The Theory and Tactics of the Communist Party of Australia (M-L)

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The Communist Party of Australia (Marxist-Leninist) (hereafter CPA [M-L]) remained, even at the peak of its influence, an "isolated sect," with estimates of its tiny membership ranging from 100 to 200.[1] Even at its peak, its influence was, apart from a few members in Queensland and New South Wales, largely restricted to the state of Victoria. Moreover, the CPA (M-L)'s strong identification with Chinese Communism, and in particular the thought of its leader Mao Zedong, has made it appear to many, even on the Left, an eccentric, doctrinaire and seemingly unAustralian political group. After all, Mao Zedong Thought is supposedly a doctrine which grew out of revolutionary struggle in an impoverished Third World country and which seemed, at face value, to hold little relevance to a reasonably affluent capitalist country with a stable tradition of parliamentary politics and the legal toleration of unions. The CPA (M-L)'s choice of ideology, its bitter factional squabbles with other parties and groups on the Left, and its commitment to armed struggle and revolutionary change, have made it an exotic fish out of the somewhat humdrum waters of mainstream Australian political life.

While the CPA (M-L) hardly rates a mention in conventional accounts of Australian politics, which tend to focus on the electoral process and the operation of parliamentary institutions and peak pressure groups, its significance has been greater than may be evident at first glance. Its activities within the trade unions, student organisations and mass movements have, at times, given it an influence far in excess of that suggested by its own diminutive membership. The CPA (M-L) has also been a major player in Left politics in Australia, and no history of the Australian Left can be complete without a consideration of its origins, ideology and tactics. Moreover, any attempt to analyse the global significance of Mao Zedong Thought must consider its application and levels of success in the industrialised capitalist countries as well as in Third World countries seemingly more appropriate to its use. It must be remembered that the CPA (M-L) was part of a wider international movement whose purpose was militant opposition to U.S. imperialism, the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, and the establishment of socialist societies constructed after the Chinese experience. It is in this context that analysis of the CPA (M-L) assumes a broader significance. For here we have a political party which sought the radical and violent transformation of Australian society, a society differing in almost every conceivable way from Chinese society. How effective was the CPA (M-L) during the 1960s and 1970s in applying Mao Zedong Thought to the particular characteristics of Australian society? Did the CPA (M-L) heed Mao's warning to non-Chinese revolutionaries "not to transplant Chinese experience mechanically," and that the "experience of any foreign country can only serve for reference and must not be regarded as dogma?"[2]

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Answers to these questions may provide some insight into the failure of the CPA (M-L) to expand its membership and exert a more profound influence than it did. I will argue that, while the CPA (M-L) did make some efforts to identify the particular characteristics of Australian society and develop tactics which seemed appropriate, it was never able to reconcile some of the major themes of Maoism with the nature of the Australian context. Of these themes, the most difficult for the CPA (M-L) was the stress on armed struggle as the indispensable medium for the transition to a socialist society. While Australian political history is not without its violent episodes, it remains the case that Australia does not have a significant tradition of political change achieved through violence. The CPA (M-L)'s espousal of armed struggle throughout the 1960s and 1970s thus put it at odds with dominant Australian values, and served to repel many on the Left who perceived both the futility and danger of this strategy. I will suggest too that the CPA (M-L)'s dogged insistence on working class leadership of the Australian revolution made it less able to appeal to the concerns of other disaffected groups and movements (students and youth, women, Aboriginal Australian, conservationists) which were becoming increasingly important to social and political change in Australia. Finally, the CPA (M-L)'s insistence on Australian nationalism was at odds with its continued deference to the line emanating from Beijing. This lack of independence not only made the CPA (M-L) very susceptible to charges of foreign influence, it made it less able to formulate a strategy for change and development based on the specific characteristics of Australian society.

Before turning to a consideration of these themes, a cautionary note is in order. As we shall observe, the CPA (M-L) was obsessed with secrecy. While it published a newspaper and journal, many facets of its internal operation, including details of its membership, have never been divulged. Much of the information available on the CPA (M-L) derives from the memoirs of other Australian communists, many of whom were extremely hostile to it. I have used this memoir literature, mindful of the negative values which motivate antagonistic recollections of the CPA (M-L) and its leaders, and have attempted to offset these by examination of the CPA (M-L)'s own publications. Nevertheless, the questions I pose require judgments which go beyond a supposedly balanced account of the CPA (M-L)'s history. The rather negative judgement that I do render on the CPA (M-L) is, however, based primarily on a Maoist criterion which the CPA (M-L) itself endorsed throughout its early years: attention to concrete circumstances. This was, in many respects, the centre of Mao's approach to social investigation and political change, at least during China's revolutionary period. The unwillingness of the CPA (M-L) to modify or compromise its principles in light of their irrelevance to Australian conditions flew in the face of this central tenet of Mao's thought, and ultimately contributed to its decline. This judgement is, however, tempered by a recognition that the CPA (M-L)'s lack of success was linked to the general decline in support for left-wing parties in Australian since the Second World War. The failure of the CPA (M-L) was thus a function of broader political forces and changes, as well as its inability to formulate strategies compatible with Australian characteristics.

The Formation of the CPA (M-L)

Ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union in the late-1950s and early-1960s was the main reason for the split in the Communist Party of Australia (hereafter CPA) which gave rise to the CPA (M-L), although internal tensions within the CPA over other matters (falling membership, financial difficulties, personality clashes) also contributed.[3] Established under Soviet influence in October 1920 and strongly influenced subsequently by Comintern policy, the CPA nevertheless established close ties with the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) after 1949.[4] These ties included not only extensive visits by Australian communists to China, but the absorption of organisational techniques from the Chinese (including criticism and self-criticism) and the dissemination of Chinese revolutionary propaganda within Australia.[5] Indeed, by 1960 over 100 CPA officials had completed study courses in China, and it was widely accepted that China, rather than the Soviet Union, was the normal place to train officials.[6] From the early-1950s, artists and writers within the CPA had advocated emulation of Chinese conceptions of socialist art and literature; "those of us who are Communist artists need to make a close study of the writings of Lenin, Mao Tse-tung and other leading Communists on art," one artist wrote in a Communist periodical in 1952.[7] And in terms of ideological influence, one hostile commentator asserted that " despite its crude pseudo-theoretical content, Maoism had a major influence on the Communist Party of Australia at the highest level in the 1950s and 1960s. This was particularly reflected by leading cadres who attended study courses in China in the fifties. Some returned to make the idealist assertion that Maoism was 'the most outstanding expression of Marxism in modern times'."[8]

There were thus strong organisational and ideological links between the CPA and *both* the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (hereafter CPSU) *and* the CCP. Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 and his revision of Marxist-Leninist theory to allow that there could be peaceful competition and coexistence between the socialist and capitalist camps thus placed the CPA in a very serious theoretical and organisational dilemma. The CCP objected very strongly to Khrushchev's revision of Marxist-Leninist Theory, and the CPA would inevitably have to decide which side to support.

