MIA > Archive > Boudin > Socialism and War
In the preceding lecture I have attempted to treat the present war as a scientific problem only, as a question of cause and effect pure and simple. This is in accordance with what I believe to be the spirit not only of true scientific method, but also of Socialist philosophy. Now there are people who believe that because a phenomenon is treated scientifically, as a problem of cause and effect, it excludes the “human” element so-called,— the questions of judgment and sympathy. These people believe that when we have stated that a certain historical phenomenon, is the result of certain economic or social forces, we have thereby foreclosed ourselves of all right to approve or disapprove. That we have thereby eliminated the element of individual or group responsibility, because we have reduced the humans involved therein to mere automatons devoid of any will-power and therefore not morally responsible for their acts.
The question of the relation between the general forces, social, economic, or otherwise, which determine the general course of historic events, and the human beings who are the actors in those events is a very important and intensely interesting philosophic problem. This is not, however, either the time or the place to enter upon a discussion of that problem. Suffice it to say, that we who consider ourselves the followers of the philosophic teachings of Marx, which are generally known under the name of the Materialistic Conception of History, believe in the moral responsibility of the individual for his actions while participating in the historic process; although we believe that the general course of history is determined by social and economic forces beyond the control of the individual. There is, therefore, in our way of looking at the historical process, room not only for the scientific investigation of cause and effect, but also room for our sympathy and the passing of moral judgment. And since the human beings who are “making history” are not mere automatons but may profoundly influence the process, there is also the possibility of “learning a lesson”. It is with these latter “human” and “practical” aspects of our problem that we shall concern ourselves in this and the next lecture.
The first question that presents itself to us when we come to consider the war as the result of human conduct, instead of that of blind economic forces, is: Was the war justifiable? And the answer that naturally suggests itself to us, in view of the awful carnage and devastation, the incalculable waste of human life and treasure, is that it was not. Nothing, it seems, could justify the killing and maiming of hundreds of thousands, nay, millions, of human beings, the flower of the human race intellectually as well as physically. Nor, it seems, could any possible advantage to be gained by war be sufficient to recompense for the enormous waste of property, the accumulations of the toil, the industry, and the intellectual genius and artistic inspiration of the race during many generations past.
I said this answer naturally suggests itself to us. Because it is only natural that we would look at it from the purely humanitarian point of view. This point of view in particular has no direct interest in the conflict, no passions which have been inflamed thereby, and should come naturally to us Socialists who profess to be lovers of peace, and claim to be the only real social force making for peace.[a]
And yet, I must state at the outset that this is not my point of view. I do not deprecate the humanitarian point of view. In fact I recognize its legitimacy when viewed purely as a psychological phenomenon. But I cannot recognize its cogency as a guide to action. Now, I do not want to be misunderstood; and I therefore want to differentiate my point of view not only from the purely humanitarian but also from that of the militarists. The militarists’ point of view is best exemplified by that oft-quoted saying attributed to Von Moltke: “Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream at that.” To the militarist war is therefore beautiful in itself, “the finest expression of human personality”,— as one of our own militarists recently put it. In absolute contrast to this stands the purely humanitarian point of view which sees in war nothing but hideous butchery and criminal waste.
As distinguished from both of these points of view I hold to the belief that war, while abhorrent in itself, may nevertheless become an engine of human progress. In fact, in the past it frequently has been so. Whether or not it can still be so is a matter to be carefully inquired into. The present war is therefore not merely a matter to be abhorred, but also one to be studied and understood. And studied and understood not merely as a scientific problem, but as a matter throbbing with the interest of a life-problem awaiting solution at our hands. To my mind this world is not a place to play in, but a place to work in. And it is so peculiarly arranged that we can only work to a purpose by making great sacrifices. Whether or not the time will ever come when we can work without sacrifices is a matter that cannot be inquired into here. One thing is certain: that time is not here yet. We cannot therefore give up the work that we may deem our task here because it may involve some sacrifice, even if that sacrifice be that of human life and individual human happiness.
I am not a believer in the theory that human progress is possible only at the expense of the lives or welfare of millions of people, either in peace or war. But it is undeniable that in the past at least some progress has come through wars. The point of view that this war, like other wars, might be a necessary engine of human progress is, therefore, at least a permissible point of view. In fact it is the proper point of view as long as it retains the “might” in it. And you cannot dispose of it by the purely humanitarian argument of the awfulness of war. You might as well argue against the continued existence of the race because of the awful pains of childbirth. We must therefore put our humanitarian sentiments aside, and try to grasp the meaning of this great historic event as a factor of social progress or reaction. Sentiment has of course its place in our life, but it should not be permitted to run away with our judgment.
And when you have put aside your sentiment, and try to examine the question dispassionately, you will find that the question of the justifiability of the war is not easily answered. In fact, the answer will depend entirely on the views you hold with respect to the question of races and nationalities and their function as agents of human progress. That is, it will depend on whether or not you accept the ordinary Nationalist and Modern Imperialist position as to the historical progress of the Race and the Nation.
