G. M. Malenkov 1947
Written: By G. M. Malenkov, September 1947;
Source: For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! Vol. 1, no. 2; December 1, 1947;
Transcribed: David Adams, March 2022.
Comrades,
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has instructed me to submit to the present Conference of Communist Parties an informative report on the activities of the CC CPSU (B). The work of the CC CPSU (B) is so many- sided that in order to fulfil my assignment successfully and not overtax your attention, I shall have to limit the scope of my report. I propose, therefore, to report on the activities of the CC CPSU (B) in the post-war period and deal, firstly, with the problems of directing the national economy of the USSR, secondly, with questions of building the Party, and, thirdly, with questions of foreign policy.
The victorious conclusion of the Second World War, which we in the USSR call the Great Patriotic War, and the passage from war to peace, confronted the CPSU (B) with new and complex problems of liquidating the aftermath of the war and of securing the further development of Socialist construction. The Party had to make a serious turn—from solving wartime tasks to the solution of economic and cultural tasks.
The tasks of the Party and of the Soviet state in this new period were defined with the utmost clarity by Comrade Stalin:
"We must," stated Comrade Stalin, "in the shortest possible space of time heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the enemy and attain the pre-war level of economic development so that we can considerably surpass it in the near future, raise the material well-being of the people and further strengthen the military and economic might of the Soviet state."
Our Party took into account the fact that the successful accomplishment or these tasks involved overcoming serious difficulties, inasmuch as the recent war was for the Soviet Union the most cruel and difficult of all wars ever experienced by Russia.
The war entailed many sacrifices for the Soviet people. As a result of the German invasion the Soviet Union lost some 7 million people, who were killed in action, perished during the occupation or were forcibly driven off to Germany
Tremendous damage was done by the German fascist invaders to the Soviet national economy. The fascist vandals destroyed and razed to the ground tens of thousands of industrial plants, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms. They destroyed the entire network of railways in the western part of our country, devastated and ruined whole districts, destroyed the fruits of many years of strenuous work by the Soviet people and left millions of Soviet people homeless. The damage done by the German fascists by the outright destruction of property alone, amounts to 679 thousand million rubles.
Any other country, even the biggest of the capitalist states of today would, as a result of such losses, have been retarded in its development for dozens of years, and would have become a second-rate power. But that did not happen to the Soviet Union. The Soviet state and social system stood the severe test of the war and proved its superiority over the capitalist system.
The great historic victories won by the Soviet Union during the war were possible only due to the preliminary preparations for defence made by our country under Comrade Stalin’s leadership in the pre-war years. It would be a mistake to imagine that a victory of such historic importance could have been achieved without preliminary preparations for active defence by the entire country, or that such preparations could have been effected in a short space of time, say in 3 or 4 years. To withstand the blows of such an enemy as Hitler Germany, to repel this enemy, and then inflict utter defeat on him. required, apart from the unexampled bravery of our troops, the possession of armaments that were quite up-to-date and, moreover, in sufficient quantities, and of a well-organised system of supplies also available in sufficient quantities. To make that possible one has to possess metals, fuel, a developed engineering industry, grain and cotton. But in order to have all of this our country had to be transformed from a backward agrarian country into historic an up-to-date industrial state. This historic transformation was effected in the course of the three Five-Year Plan periods, beginning with 1928.
Even prior to its participation in the Second World War the USSR possessed the minimum of material resources necessary to meet the basic requirements of the battle fronts. These material resources were created as a result of the fulfilment of three Five-Year Plans of national economic development by our country and our Party under the leadership of Comrade Stalin. Thereby was established the economic base of the USSR that could be used for the conduct of a victorious war.
It is generally known, the Party’s policy, aimed as it was at the industrialisation of the country and the collectivisation of agriculture—a policy without which it would have been impossible to prepare the country for active defence—met with the furious and active opposition of the enemies of Socialism not only outside, but also inside, the Soviet Union. This policy of the Party had to be carried out in bitter struggle against various counter-revolutionary Trotzkyite and Bukharin-Rykov groupings, against these contemptible traitors and capitulators, who, being In the pay of foreign intelligence services, tried to undermine the strength of the Soviet Union from within and create a situation favourable to our enemies in the event of war. The Party gave way neither to the threats nor to the hysterical howls of any of these elements, but confidently marched forward in the teeth of all odds. The Party did not adapt itself to backward elements. It was not afraid to go against the stream, always maintaining its position of a leading force. Had the CPSU (B) not possessed this steadfastness and stamina, it would have been unable to maintain its policy of industrialising the country and collectivising agriculture and, consequently, would have been unable to prepare the country for active defence, or to ensure the economic conditions necessary to achieve victory in the war against fascism. The Party routed all anti-party and anti-Soviet forces, and thus nipped in the bud all possibilities of a “fifth column” appearing in the USSR. The war demonstrated the unprecedented unity of the Soviet people, and their solid support of the Bolshevik Party. This constituted one of the major conditions of the Soviet Union’s victory in the war.
