades of the minority tendency of the organization (the "Mn") who had propounded the "physical survival" line suggested a halt to all the organization's activities. After the attacks on Peykar and Mojahedeen, they believed that the police were relatively consolidated and that the organization had no particular security system. The "Mn" claimed: Considering that the police are relatively consolidated and that the regime has considerable information about us, and that our organization lacks a security system, and that the origin of the assault is not completely clear yet, it is necessary to cancel all of the outreach plans, local meetings and unnecessary connections in Tehran, in addition to disruption of contact with the assaulted centers.

Hence, they suggested to transfer the leadership to secure places and then to put debates on the analysis of the assault and how to redress it on the agenda.

But a short while after this suggestion, the "Mn" comrades, unilaterally and without notifying the leadership, published a pamphlet called "Evaluation and Perspective."

This pamphlet, which represents these comrades' points of view, had been published as the "Open ideological struggle Bulletin No. 1", but was looted by the regime and was supposed to be republished as soon as possible. This was criticized by the comrades of the Majority tendency (the "Mj") as a factional act. In replying to these critics, the "Mn" comrades claimed: "It is necessary to organize independently for the revolution, and therefore the organization must welcome a political and organizational fraction. Otherwise the publishing of the pamphlet "Evaluation and Perspective" can be regarded as a split."

"Our congress," replied the "Mj" comrades, "clarified that the majority of the organization opposes factionalism, by rejecting "the right to organize a tendency" which is itself a prelude to factionalism. It is also premature to split under such conditions, for it will force the organizational masses to make a decision without knowledge of the two sides positions."

In order to prevent a premature split, the "Mj" comrades suggested to set a two-month period for ideological struggle and submitting of different points of view to the main body of the organization. According to this suggestion, at the end of the 2-month period — which was liable to be extended — the future form of the movement — joint struggle, factionalism, split, etc. — would be decided in a joint session. The "Mn"

comrades were first insisting on either imposing their factionalism on the organization or splitting. But after many debates in the central committee and the advisors meeting, with stress on the fact that the split was inevitable, accepted the suggestion. The "Mn" comrades criticized themselves for the unilateral publication of the pamphlet in the same session. They also claimed that they had never had non-organizational contacts and had not organized themselves independently and would not do so until the end of the period.

3. Open ideological struggle:

In compliance with the aforementioned decisions regarding enhancement of open ideological struggle, "Evaluation and Perspectives" was published as the Bulletin No. 1 of the debates. The "Mn" comrades also submitted a leaflet which was prepared in March for a declaration of their positions and the split. This leaflet, which was also endorsed by the martyred comrade Kazem, was published after the assault. There was then a pamphlet called "Leninism or Trotskism" published on behalf of the "Mj" comrades which criticized the positions of the "Mn" tendency.

In the submitted literature, the "Mj" comrades put stress on not admitting factionalism within the organization and believe that active survival of an organization requires a unique leadership and unique establishment under the prevailing dictatorship. They also believe that while open ideological struggle will be continued and the "Mn" comrades will be able to present their positions, they should move in accordance with the ratified policies of the organization and hence, the idea of an independent organization is nonsense. The "Mn" comrades put stress on factionalism and believe that they must be allowed to form their own political-organizational factions since independent organization is mandatory for realization of the revolution. They are willing to continue to work in the organization, only if the "Mj" comrades accept factionalism.

With all deficiencies and despite the fact that the "Mn" comrades, disregarding their self-criticism and commitments, went on to unilaterally distribute other pamphlets, the organization was experiencing open ideological struggle, and the organizational masses are now going to actively participate in this struggle. But the "Mn" comrades who, despite their pretention regarding concern over nationwide ideological struggle, apparently could not tolerate the enhancement of that struggle, and continued to unilaterally publish other pamphlets after "Leninism or Trotskism" was published. Finally four of the "Mn" comrades published a leaflet entitled "Socialist Action Method" signed by the Organization of the Iranian People's Fedaii Guerillas-the Revolutionary Socialist Tendency. This way, they once again deprived the organization

masses from the right to decide and denied our country's vanguard masses the right to choose and to know.

Obviously, from the beginning of the formation of this tendency, we knew that they could not eventually confine themselves to the organization's revolutionary trend, for there is no affinity between Leninism and Trotskism. Trotskism can not even be considered to be completely within the communist movement. But our knowing this was not sufficient. It was necessary to expose this tendency's points of view to the organizational masses. We should have let the organizational masses find out for themselves that the presence of this tendency in our ranks leads to nothing but our own liquidation. It was necessary to scrutinize the gaudy and flashy and sparkling slogans based on the realities of society and analyze their practical implications to clarify that behind all this gaudiness and sparkle there is nothing but passivism and subjectivism. It should have been revealed that those who speak of perpetuation of the revolution, advocate the cessation of the organization in practice. The tactics of those who speak of proletarian mobilization, are restricted to formation of workers action committees as underground committees which organize the vanguard workers for preparation for general political strike. (These are the same underground strike committees which were formed by the organization's workers' committee among the workers even before open propagation of its slogan was on the agenda). The tactics presented by those who portray the Mojahedeen as the "bourgeoisie's ortillergmen and consider them anarchists, include: throwing grenades and machine-gunning the regime-backed marches and funeral ceremonies. (All of these are official proposals of the "Mn" tendency which were presented in writing in the official meetings of the organization's committees). This is why we proposed to prevent the split and to organize open ideological struggle. We insisted on this demand and the "Mn" tendency was finally compelled to accept it although their desire was to split prior to the debates. But, they opportunistically kept enhancing their non-organizational contacts and unilaterally published other materials and perpetrated other acts with no affinity to revolutionary principles, — although they talk a great deal about principles — and eventually called themselves the "Revolutionary Socialist Tendency," and presumably relieved themselves.

Our Differences:

To further clarify the fundamental differences between the "Mj" and the "Mn" tendencies, we now outline the controversial issues that were discussed in the congress.

On the State of the Revolution: The "Mn" tendency defends the socialist revolution under the prevailing condi-

continued on page 5

KAR INTERNATIONAL is exclusively distributed through bookstores and subscription. To subscribe use the order form below:

FOR: one year, (\$10.00 for 12 issues in U.S., \$15.00 Foreign)
 six months (\$7.00 for six issues in U.S., \$12.00 Foreign)

NAME _____

STREET _____

CITY _____ **STATE** _____ **ZIP** _____

Please send your orders with check or money order to:

**KAR COMMITTEE,
P.O. Box 540
New York, New York 10185**