Philosophy and Ideology. Z. A. Jordan 1963

Notes

1. Bell (1), 572.

2. There is no full biography of Twardowski, but his former pupils wrote much about him. See Ajdukiewicz (18) and (37); Czeżowski (3), Czeżowski (22), 9-16, Czeżowski (23); Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 891-899, 926-927, Kotarbiński (28); Słniewska (1) and (2).

3. Twardowski’s role in the development of Austrian and German philosophy is examined in Ingarden (10).

4. In this respect Twardowski’s two studies: Wyobrażenia i pojęcia (Representations and Concepts) and O czynnościach i wytworach (On Acts and Their Products), published in 1898 and 1911 respectively, were of considerable importance in the development of Polish philosophy. Twardowski came very close to the view established in modern times by Frege, Peano, and Russell that the logic of propositions is logically prior to the logic of classes. See Czeżowski (23), 7-8; Ajdukiewicz (37), 32.

5. Czeżowski (3),16.

6. Czeżowski (22), 10-11; Czetowski (3),14-15; Sioniewska (1), 58-63.

7. The Chair of the History and Philosophy of Medicine, founded at Cracow University in 1920, was the first of this kind not only in Poland but also in Europe (Szumowski (2), 1115). Similar chairs were set up at the University of Warsaw, Poznań, Wilno and Lwów. In 1924 a periodical Archiwum historii i filozofii medycyny devoted to the history and philosophy of medicine was started, eighteen volumes of which appeared up to 1947.

8. Łukasiewicz (9), 607; Czeżowski (22), 9-16; Schaff (15), 37.

9. Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 733-749; T. 2, 203-206.

10. See Baley (1), Słoniewska (2).

11. Leśniewski (3), 182-183.

12. The most complete bibliography of Łukasiewicz’s writings is Gromska-Mostowski (1) or Bibliografia (1)

13. Łukasiewicz (1), (2), (3), (12). For a summary of the content of these and Łukasiewicz’s other contributions published at that time see Borkowski-Słupecki (2), 7-21.

14. An outline of the classification in question is to be found in Łukasiewicz (1), 169-170. Łukasiewicz divided all reasoning into two types: deductive and reductive, according to whether the antecedent is known and the consequent is sought, or, conversely, the consequent is known and the antecedent is sought. Each of the two types is further subdivided, the deductive reasoning into inference and demonstration, the reductive reasoning into verification and explanation. Let (q?) and (p?) stand for a sentence that is put as a question. Then the subdivision can be schematically described in the following manner: Inference: (q?) (p and if p then q). Demonstration: (q?) (q and if p then q). Explanation: (p?) (p and if p then q). Verification: (p?) (q and if p then q). Łukasiewicz’s classification was revised and improved in Ajdukiewicz (28).

15. Łukasiewicz (1), 142-154. This view was recalled by Schaff forty years later in support of the Marxist-Leninist ‘logic of contradiction’. According to Schaff, Łukasiewicz doubted the validity of the ontological, logical and psychological principle of non-contradiction and saw in ethics its only justification (Schaff (7), 261). This claim has no foundation in Łukasiewicz(1) and was quickly corrected by Ossowski (8). 30.

16. Łukasiewicz (10), 67-68; Łukasiewicz (18), 15. See Sobociński (7), 11.

17. Łukasiewicz (1), 6,136; Łukasiewicz (2), 56-57

18. They were the problems of determinism and of the freedom of will. See Łukasicwicz (4)

19. Leśniewski (3),(4),(5).

20. Łukasiewicz (9), (10). (11), (13); Łukasiewicz-Tarski (1).

21. Ajdukiewicz (2), Łukasiewicz-Tarski (10).

22. Tarski (5).

23. Kotarbiński (3).

24. A different opinion was suggested by Grzegorczyk who claimed that Leśniewski somehow missed the opportunity, first, by delaying the publication of his system at the time when it would have had a chance of influencing further development; second, by continuing his efforts on the formalisation of the whole of logic and mathematics when under the impact of Gödel’s results the interest shifted towards metalogical research (Grzegorczyk (7)). Grzegorcyk’s assessment is not endorsed by other mathematical logicians. See Fraenkel-Bar-Hillel (1), 185-188. The assessment of Leśniewski’s system that follows stresses its philosophical importance which is not affected by what has happened in the research on the foundations of mathematics.

25. Łukaniewicz (10), 9. Kotarbińzki paid a warm tribute to Leśniewski’s inspiration in the introduction to Kotarbiński (3) and later often recognised his philosophical debt to him. See Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 738, 834; Kotarbiński (24),4-5.

26. Tarski (5), 24, 54, 155, 215, 333, 402

27. Leśniewski’ system consists of three parts: the protothetic, ontology and mereology, whose elements are respectively expounded in Leśniewski (4), Leśniewski (5) and (3), chapter 11, Leśniewski (3). So far as ontology is concerned, Kotarbiński (3) and Sobociński (1) are important sources. A concise description of Leśniewski’s system is to be found in Sobociński (2), 11-13. The work of reconstruction of Leśniewski’s system was undertaken by Słupecki (Słupecki (11) and (13)) and abroad by Sobociński and Lejewski. See Sobociński (4) and (5), Lejewski (2), (3), (4). Sobociński’s and Lejewski’s contributions both elucidate Leśniewski’s system by solving a variety of its problems and reconstruct its particular parts.

28. Compare Łukasiewicz’s opinion in Łukasiewicz (18), 6, which sounds very much like that of Leśniewski. Leśniewski’s evaluation of earlier systems intended to establish a safe foundation for mathematics is to be found in Leśniewski (3), chapter 1-3.

29. Leśniewski (2) and Leśniewski (3), chapter 2-3. It was mentioned before that Lenieskiewski had repudiated his paper of 1914, but it was studied and extensively used by others. See, e.g., Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 175-177. Practically all the expositions of Leśniewski’s views on antinomies and the manner in which they should be resolved refer to the ‘oral tradition’. See Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 834; Kotarbiński (16), 191; Tarski (5), 155, footnote I; Sobociński (3), 95, footnote 2.

30. Sobociński (3)

31. As we know from Leśniewski himself, the theory of semantical categories was established in 1921, but the foundations for it were laid much earlier, namely in his presymbolic Lwów period. Leśnicwski’s theory of semantical categories is explined in Słtupecki (11), 4547, Slupecki (13), 9-11.

32. Łukasiewicz (2)

33. See Mostowski (10), 1-2. A similar of evaluation of Leśniewski and Łukasiewicz, as well as of the role they played in philosophy, logic and mathematics in Poland, was given by Sobocciński. See Sobociński (7), 42-43.

34. Łukasiewicz contributions to logic made in the post-war period are briefly describe in Prior (2).

35. Łukasiewics (6) Ł?Lukasi (6) and (9), Ł Lukaieqwiz (18), 4-7,15. When he could still have described as a member of the Lwow school, Łkasiewicz considered logical and mathematical structures as a ‘free creation of the mind.’ See Łkasiewics (12), 30-31

36. Łukasicwicz (19), 99-100. Chwistek made en passant a remark in one of his lectures that it did not matter whether the functor is written between or in front of its arguments. This idea was seized upon by Łukasicwicz and worked out into a new system of symbolic notation. See Sobociński (7), 16-17. Chwistek himself did not claim the authorship of the new symbolism and gave credit for it to Łukasiewicz (Chwistek (3), 110). The formal advantages of the CN calculus were at once appreciated in Poland, also outside the circle of logicians. See the review of Łukasiewicz (10) in Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 810-813

37. The collective character and team work of the Warsaw school is very apparent in Łukasicwicz-Tarski (1) or Sobociński (1). Some references to it can be also found in Legniewski (3). For the survey of Łukasiewicz’s and of the Warsaw school achievements in the field of the propositional calculus in their relations to the progress made elsewhere see Chumh (1). 155-166; Borkowski-Słupecki (2), 21-29. – Lindenbaum perished at the hands of the Germans, Presburger and Wajsberg are missing, presumably murdered by the Germans.

38. Łukasiewicz (1), 6.

39. See Tarski (4), 138-140, and Tarski (5), chapter 8. in particular – 2, also chapters 3 and 5. For reasons given, Tarski’s description of the origins of metalogic is closer to the facts than the short and sometimes misleading ‘Terminological Remarks’ in Carnap (1), 9

40. Łukasicwicz’s criticism aimed in particular at K. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 4 Bdc, Leipzig, 1855-70, and, so far as Aristotle was concerned, H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, 3 Bdc T�bingcn, 1896- 1900. But in the case of Aristotle Łukasiewicz showed that gross errors were committed by practical ly all historians and logicians, including the most eminent ones.

41. Salamucha (1), (2), (5), (6), and Sobocińiski (8). Salamucha was shot by the Germans together with the wounded whom he refused to leave alone in a Warsaaw hospital during the rising of 1944.

42. Bocheński (5), (7), (9), (12). Bocheński’s pre-war contributions are listed in Bocheński (5).

43. Jordan (2), Kokoszyńska (I A), Michalski (1)

44. Łukasiewicz (9), 616; Bocheńfiski (6), 1063

45. See, e.g., the bibliography of works concerned with ancient formal logic in Bocheński (7), 112-116, to which Bochner (1) should be added. Heinrich Scholz, the author of Geschichte der Logik, was with Łukasicwicz the second protagonist of the revival of the history of logic in our times. Scholz kept in close touch with the Warsaw school, in particular with Łukasiewicz.

46. They will be denoted by the symbol ‘L n ‘, where n is a natural number or n is aleph zero.

47. Łukasiewicz (5) and (6). In Łukasiewicz (4) the discovery of L₃ is stated to have been made in the summer of 1917

48. Łukasiewicz (11), 72; Łukasiewicz (10), 67-70.

49. Wajsberg (1), Słupecki (1). See also Słupecki (2), (3), (5)

50. Łukasiewicz (21). No reference is made to non-Polish contributions because they lie outside the scope of this study. With the exception of Post and the intuitionist school, whose purpose and manner somehow differed from that pursued in Warsaw, the investigations on L n were carried out before the war exclusively in Poland

51. Łukasiewicz (20), 207-208.

52. Łukasiewicz (4). Łukasiewicz felt that the second of these addresses was important enough to reconstruct it and he did it in 1946. A copy of the manuscript is in possession of the writer.

53. Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 150-159, 122-140.

54. Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 168. In a note attached to the 1957 edition of his essay published in 1913 Kotarbiński said that he did give up ‘logical indeterminism’ one year after the initial publication of his essay, largely under Leśniewski’s influence. See Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 13, footnote 1.

55. Ajdukiewicz (8),158-159; Greniewski (8),94.

56. Łukasiewicz (11), 59; Łukasiewicz (20),156.

57. Łukasiewicz (21), Łukasiewicz (20), 158-180. The qualification of Łukasiewicz’s success is prompted by his own observation to the effect that some consequences of his four-valued modal system look paradoxical. In this connection Łukasiewicz remarked that when the propositional calculus had first become known some of its theorems, still referred to as the ‘paradoxes of implications’, also aroused fierce opposition. By now they are universally accepted.

58. Mostowski (10), 3.

59. Łukasiewicz (9), 609-612. When Łukasiewicz was asked to address the Congress of Philosophy in Prague (1934) on the significance of logical analysis for knowledge, he simply surveyed the most important logical discoveries and emphasised the precision achieved by logic. See Łukasiewicz (14).

60. Łukasiewicz (9), 614; Łukasiewicz (17), 124.

61. Łukasiewicz (8), Łukasiewicz (9), 612-614; Łukasiewicz (17),125-126.

62. Łukasiewicz (17), 126-129.

63. Łukasiewicz (17), 119-121; Łukasiewicz (18), 4-7.

64. Łukasiewicz (17), 121; Łukasiewicz (18), 15.

65. ‘Perhaps a philosopher of a sort’, as he described himself (Tarski (3), 41).

66. Tarski (5), chapter 1.

67. Tarski (5), chapter 7 and 12.

68. Tarski (5), 252. A short summary of Tarski’s celebrated essay was first published in Polish in 1931 and in German in 1932. The full text in Polish appeared in print in 1933 (Tarski (1)), and in German in 1935 (Tarski (2)). Outside Poland it was almost ignored at that time.

69. Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 22, 85-86; Doroszewski (1)

70. Elements of semantics were included in Ajdukiewicz (2) and Kotarbiński (3). Some semantical concepts were discussed in Ajdukiewicz, Kreczmar, Ossowska’s and Ossowski papers published in the early ‘thirties. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 221-224 provides some information concerning the history of semantics in Poland.

71. Tarski (5),155, footnote 1, 402.

72. For a very clear definition of the conditions under which a language can be exactly specified see Tarski (3), 18.

73. Tarski (5), 165.

74. Apart from philosophers of the traditional school of thinking. including MarxistLeninists in the post-war period, who considered the philosophical application of semantics as trivial, I do not know of anyone in Poland subscribing to Bergmann’s view, published in 1950, that ‘formal semantics is philosophically not important’ (Bergmann (1), 29).

75. See Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 167-173; Kokoszyńska (4) and (7).

76. At the time of writing his essay on the concept of truth Tarski agreed in principle with what he called Leśniewski’s intuitionistic formalism, which, as says a note to the English translation of his pre-war papers, ‘does not adequately reflect his present attitude’ (Tarski (5), 62). If I understood him correctly (Tarski (3), 27-28), Tarski no longer considers himself an adherent of the absolute conception of truth. His (T) schema states what is the meaning of the classical conception of truth and does not raise the claim of being the only acceptable definition of a true statement.

77. Tarski (5), 267; Tarski (3), 19.

78. Tarski (5), 37.

79. Chwistek (3), 70-73 refers to Zaremba and summarises some of his ideas.

80. See, e.g., Ajdukiewicz (8),160-161.

81. The lecture and the impression it made on Chwistek is described in Chwistek (3), 78-79

82. Chwistek (3),154.

83. ‘I must confess’, Chwistek wrote, ‘that systems of symbolic logic, worked out with extreme accuracy but based upon idealistic presuppositions, are much less clear to me than are trivial descriptions in which everyday language is employed’ (Chwistek (3), 273).

84. Chwistek (3). chapter 7; Myhill (1), 119

85. See Marczewski (1), where a short survey of the development of mathematics in Poland in the years 1918-1939 is to be found.

86. Fragmenty Filozoficzne (1), Przedmowa; Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 435-445; Kotarbiński (3), T. 2, 281-283.

87. Kotarbiński (3). The essays mentioned were reprinted in Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 7-136.

88. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 110-113, 154-155.

89. I do not refer to the shortest axiom of ontology but to its original formulation which can be found in Kotarbiński (3). T. 1, 295. See also Lejewski (4). Kotarbiński said recently that the origins of reism were of intuitive nature and that reism was an answer to the difficulties he experienced in understanding what was meant by the object-property inherence relation. Only later he found in Leśniewski’s ontology a powerful logical instrument which gave him a chance to expound and express precisely the main reistic assumptions (Kotarbiński (24), 3-5). What is said in the text above should not be understood as a denial of Kotarbiński’s autobiographical information.

90. Quine (1), 119-123. Within the Warsaw school Ajdukiewicz was the most incisive critic of reism.

91. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 76-89; Kotarbiński (3). T. 2, 244-246; Kotarbiński (9). 495-496; Kotarbiński (17), 18-20.

92. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 97-103; Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 122-133; Kotarbiński (9), 493-495.

93. The reistic interpretation of psychological statements, the most controversial part of reism in Poland, is briefly explained in Kotarbiński (9), 496-500. Kotarbiński expounded his views on this matter in a paper published in 1922 and reprinted in Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 40-59. In the discussion that followed Ingarden and Helena Lelesz were Kotarbiński’s main opponents. The discussion is summarised in Jordan (1).

94. Kotarbiński dealt with problems of praxeology in numerous articles. See Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 331-386, 395-397, 422-449; Kotarbiński (1), (2), (5), (8), (13). The difficulties encountered in praxeology formulated in the reistic language are indicated in Dąmbska (11), 147.

95. Ajdukiewicz (3), (19), (21), (27).

96. The examination of the idealist argument by means of semantical concepts belongs.mainly to the post-war period but it originated with a paper published in 1937. See Ajdukiewicz (10).

97. The concept of a closed and connected language is defined in Ajdukiewicz (5), 120-129.

98. Ajdukiewicz (6), 278-282. Ajdukiewicz abandoned the conception of radical conventionalism in 1936. See Ajdukiewicz (26), 316-317.

99. Ajdukiewicz (5),113-118; Ajdukiewicz (26), 295.

100. Zawirski (2). For details see Gawecki (6).

101. Wiegner (1).

102. Wiegner(2), (3).

103. Many of them are no longer alive. Markin, Auerbach, Pański, Rajgrodzki, Hosiasson-Lindenbaum perished at the hands of the Germans, Milbrandt was killed in the Warsaw rising, and A. Wundheiler died in the U.S.A. Tarski, Sobociński, and Hiż are teaching in American universities, and Poznański at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. For a fuller list of Kotarbiński’s pupils see Fragmenty Filozoficzne (1), 5.