However the powerful economic pre-requisites existing in the Soviet Union at the outbreak of the war could not of themselves ensure victory. They had to be efficiently utilised rapidly mobilised to serve the needs of the war and reorganised to meet wartime requirements. In the difficult conditions of the war, in the face or the enemy’s blows during the first stage of the war, the Party managed in an exceptionally short space of time to place the entire economic life of the country on a war footing, in accordance with the needs of the front, and to subordinate all economic activities to the slogan “everything for the front."
The hopes placed by our enemies on an internal instability of the Soviet political system proved to be groundless. The Hitlerites based their calculations on the disintegration, during the war, of the Soviet multinational state, on the development of strife and discord among the peoples inhabiting our country. They utterly miscalculated. The war demonstrated the indestructibility of the Union of Soviet Republics and the firmness and enduring character of the friendship binding its peoples. All the peoples of our country, headed by the great Russian people, rallied round the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet government, rose in defence of their national independence and liberty, in defence of the achievements of Socialism in our country. The amity developed between the peoples of our country as a result of the triumph of the new socialist system and our Party’s correct national policy were for the Soviet Union a source of multinational state.
"The Soviet system," Comrade Stalin said, "proved to be a model multi-national state... The Soviet state system represents such a form of organisation of the state, in which national problems and problems of cooperation among the nationalities are better solved than in any other multinational state."
Despite the sacrifices it made, the Soviet Union emerged from the war with added strength and might. The superiority of the socialist system of society and state, the establishment of a developed socialist industry and the introduction of the collective farm system in the countryside brought us victory during the war. Today, also, when the Party has undertaken the work of rehabilitating and developing the national economy, this superiority is manifested with the utmost clarity. Whereas the conversion from war to peace is being accompanied in the capitalist countries by the further aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system and is leading to a sharp contraction of markets, to a slump in production, to the closing down of industrial plants, to growing unemployment, to the impossibility at finding jobs for ex-servicemen and so forth— the Soviet Union, thanks to its socialist system of national economy, has been spared such post-war upheavals. In the Soviet Union there are neither crises nor unemployment, but a steady development of production and improvement in the material well-being of the people.
The tasks involved in the post-war rehabilitation and development of the national economy are set forth in the new Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950. The basic economic and political task of the Five-Year Plan is to rehabilitate the war- ravaged districts, reach the pre-war level in industry and agriculture, and make a substantial advance above this level. The Five-Year Plan stipulates that the pre-war level of industrial output be achieved by 1948. For the subsequent years the plan visualizes a fifty per cent increase in industrial output over and above the pre-war level and priority in rehabilitating the heavy industries and railways, without which the rapid and successful restoration and further development of the country’s economic life is impossible. The rehabilitation of the heavy industry will serve to consolidate the country’s technological and economic independence.
The Five-Year Plan sets out to achieve the development of agriculture and of the branches of industry engaged in producing articles of general consumption, in order to ensure the material well-being of the peoples of the Soviet Union and create within the country an abundance of basic items of general consumption.
We have to surpass the pre-war level of national income and national consumption, eliminate in the near future the rationing system, replacing it by a highly developed system of Soviet trade. We have to devote special attention to extending the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily lowering prices and to consolidate money circulation and Soviet currency.
The Five-Year Plan proceeds from the premise that it is necessary to ensure further technical progress in all branches of the economic life of the USSR, as the condition for a mighty advance in production and increase in the productivity of labour. With this aim in view we have set ourselves the task not only of catching up with scientific achievements abroad, but of surpassing them.
The Five-Year Plan outlines important tasks concerning the further enhancement of the material and cultural standards of the working people of the USSR. It provides for the rehabilitation and extension of the existing network of schools and universities, the improvement of the public health service, and the development of housing construction on a large scale, etc. As one of its chief aims the Five-Year Plan sets out to secure the fullest development of Soviet culture and art.
The Five-Year Plan is aimed at the further enhancement of the Soviet Union’s defence capacity and at equipping its armed forces with the most up-to-date material. In order to safeguard our country against eventualities of every kind, defend the peace and avert fresh aggression against the USSR and its allies, we have to strengthen the armed forces of the Soviet Union, strengthen the military and economic might of the Soviet state.
The fulfilment of the new Five-Year Plan, while ensuring the rehabilitation and development of our national economy, at the same time signifies the resumption of the path of development of Soviet society pursued by us before the war and temporarily interrupted by the war. This path is the path of consummating the construction of a classless Socialist society and of the gradual transition from Socialism to Communism. In this respect the new Five-Year Plan marks an important step forward.
The results of the year 1946 and of 1947 so far, show that the fulfilment of the new Five-Year Plan is proceeding successfully. In the course of the first year of the new Five- Year Plan period our industry reverted to the production of civilian goods. The rehabilitation of the districts that suffered the German occupation is proceeding apace.
The fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan is accomplished amidst a mighty upsurge of tabor enthusiasm. Throughout the entire country, in industry and the transport system, Socialist competition has developed for the fulfilment of the 1947 plan ahead of schedule, by the thirtieth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution. Plan fulfilment in such key industrial centres as Moscow, Leningrad, the Donetz Basin, the Urals, Gorky, the Kuznetsk Basin and elsewhere, justifies our expectations that the targets tor 1947 will be successfully fulfilled ahead of schedule. This will signify a speeding up of the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan as a whole.
As a result of this work, production of coal, copper, aluminium, nickel, electric power, tractors, machine tools and certain other types of machinery had, in July 1947, approached the pre-war figure.
Thus, 18 months or struggle for the fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan have demonstrated the possibility of developing certain branches of industry at a more rapid pace than was originally anticipated. In view of this certain original target figures of the Five-Year Plan for various branches of Industry are being reconsidered and raised.
Mention should be made of the importance of industrial development in the eastern parts of the country. The industrial base in the East, built up during the period of the Stalin Five- Year Plans, was greatly extended and strengthened during the war years in connection with the transfer there of over 1,300 industrial establishments from the Western regions. This constituted one of the decisive factors in the victorious prosecution of the war. In the war years the Eastern regions provided tens of thousands of tanks pieces of artillery, aircraft, huge supplies of munitions, etc. for the battle fronts. In the post-war period industrial establishments located in the Urals, Siberia, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia have been rapidly converted for peacetime production.
Under the new Five-Year Plan the Eastern regions assume an ever more important role in the economic life of the USSR. It goes without saying that the post-war rehabilitation of the country’s economic life cannot proceed smoothly or spontaneously and without difficulties. No small number of difficulties has to be overcome in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan. The transfer of the national economy from a war to peace footing in itself entails many difficulties of an economic, organisational and technical nature. Nor should it be forgotten that reconversion to peace-time production had to be effected amidst such additional difficulties as those created by the drought of 1946—one of the most severe droughts in the history of our country—which led to crop failures in the basic grain producing areas. That we were able in such conditions successfully to overcome these additional difficulties, to cope with the task of supplying the population with food and moreover to fulfil the program set for the first year of the Five- Year Plan, is to be ascribed to the advantages afforded by the Socialist economic system and to the correct policy of the Party in the supervision of the national economy.
Here I wish to point out how enormously important as far as concerns the strength of the Soviet state is the fact of its possession of material and food reserves. Without reserves planned economic development would be impossible. Material reserves are a powerful means of overcoming all sorts of difficulties and serve as a sure guarantee against the eventualities and unexpected development of all kinds which may confront us in the course of our economic progress. That is why the Party attaches special importance to the accumulation of state reserves.
In dealing with the difficulties attending our development mention should be made first and foremost of the difficulties encountered in procuring manpower for industry, building and transport. These difficulties arose even before the war and were aggravated by the war.
The absence of unemployment in the USSR has created totally new conditions for the development of industry and transport from the point of view of the supply of manpower. Under capitalism employers draw the manpower they require from the reserve army of unemployed, which swells during periods of crisis, contracts somewhat in boom periods, but never disappears so long as the bourgeois system exists. This army is a constant concomitant of capitalism. The reserve army of unemployed is swelled by impoverished peasants, driven into industry by the fear of hunger, by impoverished urban petty-bourgeois elements—handicraftsmen, petty traders —compelled in the end to sell their labour power to the capitalists.
Socialism has eliminated these sources of the replenishment of manpower reserves, that involve untold hardships for the working people. We no longer witness the flight of the peasant to the towns. We have no impoverished petty-bourgeoisie in our towns. There is no longer any spontaneous influx of manpower.
On the other hand, extended Socialist reproduction is unthinkable without the steady numerical growth of the working class. Our industry and transport require constantly increasing contingents of workers. In the Five-Year Plan period the number of workers and office employees in the USSR should increase by more than six million. The enrolment of new workers into industry, transport and building is therefore one of the decisive conditions for the fulfilment of our plan to rehabilitate and develop the national economy. This task, no easy one even under normal conditions, becomes all the more complicated in the post-war period when our losses in manpower during the war inevitably begin to tell, moreover since these losses were at the expense of the most active sections of the Soviet working population.
That is why the Party and the Soviet state are devoting special attention to the planned distribution of manpower and to finding new sources from which the supply of manpower can be replenished. Unless the necessary reserves of manpower are built up, there can be no development of socialist industry. Hence the building up of state manpower reserves, the training of fresh contingents of workers in vocational training establishments and factory schools, as well as their distribution in planned fashion in accordance with the requirements of the various branches of the national economy—all these are questions of the special concern of the Party. The Five-Year Plan makes provision for the training of four and a half million workers under this system.
But we are also confronted with difficulties of another nature. In connection with the international situation as it has taken shape after the war, we cannot count on the import of any substantial quantity of the equipment, we need and must therefore to a still greater degree depend on our own resources. This entails additional efforts in organising the home manufacture of new types of industrial equipment which under more normal International conditions we could import from abroad.
