

Unity to defeat the dictatorship

If we analyse the political experience crushed by the coup d'état in Chile, we come to the conclusion that unity is indispensable, but ... unity around a really revolutionary line. It is known that a week before the coup, the Popular Unity (PU) government succeeded in holding a rally attended by one million people in Santiago alone. This was in the midst of galloping inflation and a scarcity of basic goods. Events like this one, and there were many others, at a time when the reactionary forces had already created the "destabilization" of the government they considered necessary to unleash the fascist coup d'état, proves the enthusiasm and hope awakened in the hearts of the people by the anti-imperialist, anti-monopolist and anti-latifundist measures applied by the Allende government. This government would have succeeded in its goals if right from the start it had the determination

not only to take advantage (as much as was possible and reasonable) of bourgeois laws and institutions, but more important, support and develop a popular revolutionary struggle in defence of the measures it applied against the large exploiters, and thus opened the way for the conquest of power. Don't let anyone tell you that the armed forces in Chile were too strong, that they made the attaining of such goals impossible. They were even stronger in Iran and in Nicaragua, and there, in those countries both the government and effective power were controlled by fiercely repressive sectors. However, to have asked the Allende government to do this would have been like trying to squeeze blood from a stone, since the PU was dominated by forces such as the P "C" of Chile and their followers, who feared the revolutionary movement more than an eventual take over by fascism

because their political objectives were to go from one form of exploitation to another. They wanted to go from traditional dependent capitalism to State capitalism controlled by a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, like in the U.S.S.R., Poland and Czechoslovakia, etc. The only thing such forces were able to think of when confronted with the fierce offensive by the imperialists and the reactionaries to defeat the Allende government was to try to convince the Christian Democrats to share their plans for State capitalism.

However, there were political forces within and outside the PU who wanted, with varying degrees of awareness, to take advantage of the electoral defeat suffered by the most reactionary forces during the presidential elections and the enthusiasm and combativity of the

masses to do battle with the reactionary offensive and conquer power. But those of us who were part of these forces did not understand correctly or completely or were unable to see, the necessity to generate a new united front, strong and clear enough to wrest the leadership of the mass movement from the hands of the reformists and opportunists.

With regards to our Party, even though we were clear on the character of the dominant sectors of the government and of the PU, and on what could be expected from this experience (if it succeeded in surviving), serious sectarian errors prevented us from uniting with the most advanced political groups to create a new revolutionary pole. This would have united honest militants from the reformist parties and the large masses of our people. We struggled in an isolated manner to gather the masses around us, without paying any attention to the most advanced political groups within and outside the PU government. We often criticized them with almost as much force as we did the unrepentant opportunists. Thus, we reinforced their (the opportunists) policies, which were to isolate us, to silence our voices and to lie about us. On the other hand, the other political forces that repudiated the opportunist policies which were dominant in the government and in the PU committed the opposite error. Afraid of isolating themselves, they allowed themselves to be dragged into a false and pernicious unity with the opportunists, without understanding the necessity of wrenching the masses from their influence and proposing a really revolutionary, united alternative. A few thought, at that time, that the opportunist leaders in good faith, but mistaken, and tried desperately to unite with them to convince them. A few continue to try to convince them, even now, after the coup d'état (after a decade) without making up their minds to contribute to the construction of a really revolutionary pole.

However, in the years since the fascist coup, many people from parties that belonged to the PU have made a critical evaluation of what the dominant policies were in the Allende government years and their consequences and have separated from the opportunists. This has

caused division after division in these parties, fragmenting them. This has a positive aspect — their separation from the opportunists.— However, as long as they continue to be divided and do not succeed in achieving unity around a platform that is coherent, anti-fascist and revolutionary, they will not be able to develop a decisive role in defeating the dictatorship. The two main factors that maintain this division are: the lack of clarity on what programme is necessary at this time, which has to be rectified right now, and a certain "caudillismo" (the error of blindly following a leader-tr.). All this is highly encouraged by the opportunists who have an interest maintaining these divisions.

The programmatic platform to forge this unity and to demarcate from the camp of the opportunists is, however, quite simple. What must be done is to mobilize the Chilean people to defeat the dictatorship and forge a unity government under the leadership of the proletariat which will eliminate the enemy who promoted the defeat of the Allende government and the implantation of fascism: Yankee imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie (industrial, financial and commercial) and what remains of the large landowners. What is essentially at stake is a popular democratic revolution with a socialist perspective. As much as is possible, we must win the middle sectors of industry and commerce who are strongly affected by national and foreign big monopolies because of the concentration of capital.

This alternative is very clearly different from that of the opportunists who, in order to replace Pinochet, conciliate with those who brought him into the government in the first place and who defend him, and go so far as to abandon the incomplete programme that the previous government attempted to apply.

A factor that adds to the division of the revolutionaries is the desire of some to immediately set up socialism in Chile. This is an unrealistic objective, and behind its more radical appearance actually puts off the date when socialism will be attained. We can see this is true when we realize that it was not even possible, in the previous government, to conquer power, or at least

defend the anti-imperialist, anti-monopolist and anti-latifundist reforms it applied.

Does the gathering of revolutionary forces around one pole mean that it is not possible to unite with others who are against the dictatorship? Our Party thinks that it is possible to unite with them at this time, for a series of specific anti-fascist actions. In fact, this is going on at this time, in different actions against repression, in certain demands on human rights, in the demands for the right to return, etc. However, it is one thing to unite to wage certain battles, and something very different to unite organically in one front, under opportunist leadership. Insofar as a revolutionary political front develops and exerts growing influence on the masses in the future, then the militants of groups led by opportunists will be won over, and their leaders will be forced to join a coherent anti-fascist and revolutionary front. In such an event, they will be forced to join a front led by the revolutionary proletariat, which is not the case right now, when one looks at the weakness and division of revolutionary forces. In the united actions taking place at this time, it is exceedingly important to defend revolutionary ideas and not let oneself be dragged along behind opportunist or social-democratic leaders. For instance, the struggle for the right to return should be a battle in the war to defeat the Junta, and not a way to slowdown this war in order to get "permission" to return to the country.

The vast influence wielded by opportunist policies and, even more, the division amongst revolutionaries are the main factors keeping the government in place, more than the repression (which still exists and must be combatted). This proves that, in the face of our people's suffering under the boot of fascism, it is urgent that we put aside all sectarianism, all "caudillismo", to build the political revolutionary unity needed to lead the struggles waged by our people and which are daily growing in intensity and size, to get rid of the fierce over-exploitation and oppression of the dictatorship.

**International commission
of the Revolutionary
Communist Party of Chile**