Once you have accepted the Nationalist point of view that a nation is an entity used in the historical process as a medium of progress, necessarily having interests separate from other nations but common to all of its members, his position becomes impregnable. You may still argue with him as to what is the wisest policy for a certain nation to pursue under certain given conditions in order to preserve or advance its national interests. But you must admit that whenever war becomes necessary in order to preserve or advance these interests, war should be resorted to. The question of war then ceases to be a question of principle, and becomes a question of policy. War ceases to be a wrong per se. Each war must then be judged on its own merits. And in judging it you cannot be guided by purely humanitarian considerations; nor by considerations of abstract principles of justice which are applicable to international relations, no more than there are any abstract principles of justice between the different species of animals or between the animal and the vegetable kingdoms. The most just of men and the most kind— men who scrupulously refrain from doing an injustice to their neighbors and who wouldn’t “hurt a fly”— think nothing of killing inoffensive animals in order to obtain the food that they think is good for themselves or which may simply serve to tickle their palates. We think nothing of killing, maiming, enslaving or torturing those belonging to a “foreign” species of animals whenever such a course is necessary for the “progress” of the human race, which we identify with the “progress” of the world. The struggle between species, we say, is the law of animal existence— the law by which the animal world “progresses”.
Similarly, struggle between races and nations is the law of existence— the law of “progress”— within the human world, according to the nationalist point of view. A nation’s duty is only towards itself. It has no duties towards other nations; except such as it voluntarily assumes in order to further its own interests, and which cease to have any meaning when that interest ceases, which is the case in war. Hence the old maxim: inter arma silent leges.[b] At most there may be a self-imposed duty not to commit wanton, that is unnecessary and unprofitable, waste; a duty which may be enforced by a nationalistic Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Humans. The rest is mere matter of policy. As to the so-called inferior races which cannot offer any effective resistance and are therefore at our mercy, it may be good economy to follow a wise conservation policy, to have “closed seasons” when hunting is forbidden, and generally to avoid what Germans call “raubwirtschaft”— that is, that excessive greediness which kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. A war may therefore be wise or unwise, but never right or wrong; never “criminal”, except in the sense that an action may be “criminally foolish”,— the “crime” being against your own national interest, not against the other nation. In other words, a war is “wrong” when it leads to failure, does not justify the expense in life and treasure necessitated by it; it is “criminally wrong” or “foolish”— these being convertible terms— when it not only fails of its object but reacts in a disastrous way. Success is the supreme and only test of the rights and wrongs of war. If you are an “enlightened” Nationalist and not an ordinary jingo, then you will use the term “success” in the broadest sense, taking a “long view” of the subject, and counting the cost as well as the results achieved. But the question is still one of success.
These considerations lead to a certain corollary: We all know that hindsight is easier than foresight. It is easy to tell after the event what wars were wise and what unwise. But some of these wars, even some which may after the event seem “criminally foolish”, presented quite difficult problems before the event,— problems with many unknown factors and therefore difficult of solution in advance. The “statesmen” who guide the “destinies of nations” must solve these problems in advance of the event. Risks must therefore be taken. Of course, a wise statesman will not take any unnecessary risks, nor any big risks when the object to be achieved is of small consequence. But great objects— “great” from the nationalistic point of view, which means the achievement by the nation of great advantages over other nations— justify great risks. War is therefore justifiable not only as a means to be resorted to in exceptional cases but as a policy.
Take the present war as an instance. And first the eastern end of it. Look at it from the point of view of the Russian or Servian nationalist. The march to the sea is, as I have already explained, the necessary concomitant of the fight for independent economic existence on the part of both Russia and Servia, particularly the latter, in a capitalistic world. But independent economic existence is indispensable to independent national life generally. There can be no political independence without economic independence. Nor can there be any independent intellectual and spiritual life without an independent economic existence. This is apparent in the case of Servia. But it is also true of Russia, though the idea of Russian dependence, particularly political dependence, may strike us as rather strange on first presentation. Russian inefficiency, the “feet of clay” of the great giant, even in military matters, is simply one of the expressions of Russia’s economic backwardness, a backwardness which she cannot overcome as long as she is not complete master of her own economic destinies,— that is as long as she has no free and adequate access to the open sea and the world beyond. To put it in the phraseology of Russo-Serbian nationalistic ideology: The free and untrammeled development of Russian and Serbian "Nationality”— with all that that implies in the way of national "genius”, national "culture”, etc.— requires "freedom from foreign domination.” Is it not clear that a war which would be the means of achieving such an object is perfectly justifiable, and that engaging in a war which makes the achievement of such a great national object possible is taking a "legitimate risk?”
Again, look at this war from the Pan-Germanist point of view, and you will find that not only the war as such is perfectly justifiable, but that everything Germany has done and would like to do in this war is justified by the "higher morality” which must guide the conduct of nations,— the law of self-interest. In justifying the invasion of Belgium, which must be admitted to be "wrong”— that is, without provocation on the part of Belgium— the Imperial Chancellor said that “necessity knows no law”, and this was considered as covering the case by all good German nationalists. And a German Socialist editor in commenting upon the same incident said: “The violation of Belgium’s internationally guaranteed neutrality was an invasion of a legal right, but morally it was justifiable”— the justification being that Germany needed it.