All these difficulties cannot but tend to retard the pace of our development, the completion of new industrial plans and the carrying out of our plans of capital construction.
Serious difficulties have also to be overcome in agriculture. The war temporarily held up the development of our socialist agriculture, weakened its material and technical base. Our industry, diverted to the satisfaction of war needs. was compelled to discontinue the production of tractors and greatly to reduce the output of farming machinery, spare parts and fuel for agriculture. The war years saw a decline in the areas under crops and a deterioration in the quality of land cultivation; crop yields fell, the cattle population decreased and the yield of livestock likewise fell. To these difficulties engendered by the war there were added the difficulties arising out of the drought which gripped certain areas of the country in 1946.
Faced with this situation the Party adopted a number of special measures designed to facilitate the development of agriculture and to consolidate the collective farm system. In February 1947 the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) adopted a detailed resolution on measures for the development of agriculture in the post-war period. The Party’s main concern with regard to agriculture at the present time is to achieve the organisational and economic strengthening of the collective farms and to extend the material and technical resources available for agriculture. Violation of the Collective Farm Rules, which was detrimental to the collective farms was resolutely cut short by the Party and steps were taken to improve the organisation and payment of labour on the collective farms. At the same time the Party is taking steps to increase the output of tractors, combine harvesters and other agricultural machines. as well as of mineral fertilizers necessary for agriculture.
The Central Committee’s decision outlines a detailed program for the development of agriculture in the post-war period. It enumerates ways and means of increasing the output of grain and technical crops (cotton, sugar-beet, hemp, etc.), of improving cattle-raising, of improving the quality of land cultivation, improving the work of machine and tractor stations and state farms. The decision also formulates the tasks confronting socialist industry in providing technical equipment for agriculture. All of these measures are designed to strengthen rapidly and develop agriculture in our country and consolidate the collective farm system. Agriculture must be developed to a degree that will enable us in the shortest possible time to create an abundance of food for the population and raw materials for industry, and to accumulate the necessary state reserves of food and raw materials.
The Soviet peasantry responded to these measures of the Party and the government by a mighty wave of labour enthusiasm which had a favourable effect on the fulfilment of the agricultural program for 1947. Socialist competition for high crop yields in 1947 developed throughout the country, embracing the widest sections of collective farmers. The government established special awards for foremost workers in agriculture and cattle farming, conferring on them the title of Hero of Socialist Labour and awarding them various decorations.
This year’s spring sowing was carried out successfully and some 8 million hectares were added to the crop area as compared with last year’s figure.
Harvesting this year proceeded with similar success, in a more organised fashion and at a more rapid pace. The same can be said of the grain deliveries now in progress.
Preliminary figures indicate that this year our agriculture has made an important step forward in solving the grain problem, in building up state reserves of food and raw material. A new step has been taken in strengthening the collective farms. This creates the necessary conditions for the further improvement in the supply of food for the population of industrial areas.
The successes scored by agriculture create the conditions for abolishing the rationing system throughout the Soviet Union this year. Rationing was indispensable during the war, fought on to large a scale, when we had to cut down consumption in the rear in order to ensure a regular supply of food for the army at the front. Now that the war is over and the army demobilized, the need for the rationing system has disappeared and it must be eliminated. The Soviet state can return to normal trade and to an all-round development of production and consumption. The drought in certain areas and the decrease in state food stocks made it necessary to postpone the abolition of rationing from 1946 to 1947. The Soviet government has already introduced a number of measures to eliminate the existence of different prices with a view to preparing for· the abolition of rationing.
Our work in fulfilling the Five-Year Plan constitutes the initial stage in the carrying out of the tasks which Comrade Stalin placed before the Soviet people. These tasks are to secure a new and mighty development of the national economy which would enable us to raise the level of industry approximately threefold as compared with the pre-war standard.
In the next three Five-Year Plan periods we must make it possible for our industry to produce annually up to 50 million tons of pig iron, up to 60 million tons of steel, up to 500 million tons of coal and up to 60 million tons of oil.
The chief and most characteristic feature in the life of our Party, the foundation of all its successes, is its indisputable authority among the people of our country and the unlimited support which the Party’s policy enjoys among the Soviet people. The Party’s correct policy made for the firm moral and political unity of the Soviet people.
This enabled our Party to organise the defeat at the enemy in the Patriotic War and to rally the entire nation to the successful fulfilment of the work of eliminating the terrible aftermath of the war.
The moral and political unity of the Soviet people found profound and clear-cut expression in the victory of the bloc of Communists and non-Party people in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR held last year, and in this year’s elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union and Autonomous Republics. The elections were held amidst tremendous political enthusiasm, and once more demonstrated the unbounded confidence and support enjoyed by our Party among the people.