Initially, the leadership of the CPA attempted to remain neutral, although they retained a great deal of sympathy for the Chinese position. For many in the CPA, the notion of a peaceful transition to socialism premised on the parliamentary road would make the CPA indistinguishable from the Australian Labour Party (hereafter ALP), the mass-based moderate reformist party which had electoral success at both state and federal parliamentary levels. A parliamentary road to socialism implied a closer relationship with the ALP, something not welcomed by many in the CPA, for a long history of bad blood existed between the two parties; CPA members were not likely to forget or **forgive Labour Prime Minister Chifley's violent attacks on Australian communists during the miner's strike of 1949. There was also a good deal of intense and unfriendly** competition between the ALP and the CPA over control of industrial unions. Nevertheless, some CPA members saw the validity of Khrushchev's line for Australian conditions, but their position was initially given little tolerance.[9]

In the late-1950s, virtually the entire National Secretariat of the CPA was ideologi-
cally and psychologically in favour of the Chinese position.[10] L. L. (Lance) Sharkey,
the long-time General-Secretary of the CPA, visited China in 1959 and 1960, held dis-
cussions with Mao Zedong, and returned with his faith in the Chinese position appar-
ently unabated.[11] Sharkey had commented unofficially that the Chinese "knew more
about Marxism."[12] His views were strongly endorsed by E. F. (Ted) Hill, then Victorian
State Secretary of the CPA. It is probable, however, that Sharkey had not, at that time,
realised that a possible consequence of the tensions between the CPSU and the CCP
was a split in international communism. This possibility was sharply borne home to
Sharkey at the Moscow Conference in November 1961, but he resisted pressure brought
to bear on him in Moscow to desert the Chinese camp, and even visited Beijing on his
return to Australia. Once back in Australia, Sharkey asserted publicly that the dispute
was over and refused to allow discussion of it.[13] Ted Hill, however, continued his bitter
attack on revisionism. "At this moment," he declared, "there are two lines in the world
Communist movement. In my opinion, one is a Marxist-Leninist line and the other is
not. The Marxist-Leninist line [is] ... upheld above all by the Communist Party of China,
and the non-Marxist line is upheld by the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union."[14]

Despite his previous support for the CCP, Sharkey's position shifted in favour of
the CPSU, probably as a result of his realisation that the CPA would become isolated
from the fraternity of international communist parties should its support for the Chinese
position continue.[15] Overacker suggests too that the CPA's declining membership, its
falling revenue, and the large East European migrant population in Australia, also en-
couraged Sharkey towards ideological flexibility and support for the Soviet position.[16]
Following the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, which Sharkey attended, the leadership of
the CPA finally declared it support for the Soviet position, and condemned the "Alba-
nians" (a thinly disguised euphemism for the Chinese). Hill angrily opposed this change
in direction,[17] but he was out-manoeuvred, and in mid-1963 he and a number of his
supporters were expelled from the CPA; others resigned in disgust.[18] There ensued a
vitriolic polemic between Hill and the leadership of the CPA, with Sharkey charging
the "Hill group" with wanting "to force upon our Party the incorrect line of the Com-
munist Party in China," and Hill lashing Sharkey for his abandonment of the universal
principles of Marxism-Leninism.[19] Hill was strongly supported by the Chinese for his
determination "to repudiate revisionist leadership," and the full text of his November
1963 speech denouncing "modern revisionism" was reprinted in full in the Chinese
media.[20]

Hill and his supporters decided to found a rival communist party, and the CPA (M-
L) was formally established in March 1964; Hill was elected Chairman of the Central
Committee. The founding conference formulated "a program for Australia's advance to
socialism in strict accord with the scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism," and es-
tablished cordial relations with the "Marxist-Leninist Communist Parties" of New
Zealand, Indonesia, China, Burma, Korea, Malaya, Ceylon, Laos and Japan.[21]

Ted Hill and the Universal Truths of Marxism-Leninism

Edward Fowler (Ted) Hill (1915-1988) was both the Chairman (until 1983) and major
theorist of the CPA (M-L).[22] Hill had graduated in law from the University of Melbourne,

and gained a reputation as a tough and skilful advocate.[23] According to one who knew him well, "Hill did not believe in half measures; he usually went in boots and all ... He was thoroughly determined, quite ruthless and absolutely devoted to his cause." He was the "epitome of the hard-line Communist," a Stalinist and proud of it, one who believed in "utmost secrecy in the Party.[24] Hill had first met Mao Zedong in 1956, and met him on many occasions subsequently,[25] and it is clear that Mao made a deep impression on Hill: "His conversation was full of wisdom, inspiration, modesty, service to the people, warmth and understanding. He was the master of Marxism-Leninism."[26] Both ideologically and psychologically, Hill was strongly attracted to Mao Zedong's thought, with its continued emphasis on revolutionary struggle by a Leninist party, and under his leadership the CPA (M-L) revered Mao's thought as the correct manifestation of modern Marxism, and attempted to implements its doctrines.

Hill explicitly endorsed Mao's view that the CPSU under Khrushchev (and by extension, the CPA) had deviated from orthodoxy as a result of a misperception that world history had made redundant a number of Marxism-Leninism's formerly universal truths.[27] For Hill, the position of the CPSU was untenable, for Marxism-Leninism's initial historical propositions were as relevant in the 1960s as they had been in Lenin's time; "The fact is that the whole course of development of society since Lenin's day has brilliantly confirmed and substantiated Marxism-Leninism in every single respect. Not one of its principles is outdated or has not justified itself."[28]

Nothing had occurred in world history, according to Hill, which suggested any alteration in the fundamental character of capitalism; it was founded on the oppression and exploitation of the working class and other toiling classes, and it was a system which resorted to violence to maintain and extend itself. It was thus idle daydreaming to imagine that capitalism could be reformed through peaceful means. For this strategy was based, not only on a misunderstanding of the essential nature of capitalism, but of the institution of parliament through which these reforms were supposed to be achieved.[29] For Hill and the CPA (M-L), parliament and the electoral process were merely a facade used by the ruling class to deceive the working class into believing that it could influence the state and its policies. As the creature of the ruling class, it was illogical to think that the state, of which parliament was only one institution, could be captured through peaceful means and transformed into an agency for changing capitalism to socialism; the class basis of the state precluded any such possibility. The only possible response to the contradictions of capitalism was revolution, to violently resist oppression and exploitation, and ultimately to smash the capitalist state and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. All reformist parties (the ALP and revisionist CPA) not only compromised themselves by being drawn into the morass of electoral politics, they postponed the eventual victory of the working class by reinforcing the deception that bourgeois democracy was a genuine democracy which would allow the achievement of socialism through peaceful, incremental change.