This may sound cynical to us. But the Socialist writer in question deliberately waived all attempts to find cheap excuses for this action in the alleged actions of other nations, designed to cover the naked truth so that it should not shock the Mrs. Grundies of international law and morality. He proclaims boldly that the entire scheme of international law and international regulations is nonsensical, for the only law which a nation can recognize is the higher law of its own sense of duty,— which is, of course, to fulfill its mission, march boldly on the road of its manifest destiny, and so forth. That this man means what he says, and believes that Germany did what was unquestionably right, is beyond doubt. The argument from the Belgian or neutral point of view sounds to him as ridiculous as the argument of the anti-vivisectionist sounds to the scientific worker who believes he has a mission and is working for “progress”. To the “humanitarian” scientist, working for the amelioration of the condition of his kind, the incidental sufferings of the poor “brutes” on whom he experiments is at most a disagreeable detail.
Most people will agree with the scientist. And all nationalists must agree with our Pan-Germanist. For, once you admit that the progress of humanity is effected by means of the development of different nations, having different, individual and independent cultures; each nation representing a certain individual culture which has a character of its own and is not merely a part of a common or general civilization; that each nation has the task and duty of protecting and developing its culture;— then you must admit that the protection of your culture can not possibly be left to international law, a code formulated, at best, by peoples alien to the spirit and real meaning of your national culture, and at worst, by its deadly enemies. This is exactly the meaning of the old maxim that questions of sovereignty cannot be arbitrated. And when you take the logical step from the basic nationalist position to that of the modern Imperialist position, and assume that your culture is the culture par excellence, and that it is therefore the mission of your nation to spread its culture everywhere in order to help it to the dominance of the world,— you will find that it is perfectly justifiable for you to do it by all means possible, for you would really be working for the improvement of the entire human race, the perfection of the world at large, and the realization of the designs of the Creator.
To the mind of the honest German Imperialist of the idealistic turn of mind this is exactly what Germany is engaged in doing in this war. Can any work be more noble? And can any such petty considerations as the breach of a man-made paper-treaty about the neutrality of Belgium, or even the complete destruction of the nondescript Belgian “nation”— a country and a people manifestly of no “historic destiny” whatsoever— be permitted to stand in the way of its accomplishment?
And if this reasoning somehow fails to convince us, if we still feel that the invasion of Belgium was an outrage, and the prospective greatness of German culture leaves us unmoved, it can only be due to the fact that we do not accept the Pan-German’s premise, and not because there is any flaw in his reasoning. Now, our non-acceptance of the German nationalistic premise may be due to one of two reasons: Either we reject the entire Race-National theory; or we simply deny the assertion that the German race or nation is the chosen one. The latter is the position of the non-German nationalists. Their reasoning is exactly that of the German nationalists, except that where the latter says “German” they say “French” or “English” or some other national name. Of course, viewed from the outside it seems utterly absurd for one set of nationalists to complain of the “utter disregard of the rights of other nations” by another set of nationalists, since disregard of the rights of other nations is of the essence of nationalism; and the complaining nationalists would unhesitatingly approve of the acts complained of if they were committed by or in the interests of their own nation. But it is of the very essence of nationalism that its devotees cannot look at things from any outside, or extra-national point of view. As a German writer recently put it: Nationalism is a disease, the principle symptom of which is the inability to see the other man’s point of view.
The position of the Socialists is totally different from the position of the nationalists. We reject entirely the nationalist ideas with respect to the role of races and nations in the development of the human species and its civilization and culture. But before proceeding to discuss what I consider to be the Socialist view of the subject, we must dwell a while longer on the nationalist point of view,— which I believe to be the general bourgeois point of view.
In trying to get at the point of view of those engaged in the present war, I presented what I believe to be the extreme expression of militant nationalism, the point of view of the Pan-Germanist, which is, however, merely typical of the point of view of modern Imperialism. This is the attitude of aggressive nationalism. But not all nationalists are aggressive. Some of them are peace-loving, and abhor war and its horrors. That does not mean, however, that the peace-loving nationalists repudiate the basic principles of the bellicose nationalists as to the essential unity of interest of all those belonging to one nation against the rest of the world, which interest is to be protected at all hazards and by all means. It simply means that some nationalists differ from others as to what are the best means of preserving or promoting the national interest, which both agree to be paramount to any other consideration. When an English pacifist says he is opposed to the present war, he does not mean to intimate that he is indifferent to England’s national interests. What he says, in effect, is that England’s interests would have been better preserved if she had stayed out of this war; that it did not pay her to go into this war. Your confirmed pacifist is nevertheless a good patriot and wants his country to win whenever it does engage in war, as it could not be to its interest to lose in war. The task of the bourgeois pacifist is therefore simple: As long as there is no war he works for peace, and after the war has broken out he works for its speedy termination. But so long as the war continues he “does his duty by his country” by ranging himself on the side of his nation and helping it to win. And even while working for the termination of the war he does his work with a view to his country’s interest, and with a view to help it conclude a peace with honor and profit.