The war demanded of our people enormous sacrifices and severe hardships. It is but natural that during the war the vital material and cultural requirements of our people could be met only to a limited degree. The transfer from war to peace makes it incumbent upon us, therefore, to introduce measures aimed at abolishing these limitations and at satisfying all the material and cultural requirements of the people. At the same time during, and since the end of the war. there has been a steady rise in the political and cultural level of the masses. The Soviet people want to be able to satisfy all their requirements, both material and cultural.
All of this makes new and more serious demands on the Party, as regards the level of Party leadership and the quality of the work of the Party organisations.
In the light of these new demands and In connection with the conclusion of the war and the transition to peace-time conditions, it was necessary seriously to reshape the work of the Party organisations. This proved all the more necessary since certain shortcomings in the work of Party organisations came to the surface, which remained unnoticed during the war. First and foremost these shortcomings concern organisational and ideological activities.
The successes of our Party and the test which Party and Soviet cadres withstood during the war do not in the least justify any attempt to rest and to be content with what has been achieved to date. On the contrary, the new tasks of economic and cultural development confronting our country after the war, as well as the entire international situation, insistently demand that the CPSU (B) constantly raise the level of all Party and ideological and educational activities.
One of the prime tasks in this connection is improving the work of our Party organisations. During the war Party organisations performed a tremendous job in organising work behind the lines and in the transfer of industry to war purposes. Under wartime conditions Party organisations were often compelled to take upon themselves the work of economic administration. This was correct in the conditions then existing. However, we could not but notice that this gave rise also to certain negative phenomena in the work of Party organisations, led to a weakening of inner Party activities, and at the same time tended to have Party organisations perform the work of state and economic bodies. Thus one of the fundamental principles of Bolshevik leadership was violated.
At present the Party has formulated as one of its major tasks that of strengthening local Party bodies and of improving the work of Party organisations. To raise the level of inner- Party work as well as the level of Bolshevik leadership in state and economic activities—this is one of the major tasks of inner-Party work in the present stage.
The fulfilment of these tasks is intimately associated with the development of Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism which constitute a basic requisite for the development of our Party.
The Party regards as a main task the further strengthening of the Soviet state, perfection of the administrative apparatus and improvement of its work.
During the war the state apparatus contributed in no small share to the proper fulfilment of the directives issued by the Party and Soviet government. The results of the Party’s work in building up a flexible and efficient state apparatus, in training cadres of state officials devoted to the cause of the Party and possessing necessary knowledge and organisational ability, were clearly brought out in this situation.
At present administrative bodies are bringing to the fore economic and organisational as well as cultural and educational activities; they are striving to achieve improved observance of Soviet laws, are combating the remnants of the proprietary outlook, and are working for the further consolidation of socialist property and for higher discipline in all spheres of activity.
In these conditions the Party has adopted measures for the further strengthening of the organs of State power, for increasing their organising role in the solution of economic and cultural tasks and for achieving still closer contact between Soviet administrative bodies and the masses.
In the near future elections will take place to local Soviets of Working People’s Deputies. These elections should serve considerably to improve the work of local Soviet bodies. The new tasks in Party and state activities that have arisen after the war have placed higher requirements on Party cadres and have very sharply advanced the necessity of enhancing the ideological level and general efficiency of Party and Soviet cadres. The training and perfection of Party and Soviet personnel is one of the vital problems on the solution of which the Party is now working. This training is aimed at helping millions of party and administrative workers to master Marxist- Leninist science, to equip them with a knowledge of the laws of social development, of the country’s economy and its economic policy, and also to give them an understanding of the problems of international politics and Soviet foreign policy.
With the aim in view of providing means for a serious improvement in the political and theoretical development of Party and Soviet workers, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) has decided that in the coming three or four years the basic Party and Soviet cadres in the various republics, territories, regions, cities and districts shall be provided the opportunity of attending Party schools and study courses. In this connection much has been done to reorganise the network of Party schools and courses. We have established a higher Party school with, a three-year term of study for the purpose of training Party and Soviet workers for republican and regional institutions, At present some one thousand students attend this school. In addition study courses of nine months’ duration have been organised at the higher Party school for the purpose of providing additional training for young secretaries of regional Party committees, chairmen of regional Soviets, editors of regional newspapers, etc. These courses are attended by over 500 students.
In the various republics and regions 177 two-year Party schools and nine-month courses have been organised. They have a total student body of some 30,000 Party, Soviet, Young Communist League workers and newspaper editors.
The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) has established an Academy of Social Sciences for the purpose of training cadres possessing thorough knowledge of Marxist theory, for central Party institutions, for the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics and for regional committees. The Academy also trains qualified university instructors and persons for scientific research institutions and scientific journals. The Academy’s curriculum provides for training specialists in the following subjects: political economy, economics and politics of foreign countries, the theory of state and law, international law, history of the USSR, general history, international relations, history of the CPSU (B), dialectical and historical materialism, history of Russian and West European philosophy, logics and psychology, literature, art. The term of study is three years. At present there are some 300 students in the Academy.
Our Party’s membership substantially increased during and after the war.