104. Rutski was killed in action in 1939 and Schmierer perished in a concentration camp. Mehlberg is in the U.S.A.

105. In the ‘thirties much has been written about the Vienna Circle. See Kotarbińska (3) and the literature quoted there.

106. See Gawecki (7). Heinrich was the teacher of many psychologists now active in Poland, among whom are Stefan Szuman, a scholar of high and varied accomplishments, and Włodzimierz Szewczuk, author of a valuable book on Gestalt psychology.

107. See in particular Smoluchowski (1), T. 3, 87-110 and Mises (1), sixth lecture.

108. A short characterisation of Catholic philosophers can be found in Bocheński (3), 247-248. See also Woroniecki (1), 50-55.

109. See Bocheński (3), 245.

110. Michalski (2).

111. Boehner(1), XIII.

112. Lutosławski is the author of The Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic with an Account of. Plato’s Style and of the Chronology of His Writings (London, 1897), which greatly contributed to the final establishment of the chronology of Plato’s dialogues.

113. Ingarden (12), T. 1, 1.

114. Ingarden (12).

115. Ingarden (6), Ingarden (22), T. 1, 3-226.

116. Ingarden (1), (2), (5).

117. Ingarden (3), (4).

118. The publication of a volume of essays and recollections commemorating Witkiewicz and his various achievements (Kotarbiński-Płomieński (1)) was delayed for several years because of the prohibition of the Communist authorities.

119. This particular Chwistek’s theory is outlined in the last chapter of Chwistek (3).

120. See Opałek-Wolter (1), 11-13; Kotarbiński (3), T. 2, 261-264; Kotarbiński (15), T.2, 326-327.

121. A concise summary of Petrażycki’s various theories is to be found in Lande (2), 843-908.

122. The history of art and aesthetics were highly developed disciplines in the period between the two wars. For selective bibliography, see Wallis (3).

123. Tatarkiewicz (5).

124. Heinrich (1).

125. Heitzman teaches now in the U.S.A. and Kieszkowski disappeared without trace.

126. For details see Hammer (1), 35-58.

127. Bocheński (12), 485.

128. It is not possible to mention all who contributed to the history of ancient, medieval and modern philosophy. A fuller survey can be found in Bocheński (3), 225-256.

129. See Krzywicki (5), T. 1, 287-288, T. 2, 231-235. The Polish translation was preceded by that in Russian and French (1872). The first English edition of Capital appeared in London in 1887

130. They included Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Geneva 1882), The Manifesto of the Communist Party (Geneva 1883), The Civil War in France (Geneva 1884), Wage, Labour and Capital (Paris 1886), The Poverty of Philosophy (Paris 1886), The Eighteenth Brummaire of Louis Bonaparte (Paris 1889), A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Paris 1889), Ludwig Feuerbach (Riga 1890), The Peasant War in Germany (London 1902), The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850 (Warsaw 1906)

131. Compare Hertz (1), 74-76

132. Plekhanov (1), 24.

133. Krzywicki met some Russian emigrants in Paris in 1885 from whom he heard of Plekhanov Our Differences (Krzywicki (5), T. 1, 301-308). So far as I am aware, Krzywicki’s interpretation of historical materialism was worked out before 1890

134. See Znaniecki (7), 222-223; Lutyński (2), 792-800

135. Krzywicki (1) and (4), T. 1. See also Krzywicki (2), 217

136. Lange (1), 109. Lange’s essay was reprinted in 1947

137. Znaniecki (5), 248. Krzywicki’s hostility to speculations-and all-embracing sociological theories constructed without sufficient factual evidence was widely considered as his greatest contribution to the development of sociology in Poland. See Bystroń (1), 235

138. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 748

139. Rudniański (3), 199-231; Bachulski (1) and the literature quoted there; Reutt (1)

140. Historical materialism is examined in Kotarbiiński (3), T. 2, 244-246; Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 88; Engels’ opinions on chance-in Kotarbińska (1); social determination of knowledge in Ossowska-Ossowski (1), Ossowski (1), 7-10. Lande essay on the sociology of knowledge (O tak zwanej socjologii wiedzy. CzasopismoPrawnicze i Ekonomiczne Prawnicze i Ekonomiczne 30, 1936, 470-523) was not available to me. This essay was not reprinted in Lande (2).

141. Marks i Engels w Polsce (1), 27-39. Full original editions of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, as well as Soviet scientific publications and periodicals not easily obtainable from the Soviet Union, were available to university undergraduates and other persons. See Assorodobraj (2),119-120.

142. Chałasiński (13), 26-27

143. Czarnowski (2)

144. Czarnowski (3)

145. The most important of them was Czarnowski (1)

146. Assorodobraj (2), 117-124, 151-156. It is clear from what good and reliable judges of men say about Czarnowski (see Ossowski (2), Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 905-910) that he was a man of tender heart, sensitive to injustice, intolerant only of violence and oppression, which aroused in him a strong urge to action. His political and social views were radical and kept on becoming more and more so. When he died he was mourned not only by his intellectual friends, but also by Warsaw workers, among whom he was active as a devoted educationist, and who came out in great numbers to pay him the last tribute.

147. Rudniański (2), Rudniański (3); Szaniawski I. (1), 267

148. Zawirski (6), 333, Zawirski (7), 31.

149. Chwistek discusses Marx’s doctrine and dialectical materialism in Chwistek (3), 45-52

150. Ludwik Gumplowicz (1838-1909), who can be described as the first Polish sociologist in the modern sense of this term, left Poland for Austria to teach at the University of Graz. He exercised hardly any influence on the development of sociology in Poland and has been even better known abroad than in his native country. Krzywicki never taught sociology and his scientific work was concerned mainly with social anthropology. Czarnowski was trained in Paris in the Durkheim school and began to make his mark in Polish scientific life from 1926. J. Bystroń, who held the chair of cultural anthropology at the University of Poznań and Cracow, combined anthropology with sociology only later when he came to Warsaw

151. Abel (1), 104

152. Chałasiński (5) and (13), Znaniecka (1), Barnes-Becker (1), Vol. 2,1069-1078

153. Bystroń (1), 257

154. Znaniecki (10), VIII. Znaniecki paid a high tribute to W.I. Thomas’ contribution to sociology in Znaniecki (5), 237-238

155. See Znaniecki (10), 148-151

156. Znaniecki (9), 205-206

157. Znaniecki (10), 387-400

158. This did not contribute to the establishment of good relations between the Warsaw school on the one hand, Znaniecki and his followers on the other. See, e.g., Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 743, 905-906

159. Chałasiński (1)

160. The personal documents method was critically examined after the war in Szczepański (4). In his reassessment, Szczepański made use mainly of the results of the discussions on this method obtained by American sociologists, but he also referred to criticism and suggested improvements that were put forward in Poland by Stanisław Grabski.

161. Some moral and social doctrines of Marxism-Leninism were considered as objectionable and destructive by writers and philosophers who differed widely and fundamentally in practically every other respect, for instance, by the Rev. Piwowarczyk and Krzyżanowski on the one hand, Chałasiński and Kotarbiński on the other.

162. Ossowski (5) and (7).

163. Schaff (21), 5. Compare Dembowski (5), Żółkiewski (11).

164. Ajdukiewicz (15), Chałasiński (9) and (16), Kłósak (5), (8), (9), (10), Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 676-679, T. 2, 501-516, Lubnicki (1), (2), (7).

165. Chałasiński (14), 362.

166. Białobrzeski (3); Wniosek Polskiego Instytutu Socjologicznego do UNESCO (1).

167. Chałasiński (14), 359

168. Ossowski (4), 2.

169. Choynowski (1).

170. Choynowski (1), 9-14. It is clear that Choynowski was strongly influenced by the British scientific humanists of the ‘thirties, but the attitude which he expressed was widespread in the country at the time.

171. Choynowski (1), 14-16; Choynowski (2), 333. It is no wonder that Marxism-Leninism was strongly opposed to scientific humanism

172. Choynowski (2), 322-325

173. Rutkowski (1), (2), (3), (4); Drewnowski J. (1), (2).

174. Ajdukiewicz (12).

175. Rutkowski (2), 366-368, 371-374. Most of the demands for restricting the planning of science, advocated by Rutkowski, were later rejected by the Communist authorities. The errors committed were belatedly recognised by a considerable number of Communists. See, e.g., Schaff (28), 17-21, 29-32, 85-87.

176. Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 680-698

177. Chałasiński (2).

178. Chałasiński(2), 11-14; Chałasiński (9).

179. This point was forcefully stated by Ossowski before the war. See Ossowski (1), 7-8.

180. Znaniecki (2), 570

181. Chałasiński (12), 194-198; Chałasiński (8), 418. The same conclusion, based on an accumulation of a vast historical evidence and an impressive comparative analysis of class structures at various times and in various societies, was reached in Ossowski (15), 157.

182. Chałasiński (12), 198-199, 201-208; Chałasiński (17), 21-22

183. Chałasiński (3), 14-16; Chałasiński (7), 142-143; Chałasiński (12), 194-195

184. Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 676-679, 680-698; Lubnicki (4) and (5); Ossowska (3); Ossowski (6); Suchodolski (2) and (3); Znamierowski (2).

185. Chałasiński (7), 152-174.

186. Chałasiński (21), Chałasiński (19), 30-47.

187. For a comprehensive but not exhaustive list of those who died or were killed in the period September, 1939-March, 1946, see Olszewicz (1)

188. See Gromska (1).

189. What remained was burnt down during the Warsaw rising of 1944. The story of Collectanea Logica is told in Sobociński (2), 7-10

190. See Bartoszewski (1); Chałasiński (13), 52

191. See Abel (1).

192. Słupecki (6), Sośnicki (1), Kaczorowski (1) and (2), Grzegorczyk (8) and (10), Malewski (3).

193. Kotarbiński (6), published in mimeographed form in 1947. A mimeographed reprint of Kotarbiński (3) appeared at the same time.

194. See Kalinowski (3).

195. Wiegner (4).

196. Mostowski (2), Czeżowski (11).

197. Ajdukiewicz (27), Greniewski (5).

198. Ajdukiewicz (21). Ajdukiewicz (19) is a reprint of the book published before the war.

199. Ajdukiewicz (13), (24), (16), (17), (23).

200. Czeżowski (9). Czeżowski (1) is a post-war edition of the book published before the war.

201. Mehlberg (1), (3), (4). See also Kotarbińska (3) and Ajdukiewicz (11).

202. Compare Popper (5), 36. The consequences of conceiving the concept of verifiability in a too narrow manner persuaded the younger Marxist-Leninists in Poland that logical positivism of the Vienna Circle was a false and harmful doctrine. It leads to subjective idealism in the theory of knowledge, to conventionalism and agnosticism in the theory of science (Kolakowski (2), 305). This verdict, based on Cornforth’s criticism of logical positivism, pronounced at the end of 1951, referred to the developments of the ‘thirties and ignored entirely later publications of logical empiricists. Gierowski drew attention to this shortcoming of Cornforth’s criticism, but his comment was ignored. See Gierowski (1), 21.

203. Mehlberg (2) and (5).

204. Kokoszyńska (3); Grzegorczyk (1), (2), (3).

205. Kokoszyńska (4) and (7).

206. Tatarkiewicz (5), T. 3.

207. The German version of Bocheński (4) appeared in 1947 and precedes Tatarkiewicz (5), T. 3.

208. Tatarkiewicz (4), 8. Es gibi keine polnische Kultur mehr, was the comment of a German officer who carried out the search. Two chapters of Tatarkiewicz (4) were translated into English (Tatarkiewicz (3)).

209. Ossowska (5) and (9).

210. Ossowska (5), 1-11. The idea of a science of morals was almost simultaneously criticised from the Catholic and Marxist-Leninist point of view. See Keller (1), Keller (2), T. 1, 16-26; Fritzhand (3).

211. See Znamierowski (10), 15.

212. Czeżowski (12); Indan (1); Ingarden (15); Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 699-707; Krzyżanowski (1); Lande (1); Ossowska (1), (6), (7), (8), (10); Pieter (1); Szaniawski K. (1); Znamierowski (1), (4), (6), (7), (8).

213. Ingarden (12).

214. Bocheński (11), 130.

215. This evaluation does not imply the acceptance of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, which Ingarden specifically rejects.

216. An ontological inquiry in Ingarden’s sense is an a priori inquiry into the content of ideas. See Ingarden (1), 162.

217. Pastuszka (5), 275.

218. Chojnacki (1), Świeżawski (4).

219. Pastuszka (1), (2), (3), (4).

220. Świeżawski (1), (2), (5).

221. Krzyżanowski (1).

222. Kalinowski (1) and (2); Iwanicki (2).

223. A.B.S. (1), 132.

224. Piwowarczyk (1); Schaff (1).

225. Klłósak (1), (3), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11).

226. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 512-514.

227. Suchodolski (1), (4). Other minor contributions are Milbrandt (1), Kroński (9), 347-370.

228. Ważyk (1), 106-110. Ważyk’s article was the first and the only major attack on existentialism, and on Sartre in particular, which was made in Poland; it appeared to be due to Zhdanov’s speech in June, 1947. Later existentialism was often referred to in derogatory terms in Marxist-Leninist contributions, but only concurrently with other symptoms of the decaying Western culture, since existentialism had no prominent adherents in Poland.

229. Pastuszka (2), 29-37; Sawicki (1); Krepiec (1); Świeżawski (6), 494-495.

230. Kreutz (2).

231. For details see Choynowski (4) and (5), Hornowski (2).

232. Beth (1), 29.

233. Ajdukiewicz (29), 270-272; Ajdukiewicz (25), 55-58. See also Stonert (1), 252-253

234. Mostowski (2), 373.

235. Slupecki (5), (4), (7), (8), (11), (12).

236. JaU+15Bkowski (7), (8), (9).

237. Łoś (1), (2), (3).

238. Suszko (1), (2), (7).

239. Grzegorczyk (6), (9), (11).

240. Borkowski (1)-(6); Kalinowski (2), (5).

241. Mostowski (9), 16, 42.

242. Mostowski (1), 231-232; Mostowski (6), 1-4; Mostowski (9), 30-31.

243. Łoś (8), 152-156.

244. Janiczak, a young man of outstanding ability, committed suicide in the early days of the Stalinist period in Poland (June, 1951). The number of suicides was apparently high at that time. Janiczak was not the only man of talent and promise who perished in this manner.

245. Mostowski (9), 18, 42.

246. Such an attempt in a popular form and for didactic purposes is made in Wilkosz (1). See also Suszko (5), 153-154.

247. Czeżowski (11), 205-235; Greniewski (5), 344-460.

248. Korcik (1)-(6); Kamiński (1)-(6); Leśniak (1); Greniewski-Wojtasiewicz (1).

249. Ziemski (1); Ziemski-Spiralo (1); Średzińska (1); Narbutt (1).

250. Kotarbiński (16).

251. This can be clearly seen from Lange (2).

252. Schaff (11), 597-598.

253. His short biography is to be found in Żółkiewski (6A).

254. Kott (1), T. 2, 70, 77, 338-339.

255. Żółlkiewski (1), (3), (5); Schaff (3), 335, 347; Wudel (1), 344; Suszko (3), 391.

256. Marx-Engels (1), 15; Engels (1), 31; Konrad (1), 10. Compare Hochfeld (1), 78-81, 87, whose language and sequence of thought are, however, very hard to follow and understand. Konrad perished in a Party purge, or, to use Kolakowski’s words, ‘has been withdrawn from historical circulation, murdered by the missionaries of great historical justice’ (Kolakowski (16), cz. 1, 11).

257. Żółlkiewski (2).

258. Wudel (1), 343, 350, 361, 367.

259. Bromberg (1), 83.

260. Lubnicki (1), (2), (7), (8). See also Iwanicki (1).

261. Lubnicki (1), 148.

262. Krajewski (7), Krajewski- Temkin- Hekker (1), Lider (1), Litwin (3), Schaff- Brum (1), Wagner (1).

263. Schaff (6) and (12).

264. Compare W. Sobociński (1), Piwowarczyk (2) and Ossowski (7), 5 on the one hand with J. Górski (1) or Hochfeld (1), 77 on the other.

265. J. Górski (1), 292.

266. See Schaff (6), 7, 17; Schaff (12), 40, 44.

267. Schaff (6), 31. Elsewhere, and in order to refute a view with which he disagreed, Schaff recognised that such a procedure cannot help to prove anything. See Schaff (14), 199.

268. Schaff (6), 78.

269. See, e.g., Kotarbiński (6), 121.

270. Schaff (6), 117 and Eilstein (2), 199; Sejneński (1), 32-33. Konrad (1), 10 spoke of the transformation of dialectics into ‘mysterious rites’. See Ossowski (7), 4-5, whose criticism was favourably commented upon by Krajewski (3), 49.

271. Schaff (6), 97, 102, 108, 129, 140, 146-147. Kłósak has convincingly shown that Schaff had extremely inaccurate, fragmentary and antiquated ideas about modern theories of evolution. See Kłósak (5), 80-86.

272. Russell (4), 180-199; Mises (2), 151-154.

273. Plamenatz (1), 250, 248. See also Wolfe (1), chapter 29.

274. Engels (1), 36.

275. Choynowski (1), 17; Choynowski (2), 330-331; Ossowski (5), 503-504.

276. The objections summarised above were actually made in the critical assessment of Marxism-Leninism, published in the years 1946-1948.