The question of justice to other nations— not as a policy that pays, but as a right— is no more part of the peace-loving patriot’s creed than it is of the militarist’s. For the simple reason that according to good nationalistic-patriotic doctrine the interests of one’s own country or nation are the Supreme Good, and therefore the highest justice. This is well expressed in the famous dictum, which is taught to our children in the public schools in this non-militarist nation as the highest expression of noble sentiment: “My country may it ever be right, but right or wrong, my country!”
Now, what is the position of the Socialists on this fundamental question of nationalism-patriotism? I said a while ago that the Socialists reject the nationalist’s point of view in toto. I must say now that that was an over-statement, if taken literally at least. What I meant to say was not that they actually, in point of fact do so, but merely that they ought to do so if they followed out logically and to the uttermost consequences what I believe to be the true fundamentals of the Socialist philosophy. And I may add that until this war broke out many, if not most, people believed that what I consider to be the proper Socialist position was their actual position. It is largely due to this belief, equally prevalent among Socialists and non-Socialists, that there was a general expectation that the Socialists would prevent the war by refusing to engage in it. And it is largely due to this belief, that the seeming readiness with which the European Socialists entered into this war was felt to be a base betrayal of principle.
A careful examination, however, of the literature of the subject will prove conclusively that whatever may be the offense of the European Socialists, or some of them, in failing to draw the proper conclusions from the fundamental ideas underlying their philosophy, they have not violated any prescribed rules of conduct, except one which will be discussed further below. The truth is that neither on the subject of nationalism nor on that of war and peace were there any established doctrines or any well-recognized canons of conduct. The views of many of the leading Socialists on this subject are utterly irreconcilable. But what is worse: most leading Socialists never clearly defined their position at all, and no Socialist congress ever attempted to deal with the subject adequately.
There is, indeed, an impression current that absolute opposition to war, at all times and under all circumstances, is one of the cardinal principles of Socialism. And it must be conceded that “the man in the street” was absolutely justified in his assumption that absolute pacifism was one of the chief tenets of Socialism, as their most important leaders were untiring workers in the cause of peace and their popular orators, when voicing their opposition to war, were not always careful to point out the distinction between opposition to war under certain given conditions and absolute opposition to it under all and any circumstances.
There can be no doubt, however, that the Socialists, particularly those of the Marxian School, the predominant school among present-day Socialists, are not absolute pacifists. Indeed, the cast of mind and mode of thought which would lead to absolute pacifism is utterly alien to them. They are not sentimentalists, and therefore could not be opposed to war on purely sentimental grounds. And they are rather close students of history, and are therefore aware of the important role of war in the past, a part which they could not always deprecate in view of the revolutionary character of their own doctrine. That force and bloodshed are not, as such, repugnant to the spirit of their teachings is well known. Marx himself assigned to force a very important place in the historical process. And most Socialists are enthusiastic admirers of the French Revolution and the Paris Commune, notwithstanding their bloodshed. It is also well known that these sympathies are not limited to internal “revolutions”, but extend to wars proper whenever they have a “revolutionary” or progressive character, such as the wars of the French Revolution and the American Civil War. In fact they consider war a legitimate and sometimes unavoidable accompaniment of the revolution which they preach and advocate.
Furthermore, their approval of war is not necessarily limited to revolutionary wars properly so-called, but applies to all wars which they consider in the line of human progress. Marx is in this respect typical of the revolutionary Socialists generally. To him the question of war and peace was never an abstract question to be decided on abstract principles, but a question of policy to be decided according to the circumstances of each case. The causes which brought about the war, the purposes for which it was carried on, and the results which were likely to follow from it, were the determining considerations when he was called upon to judge of any war. Was the war making for human progress? If so, he was for it; if not, he was against it. And he not only approved of some wars when they came, but actually did all he could to bring at least one of them about.
His relation to the Crimean War is characteristic of his general attitude on the subject. As a result of the general political situation in Europe at that time, and the part which Russia played in the suppression of the revolts of 1848, Marx came to the conclusion that a war against Russia and a defeat of Russia by the western European powers was absolutely necessary in the interest of a democratic reorganization of Europe. When, therefore, Russia picked a quarrel with Turkey in 1853 and marched her troops in what was then known as the Danube Principalities, now Roumania, he demanded that England intervene in the war. England was then in her pacific era. Her most representative ideologist in the political arena was John Bright. Like the true representative of textiles and Manchesterism that he was, Mr. John Bright used his great eloquence for the propaganda of peace and profits. To offset the influence of Manchesterian pacifism Marx endeavored to arouse the English working-men to a support of his war-policy. And when the revolutionary working-men of England, under the leadership of the old Chartists, responded to the call, he expressed his exultation in a letter published in the New York Tribune of July 25, 1853, in which he says:
“While the English Queen is, at this moment, feasting Russian Princesses; while an enlightened English aristocracy and bourgeoisie lie prostrate before the barbarian Autocrat,— the English proletariat alone protests against the impotency and degradation of the ruling classes. On the 7th of July the Manchester School held a great Peace meeting in the Odd Fellows’ Hall, at Halifax. Crossley, M. P. for Halifax, and all the other ‘great men’ of the School had especially flocked to the meeting from ‘Town’. The hall was crowded and many thousands could obtain no admittance. Ernst Jones was at the time at Durham. The Chartists of Halifax summoned him by electric telegraph, and he appeared just in time for the meeting. Already the gentlemen of the Manchester School believed they would carry their resolution, and would be able to bring home the support of the manufacturing districts to their good Aberdeen, when Ernst Jones rose and put in an amendment pledging the people to war, and declaring that before liberty was established peace was a crime. There ensued a most violent discussion, but the amendment of Ernst Jones was carried by an immense majority.”