Despite very heavy losses of Party members at the fronts during the Patriotic War, the Party’s membership has increased rather than decreased. Before the war the Party totalled 3,800,000 members and candidates: at present its membership amounts to 6,300,000. Approximately half of the Party members joined the CPSU (B) during or after the war.
The history of the Party affords no parallel for such a rapid growth. The overwhelming majority of new members joined our ranks at a time when our country was subjected to mortal danger, in other words the most persevering elements of the people came to our ranks.
The great numerical growth of the Party and its changed composition have advanced very sharply the question of improving the work of political education of Party members. A considerable section of Party members. particularly those who joined the Party in recent years have not as yet been able to receive the necessary political training. There appeared a certain disproportion between the numerical growth of the Party and the level at political education of members and candidates of the CPSU (B). In view of this the Party is now aiming, not at accelerating a further increase In membership, but rather at the political education of members and candidates, emphasising the need to raise the political level of Party members, for, in the final analysis, quality is more important than quantity.
Of tremendous significance in the work of raising the ideological and political level of Party members and in providing Communist education for the working people, is the study of the biographies of V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin, which is now being developed on a wide scale.
In 1946 we resumed the publication of the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin, interrupted during the war, and began the publication of the works of J. V. Stalin. Each of these editions is being printed in 500,000 copies.
In addition, over 90 million copies of Marxist-Leninist classical works have been published since the end of the war. The Short Biography of J. V. Stalin has been published in an edition of one million copies. An edition of the History of the CPSU (B), Short Course, published since the end of the war reaches 10 million copies, thus bringing the total issue of this work since it was first published, to over 30 million copies.
The task of building Communism in our country is indissolubly linked up with the task of the Communist education of the working people. In conditions of the gradual transition from Socialism to Communism. Communist education and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in the minds of people assume decisive importance. Following the defeat and abolition of the remnants of the exploiting classes in our country, the international bourgeoisie were deprived of any base whatsoever within the Soviet Union for their struggle against the Soviet state. But, they strive to utilise for their own purposes the survivals of capitalism in the minds of Soviet people—the remnants of a proprietary psychology, the survivals of bourgeois morals, the obsequies attitude of certain individuals toward Western bourgeois culture, manifestations of nationalism, etc.
Among the tasks of ideological and political work special mention should be made of the task of cultivating and developing Soviet patriotism.
“The power of Soviet patriotism,” Comrade Stalin teaches us “consists in that it has as its foundation not racial or nationalistic prejudices. but the profound devotion and fidelity of the people to their Soviet homeland, the fraternal commonwealth of the working people of all nations of our country. Soviet patriotism provides a harmonious combination of the national traditions, of the people and the general vital interests of all working people of the Soviet Union.”
The development of Soviet patriotism is intimately connected with the struggle against manifestations of nationalistic narrowness and chauvinism. The Party educates the Soviet people in the spirit of respect for other peoples and for their right to independent development.
In the recent period the Party had to wage a resolute struggle against various manifestations of an obsequious and servile attitude toward Western bourgeois culture. Displayed in certain sections of our intelligentsia, this attitude represents one of the remnants of the accursed past of Tsarist Russia. The Party had to deal a resolute blow against several specific manifestations of this attitude, since these manifestations represent, in the present stage, a serious danger to the interests of the Soviet state, inasmuch as the agents of international. reaction. in order to weaken the Soviet state, seek to utilise people infected with a feeling of servility toward bourgeois culture.
The October Revolution liberated the peoples of Russia from economic and spiritual enslavement to foreign capital. Soviet power has for the first time made our country a free and independent state. Having carried out a cultural revolution and having created its own Soviet state, our people torn asunder the bonds of material and spiritual dependence on the bourgeois West. The Soviet Union became the bulwark of world civilisation and progress.
How was it that under such conditions there were manifestations of servility and obsequiousness to everything foreign? The roots of such unpatriotic conduct, manifestations and sentiments should be taught in the survivals of the accursed past inherited from Tsarist Russia—survivals which still exercise pressure on the minds of a certain section of our intellectuals. Foreign capitalists who held such secure positions in Tsarist Russia, in every way supported and cultivated in Russia the conception that the Russian people were inferior in their cultural and spiritual development. The ruling classes of Tsarist Russia, divorced as they were from the people, had no faith in the creative abilities of the Russian people and ruled out the possibility that Russia by her own resources could emerge from her state of backwardness. This gave rise to the incorrect conception that Russians must, allegedly, always be the “pupils” of West European “teachers."
The survivals of these old capitalist conceptions are being used today by agents of American and British imperialism who spare no effort in their attempt to find within the USSR support for their espionage and their anti-Soviet propaganda. The agents of foreign espionage services are bending every effort to seek out weak and vulnerable points among certain unstable sections of our intelligentsia who still bear the stamp of the old lack of faith in their own forces and are infected with the disease of servility to everything foreign. Such people become an easy prey for foreign espionage services.