Hill's response to the revisionist doctrines of peaceful coexistence and the parliamentary road to socialism largely reproduced the arguments flung at the CPSU by the CCP in the early-1960s. Indeed, one of the documents widely quoted by Hill and the

CPA (M-L) organs[30] was the Chinese editorial of 1960 entitled *Long Live Leninism,* a lengthy repudiation of Khrushchev's abandonment of the essential tenets of Leninism.[31] *Long Live Leninism* argued that, despite the changes in the world situation since Lenin's death, his thesis regarding the fundamental character of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism remained relevant. However, now dominant in this system of global oppression was U. S. imperialism; and most threatening to world peace was the development of atomic weapons which were employed by U. S. imperialism to "to threaten war and blackmail the whole world."[32] The threat of war was intensifying as imperialism decayed, and rather than putting any hope in the doctrine of peaceful coexistence between the capitalism and socialist camps, socialist forces throughout the world must gear up for a struggle which would eventuate in the overthrow of imperialism. Moreover, *Long Live Leninism* violently repudiated the possibility that the coming conflagration could be avoided or that the essential nature of capitalism could be altered through a parliamentary strategy.[33] Underpining the CPA (M-L)'s acceptance of the Chinese position was the basic premise that the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism had not changed. The task was to integrate these truths with the "concrete reality of Australia" and the CPA (M-L) pledged to "play its full part" in this process.[34]

The "Concrete Reality" of Australia

The concept of the integration of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete reality of Australia was based on a recognition that Australian society had its own specific characteristics which were themselves manifestations of universal historical laws. However, a recognition of Australia's concrete reality did not signify that Australian society was so different from others that it stood apart from world history. In his polemics with Sharkey of the CPA, Hill vehemently rejected the doctrine of "exceptionalism," the idea that communism was not relevant because of Australia's particular characteristics. Of these, the most important for Sharkey was the existence of the ALP, a party supposedly in tune with the temper of Australian workers and through which Australian could achieve peaceful socialist reform. The truth was very different, Hill asserted, for the ALP was anti-communist to the core, and despite the socialist protestations of its programme, the leaders of the ALP were "violent opponents of socialism" and guilty of "the most depraved deception of the workers."[35]

But if Hill and the CPA (M-L) rejected "exceptionalism," how did they define Australia's concrete reality and how did they perceive the process of its integration with the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism? The most detailed analysis by the CPA (M-L) of Australia's history and society appears in *Australia's Revolution: On the Struggle for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party,* a substantial volume published in 1973. *Australia's Revolution* portrays all of Australian history since 1788 as belonging to the national democratic revolution. The main characteristics of this revolution are the struggle against imperialism, firstly British imperialism, but as capitalism develops unevenly and there is constant competition between capitalist powers, later against U. S. imperialism. This struggle embraced both black and white Australians, and people from many strata; it gathered momentum as capitalism developed in Australia, and with it came the

emergence and growth of the capitalist and working classes. Prior to 1917, the national democratic revolution had been led by the bourgeoisie, but the Russian Revolution made its continued leadership impossible; leadership of this revolution then passed to the working class which, while "young and immature" in Australia, had "no motive and no reason for compromise with imperialism." After 1917, the national democratic Australian revolution "entered the world stream of proletarian socialist revolution."[36]

One of the reasons why imperialism represented the main target of Australia's national democratic revolution was that Australian workers were largely employed in the factories of foreign imperialist companies. The fact that Australian workers were, in these factories, involved in socialised labour and yet denied the fruits of that labour, represented the basic contradiction on which was founded the struggle for Australia's independence from imperialism. This basic contradiction of Australian economic and social life meant that the working class were central to this struggle. Here the CPA (M-L) vehemently denied the suggestion that Australian workers are "dull and stupid, will never advance," and "are like sheep."[37] Australian reality "is that not only is the working class the leading class but it is the biggest single class by far and the main force in revolutionary struggle." United with the workers are other "struggling sections of the population:" rural workers, semi-workers small and not so big farmers, public servants (other than the top ranks), insurance and bank clerks, small shopkeepers, some patriotic sections of the capitalists, and students and other intellectuals. However, the CPA (M-L) believed that only the working class "for entirely objective reasons can consistently lead the struggle against imperialism to the end."[38]

When *Australia's Revolution* broaches the possibility of radical change, it concedes that, while "revolution is not so obvious in Australia ... irresistible forces are working to revolution. This is an objective fact."[39] Pointing to the validity of the Russian and Chinese revolutionary experiences, *Australia's Revolution* asserts the continued necessity of armed struggle; after all, the chief component of the capitalist state is the army, and "the violence of an army can only be overthrown by the violence of an army."[40] Consequently, "the universal truth of the central position of armed struggle holds good," despite Australia being very different to Russia and China. But how was armed struggle to be prosecuted in Australia, a society with almost no tradition of left-wing violence against the state and in which the revolutionary Left, made up of the CPA (M-L) and a number of tiny antagonistic Trotskyist parties, could muster only a handful of supporters? This was the major question for the CPA (M-L), and one to which it was able to provide no clear response. "The precise form of armed struggle in countries such as Australia has not yet been worked out," it conceded.[41] Nevertheless, armed struggle, in accordance with Mao's and Lin Biao's theory of people's war, necessitated "the gradual unfolding of protracted people's war and the establishment of people's armed forces in Australia." The first stage in this protracted people's war was resistance to police violence.[42]

Strategies and Tactics

Although the prospects for violent revolution in Australian were certainly not good, the CPA (M-L) developed a series of tactics which it hoped would lead to that end. First and

foremost of these was the building of its party structures, and establishing modes of practice appropriate to a revolutionary party. With the split from the CPA, the CPA (M-L) inherited the organisational tactics and approaches characteristic of a Leninist Party.[43] Even before the CPA (M-L) had been formally established, Hill's supporters began publishing a newspaper and a theoretical journal (*Vanguard* and *Australian Communist*) to project its message, to attract support, and to counter the ideological position of CPA publications (*Tribune* and *Communist Review*). The publication of *Vanguard* and *Australian Communist* was also highly significant for the ideological education of CPA (M-L) members and supporters; for the CPA (M-L) believed that "until Party building is put on the ideological plane there can be no real Party building."[44]

The CPA (M-L) also revealed its Leninist inclinations by stressing both discipline and the importance of secrecy in its Party work.[45] Hill conceived of party structure as a secret, largely underground cell-like organisation, with military discipline, and all power concentrated in the hands of the leaders.[46] While there would be some open work, this would be kept to a minimum; and even open work involved an element of secrecy, for the affiliation of Party workers could not be revealed.[47] Given the legal conditions prevailing in Australia, it was possible to have a few Communists who had been "publicly proclaimed;" but these were the exception. This secretive approach to Party work was felt justified by the infiltration of left-wing groups and parties by Australia's security organisations, and the attempt to suborn their leaders and theorists.[48]

While the CPA (M-L) put great stress on party-building, it did not measure the success of this process just in terms of the expansion of its membership. Indeed, it went out of its way to criticise the CPA for being preoccupied with the issue of membership, for this could lead to a dilution of ideological principles in the hope of attracting a greater following.[49] It was preferable, if necessary, to have a small and committed membership, one with a highly developed sense of its political mission and with a high ideological level; it would, in short, be a party of activists, one which would bring propaganda to the masses "from above."[50]