Of course, Marx did not expect for a moment that England would, if she went to war with Russia, carry on a revolutionary war, in the Socialist sense of the word. He knew full well that if he succeeded in getting England to intervene in this war, she would do so for the benefit and in the interest of her bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, he was in favor of that war, because in his opinion, it was in line with general political and economic progress, and therefore in the interest of the working class. We may therefore consider as conclusively established, that, far from being absolute opponents of all wars, Socialists are in favor of all revolutionary wars, and also of those wars whose necessary net result would be a strengthening of the forces making for progress, and, therefore, in the interests of the working class. At least that was the position of Socialists fifty or sixty years ago.
Since then the position of Socialists on the subject of war has undergone a great change. The vast majority of Socialists of the present generation have completely abandoned the bellicoseness of Marx even against Russia and have become thorough pacifists. This is not due however to any change of opinion on the matter of principle involved, but to a change of the political conditions of Europe, which lead the Socialists to believe that the interests of human progress generally, and of the fight of the working class for its emancipation in particular, require continued peace as a policy. The change of conditions which led to the adoption of a general peace policy by the Socialists may be summarized as follows:
At the time Marx summoned Western Europe to a crusade against Russia, the latter was still a medieval state, whose great military strength and consequent political preponderance in Europe was a source of great danger to the bourgeois-democratic development of Western civilization. It should be remembered that at that time Russia had neither an industrial bourgeoisie nor a modern working class. Her agrarian economy was based on a polity of personal servitude. Her government, which was sometime afterward described as “a despotism tempered by assassination” had at that time not developed as yet its “tempering” element, and was therefore a despotism pure and unalloyed. Moreover, it was a despotism of an aggressive kind, supporting by its military power every despot in Christendom. In Western Europe the bourgeoisie was then just getting on its feet, so to say, and if not interfered with from without was likely to gain the upper hand over the absolute-feudalist combination which opposed it. It had already gotten the upper hand in England, and to a considerable extent in France. The fight in Germany seemed to depend largely on whether the Western powers or Russia would lead the Concert of Europe. The bourgeoisie which was fighting the old feudal-absolutist order was in a revolutionary frame of mind, fighting for democratic political institutions. The working class had not yet achieved its majority, and had not, as yet, developed any political power of its own,— its future, for the moment at least, hanging on the fortunes of the bourgeoisie.
Under these circumstances it seemed the imperative duty of the hour to crush the reactionary power in the East of Europe in order to permit the orderly development of Europe towards industrialism and political democracy,— the prerequisite to the emancipation of the working class and the inauguration of economic freedom and equality. Hence Marx’s call to arms.
But during the half-century that has elapsed between the Crimean and the Russo-Japanese Wars all this changed. To begin with, the Russia of the Twentieth Century is not the Russia of the middle of the Nineteenth, either internally or as to her position as a world-power. The overshadowing predominance of Russia in European affairs which followed the Napoleonic Wars was rudely shaken in the Crimean War, and was completely destroyed by the Russo-Japanese War. At the same time she has been completely revolutionized internally. The freeing of the Serfs, which was one of the results of the defeat which she suffered in the Crimean War, set Russia definitely and irrevocably on the high-road of capitalist industrial development which transformed the stagnant medieval state of 1853 into a rapidly-developing modern state, with a strong bourgeoisie and a revolutionary working class. Not only was the “tempering” influence of assassination introduced into her political system during the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century, but a real revolution occurred early in the Twentieth. This revolution, although it failed of accomplishing its entire purpose, has nevertheless proved two things: First, that the old political order is as dead in Russia as is the old economic order. And second, that the Russian people can very well take care of themselves without any outside assistance. Russia not only ceased to be a menace to the democratic development of the rest of Europe, but her own absolutism, hard-pressed, is in need of outside help; while large sections of her people are among the foremost carriers of democratic ideals and disseminators of revolutionary principles the world over.
At the same time Western Europe has been changing too,— changing in the opposite direction. The bourgeoisie of Western Europe has succeeded in the years following the Crimean War in establishing its supremacy. But this has been accompanied by a complete abandonment of its revolutionary ideals, and a willingness to betray its democratic principles whenever such a course seemed necessary in order to achieve or maintain that supremacy. This new spirit which has come over the bourgeoisie manifests itself particularly in Germany, which, as I have already pointed out, passed from one warlike period into another without the intervening peaceful period under the dominance of bourgeois-democratic ideas. The German bourgeoisie, coming upon the historic stage later than its more western neighbors, shamefully capitulated before autocracy and compromised with the remnants of feudalism in order to be in a better position to fight its capitalistic rivals of other countries on the one hand and the working class of its own country on the other. The time when the bourgeoisie could go to war for liberty and progress is past, never to return.
