The old British historian of Spain, Adam, relates in four volumes, which have been particularly well gnawed by bookworms, the history of the Pyrennean peninsula from the time of its discovery by the Phoenicians until the death of Charles III. [1] Great Britain’s role in destroying Spanish might emerges from under Adam’s pen in an instructive light. Over the course of a century Britain played upon the antagonism between France and Spain, striving to weaken them both, but once having weakened Spain began to defend her as well as plundering her colonies. In the so-called “War of Spanish Succession”, Britain led a European coalition made up of the Dutch, the Austrians and the Portuguese against the Bourbons who had unified France and Spain. The war was conducted supposedly in the name of the right of succession of the Austrian ruling house to the Spanish throne. In passing, Britain seized Gibraltar (1704), and at a cheap price: a detachment of sailors clambered on to a rock, which was undefended on account of its “impregnability”, from where Britain was to hold sway over the entrance and exit to the Mediterranean Sea. In the War of Spanish Succession British methods of international banditry found their classic expression: 1) the alliance against the Bourbons, who unified France with Spain, was an alliance against the chief continental power; 2) once this alliance was created Britain took its leadership; 3) she suffered less and gained more from the war than her allies, not only by seizing Gibraltar but also by securing in the Treaty of Utrecht first-class trading privileges in Spain and her colonies; 4) having weakened the unified Spain-France, thereby achieving her main aim, Britain was quick to betray the Austrian pretender to the Spanish throne by recognizing Philippe Bourbon, Louis XIV’s grandson, as King of Spain on condition that he renounce any claim to the French throne. The analogies with the present war speak for themselves. Incidentally we can let the philosophers of social-patriotism determine who was the aggressor and who was on the defensive in the Anglo-Spanish War.
At the end of the 1750’s Pitt the Elder [2] considered it necessary to declare war on Spain because of the secret “family pact”, directed against Britain, which had been concluded by the Madrid and Versailles courts. The British government hesitated, and the worthy historian, Adam, tells of the reasons for this hesitation in epic fashion. “The details of the family pact were still not known. Britain was burdened with debts; Spain had done nothing that could provoke Britain to war; she was obliged to respect international law and, more particularly, the great interests of commerce and moreover the solid strength of the Spanish Navy.” These words might appear ironic when applied to Great Britain were not the author himself a devout Englishman. We can see that, long before Lloyd George, British rulers knew how to turn their back on international law when it was convenient.
From It Happened in Spain, written in November and December 1916
and first published in Krasnaya Nov, July 1922 and January 1926.
[For example] what is the military doctrine of Britain? Into its composition there evidently enters (or used to enter): the recognition of the urgent need for naval hegemony; a negative attitude towards a regular land army and towards military conscription; or, still more precisely, the recognition of Britain’s need to possess a fleet stronger than the combined fleets of any two other countries and, flowing from this, Britain’s being enabled to maintain a small army on a volunteer basis. Combined with this was the maintenance of such an order in Europe as would not allow a single land power to obtain a decisive preponderance on the continent.
It is incontestable that this British “doctrine” used to be the most stable of military doctrines. Its stability and definitive form were determined by the prolonged, planful, uninterrupted growth of Great Britain’s power in the absence of events and shocks that would have radically altered the relationship of forces in the world (or in Europe, which used to signify the selfsame thing in the past). At the present time, however, this situation has been completely disrupted. Britain dealt her “doctrine” the biggest blow when during the war she was compelled to build her army on the basis of compulsory military service. On the continent of Europe, the “equilibrium” has been disrupted. Nobody has confidence in the stability of the new relationship of forces. The power of the United States excludes the possibility for any longer maintaining automatically the rule of the British fleet. It is too early now to forecast the outcome of the Washington Conference? [3]
But it is quite self-evident that after the imperialist war Great Britain’s “military doctrine” has become inadequate, impotent and utterly worthless. It has not yet been replaced by a new one. And it is very doubtful that there will ever be a new one, for the epoch of military and revolutionary convulsions and of radical regroupment of world forces leaves very narrow limits for military doctrine in the sense in which we have defined it above with respect to Britain: A military “doctrine” presupposes a relative stability of the domestic and foreign situation.
From Military Doctrine or Pseudo-Military Doctrinairism
(dated December 5th 1921),
Kommunisticheskii International, 17th December 1921
… At the same time we have to bear in mind that our Navy could take on a great and wide role with a change in international conditions. Here it must be noted that there is something in our Navy, that weak, at the moment so very weak organism, that forms our superiority and advantage by comparison with even the British Navy: for we have left our deepest crisis behind us, whereas they still have all of their crisis to come. They have a powerful organism, yet their crisis will also be very powerful – this crisis will paralyse the forces of the British Navy for a long while.
The British revolution will to an enormous extent depend oil the behaviour of the British Navy; the latter will likewise predetermine the fate of the British colonies. How the process of decomposition in the British Navy will take place, with its inner struggle and uprisings, possibly of one section against another, we do not nor cannot tell; but we do know that it is inevitable and by that critical. and sharp period we must have a Red Navy which, even if small, is firmly cohesive and absolutely conscious.
From a speech to the All-Russian Conference of Sailors, 1st April 1922
For the sake of illustration let us take Britain and let us try to imagine what will be, or more correctly, may be the character of a civil war in the British Isles. Naturally, we cannot prophesy. Naturally, events may unfold in an altogether different way, but it is nevertheless profitable to try to imagine the march of revolutionary events under the peculiar conditions of a highly developed capitalist country in an insular position.
The proletariat constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population in Britain. It has many conservative tendencies. It is hard to budge. But in return, once it starts moving and after it overcomes the first organized opposition of internal enemies, its ascendancy on the islands will prove to be overwhelming owing to its overwhelming numbers. Does this mean that the bourgeoisie of Great Britain will not make the attempt with the assistance of Australia, Canada, the United States and others to overthrow the British proletariat? Of course it will. For this, it will attempt to retain the navy in its hands. The bourgeoisie will require the navy not only to institute a famine blockade but also for purposes of invasion raids. The French bourgeoisie will not refuse black regiments. The same fleet that now serves for the defence of the British Isles and for keeping them supplied uninterruptedly with necessities will become the instrument of attack upon these islands. Proletarian Great Britain will thus turn out to be a beleaguered naval fortress. There is no way of retreat from it, unless into the sea. And we have presupposed that the sea will remain in enemy hands. The civil war will consequently assume the character of the defence of an island against warships and invasion raids. I repeat this is no prophecy: events may unfold in a different way. But who will be so bold as to insist that the scheme of civil war outlined by me is impossible? It is quite possible and even probable. It would be a good thing for our strategists to ponder over this, they would then become completely convinced how unfounded it is to deduce manoeuvrability from the revolutionary nature of the proletariat. For all anyone knows, the British proletariat may find itself compelled to cover, the shores of its islands with trenches, deep ribbons of barbed wire defences and positional artillery.
From a speech to a conference of military delegates
to the 11th Party Congress, 1st April 1922
1. Histoire d’Espagne depuis la découverte qui en a été faite par les phéniciens jusqu’à la mort de Charles III, traduite de l’anglais d’Adam par P.C. Briand, Paris 1808, 4 vols.
2. William Pitt the Elder (1708-1778), English Whig politician, virtual head of the government 1757-1761 and prime minister 1766-1768, he played a major role in forging British foreign policy.
3. The Washington Conference (21 November 1921–6 February 1922) drafted a Naval Convention which pledged the nine powers participating not to build capital ships for ten years and fixed a ratio between Britain, USA and Japan of 5 : 5 : 3 for capital ships.
Last updated on: 1.7.2007