277. Schaff (6), 73; Schaff (7), 263; Hochfeld (2), 605.

278. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 509, 515-516.

279. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 502, 514; Lubnicki (1), 156, 179; Lubnicki (2), 86; Ossowski (5), 504-505, 512.

280. This was realised by Bukharin. See Bukharin (2), 12-19.

281. Kotarbiński (21), 34.

282. Schaff (6), 142-143.

283. Schaff (23).

284. Schaff (6), 71-72, 107-108, 135.

285. Schaff (5), 4; Schaff (12), 71.

286. Schaff (12), 46, 53-63. These were grave words in Poland at that time. They stated as plainly as possible, without using actual threats, that the neutrality of non-Marxist scholars was no longer sufficient and that it could not be tolerated, since no genuine neutrality was possible. – It should be emphasised that no Polish physicist ever attacked Einstein, either his physical or philosophical theories. What is morm, ideological distortions and factual errors in the Soviet criticism of Einstein were gently but firmly pointed out by Infeld at the time when a more reasonable attitude to Einstein’s views did not yet prevail in the Soviet Union. See Infeld (4). The position in biology was different, for some leading Polish biologists were for ‘Soviet creative Darwinism’ and against ‘formal genetics of Mendelism-Morganism’. In their opinion, criticism of Lysenko exemplified the class struggle in science and the ideologically-conditioned blindness of the bourgeois science. See Dembowski (1) and (2), T. Marchlewski (1), Skowron (1), Skowron-Wróblewski (1), Petrusewicz (1) and (2).

287. Lenin (3), 336-337 and Eilstein (2), 195-198. Four years later Miss Eilstein came to the conclusion that Marxist-Leninist philosophers themselves had been under the pressure of ‘ideology’ (the inverted commas are hers) in the pejorative meaning of this term, ‘that is to say, under the pressure of prejudices and taboos of an extra-scientific origin’ (Eilstein (9), 168). The source of numerous errors committed by contemporary Marxism-Leninism, she wrote elsewhere, was the intrusion of social and political considerations into what can be resolved only by scientific procedure (Eilstein (8), 80).

288. Schaff (12), 67; Schaff (22), 29.

289. See Lenin (3), 553

290. Eilstein-Kochański (1), 151; Schaff (22), 12-13, 28-29; Konrad (1), 10.

291. Ossowski (14), 71-74. Ossowski’s essay was at that time suppressed by the censorship.

292. Schaff (6), 20. Schaff’s insistence on the unchanging core of Marxism-Leninism was described as dogmatism not only by its opponents but also by its active supporters. See W. Sobociński (1), 430; J. Górski (1), 297-300.

293. This was later recognised by Schaff who, however, did not conclude there from that the principle of partijnost’ must be rejected. This principle was only distorted by Stalin and means should be found to prevent the recurrence of a similar development. See Schaff (29) and (30). On the other hand, former supporters of Marxism-Leninism, such as Kolakowski, reached the conclusion that the only effective means was a return to the respect for and practice of scientific procedure. See Kolakowski (11)

294. See Popper (1), Vol. 2, 203.

295. This method applied to the problems of ethics, physics and sociology, can be seen at work in Fritzhand (3), Eilstein (2) and Wiatr (1) respectively.

296. Chałasiński (11), 6; Chalasiński (18), 12.

297. Czeżowski (22), 305-309; Lange (2), 750-751; Ossowski (7), 8; Ossowski (14), 7174.

298. Kolakowski (11); Kolakowski (13); Kolakowski (14), 69-83; Eilstein (8), 79-80, 94-98, 103-107; Ossowski (14), 78-79. See also Malewski (1).

299. For details see Baczko (9); Wetter (1), 134-135, 155-156, 182.

300. J. Górski (1), 293-295. Górski wrote in the theoretical organ of the Communist Party and his views reflected the concern felt in Communist political circles. Górski criticised Schaff for doing too little to expurgate Marxism-Leninism of its Hegelian ingredients.

301. Engels (1), 151-152, 157; Engels (2), 26.

302. Lubnicki (1), 131; Zawirski (7), 13; Ajdukiewicz (21), 143-144.

303. Schaff (6), 77, 112. Schaff followed Plekhanov who tried to exonerate even Hegel from the objection that Hegel used the triad as a method of proof. See Plekhanov (2),100.

304. Kłósak (5), 86-88; Kłósak (10); Ajdukiewicz (15), 48. Compare Acton H. B. (1), 89-90.

305. Schaff (19), 68. Schaff probably referred to Lenin (1), Vol. 1, 101-110. After Stalin’s death some Soviet philosophers re-opened the discussion in order to reinstate the negation of the negation among the laws of dialectics. See Wetter (1), 355-365. Some passages in Lenin’s writings were found to support the view that Lenin, after all, did accept the negation of the negation as a ‘development, so to speak, in spirals’ (Lenin (3), 25). This interpretation found some enthusiastic support in Poland. See Krajewski (9).

306. Stalin (2), 38; Stalin (3), 59; Stalin (1), 573. Schaff ignored the fact that in the quoted passages Stalin’s pronouncements apply solely to social phenomena in socalled socialist conditions. – Lysenko’s assumption was that every change results from a leap. First public criticism of Lysenko’s theory in Poland took the line that this assumption was not always valid. See Petrusewicz (2), 85-90.

307. Schaff (19), 68-69, 99.

308. Ossowski (7), 5; Sobociński W. (1), 433.

309. Stalin (1), 569; Schaff (6), 165; Engels (1), 15-16. Stalin’s view can be found in Lenin (1), Vol. 1, 60, but Lenin was more cautious and spoke of philosophical materialism and its extension to the knowledge of human society.

310. Marx (4). Vol. 1, 177-178; Piwowarczyk (1).

311. Marx (2), 92; Marx- Engels (1), 14, 16.

312. Stalin (1), 578. See Acton H. B. (1), 141-144.

313. Frank (4), 12-16.

314. Stalin (1), 573-575. This aspect of dialectical materialism could hardly have been publicly mentioned, but became one of the reasons for the poor opinion in which it was held. See Eilstein- Kochański (1), 149.

315. Marx- Engels (1), 49.

316. This is the sixth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx- Engels (3), Vol. 2, 366. Each individual, wrote Bukharin, is basically ‘filled with the influences of his environment, as the skin of a sausage is filled with sausage meat . . . . . a collection of concentrated social influences, united in a small unit’ (Bukharin (1), 98).

317. Marx (4), Vol. 1, 10, 270, 364, 592; Popper (1), Vol. 2, 94.

318. Ossowska (5), 200-202; Ayer (2), 274-284. This view was vigorously stated by Moritz Schlick in Fragen der Ethik

319. Krajewski (3), 65.

320. Schaff (6), 272, 274.

321. See, e.g., Lukacs (1). 586-587.

322. Schaff (6), 199, 208, 222, 235, 240.

323. Schaff (6), 154-155, 179-180, 184-188.

324. Engels (2), 154-155; Lenin (3), 560.

325. Schaff (18), 9.

326. Schaff (12), 245-249; Schaff (19), 53. It should be noted that the concept of social consciousness or of the consciousness of the masses is not an empirical concept in Marxism-Leninism. It is a normative category, a postulated state of affairs, not to be confused with what could be found by empirical research.

327. Plekhanov (2), 206-207.

328. Kolakowski (12),137.

329. Marx-Engels (4), 322; Lenin (2), 346, 349-50, 361-362, 365. During the Stalinist period the principle of partijnost’ was found in Capital and Marx was presented as its supporter. See Brus (1), 46.

330. Znaniecki (8), 98-111.

331. Ossowski (5), 505-506.

332. Durkheim (1), 47.

333. Ossowski (5), 509-511; Ossowski (7), 17-18. Compare Ossowski (14), 78-99; Ossowski (12), 22-23.

334. Hochfeld (1), 92-93; Schaff (7),248.

335. Schaff (7), 250-253.

336. Ossowski’s essay published in Ossowski (14), 69-77, is an instance in point. It was refused publication at the time it was written (1950).

337. Russell L. J. (1), 405.

338. See, e.g., Schaff (21),4-5.

339. Schaff (28), 92-93.

340. At the beginning, Party members on the university teaching staff were themselves diffident as to whether they could be a match for their non-Marxist colleagues. They had to be encouraged by the assurance of Party support through the State administration. See Rybicki (1), 43, 48.

341. Schaff (21), 10; Hochfeld (3),110-115; Żółlkiewski (11), 44.

342. Sesja (2), 154; Ossowski (16), 220.

343. Antoniewicz (1).

344. Szczepanski (8).

345. Chalasiftski (11), 4.

346. M. Jaroszynski, professor of administrative law at Warsaw University, was the spokesman of this minority. See, e.g., Jaroszynski (1).

347. Chalasinski (11), 3, 5.

348. Tezy dyskusyjne (1), 99-102. For a fuller summary of the agreed views about what the prospective reform of higher education should achieve see Leśnodorski (1), 242-248.

349. This development of events is described in Wojciechowska (1), 519-521.

350. This was described as an achievement of the first order since it enabled the ‘seizure of control over the process of change towards socialism’ (Jaroszyński (2), 48, 58).

351. The fact that the imposition of Marxist-Leninist doctrines and of political scholars on the universities was one of the important purposes of the educational reform was clearly stated by the Minister of Education. See J. K. (1), 342; Krassowska (2), 1; Żółlkiewski (11), 54. Although Marxist-Leninist scholars themselves recognised their inadequate academic qualifications, their appointment to university chairs was urged on account of their political beliefs which in spite of their academic deficiencies would make them a driving force of progress. See Piotrowski (1),496.

352. Dembowski (3),27.

353. Schaff (15), 40-41; Schaff (12), 28-29.

354. Kotarbinski (10), 228

355. Stonert (1), 253.

356. Obrady (1), 367. The first volume of Studia Logica, dated 1953, appeared at the beginning of 1954 as a yearly publication. Although articles on logic continued to be published in Fundamenta Mathematicae, and occasionally also in other mathematical periodicals, Studia Logica could not cope with manuscripts waiting for print (Kotarbiński (10), 227). There was no volume of Studia Logica for 1954 but two volumes appeared in 1955, one in 1956, two in 1957, and two in 1958.

357. Grzegorczyk (5), 347. At the first meeting the discussion was concerned with the problems of definition and the classification of reasonings (Ajdukiewicz (28), Kotarbińska (5)). The logicians never ceased to demand that the restrictions imposed upon them should be removed. See, e.g., Ajdukiewicz (25), 58-67; Ajdukiewicz (29), 269-272; Grzegorczyk (5), 340-343. At the conferences of logicians held in following years logic was expanding and crossed the boundary line which was to separate it from the realm assigned to dialectics. See Konferencja (1), 43; Suszko (6), 232; Kokoszyńska (9); Luszczewska-Romahnowa (4); Czerwiński (4); Greniewski (7). The delimitation of the subject-matter between logic and dialectics and the subordination of the former to the latter was finally abolished in 1956.

358. At the time when the teaching of sociology was discontinued some two hundred undergraduates were reading sociology as their main subject of study (Chalasiński (15), 589).

359. Three volumes of such theses were published in the years 1955-1956, and one of them was an opening volume in the philosophical series.

360. Bierut (1), 505; Schaff (15), 47.

361. This group includes Czerwiński, Giedymin, Lazari-Pawlowska, Malewski, Pawlowski, Pelc, Przelecki, Szaniawski.

362. Dembowski (3), 29; Dembowski (5), 11.

363. See, e.g., Dembowski (3), 29-31; Żółkiewski (11), 61.

364. Orthwein (1), 98-99; Obrady (1), 361-364; Chałasiński (20); Baley (2) and (4); Suchodolski (5) and (6); Tomaszewski (1) and (2).

365. Lewicka-Strelcyn (1), 305; Klemensiewicz (1), 187.

366. Konorski paid the penalty for having refused to join the cult of Pavlov by not being appointed a member of the Academy. See Chałasńiski (32), 28Physiologist. in other People’s Democracies were warned before their visits to Poland to shun him. See Biologia i polityka (1), 90. Konorski was elected a member of the Academy in 1956. The announcement of his election mentioned Konorski (1) as his important contribution to science, that is, the work that previously found no favour with Marxist-Leninists.

367. Schaff (15),32,40; Obrady (1), 354-355; Życie Nauki (1), 531.

368. Jabłoński (2), 5.

369. Dembowski (3), 34-35; Żółkiewski (8), 30-31; Sesja (1), 78-84; Jabłoński (1), 14, 22.

370. Sesja (2), 53, 79-81; Chałasiński (32), 16; Ajdukiewicz (12) and (32).

371. Chałasiński (32), 10; Sesja (2), 67-68, 79; Jabłoński (2), 14-15. Hochfeld (3),112-115; Schaff (21),10,13,17; Werfel (1), 43.

372. What follows is based on the disclosures made at the meeting of the General Assembly, held in June, 1956. See Sesja (2); Jarnuszkiewicz (1); Chałasiński (32).

373. This informal organisation of the Academy can be discerned in the plans made in Żółkiewski (8), 34-38. The way in which the informal organisation operated has been described by Infeld and Chałasińiski. See Sesja (2), 43, 88-89; Chałasiński (32), 8-18,25-32.

374. Jabłoński (2), 16, 19; Chałasiński (32), 16, 25-32.

375. Hochfeld (3),112-115; Schaff (21),10,13,17; Werfel (1), 43.

376. This was Professor Dembowski’s expression (Dembowski (3), 23) which in the conditions prevailing at that time was hard to answer and damning for those to whom it referred. Similar accusations against those defending the autonomy and freedom of science were raised in Żółkiewski (11), 51.

377. Particular examples of this technique are described in Sesja (2), 67, 80.

378. A detailed description of the tug-of-war between one of the regional societies and the Academy was published in 1957 (Wojciechowska1). This particular effort at further centralisation was ultimately unsuccessful owing to the changes in the Academy accomplished in 1956.

379. Dembowski (3), 39-40.

380. Chałasiński (31), Nowakowski (1). In 1957 the Sociological Society numbered seventy four members and in 1959 this figure rose to one hundred and fifty.

381. At the beginning of 1957 the Philosophical Society numbered nearly three hundred and fifty members.

382. Bromberg (1), 33-38.

383. Among the books whose publication was held up for years – as is stated in their respective prefaces – were Znamierowski (9) and (10), Krokiewicz (7).

384. Particular cases of this kind, based on personal experience, are described in Chałasiński (30), 5; Biologia i polityka (1), 66.

385. See Wojciechowska(1), 536, where the bitterness and resentment at the censorship and its methods are described.

386. Nusbaum’s work first appeared in 1910. When it was republished in 1952 the editors were not satisfied with adding a new chapter, which would bring the history of evolutionism in biology up to date, but corrected the text throughout in such a manner that nobody knew what was the original text and what was rewritten. The work, with Nusbaum’s name as its author, was lengthened by about one-third, brought into line with the so-called new biology of Lysenko and Lepeshinskaya and expurgated of what was described as ‘errors and wrong views’. Only one young philosopher raised a protest against the manner in which Nusbaum’s book was republished. See Kochański (1). – The translation of Pestalozzi’s work that reappeared in 1955 simply left out two chapters for they lacked, according to the explanation of the editors, pedagogical interest or had a fideistic content. By then circumstances were greatly changed and the indignation was publicly and strongly voiced. See Csorba (1)

387. Dembowski (3), 42; B£dzyk (3), 124-126; Bromberg (1), 25.

388. ‘The Library of Philosophy Classics’ includes the works of Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius, Plotinus, Francis Bacon, Berkeley, Locke, Hume, Hobbes, Herschel, Bentham, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Feuerbach, Mandeville, Condillac, Holbach, Mably, Morelly, Rousseau, Voltaire, Condorcet, De la Mettrie, Meslier, d’Alembert, J. S. Mill. Works of some Polish and Russian philosophers of the past also appeared in this series (Staszyc, s + 0304niadecki, Lomonosov, Belinsky, Chemyshevsky, Dobroljubov, Dembowski, Kamieński, and many others).

389. After the end of hostilities the Academy of Science and Learning in Cracow started the publication of a series of philosophical works in Polish translation which included the first Polish translation of Hume A Treatise of Human Nature. Outside the ‘Library of Philosophy Classics’ there appeared in the ‘fifties the translation of the works of Thomas More, Campanella, Galileo, Pascal, Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Russell, Dewey, James, Bergson, Gilson, and many others.

390. Dembowski (5), 12. By the end of 1955 nearly 2,600 research workers were permanendy employed by the various institutes. This figure did not include the personnel of the Institute of Nuclear Research.

391. Fritzhand (5), 332.

392. Komitet (1), 388.

393. Kotarbiński (8), published that year, made the first breach, through which later an increasing stream of non-Marxist publications began to flow. Schaff (15), 26.

394. Schaff (21), 8.

395. Schaff (15), 26.

396. Schaff (10), 139.

397. Schaff (10), 137-149; Schaff (12), 107-116.

398. Hoffman (2), 56.

399. Schaff (10), 149-151; Michajlow (1); Dembowski (1), 361. This happened at the beginning of 1949. The cult of Lysenko, the ‘greatest biologist since Darwin’, came two years later.