The guardianship of democratic ideas and ideals has passed to the working class, the only social class which seems to have an abiding interest in their realization and preservation. But while this class has grown immensely in power since the days of the Crimean War, it is still very far from controlling the politics of any country, and is therefore not in any position to impose its policies at home, even where it is stronger,— let alone imposing them on any foreign nation. Besides, this class, or at least its intellectual leaders, have heeded the lesson of history, which is to the effect that so-called “wars of liberation” are a snare and a delusion. If the elements of progress working for the reformation of a people’s institutions are absent from its life, all attempts to reform or revolutionize its institutions by the use of force from without will prove futile. Each people must be left to itself, to work out its own salvation as best it can.
The conditions for a war in the interest of progress are therefore entirely absent from our modern life, and the chances of their ever recurring are so remote as to be negligible. Hence the pacific mood of the present-day Socialists.
But this pacifism evidently does not exhaust the subject. Not being the result of principle, but merely a matter of policy, dictated by conditions, it leaves open a number of very important questions. To begin with, the changes which I have described as having taken place since the days when Marx called for a crusade against Russia militate only against any aggressive warlike policy on the part of Socialists. They should not desire any war. But what should they do when they are confronted with the actual fact of war? Is there anything in their principles which prohibits them from following their natural impulses and fighting for their nation? Is a Socialist debarred from being a patriot? And if so, on what principle? This question becomes even more complicated when the socialist happens to belong to a nation which is being attacked by another nation. In such a case the requirements of justice seem to unite with the natural impulse in urging the Socialist to a defense of “home and country”. How should a Socialist act in such an emergency? Are there any distinctively Socialist principles covering the subject, upon which a Socialist rule of action could be based?
Of all these perplexing questions only one can be answered definitely: It is the consensus of opinion of all Socialists, or at least was until the outbreak of the present war, that a Socialist could not be a “patriot” in the ordinary sense of the word, that he could not subscribe to the principle of “my country, right or wrong”. The opposition to this principle proceeded, however, not from any radical dissent from the nationalist position on the role of nationalities as a cultural factor, but from a loftier moral sense than that of the ordinary patriot. It simply amounted to a declaration that a Socialist can engage only in a “just war”,— “tempering patriotism with justice”, so to say. But what is a just war?
Proceeding upon the assumption that no war could now be carried on in the interests of progress, and that the engaging in war aggressively is therefore necessarily wrong, August Bebel, the great German Socialist leader, announced the true rule to be that all wars of aggression are unjust, while all defensive wars are just. Socialists should refuse to join in the first, but should do their duty cheerfully for “home and country” whenever these are attacked. This rule of conduct was probably the most generally accepted among Socialists up to the outbreak of the present war. But it by no means received their unanimous approbation. Among those who were opposed to it was Karl Kautsky, the leading theoretical writer of the international Socialist movement of the present day. At the Congress of the German Socialist Party held at Essen in 1907, Bebel and Kautsky debated this subject at some length. Kautsky’s main objection to the rule advocated by Bebel was that it was not a safe guide to go by, in practice, as a government could easily fool its socialists into participating in a war of aggression by making it appear to be a purely defensive war. To which Bebel retorted that if the working class and its leaders can be fooled in a matter like that no rule could save them from error.
The events of August, 1914, demonstrated that Bebel’s neatly turned oratorial phrase was no adequate answer to Kautsky’s objection. Although the element of “fooling” was perhaps unduly emphasized by Kautsky. The real trouble lies much deeper. The fact is that it is very often really impossible to tell, even with the knowledge of all the facts, and with perfect good faith, as to who is the real aggressor in a given war. But even if we should always be able unerringly, and at the very outbreak of the war, to detect the aggressor, the distinction between aggressive and defensive wars is entirely too technical and formal, and cannot be relied upon always to conform to the demands of that higher morality which is supposed to distinguish the action of the Socialist from that of the ordinary patriot.
Let me illustrate: In 1911 Italy declared war on Turkey for the purpose of despoiling her of Tripoli. Here was a clear case of aggression— aggression for the purpose of robbery. According to the rule laid down by Bebel the duty of the Socialists in the two countries at war was clear: The Italian Socialists were in duty bound to oppose the war, while the Turkish Socialists were bound to defend their country against Italian aggression. Now suppose that a year or two after the conclusion of the war,— Italy having successfully carried off the prize which was the object of the war— a turn in the international situation should make it seem likely that Turkey could regain the lost province by making war on Italy, and that Turkey should grasp at the opportunity. What would then be the duty of the Socialists? If the rule were strictly adhered to, the Italian Socialists would now be bound to go to war in order to “defend” their country,— defend it in the possession of the ill-gotten gains of the war which only a short while ago it was their duty to oppose. Evidently the fact that a war is a “defensive” one does not necessarily mean that it is a just one.
It would seem that while Bebel permitted justice to “temper” his patriotism when his country was about to commit an act of injustice, his patriotism got the better of his sense of justice when his country’s misdeeds brought forth the inevitable consequences and her “safety” was threatened.
