Vladimir Ilyich Lenin
Fr. Paulsen. Introduction to Philosophy
Written: 1903
Source: Lenin’s Collected Works,
4th Edition, Moscow, 1976, Volume 38, pp. 53 - 55
Publisher: Progress Publishers
First Published: 1930 in Lenin Miscellany XII
Translated: Clemence Dutt
Edited: Stewart Smith
Original Transcription & Markup: R. Cymbala &
Marc Szewczyk
Re-Marked up & Proofread by: Kevin Goins (2007)
Public Domain: Lenin Internet Archive (2003). You may freely copy, distribute, display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet Archive” as your source.
Remarks on Fr. Paulsen’s
book “Einleitung in die Philosophie,”
1899 (Fr. Paulsen, Introduction to
Philosophy, 1899) are contained in the
same notebook in which the note on the book by
Überweg is recorded (entries made in Geneva in
1903). After the remarks in the notebook on
Paulsen’s book, there follows: “Note on
the Position of the New Iskra.”
(See Lenin, pres. ed., Vol. 7.)
Note that this document has undergone special formating to ensure that Lenin’s
sidenotes fit on the page, marking as best as possible where they were
located in the original manuscript.
1899
|
Highly characteristic is the frank formulation
of the question in the introduction: the
task of modern philos- ophy is “to
reconcile the religious world outlook and
the scientific explanation of nature”
(p. IV[1]). Sic! And this
idea is developed most circumstantially: there is said to
be a struggle on two fronts—against materialism and “Je-
suitism” (both Catholic and Protestant). Materialism, of
course, is understood (described?) as rein mechanisch,
physikalisch u.s.w.[2]
The author also says directly that modern
philosophy rests on Kant
and is the representative of “idealistic mon-
ism.”
Up to p. 10 ...“Peace between science and
faith...”
And p. 11: “The real corner-stone of
Kant’s philoso- phy” (to create
this peace) ...“is to give to both their
due: to knowledge against the scepticism of
Hume,
to faith a- gainst its dogmatic negation
in materialism—that is the sum-total of
his undertaking.” (12)
“What is capable of disappointing this
hopeful” (the hope
of this peace) “expectation is the
absolutely anti-religious
|
radicalism that is at present
becoming widespread in the broad mass of the
population.... Thus atheism now ap-
pears” (as formerly among the bourgeoisie)
“as an article of faith of
Social-Democracy” (pp. 14-15). “It is
the cat-
|
|
|
echism turned inside out. And like
the old dogmatism, this new, negative
dogmatism, too, is hostile to science,
|
|
|
|
|
?
|
insofar as by its dogmas it puts
fetters on the spirit of criticism and
doubt.” (He recalls the term
Antipfaffen[3] and
assures us that Christianity has no predilection
for the rich, that it (Christianity) will go
through the same struggle towards which Europe
is advancing.)
Refuting materialism
and defending the theory
of All- beseelung[4] (which he interprets in
an idealist
sense), Paulsen
ignores: 1) that he is not refuting materialism,
but merely some arguments of
some materialists; 2) that he
contradicts himself in interpreting
modern psychology in an idealist sense.
Ⅹ Cf. p. 126.
“A force ... is nothing but a
tendency to a certain action, and hence in its
general essence coincides with an unconscious
will.”
(Ergo—Seelenvorgänge und
Kraft[5]
are by no means so unüberbrückbar[6] as it
previously seemed to the author,
p. 90 u. ff.[7])
Pp. 112-116: Why could not the Weltall[8] be the bearer of des
Weltgeistes?[9] (because man and his
brain are the highest development of
mind, as the author himself admits.
|
When Paulsen criticises materialists—he
counterposes the highest forms of
mind to matter. When he defends idealism
and interprets modern psychology
idealistically— he approximates the lowest
forms of mind to Kräfte,[10]
etc. That is the Achilles heel of his
philosophy).
|
|
|
|
|
NB
|
Cf. especially pp. 106-107, where Paulsen
opposes the view that matter
is something dead.
The author seems to dispose too lightly of the con-
cept that Gedanke ist Bewegung.[11]
His arguments a- mount only to “ordinary
common sense: senseless,”
“thought is not motion, but thought” (87).
Perhaps heat, too, is not motion, but heat??
Quite stupid are the author’s arguments that a
physiol- ogist will not cease to speak about
thoughts, instead of movements equivalent to
these thoughts? And no one will ever
cease to speak about heat.
One who has fallen in love does not speak to
“his lady- love about the corresponding
vascular-motor process.... That is obviously
nonsense” (86-87). Precisely what is done
by Herr Paulsen! And if we experience a lack of
heat, we do not speak about heat being a form of
motion, but of how to get some coal.
Paulsen considers that the statement that thought
is Be- wegung[12], is sinnlos.[13]
But he himself is against dualism, and speaks about the
“equivalent” (140 and
143)—“the physical equivalent of the
psychical” (or Begleiterschein- ung[14]). Is not that the
same begriffliche Konfusion[15] for which
he contemptuously abuses Büchner?
When Paulsen declares that his parallelism is
“not local” but “ideal”
(p. 146), his dualist character shows still more
clearly. That is no explanation of the matter, nor a
theory, but a simple verbal trick.
|
Notes
[1] Paulsen, Fr.,
Einleitung in die Philosophie, Berlin,
1899.—Ed.
[2] purely mechanical,
physical, etc.—Ed.
[3]
anti-clericalism—Ed.
[4] universal soul
embodiment—Ed.
[5] soul processes and
force—Ed.
[6]
incompatible—Ed.
[7] und folgende—et
seq.—Ed.
[8]
universe—Ed.
[9] universal
spirit—Ed.
[10]
forces—Ed.
[11] thought is
motion—Ed.
[12]
motion—Ed.
[13]
senseless—Ed.
[14] accompanying
phenomenon—Ed.
[15] conceptual
confusion—Ed.
Ⅹ Contra p. 86:
“Motion has absolutely nothing of thought in it....”