400. Schaff(15). 38-39.

401. Sprawozdanie (1), 8-9.

402. Bromberg (1), 85, 87.

403. Bychowski (1), whose more objectionable passages were deleted in the translation. For the critical comments see Kronika (1), 462-463.

404. Czeżowski (19), Elzenberg (3). Tatarkiewicz (11). See E.S., B. K. (1), 237.

405. Posiedzenie (1); Posiedzenie (2); A. Z. (1). The members of the editorial committee, which replaced the editorial board, were as follows: Schaff, Chałański, Hochfeld, Baczko, Kolakowski, Sosnowski, Suchodolski. The first six issues of Myll Filozoficzna were favourably reviewed in Voprosy Filosofii which in particular stressed that Polish Marxist-Leninists were perfectly capable of coping with the Warsaw school and of ‘routing’ the’idealists’ (Voprosy Filosofii (1)).

406. See Frank (3), 354-360.

407. Perry (1), 246.

408. Schaff (14). 213-218. The source of these views, common to Marxist-Leninists everywhere, was Zhdanov (1), 83-84.

409. Mysl Filozoficzna (1), 11; Schaff (15). 21.

410. Popper (2), 360-365.

411. Stalin (2), 47, 9; Schaff (15), 22-23.

412. My?l Filozoficzna (1), 7-8, 10; Schaff (15),19,23-26; Baczko (2). 247-248.

413. Chałański (9), 8; Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 678-679; Ossowski (14), 84-85.

414. Baczko (2), 287-288.

415. Schaff (20), 207; Kolakowski (4), 336-337, 351-355. The fact that conventionalism might be a dangerous instrument in the hands of those anxious to uphold the existing order of society was emphasised by Chwistek, who, however, did not ascribe this intention either to PoincarÉ or to other conventionalist philosophers (Chwistek (3), 234).

416. Schaff (12). 28-38; Schaff (14), 214, 333, 375; Schaff (16), 213, 254-255. In their views on logical empiricism Polish Marxist-Leninists were strongly influenced by Maurice Cornforth Science versus Idealism and In Defence of Philosophy which were translated into Polish. Their knowledge of logical empiricism was based more on Cornforth’s books than on a study of the original works of logical empiricists.

417. See, e.g., Kolakowski (6), 75-76.

418. Russell (5), 10.

419. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 69-96, 87-88.

420. Kłósak (11).

421. Kołakowski (17), 619-620; Krońaki (9), 244-245.

422. Schaff (15), 24

423. Schaff (15), 32-33.

424. Schaff (15), 30-31.

425. Zhdanov (1), 79-83, 91, 96-97.

426. Obrady (1), 353, 367.

427. Obrady (1), 352; Baczko (2), 289; Baczko (3). 132-133; Mysl Filozoficna(2).

428. Schaff (15), 35,44; Schaff (14),375-376; Mysl Filozoficzna (1).

429. Chałasiński (7),152-155; Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 501-516.

430. See Kolakowski (6), 67-74, 214-240. The statement about the similarities between Marxism-Leninism and Christian philosophy comes from Wetter (1), 556.

431. Schaff (15),35-36; Schaff (14),377-381.

432. Obrady (1), 352; Rybicki (1), 45.

433. Żółkiewski (7), 61-62. Żółkiewski does not subscribe to this evaluation any longer. See Żółkiewski (13). The interest in Ingarden as an art theorist has considerably increased in Poland in recent years. See Morawski (1), Pelc (2), GierulankaPoltawski (1), Kmita (1).

434. Obrady (1), 354-356; Schaff (15), 36-38.

435. Schaff (15), 43; Schaff (7),255-258.

436. Znaniecki (2), 551.

437. See, e.g., Kołakowski (12), 53-68; Schaff (36), 31, 34.

438. Kołakowski (12), 68.

439. Obrady (1), 355; Kotarbiński (15), T. 2,183, 192-193; Ajdukiewicz (26). 312-313, 327-328.

440. Compare Kołakowski (12), 61-67.

441. Zhdanov (1), 87-88.

442. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 192, 199; Kotarbiński (7).

443. Schaff (36), 34.

444. Schaff (16) and (20), Baczko (2) and (3), Kołakowski (4), Chałasiński (22), Holland (1).

445. Schaff (15), 37, 40; Suszko (6), 233.

446. Schaff (14), 87, 95; Schaff (20), 222; Holland (1), 308-310.

447. Tarski (5), 165.

448. Obrady (1), 352-353; Schaff (16), 209-212, 254-255.

449. Holland (1), 310. This diagnosis follows closely Lenin’s evaluation of positivism and empirio-criticism as represented by Mach, Avenarius, Petzold and their adherents.

450. Holland (1), 269-271, 310-312. Readers familiar with Lenin Materialism and Empirio-Criticism will easily recognise that Holland again closely followed Lenin’s criticism of Avenarius’ views on the mind-body relation (Lenin (2), 76-84).

451. Ingarden suggested that the method of investigation used by Twardowski was essentially that of phenomenology. His neutral attitude to metaphysical problems corresponded to what later became known as ‘phenomenological reduction’ (Ingarden (10), 23).

452. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 7.

453. Holland (1), 278-289.

454. Lenin (2), 351.

455. The monistic fallacy, conceived as a methodological rule in historical inquiry, is most clearly formulated in Kolakowski (6), 72, 117-118, 144-145.

456. Holland (1), 271, 281-283, 294, 300.

457. Holland (1), 288, 295, 311.

458. Holland (1), 300-301.

459. Kotarbiński (9), 495-496; Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 184-188, 194-195.

460. Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 128-133; Kotarbiński (9), 493-494.

461. Baczko (2), 267. Baczko considered the rejection of the sentence in inverted commas as an implied or disguised support for psychophysical parallelism which of course it is not.

462. Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 123-124.

463. The question whether these hypotheses are metaphysical beliefs in Popper’s sense lies outside the scope of this study.

464. Baczko (2), 262.

465. Compare Kotarbiński (15), T. 2,193-194, 201-202.

466. Baczko (2), 255, 257, 262, 278-279.

467. Engels (1), 177-178.

468. Polanyi (1), 7-11.

469. Popper (4), 177-178.

470. Schaff (14), 271-273; Schaff (16), 209-210, 216, 243, 253.

471. See, e.g., Nagel (2), 241-246.

472. Compare Ajdukiewicz (8), 161; Kotarbńiski (15), T. 2, 747-748.

473. Jorgensen (1), 54.

474. Carnap (1), XIII-XVI, 280-281; Łukasiewicz (17), 126-130; Ajdukiewicz (8), 151; Zawirski (7). 6-7.

475. See Jaszkowski (2), 278-279; Zawirski (3), 283-284 and also: Kokoszyńska (1) and (2A).

476. See Ajdukiewicz (11), Kotarbińska (3) and (4).

477. Carnap (1), 301, 310-311.

478. Based on Ajdukiewicz’s information given orally to the author.

479. See, e.g., Carnap (5), IX-XII, 29.

480. The distinction is Russell’s. See Russell (6), 289-290.

481. Carnap (1), 51-52; Carnap (7), 206-208,220-221.

482. 146 The only exception was Ajdukiewicz’s radical conventionalism, which in Schaff’s opinion was an extension of Carnap’s ‘principle of tolerance’ to the whole field of knowledge. See Schaff (14), 332, 357.

483. Schaff (14), 272; Schaff (16), 251.

484. Schaff (16), 209, 212; Schaff (20), 209; Baczko (2), 251; Holland (1), 298-301.

485. Ajdukiewicz emphasised this point in his polemical exchanges with Schaff but his efforts were of no avail. See Ajdukiewicz (26), 306

486. See, e.g., Baczko (2). 252-253; Baczko (3), 24-25

487. Tarski (3), 17.

488. Nagel (2), 327-330, 347-348; Gardner (1), 281-288; Black (1), 223-246. The first public recognition that ‘general semantics’ and the philosophical and logical semantics differ in some important respects is to be found in Buczyńska (1).

489. Schaff (16), 255; Schaff (14), 358-359, 366-367.

490. Stalin (2),15, 29-30,49-51; Schaff (16), 214-215, 223; Schaff (14), 10-11. See also Schaff (2).13-15; Schaff (32), 24-35.

491. Carnap((2),6; Carnap (6), 78-80.

492. Schaff (16), 216, 224-225; Baczko (3), 18-21; Holland (1), 307-308.

493. This was pointed out in Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 189; Ajdukiewicz (26), 296-297.

494. They are reviewed in Kotarbińska (6).

495. Semantics might be ‘idealist’ in another sense. Semantics may be conceived as a general discipline, which applies to a comprehensive class of freely invented languages, not necessarily of the lowest type. In general or pure semantics, abstract entities are admitted as designata which seems to commit it to Platonic realism or idealism in the Marxist-Leninist sense. But the usefulness of semantical methods making use of abstract linguistic forms is doubtful when they are applied to languages of communication or languages of science. Moreover, this objection could not be raised against the Warsaw school semantics which was invariably concerned with a single historical or ethnical language, and, in the case of Kotarbiński was clearly and consistently nominalist in character.

496. Lenin (2), 353; Schaff (16), 215-216, 254-256.

497. Baczko (2), 254-255; Baczko (3), 56.

498. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 189-190, 201-202.

499. Schaff (16), 217.

500. This was already recognised in the ‘thirties. See Carnap (2), 8; Nagel (2), 246.

501. Aidukiewicz (10), (16), (17), (23).

502. Schaff (16), 226-228, 247.

503. Ajdukiewicz (23), 10; Carnap (1), 301, 313-315.

504. Ajdukiewicz (26), 308-310; Ingarden (12), T. 1, 23,148-149.

505. PoincarÉ (1), 117.

506. Ajdukiewicz (5), 129.

507. This weaker version of radical conventionalism, as applied to physical theories, was discussed in popular form in Ajdukiewicz (14).

508. Frege (1), 62.

509. There is some apparent similarity between the starting position of Ajdukiewicz and that of C. I. Lewis in Mind and the World Order, but their respective methods of solving the problem of communicability are essentially different.

510. Ryle (2), 256.

511. Ajdukiewicz (5), 105.

512. Ajdukiewicz (5),113-116; Ajdukiewicz (22),182.

513. The concept of a closed and connected language is defined in Ajdukiewicz (5), 120-123. This definition is not reproduced here since Ajdukiewicz has recognised that it is of no use in the examination of any existing language (Ajdukiewicz (26), 317).

514. For the concept of world picture see Ajdukiewicz (6), 278; Ajdukiewicz (22), 316-317.

515. Ajdukiewicz (6), 278-285. It must be recalled that a thesis of one closed and connected language cannot be translated into a thesis of another and vice versa.

516. Ajdukiewicz (6), 278-279; Ajdukiewicz (22), 324-325.

517. The differentiation between the semantical and the pragmatical approach to the problem of meaning is clearly, though marginally, made in Ajdukiewicz (5), 105.

518. Schaff (16), 231-233.

519. Schaff (16), 234-235, 237-240; Kolakowski (4), 358-359. Ajdukiewicz forestalled these objections and showed why they do not apply but they remained unnoticed by his critics. See Ajdukiewicz (6), 270-271, 278-279.

520. Kolakowski (4), 336-337, 358-360; Boczko (2). 263-264. Conventionalism is for Marxist-Leninists exactly the opposite to what it is to some other philosophers who see in it the quest for certainty in knowledge and an indication of progress in the logical foundations of any science. See, e.g., Quine (4), 250.

521. Ajdukiewicz (22), Schaff (20).

522. Mysl Filozoficzna (2), 337; Schaff (20), 201, 211-212; Schaff (21), 14.

523. See, e.g., Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 85-87; Kotarbiński (16), 206-207; Ajdukiewicz (2), 9; Czeżowski (11), 226.

524. Quoted in Ingarden (12). T. 1, 173.

525. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 25-36, 161-182. The reaction of Marxist-Leninists can best be seen from Baczko (3), 45-66 and also from Chałasiński (22).

526. Husserl (1), 153, 168.

527. Kroński (1), 47; Kroński (2), 330.

528. According to Kroński (2), 321, the ‘phenomenological secession’ rejected what Husserl called Epoche and by this step abandoned Huusserl’s subjective idealism. This is not correct.

529. Kroński (1), 34, 54-55; Kroński (2), 329.

530. Kroński (1), 54; Schaff (14),161; Farber (1), 619.

531. Perry (1), 113, 119.

532. See Schaff (15), 35-36; Schaff (14), 377-378. Kroński was somewhat uneasy about putting Neo-Thomism and phenomenology into the same class and conceded that perhaps neither of them can be called ‘objective idealism’.

533. It appears most improbable, Ingarden writes, that the solution of the controversy between realism and idealism suggested by Husserl is correct (Ingarden (12), T. 1, 13). The justification of this assertion is scattered throughout his work. Ingarden’s critical attitude to positivism and neo-positivism is very apparent in his various parenthetical remarks and comes out most clearly in his examination of the ‘class conception of the individual object’, which conceives it as a ‘bundle of compresent qualities’ (Ingarden (12), T. 2, 193-205). So far as intentional objects are concerned see Ingarden (12), T. 2, 263.

534. Kroński (1), 49, 53-54; Kroński (2), 318-319, 321, 330.

535. Farber (1), 609-614; Bocheński (8), 22-35.

536. Luk cs (1), 573-577.

537. Luk cs’ influence is particularly apparent in Kroński’s writings. Husserl’s views on science, its lack of ‘scientific grounding’ and its supposed dogmatic standpoint are fully endorsed in Ingarden (12), T. 1, 27-39.

538. Ingarden (12), T. 1, 67.

539. Ingarden (12), T. 1, 58-59.

540. Lewis (1), 30.

541. Farber (1), 591-600, 609-616.

542. Kroński (2), 318.

543. Luk cs (1), 572-574; Krońaki (2), 330-331.

544. See Bocheński (11), 153; Farber (1). 611-612; Luk cs (1), 589-590. It may be incidentally observed that this objection does not fully apply to Ingarden’s phenomenology. Ingarden was aware of the fact that ‘objective reality’, as conceived in the phenomenological school, was reduced to the status of a twin brother of the ‘bracketed reality’. This was one of the reasons why he differentiated ontology and metaphysics, a distinction which Husserl, strictly speaking, was unable to make, and supplemented the former by the latter. See Ingarden (12), T. 1, 53, 57, 67-71, 175.

545. Ingarden (11), 5-14.

546. The recognition of physical reality, its irreducibility to intentional existence, which is emphatically stated in the essay in question, is again strongly underlined in Ingarden (12), T. 2,260-268.

547. Kroński (2), 319. The other source of arguments to support the Marxist-Leninist evaluative interpretation of Ingarden’s phenomenology was his numerous works on the theory of art in which he advocated ‘formalism’. This term was to indicate that Ingarden recommended that the ontological structure of a work of art should be carried out in abstraction from any social signfficance it might possibly have. Since the insistence on this significance was a fundamental principle of the MarxistLeninist theory of art, ‘formalism’ was decreed to be a hostile view and Ingarden one of the main opponents of Marxism-Leninism in this particular field of research.

548. Kroński (1), 45-46, 52-53; Kroński (2),320,324,327-329.

549. Kolakowski (6),106-107; Baczko-Kolakowski (1), 91. This view on the Cartesian method of universal doubt is shared by those who take Marx’s second thesis on Feuerbach as their point of departure in the theory of knowledge. See Kolakowski (18),12.

550. Ingarden (12), T. 1, 158-159. This is the main passage in Ingarden’s work which in the opinion of his critics shows that the refutation of materialism is the main purpose of his work.

551. Lewis (1), 9.

552. Ingarden (12), T. 2, 822, 825. This is emphasised throughout the work. See in panicular T. 1, 155-156.

553. Ingarden (12), T. 2, 725-825.

554. Ingarden (12), T. 2, 844-846.

555. Ingarden (12), T. 1, 157-160, 286-296, T. 29, 837.

556. Perry (1), 118-119,126-129

557. This is no longer accepted by the younger Marxist-Leninists.

558. Schaff (14). 296-297; Baczko (11), 10.

559. Hochfeld (3), 131.

560. Znaniecki made some incisive observations on these matters a few years before they acquired a topical interest in Poland. See Znaniecki (8), 69-78.

561. Chalasiński (34),142-143.

562. Many of Znaniecki’s and Merton’s comments on the predicament of specialists in the field of social, economic, and political knowledge, in their relations with the Government and its agencies, apply to Polish sociologists and account for what happened, both when they originally tried to adjust themselves to the prevailing circumstances and when later they led the revolt against the conformity. See Znaniecki (10), 412-419; Merton (1), 207-224.

563. Znaniecki (5). 90-100, 130-139.

564. Chałasiński (20), 76, 78. Hochfeld made similar charges and expressed them in such abusive language that he deprived them of all plausibility. See Hochfeld (3), 113. The best balanced evaluation of American sociology is to be found in Szczepański (7).