In the face of its small numbers and in response to its ideological emphasis on the leading role of the working class, the CPA (M-L) attempted to employ a tactic which the CPA had used with considerable though decreasing effect since the Second World War: winning positions and influence in the trade union movement. On the split in 1963, a number of leading Victorian trade union officials had left the CPA and followed Hill into the CPA (M-L).[51] There was consequently considerable bitter rivalry between the CPA and CPA (M-L) for control over unions which had traditionally been under CPA control.[52] The CPA (M-L) used its influence within the unions to pursue a number of goals. The first of these was to achieve close contact with working class people in the work place in order to influence their thinking towards revolution. As *Australia's Revolution* points out, "the Party must be organized deep in the working class and deep amongst the workers at the point of production, i.e., in the actual workplaces. It is the actual workplaces that the workers are united by the very process of production, where they are most revolutionary."[53] Second, the CPA (M-L) used its union to pursue radical

industrial tactics which often involved violent confrontation, not only with employers, but with rival unions. The CPA (M-L) has, by and large, not accepted the conventional principles of conciliation and arbitration underpinning Australia's industrial relations system, for this is perceived as a system contrived by "the bosses" on the one hand and right-wing unions on the other to defuse the revolutionary potential of the Australian working class; "negotiations," it argues, "must be backed up by strength and militant activity.[54] Not only have CPA (M-L) dominated unions not felt much compunction to abide by the conventional norms of industrial relations, they have also been involved in some highly publicised illegal activities. The results of these militant industrial and illegal activities have been mixed. While these unions have clearly attracted a strong cadre of activists who can be mobilised for demonstrations, pickets and other industrial conflicts, they have also attracted the enmity and opposition of other powerful unions with strong links to the ALP; for their activities are perceived as a threat to both the stability of the union movement and the smooth running of the industrial relations system. Moreover, unions such as the Ship Painter's and Dockers' Union and the Builders' Labourers' Federation have attracted the hostile attention of Federal and State Governments and the judiciary, the latter union being deregistered in some states and its General Secretary Norm Gallagher jailed for accepting bribes.[55]

Another tactic employed by the CPA (M-L) to disseminate its propaganda and enhance its influence was to work within front organisations, a tactic earlier employed with considerable success by the CPA.[56] One of these was the Australia-China Society over which there was a struggle in 1964 between members of the CPA and CPA (M-L).[57] Another was the Australian peace movement which the CPA (M-L) struggle to control, although with less success, for the line of the peace movement moved away from recognition of the supposedly peaceful nature of the socialist camp and support for national liberation struggles; the CPA (M-L) blamed this on the domination of the peace movement by CPA "revisionists" and the ALP.[58] Other organisations which the CPA (M-L) attempted to infiltrate and control were Parents and Teachers' Associations, community health groups, student organisations, and community radio.[59]

Finally, although the CPA (M-L)'s attitude toward parliament and the electoral process was scornful, it did not reject the possibility of utilising these "paraphernalia of bourgeois democracy" to expose their fraudulent character and to raise the consciousness of workers.[60] It accepted the utility of parliamentary struggle on "immediate issues," mainly to reveal the deceptive nature of parliament, but insisted that "the fundamental question of the social system" was a matter for the mass movement, one which could not and should not be constrained within the framework of parliamentary politics. At all times, the independence of the proletariat had to be maintained, and this could not be achieved if parties (like the CPA and ALP), which purported to represent the interests of the working class, were mired in the "shadow sparring" of the electoral process; indeed, the CPA (M-L) regarded such parties as degenerating "into appendages of the ruling class."[61] Preparation for the central struggle, for the establishment of working class state power and a socialist society, had to proceed outside parliament and had to be based on the mass movement.

Policies

The major policy thrust of the CPA (M-L) in its early years was resistance to imperialism.[62] Guided by Lenin's theory of imperialism, the CPA (M-L) perceived the United States as the dominant imperialist power, one which used its enormous financial and industrial might to penetrate capitalist countries (such as Australia) which were "friendly," or its massive military power to intervene in those countries (such as Vietnam) which were not. In Australia, the conservative Menzies government had adopted a complacent attitude to massive American investment in the Australian economy and what Jupp has called the "Americanisation of Australia" across many dimensions of social, cultural and political life.[63] In this context, the CPA (M-L) felt it could tap the nationalist sentiment of Australians for resistance to the encroachment of American economic power and cultural influence. As *Vanguard* of June 1964 pointed out, the "main link" in Australia "is the struggle against American imperialism for Australia's independence, its sovereign right to act independently in foreign relations and to develop its own resources."[64] Indeed, slogans such as "For peace, freedom and national independence" and "For an independent, patriotic Australian policy," were common in the pages of *Vanguard* during its early years.[65]

Resistance to U. S. imperialism inevitably led the CPA (M-L) to oppose Australian involvement in the war in Vietnam (particularly the policy of conscription) and the stationing of U.S. bases on Australian soil; the existence of the latter was seen as "proof positive of Australia's subordination to U.S. imperialism."[66] Resistance to British imperialism led to opposition to the formation of Malaysia, to which the Menzies government had given its support and to which it committed troops; the CPA (M-L) believed this had involved "the Australian nation in an imperialist and adventurist policy which could lead to war with Indonesia."[67] The formation of Malaysia was opposed by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) with which the CPA (M-L) had cordial relations, and messages of support for Aidit, and even the transcript of his speeches, appeared in *Vanguard.*[68]

The CPA (M-L)'s preoccupation with imperialism led to a parallel preoccupation with the issue of war and peace. World peace was threatened by the belligerent actions of imperialist powers, and in particular those of the United States.[69] The CPA (M-L)'s call for peace was clearly premised on its opposition to imperialism. It believed that the military interventions of imperialism, in such places as Vietnam and Malaysia, could be challenged and weakened through the development of domestic peace movements within the capitalist countries. The encouragement of the Australian peace movement was, therefore, a purely tactical ploy, for the CPA (M-L), following the lead of Mao and the CCP, believed that a violent confrontation between the socialist and capitalist camps was ultimately inevitable and, in the fullness of time, desirable.[70] However, while the CPA (M-L) called for a broad united front against U. S. imperialism, and strove to control the peace movement in Australia to the benefit of "the socialist world," it was not able to make much headway against the entrenched influence of the CPA "revisionists" and the ALP which perceived the issue of war and peace in terms very different from the CPA (M-L).[71]

Another issue of concern to the CPA (M-L) was Australian recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Menzies Government had, following the lead of the United States, consistently refused to recognise the communist government established in China in 1949, although it was not above trading with it. Menzies was also a past master at playing "the communist card" in his electoral tussles with the ALP, any apparent weakening of his resolve to refuse recognition to the PRC would have meant a dilution of this tactic.[72] The CPA (M-L) called for immediate recognition of the PRC, arguing that "the Government of China is really a people's government which acts at all times in the interests of the Chinese people and which enjoys the utmost confidence and support of the whole of the Chinese people."[73]

