IT is not too much to say that of all the announcements which would bring gladness to the hearts of the vast majority of the people of this country, none would be more welcome than that a pact had been made between Britain and the Soviet Union. Is such a pact of friendship possible?
The two countries are widely separated. There are no frontier problems between them. The nearest Soviet city to London is Leningrad, and that is twelve hundred miles away as the crow flies. At no point, except in the regions of the vast Himalayan mountains near to the almost impassable country of Afghanistan, thousands of miles away from the capitals and industrial regions of both countries, do the frontiers of the Soviet Union and the British Empire touch. There is, therefore, no basis whatever for a quarrel about our respective borders. Nor is there a basis for trade quarrels. The Soviet Union is not a formidable competitor in the world market. Its trade with this country can be arranged by the two governments, for it is generally admitted that their respective exports are complementary to each other. The Soviet Union imports machinery and manufactured goods and exports mainly timber, foodstuffs, raw materials. We import the three latter and export the former. The participation of the Soviet Union in world trade is not its principal interest. It participates in world trade to help forward the development of its internal economy, but it is not dependent upon it. There is, therefore, no deeply rooted economic rivalry between the two countries.
From the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution, all disputes between Britain and the Soviet Union have been political in their origin and character. The first great quarrel arose because the British Government took exception to the establishment of the Socialist Soviet regime. It will be found that this quarrel lies at the roots of all subsequent disputes between the two countries. Although the British Government promptly recognized the Kerensky Government which followed the collapse of Czarism, we waged war on the Lenin Government without declaring war. Mr. Lloyd George, who was then the head of the British Government, has declared that we spent more money, and did more than all other countries combined, to assist the supporters of Czarism to overthrow the Socialist Revolution. Only the outcry of public opinion and the threat of a general strike on the part of the workers of Britain stopped our participation in the wars of intervention.
The cessation of military action did not change the attitude of our Government towards the Bolsheviks. The Soviet Government had been established seven years before full diplomatic relations obtained between the two countries. But it was an uneasy arrangement from the outset. No sooner had the short-lived Labour Government of 1924 brought it into being than, with the advent of the Conservatives to power, they sought for an opportunity to bring the new friendship to an end.
To give a detailed history of the ups and downs of the relationship of the two countries is beyond the scope of this book. But here is a statement from a Cabinet Minister of that time, the present Lord Harlech, which undoubtedly expressed the general attitude of his class and the view of his Government on the occasion of the signing of the Locarno Pact in 1925. This pact was widely represented as the greatest measure of our time for securing the peace of the world. Lord Harlech said: ‘The solidarity of Christian civilization is necessary to stem the most sinister growth that has arisen in European history. . . . The struggle at Locarno as I saw it, was this: is Germany to regard her future as bound up with the fate of the great Western Powers, or is she going to work with Russia for the destruction of Western civilization. . . . Locarno means, so far as the present Government of Germany is concerned, it is detached from Russia and is throwing her lot in with the Western party.’
This statement of policy reveals that the principal motive in the minds of the Western Powers at Locarno was to secure Germany as the spearhead of an all-in attack upon the Soviet Union. The same motive has run through all the efforts to secure a Four Power Pact of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, right up to the outbreak of the war between the Allies and the Axis Powers. The evidence is overwhelming in the speeches of our statesmen year after year, in the press, in the diaries of ambassadors, and in the strength of the ‘switch the war’ opinion during the Soviet-Finnish conflict. It is also common knowledge that the rise of Hitler to power in Germany was greeted with approval by sections of opinion ranging from those of Lloyd George to the most reactionary Tory. They regarded the Nazis as a bulwark against the westward spread of Bolshevism.
Has the attitude of our rulers changed since the outbreak of Britain’s war with Germany and Italy? The Bolsheviks hold the view that there has been no change and assemble a series of facts in support of their view. They observe that the neutrality of the Soviet Union has been regarded, and is still propagated, as the equivalent of an alliance with the Nazis. They are well aware that the great majority of the people of this country were surprised and shocked by the turn of events when the Soviet Union made its neutrality pact with Germany. But they refuse to accept the view that they were responsible for the breakdown of their five years of effort to secure ‘collective security’ against the aggressor. They insist that we must place that responsibility on our own Government. The Bolsheviks resent and repudiate the view that the Soviet Union is an appendage of some Great Power and not acting independently. Molotov has repeatedly emphasized, with not a little bitterness, that the Soviet Union is an independent Power pursuing its own policy and having independent aims and interests. The Bolsheviks, therefore, insist that there is nothing in the pact of the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany which infringes on their independence or precludes the making of a similar pact with Great Britain or any other country. They ask why their ‘neutrality’ is given such prominence while that of Sweden, which supplies six million tons of steel to Germany in a year, calls for no comment? Why can the ‘neutrality’ of Spain, an openly proclaimed Fascist country, made fascist by the help of Hitler and Mussolini, be regarded as virtuous while the neutrality of the Soviet Union is regarded as a crime? Why, they ask, is it a crime for the Soviet Union to sell their surplus products to Germany and a virtue for Britain and America to supply Japan with war materials, although Japan is an ally of Germany? They insist that there must be some motive behind this selection of Soviet neutrality for special attention and that motive they regard as unfriendly.
The Bolsheviks are well aware that there was profound indignation in all countries concerning the Soviet offensive against Finland and it is quite clear that they have a different valuation from that held by us, of the forces, the circumstances, and the motives operating at that time. They note that although the Finnish Government and the Soviet Government agreed upon peace terms the British Government still have reservations concerning them. This can be interpreted by the Bolsheviks only as an indication of the intention of the British Government at the first opportunity to alter those terms to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union.