565. Znaniecki (5), 26-28.

566. Merton (1), 85-86 and the literature quoted there, Parsons (2), chapter 11 and 17. Chałasiński who was widely read in Azncrican sociological literature emphasised its false theoretical assumptions rather than their total absence. See Chatasiński (20), 80.

567. Merton (1), 5-6, 85-101.

568. Popper (4), 155-163.

569. Znaniecki (5), 229-234.

570. Hochfeld (3), 147; Chałasiński (20), 85; Schaff (17), 234.

571. Schaff (17), 223-227, 231-248, 253-254; Kowalski (1), 15-20, 26-27.

572. The distinction between the natural and cultural sciences in Znaniecki’s sense is not identical or even related, as Schaff suggested, to that of the idiographic and the nomothetic sciences of Windelband and Rickert (Schaff (22), 160-161). Znaniecki expressly rejected the view that there am sciences, including history, which would not combine the generalising and individualising way of thinking. See Znaniecki (5),23-26,259.

573. Szczepański (1) and (2).

574. Znaniecki himself is accepted the verdict that the method of personal documents was ‘methodically defective’. See Znaniecki (10). 238. Thecriticiam made in Poland and the United States was summarised in Szczepański (4). Szcepański has also done a great deal to transplant in Poland new sociological methods and research techniques worked out abroad. See Szczepański (5). The Marxist-Leninist criticism of the personal documents method, to be found in Schaff (17), is behind the times and falls short of that accomplished by ‘bourgeois sociology’.

575. Znaniecki (5), 217-218.

576. Znaniecki (5), 34-36,155,172-173.

577. Znaniecki (10), 132-136; Znaniecki (5), 36-43; Znaniecki (9), 205-207.

578. Znaniecki (5), 267-268; Znaniecki (8), 192-194.

579. Znaniecki (10), 7,115.

580. Znaniecki (5), 55, 207; Znaniecki (10), 140.

581. Znaniecki (5), 295-296; Znaniecki (10), 198-204.

582. This is the meaning of ‘idealism’ in which this term is used in White (1), 357-372.

583. Znaniecki (10), 132,138,151.

584. Schaff (12), 285-397; Schaff (8) and (9); Antoszczuk (1); Baczko (1); Hoffman (1); Kuziński (1); Osiadacz (1). On the other hand, Białoblocki, a contemporary of Krusiński and Krzywicki, was elevated to the rank of the first revolutionary Marxist literary critic in Poland. See Sandler (1) and the ensuing discussion in Osiadacz (2), Sandler (2).

585. Obrady (1), 358-359, 364-365; Assorodobraj (2), 126-139.

586. Precision of speech and thought was not one of Znaniecki’s strong points and this caused considerable frictions between Znaniecki and the Warsaw school. Without naming any of the Warsaw school thinkers, Znaniecki often retaliated. See, e.g., Znaniecki (5), 238-245; Znaniecki (8), 147-148. Ossowski, Szczepański and Znamierowski represented the tendency of emulating in sociology the example of the Warsaw school. Chałasiński has remained close to Znaniecki in this respect.

587. Ossowski (15), Ossowska (12).

588. Ossowski was accused of being a supporter of Gomulka’s ideology just at the time when the latter was arrested and waiting for trial. See Hochfeld (3), 127. This accusation exposed Ossowski to great personal danger and he was lucky not to have suffered more than he did.

589. Obrady (1), 357-358; Hochfeld (3),119-129; Schaff (17), 227-231, 241-248.

590. Obrady (1), 360-364; Chałasiński (20) and (22), 314; Schaff (17), 228, 248-249; Schaff (28),48.

591. Obrady (1), 364-365; Hochfeld (3), 129, 153; Schaff (17), 232, 257. See also Szczepański (6), 261-265. Szczepański’s determination to exercise a moderating influence was skilfully performed but not particularly successful.

592. Lenin (2), 331-332; Schaff (17), 227-231.

593. Hochfeld-Nowakowski (1). This article reads as if it were a malicious satire on the Marxist-Leninist research techniques, written by a determined opponent of Marxism-Leninism, but this effect was, of course, not intended.

594. Weber (2), 80-81.

595. See, e.g., Bauman-Wiatr (1), 70-71; Hochfeld-Nowakowski (1), 248-249.

596. Schumpeter (1), 18-19, 45.

597. See Chałasiński (34), 146.

598. This term was introduced by Kott (Kott (1). T. 2, 350-351) and widely used since 1956.

599. Hochfeld (3), 106-109, 112-115.

600. Nowakowski (1), 326.

601. Some representative examples of quasi-sociological contributions published at that time are provided by Chałański (23) and (24); Hochfeld (4), (5) and (6); Wiatr (1); Bauman-Wiatr (1); Litwin (2) and (4). The question often asked by Marxist-Leninists why practice did not prevent their theories and actions from wandering astray, was answered in Malewski (1), which is a notable contribution to the methodology of the social sciences.

602. Szacki (2), 38; Bauman-Wiatr (2), 8, 15-17; Schaff (26); Chałansiński (27) and (28).

603. Those who did not endorse this view have resigned themselves to the use of the expression ‘historical materialism’ and ‘Marxist-Leninist sociology’ as the name of a particular school of thought within sociology whose existence they no longer deny. See Schaff (28), 41-43; Wiatr (2), 209-213; Wiatr (3), 192-194; Hochfeld (8), 121.

604. Kolakowski (14), 174.

605. Bauman-Wiatr (2), 10-18; Kolakowski (14), 170-173.

606. Kolakowski (14), 174.

607. Lenin(4), 239.

608. Lenin(4), 81.

609. Engels(1), 135

610. "T’p’" stands for "’p’ is true".

611. Engels(2), 286; Marx- Engels(4), 519

612. Łubnicki(7), 279-280.

613. Ossowski(5), 504; Ossowski(7), 11-12; Ossowski(8), 32-33; Ossowski(15), 142.

614. Strawson(1), 2.

615. Jaśkowski(7) and (8).

616. In the ‘logic of discussion’ ‘p⊃q’ should be read ‘(?p)⊃q’.

617. See Jaśkowski(7), 69.

618. Pears (Ed.)(1), 164.

619. Jaśkowski(3), 68-70. Compare Chwistek(3), 29-30.

620. See, e.g., Eilstein(6), 126; Schaff(7), 262

621. Ajdukiewicz (15), 52; Kotarbiński(15), T. 2, 515-516.

622. Greniewski(5), 136-137, 204-206.

623. See, e.g., Kotarbiński(6), 5-6; Ajdukiewicz(25), 51-58.

624. Bocheński(9), 63.

625. Church(1), 1.

626. Engels(2), 58-59, Lenin(4), 64-65, 149, 165, 217

627. Schaff(3), reprinted in Schaff(6), 109-143, with some significant omissions.

628. Schaff(3), 336-337. Schaff followed closely Engels(2), 285-286.

629. Lenin(3), 336; Lenin(4), 65-66, 68-69.

630. Engels(2), 296.

631. Schaff(3), 342, 345. Compare Lenin(3), 332-333.

632. Schaff(3), 340, 345; Schaff(14), 213-214; Lenin(3), 553. I do not think that Schaff would maintain to-day that vague and ‘elastic’ concepts are the best descriptive instruments of science. This doctrine still has supporters among Marxist-Leninists in Poland. See Ładosz(2), 132-133. Kokoszyńska made a sharp and trenchant criticism of this view. See Kokoszyńska(10), 144-149.

633. Hegel(1), Vol. 2, 66-70; Lenin(4), 110-116.

634. See, e.g., Engels(1), 158; Engels(2), 271

635. Bialobrzeski(2), 37.

636. Other absurdities arising from the abuse of terms taken from physics and applied outside their proper field are discussed in Popper(3), 112-114.

637. Schaff(3), 351-352.

638. Engels(1), 135.

639. Kłóak(5), 75-77. Compare Suszko(7), 65.

640. See, e.g. Popper(4), 162-163; Popper(5), 32-35.

641. Schaff(3), 332; Schaff(15), 40-41.

642. Schaff(3), 332. It was not unusual in those times to read in Soviet publications that to consider a logical or mathematical theory as ‘an abstract hypotheticodeductive system without intrinsic content other than that implied by arbitrarily prescribed sets of postulates’ was prompted by the desire to further the cause of imperialism and capitalism. See Janowska(1), 6-7, who comments on Bell(1), 334.

643. See Jordan(3), 25-26; Lukasiewicz(18).

644. Ajdukiewicz(13) and (24).

645. See Mostowski(9), 16-42; Suszko(5), 148-161; Grzegorczyk(6), 212-216.

646. This can be seen, for instance, by comparing Schaff’s views with those of Kotarbiński or Ajdukiewicz. See Kotarbiński(16), 208-210; Ajdukiewicz(13) and (24).

647. Lenin(3), 334-335; Schaff(3), 342.

648. This view is taken from Soviet philosophy which has continued to adhere to it even when a little more enlightened opinions on logic could be heard in the Soviet Union. See Rozental- Judin(1), 338.

649. Schaff(3), 334-336, 349, 351.

650. Schaff(3), 336, 338, 347.

651. Schaff expresses these opinions without providing any evidence for either. Łukasiewicz(1), to which he referred, does not justify the view that Aristotle ever doubted the validity of the principle of non-contradiction and later research found no reason to modify this conclusion. See Bocheński(7), 40. As to Lukasiewicz’s own views on this matter, Schaff’s implied suggestion that Lukasiewicz questioned the validity of this principle is not justified. Lukasiewicz pointed out that the principle of non-contradiction requires a proof and that such a proof was not available at that time. Schaff did not seem to be aware of the fact that Łukasiewicz later modified his opinion on the principle in question.

652. Schaff(3), 335-336, 349; Schaff(7), 259-263.

653. Czeżowski(9), 82; Czeżowski(22), 219; Kłósak(5), 96.

654. Heyting(1),17; Czeżowski(9), 82-85; Zawirski(4), 188.

655. See, e.g., Suszko(5), 156. Such views were not shared by non-Marxist philosophers. See Ajdukiewicz(21), 45-49 or Kotarbinński(16), 210-211.

656. The theory of the analycity of logical and mathematical theorems has been criticised in Poland and is considered to be false and detrimental to the development of logic and mathemtics. So far as Marxist-Leninists are concerned, they did not seem to distinguish the two possible meanings of the term ‘tautology’, that is, between statements true or false by virtue of their wording and tautologies in the sense familiar from formal logic. Thus, one of the axioms of the propositional calculus of Russell and Whitehead: p ? p. ⊃ p, is known as the principle of tautology. It states that to assert p twice is to assert it just once. The two different meaning of ‘tautology’ seem to merge into one in the Marxist-Leninist language.

657. Łukasiewicz(20), 45, 149; Bocheński(7), 40-41.

658. Czeżowski(22), 222-227.

659. Łukasiewicz(10), 67-68.

660. Łukasiewicz(11), 63.

661. Czeżowski(11), 71; Kotarbiński(16), 136.

662. See, e.g., Mostowski(2), 273-274.

663. See Schaff(3), 329-330; Schaff(6), 115. Ossowski repeatedly criticised Schaff’s view. See Ossowski(5), 504; (7), 11-12; (8), 33.

664. Łukasiewicz(18), 26. Compare Chwistek(3), 9, 109.

665. Heyting(1), 97.

666. Zawirski(4), 165-196.

667. I consider only the simplest case, namely the intuitionist propositional calculus based on the trichotomy of truth-values. Such as calculus is not complete. As was 60. shown by Gödel (1932) and later by Jaśkowski (1935), no finite truth-matrix adequately determines the intuitionist calculus. This can be only achieved, if matrices with an infinite number of truth-values are considered& See Zawirski (4), 204-222; Czeżowski (11), 76.

668. Kotarbiński (15), T. 1, 122-123, 129-130.

669. Chwistek (3),131-132. Compare Mostowski (2),42-43

670. Schaff (14), 81-84.

671. Ryle (1), chapter 2; Pears (2), 232.

672. This is Becker and Prior interpretation of De Interpretatione 9 (Becker (1), Prior (1), 240-244). Lukasiewicz’s view is to be found in Likasiewicz (11), 75-76. See also Bocheński (7), 41; Bocheński (12), 73. According to Becker, Aristotle did not restrict the validity of the principle of the excluded middle and considered also the disjunction ‘Either there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or there will not be’ as true, although neither of its components is either true or false.

673. Rosser-Turquette (1), 3-5; Ryle (1), 25-27.

674. Pears (2),235-236; Waismann (1), 457.

675. Schaff (14), 157-160, 165. In a recent publication Schaff was, therefore, rightly classified as a supporter of pseudo-bivalued logic (Greniewski (8), 91-93).

676. Wudel (1).

677. This contention cannot now be maintained. Lukasiewicz’s investigations seem to have firmly established the fact that modal functors (as logical functors) have no interpretation in two-valued logic and that consequently every system of modal logic must be many-valued (Lukasiewicz (20), 166; Lukasiewicz (21), 111-113).

678. Greniewski (5), 207-212; Rolbiecki (1), 76-77; Eilstein (7), 116. An interesting example of statements which might be considered to be neither true nor false is given in Greniewski (5),210-211.

679. Rosser-Turquette (1), 6; Greniewski (5), 212

680. Schaff (3), 334, 341-342. The distinction between objects whose opposite characteristics do not and those which do require a conjunction of contradictory statements for their adequate description was important, because it paved the way for the final rejection of the existence of contradictory objects.

681. Engels (1), 27-28; Plekhanov (2), 94; Schaff (3), 333-334, 343-344.

682. Ajdukiewicz (15), 46-47.

683. Hegel (1), Vol. 2, 67; Engels (1), 135; Lenin (4), 244; Pickhanov (1). 112-113; Pickhanov (2), 92-94.

684. This opinion is still shared by some Marxist-Leninists in Poland. See Ladosz (2), 125-133. Outside Marxist-Leninist circles even their sympathisers were altogether unwilling to accept Schaff’s views on Zeno’s argument. See Greniewski (5), 352-353.

685. Schaff (3),331,339-341; Lenin((4),243; Engels((1), 135.

686. Engels (1), 136, 151.

687. Schaff (23),156.

688. Lenin (4), 244-245; Ladosz (2), 126-128.

689. Schaff (3), 340, 341, 343, 351-352.

690. Plekhanov (1), 118; Schaff (3), 349, 351. This appraisal of Plekhanov was never again repeated by Schaff and the phrase in question was deleted in Schaff (6). In Fomina (1), 283-285, we find the opinion that Plekhanov’s views on dialectical logic are not faultless and that Plekhanov’s ‘dialectical opportunism, revealed in his political activities since 1903, originated from his views on the relation of dialectics to logic. Fomina’s book, published in Russian in 1955, was severely censored before publication and after its appearance in turn criticised for endorsing false opinions on Plekhanov. See Wetter (1), 108-109.

691. Engels (1), 28; Engels (2), 50. Schaff quoted Engels (1), 31 and 135, but the passages referred to above seem to better support Schaff’s point.

692. Schaff (3), 347, 353. Also this passage was deleted in Schaff (6). Compare Suszko (3),394.

693. Schaff (3), 346.

694. Lenin (4), 335; Schaff (3), 343, 345-346, 353.

695. Schaff (3), 349, 352.

696. Soviet discussions in Voprosy Filosofii (1950- 1951) were summarised in Dyskusja (1) and Wróblewski (1), but they were of course available in the original and widely known. See, e.g., Kokoszyńska (8),186.

697. The logicians repeatedly took advantage of Stalin’s pronouncements on linguistics to reassert their rights. See Stonert (1), 253; Kokoszyńska (8), 184, 186; Gregorowicz (1), 9-10. Stalin’s pronouncement was emphatically endorsed by the leading Polish Marxist-Leninists. See Schaff (15),40-41.

698. Bialobrzeski (1), 169; Bialobrzeski (7), 54-56.

699. Mehlberg (2), 97-98; Klłsak (5), 53-56.

700. See, e.g., Szczeniowski (1), 33-34. The various possible views that a physicist may take of the dual nature of micro-objects are discussed in Bohm (1), 91-103.

701. Infeld-Sosnowski (1), 51; Szczcniowski (2),185-186,196-197.

702. Ajdukiewicz (15), 48; Łukasiewicz (1), 139. The same can be said of a moving body. The contention that it is at a given point and is not them at the same time is an extrapolation never to be actually observed (Klłósak (5), 71). See also Russell (3), 110-114, where an essentially similar argument is examined in a general manner.

703. Ajdukiewicz(15),50

704. Ajdukiewicz(15),51.

705. Schaff (6), 103-108; Schaff (12), 97-102. A ‘development by leaps, catastrophies, revolutions’ was strongly emphasised by Lenin, who saw in this idea the revolutionary side of Hegel’s philosophy. See, e.g., Lenin (3), 23-25.

706. Ajdukiewicz’s analysis of the ‘race course’ and ‘Achilles and tortoise’ arguments is omitted, because Marxist-Leninists never refer to them and Ajdukiewicz’s exposition of Zeno’s fallacy follows the familiar line (an infinite series might have a limit).

707. Ajdukiewicz (15), 39-40. This particular fallacy was analysed and explained in Ajdukiewicz (2), 205-206. See also Quine (2), 121-122. Them can hardly be a better example of how the logical notation helps us to keep the distinction clear where ordinary speech signally fails.