Finally, the CPA (M-L) held strong views on social and economic issues. It was concerned with equal pay for women, although it perceived gender inequality in strictly class terms.[74] It supported the struggle for genuine democratic rights,[75] and a "substantial rise" in the basic wage.[76] It also supported the struggles of Australia's indigenous people, and opposed racism.[77] However, underpinning and qualifying its approach to these "immediate" issues was its focus on the longer-term struggle for socialism; its slogan was: "A socialist revolution in Australia -- for socialism."[78] The primary mission of the CPA (M-L) was "to lead the working class to the overthrow of capitalism."[79]

The CPA (M-L) and Mao Zedong Thought

The CPA (M-L) explicitly adopted "the general truth of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought" as its ideology,[80] and the influence of Mao's thought is quite evident in the CPA (M-L)'s analysis of the world situation and Australian domestic issues. It is clear from its publications that the CPA (M-L) perceived China under Mao as the most advanced socialist country and the true defender of Marxism-Leninism. The pages of *Vanguard* contained frequent laudatory references to aspects of the Chinese socialist experiment, such as the people's commune.[81]

It is clear too that the theorists of the CPA (M-L), such as Hill, were well versed in Mao's thought, not only quoting widely from the Mao texts, but attempting to apply Mao's philosophy to the interpretation of Australian society. For example, *Australia's Revolution*, mobilises Mao's "On Practice" to explain the need, not only for knowing the "laws of the objective world." but "applying the knowledge of these laws actively to change the world." It continues: "The Communist Party of Australia was created as a party of struggle to apply its knowledge of materialist dialectics actively to change the social system in Australia from bourgeois democracy to people's democratic dictatorship and then socialism."[82] Similarly, Mao's "On Contradiction" is quoted to explain that "all development, social and scientific, occurs through the resolution of contradiction within the essence of things." Consequently, the "class struggle is a manifestation of materialist dialectics, the struggle of opposites. In Australia, it is the class struggle between the foreign imperialists with their local collaborators on the one hand and the Australian workers, working people and other patriots on the other hand."[83] Indeed, Mao's "On Practice" and "On Contradiction" summed up "in the most brilliant and comprehensive way the whole of the Marxist world outlook of materialist dialectics."[84] Mao's thought is also mobilised to support the strategy for party-building adopted by the CPA (M-L), and the three texts most often cited in this context are Mao's "Reform Our Study," "Rectify the Party's Style of Work" and "Oppose Stereotyped Party Writing."[85]

The CPA (M-L) and the Reform Process in China

The CPA (M-L) was confronted with the dilemma of how to respond to changes of line in China. In this respect, the CPA (M-L) was in the same invidious position as the CPA before it, for the policies of the CPA had zigzagged to comply with the line determined by the Comintern and Cominform and, after some soul-searching, with the line of the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in 1956.[86] Sharkey's willingness to comply with the line emanating from Moscow created serious problems of morale within the CPA, and brought charges that it was not an independent party, owing its allegiance less to Australia than to the Soviet Union.

In its early years, the CPA (M-L) waxed very righteous about the unchangeability of the universal truths of Marxism-Leninism, making the risky assumption that the socialist line of Mao's China would remain constant. As the line in China altered, however, the CPA (M-L) had little option but to alter its own line, bringing in its train the same sorts of problems as had beset the CPA.[87] With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in China, the CPA (M-L) swung its support behind Mao, and it was inspired to set out "with even greater confidence to grasp Mao Tsetung Thought."[88] Liu Shaoqi was criticized, and then in his turn, Lin Biao.[89] However, it was the dramatic shift in Chinese foreign policy occasioned by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the enunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine which was to create the most serious theoretical and tactical problems for the CPA (M-L). In the face of possible Soviet aggression, China began to make overtures to the United States, and accused the Soviet Union of "social imperialism" and attempting to achieved world dominance. The visit to China in 1972 of U.S. President Nixon was a rude shock for the CPA (M-L), for here was the leader of the imperialist power dubbed the gravest threat to world peace and the principal enemy of the Australian people welcomed in Beijing and holding cordial talks with Chairman Mao.[90] China was clearly moving towards a reduction of tension with its old enemy, the United States. How did the CPA (M-L) respond?

The response of the CPA (M-L) virtually mirrored the Chinese line. While U. S. imperialism was still attacked as a major enemy and threat to world peace, the Soviet Union was now identified as one of the two superpowers attempting to achieve world hegemony. *Vanguard* continued to lash the United States for its dominance of Australia, but by November 1973 the Soviet social-imperialists had been designated "a central enemy," and "a real danger to the Australian people;" for U. S. imperialism was in decline, and Soviet imperialism was seeking "to fill up the vacuums left by the decline of other imperialisms." Soviet social imperialism was "an increasing menace" and Brezhnev was "an utter reactionary."[91] By 1976, when Hill published a major analysis of superpower rivalry, Soviet social imperialism had become "the greater evil."[92]

The CPA (M-L) thus managed to rationalise the change in China's foreign policy in terms which paralleled the CCP's explanation of its actions. Moreover, the CPA (M-L)'s line zigzagged wildly in response to the rapidly unfolding events in China in 1976. Following the crushing of the disturbances in Tiananmen Square in April and the subsequent sacking of Deng Xiaoping, the leadership of the CPA (M-L) sent a cable to Mao and the Central Committee of the CCP hailing this "great victory against counter-revolution and the attempt to reverse the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution;" it also "fully supported the dismissal of Deng Xiaoping."[93] Yet, following Mao's

death and the arrest of the Gang of Four later that year, the CPA (M-L) again fell into line behind the new Chinese leadership. Hill, in fact, travelled to China in December 1976 and held talks with Hua Guofeng, and the CPA (M-L) subsequently hailed the appointment of Hua and the smashing of the Gang of Four; the latter were castigated as "the class enemy within the Chinese Communist Party who were co-ordinating their activities against socialism in China with the activities of imperialism, social-imperialism and all reactionaries."[94] In response to these dramatic changes, Hill obviously felt some theoretical rationalisation was in order. This appeared in a pamphlet entitled *Class Struggle within the Communist Parties* in which he invoked the inevitability of class struggle within communist parties as a means to explain the sudden shifts in policy within both the CCP and the CPA (M-L).[95]

However, Hill's willingness to dilute radical principles to maintain cordial relations with the new leaders of the CCP sat uncomfortably with some CPA (M-L) members.[96] The CPA (M-L), like the CPA in the early-1960, was now faced by the very real possibility of a split. This is what occurred. A group led by Albert Langer,[97] a Maoist active in student circles in the 1960s, led a breakaway group which adopted a red Eureka flag as its emblem and the theoretical line of the French Maoist Charles Bettelheim.[98] But the writing was on the wall for the CPA (M-L). Its influence declined as the radicalism of the Vietnam War period receded; its base in the union movement has, apart from what is left of the Builders' Labourers' Federation, largely disappeared, and the little support it drew from the ranks of student activists has all but evaporated. The changes in China since 1978 (adoption of free market economic policies, opening wide to trade and investment from the capitalist West), and the CPA (M-L)'s initial willingness to support these, seriously eroded the claims to ideological rectitude made so stridently by the CPA (M-L) in the 1960s and early-1970s.