The reason for this rather contradictory position with respect to the relation of justice to “patriotic duty” is to be found in the fact that the basis of Bebel’s position, the point of departure from which the train of his thoughts on this subject starts, is the bourgeois theory of nationality. In common with the ordinary bourgeois nationalists Bebel believed that the “nation” was not merely an incident of historical evolution, but that each nation was a vessel especially designed for the purpose of carrying a certain brand of “culture” necessary for human progress, which culture would be lost to humanity if the nation ceased to exist or its independence were destroyed. He rejected the modern outgrowth of nationalist theory according to which each nation is to strive for world-dominion, but he believed that each nation was the carrier of a national culture and represented an entity which must be preserved under all circumstances. Granting his premises, his conclusion is perfectly correct: The fact that a nation may be wrong in a certain quarrel with another nation is certainly no adequate reason for permitting such an important factor of progress to perish or even its influence to be diminished.
And in so far as there was any Socialist theory at all on the subject it granted the nationalistic premises, at least in the Bebel formulation. It is true that there were heard some dissenting voices, but they were neither numerous nor very authoritative; for they usually lost themselves in generalities— and negative generalities at that— without attempting to build up a solid theoretical structure which could replace the well-constructed nationalist theory. That does not mean that no work whatever had been done towards building up such a theory. On the contrary, as I shall endeavor to prove in my next lecture, the foundations for such a theory were laid long ago by the founders of what we Socialists are pleased to call “Scientific Socialism”, and the materials for the entire structure were there, but they were in fragmentary form scattered throughout the length and breadth of the literature of Socialism, and had never been used to actually build the edifice.
In the debate between Bebel and Kautsky at the Essen Congress which I have already adverted to, Kautsky indicated the lines along which such a theory is to be constructed, when he insisted that the needs of the working class should be the only guide for Socialists to follow in matters of war and peace. By this declaration Kautsky took a position squarely in opposition to all nationalistic theories, including the pacific nationalism of Bebel. The logical implications of this declaration were that the interests of the working class may sometimes, at least, become fundamentally antagonistic to those of the “nation,” and that in such an event the interests of the working class should take precedence. In other words, that Socialists are bound to go to war, if at all, only in defence of the interests of the working class, and not in the interests of their “nation”.
Unfortunately, Kautsky merely indicated but never elaborated his Socialist theory of peace and war, and never developed a Socialist theory on the subject of race and nation, which is the only basis upon which a Socialist theory of peace and war can securely rest.
Another attempt to lay down a Socialist rule of action on the subject of war which should be fundamentally different from the nationalistic position on the subject, is contained in the concluding clause of the resolution adopted by the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart (1907) and incorporated in the resolutions adopted at the International Socialist Congress at Copenhagen (1910) and at the Extraordinary International Socialist Congress at Basle (1912). This clause reads as follows:
“In the event that war should break notwithstanding the efforts of the Socialists to prevent it, then it becomes the duty of the Socialists to work for its speedy termination, and to use all the power at their command, utilizing the political and economic crises produced by the war, in an effort to arouse the discontent of the people so as to hasten the abolition of the rule of the capitalist class.”
This resolution contains the same unpatriotic implications as the Kautsky declaration, which, by the way, was made only a few weeks after the adoption of this resolution at the Stuttgart Congress. The same emphasis on the working class interest; and the same utter disregard for the defence of nation and country. Instead of being in duty bound to come to the defence of his country, it is made the paramount duty of the Socialist to exert himself on behalf of the interests of the working class in the abolition of capitalist class rule. Instead of uniting with the other classes of his nation in defence of his country, he is to arouse the discontent of the people, presumably irrespective of what the consequences might be as to the “defence”. This resolution has the advantage over the Kautsky declaration in that it prescribes a definite course of action, instead of merely laying down a principle the application of which might depend upon the interpretation of what is meant by “the interest of the working class.” But it shares with the Kautsky declaration the unfortunate situation of not having any solid, well-recognized theoretical position on the underlying subject of race and nationality. Not being founded on any such fully elaborated and well-recognized theory, and having among its sponsors such men as Bebel, who stood firmly on the basic nationalistic principle, it was liable either to be misinterpreted or to be regarded merely as a sop thrown out to Gustave Hervé and other anti-patriots, as a compromise, and having really no organic connection with the general position of the Socialists on the subject.
Such was the condition of Socialist theory at the outbreak of the great European conflict. Now let us turn for a moment to the practice. A survey of the actions of the European Socialists immediately prior to and since the beginning of the war will show conclusively that with few exceptions, they have all acted on the principle of nationalism,— a pacific nationalism, but nationalism nevertheless. By this I do not mean to intimate that I disapprove equally of all the Socialists who went into this war. I will anticipate my next lecture here sufficiently to say that the action of some of the Socialists who went into this war might be justified on correct Socialist principle. Only it is my belief that as a matter of fact they were not guided in so doing by correct Socialist principle, but by ordinary bourgeois-nationalistic considerations.