708. I agree with Russell (3), 179, that the ‘arrow in flight’ assumes that finite segments of time and space consist of a finite number of instants (intervals) and points. This assumption should, therefore, be added to (E). Zeno’s arguments against his adversaries who held that things were ‘a many’ proceeded on the assumption that segments of time and space consist either of a finite or an infinite number of instants and points. The ‘arrow in flight’ belongs to the first group of the logoi (Jordan (2), 40-43.).

709. Ajdukiewicz (15), 40-42. The two meanings of ‘is’ used in the statements about continuous motion and the difficulties arising therefrom are mentioned in Russell (3), 142. ‘To be at a place’ may carry different meanings according to whether we think in terms of instants or intervals.

710. Plekhanov (1), 112-113.

711. This is essentially Black’s solution of the paradox. See Black (2),140-147.

712. Ajdukiewicz (15),42-45

713. Russell (1), 347.

714. Schaff (7), 259, 269.

715. Schaff (31),207-210.

716. Rozental-Judin (1), 338-340,704-710.

717. Greniewski (5), 5; Grzegorczyk (8), 39-40; Ajdukiewicz (27), 75-78.

718. Rolbiecki (1), 63; Eilstein (7), 116. See also Ładosz (2), 107 and Schaff (21),15, 29 where the discrepancy between the official doctrine and what more and more Marxist-Leninists thought to be the co was implicitly acknowledged.

719. Schaff (19), 69-70. The political motives, which initiated this trend, are analysed in Marcuse (1), 136-159.

720. Rolbiecki (1). Tlhis article appeared in print in 1955 but its substance was contained in a paper, written in 1953, which won the award in a competition organised by Myśl Filozoficzna. See Rolbiecki (1), 43, footnote.

721. Schaff (23), 143-144; Ładosz (2), 106.

722. Schaff (31), 201, 207-210. A slightly different appraisal of the position in the Soviet Union is given in Wetter (1), 243, 527-535. Schaff and Wetter are in agreement that Bakradze and Kondakov have probably more supporters than the public discussion in Voprosy Filosofii might suggest.

723. Rolbiecki (1), 49-62; Schaff (23), 157; ŁLadosz (2), 108-110, 123-134; Eilstein (6), 131,143,145.

724. Rolbiecki (1). 43-49. For a similar interpretation of Marx’s views on formal logic see Calvez (1), 359-360.

725. Schaff (23),144-147; Eilstein (6),143-146.

726. Schaff (23),148-158; Eilstein (6),146-149.

727. Eilstein (6), 132-138. This answers another criticism of non-Marxist philosophers. See Lubnicki (1), 147; Lubnicki (7). 283-284; Kłósak (5), 78-79.

728. Schaff (31),204-205; Eilstein (6),138-143

729. Rolbiecki (1), 72,74.

730. Ładosz (2),111, 125-127, 130-131.

731. Lenin (4),168.

732. Ładosz (2), 107, 109.

733. Ładosz (2), 123.

734. Kokoszyńska (10), 131-133.

735. Kokoszyńska (8), 189-193; Kokoszyńska (10), 134-136.

736. Kokoszyńska (10), 136-139.

737. Kokoszyń (10), 139-144

738. Lenin (2), 48, 57-58. See also Kołakowski (6), 75.

739. Lenin (2), 348.

740. This accounts, for instance, for the invariable hostility shown to the second law of thermodynamics, ‘the hypothesis of bourgeois physics’, by Marxist-Leninists. See, e.g., Eilstein (3), 125.

741. This is Lenin’s argument, inspired by what Engels had already said on this matter. See Marx- Engels (3), Vol. 2, 94, 353. Lenin made much use of it in his polemics against Mach, Avenarius and their followers (Lenin (2), 353-363). MarxistLeninists have transformed Lenin’s argument into a standard justification of their claim that science supports the metaphysics of materialism or even dialectica materialism. See, e.g., Schaff (14), 24.

742. See Engels (2), 279; Lenin (2), 349-350; Schaff (12), 57-58.

743. Simpson (1), 29.

744. Lenin (2), 319.

745. See Carnap (2), 63-64; Margenau (1). Polish physicists who have sympathised with the social and political ideology of Marxism-Leninism without surrendering their power of independent and critical judgement in matters of science and philosophy, supported this point of view, cautiously but firmly, also during the period of intellectual terror in Poland. See, e.g., Infeld- Sosnowski (1).

746. The Christian point of view was expressed in numerous articles published in Tygodnik Powstechny, Tygodnik Warszawski Dziś i Jutro and Znak. The two main Marxist-Leninist publications are Krajewski (3) and Sejneński (1).

747. See Lenin (2), 48, 58, 62.

748. Schaff (14), 199.

749. Durkheim (2), chapter 6.

750. Marx- Engels (4), 218, 322, 559-560; Marx- Engels (3), Vol. 1, 58; Engels (1), 25, 286.See also Rozental- Judin (1), 69-70.

751. Marx- Engels (3), Vol. 2, 330-331, 362-363; Marx- Engels (1), 15; Engels (1), 31-33, 45, 155.

752. Engels (1), 45-46. Engels closely followed Saint-Simon’s ideas. See Durkheim (2), 91-93.

753. Engels (1), 158; Schaff(12), 20.

754. Lenin (2), 203, 345.

755. Frank (1), 75-76

756. Engels and Lenin frequently referred to Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s concept of thing-in-itself as one of Hegel’s greatest contributions to philosophy. Hegel pointed out that since all knowledge is conceptual, to formulate concepts applying to a thing is to gain knowledge of that thing. Consequently, Kant’s unknowable thing-in-itself is nothing unknowable; everything that Kant said about the noumenon only shows that he had knowledge of it. There is, therefore, nothing in the Universe that the mind cannot know. From this Hegel drew the conclusion that existence is the possibility of being known by the mind.

757. Lenin (2), 27-28, 232.

758. Marx- Engels (3), Vol. 2, 92-94, 335-336, 341, 349-350.

759. See Engels (1), 52-53.

760. Russell (6), 15.

761. Schaff (14), 39-40.

762. Lenin (2), 93.

763. Lenin (2), 47, 122.

764. Kotarbiński (3), T. 1,109.

765. Kotarbiński (3), T. 1,108; Ajdukiewicz (21), 18. Compare Paul (1).

766. Lenin (2), 195, 234-235; Schaff (6), 58, 63; Schaff (12), 195-196, 220-221. The criticism of Lenin’s point of view is to be found in Lubnicki (7), 290. Lubnicki’s objection was raised already in the past by Axel’rod. See Wetter (1), 151-152, 500.

767. Lubnicki (7), 290.

768. Lenin (2), 309.

769. See, e.g., Lenin (2), 45, 62, 121, 351-353.

770. Czeżowski (22), 309.

771. Schaff (6), 56-58, 63; Schaff (14), 180; Martel (1), 289.

772. Schaff (14), 36-47.

773. Helmholtz presented his views on the matter in Die Thatsachen in tier Wahrnemung, which was translated (in extracts) into Polish by Ajdukiewicz, and Hertz in the introductory chapter to Principles of Mechanics.

774. Schaff (14), 127; Lenin (2), 136

775. Compare Acton H. B. (1), 38, 64; Lewis (1), 117-145.

776. Mach (1), 81.

777. Lenin (2), 133; Schaff (14), 106-107, 128-130.

778. See, e.g., Kołakowski (6), 87-88.

779. Schaff (14), 44-45.

780. This comes out very clearly in Schaff’s observations on Lubnicki’s argument against the copy theory of perception which pointed out the gap under discussion. See Schaff (14), 50-51.

781. Lenin (2), 351.

782. Lenin (2), 80, 105, 107-110, 118-122.

783. Nagel (2), 165.

784. Lenin (2), 295-296.

785. See, e.g., Lenin (2), 42, 80, 104, 140, 172; Schaff (14), 42, 47.

786. Lenin (2), 233.

787. Stout (1), 237.

788. Mach (1), 29, 35; Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 122-133; Czeżowski (22), 36-38.

789. Price (1), 67, 99-102.

790. Ayer (1), 220-228. This point of view has been represented in Poland by Czeżowski. Czeżowski (22), 173.

791. Stout (1), 235.

792. Russell (10), 27.

793. Lenin (2), 195.

794. See, e.g., Lenin (2), 306-307, which, however, is incompatible with what he says of the relation between the image and the imaged material object elsewhere

795. Lenin (2), 92.

796. Schaff (37); Fritzhand (8); Kuszko (1).

797. Compare Hampshire (1), chapter 1, where a similar attitude is taken, though the starting point is different.

798. Kołakowski (6), 135-137.

799. Kołakowski (19), 44.

800. Kołakowski (6), 87-88, 93, 159-160.

801. Bukharin (2), 23.

802. Marx (1), 107, 155.

803. Marx (1), 104-105.

804. Russell (8), 182.

805. Marx (1), 156-157; Kołakowski (19), 48. This view underlies the analysis of the labour process in Capital. See Marx (4), Vol. 1, 177-180.

806. Marx (1), 170.

807. Kołakowski (19), 52-53, 56-57.

808. Kołakowski (19), 50-51.

809. The similarity is not as superficial as Kołakowski thinks, if instead of William James’ views those of Dewey are considered. Kołakowski does not appear to be acquainted with Dewey’s philosophy.

810. Lenin (2), 130; Kołakowski (19), 58-59.

811. Marx (1), 156.

812. Lenin (2), 267.

813. Marx (1), 148; Kołakowski (19), 53, 56.

814. Kołakowski (19), 54.

815. Kołakowski (12), 14-28.

816. Kołakowski (17), a work of considerable erudition and philosophical talent, is the most notable exception.

817. Mannheim (1), 244.

818. Dewey (1), 11.

819. Stebbing (1), 48.

820. Lenin (2), 122.

821. Schaff (14), 51, 100, 109, 131.

822. The last part of the polemical half of the book deals with the views of Wittgenstein, Neurath and Carnap, and was antiquated on the day of its publication, for it refers to the views of these thinkers as they were stated in the early ‘twenties and ‘thirties respectively.

823. See, e.g., Schaff (14), 75, 225, 233, 249, 300, 324, 354.

824. Schaff (14), 27, 100-101, 107, 111. Brentano is one of those modern thinkers who revived the self-evidence theory of truth in recent times. Schaff contended that through Brentano and Twardowski this particular theory has established itself in the Polish philosophy of the inter-war period (Schaff (14), 103, 400). This claim falls under the category of interpretations intended to create a difference between Schaff’s views and those of the Warsaw school, though in fact there is none in this respect. There is no evidence that any of the Warsaw school thinkers considered ‘true’ and ‘self-evident’ as logically equivalent terms. See Czeżowski (22), 82-87.

825. Schaff (14), 27-28, 35, 100, 109.

826. Schaff (14), 35-37, 107, 131,379-380; Kołakowski (6), 106-118.

827. Schaff (14), 18-19; Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 160-161; Kokoszyńska (4), 167-168. The view that belief is a pre-linguistic occurrence and that it does not need to be expressed in words to be held, is one of Bertrand Russell’s reiterated convictions. See, e.g., Russell (6), 227.

828. See Czeżowski (22), 68.

829. Church (1), 23-27; Church (2), 4-5; Carnap (5), 235-236.

830. Schaff (14), 20. Schaff refers the reader to Russell (1), 34-35, 47-49.

831. What Kotarbiński says on this matter in Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 157-159, should be read in conjunction with Kotarbiński (6), 53-55. In his earlier writings he rejected the use of the expression ‘judgement in the logical sense’ since it suggested some hypostatised entities. - If the term ‘sentence’ applies merely to a given indicative sentence, to an individual physical thing, taken in association with its meaning, we may find it difficult to make statements about sentences which have the same meaning. For this reason Tarski preferred to understand by a sentence not an individual inscription but a class of such things which are of the same shape. See Tarski (5), 156.

832. Lenin (2), 125.

833. Schaff (14), 19.

834. Schaff (14), 21.

835. Lenin (2), 57; Schaff (14), 22.

836. Schaff (14), 36.

837. Czeżowski (22), 68; Ajdukiewicz (21), 18-19.

838. Tarski (3), 33-34; Schaff (14), 38, 40, 95, 98.

839. Schaff did not mention the criticism to which The Nature of Truth had been subjected by Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore when it had been published in 1906.

840. Moore (2), 252-266; Russell (2), 193-203. Russell (2) was translated into Polish in 1913, reissued in the period between the two wars and well known to every Polish student of philosophy.

841. Schaff (14), 78-80.

842. Tarski (5), 158.

843. Schaff (14), 95-99.

844. Russell (6), chapter 4. Schaff refers to Russell (6) in connection with the paradox of the liar (Schaff (14), 399).

845. Russell (6), 63.

846. So far as I am aware, this idea was formulated as a methodological principle for the first time in Poland in Ajdukiewicz (3), 8.

847. Lenin (4), 154; Schaff (14), 56-58; Suszko (5), 146-147.

848. Nagel (2), 79; FraenkeI-Bar-Hillel (I), 343-344.

849. Schaff (14), 57-58, 62, 64; Lenin (4), 163, 189.

850. For a different definition of analytic statements see Ajdukiewicz (24), 292.

851. Schaff (14), 65-67.

852. Schaff (14), 65, 67-68, 333-335.

853. Kotarbiński (3), T. 2, 9.

854. Ajdukiewicz (5) and (6). Ajdukiewicz made use of the rules of meaning for the purpose of circumscribing the concept of analytic sentences in colloquial languages in Ajdukiewicz (24). There are some similarities between Ajdukiewicz’s views and Nagel’s operational interpretation of logical principles. See Nagel (2), 52-92.

855. Ajdukiewicz (24), 296-298.

856. See, e.g., Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 167-173.

857. ‘Egocentric particulars’ is a term introduced into the English language by Bertrand Russell. The semantical category of these expressions was first differentiated by Husserl in Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. 2. Husserl emphasised their essentially subjective character and called them ‘okkasionelle Ausdr�cke’. in Polish they are known as ‘occasional expressions’ (occasional in the sense of being concerned with a particular occasion).

858. Kotarbiński (3), T. 1,170.

859. Russell (6), 115

860. Kokoszyńska (4).

861. Reichenbach (1), 49.

862. Kaufmann (1), 53; Czeżowski (22), 99-104.

863. James (1), 147.

864. Neurath (1), 12-13; Carnap (3), 121-123, where the view under discussion is also critically examined; Russell (6), 139-149.

865. Lenin (2), 125.

866. Marx- Engels (3), Vol. 2, 328-329; Lenin (2), 127. Lenin’s viewpoint has been fully supported by Polish Marxist-Leninists.

867. Carnap (3), 119-120, 124-125; Kokoszyńska (7), 105-112. See also Nagel (4), 2-4, where the impact of methodological developments on philosophical views is concisely discussed.

868. Bergson (1), 297.

869. Schaff (14), 139, 151.

870. Schaff (14), 172, 183; Schaff (35), 97-98.

871. Łuszczewska-Romahnowa tried to reconcile the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the relativity of knowledge with modern developments in the methodology of empirical science. But she did not distinguish Engels’ views from those of Lenin and his adherents. See Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (4), 80-81.

872. Schaff (14), 137, 168-169, 191.

873. Schaff (14), 177. This argument is taken from Twardowski, but it is not quite convincing since it does not apply to a more carefully stated version of the relativity of truth. See Kokoszyńska (4), 171.

874. Engels (1), 103; Schaff (14), 172- 173; Martel (1), 297.

875. Schaff (14), 137-138, 147.

876. Wollheim (1), 180.

877. Moore (2), 284.

878. Bocheński (2), 97.

879. Engels (1), 105

880. Compare Moore (2), 284-286.

881. Schaff (14), 159, 169-171; Schaff (35), 95. The fallacy of Schaff’s argument is recognised in Kołakowski (4), 341.

882. The distinction between the pragmatical and semantical concept of confirmation is implicitly contained in the conventionalist theory of science. See Czeżowski (22), 107. Czeżowski dealt with the two concepts under discussion in Czeżowski (19).

883. Schaff (14), 157-158, 171; Lenin (2), 314-319.

884. Schaff (14), 147.

885. Hosiasson (1); Carnap (4), 346-348.

886. James (1), 146. Lenin and Schaff use almost the same expression as James.

887. Schaff (14), 144, 195.

888. Schaff (14), 153-155.

889. Lenin (4), 156; Schaff (14), 151-152.

890. Wolniewicz (1).

891. Hegel (1), Vol. 1, 36, 69. Lenin commented upon this passage with approval and admiration. See Lenin (4), 71.

892. Engels (2), 270-321 is a commentary on this single subject and its importance for empirical science.

893. Marx (3), 292-300.

894. Schaff (35), 98.

895. Engels (1), 100-104.

896. See, e.g., Lenin (2), 114-130; Schaff (14), 185-197.

897. Lenin (3), 335.

898. Schaff (14), 191-194.

899. Quoted by Wetter (1), 515.

900. Russell (3), 14-21.

901. Ajdukiewicz (33), 4-5, 11-12.

902. See, e.g., Russell (2), 147-149; Russell (7), 758-760.

903. Nowiński (4), 14-15.

904. Lenin (4), 314.

905. Marx-Engels (2), 173.

906. Engels (2), 308, 312-313, 337.

907. Marx-Engels (2), 172-173.

908. Kołakowski (10), 127-129; Kołakowski (7), 134-137.

909. Kołakowski (10), 46-47, 77-78; Kołakowski (7), 138-139.

910. Schaff (2), 15; Schaff (4), 52; Nowiński (4), 50.

911. See, e.g., Ajdukiewicz (21), 124-125; Czeżowski (22), 105-11; Czeżowski (4). In a public discussion in 1956 efforts were made by the non-Marxist thinkers to make their opponents familiar with the basic differences dividing contemporary nominalism and realism. See Sesja (3), 188-191.