The spearhead of the Party’s ideological work in present day conditions is directed at undeviatingly overcoming the remnants of bourgeois ideology, at heightening Bolshevik irreconcilability towards ideological distortions of every nature. In this connection great importance should be attached to the decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) regarding ideological and political activities (the CC decision on the magazines “Zvezda” and “Leningrade”, on the repertoire of theatres, etc.), and to the discussion on problems of philosophy recently held on the initiative of the Central Committee.
The measures adopted by the Central Committee have as their aim the triumph of a militant Soviet patriotic spirit among scientists and art workers. They are thus aimed at strengthening adherence to Party principles in science, literature and art and at raising to new and higher levels all vehicles of Socialist culture—the press, propaganda, science, literature and art. In emphasising the great role of literature and art as a means of social reorganisation, their role in the Communist education of the people, particularly In the correct education of the youth, in training a vigorous young generation imbued with faith in the cause of Communism, a generation undaunted by obstacles and prepared to surmount all barriers, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) stressed that Soviet writers, artists and cultural workers can have no other interests save the interests of the people and of the state. That is why all advocacy of art devoid of ideas, of art without politics, of "art for art’s sake," is alien to Soviet literature, harmful to the interests of the Soviet people and state and must not find a place in our books and periodicals. The Central Committee of the CPSU (B) pointed out that in our country creative work in literature and art must be guided by Soviet policy, which constitutes the vital basis of the Soviet country.
The decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) cautioned those active in the sphere of Soviet culture against a servile attitude towards bourgeois literature and art which are now in a state of marasmus and disintegration.
The Central Committee particularly stressed the importance of developing to the utmost objective criticism based on principles, without which it is impossible to ensure the further development of Soviet literature and art. In order to foster the development of criticism of shortcomings in various fields of ideological activities, the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) established a new paper “Culture and Life”, the organ of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the CC CPSU (B).
As a result of the discussion on philosophical problems recently held on the initiative of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B) in connection with G. F. Alexandrov’s book “The History of West European Philosophy”, a number of defects in our work on the theoretical front were brought to the surface, particularly with regard to the elaboration of problems of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. With a view to eliminating these defects and in order to facilitate the further improvement of scientific and theoretical research in the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, publication was begun of a new magazine, “Problems of Philosophy”.
At present the Central Committee is working on the preparation of a new program of the CPSU (B). The existing program of the CPSU (B) is clearly out of date and must be substituted by a new one. Together with elaborating a new program work is being conducted to introduce changes in the Party’s Statutes. The situation both in the country and in the Party has in recent years changed to such an extent that a number of articles of the Statutes have become obsolete.
As a result of the victorious war against fascism the positions of Socialism and democracy have been strengthened, and those of the imperialist camp weakened.
One of the major results of the Second World War is the strengthening of the USSR and the establishment in a number of countries of new democracy systems under the leadership of the working class.
The defeat of Germany and Japan signify the weakening of the imperialist camp and the further aggravation of the general crisis of the capitalist system. Of the capitalist countries, the USA emerged from the war considerably strengthened, while her partners, Great Britain and France, were weakened by the war.
In a situation in which America’s chief competitors, Germany and Japan, have been removed and Great Britain and France weakened, the USA adopted a new openly expansionist policy aimed at establishing American world supremacy.
In these new post-war conditions relations between the war allies who collaborated in the war against fascist Germany and imperialist Japan. are changing. Two opposite trends in international politics have taken shape.
One is the policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the new democracies. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and of the democratic countries is designed to undermine imperialism, secure a stable democratic peace among the nations and gene- rally strengthen amicable cooperation among the peace-loving nations.
In following this line, our foreign policy is supported by the increased international significance of the Soviet state and the new democracies.
The other trend in international politics is headed by the ruling clique of American imperialists. In their efforts to consolidate the position which American monopoly capital gained in Europe and Asia during the war, this clique has taken the path of outright expansion, of enthralling the weakened capitalist states of Europe and the colonial and dependent countries. It has chosen the path of hatching new war plans against the USSR and the new democracies under the banner of combating the “Communist menace”. The clearest and most specific expression of this policy pursued by American capital is provided by the Truman-Marshall plans.
Such are the two trends in present-day international politics.
The wise Stalin foreign policy of the Soviet Union, both prior to the war and in the course of its conduct, enabled us correctly to utilise the contradictions existing within the imperialist camp, and this was one of the important factors making for our victory in the war.
We proceed from the fact that the co-existence of two systems—capitalism and socialism—is inevitable for a long period of time, and we follow the line of maintaining loyal good-neighbourly relations with all states manifesting a desire for friendly cooperation on the condition that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations undertaken are fulfilled. The USSR, true to its international treaties and obligations, pursues this policy with the utmost consistency and firmness.
But at the same time we are prepared to repel any policy hostile to the Soviet Union, no matter from what quarter it comes. The Soviet Union together with the democratic countries invariably exposes all enemies of peace, all foes of friendship among the nations, all enemies of international cooperation on a democratic basis. It combats all attempts by hostile imperialist circles to discriminate against the USSR and the new democracies, belittle their importance or ignore them in the solution of major questions of international policy, weave intrigues against the USSR and the new democracies, and set up hostile blocs and groupings.