In response to the dilemma posed by the reform process in China and the damage this did to its own credibility, the CPA (M-L) invoked Mao's repudiation of "foreign worship" and reasserted the necessity of policies suited to the realities of Australian society.[99] In a rare example of introspection and self-criticism, Hill wrote (in the 1980s) of the mistakes made by the CPA (M-L)'s earlier slavish following of the Chinese line. The CPA (M-L) had:

> tended mechanically to try to follow Chinese Communist Party decisions and statements. Australian Marxist-Leninist Communists tended to demand of members and supporters as a condition of membership and support, acceptance of every position taken and move made by the Chinese Communists and Mao Zedong ... Emphasis on "revolution as the main trend," for example, was not applicable in an immediate sense in Australia but it was accepted as being applicable.[100]

The repudiation of Mao's line in China, Therefore, did not see the demise of the CPA (M-L), for it altered its line to accommodate the changes in China, and has during the 1980s and 1990s stressed the importance of the struggle in Australia for an independent Australia. The CPA (M-L) has survived the death of Ted Hill (in 1988) and continues to publish *Vanguard* and *Australian Communist*. Indeed, the CPA (M-L) is now the only non-Trotskyist Communist Party in Australia, although its influence on Australian political life is now virtually negligible, and even on the Australian Left it has few supporters.[101]

The CPA (M-L): The Failure of "Maoism" in Australia

In the thirty-odd years of its existence, the CPA (M-L) has had no success in achieving its primary goal, a revolution in Australia and the establishment of a socialist society. Its call for armed struggle against the capitalist state has gone largely unheeded, and if anything, Australian politics has become even more conservative in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the CPA (M-L)'s membership, always small, has declined, although precise membership figures cannot be obtained given the Party's secretive nature.

Is it to be concluded, then that the CPA (M-L), the institutional home of Mao Zedong Thought in Australia, has been a failure? To the extent that its goals have not been met, the CPA (M-L) has indeed failed. A number of reasons can be suggested for this. First, the CPA (M-L)'s call for armed struggle and the violent overthrow of the state was made in the context of a society which has comparatively little history of political violence. The CPA (M-L) talked much, in its early years, of the "concrete reality" of Australia, but it was unable to reconcile itself to the reality of a political culture in which political complacency and apathy, rather than militancy and violent resistance, have been the norm.[102] Second, despite some efforts to do so,[103] the CPA (M-L) had only limited success influencing and recruiting amongst the counter-movements (student, feminist, conservationist, anti-war and anti-racist) which sprang up during the late-1960s and the 1970s.[104] One of the reasons for this is that the CPA (M-L) insisted throughout on the leading role of the working class in the Australian revolution; it explicitly denied that role to students, and for many in the very active student movement of that time this was a significant disincentive to support the CPA (M-L).[105] The Leninist organisation of the CPA (M-L), which embraced centralism, discipline and secrecy, also offended the libertarian impulse of many student radicals; the emphasis on armed struggle and violence also offended the commitment, quite widespread in student circles, to peace and love as means of achieving political goals.[106] The nationalist appeals of the CPA (M-L) were also regarded with distaste by some students.[107] Third, the CPA (M-L) was never able to come to grips with the widespread electoral support which the Australian working class gave to the ALP, a party which had decidedly rejected revolutionary tactics and was largely uninfluenced by Marxist ideas. The CPA (M-L)'s attack on the ALP as the "running dogs" of U.S. imperialism cut no ice with the Australian working class.[108] Moreover, the election of the Whitlam Labor government in 1972, with its immediate recognition of the People's Republic of China and disengagement of Australia from the war in Vietnam (two of the CPA (M-L)'s most strident demands), indicated, even to those on the Left, that electoral politics could, after all, achieve significant political goals.[109] Fourth, the CPA (M-L)'s advocacy of Mao Zedong Thought made little headway in a society prone to racism; many Australians were repelled by this ideology precisely because it was perceived as Chinese in origin. The CPA (M-L) recognised this problem, but was unable to find any solution to it.[110] Fifth, the willingness of the CPA (M-L) to change course as the political line in China altered made its nationalistic appeals for an independent Australia sound increasingly hollow, especially in light of the growing appreciation of Australia's own national identity in mainstream Australian politics. And finally, there is the personality and political styles of Ted Hill, the long-time leader of the CPA (M-L). Hill was committed to a commandist and Stalinist form of politics which repelled many of his former colleagues in the CPA and which many radicals in the student movement also found distasteful.

The judgement that the CPA (M-L) failed has, however, to be qualified by consideration of the broader reasons for the failure of the Left in Australia. First, the decline in numbers of the blue collar working class has meant a decline in the social constituency of left-wing parties.[111] The ALP, under Whitlam, recognised this trend in the late-1960s and oriented its appeals to the concerns of white-collar and professional middle class Australians; the dilution of commitment to socialist goals indicated by this strategy to capture the centre-ground of politics has been largely accepted by the ALP. The political agenda in Australia has thus been dragged to the right, and the Australian electorate has endorsed this political move by electing the ALP to national government between 1983 and 1996. The movement of mainstream Australian politics to the rights has made the parties of the Left appear isolated and largely redundant; what strategy could they pursue in a society increasingly indifferent to the appeals of socialism? Second, there has been a decline in the influence of the Left within the trade union movement.[112] By 1965, for example, the number of unions controlled or heavily influenced by the CPA had been cut to one-third of its 1961 level. Moreover, although unionisation in Australia remained comparatively high until the late-1970s at about 55% of the work force (dropping to less than 40% at present), the composition of trade union membership has changed to reflect the growth of the service sector and the decline of manufacturing industries whose unions have been the conventional base of support for left-wing parties such as the CPA and CPA (M-L).[113] Third, and as Oversacker has pointed out, "Australians think of their society as 'affluent';"[114] and while Australia's economic position has declined over the last two decades, parties of the Left have been unable to make any headway in the face of this continued belief in Australia's prosperity. Socialist appeals to economic grievance or resentment of inequality have largely fallen on deaf ears. Fourth, the parties of the Australian Left have suffered from the apparent failure of socialism elsewhere. China's apparent embrace of capitalist methods and the collapse of the Soviet Union have resulted in a decline in the belief in the claims made by left-wing parties regarding the superiority of socialism. Finally, the parties of the Australian Left have preoccupied themselves with fractious squabbles over matters of doctrine and strategy, as well as personal rivalries; indeed, they often appeared to expend more energy attacking each other than they did capitalism and imperialism.[115] This fragmentation and bitter discord on the Left has been a powerful disincentive to young Australian joining or supporting left-wing parties.