Let me illustrate what I mean, and at the same time offer proof of my assertion. In my opinion the positions of the Socialists in Germany and Belgium, respectively, were fundamentally different from one another, so that while the action of the German Socialists was utterly indefensible from what I consider to be the Socialist point of view, the action of the Belgian Socialists in coming to the defense of their country was perfectly consistent with Socialist principle. And yet, I cannot acquit the Belgian Socialists, or at least some of them, of the charge of having acted on non-Socialist principles in what they did. And for the following reason: During his stay in this country Vandervelde was asked what he thought of the conduct of the German Socialists. To which he replied substantially as follows: We (that is the Belgian Socialists) have no complaints to make against the German socialists. Until the outbreak of hostilities they did all they could to prevent the war; and after the outbreak of hostilities they were in a very difficult position, with Republican France on one front and the Czar of Russia on the other, and had we been in their position we would have in all probability acted the way they did. As we have no right to assume that Vandervelde would have made so serious a statement merely out of international courtesy, we must adjudge him to be particeps criminis with the German Socialists in whatever they did, as an accessory after the fact,— which can only be due to a community of views.
And here I must tarry a while in order to dispose of a disturbing element in the situation— the Russian Czar. You will have noticed that Vandervelde refers to the Russian Czar as the justification or excuse for the German Socialists’ conduct in supporting the German Government at the outbreak of the war. The German Socialists themselves asserted at the beginning of the war that the Czar was the real reason for their conduct with respect to the war, and they have called upon the shades of Marx and Engels to justify their action. I must say frankly that this attempt to make the poor Czar the scapegoat for the sins of the German Socialists is extremely disingenuous and not in accord with the known facts of the case; and the appeal to Marx and Engels smacks somewhat of the hypocritical, at least in the mouth of some of those making it.
I have already pointed out that the circumstances under which Marx called upon Western Europe to war on Russia were entirely different from those which prevailed at the outbreak of the present war. I may add here that these differences had been repeatedly pointed out long before the present crisis arose and were well-known to all Socialists, particularly to German Socialists. Those German Socialists, therefore, who had always been upholders of the Marxian theories, doctrines, and policies, refused to be caught by this bait thrown out by the German Government and warned their comrades against it. So the Vorwaerts, the central organ of the German Socialist Party and for years the rallying point of what might be considered the simon-pure Marxists in Germany, published a leading article on August 3rd, only one day before the fateful session of the Reichstag when the Socialist Parliamentary group joined in voting the war credits, protesting most emphatically against the attempt to use the Czar as an excuse for drawing the German working class into this war. As a result, we were therefore confronted with the curious spectacle of the alleged authority of Marx and Engels in favor of the war being invoked by that portion of the Socialist movement in Germany which ordinarily cared least about the opinions and example of the “revolutionary fathers”, and being denied by the most revolutionary and consistently Marxist portion of that movement. This alone should be sufficient to prove the vulnerability of the Czar as a shield for Socialist warlike operations.
But there is more direct proof of the fact that the Czar had practically nothing to do with the conduct of the German Socialists in the present war. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Had the German Socialists gone into this war because it was, or they thought that it was, a war against Czarism, they would have stayed in it only as long as the idea that this was a war primarily against Russian Czarism was actually entertained by them. Their support of the government would of necessity have been withdrawn the moment it became evident that this war was directed primarily against the Western Powers. But the pretense that this was a war mainly against Russia did not last longer than Jonah’s leaf. Not only in the purely military operations, but in the avowed purposes of the war the German Government and the German Press, as well as all other organs of public opinion, set their face westward practically from the second week of the war. And yet the Socialists stayed on. After the first excitement was over, the entire bourgeois and governmental press declared in one voice that England was the enemy. Russia was practically forgotten. And yet the Socialists not only stayed on, but actually joined the chorus of execration against England and announced their intention of staying in the war until this mortal enemy was completely vanquished.
It is therefore clear beyond peradventure of a doubt that the Russian Czar was not a determining factor in the support which the German Socialists have given to this war. By this I do not mean to say that a few individuals may not have gone into this war solely on account of the Russian Czar. But such individuals must have been very few, and they must have pulled out as soon as the true character of the war became apparent. Nor do I mean to say that the vast majority of German Socialists who stayed on, warring as enthusiastically against England as they did against Russia, were necessarily hypocrites when they declared, at the beginning of the war, that the Czar was the cause of their patriotism. That there were some hypocrites at work may be— probably is— the fact. But the great bulk of them were certainly sincere in their belief, as great masses always are. The explanation is simple enough,— although extremely interesting to the investigator of the relations existing between economics, psychology, and ideology: They went into this war for the same reason that other Germans went into it, just because they felt and thought like Germans. Being also Socialists in their secondary character they honestly tried to square their Nationalism with their Socialism, and for a while at least were able to do so, thanks to the Czar. Some may still cling to him in a desperate effort to save their Socialist conscience. When this becomes impossible by the trend of events, which accentuate with ever-growing decisiveness the Imperialistic and anti-English character of the war, they will begin to revise their Socialism so as to bring it into grater conformity with their Nationalism. The process has already begun; when and where it will end it is difficult now to foretell.
a. I have revised the original wording due to grammatical errors. The original text reads:
I said this answer
naturally suggests itself to us. Because it is only natural that we
who are look at it from the purely humanitarian point of view.
This point of view is particularly not directly
interested in the conflict, whose passions have not been inflamed
thereby, should natural to us Socialists who profess to be lovers of
peace, and claim to be the only real social force making for peace.
b. "In times of war, the law falls silent".
Last updated on 26 October 2022