912. Kołakowski (10), 129; Kołakowski (7), 128-136; Greniewski (5), 410-411.

913. Quine (3), 14; Church (2), 9; Schaff (4), 53; Kołakowski (10), 129. Logicism, formalism and the views of logical empiricism are discussed in Suszko (5), without being differentiated from each other and without being related to the debate between nominalism and realism.

914. Kotarbiński (15), T. 2, 184-187; Kotarbiński (24), 13.

915. Quine (3), 127-129; Russell (6), chapter 25.

916. Kołakowski (7), 115. This view on modern nominalism underlies the criticism of Kotarbiński’s semantical reism. See in particular Baczko (3), 43-45.

917. Engels (2), 152; Lenin (3), 334; Schaff (4), 53, 59; Schaff (22) 283; Baczko (3), 52-53.

918. Roscelin’s and Hobbes’ views are explicitly ascribed to the contemporary nominalist doctrine in Schaff (2), 11-12, 14; Baczko (2), 266. Nominalism or vulgar materialism, we are told, reduces concepts to ‘empty words’ and to verbal utterances, devoid of objective significance.

919. Baczko (3), 49-50.

920. Nowiński (4), 20-24.

921. Schaff (4), 54-59.

922. Nowiński (4), 35-36.

923. The fragmentary nature of the doctrine is recognised by its own supporters. See Schaff (4), 52; Kołakowski (10), 131; Nowiński (4), 17, 50. Its obscurity was deplored by some Marxist-Leninists and non-Marxist thinkers alike at a conference convened for the purpose of discussing it. See Sesja (3), 178, 195, 223.

924. The influence of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism on Polish Marxist-Leninists is not only apparent in their views but also supported by explicit references to his works. So far as Bradley is concerned, no such evidence is available.

925. Schaff (4), 57-58; Baczko (3), 65.

926. Bocheński (10).

927. Bocheński (10), 40-44.

928. Popper has suggested that the social sciences have been the stronghold of methodological essentialism and that even philosophers who favour methodological nominalism in the natural sciences often remain essentialists in the social sciences. J. S. Mill provides perhaps the most striking instance of this fact. See Popper (3), 29-30; Popper (1), Vol. 1, 190. In the case of Marxist-Leninist philosophy the social sciences have been exercising a decisive influence in rejecting nominalism in favour of essentialism.

929. Quine (3), 115.

930. Leśniewski (3); Kotarbiński (3), T. 1, 16-20.

931. See Schaff (4), 57. The misunderstandings, to which the requirements of social theories and ignorance of elementary logic contribute their share, have recently been aired by Ossowski in Ossowski (17), 128-130.

932. Baczko (3), 56, 63; Nowiński (4), 74-82; Schaff (4), 54. The basic idea of this visionary scheme can be traced to Marx, but Marx did not apply it outside history and the social sciences. See, e.g., Marx (2), 145

933. Lenin (4), 194. 196.

934. Nowiński (4), 86-100.

935. Kneale (1), 92-103.

936. Nowiński (3), 87.

937. Schaff (4), 58-59.

938. Nowiński (3), 88. Amsterdamski (1) and Reykowski (1) are studies of this sort. The first is, however, nothing more than a chapter from the history of the concept of chemical element and the second is veiled in obscurities and generalities which do not elucidate the psychological process of concrete abstraction.

939. Whitehead (1), 141-142.

940. Kołakowski (7), 154-157; Schaff (22), 286, 289. The concept of real aggregate plays a considerable role in Bukharin’s sociology, where it is introduced as a structural principle underlying all natural processes. See Bukharin (1), 84-85.

941. The present state of the discussion on the concept of emergence is summarised in Hempel-Oppenheim (1), 331-337.

942. Kołakowski (7), 158-160; Sesja (3), 184-185.

943. Hegel (1), Vol. 2, 115-117, 119; Nowiński (4), 79.

944. Marx (4), Vol. 1,47; Kołakowski (7), 151-153.

945. Moore (1), 278-279.

946. Kołakowski (7), 153-154; Schaff (22), 280-281, 284-286.

947. Nowiński (4), 52-53, 56; Rolbiecki (1), 74.

948. Nowiński (3), 86-87.

949. Moore (1), 276-309; Russell (1), 224-226; Russell (2), chapter 14; Nagel (3), chapter 15.

950. Lenin (4), 264.

951. Nowiński (3), 44.

952. Sesja (3), 262-263

953. Stalin (3), 5-13, 93; Lenin (4), 125-127; Lenin (2), 150; Schaff (22), 32, 36; Modzelewski (1), 87; Michajłow (2), 114; Tomaszewski (3), 85-86; Ingarden, R.S. (1)-(3).

954. Engels (2), 307-308.

955. Engels (2), 54, 315-317; Stalin (3), 8; Schaff (22), 42-45; Michajłow (2), 123.

956. Kołakowski (7), 116, 159.

957. Kołakowski (7), 118-119, 124. Kołakowski’s definition of nominalism probably aimed at Kotarbiński’s reism. His account of nominalism as a conceptual scheme underlying scientific theories was criticised from the non-Marxist viewpoint in Czerwiński (1).

958. Kołakowski (7), 141-159.

959. Popper (5), 62.

960. Whitehead (2), 45; Pelc (1), 30-40. Pelc has suggested that the universality of natural laws is restricted by their limitations to a definite space-time region but unrestricted with respect to the class of things or events to which natural laws apply.

961. Kołakowski (7), 141-143. See also Pelc (1), 25-27.

962. See Czeżowski (9), 134-135, where this objection is succinctly stated. Some logical empiricists once asserted that if natural laws are strictly universal statements they must be unverifiable, that is, meaningless. Consequently, they suggested that natural laws are not propositions but propositional schemata or propositionforming instructions. Kołakowski appears to have confused the question of verifiability in its old, now antiquated formulation of logical empiricists, with that of the alleged existence of abstract entities, which in his view the acceptance of strictly universal statements implies.

963. In Grzegorczyk (6), 212-213, this choice is convincingly argued.

964. Popper (5), 68-69

965. Schaff (6), 143-144; Kołakowski (7), 145-149. Schaff writes that one cannot dispense with the ‘law of causality’, in the sense of its being a principle of necessitation, unless one is ready to give up the scientific world outlook. ‘Such attempts have been undertaken only by those who being anxious to preserve their class privileges at any price, are ready to sacrifice even science whenever science interferes in any manner with the means leading to this end’ ( Schaff (6), 152-153). Anthropomorphism consists in assigning human qualities to physical objects. When the law of causality confers efficacy upon natural causes this does not mean that a human quality is ascribed to them, as the idealist anti-anthropomorphism asserts, but that man is considered as a particular natural object instantiating an universal property of matter ( Eilstein (9), 149).

966. Kołakowski (7), 149-150; Schaff (6), 147- 148; Kryszewski (1), 228.

967. Schaff (6), 155-159; Schaff (22), 147-148; Krajewski (10), 103-175; Ladosz (1); Złotowski (1). For a concise characteristic of the concept of chance in MarxistLeninist philosophy see Kotarbińska (1), 164-166; Szaniawski K. (2), 79-80.

968. Engels (2), 288-293; Bukharin (1), 44-46.

969. Schaff (6), 144.

970. See Eilstein (9), 165-172.

971. Mach (1), 89; Mises (2), 152.

972. This is one of the important reasons why the Polish supporters of the ‘materialist methodology’ rejected the Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum theory. In their view the Copenhagen interpretation has ‘identified probability with the absence of causality’. They welcomed the alternative interpretation of the quantum theory put forward by David Bohm and were in general agreement with the philosophic views of the Soviet physicists D. I. Blochincev and J. P. Terleckij. Blochincev and Terleckij suggested that the statistical treatment of the quantum theory would eventually be supplemented by a fuller account more in agreement with the conceptual framework of classical physics and the views on necessity and chance of dialectical materialism. See Plebański-Werle (1), Plebański (1), Eilstein (2). Simultaneously the biologists were warned against the application of statistical methods, which frequently lead to ‘arbitrary conclusions’. See Statystyka (1), 99.

973. Czeżowski (22), 105-111. Czeżowski refers to Ramsey (1), 237-255, who was the first to notice this implication.

974. Engels (2), 288-293.

975. Whitehead (2), 28.

976. Criticism along these lines can be found in Sesja (3), 198-199.

977. Wollheim (1), 282.

978. Kołakowski (7), 159.

979. Kołakowski (7), 160; Nowiński (4), 58-62.

980. Lenin (4), 180; Nowiński (3), 44. Lenin’s comment should be read in conjunction with Hegel (1), Vol. 2, 429, to which it refers. There is another commentary of Lenin inspired by the chapter on The Absolute Idea in Hegel (1) which is very revealing in this context. ‘The relationship of every thing (phenomenon, etc.)’, Lenin wrote, ‘ is not only often manifold but also general, universal. Every thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with every other’ ( Lenin (4), 194).

981. Kołakowski (7), 159-160

982. See W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History, Hutchinson’s University Library, 1951, pp. 13-15

983. Deborin (1), 91

984. Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 356.

985. Górski K. (1), 9, 23. Górski is a Catholic historian and the lecture in which he propounded these views was delivered at the Catholic University of Lublin. He dismissed every kind of historiosophy, not only that of inevitable progress or of historical materialism, but also theological historicism. He made it quite clear that a Catholic historian should draw a sharp distinction between accepting the teaching of the Church and making use of it in describing and explaining the actions and motives of men.

986. Geyl (1), 31-33; Geyl (2), 11. Paul Kecskemeti, the translator of Mannheim (2), used ‘historicism’ for the German ‘Historismus’.

987. Bullock (1), 293-296.

988. Polish Marxist-Leninists thought otherwise and accused Polish historians of supporting the ‘idiographic creed’. This also applied to Górski and his views presented above. See Schaff (22), 184-186.

989. Randall (1), 39, 46; Aron (1), 160; Aron (2), 66.

990. Historism and historicism are confused with each other by many MarxistLeninist and non-Marxist writers in Poland. See Baczko (11), 54-55; Kula (4), 31, 141; Borucka-Arctowa (1), 280-284; Kroński (9), 256.

991. Schaff (22), 138-155.

992. Hegel (2), 22, 27-28.

993. Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 354-355, 443, 458.

994. See, e.g., Kroński (3), 251-254; Kolakowski (16).

995. Stalin (1), 574.

996. Stalin (1), 578.

997. Hegel (2), 9-10, 25, 35.

998. Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 356.

999. Lange (5), 277.

1000. Lenin (2), 332.

1001. Schaff (22), 8-10, 22, 155, 188; Bukharin (2), 43.

1002. Hegel (2), 10.

1003. Weber (1), 178-181. The logical priority of the value interpretative approach to historical inquiry, together with the assumption that this approach is consciously or unconsciously class-bound and class-determined, was used by Polish MarxistLeninists for the purpose of refuting methodological individualism in the social sciences and of defending historicism against Popper’s criticism in Popper (3). See Żółkiewski (12), 280-286. Popper’s critic made his task easy by ignoring the last chapter of Popper (1), a work to which he referred but failed to take into account. Methodological individualism does not exclude the interpretative approach.

1004. Aron (2), 68.

1005. Mises (2), 209-215; Hempel (1), 460-461; Hempel-Oppenheim (1), 326-327; Zilsel (1), 720-721.

1006. Butterfield (2), 102.

1007. See Mises (2), 215; Popper (1), Vol. 2, 250-252; Popper (3), 143-147.

1008. Schaff (22), 100-111. The distinction of the absolute and relative sense of the term ‘unique’ and of ‘recurrent’ or ‘non-recurrent events’ are accepted in Schaff (22), 277-283, without reference to the contribution of logical empiricists whose essays are quoted in a different context and dismissed for they ‘deny’ the laws of history. See Schaff (22), 133-138. Popper’s views are evaluated in extremely sharp language. They are said to represent "the very heights of ignorance which shocks even when judged by the ‘more solid’ standards of bourgeois science". Compare Żółkiewski (12), 278. Schaff also misunderstood the views of Rickert. See LAzariPawlowska (1), 19-21.

1009. Schaff (22), 283-293.

1010. See Popper (5), 420.

1011. This comes out clearly also in Schaff’s inquiry. At one point in his argument he speaks of the ‘objective laws of development’ providing the criterion of distinguishing which characteristics should be regarded as singular or general, recurrent or non-recurrent ( Schaff (22), 283). But this is soon forgotten, and the recurrent characteristics, given irrespective of adopted viewpoint, are considered as corroborating evidence for the acceptance of laws ( Schaff (22), 289).

1012. Weber (1), 204-205. The Marxist-Leninist criticism of Weber’s methodological theories is to be found in Schaff (22), 239-246; Kryszewski (1). Schaff saw in them only a collection of ‘false and reactionary conclusions’ drawn from the erroneous premiss that abstract concepts have no factual reference. Schaff’s peremptory condemnation was in turn criticised in Lange (5), 99. The role of ‘typological concepts’ in the humanities is examined in Lazari-Pawlowska (2). This is a scholarly essay, whose task is to re-examine the whole problem in the light of recent developments provided, above all, by C. G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim, Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik ( Leiden, 1936) and Polish inquiries in the domain of sociology, history of art and literature.

1013. Lenin (1), Vol. 1, 84-85.

1014. Marx-Engels (1), 6-7, 14-15, 30

1015. Quoted in Berlin (2), 121-122.

1016. See, e.g., Schaff (22), 34, 37-38; Lange (5), 51.

1017. Lange (5), 51.

1018. Marx-Engels (1), 28-29; Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 401-402.

1019. Lange (5), 55-56.

1020. Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 356.

1021. Lange (4), 30-32; Lange (5), 67, 97-99.

1022. Schaff (22), 298-307. Schaff closely follows Engels. See Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 1, 338-339 and also Bukharin (1), XI-XV, 49.

1023. For more specific arguments against historicism see Popper (3).

1024. According to Schaff, historical laws are laws of social development. See Schaff (22),51,307.

1025. Schaff (22), 24-31.

1026. Bukharin (2), 33.

1027. Stalin (3), 8, 10-11.

1028. Schaff (22), 12-14.

1029. Marx-Engels (4), 208.

1030. Marx (2), 102; Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 404-405, 407-408.

1031. Stalin (3), 8.

1032. Lange (4), 22-23; Schaff (22), 42-45.

1033. Popper (3), 102-103; Popper (5), 252-254.

1034. Robbins (1), 79-83.

1035. See Schaff (22), 52.

1036. Lange (4), 23-30; Lange (5), 58-70.

1037. Lange (5), 44-47, 79-81.

1038. Stalin (3), 71, 75; Lange (5), 38-43.

1039. Bukharin (1), 120-129, 148; Goldschmidt (1), 108.

1040. Marx (4), Vol. 1, 372-373, 180. See also Marx-Engels, (3), Vol. 1, 83-84.

1041. Marx (2), 92.

1042. Goldschmidt (1), 112-113

1043. Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 94.

1044. Malewski (2), 63-74.

1045. The analytical and empiricist approach to the traditional formulation of historical materialism aroused strong objections on the part of the supporters of Marxism-Leninism not only of the ‘old school’ but also those of the younger generation. See, e.g., Kossak (1). The publication of Malewski (2) was followed by a long and sometimes heated exchanges of views. See Wiatr (2) and (3), and the reply of Malewski in Malewski (4) and (6). The main objection against Malewski’s approach was that historical materialism constitutes a coherent sociological system and that a greater precision in its formulation should not be accomplished at the expense of disrupting its coherence and comprehensiveness.

1046. Malewski (2), 77-79; Lange (5), 46-47, 81-82, 291.

1047. See Lange (2), 746.

1048. Bukharin (1), 49; Deborin (1), 91.

1049. Popper (3), 3.

1050. Schaff (22), 350.

1051. Merton (1), 423. See also Neurath (1), 29; Goldschmidt (1), 103.

1052. Popper (3), 128.

1053. Hempel (1), 466-467.

1054. Schaff (22), 354.

1055. See Weber (1), 220.

1056. Schaff (22), 367, 351-353.

1057. An attempt to establish some formal criteria by means of which causal factors can be ‘weighted’ in respect to their degree of importance is to be found in Nagel (1), 696-700.