Consequently, while the CPA (M-L) has failed, so too has Australian Left more generally. The CPA, from which the CPA (M-L) split with such acrimony in 1963, held its final congress in March 1992, resolving to end the existence of the CPA as a political organisation and to work for the establishment of a New Left Party.[116] And while the CPA (M-L) may feel some satisfaction to know that it has outlived the CPA, the issues which so bitterly divided the two parties for three decades now seem largely irrelevant. The likelihood of the CPA (M-L) exerting any significant influence on the direction of Australian politics in the near future is negligible; indeed, Trotskyist groups such as the International Socialists have a greater following. Nevertheless, although the "concrete realities" of Australian society appear to have dictated the failure of Maoism in Australia, any understanding of the post-War Australian Left would be impossible without a comprehension of the origins and activities of the CPA (M-L), with its espousal of Mao Zedong Thought and revolutionary struggle drawing on the Chinese experience.

Notes

1. W. J. Brown, The Communist Movement and Australia: *An Historical Outline - 1890s to 1980s* (Haymarket: Australian Labor Movement Publications, 1986), p. 261. Also A. B. Davidson, "The Effects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on the Australian Communist Party," *The Australian Quarterly 26, 3* (September 1964), p. 67; also Fred Wells, "The Communist Party of Australia," in Henry Mayer (ed.), *Australian Politics: A Second Reader* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1969), pp. 400-401.

2. *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung* (Peking: FLP, 1977), Vol. 5, p. 326.

3. See A. B. Davidson, "The Effects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," pp. 59-68.

4. See Brown, *The Communist Movement and Australia*, p. 262. See also Alistair Davidson, *The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History* (Standard: Hoover Institution Press, 1969).

5. Brown, *The Communist Movement and Australia*, p. 263. See also Eric Aarons, *What's Left?: Memoirs of an Australian Communist* (Ringwood: Penguin, 1993), p. 154.

6. Louise Overacker, *Australian Parties in a Changing Society: 1945-67* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1968), p. 167.

7. Quoted in M, Harris, "Australian Communists and Intellectuals," Social Survey (December-January, 1966), p. 329.

8. Brown, *The Communist Movement and Australia*, p. 263.

9. Keith McEwan, *Once a Jolly Comrade* (Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne: Jacaranda Press, 1966), p. 93.

10. Davidson, "The Effects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on the Australian Communist Party," p. 62; see also Davidson, *The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History*, pp. 158-162.

11. For a transcript of the discussion between Sharkey and Mao Zedong in September 1960, see *Australia's Revolution: On the Struggle for a Marxist-Leninist Communist Party* (Melbourne: n.p., August 1973). pp. 249-254.

12. John Sendy, *Comrades Comes Rally: Recollections of an Australian Communist* (Melbourne; Nelson, 1978), p. 122.

13. See Geoff McDonald, *Australia at Stake* (Melbourne: Peel Print, 1977), Chapters 13, 14 and 15.

14. *Australia's Revolution*, pp. 189-190.

15. See Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally*, pp. 126-127.

16. Overacker, *Australian Parties*, p. 169. Membership of the CPA had declined from over 20,000 during World War II to 5,300 in 1965.

17. For Hill's speech opposing Sharkey's shift, see *Australia's Revolution*, pp. 187-238.

18. Gibson estimates that about 100 resigned. See Ralph Gibson, *My Years in the Communist Party* (Melbourne: International Bookshop, 1966), p. 256. Also Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally*, p. 134.

19. *See Differences in the Communist Movement: View of the Communist Party of Australia* (Sydney: Current Book Distributors, 1963), p. 4; also E. F. Hill, *The Australian Socialist Movement at the Crossroads* (Glenroy: n. p., 1964).

20. *See Peking Review,* December 6, 1963, pp. 20-25; and April 3, 1964, p. 23.

21. *Vanguard* 1, 10 (March 1964); *also Vanguard 1*, 15 (June 1964).

22. Something of a cult of personality developed round Hill in the hothouse atmosphere of the CPA (M-L). See *The Australian Communist* 71 (1975), and *Australian Communist* 181 (April/June 1994), p.4.

23. McDonand refers to Hill as a "tough barrister;" *see Australia at Stake*, p. 149.

24. Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally*, p. 132. Also McDonald, *Australia at Stake*, p. 149. However, see E. F. Hill, *Communism and Australia: Reflections and Reminiscences* (Fitzroy: Communist Party of Australia [Marxist-Leninist], 1989), pp. 7-10.

25. Hill's visits to China and meetings with Mao Zedong were usually reported in the Chinese media. See, for example, *Peking Review,* May 1, 1964, pp. 3-4. For photos of Hill with Mao Zedong, see E.F. Hill, *Communism and Australia*, pp. 98-99.

26. *Vanguard*, September 10, 1976.

27. See McDonald, *Australia at Stake*, p. 146.

28. Hill, *The Australian Socialist Movement at the Crossroads*, p. 6.

29. *Vanguard* 1, 11 (April 1964), p. 1.

30. See for example Hill, *The Australian Socialist Movement at the Crossroads, p. 10; also Australia's Revolution*, p. 190.

31. It is widely assumed by Mao scholars that Mao wrote portions of *Long Live Leninism,* or inspired or revised it. See Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966) p. 302.

32. *Long Live Leninism* (Peking: FLP, 1960), p. 19.

33. *Ibid.,* pp. 22-31.

34. *Vanguard,* 1, 14 (May 1964), p. 4.

35. Hill, *The Australian Socialist Movement at the Crossroads,* pp. 20-26.

36. *Australia's Revolution,* pp. 5-7.

37. *Ibid.,* p. 9.

38. *Ibid.,* pp. 10-11, 29, 35,55.

39. *Ibid.,* p. 13.

40. *Ibid.,* pp. 49-50. See Aarons, *What's Left?: Memoirs of an Australian Communist,* p. 130.

41. *Australia's Revolution,* p. 54.

42. "Without a People's Army the People will have Nothing," *The Australian Communist* 48 (1971), pp. 88-89.

43. See V.I. Lenin, *What is to be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement* (Peking: FLP, 1975).

44. *Australia's Revolution,* p. 84.

45. See Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally,* p. 132; also, Wells, "The Communist Party of Australia," pp. 400-401.

46. Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally,* p. 132, 136. See also *Australia's Revolution,* pp. 151-152.

47. *Australia's Revolution,* pp. 52-53.

48. See W. J. Brown, *The Communist Movement and Australia,* pp. 268-270. Also Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally,* p. 132.

49. *Australia's Revolution,* pp. 83, 146-147.

50. *Australian Communist* 2, pp. 3-4; *Australian Communist* 5, p. 9; and *Australian Communist* 6, p. 6. See also Vanguard (June 1964).

51. See Davidson, *The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History,* p. 155. Also *Vanguard* 1, 12 (April 1964), p. 1.

52. See McEwan, *Once a Jolly Comrade,* pp. 105-108. See also Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally,* p. 135.

53. *Australia's Revolution,* p. 52.