They note also that a still more antagonistic attitude is adopted on the question of the future of Poland. Although no frank statement has been made of the intentions of the British Government with regard to this question, the Bolsheviks regard it as of the utmost significance that Britain approved of the alliance of the two emigrant governments of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, although the Polish Government openly declares itself at war with the Soviet Union.
Nor can they overlook the fact that after Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joined the Soviet Union, the British Government seized gold and ships belonging to these states and have refused to go further than recognize de facto the incorporation of these States in the Soviet Union. Once more the Bolsheviks regard these actions of our Government as clear indications of the intention of the British Government to restore the old regime when occasion offers. It is this which prevents the opening of any negotiations with Britain concerning trade between the two countries.
The Bolsheviks insist on de jure recognition of the decisions of the three Border States.
On 22nd October, 1940, it almost appeared that our Government had decided to change its anti-Soviet policy. It proposed to the Soviet Government (a) de facto recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet Union; (b) a British pledge not to join any anti-Russian military coalition; (c) a British undertaking to give Russia a voice at the peace conference following the war.
Whatever favourable interpretation the Bolsheviks were prepared to place upon these proposals was made impossible by what immediately followed. Two days after Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in .Moscow, presented these terms, the British Government seized thirteen more Soviet ships. A week later the British Government charged the Soviet Government with a violation of its neutrality by its participation in the Danubian Conference upon which the Bolsheviks had insisted in spite of Nazi opposition. It seemed to the Bolsheviks that once more ‘The voice is the voice of Jacob, but the hands are the hands of Esau’ and that the proposals presented by Sir Stafford Cripps had to be treated accordingly.
Until the British Government ceases its anti-Soviet policy and frankly deals with the Soviet Union as a Great Power, capable of looking after its own interests, the Bolsheviks will pursue their own course without regard to the idiosyncrasies of the British Government. Such in effect is the substance of all the statements made by the Bolshevik leaders, who are nevertheless prepared to welcome any change which would bring the two countries into better relations with each other. They insist that the days are gone when the Governments of foreign Powers can deal with them on any other basis than that of equality and reciprocity. Representing nearly two hundred million people who have transformed their country from a backward agrarian community into a powerful industrial state, defended by the largest army in the world and an air force as large as that of the Axis Powers combined, they are in no mood to be treated by any governments other than as equals. They observe that while other countries have frequently sent their Minister for Foreign Affairs to negotiate with them in Moscow only once has a member of the British Cabinet visited Moscow. Mr. Eden was then Foreign Secretary for the first time and his visit was regarded with approbation. But in the most important negotiations prior to Britain’s war with Germany, the representatives of the British Government were always subordinates without. authority to arrive at decisions on any matter of importance. Even when Sir Stafford Cripps was appointed to represent the British Government in Moscow after the war had begun, the Bolsheviks had to refuse his admission until full ambassadorial credentials were issued to him.
The Bolsheviks thus present formidable evidence of the unwillingness of the British Government to treat the Soviet Government on the basis of equality. All this has to be taken into account and overcome if the two countries are ever to make a pact of friendship. In the opinion of the Bolsheviks it is the failure on our part to do this which gives Soviet neutrality the appearance of partiality towards the Axis Powers. The latter have taken advantage of the independence of the Soviet Union by recognizing it and realistically coming to terms with it. Hence, while the Nazis proceed to trade with the Soviet Union our Government, who can least afford the luxury of their anti-socialist prejudices, leave all the advantages of good relations and trade with a great neutral Power to those who are waging a war of extermination against this country.
It is argued that our commitments to our allies forbid a change of attitude on the part of our Government until the war is over. The Bolsheviks answer to this argument is unequivocal. They observe that the frontier now established in Poland is approximately that of the Curzon line of Versailles and the territory they have occupied was seized from Soviet Russia when she was weak. Furthermore, it was occupied not by Poles but by White Russians and Ukrainians. The Baltic States joined the Soviet Union of their own free will after the verdict of Parliamentary elections. They were States over which the British Government had no suzerainty and whose independence the British Government had refused to guarantee either independently or jointly with the Soviet Union. It is universally recognized that the seizure of Bessarabia by Rumania with the connivance of the Allies was illegal, and would not have been tolerated had Soviet Russia had the strength to resist. The return of Bessarabia to Soviet Russia is therefore a rectification of a wrong. The war with Finland was a war with an independent country over issues that concerned the two countries; unless Britain and others wish to admit responsibility for preventing the Soviet Government securing by negotiation with the Finnish Government the terms which were subsequently agreed to, with force as the arbiter. The Finnish settlement presents no threat to British interests, unless the British Government has in view the use of Finland as a jumping off ground for an attack upon the Soviet Union. None of the new frontiers of the Soviet Union infringe upon any territory which can be regarded as remotely under British control or even of interest to Great Britain, unless the latter has some ulterior anti-Soviet purpose in mind. In fact, judged from the point of view of the power relations between the Soviet Union and her potential enemies, all the new positions are directed to ensure the safety of the Soviet Union from attack by Nazi Germany. Any modern map of Europe will make this clear.
Mr. Eden is again Britain’s Foreign Secretary. The door of the Soviet Union is wide open for the development of friendship with Britain on the conditions common to self-respecting Governments—equality of status, reciprocity of obligations, cessation of efforts to secure a combination of powers for subsequent war against her.
I have set out here the views of the Russian Bolsheviks on the question of Anglo-Soviet relations without seeking to reinforce or combat any of them. I would only add that the interests of the people of this country demand that the causes of friction between the U.S.S.R. and this country be eliminated as quickly as possible.
Next: Conclusions