The CPSU (B) clearly and distinctly sees the danger of the reorientation now being effected by certain fanner war allies of the USSR. We see that the USA and Great Britain, having abandoned the obligations they undertook in the course of the Second World War, are playing a game fraught with great danger and are seeking new allies among anti-democratic sections in Germany and Japan, in anti-democratic Turkey, monarchist-fascist Greece, are condoning Franco Spain, encouraging the Dutch imperialists in Indonesia, supporting the reactionary regime in China, etc. At the same time, with regard to such truly democratic countries which have made major contributions to the defeat of Germany, such countries as Yugoslavia and Poland, the USA and Great Britain are pursuing a terrorist policy of slander and discrimination, of unceremonious bullying, of interference in the internal affairs of these countries, of openly supporting anti-democratic and anti-government elements within these countries. etc. Propaganda for a third world war is becoming ever more brazen and outspoken. Plans of fresh aggression, plans for a new war against the USSR and the new democracies, are being hatched. The ruling circles of the USA are coming out as the initiators of new openly expansionist plans.
It goes without saying that we must differentiate between the desires of these would-be aggressors to wage war and the possibilities of actually unleashing a war. Imitating the Hitlerites, the new aggressors are using blackmail and extortion as one of the principal means of influencing the weak-nerved and unstable.
We oppose to the plans of American and British imperialists the friendly cooperation of the Soviet Union and democratic countries, primarily the new democracies. The USSR calmly and confidently rebuffs all attempts at blackmail and keeps a watchful eye on all suspicious manoeuvres of its erstwhile allies belonging to the imperialist camp, in order not to allow itself to be tricked.
With regard to countries that have proven true friends and loyal allies of the Soviet state—the new democracies—the USSR is always prepared to come to their assistance, and actually does so by rendering them extensive aid and firmly defending their interests.
The USSR and the new democracies pursue a policy of unswerving support with regard to colonial and dependent countries fighting for their national liberation from the yoke of imperialism.
Such are the foundations of the foreign policy of the CPSU (B).
Inasmuch as antagonistic classes have been eliminated in the USSR and the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been achieved, all the sharpness of the class struggle, as far as the USSR is concerned, has now been shifted to the international scene. Here we witness competition between two systems—the capitalist and socialist systems. Here our Party has to test its arms in battle against case-hardened bourgeois politicians.
The CPSU (B) devotes much attention to problems of foreign policy and shows special concern for the selection and proper training of cadres capable of putting into effect the Party’s line in the sphere of foreign policy.
The Party devotes much attention to equipping its cadres with the knowledge of the laws of international development, with an understanding of the international situation. It teaches them to defend the interests of the socialist state on the international scene, to distinguish between friend and foe, detect the insidious designs and methods of the imperialists and their agents.
During the war and in the period following it, the political, ideological and cultural contact of the USSR with the working class movement and genuine democratic progressive circles and organisations throughout the world. and particularly in Europe, grew and became stronger.
After the war Soviet public organisations received extensive possibilities actively to participate in international trade union and other democratic organisations, and to develop friendly contact with national democratic organisations in the vast majority of countries.
The active participation of the Soviet trade unions and other public bodies in international democratic organisations is of assistance to our fraternal Communist Parties in their struggle for the unity of the labour and democratic movement abroad. Our participation counteracts the splitting activities of the right-wing Socialists and other enemies of unity, facilitates the growth and consolidation of progressive organisations, and, at the same time. strengthens the international influence of the USSR.
Our cultural and political contact with democratic organisations in various countries, exercised in different forms, helps to spread the truth about the socialist slate, strengthens the influence of the Soviet Union and facilitates the activities of democratic organisations.
In concluding my report I wish to dwell on the question of contact between Communist Parties. As is generally known, following the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, contact between fraternal Communist Parties was interrupted. Experience has shown that lack of contact between Communist Parties deprives both the CPSU (B) and other Communist Parties of the opportunity to exchange necessary and mutual in- formation and elaborate common views on the cardinal questions of the labour and Communist movements.
The absence of contact between Communist Parties is a hindrance in coordinating the actions of Communists in various countries in their resistance to the plans of the imperialists particularly now, when American monopoly capital is organising an offensive against Communism and democracy, against the USSR and the new democracies. developing its expansionist plans with the intention, under the guise of »aid«, of enslaving a number of European and other countries, and when Communists are called upon to define their attitude to these plans of American imperialism.
In our opinion it is necessary to put into effect definite measures designed to eliminate the present abnormal situation in this respect.
That is why we consider it necessary to discuss at the present conference both the international situation and the question of improving contact between Communist Parties, of establishing regular connections between them with a view to achieving mutual understanding, exchange of experience and voluntary coordination of activities of the Communist Parties whenever they consider this necessary.