54. *Vanguard* 1, 22 (September 1964), pp. 3-4.

55. See Aarons, *What's Left?: Memoirs of an Australian Communist,* p. 202.

56. See Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally,* p. 130. Aarons recalls that, before the 1963 split, Hill had treated broad organisations like the peace movement as adjuncts of the CPA. See *What's Left?: Memoirs of an Australian Communist,* p. 131.

57. See *Vanguard* 1, 11 (April 1964), p. 4.

58. *Vanguard* 1, 6 (January 1964), p. 3; and 2,1 (October 1964).

59. Information from a personal source.

60. See *Australia's Revolution,* pp. 170-171.

61. *Vanguard* 1, 16 (June 1964), p. 1: also 1. 17 (June 1964).

62. "All Struggles Flow Into the Anti-imperialist Stream," *Australia's Revolution,* p. 170.

63. James Jupp, *Party Politics: Australia, 1966-1981* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 7-10.

64. *Vanguard* 1, 15 (June 1964), p. 1.

65. See *Vanguard* 1, 6 (January 1964), p. 4: and 1, 9 (March 1964), p. 1.

66. *Vanguard* 1, 14 (May 1964).

67. *Vanguard* 14, (May 1964).

68. *Vanguard* 1, 6 (January 1964). Also *Vanguard* 1, 15 (June 1964), p. 1.

69. *Vanguard* 1, 2 (1963).

70. See *Australia's Revolution,* p. 166.

71. See *Vanguard* 1, 6 (January 1964), p. 3; and 2, 1 (October 1964).

72. On the "China problems" in Australian politics and Menzies' approach to recognition, see Edmund S. K. Fung and Colin Mackerras, *From Fear to Friendship: Australia's Policies Towards the People's Republic of China,* 1966-1982 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), esp. Chapter 1; also Gregory Clark, *In Fear of China* (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press 1967).

73. *Vanguard* 1, 11 (April 1964), p. 4; also 1, 7 (February 1964); also 9, 29 (August 1972); also 9, 38 (October 1972).

74. *Vanguard* 1, 9 (1964), p. 3; also *Australia's Revolution*, p. 169. Also *The Australian Communist* 66 (July 1974), p. 51.

75. The CPA (M-L) perceived the apparent freedoms and rights in Australia as part of bourgeois democracy, whose purpose was "to bemuse and deceive people that they have democracy, have real power." *Australia's Revolution*, p. 118.

76. *Vanguard* 1, 8 (February 1964), p. 4.

77. *Australia's Revolution*, pp. 168-169.

78. *Vanguard* 1, 10 (March 1964), p. 4.

79. *Australia's Revolution*, p. 155.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 124. See also the "Draft Provisional General Program of the Australian Communist Party, Marxist Leninist," in *The Australian Communist* 71 (1975), pp. 1-5.

81. See, for example, *Vanguard* 1, 17 (June 1964). Also *Vanguard* 2,1 (October 1964). *Vanguard* 1, 2 (October 1963).

82. *Australia's Revolution*, p. 44. The quote from Mao appears in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: FLP, 1975) 1, p. 304.

83. *Australia's Revolution*, pp. 45-46.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

85. See, for example, *Ibid.*, pp. 28, 876, 123-124. See also *The Australian Communist* 48 (October 1971), p. 27. See also E. F. Hill, *Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Revolutionary Socialist Politics Against Trade Union and Parliamentary Politics* (Brighton: Typo-Art Printing, 1986, second edition), pp. 11, 149.

86. See Geoff McDonald, *Australia at Stake*, p. 155.

87. Eric Aarons makes the judgement that "Ted Hill never gave up his slavish following of the twists and turns of internal Chinese Party politics." *What's Left? Memoirs of an Australian Communist*, p. 134.

88. *Australia's Revolution*, pp. 122-123.

89. See, for example, *The Australian Communist* 48 (October 1971), pp. 28ff.

90. For a review of the year's events which conspicuously avoids any mention of Nixon's visit, see *Vanguard* 9, 48 (December 1972).

91. *Vanguard* 10, 45 (November 1973); also 10, 48 (December 1973).

92. E. F. Hill, *Australia and the Superpowers* (Australia:, n. p., 1976); see also *Vanguard* 13, 38 (October 1976).

93. *Vanguard* 13, 14 (April 1976).

94. See *Vanguard* 14, 6 (February 1977); also 14, 1 and 14, 2 (January 1977).

95. Excerpts from *Class Struggle Within the Communist Party* appear in *Vanguard* 14, 2 (January 1977).

96. Although it is true that Hill continued to endorse strategies formulated by Mao. See "Comment on the Mass Line," *The Australian Communist* 104 (March/April, 1981). However, even here, Hill invoked Mao's "on Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party" to caution against "revolutionary impetuosity."

97. See Albert Langer, "The Revolution Lives On, Long After Mao," *The Age* (Melbourne), December 24, 1993.

98. For Bettelheim's refusal to support the post-Mao line in China, see Neil G. Burton and Charles Bettelheim, *China Since Mao* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

99. Indeed, "For an independent Australia" remains the slogan on the masthead of *Vanguard*.

100. Hill, *Communism and Australia*, pp. 137-138.

101. See *Ibid.*, p. 140, for Hill's admission of the "loss of membership" of the CPA (M-L).

102. See Jupp, *Party Politics: Australia*, 1966-1981, Chapter 1.

103. For a description of Hill's visit to Monash University, see *Vanguard* 9, 16 (May 1972).

104. See Jupp, *Party Politics: Australia*, 1966-1981, pp. 18-22; see also Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally,* pp. 181-182. Sendy makes the judgment that "the traditional left-wing forces failed to attract the thousands of radically activised youth and younger people into the protracted struggle."

105. See *Australia's Revolution*, pp. 9-10, 137, 162-164, 168.

106. Jupp comments that the "Australian 'countermovement' ... with important exceptions ... did not want a state socialist Australia." *Party Politics: Australia*, 1966-1981, p. 22.

107. Information from a personal source.
108. See *Vanguard* 1, 15 (June 1964).
109. For the CPA (M-L)'s response to the election of the Whitlam Labor government, see *Vanguard* 9, 47 (December 1972).
110. See *Australia's Revolution*, p. 121. "The Australian revolutionary movement in reality is deeply affected by the liberation movement, particularly in Asia. But this history (plus perhaps something of racial prejudice inherited from imperialist ideology) denied in Australia real knowledge of the work of Mao Tsetung.
111. Overacker, *Australian Parties in a Changing Society*, pp. 12-14.
112. See Davidson, *The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History*, p. 157.
113. Overacker, *Australian parties in a Changing Society*, pp. 11-12.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 9. See also McEwan, *Once a Jolly Comrade*, p. 100.
115. See Brown, *The Communist Movement and Australia*, pp. 261-287.
116. See Aarons, *What's Left? Memoirs of an Australian Communist*, pp. 228-229; Also Brown, *The Communist Movement and Australia*, p. 276; also, Sendy, *Comrades Come Rally*, p. 136.

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