1058. Marx (4), Vol. 1, 486-488.

1059. Popper (3), 109-117.

1060. Bukharin (2), 64-65.

1061. Schaff (22), 350-351, 376.

1062. See Northrop (1), 262-263. Northrop makes some illuminating comments along the lines indicated.

1063. See Mehring (1), 111.

1064. Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 360, 451.

1065. Marx-Engels (1), 15. Similarly, in The Communist Manifesto Marx sharply differentiated his own conclusions from the ideas or principles invented by wouldbe reformers as well as from the prejudices of the bourgeoisie, its views on law, morality, or religion ‘behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois in terests’. While the latter are dismissed as ideologies, the conclusions of Communism ‘merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes’ ( MarxEngels (3), Vol. 1. 42, 44).

1066. Marx (2), 53, 104-107

1067. Aron (2), 83.

1068. Mannheim (1), 254.

1069. Some Marxist-Leninists, e.g., Schaff (33), 18-25, seem to derive comfort from the fact that Mannheim’s conception of the general total ideology, which should not be identified with the sociology of knowledge, leads to epistemological relativism and its familiar antinomies. See Merton (1), 502-508. Mannheim’s relativistic fallacy is, of course, no remedy which would relieve Marxist-Leninists of their own fallacy.

1070. It can be noted as an amusing incident that Stalin’s pronouncements on linguistics and socialism were also found to contain a great wealth of thought for those interested in the theory and history of music. See Lissa (1).

1071. Życie Nauki (1), 73.

1072. Stalin (1), 581-584.

1073. Berman (1), 222; Schaff (13), 242-243; Lange (3), 31-32. Lange carefully avoided saying clearly that he disagreed with Berman and Schaff, though he could not have endorsed their interpretation, which was probably based on Stalin (2), 7-8, 25, 48.

1074. Marx (3),11-12.

1075. Marx- Engels (3), Vol. 2, 443, 447-448.

1076. This applies, first of all, to Plekhanov (1). Stalin’s observations on this matter were a disguised criticism of Plekhanov.

1077. Bukharin(1), 207-208; Plekhanov (2), 205-207, 224, 300.

1078. Plekhanov’s works were published in Polish and easily available. Bukharin Historical Materialism was translated into Polish in the ‘thirties and, of course, not republished after the war. But he was probably studied as much in secret as he is now studied and commented upon in public.

1079. Parsons- Smelser (1), 27.

1080. Schaff (12), 367-376, where Krzywicki is criticised for having divorced his scientific activity from the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and for having abandoned the partisan attitude. See also Kowalik (1), 337-341.

1081. Stalin (2), 8-10.

1082. Stalin (2), 14-15.

1083. Dembowski (3), 30; Berman (1), 223-224; Schaff (13), 244-246; Lange (3), 32-33.

1084. It is strange to note that the chief exponent of the first interpretation was Schaff, a Marxist-Leninist philosopher, and that of the second Jakub Berman, a politician and Éminence grise of the Communist Party, the prototype of Doctor Faul in K. Brandys’ story The Defence of Granada, translated into English and published in the collection The Broken Mirror ( New York, Random House, 1958). A few years later Berman was expelled from the Party and Schaff emerged as one of the spokesmen for its liberalising wing.

1085. Lenin (1), Vol. 1, 175-178, 203-204. It has been observed that Lenin’s contention concerning the working class inability to rise by itself above the ‘trade-union consciousness’ amounts to the recognition of the fact that in some cases classdetermined ideas may be antagonistic to the interests of that class. ( Bauer (1), 105).

1086. This was the fight against the so-called ‘right wing deviation in the C.P.S.U.’. It should be remembered that Gomulka was accused of the same deviation in 1948.

1087. See Stalin (1), 509-510.

1088. Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 2, 137, 140-141; Schaff (13), 247-249. Schaff was supported by the economist Brus. See Życie Nauki (1), 73-74.

1089. Schaff (13), 249.

1090. Stalin (1), 249-257; Stalin (2), 64-66.

1091. Schaff (19), 55; Schaff (28), 10-35.

1092. Bukharin (1), 264-265

1093. Malinowski (1), 70, 75-76; Marcuse (1), 88.

1094. James (2), 97.

1095. The concept of idealist myth played a key role in the criticism of Marxism-Leninism in the years 1955-1957. The magical frame of mind enhanced three tendencies in the voluntaristic interpretation of the Marxian thought: its abandonment of methodological empiricism, of epistemological realism and of ontological materialism.

1096. Berman (1), 225.

1097. Lange (3), 32; Markiewicz (1), 356-357; Markiewicz (2), 44; Budzyk (1); Krajewski (4).

1098. Budzyk (1), 396-398; Markiewicz (1), 360.

1099. See, e.g., Żółkiewski (9) and (10).

1100. The whole discussion is reviewed in Kurowski (1), 177-256. The most influential contributions were Kotarbiński (14); Ossowski (14), 78-99; Szczepański (9), 94-101; and some of the essays reprinted in Kołakowski (12).

1101. Some of this journalism was later republished in book form: Bieńkowski (1), Lipiński (2), Kula (4). Kurowski (1), Markiewicz (3).

1102. See Baczko (8) and (9), Eilstein (5), Kołakowski (11), (12), (13), (15).

1103. The primary function of institutions in the sociological sense of this term is to regulate the actions of individuals, groups or collectivities in their interaction with each other. This regulative function is exercised by defining institutional objectives and norms of conduct, conducive to their achievements. The institutional values of science and scholarship are these regulative and normative principles, inherent in science and scholarship as a social institution. They are also known under the non-technical name of the ‘ethos of science’. Merton dealt with them in his illuminating studies concerned with the sociology of science and distinguished four primary institutional values of science: universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism. See Merton (1), 550-561.

1104. Chałasiński (27),147-148; Chałasiński (28), 136-139.

1105. Ossowski (12), 20-22.

1106. Chałasiński (32), 14-18. The narrow utilitarianism, which followed the abolition of the autonomy of science and its subordination to political authorities, was widely criticised in the years 1956-1957. Among the most vocal critics were political scholars. See Sesja (2), 20-21, 92-95.

1107. This is one of the main sources of the hostility to science manifested by totalitarian political parties as well as by the public at large. Dictatorships have often exploited this public hostility for their own purposes. See Merton (1), 545-548; Parsons (1), 338-339.

1108. Chałasiński (27), 144-146; Chałasiński (29) and (34).

1109. Chałasiński (25) and (26).

1110. Most of the contributions to this discussion appeared in Przegląd Kulturalny in the period September, 1955-March, 1956.

1111. One of the fullest statements of this kind is Schaff (28).

1112. See, e.g., Ossowski (15), 140-151.

1113. Hoffman (2), 57-58; Schaff(33), 10, 33 ( Schaff (33) is a slightly revised version of Schaff (27)). Most of Schaff’s critical observations on Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge were forestalled and answered by Mannheim himself. In particular, Mannheim answered those objections of relativism on which Schaff laid great emphasis. See, e.g., Mannheim (1), 269-270.

1114. Schaff (33); Lange (5), chapter 7; Wiatr (4), chapter 7.

1115. See Mannheim (1), 62.

1116. See Merton (1), 496-498.

1117. Schaff (33), 30; Markiewicz (1), 354.

1118. See, e.g., Parsons (1), 348-352; Naess- Christophersen- Kval? (1), 161-165.

1119. Wiatr (4), 279, who does not seem to see the difficulties created by this recognition.

1120. Lenin (1), Vol. 2, 170, 177; Marx’s view in Marx-Engels (3), Vol. 1, 41-42.

1121. This difficulty was emphasised by the critics of Marxism-Leninism in Poland. See Ossowski (14), 72-73. Max Weber suggested in The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism that the theoretical problem involved is insoluble by the Marxian historical method and that the comparative method should be used instead.

1122. Lenin, Imperialism, chapter 8.

1123. Mannheim ( 1), 239-240; Neurath ( 1), 20-22. See a detailed analysis of Mannheim’s difficulty in Merton ( 1), 498-502.

1124. Aron ( 2), 57.

1125. See Mannheim ( 1), 229; Parsons ( 2), 23-24.

1126. See, e.g., Schumpeter ( 2), 354.

1127. This view is ascribed to Marx in Schaff ( 33), 31, and Wiatr ( 4), 269-270, 277-278. Both these writers agree, however, that the concept of ‘scientific ideology’ is due to Lenin rather than to Marx.

1128. Mannheim ( 1), 243-244.

1129. Schaff ( 33), 34-35.

1130. Schaff ( 33), 30-31.

1131. Wiatr ( 4), 287-294.

1132. See Mannheim ( 1). 49-53, 57-62, where the particular and the total conceptions of ideology are described.

1133. Lange would probably agree that the role of ideological elements in natural science is not comparable with that in the social sciences, for they do not affect, as is the case in the latter, the structure but the acceptance of a theory. There is nothing extraordinary or sinister when one social fact - an ideological belief - influences another social fact, that is the acceptance or dissemination of some scientific opinions. Some social scientists are inclined to a more extreme view on this matter. See Merton ( 1), 498.

1134. Lange ( 2), 750-751. Compare Schumpeter ( 2), 358-359; Myrdal ( 2), chapter 10.

1135. Veblen ( 1), 192-196, compare Neurath ( 1), 43

1136. Myrdal ( 1) and ( 2).

1137. Lange ( 5), 281-287. Similar views were voiced by Max Adler. See Aron ( 2), 53.

1138. We owe this distinction to Max Weber. Schumpeter ( 2) is one of the clearest recent statements of this point of view.

1139. See Naess-Christophersen-Kval? ( 1), 206-208. 159. 160. 161.

1140. These problems are touched upon in Hirszowicz ( 2),65-66.

1141. Merton ( 1), chapter 15 and 16; Parsons ( 1), 335-345.

1142. In November, 1959, following the publication of Chałasiński ( 34), Chałasiński was removed from the Praesidium of the Polish Academy of Science. The Institute of Sociology and History of Culture, of which he was director, was closed down and he lost the editorship of some periodicals published under the auspices of the Academy.

1143. Schaff ( 33) and Martel ( 3) provide a good example of the still prevailing conceptual confusion.

1144. Ossowski ( 7), 4-16; Ossowski ( 15), 167-170; Szczepański ( 3), 15-33; Chałasiński ( 16), 459-464. Compare Aron ( 2), 122.

1145. Historians of philosophy who did not accept Marxism-Leninism will not be considered in this survey, for they could not be active in the period under review.

1146. Kroński ( 3), 251-254, 256-257, 260, 264; Legowicz ( 3), 181. What Kroński said about the treatment of Marxism-Leninism by the bourgeois history of philosophy referred to Tatarkiewicz ( 5), Vol. 3, 353-363. Scathing references to Tatarkiewicz’s work continued for several years.

1147. Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 77.

1148. Kołakowski ( 3), 54; Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 77-78.

1149. The Russian revolutionary democrats in question are Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and Dobroljubov, who, according to the Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy, represent the most advanced stage of materialist thought prior to Marx and Engels. Tatarkiewicz was criticised for the omission of the Russian revolutionary democrats in his History of Philosophy, and this omission was ascribed to his cosmopolitism. In fact, they are mentioned ( Tatarkiewicz ( 5), Vol. 3, 17), for in Tatarkiewicz’s opinion their writings contain a contribution to aesthetics. Since, however, Tatarkiewicz ( 5) does not include the history of aesthetics, the author did not pay attention to them apart from a cursory remark.

1150. Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 80-82. The last sentence refers to Wetter ( 1) and Bocheński ( 13), which were criticised elsewhere with an abusive and malicious vehemence. See Kołakowski ( 5).

1151. Schaff ( 15), 29, 39, 45; Kroński ( 3), 251; Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 81.

1152. Kroński ( 3), 251, 257, 271-272.

1153. Farrington ( 1), 150. It has often been observed that Farrington himself provided evidence which undermines his general thesis.

1154. Kroński ( 7), 5-7, 77-78.

1155. Legowicz ( 3).

1156. Kołakowski ( 10).

1157. In spite of its banishment Tatarkiewicz ( 5) was widely read and studied by a large number of people, including Marxist-Leninists, and was for the philosophers the main source of historical knowledge. Krokiewicz published some articles in journals of classical scholarship, but Krokiewicz ( 7) ready for print in 1950 did not appear until 1958 because of the refusal of the Communist authorities. Legowicz, a medieval scholar and a sympathiser of Marxism-Leninism, published little. See Legowicz ( 1) and ( 2).

1158. Hegel ( 2), 6-7.

1159. This is Collingwood’s expression.

1160. The high regard in which the historiography of the Enlightenment was held can be seen from Serejski ( 2), 11-41. Serejski is the leading Polish historian of historiography.

1161. Collingwood ( 1), 81.

1162. Zhdanov ( 1), 79.

1163. Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 83.

1164. Zhdanov ( 1), 80; Kroński ( 3), 270.

1165. Kroński ( 3), 255; Kroński ( 5); Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 83; ¸ladkowska ( 2), 105-106.

1166. Kroński ( 3), 268.

1167. Apart from Engels’ Ludwig Feuerbach the importance of Feuerbach was emphasised in Marx-Engels ( 2), 124-127. Kroński argued that in Feuerbach there were many flaws and a considerable amount of narrow-mindedness which reduced his stature and made of his system an anachronism. See Kroński ( 4) and Kroński ( 9), 141-156.

1168. See, e.g., Marx-Engels ( 3), Vol. 1, 61, and a detailed account in Bobińska ( 5), 61-72.

1169. Kroński ( 3), 256, 269; ¸ladkowska ( 4), 388. A more cautious evaluation of the Russian revolutionary democrats described them as ‘thinkers with philosophical abilities of genius’ which could not, because of the censorship, find expression in any other form except that of literary criticism. See Walicki ( 1), 124. Dembowski’s collected works appeared in 1955 and apart from numerous articles two books dealing with his life and views were published, namely, ¸ladkowska ( 3) and Przemski ( 1).

1170. Examples are provided by Bobińska ( 1), ( 2), ( 3), ( 5) and ( 6); Baczko ( 4).

1171. Lenin ( 1), Vol. 1, 533-538, 556-559.

1172. Baczko ( 4), 247-254, 273-280; Baczko ( 7), 28-64.

1173. Baczko ( 11), 45-67; Kołakowski ( 9), 25-34; Suchodolski ( 7), 10, 45.

1174. Kroński ( 3), 255-257; Krajewski ( 6). 232-235.

1175. Lord Acton ( 1). 27; Tatarkiewicz ( 10). Tatarkiewicz’s observations were received with the scathing remark that they testified to their author’s patent anti-historism (anti-historicism was actually meant) and anti-scientific tendencies. See Kroński ( 3), 255.

1176. Rutkowski ( 5). A short survey of the history of economic historiography in Poland is to be found in Tymieniecki ( 1), 120-123.

1177. Kula ( 1).

1178. Kula ( 3), 159-160.

1179. Kula ( 2).

1180. Baczko ( 4), 251; Kołakowski ( 9), 14; Kroński ( 6), 122; Poniatowski ( 1), 173-175; ¸ladkowska ( 1). 114-118.

1181. Baczko ( 5) 214, 239; Kołakowski ( 9), 43.

1182. Windelband ( 1), Vol. 1, 7.

1183. Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 84.

1184. Baczko-Kołakowski ( 1), 87-93.

1185. Engels wrote of Hobbes that he was the first modern materialist in the eighteenth century sense and an absolutist in a period ‘when the fight of absolute monarchy versus the people was beginning in England’. Engels referred to Hobbes as an example of how economic influences under a political disguise ultimately dominate philosophical thinking. See Marx-Engels ( 3), Vol. 2, 449.

1186. Kołakowski ( 7), 134-139; Kołakowski ( 17), 619-620.

1187. Kołakowski argued this point against Kroński ( 3), 269-272, in Kolakowski ( 9), 41.

1188. Kroński ( 9), 243-244. See also Serejski ( 1).

1189. Wetter ( 1), 119. 209. 210.

1190. Baczko ( 10); Kroński ( 9), 59-139. Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy of History in Polish translation were again published in 1958, Deborin ( 2) appeared in 1959.

1191. Kroński ( 9),119.

1192. Marx-Engels ( 3), Vol. 1, 225; Baczko ( 5), 214-216; Baczko ( 7), 9-11.

1193. Kroński ( 5), 121-138; Poniatowski ( 2), 11-13.

1194. Baczko ( 11), 66; Bobińska ( 6), 115-117.

1195. In a Marxist-Leninist contribution to the history of philosophy in the nineteenth century the examination of philosophical problems filled a tiny proportion of the space, most of it being devoted to extra-philosophical matters. Poniatowski ( 2) provides a good instance, for he dealt with the most philosophically minded representative of the progressive trend, and yet out of 135 pages in Poniatowski’s book some 25 at most are concerned with philosophy. The same applies to contributions dealing with other periods. See, e.g., Suchodolski ( 7).

1196. This understanding of the expression ‘materialist outlook’ is common to all Marxist-Leninist historians of the nineteenth century philosophy, but is particularly apparent in Baczko ( 4), ńladkowska ( 2) and ( 4).

1197. This was recognised in Baczko ( 6), which is a critical evaluation of the state of studies on Polish philosophical thought in the nineteenth century.

1198. Końakowski ( 16).

1199. Końakowski ( 17).

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